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Home , Chauvinism, Civic nationalism, John Plamenatz, Nationalism, Patriotism, Types of nationalism

Russian and Euro-Asian Bulletin Vol.7 No.12 December 1997

Published by the Contemporary Research Centre University of Melbourne

Two Types of in Europe?

Stefan Auer Dec 1997

While and some politicians in a radical change in the relationship between the West have seen Europe approaching the and , and that this in turn pro- ‘postmodern’ age, in which the conception duced nationalism. The salient feature of the of a national would become outdated preceding agrarian was, according and would be replaced by a new multina- to Gellner, cultural diversity and fragmenta- tional and multicultural entity, the ‘back- tion in small autonomous sub-, ward’ neighbours in the East have been said each of which lived in its own specific id- to be prone to succumb to a resurgence of iom. A peasant had no need to communicate nationalism. Thus, analysts like Schöpflin1 with the elite of who existed saw confirmed the old concept2 of two es- beyond his/her experience (which was usu- sentially different forms of nationalism: the ally limited to the size of his/her valley). The enlightened Western, that is supportive of modern industrial and predominantly urban , and the backward Eastern, that required mass literacy and a high de- is an obstacle to any genuinely democratic gree of social mobility, which could only be society. The differences are, however, not achieved by nearly universal access to a well described by this reference to geogra- state-sponsored ‘national’ educational sys- phy. Rather, two (or more) different concep- tem. This, in turn, could only be successful if tions of nationalism are to be found conducted in a vernacular accessible to the competing for influence within particular entire population of the country. Thus, a countries in both the East and the West. need for cultural homogenisation arose and gave birth to the political doctrine of - What is Nationalism? alism, ‘which holds that the political and the 6 Nationalism is a contentious issue. Analysts national unit should be congruent’. cannot agree on its definition and its role in were being ‘created’ either by turning the society. Most contend, however, that nation- ‘low’, spontaneous and oral into lit- alism is a specifically modern phenomenon, erate and cultivated ones, or by imposing the which became salient in the eighteenth3 or existing ‘high’ culture on the available and nineteenth century.4 con- diverse idioms of peasants. Nationalism can vincingly demonstrated5 that nationalism, then be characterised as ‘the organisation of human groups into large, centrally educated, rather than corresponding to a universal and 7 ancient human need, marked a profound culturally homogenous units’. In short, break in human . He stated that the Gellner concludes that modernisation leads industrial in the West necessitated to nationalism and nationalism engenders nations, and not the other way around. And since ours is a time of a never-ending proc- and , for example ‘perceived ess of modernisation, we live in the ‘Age of in the sentiments of an important Nationalism’: source of social , and of the politi- 10 ‘Nationalism - the principle of homogenous cal stability of a liberal society’. The Ital- cultural units as the foundations of political ian nineteenth-century liberal Giuseppe life, and of the obligatory cultural of Mazzini was convinced that ‘democratic na- tionality was the necessary precondition for rulers and ruled - is indeed inscribed neither 11 in the nature of things, nor in the hearts of a peaceful international ’. This has men, nor in the pre-conditions of social life changed dramatically in the twentieth cen- in general, and the contention that it is so tury, with Europe experiencing fanatical na- inscribed is a falsehood which nationalist tionalism leading to , doctrine has succeeded in presenting as self- and . Hence, despite all the evident. But nationalism as a phenomenon, disagreements about the true nature of na- not as a doctrine presented by nationalists, is tionalism, most analysts today view it as a hindrance to the development of a liberal inherent in a certain of social conditions; 12 and those conditions, it so happens, are the democracy. Some (like Beiner, Habermas conditions of our time.’8 and Hobsbawm) say that this hindrance has to be superseded altogether, others (like Gellner’s conception has been criticised for Dahrendorf, Kymlicka and Tamir) see how being simplistic and historically inaccurate, democracy and nationalism can be recon- and there are good examples which seem to ciled. refute the assumption that nationalism only became important in the nineteenth century Civic versus as a result of modernisation.9 Gellner’s de- The liberal defenders of nationalism are scription does, however, provide an accurate mostly indebted to the original Enlighten- reflection of the actual historical evolution ment ideal of the nation as an agency of of nationalism in . democratic power that was able to challenge The main aim of Gellner’s study is to ex- the old suppressive order of the ‘ancien ré- plain why nationalism emerged and became gime’ (Rousseau). Hence, French and pervasive in modern times. It does not, how- American have traditionally ever, explicitly explore the issues which are been regarded as the epitome of civic na- probably more pressing for the present po- tionalism. They were based on the political litical development of Central Europe: What ideas of who fought for the is the relationship between nationalism and ‘ of the people’. The membership ? Why did some forms of of the was thus defined primarily nationalism (German, Italian, even Slovak in political terms; civic virtues were more and Hungarian) become virulent in the first important for the new than ethnic- half of our century and others not? Is nation- ity, common culture, or even common lan- alism a deadly enemy of , or its guage. The only means of exclusion were the natural ally? territorial boundaries of a country. For that anybody, at least in theory, could be- Is the Best Nation No Nation? come a French, or American citizen by ac- Nationalism was originally regarded as pro- quiring the necessary civic virtues (of which French- or English- proficiency was gressive and supportive of the development 13 of liberal democracy. but a part). This voluntaristic notion of na- tional identity is usually contrasted with eth- But the simple fact that national identities nic nationalism, which is exclusionary, since are social constructs and not something in- the belonging to a nation is in this case de- herently ‘natural’ does not mean that they fined by birth, blood and ethnicity. While the can be easily abandoned, or subdued to some former conception of a nation is ideally con- form of enlightened . ceived of as a voluntary association, the lat- should not be con- ter is seen as a community of fate.14 Ethnic fused with imaginary ones.21 As Anthony nationalism emerged in the late nineteenth Smith accurately observed, ‘whenever and century and is said to be pertinent to the however is forged, once people of Central and .15 established, it becomes immensely difficult, While is usually associated if not impossible (short of total genocide) to with liberalism, exclusionary ethnic nation- eradicate.’22 alism has often been conducive to authori- Habermas seeks to overcome ‘the ghosts of tarian regimes. It is the latter that is feared the past’ by replacing conceptions of ethni- by many critics of nationalism. cally defined nationalism with a cosmopoli- The distinguished Marxist historian Eric tan notion of a ‘Verfassungspatriotismus’ Hobsbawm argues that, ‘in spite of its evi- (constitutional ), based on shared dent prominence, nationalism is historically principles of and democracy, which less important’ in world today.16 would make the idea of a Euro- Given that ‘characteristic nationalist move- pean Union (comprised of European rather ments of the late twentieth century are es- than national citizens) a politically viable sentially negative, or rather divisive’, concept.23 Habermas argues that the political Hobsbawm is hopeful that ultimately ‘na- unity of European nations cannot be based tionalism will decline with the decline of the on the shared , cultures, and lan- ’.17 He goes as far as to suggest guages that characterised successful nation- that ‘"nation" and nationalism are no longer states. Instead, European must adequate terms to describe, let alone to ana- rely on a ‘post-national’ constitutional patri- lyse, the political entities described as such, otism that is yet to be created.24 or even the sentiments once described by Ralf Dahrendorf rejects Habermas’s project these words’.18 From the fact explored by as utopian and looks for arrangements which Gellner, that national identities are to a cer- would accommodate the needs of the major- tain extent arbitrary results of nationalism ity of people throughout the world who can- based on myths and half-truths, Hobsbawm not live without a national identity, with the infers that their importance should subside requirements of a modern and with time. This seems to be plausible con- (). He proposes the creation of a sidering that citizens in a truly modern (and heterogeneous national state - as opposed to enlightened) society are expected to act fol- a homogeneous state built on the idea of an lowing their reason rather than feelings and ethnic nation - which is liberal and open for attachments connected with some ‘imagined 25 people of other ethnicities. ‘To be proud of communities’.19 Hobsbawm tacitly assumes the basic is not enough,’ argues Ralf that by showing that particular national tra- Dahrendorf. ‘As Taylor notes, even the ditions are more often than not invented and model experiments in constitutional patriot- manipulated, the allegiance of people to their 20 ism, and the , have al- nations can be undermined. ways also required many of the trappings of nation-states, including founding myths, na- tional symbols, and ideals of historical and Hungarian minority. It appears that both eth- quasi-ethnic membership.’ nic and civic forms of nationalism can cause problems for political communities. The age Yael Tamir raised more serious objections to of nationalism is, however, not over yet. the contractarian theories that have national values hidden in their liberal agenda. If the Even George Schöpflin, who is very scepti- liberal state were a truly voluntary associa- cal about the potential dangers of national- tion based on contract in which citizenship ism in Central and Eastern Europe, was ideally based on shared principles of acknowledges that: justice and democracy (not more and not ‘Democracy rests on the strongly cohesive less), then two problems would arise. Firstly, identities provided by nationhood - there is all those complying with the criteria of con- no democratic state that is without this... On stitutional patriotism could become citizens - its own democracy is not capable of sus- which is clearly not a practical option for taining the vision of past and future that virtually all of the existing states. Secondly, holds communities together politically, be- anyone questioning the values of justice and cause it does little or nothing to generate the democracy (certain anarchist groups, for ex- affective, symbolic, and ritually reaffirmed ample) could be stripped of their citizenship ties upon which community rests.’28 - which certainly does not correspond to any conceptions of justice.26 Indeed, civic na- Thus, it can be argued that today, as in the tionalism, according to Tamir, can be more past, some conception of national identity is exclusive than culturally based nationalism: still needed in order to support and sustain liberal democracy. Furthermore, not only ‘Contrary to widespread perceptions, na- democratic states, but most people, cannot, tional communities might, in some respects, or do not want to do without a sense of be- be more open and pluralistic than communi- longing to a nation. Whether we like it or ties in which social bonds rely on a set of not, ‘features characteristic of a nation - lan- shared values. [...] But in a society where guage, history, culture, , geography - social cohesion is based on national, cul- are among the most substantive components tural, and historical criteria, holding non- of individual identity’.29 Hence, Stuart conformist views does not necessarily lead 27 Hampshire was right to observe that: ‘In the to excommunication.’ last analysis, a sane nationalism is to be jus- Tamir supports her statement with the exam- tified by a utilitarian argument - that most ple of the United States, where communists men and women are happy only when their were marginalised precisely because they way of life prolongs customs and habits did not share the political values of the state. which are familiar to them’ [my italics].30 However, many examples from Central The crucial question is to determine what Europe could be put forward to show that a constitutes a sane nationalism. culturally defined nationalism can be at least The answer to this question was sought by as damaging and divisive. Thus, Slovak na- Yael Tamir in her 1993 study Liberal Na- tionalists (including Meciar) have repeatedly 31 tionalism. Yael Tamir tried to show that accused their political opponents of being ‘the liberal tendency to overlook the ‘not Slovak enough’. Moreover, citizenship 32 inherent in nationalism is mistaken’, and in - as in any multinational state - she explored ways in which nationalism may cannot be founded solely on a culturally in fact contribute to liberal thinking. and/or ethnically defined nation, as this would exclude, amongst others, the large Tamir’s liberal nationalism is polycentric, ‘membership in a nation promises individu- which means that it ‘respects the other and als redemption from personal oblivion’.38 It sees each nation as enriching a common is tempting to dismiss these needs as irra- civilisation’, unlike ethnocentric national- tional feelings that should be overcome. But ism, ‘which sees one’s own nation as supe- the conception of a community with a pres- rior to all others and seeks domination’.33 ent, a past and a future also has some im- This conception is considerably more opti- portant moral implications. Indeed, without mistic about the actual potential of national- it, we would not be able to talk meaningfully ism for modern liberal democracy, than about the historical responsibility of a na- those put forward by most writers on nation- tion.39 If were serious about their alism. ‘Nationalism’, Tamir argues, ‘is not non-national politics, they would not be able the pathology of the modern age but an an- to accept - as a people and as a nation-state - swer to its malaise - to the neurosis, aliena- the moral or even the practical responsibility tion, and meaninglessness characteristic of for the crimes of the Second World . modern times.’34 The proponents of liberal- ism have more in common with some propo- Two ? nents of nationalist projects than is usually Whether or not liberal nationalism in assumed. Both liberals and nationalists con- Tamir’s fashion is possible, most scholars of cede the importance of seeing individuals in post- would argue that it is cer- a social context. Tamir suggests that ‘the tainly not an option for Central and Eastern liberal with its respect for personal Europe.40 While the West was seen as com- , reflection and choice, and the na- ing to terms with the dangers of nationalism tional tradition, with its emphasis on be- (either by overcoming nationalism, or longing, and solidarity, although adapting it to the requirements of a liberal generally seen as mutually exclusive, can 35 democracy), it was expected that the post- indeed accommodate each other.’ communist world of Central and Eastern Since people in Central Europe as elsewhere Europe would succumb to the nationalistic do need some sense of national identity, it is of ancient . The war important to conceptualise the possibility of in appeared to confirm analysts’ a nationalism that is liberal. Nationalism not worst fears, and the apparent resurgence of only answers some urgent psychological nationalism in general after the end of com- needs, but also fulfills important political munist power seemed to confirm the pro- functions. As analysed above, national iden- claimed existence of ‘two types of tity can foster feelings of solidarity in a nationalism’. given community and alleviate alienation of As early as in the 1970s, the English histo- individuals in modern societies. Further- rian of ideas John Plamenatz argued that the more, it gives people a sense of continuity Slavic nations of Eastern Europe were by strengthening the perception of a society doomed to adhere to Eastern nationalism, as a partnership between ‘those who are liv- which is mostly (if not invariably) illiberal.41 ing, those who are dead, and those who are 36 Since the nations of Central and Eastern to be born’. Imagining themselves as a part Europe were modernised considerably later of a larger community with a glorious and than the Western nations, their peoples suf- long-lasting past and a promising future, in- fered from ‘a feeling of inferiority or inade- dividuals can transcend their own limits, and 42 37 quacy’. They had to catch up by imitating even their own mortality. In this way their more successful West European rivals. Nationalism born out of frustration leads, teristics that are ‘in many respects substan- according to Plamenatz, to , as tially different than in Western Europe, for shown by the ascendance of in Ger- both historical and contemporary ’. many and in Italy after the First The most important factor influencing cur- World War. The underlying nature of Ger- rent developments is, according to Schöp- and is, however, flin, the traditional backwardness of these Western (i.e. free of frustration), because it societies, a consequence of which is ‘the was already culturally strong and rather lib- weakness of civic elements of nationhood’.45 eral in the nineteenth century. Furthermore, in Central and Eastern Europe Thus, while and Italy can be seen ‘there is a long tradition of using or rather as an integral part of the West, meaning abusing nationalism for political purposes not connected with the definition of nation- Europe - even if their liberal development 46 was interrupted by the historical ‘accidents’ hood.’ of fascism and Nazism - the Eastern Euro- also distinguishes between the pean Slavic peoples had always been back- ‘sated nations ... of North America, Western ward and were impeded in their development Europe, Australia, New Zealand’, and the by traditions which were of little help in ad- ones in Eastern Europe and the former So- dressing the needs of modern times. When viet Union, where ‘after years of oppression Germans and Italians fought for the estab- and humiliation, there is liable to occur a lishment of their modern national states, they violent counteraction’.47 Thus, despite some were already prepared culturally. The people truly liberal personalities (such as Václav in the East, on the other hand, had to create Havel and Adam Michnik) who influence both: their states as well as their nations! political life in Central and Eastern Europe, ‘Drawn gradually into a civilisation to Berlin is convinced ‘that the possibility, un- them ... they have had, as it were, to make fortunately even the likelihood, of ethnic themselves anew, to create national identi- strife abounds in that part of the world’.48 ties for themselves’.43 J. F. Brown similarly noted that while ‘na- According to Plamenatz, these peoples - tionalist violence had burned itself out in the forced to adopt an alien civilisation - were West’, in the East it seemed to be making up historically marked as Eastern, meaning for lost time. According to Brown ‘the im- virtually non-European. Their relationship prisoning past’ is endangering the present.49 with the West was an ambivalent one, char- This is a past in which ‘nationalism in the acterised by feelings of admiration mixed East was characterized by its virulent intol- with envy and resentment. There was thus erance’.50 Thus, all the nations of Eastern ‘Eastern’ nationalism that is ‘both imitative Europe are - virtually by definition - illib- and hostile to the models it imitates, and is eral.51 apt to be illiberal’.44 In other words, while This differentiation between two concepts of the West (Germany included) finally found a nationalism can only be maintained by a sane nationalism, Eastern Europe was purposeful interpretation of European his- doomed to remain ‘wild’ for considerably tory. While any instances of nationalistic longer. excesses in Eastern Europe are considered More than twenty years later, George by Schöpflin to be fundamental to the tradi- Schöpflin still subscribes to Plamenatz’s di- tion of the region’s backward history, both chotomy by averring that nationalism in German National and Italian fas- Central and Eastern Europe shows charac- cism are explained away as temporary aber- rations resulting from ‘loss of faith in build- evolution of nations has almost always been ing on the existing European tradition’.52 characterised by some feelings of inferiority Similarly, more recent problems in Northern with regard to their competitors, and that the , and Basque in , are formation of nations has more often than not seen as exceptions to the rule which states been ‘an expression of existential envy, res- that problems with nationalism are by and sentiment’.54 large limited to Central and Eastern Greenfeld acknowledges that the distinction Europe.53 between Western and Eastern types of na- One does not need to subscribe to Milan tionalism does not make much sense geo- Kundera’s view that Central Europe has al- graphically, because ‘if we assigned ways been an indispensable part of the West, individual societies to any of these originally to agree that there are significant differences geographical categories on the basis of civi- between the historical experiences of, say, lizational characteristics, we might have to and the Czech Republic, which make characterise many Western European socie- the concept of ‘Eastern nationalism’ a crude ties as "Eastern Europe," while most of the generalisation with limited explanatory "West" or "Europe" would paradoxically value for the Visegrad Four countries. move to another continent [the USA].’55 She Moreover, it is questionable whether 1920s- concedes, however, that it is possible to dis- 1930s was any more tinguish between ‘Western, less Western, ‘Western’ (i.e. liberal) than, for example, the and anti-Western nationalism in Europe and Czech nationalism of the first Czechoslovak elsewhere’.56 In this way, any society can be Republic. While Germans sought to over- located on an imaginary map, which need come the economic and political problems of not bear any resemblance whatsoever to the the interwar period by turning to National actual geographical location of that society. Socialism, remained true to I want to argue, however, that the terms certain basic principles of liberal democracy Eastern and Western nationalism are never- considerably longer. Hence, either German theless of little use, and indeed are mislead- nationalism should be seen as traditionally ing, because they can hardly be Eastern, or the Czech variant should be clas- conceptualised outside of their geographical sified as traditionally Western. Or does the connotations. Moreover, I believe that forms whole dualistic approach beg more questions of liberal and illiberal nationalisms co-exist than it provides answers? Are, indeed, all within each European nation; analysts nationalisms ‘Eastern’ to a certain degree? should take care not to ‘condemn’ a nation Nationalism as a ‘Continental’ to be and remain illiberal in inclination be- cause of its history. National identities are Problem - Germany and Central human creations, and thus can, and do, Europe change. A positive answer to the last question could Clearly, Greenfeld’s account (unlike Gell- be derived from ’s Five ner’s) does make it clear how virulent na- Roads to , which considers the tionalism came about. The danger is, development of the English, French, Rus- however, that by explaining German history sian, German and American nations not only from the perspective of its disastrous results by comparing them, but also each on their in the twentieth century, we are led to be- own terms. Upon closer study of particular lieve that these results were logical and thus historical cases, it becomes clear that the somehow necessary.57 Greenfeld states that ‘Germany was ready for Holocaust from the right to suggest that the formation of nations moment German national identity existed’.58 is characterised not only by the invocation of But to view National Socialism as a mere common memories and a shared past, but consequence of traditional German hatred of also by a shared amnesia, a for- the West, and the desire of Germans to over- getfulness.64 The ‘true’ character of a nation come their feelings of inferiority by offering is constantly being reinvented; old symbols their salvation to humankind is misleading. can and do attain new meanings. Even na- Obviously, there were other factors involved tionalists can be critical of their own par- (social, economic), and even the German ticular culture; ‘they can aspire to change it, literary and philosophical tradition consists develop it, or redefine it’.65 of more than a few nationalistic writings. Indeed, as David Miller observed, a distin- Many influential contemporaries of Herder, guishing aspect of national identity is that it who is usually held responsible for the birth is an active identity: ‘The nation becomes of irrational, ethnically defined and thus il- 66 what it does by the decisions that it takes.’ liberal nationalism, regarded themselves as Historical narratives and myths are reinter- cosmopolitans. Thus, even a nation formed preted in order to fulfil the requirements of by a ‘purely Eastern type of nationalism’ did the present, and fierce polemics within a na- not necessarily have to end up with a totali- tion are often conducted in order to deter- tarian regime. mine which parts of its history are to be seen Will the nations of Central Europe, because as its highlights and which as a national of their ‘imprisoning past’,59 remain prone to shame. an illiberal nationalism - as the various con- As Miller has pointed out, ‘It is precisely cepts of Eastern nationalism imply? Not because of the mythical or imaginary ele- necessarily. Firstly, even Herder’s theory of ments in national identity that it can be re- nationalism could be reconciled, at least shaped to meet new challenges and new partially, with the needs of liberal democ- 67 needs.’ What Masaryk means to the racy. Herder, whose ideas, according to Czechs, Tiso to Slovaks, Pilsudski to Poles Greenfeld, anticipated Nazism, could be and so on, can and does change over time equally regarded as an antecedent of multi- 68 and has serious political implications. In . To claim superiority for a par- this way different concepts of a nation com- ticular nation goes very much against pete for dominance within a particular na- Herder’s basic idea that ‘at bottom all com- tional community at any given time in its parisons [between nations] are out of place. history, and they also change dramatically Every nation has its centre of happiness throughout history. Yael Tamir stressed the within itself.’60 Indeed, Tamir’s polycentric importance of critical participation in a na- liberal nationalism is explicitly derived from tion: the ideas of romantic nationalist writers who defined nations in cultural rather than politi- ‘The assumption of national obligations im- cal terms.61 plies the reflective acceptance of an ongoing commitment to participate in a critical de- Secondly and more importantly, the present 62 bate about the nature of the national culture, is never totally dependent on the past. Na- suggesting that individuals have a reason to 63 and tions are ‘imagined communities’, adhere to their national obligations even af- their are always, to a certain extent, 69 ter of a national state.’ created, rather than simply documented by disinterested observers. was This is obviously not limited to the experi- been employed as a tool of national libera- ence of the small nations of Central Europe. tion, thus furthering the case of liberal de- Debates in the ‘older’ about mocracy.74 Indeed, it can be argued that all what it means to be a ‘good’ American,70 the of 1989 were to a certain Australian or German, can be just as contro- extent nationalistic. The Czechs, Slovaks, versial as in the countries that only recently Hungarians and Poles felt that the end of freed themselves from communism. Fur- communist power also meant the end of for- thermore, those nations that today eign (i.e. Russian) domination and that their themselves on being liberal all have illiberal national identities were traditionally hostile pasts. to communist . The end of commu- nist power in Central Europe showed the ul- To label certain national cultures as intrinsi- timate failure of communist leaders to cally illiberal is crudely reductionist. What activate support for their ideology by re- Kymlicka argued in defence of the cultures sorting to nationalism. Their attempt to ally of national minorities is also valid for inde- the national allegiances of citizens with loy- pendent national cultures: alty to the socialist home-country had failed. ‘To assume that any culture is inherently il- One of the most important factors influenc- liberal, and incapable of reform, is ethno- ing the success of the post-communist tran- centric and ahistorical. Moreover, the sition and the ensuing integration into the liberality of a culture is a matter of degree. will be the outcome of the All cultures have illiberal strands, just as few contest between different forms of national- cultures are entirely repressive of individual ism within the particular countries of Central . Indeed it is quite misleading to talk Europe. The crucial question is whether lib- of "liberal" and "illiberal" cultures, as if the eral nationalism will be able to gain the up- world was divided into completely liberal per hand over nationalism deriving its societies on the one hand, and completely 71 strength from and . illiberal ones on the other.’ Many recent developments would suggest Having shown that the (essentially that it is the latter that is gaining momentum, Manichean) distinction between Eastern (i.e. posing a real danger to the development of illiberal) and Western (i.e. liberal) national- liberal democracy in all four countries of ism is not helpful in analysing the post- Central Europe.75 The fears of Hobsbawm, communist transition in Central Europe, I Plamenatz, Schöpflin and others who warned am far from suggesting that nationalism does against the legacy of an illiberal type of na- not pose any problems for the development tionalism in Central and Eastern Europe ap- of liberal democracy. Nor can I deny that pear to be justified. certain historical experiences of the nations Has, then, liberal nationalism any chance at of Central Europe may prove detrimental to 72 all of succeeding in Central Europe? Are the their further advancement. Clearly, how- expressions of extreme nationalism isolated ever, the potential role of nationalism is incidents, or do they correspond to the atti- more complex and ambivalent than any du- tudes of large or even dominant parts of the alistic classification would suggest. A na- societies in Central Europe? These questions tional culture and its history is never one or require more extensive studies of the coun- the other, liberal or illiberal. Nationalism in tries in focus. But it is evident that any study Central Europe has been used for the legiti- of post-communist developments will not be mation of both left-wing and right-wing 73 furthered by simplistic concepts along the , but it has also repeatedly lines of the ‘two types of nationalism’ the King James Bible has God say to Abraham . The outcome of the dynamic politi- "And in thy seed shall all the nations of the earth cal processes taking place in today’s Central be blessed" (Genesis 22:18), this is surely not so Europe is not predetermined by the region’s far from the national idea of recent history' - ‘Eastern’ past, however this past is defined. Scruton, The ..., p. 304. See also O'- Brien, Conor, God Land (Cambridge: Mass.: Endnotes: Harvard University Press, 1988). 10.Gray, John, Isaiah Berlin (: Harper- 1.Schöpflin, George, 'Nationalism and Ethnicity Collins, 1995), p. 99 in Europe', in Charles A. Kupchan, Nationalism .11.Urbinati, Nadia, 'A Common Law of Na- and in the New Europe (Ithaca: tions: 's Democratic National- Cornell University Press, 1995), pp. 37-65. ity', Journal of Modern Italian Studies, Spring 2.Kohn, Hans, The Idea of Nationalism. A Study 1996, p. 203. 12Roger Scruton, who argues that of its Origin and Background (New York: Mac- nationalism is indeed a necessary precondition of millan, 1944), Plamenatz, John, 'Two Types of a thriving liberal democracy, is a notable excep- Nationalism', in Eugene Kamenka (ed.), Nation- tion - see Scruton, The Philosopher..., pp. 299- alism (Canberra: Australian National University 328. Press, 1973), pp. 22-37. 13.Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism..., p. 21. 3.Anderson, Benedict, Imagined Communities: 14.Smith made an important qualification of this Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nation- ideal-typical classification, asserting that 'every alism (London: Verso, 1991); Berlin, Isaiah, nationalism contains civic and ethnic elements in Against the Current: Essays in the History of varying degrees and different forms' - Smith, Ideas (London: Hogarth Press, 1979); and Anthony D., National Identity (Harmondsworth: Hobsbawm, Eric, Nations and Nationalism since Penguin, 1991), p. 13. I will explore this issue 1780: Programme, Myth, (Cambridge: further below in my discussion of 'two types of Cambridge University Press, 1990). nationalism'. 4.Gellner, Ernest, Nations and Nationalism (Ox- 15.Eatwell, Roger, European Political Cultures ford: Blackwell, 1983). As put (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 238; Crawford, it, 'The modern sense of the word [nation] is no Keith, East Central European Politics Today older than the eighteenth century, give or take (Manchester: Manchester University Press, the odd predecessor' - Hobsbawm, Nations and 1996), pp. 126-128; and Smith, National Iden- Nationalism..., p. 3. But see also Smith, Anthony tity..., p. 11. But as Hobsbawm shows, the D., 'A Europe of Nations - or the Nation of and French were not the only peoples Europe?', Journal of Research, vol. 30, no. 'freely offering membership of a "nation" to any- 2, 1993, pp. 129-135, and Scruton, Roger, The body who wanted to join it, and "nations" ac- Philosopher on Dover Beach (Manchester: Car- cepted open entry more readily than classes. The canet, 1990), p. 304. before 1914 are full of great-nation 5Gellner, Nations and Nationalism... chauvinists whose fathers, let alone , did 6.ibid., p. 1. not speak the language of their sons' chosen peo- 7.ibid., p. 35. ple, and whose names, Slav or Magyarized Ger- 8ibid., p. 125. man or Slav testified to their choice' - 9Anthony D. Smith challenged this 'modernist Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism..., p. 39. fallacy' above all on historical grounds, by ar- Even the nations in Central Europe were thus to guing that 'expressions of fervent attachment to a certain extent voluntaristic. But as Tamir sug- the concept of the nation as a territorial-cultural gests, 'claiming that national obligations could be and political community' go back as far as the seen as voluntarily assumed says nothing about fourteenth and fifteenth centuries 'in France, their nature' - Tamir, Yael, Liberal Nationalism ... as well as in and Russia' - (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. Smith, Anthony D., Nations and Nationalisms in 87. See my discussion below on liberal nation- a Global Era (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), p. alism. 38. went back even further: 'when 16.Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism..., p. 35.Tamir, Liberal Nationalism..., p. 6. 181. 36.Burke, Edmund, Reflections on the Revolu- 17.ibid., pp. 164, 182. tion in France (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), 18.ibid., p. 182. p. 195. 19.Anderson, Imagined Communities... 37.Anderson, Imagined Communities..., and 20.In a speech to the Central European Univer- Smith, National Identity sity in Budapest, Hobsbawm appealed to the ..., p. 160. moral responsibility of young Central and East 38.Tamir, 'The Enigma...', p. 433. European students of history to pursue historical 39.For example, this conception enables us to truth, thereby preventing the rise of nationalism - consider the implications of the present Austra- Hobsbawm, Eric, On History (London: Weiden- lian 's policy towards the first in- feld & Nicholson, 1997), pp. 1-10. Hobsbawm habitants of Australia. It was expected that also denounced Slovak nationalistic myths in the Australian Prime Minister John Howard would British television documentary Stories My apologise on behalf of the Australian people for Country Told Me (broadcast on SBS TV, 28 the unjust treatment of the 'stolen '. September 1997). 21Tamir, Yael, 'The Enigma When he refused to do so on the grounds that of Nationalism', World Politics, no. 47, April apologies can only be made by individuals (ef- 1995, p. 423. fectively thereby denying the existence of a na- 22.Smith, 'A Europe of Nations...', p. 131; and tional community with a past and a future), his Kymlicka, William, Multicultural Citizenship argumentation was seen as inadequate not only (Oxford: , 1995), p. 185. by Aboriginal activists, but by many members of 23.See also Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizen- the Australian public at large. In contrast, ship..., p. 238. American President Bill Clinton was able and 24.Beiner, Roland (ed.), Theorizing Citizenship willing to take responsibility and to apologise on (New York: State University of New York Press, behalf of the American people for the history of 1995), pp. 255-282, 315. . 25.Dahrendorf, Ralf, 'Die Zukunft des National- 40.See for example Brown, J. F., Hopes and staates', Merkur, vol. 9, no. 10, 1994, pp. 751- Shadows (Durham: Duke University Press, 761. 1994); Chirot, Daniel, 'National Liberations and 26.This was illustrated by the recent incident Nationalist Nightmares', in Beverly Crawford involving the Canadian and Australian authori- (ed.), Markets, States and Democracy (Boulder: ties' dealings with the Ukrainian war criminal, Westview Press, 1995); Greenfeld, Liah, Nation- Konrad Kalej. While Canada was free to enforce alism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge, Kalej's deportation from the country, Australia Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992); and was not able to take away his Australian citizen- Schöpflin, 'Nationalism and Ethnicity...'. ship. See The Age, 25 August 1997. 41.See also an earlier study by , who 27.Tamir, Liberal Nationalism..., p. 90. See also distinguished between an 'organistic' and a 'vol- Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship..., pp. 105- untaristic' idea of nation to contrast Eastern and 106. Western nationalism - Kohn, The Idea of Na- 28.Schöpflin, 'Nationalism and Ethnicity...', p. tionalism.... On Kohn's dichotomy see also 42. Tamir, Liberal Nationalism..., p. 83, and Snyder, 29.Tamir, 'The Enigma...', p. 427. Louis L., Encyclopedia of Nationalism (New 30.Gray, Isaiah Berlin..., p. 104. York: Paragon House, 1990), pp. 173-176. 31.Characteristically, the title of her study was 42.Plamenatz, 'Two Types of Nationalism...', p. seen as a contradiction in terms and thus pro- 29 vocative, or even 'weird' - Tamir, Liberal Na- .43.ibid., p. 30. tionalism..., p. ix. 44.ibid., p. 34. 32.ibid., p. 4. 45.Schöpflin, 'Nationalism and Ethnicity...', p. 33.Tamir, 'The Enigma...', p. 430. 49. 34.ibid., p. 432. 46.ibid., p. 52. 47.Cited in Gardels, Nathan, 'Two Concepts of 61.Tamir, Liberal Nationalism..., p. 79. Nationalism: An Interview with Isaiah Berlin', 62.The British anthropologist of Polish origin The New York Review of Books, 21 November Bronislaw Malinowski demonstrated that this is 1991,p. 19. 48ibid., p. 21. rather the other way round: the present creates 49.Brown, Hopes and Shadows..., p. 172. history. Historical figures and events are appro- 50.Woolf, Stuart (ed.), Nationalism in Europe, priated (by nations) for current purposes, and are 1815 to the Present: A Reader (London: Rout- true or 'valid in virtue of - and only in virtue of - ledge, 1996), p. 24. satisfying a current need.' According to Mali- 51.Ernest Gellner slightly refined Plamenatz's nowski, beliefs about the past should be seen as dualistic classification by introducing the notion 'charters' of current practices - see Gellner, 'Zeno of four different time zones of Europe. The basic of Cracow', in Culture, Identity and Politics assumption, however, remains the same: the (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), further the observer moves East, the greater the p. 62, and Gellner, Ernest, Anthropology and danger posed by nationalism for liberalism. See Politics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), p. 16. Simi- Gellner, Ernest, 'Nationalism Reconsidered and lar arguments are put forward in Krygier, Martin, E. H. Carr', in Review of International Studies, 'Is There after Communism? no. 18, 1992, pp. 113-118. Institutional Optimism, Cultural Pessimism and 52.Schöpflin, 'Nationalism and Ethnicity...', p. the ', forthcoming in International 43. Journal of Sociology, and in Adam Czarnota and 53'.With one or two exceptions, the democratic Martin Krygier (eds), The Rule of Law after systems were able to deal with these [nationalis- Communism (Darmouth: 1997). tic] movements [in the West] fairly successfully - 63.Anderson, Imagined Communities... Northern Ireland and the Basque country repre- 64.Gellner, 'Zeno of Cracow...', p. 6. sent main failures', writes Schöpflin (ibid., p. 65.Tamir, Liberal Nationalism..., p. 89. 46). Virtually identical is the assessment of 66.Miller, David, 'In Defence of Nationality', Daniel Chirot: 'yet in Western Europe, internal Journal of Applied , vol. 10, no. 1, nationalist disputes are the exceptions, not the 1993, p. 7. rule: only in Northern Ireland and over the 67.ibid., p. 9. Spanish Basque issue is there much violence.' 68.Consider for example the current contest in (Chirot, 'National Liberations...', p. 51). Slovakia for the right interpretation of the Slo- 54.Greenfeld, Nationalism..., p. 372. vak State of 1939-1945. The controversy sur- 55.ibid., p. 18. rounding the publication of Milan S. Durica's 56.ibid., p. 22. Incidentally, this is more or less Dejiny Slovenska a Slovákov, which sought to what Plamenatz originally suggested when he play down Slovak responsibility for the Holo- argued that Eastern nationalism could be found caust, provided an opportunity for both ends of as far afield as Africa, and Latin America, the to present their respective though he hesitated to call it non-European - see points of view. The controversy even had inter- Plamenatz, 'Two Types...', p. 23. national implications - the book was published 57.'We are very good at predicting what has with the financial assistance of the EU and, later, happened', as Martin Krygier pointed out in his it was the EU which helped to prevent its distri- lecture 'Constitutionalism in Poland' at La Trobe bution to Slovak high . See Sme, 22 April University, 23 October 1997. 1997. 69.Tamir, Liberal Nationalism..., p. 89. 58.Greenfeld, Nationalism..., p. 384. This sort of 70.When called for more patriot- interpretation of German national history was ism and a sense of national pride, which he saw recently revived with Daniel Goldhagen's con- declining in the USA, he triggered a lively dis- troversial study, Hitler's Willing Executioners cussion about nationalism and democracy (see (New York: Knopf, 1996). 59Brown, Hopes and Rorty, Richard, 'The Unpatriotic Academy', The Shadows..., p. 172. New York Times, 13 February 1994, p. E15). 60.Ignatieff, Michael, 'Strange Attachments', The See also the special issue on nationalism in New Republic, 29 March 1993, p. 43. Boston Review, October/November 1994, with contributions among others by Martha Nuss- a case for Stúr as a predecessor of liberalism and baum, Charles Taylor and . Western integration of Slovakia (he was strongly 71.Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship..., p. 94. opposed to both the West and its liberalism), but 72.Yes, they are economically rather backward Slovaks can (and do) invoke the more recent and fragile. As Milan Kundera showed, the na- legacy of Milan Hodza (a Slovak proponent of tions of Central Europe, being geographically liberalism, who called for a Central European and culturally the 'in-between' lands, developed a as early as in the 1940s). sense of vulnerability that has had a profound 74.As early as in 1956, before Russian troops impact on their political situation - see Kundera, suppressed the upheaval in Hun- Milan, 'The Tragedy of Central Europe', New gary, the director of the Hungarian News Review of Books, 24 April 1984, pp. 33-36. Agency sent a memorable telex to the outside 73.Ludovít Stúr, for example, who has always world: 'We are going to die for Hungary and for been regarded in Slovakia as the nation's spiri- Europe' (Kundera, 'The Tragedy...', p. 33.) This tual father, was appropriated first by nationalist short statement expressed loyalty to the nation as leaders in the Slovak Nazi ; the connected with allegiance to the ideals of free- chief Alexander Mach turned him dom and democracy, i.e., Europe. into the 'Hitler of the nineteenth century' - see 75.Expressions of anti-Semitism in Poland (Pater Schwarz, Karl-Peter, Tschechen und Slowaken: Jankowski), violent racist attacks on Gypsies in Der lange Weg zuer friedlichen Trennung (Wien, the Czech Republic, rising tension between the Zürich: Europaverlag, 1993), p. 150. Later, ruling and the Hungarian minority in communist leaders in socialist Czechoslovakia Slovakia, and expressions of chauvinism in saw in Stúr a liberator, a Slovak antecedent of Hungary seem to have proven the conception of communism. It would hardly be possible to make two types of nationalism correct.

The Russian and Euro-Asian Bulletin is published by the Contemporary Europe Research Centre, University of Melbourne.

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The Bulletin is a refereed publication

ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Stefan Auer is a Ph.D student in the De- partment University of Melbourne