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Two Types of Nationalism in Europe?

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Two Types of Nationalism in Europe? Russian and Euro-Asian Bulletin Vol.7 No.12 December 1997 Published by the Contemporary Europe Research Centre University of Melbourne Two Types of Nationalism in Europe? Stefan Auer Dec 1997 While intellectuals and some politicians in a radical change in the relationship between the West have seen Europe approaching the polity and culture, and that this in turn pro- ‘postmodern’ age, in which the conception duced nationalism. The salient feature of the of a national state would become outdated preceding agrarian societies was, according and would be replaced by a new multina- to Gellner, cultural diversity and fragmenta- tional and multicultural entity, the ‘back- tion in small autonomous sub-communities, ward’ neighbours in the East have been said each of which lived in its own specific id- to be prone to succumb to a resurgence of iom. A peasant had no need to communicate nationalism. Thus, analysts like Schöpflin1 with the elite of high culture who existed saw confirmed the old concept2 of two es- beyond his/her experience (which was usu- sentially different forms of nationalism: the ally limited to the size of his/her valley). The enlightened Western, that is supportive of modern industrial and predominantly urban democracy, and the backward Eastern, that society required mass literacy and a high de- is an obstacle to any genuinely democratic gree of social mobility, which could only be society. The differences are, however, not achieved by nearly universal access to a well described by this reference to geogra- state-sponsored ‘national’ educational sys- phy. Rather, two (or more) different concep- tem. This, in turn, could only be successful if tions of nationalism are to be found conducted in a vernacular accessible to the competing for influence within particular entire population of the country. Thus, a countries in both the East and the West. need for cultural homogenisation arose and gave birth to the political doctrine of nation- What is Nationalism? alism, ‘which holds that the political and the 6 Nationalism is a contentious issue. Analysts national unit should be congruent’. Nations cannot agree on its definition and its role in were being ‘created’ either by turning the society. Most contend, however, that nation- ‘low’, spontaneous and oral cultures into lit- alism is a specifically modern phenomenon, erate and cultivated ones, or by imposing the which became salient in the eighteenth3 or existing ‘high’ culture on the available and nineteenth century.4 Ernest Gellner con- diverse idioms of peasants. Nationalism can vincingly demonstrated5 that nationalism, then be characterised as ‘the organisation of human groups into large, centrally educated, rather than corresponding to a universal and 7 ancient human need, marked a profound culturally homogenous units’. In short, break in human history. He stated that the Gellner concludes that modernisation leads industrial revolution in the West necessitated to nationalism and nationalism engenders nations, and not the other way around. And since ours is a time of a never-ending proc- and John Stuart Mill, for example ‘perceived ess of modernisation, we live in the ‘Age of in the sentiments of nationality an important Nationalism’: source of social solidarity, and of the politi- 10 ‘Nationalism - the principle of homogenous cal stability of a liberal society’. The Ital- cultural units as the foundations of political ian nineteenth-century liberal Giuseppe life, and of the obligatory cultural unity of Mazzini was convinced that ‘democratic na- tionality was the necessary precondition for rulers and ruled - is indeed inscribed neither 11 in the nature of things, nor in the hearts of a peaceful international order’. This has men, nor in the pre-conditions of social life changed dramatically in the twentieth cen- in general, and the contention that it is so tury, with Europe experiencing fanatical na- inscribed is a falsehood which nationalist tionalism leading to wars, ethnic cleansing doctrine has succeeded in presenting as self- and the Holocaust. Hence, despite all the evident. But nationalism as a phenomenon, disagreements about the true nature of na- not as a doctrine presented by nationalists, is tionalism, most analysts today view it as a hindrance to the development of a liberal inherent in a certain set of social conditions; 12 and those conditions, it so happens, are the democracy. Some (like Beiner, Habermas conditions of our time.’8 and Hobsbawm) say that this hindrance has to be superseded altogether, others (like Gellner’s conception has been criticised for Dahrendorf, Kymlicka and Tamir) see how being simplistic and historically inaccurate, democracy and nationalism can be recon- and there are good examples which seem to ciled. refute the assumption that nationalism only became important in the nineteenth century Civic versus Ethnic Nationalism as a result of modernisation.9 Gellner’s de- The liberal defenders of nationalism are scription does, however, provide an accurate mostly indebted to the original Enlighten- reflection of the actual historical evolution ment ideal of the nation as an agency of of nationalism in Central Europe. democratic power that was able to challenge The main aim of Gellner’s study is to ex- the old suppressive order of the ‘ancien ré- plain why nationalism emerged and became gime’ (Rousseau). Hence, French and pervasive in modern times. It does not, how- American nationalisms have traditionally ever, explicitly explore the issues which are been regarded as the epitome of civic na- probably more pressing for the present po- tionalism. They were based on the political litical development of Central Europe: What ideas of revolutionaries who fought for the is the relationship between nationalism and ‘sovereignty of the people’. The membership liberal democracy? Why did some forms of of the community was thus defined primarily nationalism (German, Italian, even Slovak in political terms; civic virtues were more and Hungarian) become virulent in the first important for the new republic than ethnic- half of our century and others not? Is nation- ity, common culture, or even common lan- alism a deadly enemy of liberalism, or its guage. The only means of exclusion were the natural ally? territorial boundaries of a country. For that reason anybody, at least in theory, could be- Is the Best Nation No Nation? come a French, or American citizen by ac- Nationalism was originally regarded as pro- quiring the necessary civic virtues (of which French- or English-language proficiency was gressive and supportive of the development 13 of liberal democracy. Alexis de Tocqueville but a part). This voluntaristic notion of na- tional identity is usually contrasted with eth- But the simple fact that national identities nic nationalism, which is exclusionary, since are social constructs and not something in- the belonging to a nation is in this case de- herently ‘natural’ does not mean that they fined by birth, blood and ethnicity. While the can be easily abandoned, or subdued to some former conception of a nation is ideally con- form of enlightened cosmopolitanism. ceived of as a voluntary association, the lat- Imagined communities should not be con- ter is seen as a community of fate.14 Ethnic fused with imaginary ones.21 As Anthony nationalism emerged in the late nineteenth Smith accurately observed, ‘whenever and century and is said to be pertinent to the however national identity is forged, once people of Central and Eastern Europe.15 established, it becomes immensely difficult, While civic nationalism is usually associated if not impossible (short of total genocide) to with liberalism, exclusionary ethnic nation- eradicate.’22 alism has often been conducive to authori- Habermas seeks to overcome ‘the ghosts of tarian regimes. It is the latter that is feared the past’ by replacing conceptions of ethni- by many critics of nationalism. cally defined nationalism with a cosmopoli- The distinguished Marxist historian Eric tan notion of a ‘Verfassungspatriotismus’ Hobsbawm argues that, ‘in spite of its evi- (constitutional patriotism), based on shared dent prominence, nationalism is historically principles of justice and democracy, which less important’ in world politics today.16 would make the idea of a federalist Euro- Given that ‘characteristic nationalist move- pean Union (comprised of European rather ments of the late twentieth century are es- than national citizens) a politically viable sentially negative, or rather divisive’, concept.23 Habermas argues that the political Hobsbawm is hopeful that ultimately ‘na- unity of European nations cannot be based tionalism will decline with the decline of the on the shared traditions, cultures, and lan- nation state’.17 He goes as far as to suggest guages that characterised successful nation- that ‘"nation" and nationalism are no longer states. Instead, European citizenship must adequate terms to describe, let alone to ana- rely on a ‘post-national’ constitutional patri- lyse, the political entities described as such, otism that is yet to be created.24 or even the sentiments once described by Ralf Dahrendorf rejects Habermas’s project these words’.18 From the fact explored by as utopian and looks for arrangements which Gellner, that national identities are to a cer- would accommodate the needs of the major- tain extent arbitrary results of nationalism ity of people throughout the world who can- based on myths and half-truths, Hobsbawm not live without a national identity, with the infers that their importance should subside requirements of a modern and open society with time. This seems to be plausible con- (Karl Popper). He proposes the creation of a sidering that citizens in a truly modern (and heterogeneous national state - as opposed to enlightened) society are expected to act fol- a homogeneous state built on the idea of an lowing their reason rather than feelings and ethnic nation - which is liberal and open for attachments connected with some ‘imagined 25 people of other ethnicities. ‘To be proud of communities’.19 Hobsbawm tacitly assumes the basic law is not enough,’ argues Ralf that by showing that particular national tra- Dahrendorf.
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