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1 Among all the participants in the First World War, should Germany bear the sole responsibility for the outbreak of the war? The First World War was a large scale war without precedent in mankind history. It involved nearly all the European powers and caused great destruction in whatever aspects. However, while the Treaty of Versailles signed after the war required Germany to accept all the responsibility of the outbreak of the war as well as the relative loss and damage, it was actually an unfair accuse to Germany. She was, in fact, not the only power in causing the First World War and the other great powers should also take up some of the responsibility. Germany was responsible for her extreme nationalism that had contributed a lot to the outbreak of the war. The extreme nationalism in Germany could be reflected on the Pan- Germanism idea and her colonial rivalries with other powers. The idea of Pan- Germanism, which wanted to get “a place in the Sun”, showed clearly her great ambition while it called for unity among all Germans in all parts of Europe and it could not be achieved without expansion and annexation. This expansionist foreign policy brought her into conflict with many European countries. For example, the clashes with Serbia over the Balkans were the result of conflicting interest between Pan- Germanism and Pan-Slavism. By acquiring colonies and expanding her sphere of influence after the dismissal of Bismarck in 1890, Germany had a third largest colonial empire in the world, which challenged the supremacy of Britain and France. It aroused the suspicious of them and strained the colonial rivalries. The two crises over Moroccan between Germany and France which strengthened the Triple Entente but made Germany felt humiliated were examples of the conflicts created by colonial rivalries. The relations between her and the other powers were worsened and the tension of the already tense atmosphere was enhanced. Germany must take some of the blame for her extreme and aggressive nationalism. Yet, it was not the sole responsibility of Germany as the similar extreme ideas could also be found in the other European countries. The Serb and Russian nationalists would like to unite all the Slavs in Europe (Pan-Slavism) and this bought them into the Bosnian Crisis in 1908. The Austro-Serbian relationship was then worsened when their conflicting interests existed. France under the strong influence of nationalism never stopped to think of taking revenge on Germany after her defeat in the Franco-Prussian War in 1871. They remained a hostility relationship for long. Actually, not only the above countries but most of the European countries were influenced by nationalism in different levels. They desired a larger colonial empire for economic advantages and more importantly, to glory their own country. Conflicts were inevitable. It provided a favorable atmosphere for the outbreak of the First 2 World War and became the collective responsibility among the powers instead of the sole responsibility of Germany. The Alliance system, which was first initiated by Bismarck, the Chancellor of Germany, was a worth-mentioned factor in causing the First World War and it indicated another aspect of responsibility of Germany of starting the Alliance system.1 While the European powers followed Germany and rushed to find their allies and signed alliances, Europe was divided into two blocs gradually, that were the Triple Entente led by Britain, France and Russia, and the Triple Alliance led by Germany and Austria-Hungary. As most details, sometimes even the signatories of the alliances, were kept strictly secret, the suspicious and distrustful feeling grew uncontrollably between the two blocs and even between the allies. It built up the tension and peace became fragile in such a tense atmosphere. Moreover, these alliances mainly consisted with mutual protection terms between the signatories once when a war broke out. German support to Austria- Hungary and Russian support to Serbia that finally brought them into the First World War were partly related to their alliance. Germany could not be released from the responsibility in causing the war for her initiation of the Alliance system. Although Germany was responsible for initiating the Alliance system, it was not a major factor in causing the war according to Germany’s objective of starting this system and its nature. The main goal that Germany wanted to achieve by the system was to maintain a peaceful international environment so as to preserve her national power, and to prevent France from taking revenge on her. The Alliance system was not introduced with intent to provoke a war. It was defensive in nature rather than offensive. Furthermore, the alliance treaties signed were neither reliable nor bound. The signatories were not forced to support their allies once when a war broke out. Italy, which was the ally of Germany and Austria-Hungary according to the Triple Alliance, remained neutral at the beginning of the First World War. She even did the other way round to join the Entente side later for her territorial ambitions. It showed clearly that the alliances were too weak and fragile to be the major cause of the First World War. Accusing Germany of causing the war by initiating the Alliance system was not convincing. Germany should bear the largest part of responsibility of speeding up the armament race in Europe, which created the mood of war in 1914. Armament race, which was a form of militarism, refers to the expansion of armies and navies, military expenditure, strategic facilitates and weapons, and the influence of military on the government. Germany under the rule of the ambitious Kaiser William II was especially keen on the strengthening work of military among the other European powers. She implemented compulsory conscription and 1 P.7 Mastering Modern World History. 3 universal military training to expand the armed forces. The drastic growth of her military spending and size of army alarmed the other powers. Whenever Germany increased the size of her army, they overtook her as response. Strategic canals and railways were built, new and deadlier weapons like were invented and produced. Mutual fear and suspicious feeling were then built up. Germany also put great efforts on building her navy with a view to enlarge her colonial empire. This action challenged British naval supremacy in Europe as well as her status as a world power. Under the provocation of Germany, she soon started her naval programme and produced the powerful new battleship. Germany did nothing to moderate their relationship but responded by building her own battleships. Hostility grew between them due to the German provocation. Besides, the military planners of Germany even designed the Schlieffen Plan, a war plan suggested the strategy used in a two fronts war. All these German contribution in the armament race created a war-like atmosphere which paved the way of the outbreak of the First World War. Other European powers also had to take up some of the responsibility of intensifying the armament race. They might have many reasons, for instance, to preserve the balance of military might in Europe, or to defend their security, in order to legitimate their work on military strengthening. Whatever what their reasons were, they did contribute to the armament race. The Schlieffen Plan was not a deliberately provocative war plan but a result of her dangerous geographical location that trapped her between France and Russia. Also, the German troops were not the first ones to mobilize before the war. It was the Russian troops, but not the German ones. In fact, Germany was trying her very best to bring Austria to accept mediation proposals. (S.B. Fay, 1929) The German actions were indeed understandable and she needed not bear the sole responsibility of causing the war by speeding up the armament race. Germany also did not need to take all of the blame for her failure of restraining her ally’s expansion. Germany was powerful enough to check and limit Austria-Hungary’s ambition, but she did the other way round to encourage the of Austria-Hungary’s expansion into the Balkans. The German unconditional support given to Austria-Hungary made her felt confident to take action against Serbia. Germany was responsible for supporting her instead of restraining her. Then Russia should also be blamed of not restraining Serbia’s ambition in the First and Second Balkan War and supported her to develop into the First World War before serious consideration. Russia had to share the responsibility with Germany in this aspect. There is no doubt that Germany had the responsibility in causing the war, with reference 4 to her extreme nationalism reflected on her aggressive idea of Pan-Germanism, her enthusiasm colonial rivalries as well as the initiation of the Alliance System, the armament race with other European powers, and also her failure of restraining Austria-Hungary’s expansion.. Yet, she was not solely responsible for the outbreak of the war since the other European powers were also responsible for the above. In addition, most of them believed a war was inevitable and did not try their best to prevent the outbreak of the war. Therefore, a collective responsibility should be shared among all participants for the outbreak of the First World War instead of the sole responsibility taken up by Germany. 5 Reference Fay, S.B. (1929) The Origins of World War. New York: Macmillan. Lowe, Norman (1982) Mastering Modern World History. London: Macmillan. York, T.J.P (1969) Europe 1898-1965. London: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd. Comment: The report reflected hard work. A major weakness is that it did not define the issue in question.
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