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CULTURE, COMMUNITY AND THE MULTICULTURAL INDIVIDUAL Liberalism and the Challenge of Multiculturality by DIMITRIOS (JIM) MOLOS A thesis submitted to the Graduate Program in Philosophy in conformity with the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Queen’s University Kingston, Ontario, Canada December, 2012 Copyright © Dimitrios (Jim) Molos, 2012 ABSTRACT Every theory of liberal multiculturalism is premised on some account of the nature of culture, cultural difference and social reality, or what I call “the conditions of multi- culturality”. In this dissertation, I offer a revised account of the conditions and challenge of multiculturality. Beginning with the widely accepted idea that individuals depend on both culture and community as social preconditions for choice, freedom and autonomy, and informing this idea with collectivist and individualist lessons from Tyler Burge’s famous externalist thought-experiment, my analysis shows that social contexts are multi- cultural when they are characterized by a plurality of social communities offering distinct sets of cultural norms, and individuals are multicultural to the extent that they are capable of using cultural norms from various social communities. The depth, pervasiveness, and complexity of multiculturality raises important normative questions about fair and just terms for protecting and promoting social communities under conditions of internal and external cultural contestation, and these questions are not only restricted to cases involv- ing internal minorities. As a theory of cultural justice, liberal multiculturalism must respond to the challenge of multiculturality generated by cultural difference per se, but it cannot do so adequately in all cases armed with only the traditional tools of toleration, freedom of association and exit, fundamental rights and freedoms, and internal political autonomy. My analysis demonstrates that, upon the revised conception of multicultural- ity, liberal theories of tolerationism, egalitarianism and nationalism leave significant cultural remainders, or unaccounted for cultural interests. What is needed is a different liberal multiculturalism, which respects the individual’s fundamental rights and free- doms, is committed to the equal and just treatment of individuals, tolerates voluntary cultural groups and practices in the social sphere, recognizes an individual right to culture, and provides some measure of state assistance to individuals seeking to protect and promote their cultural communities in the private sphere. This is a recipe for liberal cultural justice, and for a defensible liberal multiculturalism without nationalism. - ii - ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS In the course of my doctoral studies, I have incurred many debts of gratitude, and I would like to take this opportunity to acknowledge a few of the many people who have encouraged, supported, and assisted me along the way. My greatest philosophical influence continues to be my supervisor and mentor, Will Kymlicka. You are an inspirational role model from whom I have learned so much. I am truly indebted and thankful for your invaluable and constructive guidance. I appreciate your patience in allowing me to pursue a path that was not always clear to you or me, and for allowing me to write the dissertation that I needed to write. My dissertation has benefited from your advice, and it would have been improved further had I been better able to incorporate your guidance and suggestions. Another significant debt is owed to Alistair Macleod. In my opinion, you are the living embodiment of philosophy. You were instrumental in my decision to come to Queen’s, and it is difficult to express how deeply and extensively you have influenced me. I would like to acknowledge also the other members of my defense committee – Margaret Moore, Stan Corbett, and Michel Seymour – for taking the time to carefully read and comment on my dissertation. Your astute and probing questions have highlighted many areas requiring improvement, and I take your suggestions to heart. Once again, I must acknowledge the late James Graff for igniting my interest in political philosophy, liberalism, nationalism, and the right to national self-determination. I have yet to appreciate fully the extent of his influence on me, but I believe that this dissertation defends a liberal multiculturalism of which he would have approved. I am truly indebted to Adèle Mercier. Your integrity is a source of inspiration. You encouraged me to continue developing and refining my arguments, even when I was swimming against the stream of conventional opinion. You directed me toward valuable materials in the philosophies of language and mind, you invested your time to ensure that I understood and appreciated these materials, and our lengthy discussions have clarified many of my intuitions and provided robust support for my position. - iii - Another special debt of gratitude is owed to Sergio Sismondo for supporting me in so many ways as graduate coordinator. You were an invaluable source of counsel and assistance for me, and you so often went the extra mile for the benefit of the graduate students in your charge. Also, I am obliged to Judy Vanhooser and Marilyn Lavoie for their help on countless occasions, the Department of Philosophy for various forms of financial support, and to the Social Science and Humanities Research Council for doctoral fellowship funding. I would be remiss if I failed to express my unending gratitude to my family and friends for their enduring love, unwavering support, and continued belief in the value of my research activities. I would especially like to thank my mother for everything that she did for me. She would have been proud. Finally, and most importantly, my greatest debt is owed to Drina Bosnjak. You took every step of this long journey with me. You patiently discussed ideas with me, when they were not ready to be written. You read countless excerpts, before they were ready to be compiled into chapters. You challenged me to produce better work, and our discussions shaped the position defended here. You are the only one who truly knows what went into the writing of this dissertation. I will forever be grateful for your limitless love, boundless patience, and endless faith in me. Thank you all! - iv - TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract ii Acknowledgements iii Table of Contents v Chapter One: Introduction 1 1.1 We Are All Multiculturalists Now … Right? 1 1.2 Liberalism: A Brief Sketch 16 1.3 Nationalism: A Long-Time Liberal ‘Frenemy’ 30 1.4 The Ascendency of Multiculturalism and the Subsequent Retreat 44 Chapter Two: Rethinking Multiculturality 48 2.1 Liberalism, Nationalism and the Individual 53 2.2 What is Culture? 69 2.3 Liberalism and Culture as Context of Choice 79 2.4 Burge’s Arthritis Thought-Experiment and Our Essential Social Dependence 88 2.5 The Metaphysical Background of the Classic Anthropological Community 103 2.6 A Revised Conception of the Phenomenon of Multiculturality 112 2.7 Societal Cultures and the Incorporation Thesis 129 2.8 Three Dimensions of Multiculturality: Context, Community, and Individual 140 2.9 Cultural Diversity, Multiculturalism, and Political Philosophy 151 2.10 Cultural Contestation and the Challenge of Multiculturality 160 - v - Chapter Three: Liberal Multiculturalisms 171 3.1 Kukathasian Tolerationism and the Freedom of Exit Approach 180 3.2 The ‘Mosaic of Tyrannies’ and the Costs of Exit 195 3.3 Toleration, Autonomy, and the Imposition Imperative 206 3.4 Liberalism and the Depoliticization of Difference 222 3.5 Liberal Nationalism: Freedom, Equality and Cultural Community 250 3.6 The Impossibility of Cultural Neutrality and the Politicization of Culture 270 3.7 The Liberal Democratic State and the Nationalist Ideal 292 3.8 A Liberal Multiculturalism without Nationalism 317 Chapter Four: Conclusion 363 Bibliography 373 - vi - CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION There was once a time of caste and class, when tradition decreed that each group had its place, and that some are born to rule and others to serve. In this time of darkness, law and social norms defined rights, privileges, and obligations differently for different groups, distinguished by characteristics of sex, race, religion, class, or occupation. Social inequality was justified by church and state on the grounds that people have different na- tures, and some natures are better than others … Then one day Enlightenment dawned, heralding a revolutionary conception of humanity and society. All people are equal, the revolutionaries declared, inasmuch as all have a capacity for reason and moral sense. Law and politics should therefore grant to everyone equal political and civil rights. With these bold ideas the battle lines of modern political struggle were drawn (Young 1990: 156). 1.1 We Are All Multiculturalists Now … Right? “We are all multiculturalists now” (Glazer 1997), or so Nathan Glazer proclaims in the provocative title of a book on American education policy. This proclamation will strike many contemporary critics of multiculturalism as being almost as atrocious an error in judgement as US President George W. Bush’s raising of the infamous ‘Mission Accom- plished’ banner to proclaim an end of the major combat operations in Iraq. After all, since the publication of Glazer’s book, there has been a general retreat from multicultural policies at the domestic and international levels, and this retreat has been punctuated by claims by prominent political leaders, like the United Kingdom’s Prime Ministers Tony Blair, Gordon Brown