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2009 Image Is Everything: The Centrality of Prestige in Russian and Austro-Hungarian Foreign Policy, 1904-1914 William Weston Nunn

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COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

IMAGE IS EVERYTHING: THE CENTRALITY OF PRESTIGE IN RUSSIAN AND

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1904-1914

By

WILLIAM WESTON NUNN

A Thesis submitted to the Department of History in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Degree Awarded: Fall Semester, 2009

The members of the committee approve the thesis of Weston Nunn defended on July 22, 2009.

______Jonathan Grant Professor Directing Thesis

______Peter Garretson Committee Member

______Michael Creswell Committee Member

The Graduate School has verified and approved the above-named committee members.

ii

This thesis is an offering dedicated to the glory of God, the fountain from which flows all truth

and knowledge. Sola Dei Gloria.

iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are many important people who have assisted in the completion of this thesis. I first want to express my gratitude to the departments of History and Religion at Presbyterian College, specifically Drs. Richard Heiser and Roy Campbell, FSU alumni who were not only my teachers, but my advisors, Dr. Mike Nelson, Dr. Anita Gustafson, Dr. Bryan Ganaway, Dr. Craig Vondergeest, Dr. Bob Bryant, and Dr. Peter Hobbie, my teacher, confidant, and friend. Thank you all for your investments in me as a person and as a student. My family, my parents, Mike and Lee Nunn, also deserve recognition and many thanks for supporting me, emotionally and financially, in my pursuit of this career path. Finally, I owe Mr. Kevin Smith an incredible debt of gratitude, as his passion for teaching and the past first inspired a high school sophomore to make the study of history his vocation.

I also want to express my sincerest appreciation to the History faculty and staff at Florida State, including Chris Pignatiello and Anne Kozar, but especially my committee members for their thoughtful and sage advice. Thank you to Dr. Peter Garretson and to Dr. Creswell for sitting on my panel, and spasibo bol’shoi to Dr. Jonathan Grant, my good-humored, patient, encouraging advisor and professor of Russian history. A “thank you” also goes out to all my colleagues in the department for their support and friendship, especially Sarah Burns, Sean McCafferty, Tim Fitzpatrick, Chris Gunn, Blumlo, Tim Corradino, Jonathan Sheppard, Vaughan, Andy Zwilling, Kelly Elliott and Jeremy Elliott.

iv TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract ...... vi

1. INTRODUCTION ...... 1

2. PRESTIGE AS PANACEA? 1904-1906………………………………………...5

3. THE BREACH: CRISES IN , 1908-1909...... 17

4. MOLEHILLS INTO MOUNTAINS, 1913…………………………………….30

5. PRESTIGE, LEGACIES, AND , 1905-1914……………….50

6. --THE FINAL SHOWDOWN……………………………………...64

CONCLUSION...... 77

REFERENCES ...... 78

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ...... 82

v ABSTRACT

This thesis examines and analyzes Russian and Austro-Hungarian foreign policy and the rivalry between them between 1904-1914. It asserts the centrality of prestige-garnering as a motivator of their Balkan diplomacy, not only to project an image of strength to their European rivals, but to distract from each’s volatile and parlous domestic situation. Both and Austria- pursued a Balkan policy that emphasized form over substance in order to convince their subjects and rivals that their integrities were intact and unassailable. Instead of more tangible foreign policy goals like territory or economics, abstract notions of imperial dignity, honor, and status, ideas that became the primary reason for the Great War’s outbreak, fueled the rivalry between the two eastern . The scope of this study is a departure from other accounts of European Great Power diplomacy because it concentrates on the decade before the war instead of a lengthy narrative since the defeat of in 1815. In addition, instead of bringing into the discussion the entirety of the European Congress, this thesis focuses on the struggle between the Romanov and Habsburg states to be recognized as the mistress of southeastern . By focusing on the prestige rivalry between St. and Vienna, this study shifts the focus from the Anglo- naval rivalry in the North Sea to the wrangling over the Balkan Peninsula, the region in which the war’s first shots were fired. As a result, it challenges the notion that Germany is most responsible for the chaos, asserting instead that Austria-Hungary is the most to blame.

vi CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Magicians are masters of illusion, and they have to be. They are human beings, devoid of special metaphysical gifts or the ability to manipulate natural laws. They cannot saw beautiful women in half and put them back together again. They cannot really defy gravity with unintelligible incantations and cause their assistants to levitate above tables. Because of this, the most crucial factor in a magic show is the magician’s maintenance of his image, his reputation, as an illusionist. If he executes his tricks well, he will not jeopardize the audience’s perception that he is, in fact, capable of supernatural feats. His prestige as a magician thus rests on his continued ability to deceive his audience into thinking, or at least suspending belief to the contrary, that he is something greater than what he really is. However, if the magician blunders in his execution, if he performs the same trick twice, if the audience is made aware of a bungled attempt to deceive them, his credibility evaporates into thin air. Exposed as a fraud and a charlatan in the eyes of his audience, he will no longer be able to draw paying and loyal crowds to the venues where he performs his ruses. The fact that the maintenance of image has tangible consequences was not lost on the Romanov and Habsburg , which like magicians, strove to maintain their “moral and material” authority against the skepticism of their subjects and foreign rivals.1 At the beginning of the twentieth century the reputations of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian states as Great European Powers and masters of eastern Europe had been fading into anachronism. Eighty years after the vanquishing of Napoleonic , a laundry list of humiliating military defeats, the wear and tear of domestic strife, economic and political backwardness, and the centrifugal pulls of had significantly eroded the authority, might, and status of each . discontent was rife, and to a great extent, the former august and powerful monarchies had lost the respect and reverence they once commanded. Early twentieth-century statesmen in Vienna and St. Petersburg were all too aware of their governments’ parlous positions as absolutist, multi-ethnic in an age of electricity, constitutions, and nationalism. They recognized an intimate connection between domestic

1 William C. Fuller, Jr. Strategy and Power in Russia, 1600-1914 (New York: The Free Press, 1992), 422.

1 tranquility and their perception of the ’s strength, and were thus jealous of their traditional statuses as Great Powers of the first rank, a designation that was increasingly under question from within and without.2 Crucial to the status of a Great Power was its ability to command respect from other states and its willingness to defend its honor and interests against trespasses from its rivals. Over time, the inability to respond to affronts against its influence telegraphed weakness and decay, while successful assertions of authority suggested that the state’s legitimacy was too strong to be challenged successfully. The Russian and Habsburg empires had no desire to follow the path of their Ottoman counterpart, which they perceived to have declined from the conqueror of southeastern Europe to Europe’s own “sick man.” To them, the loss of respect, influence, and relevance in Europe meant their exclusion from the ranks of their former peers. The consequences of such a retreat, they thought, would certainly give their foreign and domestic enemies the confidence to attempt the final dismantling of their empires.3 Thus, this study argues that furthering the perception of strength was the driving force behind the two eastern monarchies’ foreign policy in the decade before the First . Because good publicity was in such short supply, the governments in Vienna and St. Petersburg sought to fabricate their own in an attempt to convince Europe and their restive subjects that their political integrity was beyond reproach. Instead of actually curing their political and social problems, though, both empires sought only to distract from them by scoring diplomatic victories against each other over even the most trivial issues. From 1908-1914, then, the became a focal point for a rivalry between Russia and Austria-Hungary in which each staked its very legitimacy by humiliating the other and forcing it to bow to its wishes. As a result, the diplomatic wrangling over the troubled peninsula took on a volatile and zero-sum character, as the aggrandizement of one empire’s image necessitated the erosion of the other’s. Unfortunately, this reckless struggle for the perception of Balkan mastery plunged Europe into four years of carnage in , after nearly doing so multiple times.

2 Norman Stone, “Army and Society in the , 1900-1914,” Past and Present 33 (April 1966), 101; Mikhail Loukianov, “Conservatives and ‘Renewed Russia,’ 1907-1914,” Slavic Review 61, No. 4 (Winter 2002), 770.

3 Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig, eds. (The Origins of . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 215; Collected Diplomatic Documents Related to the Outbreak of the European War (: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1915), von Giesl to Berchtold: No. 6 (Austro-Hungarian Red Book), pg. 451.

2 Given that the language of Habsburg and Russian diplomats was so preoccupied with notions of image, honor, and prestige as Great Powers, it is surprising that historians have not given this particular subject more attention. Their neglect of this particular discussion stems from the approaches they have used in their presentations of European foreign relations. One of the hindrances to the discussion of prestige’s role in foreign policy has been the large scope of traditional works, which combine the nineteenth and early twentieth century into a broad synthesis of Great Power diplomacy. In this corpus of scholarship there are two trajectories. The first is on the level of individual empires, such as Barbara Jelavich’s A Century of Russian Foreign Policy, 1815-1914 and F.R. Bridge’s From Sadowa to : The Foreign Policy of Austria-Hungary, 1866-1914. The second’s focus, represented by A.J.P. Taylor’s The Struggle for Mastery in Europe: 1848-1918, is even broader, focusing on the European Congress System and the continent-wide balance of power as a unit of study.4 While these works are highly effective in achieving their stated purposes, their large brush-strokes leave considerable gaps for more detailed studies like this one. This narrative’s focus on the first decade of the twentieth century provides for a nuanced explanation of the prestige rivalry between the two great eastern monarchies. Traditional scholarship ascribes some credit to prestige as a motivating force driving the Russian and Habsburg foreign offices, but only scratches the surface of the centrality of its role for the sake of the larger picture. Here, on the other hand, the motivations, language, and dynamics of the various Balkan crises of image, including the Bosnian Crises, the von Sanders incident, and the July Crises of 1914 can be given a special emphasis the larger works neglect. Emphasizing the wrangling between Austria-Hungary and Russia for the image of Balkan mastery also provides an alternative perspective on the “road to war” scholarship, a body of literature within the field of European diplomacy devoted to tracing the buildup and outbreak of the First World War. For years, many scholars have pinned most of the blame on Germany for the outbreak of hostilities, citing, among other reasons, the German desire to become the

4 F.R. Bridge, From Sadowa to Sarajevo: The Foreign Policy of Austria-Hungary, 1866-1914 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1972); Barbara Jelavich, A Century of Russian Foreign Policy, 1814-1914 (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippencott & Co., 1964), St. Petersburg and (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974), F.R. Bridge and Roger Bullen. 1815-1914: The Great Powers and the European States System (New York: Longman, 1980); A.J.P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1914 (Oxford: Oxford Unviersity Press, 1954).

3 world’s preeminent power and its almost epic naval rivalry with Great Britain.5 However, this study focuses on a different rivalry between powers from Europe’s two major armed camps. Shifting the focus from the armaments race in the Baltic and North Seas eastward to the Balkan Peninsula provides an alternative narrative of events leading to the commencement of war. After all, this region is where the first shots of the conflict were fired against , not by the German navy, but by Austro-Hungarian . As it will be seen, the latter’s notions of prestige, not economics or dreadnaught , was what initiated the catastrophe that destroyed the lives of millions and collapsed not one, but three proud empires. In order to discuss the issue of prestige effectively, this study relies on a synthesis of primary and secondary literatures. First and foremost, a close examination of early twentieth century documents forms the backbone of the narrative and analysis. The most prevalent type of primary source is diplomatic correspondence from and between the foreign ministries of Austria- Hungary, Russia, Great Britain, Germany, Serbia, and . Supplementing the chapters on international diplomacy are memoirs and speeches from Russian statesmen, including Prime Ministers P.A. Stolypin and V.N. Kokovtsov, and Duma deputies V.V. Shul’gin and A.I. Guchkov. These documents anchor the narrative on tsarism’s domestic image crises after the disasters of the Russo-Japanese War and 1905 Revolution. The author does acknowledge a potential weakness in his source base. Due to language limitations, British diplomatic documents are the most frequently cited. However, Serb, Austrian, and Russian dispatches, written in French, somewhat offset this flaw. Further redressing this shortcoming, the author draws on translated correspondence from St. Petersburg and Vienna found in edited volumes of documents. Even with mostly British sources, though, the battle for prestige in the realm of foreign policy comes through clearly and faithfully. Thus, it is to this very struggle for relevance, the maintenance of image, and the prestige illusions performed by Russia and Austria-Hungary that this study now turns.

5 Taylor, Struggle for Mastery; Peter Padfield The Great Naval Race: The Anglo-German Naval Rivalry, 1900-1914 (New York: David MacKay Company, Inc., 1974); Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914 (Amherst: Humanity Books, 1980).

4 CHAPTER 2

PRESTIGE AS PANACEA? 1904-1906

If the dawning of the twentieth century represents the beginning of a new era, it is without question that the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires were anachronisms clinging with white knuckles to the glory of their pasts. The two eastern monarchs, Franz Joseph II of Austria and II of Russia were not only the sovereigns of some 150,000,000 subjects from to the Pacific, but the embodiments of the old order of absolute monarchical power, complete with forces, poverty, rampant illiteracy, and censorship of what literary or journalistic corpus existed. Each empire’s acute domestic problems, while not at a raging boil, had long been simmering. Dissatisfaction with Romanov mismanagement in Russia and the enflaming of nationalist sentiments within Austria-Hungary were problems for which both states sought solutions in the foreign realm. The Russo-Japanese War and the Austro-Serb “” were attempts to score easy victories, although over non- Great Power states, to project an image of continued relevance and strength both within their borders and without. The Russo-Japanese War The first half of the nineteenth century witnessed the Russian ’s apogee of glory, power, and influence. During the previous hundred years, the institutions of autocracy and had earned Russia’s entry onto the stage of European power politics through victories over the and Ottomans, and expansion westward at Polish expense, but Tsar I’s defeat of Napoleon in 1812-1815 vaulted the office of Tsar to the position of the most powerful in Europe and full membership in the fraternity of European Great Powers. His successor, the “Iron Tsar” Nicholas I, backed by the august and gargantuan of 1,000,000 men, furthered a myth of Russian invincibility held since Russian columns marched into a conquered Paris, by serving as the arbiter of monarchical legitimacy and the European continent’s gendarme.1

1 W. Bruce Lincoln, Nicholas I: Emperor and Autocrat of all the (DeKalb: Northern Illinois Unviersity Press, 1989), 197.

5 However, at the twilight of the same century Russia was an empire in crisis. Ever since the , its domestic situation had become increasingly volatile as deep-seated frustration with the autocracy among educated society had been steadily growing ever since the arbitrariness and backwardness of the autocratic system had been made visible by the constitutional movements of Central and Western Europe.2 Their hopes had been raised by the promise of profound social and political reform after the humiliating debacle of the in 1854, which convinced Tsar Alexander II (r. 1854-1881) that the autocracy must either grant long-discussed reforms, lose its influence in Europe or even fall victim to uprisings “from below.” Thus, in 1861, the Tsar inked the Emancipation Manifesto, liberating tens of millions of Russian serfs from bondage, and in 1864, proclaimed the creation of the , or local, elected governing bodies that gave society an outlet for political expression and involvement on the local level.3 Alexander II and his successor, Alexander III, did not share society’s enthusiasm for public participation in politics, though. They believed the reforms that had been promulgated were concessions granted of necessity, not gifts freely given for the sake of progressivism. Over the next thirty years, Alexanders II and III consciously eroded zemstva prerogatives by restricting communication between them and subordinating their budgets to provincial ’ approval. Compounding society’s frustration was the government’s obstructionism and its inability to rule effectively in the provinces, the very function for which the zemstva were created and from which they were excluded. When, for example, zemstvo agronomists attempted to warn the government in St. Petersburg that was imminent in 1892, their reports were ignored and shelved. When the predicted famine struck, though, the central government attempted to step in and provide relief, but horribly bungled the effort in the process. When Nicholas II acceded the in 1896, he proved to be just as hostile to reform as his father and grandfather, referring to the desires for greater zemstvo autonomy as “pipe dreams.” Out of this frustration coalesced a movement for the abolition of autocracy and its replacement with a constitutional regime, which would limit the power of the Tsar and and could more effectively produce the proper governance of Russia at which the autocracy had so completely failed.

2Abraham Ascher, The Revolution of 1905: Russia in Disarray (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), 14.

3 W. Bruce Lincoln, The Great Reforms: Autocracy, Bureaucracy, and the Politics of Change in Imperial Russia (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1990), 104-105.

6 Resentment among the working classes had been increasing as well. Russia’s late and rapid industrialization in the concentrated large numbers of workers in industrial , making it easy for labor organizers to find receptive ears of the workers who were resentful of squalid living conditions and oppressive treatment by factory owners. As if this were not enough, the state forbade workers’ organization, suppressed strikes with ruthlessness, and considered disobedience to employers a crime against autocracy, for which the penalty was fifteen to twenty years of hard labor. Resentment of autocracy manifested itself through political , notably of Interior Minister D.S. Sipiagin in 1902, and over five hundred strikes of a record setting 140,000 workers in St. Petersburg alone the following year.4 To stave off a perceived and potential “general explosion,” the autocracy needed to assert its effectiveness as a viable state system, or at least that it was too strong for to challenge successfully.5 At the time, Russian foreign policy was heavily geared toward East and interested, like other European powers, in claiming for itself a part of the vacuum when the Chinese Empire, suffering serious internal deterioration, finally collapsed. Although Tsar Nicholas was somewhat of a reluctant autocrat, he believed wholeheartedly in the principles and holiness of autocracy and that Russia was destined to be the world’s preeminent Great Power.6 Thus, Russian encroachment in , designed to corner the Chinese market for Russian goods, assumed a heavy-handed character, especially in Russia’s acquisition of the Liaotung Peninsula, the military occupation of after the , and encroachment in .7 But Russian policy in China was as reckless as it was aggressive. Even though Russia had wrung large concessions from China, St. Petersburg failed to consolidate and capitalize its gains. By 1903 there were neither Russian factories nor significant military bases to protect Russian holdings from the ambitions of rival expansionist empires.8

4 Ibid., 16, 22.

5 Ibid., 11.

6 William C. Fuller, Jr., Strategy and Power in Russia: 1600-1914 (New York: Free Press, 1992), 369.

7 Ibid.,374; David MacLaren McDonald, United Government and Foreign Policy in Russia, 1900-1914 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 26.

8 Fuller, Strategy and Power, 372, 274.

7 , having defeated China in the Sino-Japanese War of 1895, also had visions of imperial grandeur at Chinese expense and viewed Russian expansion with apprehension and alarm.9 The threat of war between Japan and Russia rose every year the two empires had to share Chinese possessions, and on 24 January 1904 Japan launched a surprise attack on the Russian naval base at Port Arthur, one hundred fifty miles west of Korea, initiating the Russo-Japanese War. When he received the news of the attack, Tsar Nicholas’ outrage was only matched by his confidence that victory over the “short tailed baboons” would be inevitable and swift.10 Russia was, after all, a European Great Power, whose status had been forged in battle against Napoleon. More recently, dashing Russian generals had been gaining glory and prestige subjugating and khanates in for over three decades.11 Sipiagin’s successor at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, V.K. Plehve, furthered this sentiment, advising Nicholas that a “small, victorious war” would do the state a service by projecting the strength of the autocracy inward to discourage ever-increasing revolutionary agitation.12 Plehve’s diagnosis of Russia’s fundamental domestic problem and his prescription for its treatment indicates an understanding of the link between image and internal stability. The widespread unrest, assassinations, and society’s relative indifference to them was confirmation that the autocracy’s authority or its reputation was not held in the high esteem of Nicholas I sixty years previous.13 To fix the autocracy’s image crisis, needed to witness a manifestation of the regime’s strength, and in a seemingly fortunate stroke of luck, the prospect of a lopsided war against an upstart like Japan appeared more likely by the week. To Plehve and Nicholas, it was a perfect storm. Victory against the Japanese in the field would surely bolster the autocracy’s position at home, while also permitting Russia a freer hand to expand into China free of further Japanese annoyance. It did not matter that Japan was only an Asian regional power. The lopsided win his own assessment produced would make the victory that much more glorious.

9 Ibid.

10 Bruce W. Menning, Bayonets Before Bullets: The , 1861-1914 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 152.

11 Fuller, Strategy and Power, 292.

12 Edvard Radzinsky, The Last Tsar: The Life and Death of Nicholas II (New York: Doubleday, 1992), 69.

13 Lincoln, Nicholas I, 151.

8 However, Nicholas and Plehve greatly overestimated Russia’s capability to pull off such ambitious goals, especially its domestic one, using only smoke and mirrors. While Tsarist conquests in Central Asia had been widely published throughout Russia, mud-walled forts and small bands of Turkic tribesmen were hardly fitting opponents for the same empire that had defeated Napoleon’s Grand Armee in 1812 and who had once been the dominant land power in Europe. The Japanese were entirely different foes that had been rapidly industrializing for decades and who possessed a modern and formidable navy.14 Chinese defeat at their hands in 1895 should have given the autocracy pause, but an inflated and false sense of confidence created by recent victories utterly blinded Nicholas and his advisors, who assured themselves of victory before the first shot had been fired. The facts that the bulk of was more than 5,000 miles away from Port Arthur and that Japan enjoyed total naval superiority in both the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan were not matters of concern.15 Unfortunately for the autocracy, the ensuing war, initiated in January 1904, was neither short nor victorious. Japanese divisions overran Korea by April and Port Arthur fell after a protracted siege eight months later.16 In the winter of 1905, due to confused intelligence, the absence of coordination between commanders, and supply shortages, Russian forces suffered an humiliating defeat at the , having been dislodged from their positions and nearly encircled.17 All the while, the Baltic Fleet of the had been steaming around the world to try and break the Japanese stranglehold on Port Arthur. Although the beleaguered port fell before Admiral Z.P. Rozhdestvenskii’s battle fleet could relieve it, the exhausted Russian fleet, wracked by privation and mutiny, limped into Tsushima Strait after an eight-month cruise from the . But Japanese Admiral Heihachiro Togo had been long been laying in wait, and on 28 1905 Japanese squadrons utterly annihilated the pride of the Russian navy.18 The repercussions of these defeats sent shockwaves through the Tsarist system, clearly indicative that Nicholas’ and Plehve’s efforts to bolster the regime’s reputation had had the

14 Hamilton and Herwig, Origins, 303.

15 Fuller, Strategy and Power, 398; Menning, Bayonets Before Bullets, 153.

16 Menning, Bayonets Before Bullets, 158.

17 Ibid., 192-195; Fuller, Strategy and Power, 402.

18 Fuller, Strategy and Power, 402.

9 opposite of the intended effect. Instead of projecting an image of Tsarist strength, the war broadcasted Tsarism’s real and fundamental weaknesses. Internationally, Russia’s defeat at the hands of an upstart non-European power was a humiliation of the first degree, especially for the complete mismanagement and incompetence with which bureaucrat and general alike conducted the war.19 Domestically, the tens of thousands of Russian dead and the waste of billions of graphically telegraphed the extent of autocracy’s bankruptcy as a viable political system. The government’s image had been so thoroughly tarnished by the Russo-Japanese War that Vladimir mused, “the capitulation of Port Arthur is the prologue to the capitulation of Tsarism.”20 His words nearly proved prophetic. Frustration with the regime had been amplified rather than distracted by the fighting, especially among zemstva politicians, who had petitioned the government to assist in caring for wounded soldiers, only to be denied.21 Then, on 9 January 1905, two months after the fall of Port Arthur, the dam finally burst. A crowd of over 130,000 workers went on strike in St. Petersburg and marched to the to present to the Tsar a petition for increased economic and political rights, an eight-hour working day and a national constituent assembly. The workers, led by Georgii Gapon, an Orthodox priest, were not violent or agitated, but carried icons and portraits of Tsar Nicholas while singing hymns and patriotic songs. Troops guarding the palace misunderstood the intentions of the crowds and ordered them to disperse. When they did not, gunfire raked through the ranks of the demonstrators, killing 130 and wounding nearly 300.22 The massacre triggered assassinations of police officers and demands for drastic reforms across the entire empire. But the calls for a constitution and the inclusion of Russian society in the administration of the empire were more than just requests for reform of the exclusive and “disgraceful” system.23 They were a collective vote of no-confidence in the autocratic state. The autocracy’s prestige as the benevolent, yet august, father and defender of the Russian people had

19 Hans Rogger, Russia in the Age of Modernization and Reform (New York: Longman, 1983), 178.

20 Menning, Bayonets Before Bullets, 152.

21 Lincoln, The Great Reforms, 199.

22 Daniel Balmuth, The Russian Bulletin, 1863-1917: A Liberal Voice in Tsarist Russia (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 200), 230.

23 Ascher, The Revolution of 1905, 129.

10 vanished after decades of incompetence and mismanagement. Russians no longer trusted the autocracy to rule them, but challenged its claim to unlimited power, asserting that society should take the in local governance and central administration to keep the government from further misrule. After months of prevarication and foot-dragging by the Tsar, in late September an empire-wide strike of railway workers paralyzed the whole of Russia and brought the autocracy to its knees. Lest the empire collapse and the government disappear totally, Nicholas reluctantly promulgated the October Manifesto on the 17th of that month, creating the , a nationally elected legislative body, and calling for empire-wide elections.24 The autocracy passed down since was officially over. Thus, as much as Plehve and Tsar Nicholas intended to use prestige in foreign policy to shore up autocracy’s image crisis in the minds of its Russian subjects, the autocracy would not even survive the Russo-Japanese War, which officially ended shortly before the October Manifesto’s promulgation. The government’s moral authority had virtually dissipated after its double defeat, as both Japan and the Russian people had forced Tsar Nicholas to the negotiating table to concede demands. Nicholas II, who had been anointed the autocrat of Russia, was now in some modicum answerable to his subjects, represented by the Duma deputies, who were eager to assume as much of the Tsar’s former prerogatives as possible. Its power having been threatened by a restive population and currently under assault from the upstart parliament, the monarchy needed to recoup its prestige perhaps now more than ever. The Austro-Serb Standoff The Russian autocracy was not the only state with a crisis of image and authority at the dawn of the twentieth century, though. The Habsburg ’s history throughout the previous hundred years had also followed a similar trajectory. In the seventeenth and eighteenth century, the was one of the strongest military powers on the continent, but at the turn of the twentieth century, its star had long been waning. Ingloriously defeated at the battles of Austerlitz and Friedland, Habsburg domains succumbed to occupation by the French armies of Napoleon Bonaparte in 1805.25 Although Austria’s reputation was temporarily redeemed and its place as a Great Power of the first rank restored at the in 1815, Austria’s

24 Ibid., 216, 229.

25 Hamilton and Herwig, Origins, 112-113;

11 position in Europe was maintained not by the state’s inherent strength, but by talented diplomatic balancing acts of the able, opportunistic foreign minister Clemens von Metternich.26 At the dawn of the twentieth century, the Habsburg Empire’s membership in the fraternity of European Great Powers had for decades been up for review. Nationalist revolution in 1848 made visible Austria’s weakness, as a Hungarian rising bested the Austrian army and could have toppled the state were it not for the intervention of Tsar Nicholas I and Russian armies sent to prop up the monarchic principle.27 Only eleven years later, Piedmontese and French forces wrested away from the monarchy many of its Italian possessions, nearly bankrupting it in process. Finally, and most definitively, ’s efforts toward German unity and ascendancy in achieved a significant milestone by trouncing Habsburg forces in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866.28 Such a litany of defeats was no secret, and convinced many in the twentieth century European diplomatic community that the Austrian Empire, like its Ottoman counterpart to the southeast, was on the verge of collapse. According to N.G. Hartwig, Russian ambassador to Serbia, the Dual Monarchy was the “second .”29 Compounding Austrian difficulties was the state’s awkward configuration and acute nationalities problem. For centuries, the and queens of Austria had built up the power of their domain largely through political opportunism, marriages, and treaties.30 Ever since the acquisition of the crowns of Bohemia and Hungary in 1526, the Austrian empire saw its distinctly German essence eclipsed, and became more of a patchwork of peoples with, especially in the case of Czechs and Hungarians, beloved traditions, histories, and cultures of their own.31 With seventeen different spoken languages and peoples as diverse as , Catholic , Orthodox and , and Protestant Czechs, any sort of national cohesion was completely absent, tenuously substituted by submission to their common sovereign, the

26 F.R. Bridge, The Habsburg Monarchy Among the Great Powers, 1815-1918 (Providence: Berg Publishers Ltd., 1990), 149.

27 Lincoln, Nicholas I, 290.

28 Hamilton and Herwig, Origins, 113.

29 Ibid., 129.

30 Arthur J. May, The Hapsburg Monarchy, 1867-1914 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), 6.

31 Ibid., 7.

12 Habsburg monarch. In the words of, A.J.P. Taylor, “[the] history of Austria is the history of the Habsburg dynasty; without the dynasty it would never have existed and apart from the dynasty it cannot be comprehended.”32 Because it was largely the prestige of the office of Habsburg Emperor that kept the unwieldy, polyglot, multiethnic realm from bursting at the seams, nationalist sentiments among its various subject peoples were a constant threat to the empire’s survival, a threat demonstrated graphically by the Hungarian rising in 1848. Although the Romanov dynasty had problems of its own with non-Orthodox and non-Russian peoples under its scepter, Russians’ ethnic and cultural preeminence provided a modicum of stability beyond the wildest dreams of statesmen in Austria- Hungary. Conversely, at the time of the Great War’s outbreak in 1914, the Habsburg empire’s three largest ethnic groups were Germans at 23.9%, Magyars at 20.2%, and Czechs at a distant 12.6%.33 To make matters worse, the tensions and difficulties inherent in a multiethnic society were also felt in the army, largely a hodgepodge, conscript, non-German force whose loyalties to the dynasty could never be taken for granted.34 But it was the 1.9 million Serbs under Austrian rule, a paltry 3.8% of the total population of fifty million, that caused the dynasty and its ministers its greatest concern. From its indepenence in 1878 until 1903, the was little more than a moon in Austria- Hungary’s orbit, drawn to Vienna by mutually favorable economic arrangements.35 Austria- Hungary proved an eager market for Serb grain and livestock, and found in the tiny and nascent Balkan nation a voracious consumer of Austrian machinery and other manufactured goods. Because tariffs were either low or nonexistent, the Habsburg Empire accounted for 53% of Serbia’s exports and 84% of its imports, effectively translating into Austrian economic hegemony over the small and rural Slav kingdom.36

32 A.J.P. Taylor, The Habsburg Monarch, 1815-1918: A History of the Austrian Empire and Austria-Hungary (London: MacMillan and Co., Ltd., 1942), 1.

33 Hamilton and Herwig, Origins, 114.

34 Stone, “Army and Society,” 101.

35 David MacKenzie, Imperial Dreams, Harsh Realities: Tsarist Russian Foreign Policy, 1815-1914 (Fort Worth: Harcourt-Brace, 1994), 86.

36 L.S. Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453 (New York: Rinehart and Winston, 1958), 455.

13 However, in 1903 a bloody coup d’etat removed the pro-Austrian Obrenovic dynasty from the throne. Replacing it, the quite Austro-phobic Peter Karajordevic looked to Russia as the more effective guarantor of Serb interests even though St. Petersburg had thrown Serbia into Vienna’s aegis in 1878 to win influence in .37 King Peter and his Prime Minister Nikola Pasic were determined to remove Serbia from Austrian economic and allowed the trade agreement to lapse. When Habsburg officials learned of the conclusion of a Serb customs union with Bulgaria, they balked at Serbia’s flouting of Austrian orbit and its attempt to strengthen its Balkan position at Austria’s expense.38 To Emperor Franz Joseph, this situation was intolerable. Always concerned with upholding the honor and prestige of his dynasty, he refused to allow such flagrant disrespect to go unpunished. In the hopes of bringing their obstreperous Serb satellite to heel, Habsburg officials slapped King Peter with an embargo on Serb pork, claiming the meat was diseased. Viennese newspapers published indignant and chauvinistic articles, calling on Serbia to remember its place in the Balkans vis-à-vis the Austro-Hungarian Empire and submit. As a result, a customs battle broke out in 1905, known to posterity as the Pig War, with Serb economic and Habsburg dignity on the line.39 Now that there was a breach between Belgrade and Vienna, Pasic saw and took another opportunity to flout Habsburg Balkan preeminence. His government had inherited much from the dynasty his faction had overthrown, including inferior and outmoded field artillery, according to the murdered king Alexander, worth less than the bronze from which the pieces were cast. To rectify this problem, Alexander had inked a contract with the Austrian armaments firm Skoda before his death. In keeping with his desire to untangle Serbia’s economy from Austrian , Pasic deliberately shipwrecked the second economic agreement with Austria- Hungary that year. He cancelled the agreement with Skoda, supposedly due to insufficient funds in the treasury, and in December 1904 sought a loan for more 70,000,000 francs from France, Russia, and Germany, every other European Great Power, and even , Vienna’s rival for supremacy in the Adriatic coast.40 Indignant, the Habsburg foreign office tried to pressure the

37 Charles Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism (Berkeley: University of Press, 1958), 28.

38 Stavrianos, Balkans Since 1453, 456.

39 Ibid.

14 Serbs to accept a loan from Austrian financiers, but this was smartly rebuffed.41 The gauntlet had been thrown down. To save face, Habsburg Foreign Ministry, headed by Count Alois von Aehrenthal, attempted to force the Serbs to not only reopen the contract with Skoda, but to accept the Austrian loan, offering generous terms, to pay for it. However, the Serbs did not budge, and diplomatic wrangling continued throughout 1905 and into the spring of 1906. To the Habsburgs, this was not an economic crisis, but crisis of image that was playing out through economics. By 19 April 1906, Aehrenthal all but delivered an ultimatum to Pasic’s government, demanding that the Serbs both accept the loan and purchase the Skoda artillery pieces or risk the severance of favorable tariff rates.42 Habsburg officials were indignant and embarrassed, as the empire, a European Great Power of the first rank, had been thus far unable to compel an obstreperous dependent to come to heel. For over a year, the nearly two million ethnic Serbs under the Habsburg crown had seen an independent Serbia defy the ambitions of their ruling regime. The fiasco had to end so that the illusion that Austria-Hungary was the arbiter of power in the Balkans could be salvaged, and as long as Serbia submitted to a diktat from the Dual Monarchy, the Ballhalsplatz considered it a victory. Nothing else but image could have been behind Vienna’s indefatigable determination to force Serbia, led by a government openly hostile to the Dual Monarchy, not only to buy Austrian military hardware, but to accept favorable loans from it with which to make the purchase. The situation continued to fester during the summer and autumn of 1906, as Pasic’s determination to resist Austrian pressures rose with Aeherenthal’s determination to conform Serbia’s will with Austria’s. Both governments, through mutual attempts to publically discredit the other, published dossiers of indiscretions and duplicity, but it was Austria-Hungary who came out of the crisis the most disgraced.43 After a brief but intense tariff war, the pressures from the Austrian Foreign Ministry did not cow Belgrade or bring it back into Vienna’s economic orbit. Rather, they drove the Serb government to seek new economic opportunities,

40 Jonathan A. Grant, Rulers, Guns, and Money: The Global Arms Trade in the Age of Imperialism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 200.

41 Ibid.

42 G.P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, eds. British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898- 1914, Volume V: The : The Macedonian Problem and the Annexation of Bosnia: 1903-1909 (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1928), Thesiger to Grey, No. 132, pg. 150-151.

43 Gooch and Temperley, British Documents Vol. V, Thesinger to Grey, No. 136, pg. 154.

15 such as Egypt as a cattle market and railway passage to the through Salonika. Austrian economic domination evaporated, as Serb exports to Habsburg lands dropped by a full two-thirds.44 As if that were not enough, after all the wrangling and the brouhaha over artillery pieces, in November 1906 the Serb government signed the arms contract it had wanted for fifty- six batteries’ worth of French artillery. For the Serbs, Schneider, and not Skoda, was the better option.45 Worst of all, though, Serbian prestige in the Balkans rose, which necessarily meant that the Dual Monarchy’s was eroded.46 Thus, by 1906, the Habsburg and Romanov regimes had recognized and attempted to obtain relief from their significant social problems. Unfortunately, both eastern monarchies opted to treat rather than to cure what ailed them, employing deception, smoke, mirrors, and their reputations as European Great Powers instead of meaningful reforms. As a result, the fallout from the Pig War and Russo-Japanese conflict in Manchuria left Vienna and St. Petersburg in more vulnerable positions than the ones in which they had previously found themselves. In Austria-Hungary’s case, its unsuccessful bid to in the Kingdom of Serbia and to discourage the under its own dominion resulted in the strengthening and emboldening of an anti- Austrian, Slavic state. Further east, the Russian autocracy, through a disastrous foreign war and clumsy handling of a peaceful protest, so tarnished its own image that it was forced to choose between surrendering the absolute power of the autocrat and his bureaucracy or being swept aside by the forces of change and modernization. To counter the perceptions that they were ineffective and anachronistic and to prevent any more damage, real or perceived, to their governments, Tsar Nicholas II, Emperor Franz Joseph, and their close advisors needed an opportunity to redeem the honor their realms had so ingloriously lost

44 Stavrianos, Balkans Since 1453, 457.

45 Grant, Rulers, Guns, and Money, 207.

46 Stavrianos, Balkans Since 1453, 457.

16 CHAPTER 3

THE BREACH: CRISES IN BOSNIA, 1908-1909

Clearly, 1905-1906 was a terrible year for the Romanov and Habsburg dynasties that saw their honor and reputations as Great Powers eroded in plain view of their rivals. Aehrenthal and his counterpart in the Russian foreign ministry, A.P. Izvol’skii, were eager to show Europe and their own restive subjects that the stability and viability of their regimes was still beyond reproach. To these men, it did not matter whether or not such desired displays were indicative of the truth. All that mattered was perception. Japan’s ascendancy in the Far East at Russia’s expense meant that Izvol’skii would have to shift Russian diplomatic efforts back towards Europe, specifically the Balkan Peninsula. Such a redirection of Russian foreign policy added a volatile element to an already unstable situation in southeastern Europe, as now both eastern monarchies would be competing for prestige and influence in the same region. It would not take long for the ambitions of both powers to chafe, and Austria-Hungary’s annexation of Bosnia- Hercegovina a “forgotten corner” of the Balkan Peninsula in 1908-1909 nearly brought Europe to the brink of war.1 Although the Bosnian Annexation Crisis is mentioned in nearly every work on Austro- Hungarian, Russian, and European diplomacy, scholars have largely not given it special attention. While it agrees with the assertion that what were to become the Bosnian Crises kicked off a more violent prestige rivalry between the two powers, this study’s examination of the situation departs significantly from what little attention has been given it.2 Examining the annexation of Bosnia in its own right instead of glossing over it for the sake of a broader, European-wide narrative greatly transforms the perception of just what it was. As an incident driven by the pretensions and prestige-garnering of Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Serbia, its interpretation becomes much more nuanced. This study asserts that Russia and Austria-Hungary fomented not one crisis of image, but a series of them between themselves and Serbia, who was just as involved in the game as the giants to its north and east.

1 May, Habsburg Monarchy, 403.

2 Bridge and Bullen, 1815-1914; Taylor, Struggle for Mastery.

17 Ever since the eighteenth century, Russia and Austria had had difficulties sharing the Balkans, but the Russo-Turkish War of 1878 greatly raised the stakes of the rivalry. When Russia went to war with the Porte in defense of revolting Serbs and Bulgarians, it did so having promised Austria, ever fearful of Slavic nationalism, that Russia would not carve out a large and independent Slav nation-state from liberated Ottoman territory. But Russia did just that after triumphing against the Turks on the battlefield, raising up Bulgaria from Ottoman suzerainty and incurring denunciation by Austria, Germany, and Great Britain. The European Powers compelled an exhausted Russia to sign the , which proposed a much more equitable of the Balkans, at the threat of war. Having won the war but lost the peace, Russia’s prestige was reduced with Bulgaria’s size, and tensions between Vienna and St. Petersburg skyrocketed until 1897, when the two powers agreed to put their hostility aside. For the next eleven years, the two powers kept the Balkans “on ice,” but in the wake of diplomatic humiliations at the hands of Serbia and Japan, the rivalry began to heat up once again.3 In July 1908, a coup d’etat erupted in Constantinople, led by nationalist and reform- minded army officers and bureaucrats. Their aim was to rid the Ottoman Empire of Sultan Abdulhamid’s inefficiency, arbitrariness, and overall misrule.4 Also central to the platform of the so-called Young Turks was shoring up control of the empire’s Balkan possessions, including the province of Bosnia-Hercegovina. As part of the Treaty of Berlin, signed in 1878, Vienna had been given the privilege of occupying and administrating the province in the name of the Ottoman Empire as well as the prerogative to annex it into the Habsburg Empire whenever it chose, as long as the other Great Powers agreed. Russian and Austrian diplomats observed the unfolding events in Constantinople closely, as the Young Turk coup presented them both with an opportunity to partially redeem their governments’ tarnished images. Aehrenthal was eager to initiate the formal annexation procedures and simplify the ambiguous status of the province to forestall any kind of Serb agitation. It is possible that the Habsburg foreign office planned on annexing Bosnia-Hercegovina in the near future and was only waiting only for an appropriate time. From a conversation between Izvol’skii and A. Bertie, British ambassador to France, the former claimed the Austrians had been considering 2

3 Barbara Jelavich, St. Petersburg and Moscow (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974), 231.

4 Feroz Ahmad, “The ,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 3, No. 3, The (Jul., 1968), 20.

18 December, the sixtieth anniversary of Emperor Franz Joseph’s reign, as the empire had been a “loser of territory” for years.5 Incorporating new provinces into the empire on the Jubilee of the Emperor would be invaluable for the Monarchy’s image and signal that it was viable as ever.6 Serb nationalists’ designs on Bosnia-Hercegovina were no secret, and definitively crushing their hopes at recovering the province would assert that the Habsburg, not the Karadjordevic dynasty, was the master of the peninsula.7 For his part, Izvol’skii also looked to capitalize on the Young Turk Revolution. In 1906, he had tried and failed to force Europe to recognize Russia’s prerogative to fortify Russia’s tiny Aland archipelago in the Gulf of , but events in Constantinople and Bosnia presented him with a much bigger and diplomatically relevant opportunity: lifting the Treaty of Berlin’s on the egress of Russian naval vessels from the through the Turkish Straits.8 Izvol’skii’s scheme could have been based on nothing else than his belief that throwing off the Treaty of Berlin would garner prestige for himself and the monarchy, and the latter was certainly an end Tsar Nicholas desired in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War. Izvol’skii’s plan certainly made no strategic sense, as even if he accomplished his goal, Russia’s strategic position would have been worsened. It is unlikely that any revision to the Treaty of Berlin approved by the , much less by Great Britain, would have allowed Russian ships free passage through the Straits while barring foreign vessels from entering the Black Sea through them. Russia’s had no serviceable blue-water navy, as its most powerful ships had been rusting on the floor of the Tsushima Straits since their inglorious destruction there four years previous. Until a program of naval rearmament was completed, the only serviceable fleet of the Tsar’s admiralty was the Black Sea squadron, a flotilla of cruisers and gunboats that could never hope to challenge British supremacy in the Mediterranean or even to defend Russia’s Black Sea coastline from belligerents’ battleships.9

5 Gooch and Temperley, Vol. V, Bertie to Grey, No. 293, pg. 386

6 Ibid.

7 May, Habsburg Monarchy, 403.

8 Barbara Jelavich, A Century of Russian Foreign Policy, 1814-1914 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964,) 264.

9 Gooch and Temperley, Vol. V, A. Parker’s Annual Report, No. 270, pg. 368.

19 Nevertheless, in July 1908, with the approval of the Tsar but without that of his colleagues in the War and Finance ministries, Izvol’skii secretly approached Aehrenthal at the Moravian estate of Count Leopold von Berchtold, the Habsburg ambassador to Russia. Although no records or transcripts of the meeting exist, Izvol’skii proposed a deal supposedly beneficial to both Vienna and St. Petersburg. If Austria-Hungary would support Izvol’skii in calling a conference of the Powers to discuss modifying the Treaty of Berlin, Russia would not object to Aehrenthal’s proposed annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina. St. Petersburg was not actually opposed to the annexation, but Izvol’skii saw this situation as an opportunity to obtain something for nothing, and planned to obtain Vienna’s assistance and then to reject publicly its request to the Powers to annex the provinces. Thus, Izvol’skii was out to bite the hand that fed him and score three diplomatic wins for Russia: winning the right to sally the Russian navy into the Mediterranean, humiliating Austria-Hungary and eroding Austrian influence in the Balkans. When Aehrenthal consented to the deal, Izvol’skii was convinced that he had completely duped the unwitting Viennese minister.10 What happened three months later proved to be an unmitigated disaster for Izvol’skii’s plan. Unbeknownst to the Russian minister, Aehrenthal had been in close liaison with Ferdinand of Bulgaria, an Ottoman influenced by Russia since the conclusion of the Russo-Turkish War, and suggested to him that the annexation of Bosnia would provide the perfect opportunity to his principality’s independence from the Ottoman Empire.11 On 5 October 1908 Ferdinand abruptly declared himself king of an independent Bulgaria. Russia, the liberator of Bulgaria from the Ottomans in 1878, had been expecting to guide the Bulgars to their independence under its influence, so Ferdinand’s brazen move caught Izvol’skii completely unaware. But if that was not enough, only hours later Aehrenthal proclaimed the Austrian annexation of Bosnia- as regiments of Habsburg troops marched into the provinces. Izvol’skii demanded that Aehrenthal live up to his side of the bargain, but Aehrenthal rebuked him, that Russia would receive nothing. When word of the situation and Izvol’skii’s secret deal made it back to St. Petersburg, the ministries of Finance, War, Navy, and Interior hit Izvol’skii

10 Bridge and Bullen, 1815-1914, 162

11 F.R. Bridge, From Sadowa to Sarajevo: The Foreign Policy of Austria-Hungary: 1866-1914 (London: Routledge & Keagan Paul, 1972), 304.

20 with broadsides of denunciation for his recklessness.12 Public opinion in Russia, which was decidedly apathetic to the Straits at this point, rankled in indignation and Prime Minister P.A. Stolypin was so scandalized by Izvol’skii’s cavaliering that he threatened to resign his office.13 Izvol’skii’s botched performance had touched off yet another image crisis for the Russian government. Although not an inch of Russian territory had been annexed with Bosnia- Hercegovina and although not one Russian soldier or civilian had been killed, the government had nevertheless received a monstrous black eye. Aehrenthal’s presentation of the annexation as fait accompli was a blatant disregard for Russia’s prerogative as a Congress Power to be consulted over a matter where its own interests were at stake. Ever since the defeat of Napoleon in 1815, the modus operandi of Great Power diplomacy had been cooperation and negotiation, not a diktat by one power to another. That sort of behavior was reserved for vanquished foes on the battlefield and more importantly, nations outside the fraternity of European Great Powers, as Austria-Hungary had treated Serbia during the tariff wars two years previous. Thus, Aehrenthal’s stern rebuke of Izvol’skii’s protest was Vienna’s assertion that it did not consider Russia a peer among the fraternity of Great Powers, and as such, would exclude Russia from the Balkan decision making process without repercussion. Although Izvol’skii had compromised Russia’s position, and challenged its legitimacy as a European Power, the prestige of the Russian government would hang on its response. Embarrassingly, it had none. Izvol’skii had laid out his planned Balkan deception without any sort of contingency plan. Threats of deploying the armed might of the Russian military against Austria-Hungary would ring completely hollow, as the army, disorganized and spread thin along the empire’s western frontier, was still in the process of recovery from the debacle of the war against Japan and was in no position to fight.14 Aehrenthal knew full well Russia’s deplorable military situation, as before the annexation, Austrian Chief of Staff Conrad von Hoetzendorff had presented him with a detailed report outlining Russia’s feebleness and inability to use even the threat of its military to deter Austrian ambition should the annexation provoke a crisis.15

12 McDonald, United Government, 136-137.

13 Gooch and Temperly, Vol. V, A. Parker’s Annual Report, No. 260, pg. 378; May, Hapsburg Monarch, 416.

14 Fuller, Strategy and Power, 412.; Jelavich, A Century, 264.

21 To be sure, the manner in which Austria-Hungary had annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina was an unequivocal violation of the Treaty of Berlin, as although Vienna was permitted to annex the province at its leisure, all the signatory powers had to consent and be provided compensation. Izvol’skii could only hope to rally the other Great Powers around Russia and collectively denounce Austria-Hungary’s violation of the peace of Europe. If a conference called by Russia could force Vienna to back down and renounce its bid at Balkan supremacy, Izvol’skii could potentially redeem himself for the embarrassment to which he had subjected himself and the government he represented.16 But Vienna knew of Russian military enfeeblement, which meant that the only chance for Russian success rested on Izvol’skii’s ability to persuade the other Great Powers to put sufficient diplomatic pressure on Aehrenthal. Once again, Izvol’skii would have to use smoke and mirrors to salvage Russian prestige in the face of humiliation, to reaffirm Russia’s position as a legitimate European Great Power, and to humiliate Austria-Hungary (and Aehrenthal) in return for its show of disrespect toward Russian interests.17 Although attempting another Balkan deception was a high-risk, low-reward strategy, Izvol’skii had so compromised Russia’s image that this tactic was the only ace left in his deck. Embarrassment and the threat of losing face was a powerful foreign policy tool, indeed. Having inflicted a diplomatic slap to Russia’s face, Aehrenthal and Austria-Hungary faced a potential image crisis of their own, one from which they could not back down without a humiliating loss of face. The annexation, designed to increase the Dual Monarchy’s prestige in the Balkans, now began to threaten it. Belgrade was incensed by the annexation, and nationalist Serb and politicians had seen their dreams of reattaching Bosnia-Hercegovina to Serbia proper vanish in the dust kicked up by Austrian columns marching into the province. Pasic’s government demanded compensation and sent its diplomats abroad to obtain diplomatic support for the redressing of Habsburg aggrandizement. As Izvol’skii drafted an agenda for a

15 David Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War: Europe 1904-1914 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 115.

16 Gooch and Temperley, Vol. V, Bertie to Grey, No. 332, pg. 407.

17 Gooch and Temperley, Vol. V, Hardinge to Nicholson, No. 372, pg. 434-435.

22 conference to salvage Russian image, Serbia became increasingly petulant by calling up reservists to back up its clamoring.18 In response, Aehrenthal announced to all other European powers that it would respond in kind to Serb obstreperousness. In fact, Vienna saw Serbia’s saber rattling and raised it, retaining conscript classes, calling up reservists, placing orders for artillery, and initiating partial on the Serb and Russian borders.19 The die had been cast, as a former satellite had challenged Austria-Hungary’s independent action, its prerogative as a European Great Power, and demanded of it portion of its lawful spoils. In effect, the Serbs were asserting that Belgrade, and not Vienna, was the arbiter of the Balkan status quo. For Aehrenthal to concede to Serb demands would be to surrender authority in the peninsula to Serbia, a humiliation of the highest degree, especially for a dynasty that once held sway over half of the European continent. Serb threats to respond militarily triggered yet another crisis for Russian prestige, as Izvol’skii now faced the two-pronged problem of achieving his European conference while at the same time restraining warmongering and hotheadedness in the Serb government. Although Izvol’skii resolved to back Serbia in its claims to part of Bosnia-Hercegovina, he could only do so diplomatically given the atrocious state of the Russian army and finances.20 The army was spread out, disorganized, and still licking its wounds from the drubbing it had taken at the hands of the Japanese, and even before its Manchurian debacle, secret reports to the Tsar asserted that should a war break out with Austria-Hungary in the near future, Russia would be incapable of defending itself.21 Backing Serbia jeopardized, then, what was left of Russia’s prestige, as if the conference failed and relations between Vienna and Belgrade soured to the point of war, Russia would be compelled to either defend Serbia against the Dual Monarchy with an army unfit for service, thereby risking catastrophic defeat, or to back down in humiliation. For Izvol’skii, everything hung on the success of his proposed conference. If the Russian foreign ministry saw a European conference as the means with which to preserve its image, for Aehrenthal and the Dual Monarchy, its convocation represented the consummate humiliation, and if the signatory Powers, led by Russia, forced it to repent of its

18 Gooch and Temperley, Vol. V, Grey to Whitehead, No. 337, pg. 413.

19 Ibid.

20 Stevenson, Armaments, 115.

21 Fuller, Strategy and Power, 382.

23 violation of the Treaty of Berlin, all of the other Great Powers, Serbia, and the restive Slavs would all be witness to its embarrassment. Fortunately, the Dual Monarchy had in Germany a powerful ally through the conclusions of the Three ’ League and, most recently, the Triple . Because the terms of the latter agreement specified that Germany would come to the aid of Austria-Hungary in the event that it was attacked by another power, German support for the annexation, which Aehrenthal had garnered before the current fracas, was crucial to the operation’s success. Were the situation with Serbia to deteriorate into war, if Russia stepped in to defend Serbia, it would draw a declaration of war against it by Berlin.22 In any event, Pevchevskii Most23 presented its plan to the British on 12 October and Foreign Minister Edward Grey informed an optimistic Izvol’skii that his proposal was acceptable.24 Of course, Aehrenthal thought otherwise and, taking shelter behind Vienna’s alliance with Germany, flatly refused to be hauled before the other Great Powers, asserting that it was “beneath [the Dual Monarchy’s] dignity” to be treated as an inferior amongst its peers and forced to make account of itself.25 As Austrian resistance carried the crisis into November, Aehrenthal somewhat modified his position and consented to appear at a conference. However, it was to be one on his, and not Izvol’skii’s terms. The Viennese minister maintained that Austria-Hungary would only agree to stand before the powers to hear their recognition of the annexation as a fait accompli and to hear them deny Serbia any form of territorial compensation in Bosnia, as it was a “point of honor” with Emperor Franz Joseph.26 Furthermore, Aehrenthal also blurted to the British ambassador to Austria that if Russia wanted to press the issue all the way to war over Serbia, then she would have it.27 With only diplomatic support from its allies Britain and France forthcoming, Izvol’skii’s only hope for the conference he desired was to convince Germany to influence Austria-Hungary and bring it to heel. Frustratingly for the Russian minister, Berlin made it clear that it would only agree to a conference if Vienna did so

22 Immanuel Geiss, German Foreign Policy (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976), 113-114.

23 As the Russian Foreign Office was known.

24 Bernadotte Schmidt, “The Bosnian Annexation Crisis (III),” The Slavonic and East European Review 10, No. 28 (Jun., 1931), 162; Gooch and Temperley, British Documents, Grey to Nicolson: No. 364, pg. 429.

25 Gooch and Temperley, Vol. V, Grey to Lascalles, No. 380, pg. 444.

26 Gooch and Temperley, Vol. V, Grey to Goschen, No. 583, pg. 606.

27 Gooch and Temperley, Vol. V, Goschen to Grey, No. 413, pg. 471; Goschen to Grey, No. 430, pg. 485.

24 first, pledging to back the interests of its ally and not to force the Dual Monarchy into doing anything it was not prepared to do on its own.28 Aehrenthal and Austria-Hungary thus held the trump card, as Germany’s promise of support combined with declarations of French and British unwillingness to go to war over Serb interests, left Russia diplomatically isolated and the insult to its honor unpunished.29 Izvol’skii was desperate to keep the issue open, not only to salvage some scrap of dignity for himself and the Tsarist state abroad, but because in late November the President of the State Duma, A.I. Guchkov, informed him that if Russia were compelled to back down from Austria- Hungary, the Duma would refuse to grant a loan requested by the government.30 Further motivated to maintain the government’s image in the Tauride Palace31 the beleaguered foreign minister continued to continued to support Serbia’s clamoring for compensation. The winter chill of 1908-1909 mirrored the already icy Balkan situation, as Belgrade, frustrated at the diplomatic deadlock over Bosnia-Hercegovina, became even more vociferous in its demands. In December 1908, Belgrade mobilized three army corps and called up 60,000 reservists. In a fiery speech to the Serb parliament in the first week of the new year, Serbia’s Foreign Minister Milovanovic denounced Austria-Hungary as an enslaver of the Serb population of Bosnia.32 Such statements could only encourage revolutionary activity in the newly annexed province, and Vienna responded by declaring that the Dual Monarchy was losing patience with Belgrade, that it would not tolerate further Serb insolence, and that it would match Serbia’s military preparations with its own. With war becoming ever more possible between Austria- Hungary and Serbia, Izvol’skii redoubled his efforts to council moderation and level-headedness in Belgrade to stave off war between Serbia and Austria-Hungary, whose powerful German ally would brook no aggression from Russia.33

28 Gooch and Temperley, Vol. V, Grey to Lascalles, No. 376, pg. 440.

29 Gooch and Temperley, Vol. V, Hardinge to Nicolson, No. 464, pg. 511.

30 Ibid.; Nicolson to Grey, No. 467, pg. 513.

31 The location of the Duma’s chambers and offices.

32 Gooch and Temperley, Vol. V, Grey to Nicolson, No. 479, pg. 521.

33 Gooch and Temperley, Vol. V, Cartwright to Grey: No. 483, pg. 526.

25 Events finally came to a head in late February and March 1909. By 27 February, Izvol’skii’s dreams for a conference evaporated as the French and Italian governments communicated to him their doubts that anything good would come out of it.34 The dejected Russian minister, finally accepting of the fact that Russia was powerless to affect any sort of outcome, reluctantly declared that he was throwing in his towel and that he would advise Serbia do the same. He braced himself for the backlash of Russian public opinion, and when word circulated, newspapers of virtually every stripe denounced Izvol’skii and his entire scheme as a “capitulation” and a “sacrifice of the prestige of Russia.”35 Reluctantly, the Serbs complied that day, but not in the manner Aehrenthal had hoped. Instead of recognizing the annexation and surrendering its ambitions to the Dual Monarchy, Pasic’s government maintained it would abide by any decision that the Great Powers made collectively and reaffirming its stance twice more on 10 and 14 March.36 Obviously, Aehrenthal rankled at the disrespect Serbia displaying toward its better and rejected all three notes. He was determined to bring the crisis to a close, and on Vienna’s terms, as for five months, the Dual Monarchy had allowed Serbia to defy its ambitions and wishes with regard to Bosnia, and by mid March, Austrian subjects’ frustration with the entire situation was mounting, as the economy had long since been switched to a war footing.37 Although Aehrenthal wanted to settle the crisis without war, he and his government had had enough of Serb “insolence,” once again asserting that Austria-Hungary would not allow Serbia to be dragged before the Great Powers to answer for acting in its own interest.38 Thus, Vienna made one last push to terminate the impasse by forcing the Serbs to swallow a bitter pill and submit. The flotilla of the Austrian navy was put on full alert and Habsburg troops continued mobilization along Serbia’s northern frontier. With these measures, Aehrenthal and Franz Joseph exclaimed on 19 March that Austrian troops would only stand down after the Serbs disarmed first, changed their policy towards Vienna, and promised to

34 Gooch and Temperley, Vol. V., Cartwright to Grey: No. 592 pg. 613-14.

35 Gooch and Temperley, Vol. V., Nicolson to Grey: No. 646, pg. 652.

36 Stevenson, Armaments, 120.

37 Ibid.

38 Gooch and Temperley, Vol. V, Whitehead to Grey: No. 683, pg. 679-680; Cartwright to Grey: No. 705, pg. 697.

26 “live as a good neighbor.”39 These demands were clearly designed to humiliate the Serbs by forcing them to renounce their claims to Bosnia and to change its orientation to suit the Dual Monarchy. Although Izvol’skii had incurred disgrace for blinking before Aehrenthal, he had been disturbed by the Austrian military buildup and demands on Serbia. Returning to the diplomatic scene, he continued to intercede with Austria-Hungary and the other powers to make sure that Belgrade received a fair deal. On 21 March, Izvol’skii rebuffed an Austrian settlement proposal, but the next day was blindsided by an ultimatum from Germany. Berlin demanded that Russia make a definitive statement on the annexation, either assenting to it as fait accompli or rejecting it categorically. Were Izvol’skii to refuse or make any attempt at evasion or prevarication, Germany, committed to its ally, would not restrain the Dual Monarchy should war break out with Serbia.40 Supporting Belgrade had proven to be a terrible mistake, as now Izvol’skii was forced to choose between two courses of action detrimental to Russian prestige. A pathetic military response against Austria-Hungary and Germany could be disastrous. If the frustration of faraway Manchuria had helped foment a crippling revolution at home in 1905, the consequences of defeat in or even on Russian soil could demote Russia from its rank as a European Great Power, a humiliation that could bring down the government. Conversely, refraining from conflict and allowing Austria-Hungary to overrun Serbia, another Orthodox Slavic kingdom, would confirm the perception that Russia was a paper tiger unable to defend its interests and honor.41 Izvol’skii was compelled to choose the latter, and swallowing a bitter pill, reluctantly telegraphed his government’s assent to the annexation.42 Serbia, now devoid of a Great Power advocate, followed suit on 31 March.43 The chain reaction of crises surrounding Austria-Hungary’s annexation of Bosnia- Hercegovina carried profound implications. Aehrenthal had succeeded in using humiliation as a

39 Gooch and Temperley, Vol. V, Cartwright to Grey: No. 721, pg. 707; May, Habsburg Monarch, 421.

40 Ibid., Nicolson to Grey: No. 753, pg. 727.

41 Ibid.

42 Fuller, Strategy and Power, 422.

43 May, Habsburg Monarch, 421.

27 foreign policy tool to buttress the Habsburg claim to Balkan supremacy, but victory was won at a high price. The annexation shattered the peace between Vienna and St. Petersburg, enjoyed since 1897, replacing it with a bitter resentment and vows from Russia to Serbia that vengeance would surely come.44 The incorporation of the provinces indicated that the Habsburg regime still possessed a measure of vigor, as it was not Aehrenthal’s government that suffered a pummeling to its prestige. However, what influence or strength Vienna managed to project through these crises was only a deception, as Aehrenthal’s scheme owed its success largely to Austria- Hungary’s alliance with Germany, behind whom it quickly took shelter from the threat of Serb or Russian armed intervention. For Russia, just as in 1905, a seemingly quick and easy garnering of prestige had completely backfired, further weakening its international position and leaving the Tsarist government in disgrace. The fallout from Izvol’skii’s blunder was felt within the empire as well. Coming so soon after the disasters of war and revolution, the annexation further discredited the government in the eyes of their own subjects, as even before the crisis, the Marxist deputy I.P. Pokrovskii had branded Tsarism a rotten system possessing only an illusion of strength.45 Public opinion in the empire, which for years had been growing increasingly irritated with the incompetence of the Tsar and his ministers, rankled at Izvol’skii’s cavaliering that had so compromised Russia’s image abroad. Russian newspapers even portrayed the incident as a diplomatic defeat on par with the humiliation at Tsushima.46 After Izvol’skii’s most recent Balkan humiliation, Duma deputies of nearly all parties cited ministerial incompetence in their demands for a greater role in bureaucratic oversight, particularly over issues of foreign affairs, military reform, and budgets for the navy.47 As these areas were traditional prerogatives of the Tsar and his ministers, the Duma’s clamoring for consultation in these matters was yet another

44 Ibid., 422.

45 V.V. Shulgin, The Years: Memoirs of a Member of the Russian State Duma, 1906-1917 (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1984), 56; V.N. Kokovtsov, Out of My Past, Memoirs of Count Kokovtsov (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1935), 220.

46 William Gleason, “Alexander Guchkov and the End of the ,” Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, New Series, 73, No. 3 (1983), pg. 37.

47 Rogger, Russia in the Age, 236.

28 vote of no-confidence in a government incapable of proper leadership and unable to uphold Russia’s status and dignity in Europe.48

48 Fuller, Strategy and Power, 422.

29 CHAPTER 4

MOLEHILLS INTO MOUNTAINS, 1913-1914

The Bosnian Annexation Crises affected a complete breach in Austro-Russian cooperation and reignited their dormant prestige rivalry in the Balkans. Neither power had come away from the fracas totally victorious. Russia was forced to back down in disgrace in the face of a German ultimatum while Austria-Hungary, having won a tactical image victory over both St. Petersburg and Belgrade, fostered a desire for revenge in two proud states whose ambitions had been frustrated and dignity assaulted. Such animosity and tension created a diplomatic climate in which seemingly minor issues devolved into standoffs in which prestige, national honor, and the claim to Balkan supremacy hung in the balance. Austria-Hungary and Russia involved themselves in two such entanglements in and around the Balkan peninsula in 1912-1914, staking their reputations and honor on favorable outcomes that, were prestige not a coveted foreign policy aim, would have mattered very little. Instead, Habsburg and Russian diplomats considered both the and the dispatch of a German military mission to Constantinople as opportunities to assert their governments’ claims to Great Power status. The Dual Monarchy, who lost the least as an immediate result of the 1909 imbroglio, felt compelled to maintain its momentum three times against , who challenged Vienna’s claim to Balkan suzerainty during their war with the Ottoman Empire. Although this process was long and complicated, for the purpose of this study focus will be restricted to the crises that arose during the drawing of ’s borders in 1912-1913. On Russia’s part and for the sake of its prestige, Pevchevskii Most decided to turn an admitted non- issue into a rigamarole that involved nearly the entire fraternity of European Powers. The defining feature of both empires’ reactions to crises of image continued the precedent set during the annexation of Bosnia, as the foreign ministries in St. Petersburg and Vienna tried to assert themselves while masking their relative weakness behind the combined strength of their Great Power peers. The Albanian Crucible, 1912-1913 The Bosnian Crises, which left Serbia bereaved of any hope of recovering Bosnia and which left Russia with a monstrous black-eye, suggested an Austrian desire to annex its way

30 southward down the peninsula to the port of Salonika, a possibility quite unfavorably regarded in Belgrade and Petersburg. In Russia, Izvol’skii’s misadventure at Buchlau fomented the desire to construct a military alliance among the Slavic Balkan states to block any further encroachment (and embarrassment) from Vienna. Upon Izvol’skii’s removal from his post in 1910, his successor S.D. Sazonov realized such a scheme, one that would prevent shifts in the territorial status quo.1 The last time Balkan boundaries changed, Russia suffered a dramatic humiliation. To be sure, Serbia, Bulgaria, Montenegro, and also desired such an alliance. But what the governments in Belgrade, Sofia, Cettinje and Athens had in mind was not so much a defensive pact against Austria-Hungary, but an offensive one against the Ottoman Empire. The Young Turk Revolution in 1908 showed them how unstable Constantinople could be, and confusion in the Ottoman government and army only increased their chances of snatching Turkish territory in the Balkans for themselves. Pevchevskii Most oversaw the negotiation and inking of a series of alliance treaties in 1912, the first between Serbia and Bulgaria in March, and one between Greece and Bulgaria in May. Although the treaties contained clauses that bound the Balkan nations together in the event of Austrian expansion, Sazonov was never aware of the secret provisos, ones that united the four Orthodox kingdoms in armed struggle against the Porte for their own aggrandizement.2 As the so-called was forged, Austria-Hungary rode on the coattails of its prestige triumph in Bosnia in 1909. Vienna adopted a “sphinx”-like posture to frighten Serbia into inaction, refusing to confirm or deny rumors that it intended to march to Salonika if it perceived any threat to the status quo.3 But for all the Ballplatz desired inaction in the peninsula, events beyond its control threatened to engulf the Balkans in another . Italy, simultaneously the Dual Monarchy’s rival in the Adriatic and partner in the , had also been seeking to garner prestige for itself at the Ottoman Empire’s expense. , an Ottoman vassal, lay between French and British possessions in North Africa and, due to its heritage as a prized possession of the ancient , was coveted by Italian nationalists and war hawks.4

1 Jelavich, St. Petersburg and Moscow, 268-269.

2 Rossos, Russia and the Balkans,

3 Bridge, Sadowa to Sarajevo, 339.

31 The Italian government handed down an ultimatum to the Ottomans on 28 , demanding that the latter take stronger measures to protect Italian nationals living in Tripoli, supposedly the victims of persecution.5 The Turks rejected Rome’s diktat, prompting an Italian invasion of Libya and the commencement of the Italo-Turkish War.6 As the conflict carried over into the spring and summer of 1912, the stability desired by both Vienna and St. Petersburg began to come unglued, as the preoccupation of Turkish forces in North Africa encouraged revolutionary terrorism in and general insurrection in Albania. The Porte, rocked by disorganization in the army, had wished to cut Albania loose to redeploy troops there against the Italians, suggesting to the Balkan states that the iron was rapidly approaching temperature. On 7 October and citing a history of Turkish abuse of Orthodox Slavs, the tiny declared war, and ten days later its allies joined the fray.7 The commencement of hostilities represented a diplomatic failure on the parts of both Pevchevskii Most and the Ballplatz. Sazonov had helped create a Balkan Frankenstein he could not control while Aehrenthal and Berchtold had underestimated the alliance’s capability to disturb the status quo. Regardless, the Turks proved no match for league of Christian Slavs. By the end of November, Ottoman forces had been driven out of Thessaly and Macedonia and were being besieged by the Bulgarians at Adrianople, less than fifty miles from the Ottoman capital. In the west, the were encircling the prize they desired, the Albanian of Scutari, and Serb forces occupied and Novi Pazar. As Bulgarian troops prepared to storm Turkish fortifications near Constantinople, the Porte sued for peace, overtures to which the victorious allies agreed in early December.8 As the smoke from powder and shell dissipated, a new battle began for the Ballplatz. Austria-Hungary’s arch-rival Serbia and the upstart kingdom of Montenegro had dealt the Turks resounding defeats in the Macedonian theatre and had taken possession of towns they claimed part of their natural boundaries. Their confidence was high and Vienna, the supposed arbiter of

4 Stevenson, Armaments, 225.

5 Rossos, Russia and the Balkans, 34.

6 Bridge, Sadowa to Sarajevo, 335.

7 Rossos, Russia and the Balkans, 78.

8 Ibid., 82.

32 the status quo, now had to limit their gains or watch the tiny kingdoms increase their positions in the Balkans and in the minds of Slavs under Habsburg rule. Berchtold’s ability to redraw the map along the Adriatic while conceding as little to Serbia and Montenegro as possible would determine whether or not the Dual Monarchy’s claim to Balkan supremacy, staked in Bosnia in 1909, was legitimate. Throughout the course of the war, Serbia had made known what it hoped to win from the Turks: an Adriatic port in Albania. To the Ballplatz, this possibility was out of the question. Access to open water was a pressure-release valve, as if Serbia became too obstreperous for Vienna’s liking, Belgrade could be immune from Austrian embargoes.9 The creation of an autonomous Albania and the delineation of its borders, which had been the aim of the Powers since the opening of hostilities, now assumed a greater importance for Berchtold, who “made it a point of prestige” that the new Albania’s western coastline should stretch along the entirety of the shore from the southern border of the Dual Monarchy to the northern frontier of Greece.10 Such an arrangement would not only limit Serbia’s territorial augmentation, but ensure that Belgrade remained vulnerable should Vienna need to remind it of its place in the Balkan pecking order. The Serb government knew of the Ballplatz’s scheme, though, and was just as anxious to acquire an Adriatic outlet as Vienna was to thwart it. Although it had survived the Dual Monarchy’s last effort to use economic coercion during the Pig War, Pasic and King Peter wished not to find themselves in a similar situation in the future.11 In any event, the Austro-Serb standoff over an Adriatic port became the first in a series of image crises for the Dual Monarchy, one that worsened in the face of allied victories in the fall. By the situation was so delicate that war between the two rivals was not an unrealistic possibility. Determined to effect a conclusion to a lingering Serb annoyance, throughout November the Dual Monarchy mobilized troops in case Belgrade refused to drop its pretensions and forced Vienna to defend its “European prestige.”12 On 5 December, in order to avoid a potential conflict, the British foreign office at Whitehall proposed a conference of the Great Powers to settle the issue. Although Austrian diplomats accepted the invitation, they had

9 Ibid, 84.

10 Gooch and Temperley, British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1989-1914, Volume IX, Part II: The Balkan Wars, The League and (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1934), Paget to Grey: No. 330, pg. 247.

11 Ibid., pg. 246.

12 Gooch and Temperley, Vol. IX: II, Paget to Grey, No. 331, pg. 248; Cartwright to Nicolson: No. 406, pg. 307.

33 first tried to obstruct it by refusing to participate unless the Adriatic question was taken off the table. This was a scheme which British foreign minister Edward Grey lamented as a move to make it appear that Austria-Hungary was the driving force behind the conference, and that any decision for the future status quo had come from the peninsula’s alleged hegemon on the Danube.13 On 17 December the conference convened in London and the publication of the preliminary talks three days later showed the pourparlers was a resounding victory for the Ballplatz over Serbia. Backed by its allies in the Triple Alliance, Austria-Hungary pushed through its agenda of a large and neutral Albania stretching unbroken from Montenegro to Greece. Serbia was not only barred from the Adriatic, but compelled to withdraw its troops from Albanian territories it had liberated from the Turks.14 For its part, before the conference Russia had decided that offering Serbia anything more than diplomatic support was to go further than Pevchevskii Most was willing, or able, to go. Count Benckendorff, Russian ambassador to Great Britain, offered no resistance to Vienna’s agenda, perhaps hoping to appease the Austrians at this juncture in exchange for pliancy for future negotiations.15 Serb and Russian society saw this not as a strategy, though, but a surrender to Habsburg pretensions of Balkan mastery and a humiliating loss of face. One Russian newspaper, perhaps given to hyperbole, even claimed the government had sustained defeat worse than Mukden.16 Although Sazonov and Pevchevskii Most expected Berchtold to return their conciliatory attitude, Vienna was hardly disposed to such a mood. After scoring an uncontested victory through setting Albania’s western frontier and denying Serbia its Adriatic ambitions, the task, as Berchtold saw it, was to finish the job by drawing the rest of Albania’s borders. Indicative of Vienna’s prestige as the protector of the Balkan status quo, ’ petitions had been coming into the Ballplatz requesting that Austria-Hungary design the map to include Scutari and keep the population there from falling under Montenegrin rule.17 Berchtold was determined not

13 Gooch and Temperley, Vol. IX: II, Grey to Rodd, No. 334, pg. 249.

14 Gooch and Temperley, Vol. IX: II, Grey to Cartwright, No. 391, pgs. 292-293.

15 Rossos, Russia and the Balkans, 113.

16 Ibid.

17 Gooch and Temperley, Vol. IX: II, Cartwright to Grey, No. 407, pg. 309.

34 to disappoint, and accompanied by a partial mobilization of Habsburg troops, presented his government’s proposal at a meeting of the ambassadors on 20 December. The Austrian proposal stunned the conference, as the plan granted to Albania not only Scutari, but Pec and Djakova in the north and Dibra in the east, towns Serb and Montenegrin forces had either occupied or were attempting to liberate for themselves.18 Sazonov’s tactical retreat before the Ballplatz on 17 December had proven a tremendous blunder, as now its allies Serbia and Montenegro faced the possibility of surrendering at Vienna’s mandate the territories they had won in battle. King Nikola of Montenegro, however, refused to withdraw his troops from their positions around Scutari, and Pasic audaciously proclaimed to Europe that his government would rather fight than forfeit its gains to Austrian ambition.19 After having so recently defended its status as Balkan suzerain against Serb pretensions, the Dual Monarchy had once more to respond to the prestige gauntlet cast down by Belgrade and Cettinje or allow two upstart kingdoms to defy its wishes in full view of Europe. Even more urgently, the tense situation quickly worsened as armistice negotiations between the Turks and Slavic allies deteriorated on 30 January after showing signs of strain for weeks. The Balkan League reopened its offensives on all fronts shortly thereafter, and as the Bulgarians prepared for an offensive in Eastern , Montenegrin forces, reinforced by Serb regiments, enthusiastically resumed the Siege of Scutari.20 Belgrade’s and Cettinje’s aims enjoyed the open support of Pevchevskii Most, as Sazonov was loathe to repeat his recent humiliation during the Austrian delimiting of Albania’s western frontier. Russian public opinion had been stirred to anger at his perceived capitulation and would not be satisfied if both Balkan states were compelled to abandon their prizes after a diktat from Vienna. Although backing Serb and Montenegrin aggrandizement in Albania was the ideal outcome, as long as one kingdom or the other profited against Austrian wishes, Sazonov could claim victory, wash his hands of the situation, and bow out without a loss of face.21 Achieving a peaceful and dignified exit from the controversy would prove incredibly difficult, though, as neither Tsar Nicholas nor Sazonov were disposed to risk war over this issue.

18 Gooch and Temperley, Vol. IX: II, Grey to Goschen, No. 398, pg. 298; Rossos, Russia and the Balkans, 114.

19 Gooch and Temperley, Vol. IX: II, Paget to Grey, No. 427, pg. 324.

20 Rossos, Russia and the Balkans, 120-121.

21 Gooch and Temperley, Vol. IX: II, Grey to Buchanan, No. 507, pgs. 406-407.

35 The wheels of military reform had been turning since the war with Japan, but the Russian army was still in no position to lock horns with Austria-Hungary and Germany over a Balkan controversy blown out of proportion. For the Ballplatz, Montenegro’s determination to take Scutari and Serbia’s refusal to drop its demands for Dibra and Djakova was eroding the Dual Monarchy’s prestige in the peninsula, which Habsburg statesmen considered a threat to the empire’s survival. The fact that Austrian troops had been mobilized in December to project Habsburg resolve meant that, whether or not Vienna would actually go to war to enforce its proposal, the possibility of intervention was at least within the range of possibility.22 By late , Montenegro and Serbia had refused to yield to a collective demarche from the Concert of Europe asserting the fate of Albania’s borders was the prerogative of the Great Powers. Although Berchtold would have preferred to deny the two belligerents the fruits of their struggle, the fact that the issue had not been resolved after two months was becoming a problem.23 Embarrassingly, Serb and Montenegrin troops were still in the trenches around Scutari in full defiance of Vienna, a European Great Power of the first rank. Choosing to end the situation and compromise, Berchtold executed an abrupt volte face on 21 March. In exchange for the promise to protect the Catholic minorities in Dibra and Djakova, the would be ceded to Belgrade and compensation to Cettinje discussed as long as the siege of Scutari were lifted.24 Although the Powers collectively ratified this decision the next day, King Nikola and Belgrade rejected the olive branch and refused to quit the field or the struggle for the beleaguered town.25 At this point, Vienna was fast losing patience. Issuing collective demarches without any threats behind them was not affecting a satisfactory outcome and was making the Dual Monarchy appear powerless, or at least unwilling, to impose its will. Thus, on 24 March, Berchtold fired a warning across Montenegro’s bow, stating that if its troops were not immediately marched from Scutari, “coercive measures” would be taken against it, a prospect that alarmed diplomats from both of Europe’s alliance blocs.26 Although St. Petersburg was

22 Gooch and Temperley, Vol. IX: II, Paget to Grey, No. 331, pgs. 247-248; Rossos, Russia and the Balkans, 116.

23 Gooch and Temperley, Vol. IX: II, Grey to Paget, No. 739, pg. 606.

24 Gooch and Temperely, Vol. IX: II, Grey to Buchanan, No. 742, pg. 608.

25 Gooch and Temperley, Vol. IX: II, de Salis to Grey, No. 811, pg. 657.

36 annoyed with Nikola’s hotheadedness, Russia could never permit Austria-Hungary to overrun Serbia, who was bound by its alliance with Montenegro to come to its aid if attacked. To avert disaster from unilateral Austrian intervention in defense of its prestige, Whitehall proposed a collective naval demonstration along the Montenegrin coast, hoping an show of force would be enough to convince King Nikola to respect Europe’s wishes and to uphold the “dignity” and “self-respect” of the Great Powers.27 Berchtold was enthusiastic about this idea. Even though his office had threatened Montenegro with reprisal, war with the Cettinje and Belgrade was the absolute last recourse for defense of prestige. Armed conflict was risky--if Habsburg forces met with defeat at the hands of the upstart Slavs, the consequences from such a loss of face could be incalculable. The Ballplatz sought an easier solution if it could be found. Grey’s proposed naval demonstration would allow Austria-Hungary to take action against Montenegro while hiding its weakness behind the combined strength of the German and British navies. As in the Bosnian Crises in 1908-1909, the stiffness of the Monarchy’s defense of its image as Balkan suzerain would be made or broken by other Powers’ willingness to support it. Russia naturally refused to participate in a punitive exercise against a Slavic kingdom, and France abstained out of loyalty to Russia and their own separate military alliance. On 5 April, a delegation of British, German, Italian and Austrian naval officers issued an ultimatum to Cettinje to lift the siege or face blockade. It was immediately and unconditionally refused.28 The blockade commenced on 10 April, but even with an international squadron patrolling Montenegro’s Adriatic coastline, the attempted intimidation of King Nikola proved pathetic in the end. Although it was enough to compel the Serbs to withdraw their forces from Scutari, the town fell to Montenegrin arms two weeks later, prompting an all-out assault against Berchtold from the Hungarian press.29 The maligned foreign minister was blasted for allowing such a ridiculous and embarrassing situation to drag on unresolved for months. Stinging from Montenegro’s insolence and the scathing criticism levied against him, Berchtold issued a circular

26 Gooch and Temperley, Vol. IX: II, Grey to Cartwright, No. 751, pg. 616.

27 Gooch and Temperely, Vol. IX: II, Grey to Cartwright: No. 760, pg. 622; Bertie to Grey, No. 794, pgs. 643-644.

28 Gooch and Temperely, Vol. IX: II, Admiralty to Foreign Office, No. 809, pg. 656; de Salis to Grey, No. 811, pg. 657.

29 Gooch and Temperley, Vol. IX: II, de Salis to Grey, No. 872, pg. 709.

37 to the Concert of Europe, asserting that if more forceful collective measures were not employed against Montenegro, the Dual Monarchy would take matters into its own hands. According to the assessment of the British ambassador to Vienna, Sir. F. Cartwright, the Habsburg government simply could not yield another inch to Slav ambition lest it “lose all its prestige in the Balkans.”30 For Berchtold and the Ballplatz the situation was untenable. At this point, continuing to rely on European cooperation was to reap a barren harvest. South Slavic impudence had to be crushed, as the Dual Monarchy was hemorrhaging prestige in the eyes of its subjects, its rivals, and the fraternity of Great Powers. And when Berchtold’s proposal for a collective European military expedition to Scutari met with refusal from Russia and their Entente allies, Vienna entered into negotiations with Italy for a joint invasion, expulsion of Montenegro from Scutari, and division of Albania into Austrian and Italian spheres of influence.31 With the threat of Austro-Hungarian military action commencing any day, on 4 May, King Nikola’s government, exhausted and nearly bankrupt from the protracted campaign, telegraphed its decision to withdraw from the town.32 As Montenegrin columns marched for home, the whole of Europe breathed a sigh of relief. The standoff between Vienna and Cettinje over Balkan mastery had not produced its bitterest of possible fruits, general European war. Berchtold, though, was disappointed. Not only had he miscalculated the Balkan League’s disruptive power, but the Ballplatz’s lack of resolve to end the standoff throughout the winter and spring of 1913 allowed a tiny and poor kingdom to flout the wishes of a European Great Power with impunity. The government had looked ridiculous to Habsburg subjects and was the object of discussion throughout the European diplomatic community. Indeed, one British diplomat remarked that this time Austrian prestige, and not Russian, had sustained the most damage from a Balkan imbroglio.33 King Nikola’s retreat seemed to indicate that the turbulence caused by the Balkan League’s war against the Porte was at long last subsiding. The conflict ended with Turkish surrender and on 30 May, Serbia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria even signed the ,

30 Gooch and Temperley Vol. IX: II, Cartwright to Nicolson, No. 891, pg. 721-722.

31 Gooch and Temperley Vol. IX: II, Buchanan to Grey, No. 956, pg. 773.

32 Gooch and Temperley, Vol. IX: II, De Salis to Grey, No. 948, pg. 766.

33 Gooch and Temperley Vol. IX: II, Buchanan to Grey, No. 975, pgs. 792-793.

38 in which the allied governments formally acknowledged the Great Powers’ prerogative to decide the remainder of Albania’s borders. However, for the Dual Monarchy, the peace was only the eye, and not the end, of the storm. In late June, the victorious Balkan League collapsed due to squabbling over the division of the alliance’s Macedonian spoils. Bulgaria, feeling cheated by Belgrade at the negotiating table, launched an attack on Serb forces on 29 June, igniting a second Balkan conflagration.34 The Bulgars were the early favorites and Austria-Hungary, who considered any Serb disgrace a win for Vienna, backed Sofia in the struggle hoping to humiliate its rival vicariously. However, throughout summer 1913, Bulgarian arms capitulated under the combined weight of a secret Serb alliance with Greece and an opportunistic Romanian invasion from the north. At the signing of the Treaty of in August, Bulgaria surrendered most of is Macedonian territory to Serbia and Greece on Berchtold’s promise that the Ballplatz would obtain a future revision favorable to Sofia.35 Austria-Hungary, though, failed to deliver. Germany had been struggling with France for influence in Athens and, as both Greece’s and ’s monarchs were relatives of Kaiser Wilhelm, Berlin considered the treaty final. Neither Russia nor Italy chose to weigh in on the issue and, diplomatically isolated from its own partners in the Triplice, Berchtold’s government was powerless to prevent Serb aggrandizement at Bulgaria’s expense. As if this humiliation was not enough, Belgrade threw down the prestige gauntlet for a third time in September, flexing its muscles and questioning the limits to which the Dual Monarchy would defend its Albanian mandates. This time, Serbia asserted Austria and the Powers had done a poor job of state-building. It maintained the region’s ethnic and religious heterogeneity had been made even more unstable due to boundaries drawn to suit the political ends of the Great Powers..36 Even though Belgrade had withdrawn its troops from the siege of Scutari, Serb regiments had not yet evacuated all of the territory allocated to Albania by the Powers. In September, Pasic’s government began reinforcing the occupying units, claiming Albanian partisans, armed and encouraged by Vienna,

34 Rossos, Russia and the Balkans, 189

35 Bridge, Sadowa to Sarajevo, 357-358.

36 Gooch and Temperley, British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, Volume X (Part 1): The Near and Middle East on the Eve of War (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1936), Crackanthorpe to Grey: No. 6, pg. 5.

39 were trying to foment disorder in Serbia. The Concert of Europe, Belgrade continued, was responsible for the disorder and if it would not fix the situation, Serbia would take it upon itself to settle the matter and act unilaterally to protect its interests. On 19 September the Serb Foreign Minister S. Gruic even went so far as to demand an indemnity from the fledgling Albanian government, an unambiguous slight to the Dual Monarchy’s authority.37 Action of this kind represented yet another challenge to Austria’s reputation in the Balkan Peninsula. Although technically in defiance of the entire Concert’s wishes, Vienna felt the sting of Serb intransigence most acutely, as it was the Power with the most prestige invested in the Balkan status quo. Belgrade’s obstreperousness was, in effect, an accusation that Austria- Hungary, even if it were the Balkan suzerain, was incapable of fulfilling this role and maintaining order in the region. Although no shot had been fired against Austria, it was clear that Belgrade wanted to toy with Berchtold and see how much disgrace could be piled upon the Habsburg government before it stood up for itself. Like Russia during the Annexation Crises, Austrian prestige would either be eroded or confirmed by its response. Serb timing made the situation incredibly difficult, as Austrian troops mobilized during the turmoil of the past ten months had been sent home after the prospect of war with Montenegro had dissipated. Mobilizing them again, should Serb pretension push Vienna that far, would be extraordinarily costly to the empire’s economy.38 Emperor Franz Joseph, however, was determined that no cost be spared to protect the dignity and status of his empire from Belgrade’s obstreperousness. An encore performance of the embarrassing struggle with Montenegro was simply not an option. Thus, during the first half of October Berchtold entered into negotiations with Italy and Germany for collective pressure to be brought upon Belgrade. The Ballpaltz needed no reminder of the recent unpredictability of collective diplomacy, but as long as Vienna was the lone voice in the wilderness, it was confident that Serbia would never respect its admonitions.39 Berchtold penned a forceful note to the Serbs demanding a halt to advances in Albania and acquiescence to the mandate of the London Conference, accompanied by a declaration to Berlin that he hoped for German support

37 Ibid.; Communication from M. Gruic, No. 12, pg.9.

38 Gooch and Temperley, Vol. X: I, Goschen to Nicolson, No. 42, pg. 36.

39 Gooch and Temperley, Vol. X: I, Cartwright to Grey, No. 28, pg. 22.

40 of his resolve.40 Both Rome and Berlin agreed to back Vienna in collective measures against Serbia, and not a moment too soon. Belgrade flouted Berchtold’s command not to violate any more of Albanian territory by ordering Serb forces to advance on three fronts, claiming continued disorder and violence from Albanian guerillas.41 In response, on 17 October, the Ballplatz issued an ultimatum to Serbia requiring a complete withdrawal from Albania within eight days time. Italy and Germany were taken completely by surprise, but since the deed was done, were compelled to back Berchtold’s bold move to avoid publicly humiliating their ally by undercutting its authority. Although the Serbs initially maintained their right to act in self-defense, Belgrade, for a third time in a year, bowed to Austria’s wishes on 22 October and pulled its troops from Albania.42 Austria-Hungary’s “gambl[e] for her position as a Great Power” had worked.43 Berchtold’s brinksmanship forced his allies to consider Austria’s and the alliance’s prestige as one in the same. Instead of hoping to marshal support before proceeding, he obtained the backing of the Triplice Powers by presenting a fait accompli to Berlin and Rome. As a marked contrast from Vienna’s dealings with Montenegro throughout spring 1913, the Ballplatz’ decisiveness rectified some of the damage to its image from the fiasco with King Nikola. Serbia accepted the outcome of the matter rather quietly as a whole, although the opposition to Pasic’s government tried to use the humiliation to discredit it in the eyes of the Serb people.44 Vienna’s prestige also rose in the eyes of its ally in Berlin. Though originally surprised by the sudden Austrian ultimatum, Kaiser Wilhelm lauded his ally’s resolve to avoid disgrace at the hands of an upstart Balkan power. He remarked that Austria-Hungary had for once “shown her teeth.”45 Masking its weakness behind the curtain of the Triple Alliance, Austria-Hungary’s reputation as Balkan hegemon had been maintained more-or-less, but as in 1909, its prestige came at a price. Pasic, whose government had been once more despoiled of territory and humiliated in the eyes of

40 Gooch and Temperley, Vol. X: I, Goschen to Grey, No. 38, pg. 32.

41 Gooch and Temperley, Vol. X: I, Crackanthorpe to Grey, No. 41, pg. 35.

42 Gooch and Temperley, Vol. X: I, Grey to Cartwright, No. 51, pg. 44.

43 Gooch and Temperley, Vol. X: I, Goschen to Grey, No. 46, pg. 39.

44 Gooch and Temperley, Vol. X: I, Crackanthorpe to Grey, No. 53, pg. 46.

45 Gooch and Temperley, Vol. X: I, Cartwright to Grey, No. 57, pg. 49; Bridge, Sadowa to Sarajevo, 360.

41 Europe, declared in that he doubted the possibility of any significant improvement of relations with the Dual Monarchy.46 He could not have known how prophetic his observation would be less than one year later. The Von Sanders Crisis, November 1913- Autumn 1913 also presented Sazonov and Pevchevskii Most with a prestige battle of its own. However, instead of squaring off against a tiny Balkan rival, Sazonov’s ministry locked horns with Imperial Germany in a showdown for supremacy in Constantinople and the Turkish Straits. As discussed earlier, the formation of the Balkan League and the subsequent battle over Albania had been another black eye for a government whose reputation in Russian society was fast in decline. Sazonov intentionally provoked the von Sanders Crisis, suggesting that he had been scanning the horizon for an opportunity to offset the damage from the capitulation over the Adriatic question. From the very beginning of the fracas, Russian diplomats recognized the primacy of prestige in fueling the controversy, especially when it became clear that the Germans were unwilling to change their plans to suit Russian interests. The problem for Russia, once again, was in compelling a rival to respect its wishes without resorting to war. To achieve this, Pevchevskii Most sought, as did Austria-Hungary with the Conference’s mandates, to hide its weakness behind the collective strength of the , and to claim victory for the Russian government in the event of a successful outcome. Salient studies of pre-war European diplomacy and politics have given this event remarkably short shrift. This is probably attributable to the large scope of texts like Barbara Jelavich’s St. Petersburg and Moscow (1976) and F.R. Bridge and Roger Bullen’s The Great Powers and the European States System, 1815-1914 (1980). The authors of these works, in order to achieve a synthesis of a century of Russian and Concert diplomacy, sacrificed an in- depth discussion of the von Sanders Crisis. While studies of this sort are highly effective in their own right, their broad strokes leave exploitable lacunae for nuanced discussions.47 A more recent work, David McDonald’s United Government and Foreign Policy in Russia, 1900-1914 (1992) has examined the controversy more closely, but primarily in the context of Prime Minister V.N. Kokovtsov’s political dénouement, not in terms of Russia’s protracted battle for Balkan

46 Gooch and Temperley, Vol. X: I, O’Beirne to Nicolson, No. 62, pg. 53.

47 Bridge and Bullen, 1815-1914; Dietrich Geyer, Russian Imperialism: The Interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policy, 1860-1914 (Berg: Leamington Spa, 1977); Jelavich, St. Petersburg and Moscow; Rossos, Russia and the Balkans.

42 prestige.48 This study, however, considers the von Sanders Crisis an important component in a narrative of Pevchevskii Most’s determination to project an image of strength to its allies, enemies, and subjects. It employs and furthers the emphases of ’s War of Illusions: German Policies from 1911-1914 (1969), a work that asserts the important role of image and prestige in aggressive foreign policy.49 The inefficiency, turbulence, and ineffectiveness of the Ottoman government had worried Europe for years. Fearful of an inevitable and dangerous scramble for Turkish territory should Europe’s “Sick Man” finally die, the Great Powers took serious interest in propping up the regime and the Balkan and Middle Eastern status quo. By 1913, France, Great Britain, and Germany had all dispatched advisors to the Porte to assist in reforming various branches of the Ottoman State according to their own expertise. British naval officers worked with their Ottoman counterparts to increase the fighting capacity of the Sultan’s fleets, and the Triple Alliance also had representatives in Constantinople, namely German army officers charged with turning the Ottoman army, in disarray from the recent Balkan Wars, into a respectable and effective force. It was the latter situation that Sazonov sought to use to his advantage. In October 1913, Berlin announced the dispatching of a fresh mission to Constantinople under the direction of the highly capable Lieutenant-General Otto Liman von Sanders.50 His delegation of thirty officers, however, was to be invested with “considerably extended powers” including command of the military schools, seats on the General Staff of the Turkish Army, oversight of coastal fortifications and command of the Turkish 1st Army Corps. These prerogatives, greatly expanded from a previous German mission, were the result of Kaiser Wilhelm’s desire to prop up the Ottoman sultanate to ensure the security of German economic ventures in the Ottoman Empire.51 The preparation for this mission had been months in the making, and in May, Kaiser Wilhelm used the opportunity of the marriage of his daughter, Princess Louise, as a sounding board to ascertain his royal cousins’ attitudes towards the plan.

48 McDonald, United Government, 196-197.

49 Fritz Fischer, War of Illusions: German Policies from 1911-1914 (Trans. Marian Jackson, New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1975), viii.

50 Ibid., Mallet to Grey: No. 376, pg. 338.

51 “The Mission of Liman von Sanders. II. The Crisis,” The Slavonic Review 6, No. 17 (), 349.

43 Both King and Tsar Nicholas, who attended the nuptials, expressed no concern at the new delegation. Even though Wilhelm did not mention the specifics and increased scope of what was to be the von Sanders mission, Nicholas’ purported response to Wilhelm’s inquiry was that propping up the Turkish forces would be beneficial to Russia. At that time, the Bulgarians were besieging the lines at Chatalja, only thirty miles from the Straits, in the Balkan League’s renewed offensives against the Porte after the breakdown of the December peace talks. St. Petersburg had been adamant that no other state aside from Russia, ideally, or the Ottoman Empire, realistically, should control Russian access to the Mediterranean.52 Regardless of Nicholas’ enthusiasm or the extent to which he knew his cousin’s ambitions, the fact of the matter was that the Tsar originally considered the German military mission an issue of minimal importance. In fact, Nicholas did not even bother to inform Sazonov the Germans were sending a new team of advisors to Constantinople!53 It was not until October 1913 that any Russian statesman other than the Tsar was made aware of von Sanders’ impending reassignment to the Ottoman capital. When Prime Minister V.N. Kokovtsov as well as Pevchevskii Most learned the extent of von Sanders’ responsibilities, they interpreted Berlin’s action as provocative and “obviously unfriendly” toward Russia.54 They claimed that since von Sanders had the privilege of inspecting forts, his mission would supervise the strengthening of Turkish defenses in the , compelling Russian ships to run a harrowing gauntlet in the event of war.55 Although Deputy Foreign Minister A.A. Neratov claimed that “everything” that happened in the vicinity of the Straits was of the utmost importance to Russia, it is important to this study that Sazonov had raised no objection to London’s dispatching of naval officers to oversee improvements to the , which was attempting to acquire battleships.56 The selectivity with which the government picked its battles is indicative of prestige’s centrality as a foreign policy goal. If control of the Straits themselves were the motivating factor for Russian diplomacy, the improved and

52 “The Mission of Liman von Sanders. I. Its Origin,” The Slavonic Review 6, No. 16 (Jun., 1927), 18.

53 Ibid., pg. 25.

54 Fischer, War of Illusions, 338.

55 Kerner, “Liman von Sanders. II,” 346.

56 Geyer, Russian Imperialism, 285.

44 dreadnought-studded Ottoman Navy should have been as scandalous as the von Sanders mission. Certainly this would have represented a serious threat to Russia’s Black Sea coastline and to the flotilla anchored there. Furthermore, S.N. Sverbeyev, Russian ambassador to Germany, admitted in November that the situation constituted “not [emphasis added] a military, but a political, question of the highest importance.”57 In other words, the controversy really turned on which power, Russia or Germany, wielded the moral authority in the region. In any event, the mercurial Tsar Nicholas was persuaded that Russia should in fact respond to what appeared as German aggression, and in early November Sazonov set to work to obstruct German ambition in the Balkans. Before taking any action, Pevchevskii Most first sought to marshal the support of its allies in the Entente, as Russia’s success or failure depended on the willingness of its allies to support it. Even the British recognized Russia’s relative weakness, as one diplomat remarked that although Sazonov had “used strong language” at Berlin in protest of the von Sanders mission, it was unlikely that Russia could achieve anything by itself.58 To Sazonov, if the Triple Entente could be of one mind on this issue, Germany would surely modify the terms of von Sanders’ appointment, increasing not only the prestige of Russia, but of the alliance as well.59 By , Sazonov was heavily invested in forcing a change in the Constantinople situation. Berlin declined his request to remove von Sanders from command of the 1st Army Corps, claiming that if Germany made any changes in the face of Russian protests, it would appear to the Turks as a retreat and a loss of face.60 Von Sanders would retain the prerogatives entrusted to him by Berlin’s original plan, compelling St. Petersburg to act decisively or risk another surrender to Germanic ambition a year after its capitulation to Austria on the Adriatic question. Neither Germany nor Russia wanted to appear weak, the former for the sake of its economic aspirations in the Middle East and the latter to avoid another disgrace in the eyes of its citizens, whose antipathy against Germany had been steadily rising.61

57 Kerner, “Von Sanders II,” 347

58 Gooch and Temperley, Vol. X: I, O’Beirne to Nicolson, No. 382, pg. 342-343.

59 Gooch and Temperley, Vol. X: I, O’Beirne to Grey, No. 385, pg. 345.

60 Gooch and Temperley, Vol. X: I, Grey to O’Beirne, No. 386, pg. 346.

61 Geyer, Russian Imperialism, 297, 299.

45 Russian representations in Berlin thus rebuffed, Sazonov decided to circumvent the Germans by forcing the Porte, through boycotts and the threat of breaking off diplomatic relations, to cancel the mission.62 For this approach to succeed, though, he needed to convince his allies to back him and prop up the force of Russia’s demands with the weight of the Triple Entente. On 24 November, Sazonov sent out feelers to Paris and London, requesting their assistance and claiming that von Sanders’ command of a Turkish division upset the balance of power in Constantinople and entitled them to compensation. French Foreign Minister Steven Pichon responded positively to the communication from Pevchevskii Most and agreed that, given Berlin’s intransigence, collective pressure on the Ottomans was an appropriate step.63 The British attitude towards the matter, however, was markedly cooler. Sir L. Mallet, ambassador to the Porte, claimed that London could not justifiably join Russia in claims for compensation, as the British Admiral Arthur Limpus was serving in the same capacity in the Turkish Navy as was von Sanders for Ottoman ground forces. In addition, London’s relations with Berlin had been improving as of late, and Whitehall was in no hurry to risk damaging them over a spat between Russia and Germany, especially one in which British interests were in no way threatened.64 Instead of locking step with Russia and France, Britain sought to trod down a less confrontational path by sending a separate inquiry to the Porte to ascertain the full extent of von Sanders’ influence in Constantinople.65 Sazonov was adamant that the Triple Entente flex its muscle on this issue, especially because the apathy of Russia’s allies had paid humiliating dividends for Russian prestige in the Bosnian Crises four years previous. As diplomats from Pevchevskii Most and their Parisian confederates in the Quay d’Orsai crafted their demarche to the Turks, Sazonov became highly displeased to learn that the British were unwilling to join the collective presentation of the Entente’s demands to the Porte. The Russian minister upbraided his colleagues at Whitehall for their lack of resolve to stand with its alliance partners. British support was crucial for the success of the whole venture, as only a united front could force the Turks to conform to Russia’s

62 Gooch and Temperley, Vol. X: I, Oberine to Grey: No. 406, pg. 361.

63 Kerner, “Von Sanders II,” pg. 356.

64 Gooch and Temperley, Vol. X: I, Mallet to Grey, No. 403, pg. 358; Goschen to Nicolson, No. 424, pgs. 376-377.

65 Gooch and Temperley, Vol. X: I, O’Beirne to Grey, No. 425, pg. 378.

46 wishes. And in order to cover all contingencies, Saznov wished to fortify his demands with the might of the British Navy should Kaiser Wilhelm threaten war over the issue.66 In spite of Sazonov’s chastisement of Whitehall, Pevchevskii Most had to sacrifice the sternness of its planned demarche to present a united front. Pichon felt Grey’s proposed inquiry of the Turks was enough, and Sazonov reluctantly endorsed it as well to feign unity among the Entente partners. On 13 December, the Russian, French, and British ambassadors to the Ottoman Empire each read the copy of Grey’s inquiry to the Grand Vizier, a pathetic and almost comical scene that Sazonov considered a complete failure. The Porte retorted that von Sanders would retain his position and that administration of the Dardanelles forts was the prerogative of the Ottoman Minister of War, anyway. That evening, Sazonov fumed at the weakness of the Entente’s representation at Constantinople, again criticizing British hesitancy and blaming London for the Powers’ ridiculous showing earlier in the day.67 Whitehall, in response, asserted Pevchevskii Most should watch its language and actions, as Russia would be in a terrible position should its bluffs behind the shield of the Triple Entente be called.68 For the next two weeks the situation remained at deadlock. Neither the Turks nor the Russians refused to budge on the issue, and to the Germans, the unresolved controversy was fast becoming an annoyance. Berlin proposed that Russian and German military attachés convene a meeting to discuss a compromise, whereby von Sanders would forfeit his command of the 1st Corps to a Turkish officer and transfer the mission to Adrianople. Sazonov was reportedly pleased with the arrangement.69 Pevchevskii Most, seeing a conclusion on the horizon, pushed to terminate the matter quickly so as to paint the alteration of von Sanders’ appointment as a diplomatic victory for the Russian government. But Germany was also concerned about the manner in which its general departed the Ottoman capital. Knowing the Russians were looking for “only the semblance of something” and mindful of its own public’s opinion, Berlin intended the transition to be concluded “after several months” to avoid the appearance of a surrender to

66 Ibid.; O’Beirne to Grey, No. 412, pg. 365-366.

67 Gooch and Temperley, Vol. X: I, O’Beirne to Grey, No. 439, pgs. 389-390; Kerner, “The Mission of Liman von Sanders. (III),” The Slavonic and East European Review 6, No. 18 (March 1928), 550..

68 Gooch and Temperley, Vol. X: I, Buchanan to Grey, No. 440, pgs. 390-391.

69 Gooch and Temperley, Vol. X: I, Buchannan to Grey, No. 446, pgs. 394-396.

47 Russian wishes.70 Against the Kaiser’s proposal, M.N. Giers, Russian ambassador to Constantinople, expressed his government’s desire that the matter be finished in the coming fortnight. At loggerheads over the timetable, negotiations bogged down and sank before the end of the month.71 To Sazonov’s chagrin and embarrassment, the crisis remained open and von Sanders still retained his command in the Ottoman capital. His failure to stand up for Russian interests in Constantinople prompted a barrage of criticism from all stripes of the Russian press not only of Pevchevskii Most, but of the Triple Entente’s bankruptcy. Determined to achieve some sort of outcome in the matter, Sazonov found himself in a similar situation to that of Berchtold in September. Like the Ballplatz in its struggle against Serbia, Pevchevskii Most’s comrades had failed it. Unwilling to resort to armed confrontation, Sazonov’s government was losing face every day the terms of the German mission remained unaltered. Thus, on 5 January 1914, Sazonov informed the British that an extraordinary session of the Council of Ministers would be called in St. Petersburg to discuss means to pressure the Turks into canceling the von Sanders mission.72 Ultimately, the deliberations between Sazonov, Kokovtsov, and the chiefs of the Naval and War Ministries came to naught, and it was Germany who brought the matter to a close on its terms, and quickly at that. As Sazonov’s primary issue with the military mission had been that a German general was commanding a Turkish army corps in Constantinople, Berlin neatly sidestepped the complaint by promoting von Sanders to , an action of which the Russian government was made aware on 16 January. As a Marshal, the command of a single army corps was not befitting of von Sanders’ rank, and his new office, that of Inspector General of the Turkish Army, had been the position of the head of the previous German mission, General von der Goltz. Although Pevchevskii Most could not object with justice to this turn of events, it was highly dissatisfied with the outcome. Sazonov’s office had failed to pressure both the Turks and the Germans to modify the von Sanders mission to suit Russian wishes, and neither could it convince its allies to support it. The British were at a loss to explain the sulking in St.

70 Kerner, “von Sanders III,” 557.

71 Gooch and Temperley, Vol. X: I, Buchannan to Grey, No. 451, pgs. 399-400.

72 Gooch and Temperley, Vol. X: I, Buchanan to Grey, No. 459, pg. 409.

48 Petersburg.73 After all, von Sanders was no longer in command of the 1st Army Corps, and any fears of his exercising undue influence by virtue of his status in the capital had been allayed. As Inspector General, he could do nothing more than his predecessor, whose appointment the Tsar had never protested. However, to Sazonov and the Russian diplomatic corps, the issue had never been about strategic German or Turkish advantage at the Straits. After all, a British admiral supervised the Ottoman Navy, which was attempting to strengthen its offensive power with . Sverbeyev had even admitted that the von Sanders mission was more a political than a security problem, an assertion reaffirmed by Sazonov a month later. Rather, the affair had concerned who, Germany or Russia, could claim real authority in the Balkan region, and in that respect, St. Petersburg was the clear loser. Thus, the time between late 1912 and early 1914 was a period of constant challenge to the professed Balkan mastery of both Russia and Austria-Hungary. Whereas the Ballpaltz was compelled to defend the acclaim it had won in 1908-1909 against South Slavic pretensions, Pevchevskii Most took a risky and foolhardy gamble to mitigate its ineptitude in Bosnia and Albania. As in the Annexation Crises, neither empire emerged from the imbroglios totally victorious, although Russian prestige, once again, suffered the greatest damage. Hiding behind collective diplomacy had failed Vienna and St. Petersburg, allowing embarrassing crises to drag on for months and opening up both governments to scathing indictments of impotence. As a result of humiliation in 1913-1914, Berchtold’s and Sazonov’s policies toward Balkan conflagration executed a volte face. Both offices were tired of humiliation or the threat of humiliation, and were now unwilling to sit on the sidelines and entrust the defense of each’s legitimacy to unreliable allies. Berchtold’s determination to act decisively and present an ultimatum to Serbia in the fall of 1913 would be replicated less than one year later. On Sazonov’s part, the von Sanders crisis cemented in Petersburg the resolve to risk European war in the future should its tarnished image come under yet another assault from Germany or the Dual Monarchy.74 This is not to suggest that from this point Europe marched inexorably toward the Great War in 1914. Rather, the Albanian and von Sanders crises forced reevaluations from the Ballplatz and Pevchevskii Most about the necessity of resorting to the force of arms in response to challenges of their Great Power status.

73 Gooch and Temperley, Vol. X: I, Mallet to Grey, No. 470, pg. 421.

74 McDonald, United Government, 196.

49 CHAPTER 5

PRESTIGE, LEGACIES, AND DUMA POLITICS, 1905-1914

The maintenance of image and reputation, which had driven the crises over Bosnia, Albania, and the Straits, was not only a concern of the Russian state in its foreign policy. Just as Pevchevskii Most strove to redeem Russian honor in Europe, the government struggled to maintain its moral authority in society’s eyes after a humiliating military defeat and the 1905 Revolution. These revolutionary upheavals had been the result of decades of misrule and disgrace, stripping the Tsarist system of the veil that hid its obsolescence and ineffectiveness from view. After 1905, there were no more victories behind which to hide, as the glories of Russia’s past seemed as distant to society as the golden years of Kiev. All that was visible was the Romanov regime’s tarnished image, its litany of sins, and frustration with the lack of reforms. As in its foreign policy realm, from 1905-1914 the government experienced an acute image crisis that, if not redressed, could lead to its exclusion from Russian political life. Society, through the 1905 Revolution, had challenged the legitimacy of the system that had ruled it for centuries, claiming that the Russian people could rule themselves, and more effectively at that. The indelible line having been drawn in the sand, government and public, represented by the State Duma, waged a prestige war for political authority that was bitter, contentious, and zero- sum, as each’s legitimacy necessitated the other’s disgrace. Continuing the theme encountered in Bosnia and the 1913 crucible, what emerged from the chaos of 1905 was not one, but two sets of image crises: against liberals in the first Duma and conservatives in the third. When placed together, these wrangling for political legitimacy defined the turbulence of Russia’s “constitutional experiment.”1 By October 1905, the fallout from the killings on had devolved into waves of social turmoil, mutiny in the army, and an empire-wide .2 As his realm lay seized in paralysis, Nicholas II signed into law the Manifesto of 17 October, which, among

1 Ben-Cion Pinchuk, The Octobrists in the Third Duma, 1907-1912 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974).

2 Ascher, Revolution of 1905, 162, 168, 216.

50 other reforms, granted civil rights and the newly created parliament, the State Duma, participation in the legislative process.3 With the first Duma session slated for April 1906, political parties of all stripes convened congresses, hammered out their political platforms and elected deputies to represent their constituencies. The liberal Constitutional Democratic Party (Kadets), under the chairmanship of P.N. Milyukov, won an impressive number of seats in the new legislature, calling for a pure, based on the British system. Hoping to use the Duma pulpit as a vehicle to strip the Tsar of all his prerogatives, the Kadets demanded that the heads of government ministries be made accountable to Duma oversight, in addition to a forced expropriation of state, church, and noble lands for distribution among the .4 The stage was set for the first image showdown of the post-1905 era. In one corner was the nascent and liberal opposition party, determined to establish itself as vanguard of the new Russia by assuming as much of the old order’s power as possible. Opposite the Kadets was the old order itself, which clearly recognized the threat posed to its continued viability by a rival power center. Indeed, Prime Minister I.L. Goremykin predicted the imminent clash between the state and the Duma in a remark to V.N. Kokovtsov, his counterpart in the Finance Ministry: “The Duma will do nothing but fight the government and attempt to seize complete power. It will become a question of whether or not the government is strong and skillful enough to retain its authority in the midst of all this incredible nonsense.”5

As a preemptive measure against any embarrassing surprises, in early April 1906 Nicholas had sponsored the promulgation of the Fundamental Laws, a list of powers reserved for the government and off limits to the Duma. Matters of foreign policy, oversight of the army and fleet, appointment and dismissal of state officials, and the right to dissolve the Duma at his pleasure, would continue to be the exclusive privileges of the sovereign.6 Furthermore, as a counterweight to the Duma’s anticipated obstreperousness, the Tsar created an for the legislature, the , half of whose members were appointed by the sovereign

3 Geoffrey Hosking, The Russian Constitutional Experiment: Government and Duma, 1907-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 11.

4 “Program of the Russian Constitutional Democratic Party, Article III” in Imperial Russia: A Source Book, 1700- 1917, Ed. Basil Dmytryshyn (Gulf Breeze: Academic International Press, 1999), pg. 441. 5 Kokovtsov, My Past, 124.

6 “The Fundamental Laws of the Russian Empire, Chapters 1 and 4,” Imperial Russia, pgs. 418, 422 respectively.

51 himself. For bills to become law, they had first to be approved by both the Duma and the Council for submission to the Tsar, the ultimate authority in the land. And as a final assertion of the Duma’s position vis-à-vis the government, the Fundamental Laws maintained that the Tsar enjoyed “supreme autocratic power,” even though Nicholas, by approving the October Manifesto, had signed away autocracy’s very existence.7 The first session of Russia’s first national parliament convoked on 27 April 1906, and as had been anticipated, the government found its authority on the receiving end of a direct frontal assault from the upstart Duma. That day, the Kadet deputy I.I. Petrunkevich delivered a speech calling for the government to issue a blanket amnesty to all political prisoners held in its jails. It was only a foretaste of what was to come. In the days before the Duma’s convening, the press had come out decidedly on the side of the Russian people. Amongst jeremiads from other publications, the Kadet organ Voice (Rech’) published the text of the Fundamental Laws, upbraiding the government so bitterly that it retracted some of the document’s provisions.8 So as not to disappoint, Kadet deputies turned up their viciousness in subsequent sessions. The list of demands on the Tsar was audacious for such a newly created legislative body, but that was precisely the point. Unlike the autocracy, which had led Russia to greatness in battle against the Swedes and French, Milukov’s faction had no laurels on which to rest or from which to command influence. Rather, if it were to enjoy any political legitimacy, it would have to write its own success story as the Russian evolved. Claiming the government did not enjoy the confidence of the Russian public and amid thunderous applause, the Duma ratified the salient articles of the Kadet party platform for delivery to the Tsar. In addition to land expropriation, the list was augmented by the demand for abolition of the Council of State and Fundamental Laws, as well as the replacement of state ministers to suit the representatives of the people.9 The government had to respond. The Duma’s exploits and speeches had been published in newspapers throughout the empire, and a flood of telegrams had been pouring into Petersburg from provincial governors indicating their helplessness in the wake of a “growing revolutionary

7 “Fundamental Laws, Chapter 1,” Imperial Russia, 418.

8 Kokovtsov, My Past, 124-125; Thomas Riha, “Riech’: A Portrait of a Russian Newspaper,” Slavic Review 22, No. 4 (December 1963), 668.

9 Kokovtsov, My Past, 136.

52 spirit.”10 On 13 May, Prime Minister Goremykin delivered the government’s response to the Duma, maintaining it would not be bullied or accept its radical demands. However, his “barely audible” and sheepish attempt to assert Tsarist authority had the complete opposite effect. Indeed, at the conclusion of his oration the hall erupted with fresh denunciations of the regime and calls for the cabinet’s resignation. Throughout the next month, the Duma drafted a list of its proposed replacements for the key ministerial positions in the empire, ousting the entire cabinet in favor of prominent Kadet deputies. The list was presented to the Tsar in mid June.11 The gauntlet had been thrown down once again. The Duma’s initial obstreperousness had turned into defiance of imperial authority after Goremykin’s address. Lest it allow the parliament it had created to subvert the “supreme autocratic power” Nicholas supposedly possessed, a decisive response was necessary. To accede by replacing existing ministers with the government’s outspoken critics would appear to all as a capitulation to the new legislature, especially given the press’ recent excitability. On the other hand, delivering anemic speeches in defense of the autocratic tradition and the political status-quo was commanding as much respect as the hollow diplomacy Pevchevskii Most would eventually practice in the Balkans. Inaction meant that the Russian people would only hear of government indecisiveness against the heroics of the Duma deputies. It chose a third solution: to invoke Article 87 of the Fundamental Laws, the Tsar’s prerogative to dissolve the Duma and call for new elections. In reality, sending the first Duma home had been under discussion between Nicholas and his ministers since May. Although originally adopting a “wait and see” posture on the issue of the legislature’s intransigence, after a month of obstruction, defiance, and deadlock over the issue of land reform in particular, the government had reached an image crisis. Central to the Kadets’ solution for Russia’s agrarian problem was an expropriation of portions of noble lands and their redistribution to the peasantry, but the government refused to subvert the institution of private property.12 By the second half of June, both sides refused to budge and legislative stalemate began reflect more poorly on the government than the Duma. As such, and amid the publication of the Duma’s polemics against

10 Ibid., 137.

11 Ibid., 140, 147.

12 Ibid., 139-140.

53 the regime, Nicholas confided to Stolypin, then Minister of the Interior, that if the Duma were not immediately dissolved, “we all, and I in the first place, will bear the consequences of our weakness and hesitation.”13 On Sunday, 9 July, St. Petersburgers awoke to find texts of the dissolutive imperial ukaz posted throughout the capital and the doors to the Tauride locked. The government had sent Russia’s first parliament home, and planned to reconvene a new one the upcoming winter. As a concession to the moderate elements of Russian public opinion, the official Government Herald (Pravitel’stvennyi Vestnik) announced the dismissal of two officials considered especially obnoxious to the Duma deputies.14 Indeed, the government had acted decisively to break the legislative stalemate and silence the voices heaping disgrace upon it. Although it had done what it could to uphold its sagging image and authority, its victory was a pyrrhic one. Disbanding the upstart legislature was a decree issued from a position not of strength, but of desperation. The government had been put between a veritable rock and hard place. The Duma did not want to cooperate; it wanted the complete destruction of the old order. Partnership meant political suicide for both government and legislature. Thus, the application of Article 87 to remove the present threat was the only ace left in the regime’s sleeve. The Kadet problem had only been managed temporarily, though, as a new parliament would be convoked in a matter of months. The Kadets, on the other hand, faced their own problem. They, as the self-proclaimed representatives of the oppressed Russian nation, had not succeeded in forcing any substantial change in the domestic status quo in favor of their constituencies. More than that, the government had outmaneuvered the Duma’s intransigence by sending them all home. Having promised so much and having denounced the government so bitterly, they could not simply submit to the dissolution lest they appear unworthy to represent the people in the struggle against the old order. Thus, two days after the government’s application of Article 87, 185 Kadet and leftist deputies boarded a train for Finland, outside the jurisdiction of the central authorities. There, they convened in a hotel and proclaimed the Duma would not accept its dissolution. As the Duma in and led by its president S.A. Muromtsev, the Kadets promulgated the famous Manifesto, encouraging Russian citizens to evade and to withhold taxes

13 Ibid., 153.

14 Ibid., 155.

54 until a new parliament was elected.15 The effort was slightly ridiculous and wholly futile, as the government censored discussions of it in the mainline press and later arrested those who had signed it. Though they had been defeated, their continued political relevance as the vanguard of the new Russia compelled them to continue the struggle regardless of its chance of success.16 In the wake of the dissolution, Tsar Nicholas sacked the feeble Goremykin as Prime Minister and promoted Stolypin from his post as chief of the Interior Ministry. As the new head of the government, he sought a permanent solution to the problem of Duma intransigence. Although flanking the Kadets in the First Duma had silenced their vitriol, society was not impressed, as no significant reforms were enacted during the Duma’s initial sessions. Dissatisfaction with the government was still relatively high and manifested itself through an unsuccessful attempt against the new Prime Minister in August 1906.17 For the upcoming Duma, what the government needed was a reliable ally to uphold its authority from any further attacks and resistance from the upstart legislature. Stolypin found his ally in the Union of October 17, also known as the Octobrist Party. The first Duma had acted like a centrifuge for moderate opinion, which had hitherto been a large but undefined morass represented by the Kadets. The liberal demands for expropriation of private property and a constitutional monarchy along the lines of the British system had alienated many right-leaning moderates who were satisfied with the civil rights and liberties granted by the October Manifesto. Under the aegis of the former Muscovite banker A.I. Guchkov, moderates, as opposed to the failures of the autocratic system as to Kadet tactics in the Duma, formed the Octobrist Party on the platform of a strong state, reconstruction of the army, varying degrees of Great , and of gradual and peaceful reform of the domestic problems holding Russia back from greatness. Cooperation, and not struggle, with the government for the betterment of society was the Duma Octobrists’ raison d’etre.18 Guchkov and his fellow

15 Daniel Balmuth, The Russian Bulletin, 1863-1917: A Liberal Voice in Tsarist Russia (New York: Peter Lang, Inc., 2000) 296; Kokovtsov, My Past, 155.

16 Balmuth, Russian Bulletin, 296.

17 Kokovtsov, My Past, 159.

18 Gleason, “Alexander Guchkov,” 18.

55 Octobrists saw the government’s willingness to court them as an opportunity to improve Russian society without undermining its traditions, which had made it great in the past.19 In any event, the second Duma was in many ways a repeat performance of its predecessor, including continued deadlock over agricultural reform and scathing polemics from the left against the government’s legitimacy. Again projecting its self-styled image as Russia’s guide to freedom, the second parliament met the same fate as the first: dissolution. With it gone, Stolypin enacted the 3 June Statute, designed specifically to reduce the representation of peasants and ethnic minorities in favor of landowners, businessmen, and Great Russians, demographics that were overwhelmingly more conservative.20 His gerrymandering of the electoral laws was highly successful, and to no one’s surprise, election results indicated the Third Duma was to be dominated by a conservative block of Octobrists and rightists. But if Stolypin expected complete compliance with the faction that owed its position to him, he would become exceedingly disappointed. The opposition accused the Octobrists of profiting from a rigged election, and from the start, Guchkov was determined not to become clay in the government’s hands.21 Just as their Kadet predecessors had done in the First Duma, the Octobrists sought to establish their own political legitimacy, but staked their image on a different set of issues dear to Russian society. Rather than overthrowing the monarchy and subverting the right of private property, the Octobrist platform was concerned chiefly with the restoration of the empire’s image as a European Great Power above all else. Indeed, according to the party’s official program, “[T]he greatness of Russia, her glorious name, which had been disgraced in Manchuria, had to be restored, renewed, and carried over to the new Russia.”22 To achieve this, they were willing to cooperate with the government so long as it showed a commitment to modernization and reform, but also favored broadening the powers of the Duma to guard against reaction and the return of the disgraces of the old order. Against Stolypin’s expectations, his junior partners in the Duma proved less conciliatory than he had anticipated, and as the Third Duma convoked, the government again found its prerogatives and image under attack, this time from the center-right. As the Octobrists’ legacy

19 Hosking, Russian Constitutional Experiment, 41.

20 Gleason, “Alexander Guchkov,” 29.

21 Balmuth, Russian Bulletin, 306.

22 Pinchuk, Octobrists, 14.

56 revolved around the restoration of Russia’s military potency, they were necessarily drawn into conflict with the Tsar and his ministers. Direction of foreign policy, the army, and the navy were the exclusive spheres of the Tsar’s authority, but since the Russo-Japanese conflict, the government had done nothing to reform its broken and disorganized army. To this end, the Octobrists set to work rebuilding the army themselves, and under Guchkov’s chairmanship, the Duma Committee for State Defense (CSD) came into being, composed of Octobrists and conservatives. Although the government had created its own Defense Council (Sovet Gosudarstvennoi Oborony/SGO) to spearhead the reforms of the army following the Russo- Japanese War, it had achieved nothing significant in its two years of existence. At its head was Grand Duke Nicholas, whose position was more attributable to tradition than competency. Furthermore, the SGO was directly answerable to the Tsar, not to the War Ministry, creating a “private empire” of imperial prerogative that produced little fruit.23 Guchkov sought to have the SGO abolished and replaced by a body headed by War Minster General A.F. Rediger, officials in the State Council, and conservative Duma deputies, creating a more rational system for the implementation of reforms in which the Duma would play a salient role.24 Guchkov went on the attack against the influence of ineffective Grand Dukes during the Duma’s deliberation on the in spring 1908. The conflict arose around the government’s request for an annual allotment of 30 million rubles to reconstruct the Baltic Fleet, complete with four new Dreadnought battleships. Octobrist and rightist deputies responded not only by cutting the government’s petition by 8.5 million per annum, but by returning a list of demands that involved a total restructuring of the Ministry of the Navy. The disgrace of Tsushima Bay still loomed large to the Duma, and their remonstrance proved they had no confidence in the government’s ability to truly reform the fleet. But Guchkov was not through. He and his confederates cared more for the resurrection of the army than of the navy, but used the issue as a springboard to assert the problem of capable leadership was just as prevalent in the ground forces as well, attacking the system of Tsarist tradition that kept ineffective commanders, including Grand Duke Nicholas, in positions of privilege.25 The government and the Tsar

23 J.F. Hutchinson, “The Octobrists and the Future of Imperial Russia as a Great Power,” The Slavonic and East European Review 50, No. 119 (April, 1972), 228.

24 Ibid.

25 Hosking, Russian Constitutional Experiment, 77.

57 bristled with indignation at Guchkov’s perceived trespass on an area they considered exclusively theirs, and the State Council approved the vetoed funds anyway. However annoyed he was at the Duma’s self-assertion though, Tsar Nicholas transferred or accepted the resignation of many imperial dotes and even eventually abolished the SGO. General Rediger had confirmed the essential truth of Guchkov’s claims, and so as not to be portrayed as an obstacle to reform, Nicholas conceded ground to the Duma.26 Although the government had made efforts at reform in the appropriation of an ambitious rearmament program for the Baltic Fleet, Russia was still unprepared to make its presence known and interests respected in Europe. Dreadnoughts in the Baltic were of no use in Bosnia, and the preference for rebuilding the fleet first kept the army disorganized and in shambles. Thus, when Pevchevskii Most committed its own diplomatic Tsushima during 1908-1909, Russian troops could in no way prop up Izvol’skii’s smoke-and-mirror diplomacy. What resulted was not only a foreign humiliation, but a domestic one that gave the Octobrists an opportunity to improve their image at the government’s expense. Guchkov held Stolypin’s administration personally responsible for Russian disaster, remarking in 1913 that its shameful response to the Bosnian Annexation Crises was the manifestation of a political system in a state of “prostration and marasm.”27 Although the Prime Minister had delivered a memorable speech in the Second Duma asserting his desire for a renewed and powerful Russia, his Octobrist allies were becoming convinced that his government was incapable of redeeming Russia’s honor from the trenches of Mukden and the bottom of the Sea of Japan.28 In the weeks following the Crises, which had been so onerous as to enflame even liberals’ senses of patriotic indignation, Guchkov took another opportunity to dress down the government in the Duma for having failed the Russian people, whose “chief article of…political faith” was the reassertion of Russia’s Great Power status in Europe.29

26 Pinchuk, The Octobrists, 67-68.

27 Alexander I. Guchkov, “A.I. Guchkov Warns of Impending Disaster, 1913,” in Major Problems in the History of Imperial Russia, Ed. James Cracraft (Lexington: D.C. Heath & Co., 1994), 640.

28 Petr A. Stolypin, “We Need a Great Russia [1907],” in Readings in , Volume II: Imperial Russia 1700-1917, Revised Second Edition, Ed. Thomas Riha (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 464.

29 Gleason, “Alexander Guchkov,” 37; Guchkov, “Impending Disaster,” Major Problems, 641.

58 After offering concessions to the Octobrists during the budget debates, Tsar Nicholas was unwilling to retreat another inch to intransigence from the right. He could not allow the Octobrists to assume its privilege of directing reform of the army, even in the wake of international embarrassment, lest the Duma and its Octobrist majority be perceived as the saviors of the army’s dignity from government mismanagement. If there were to be reforms, it would be on the Tsar’s initiative, not the Octobrists’. Thus, in response to Guchkov’s most recent encroachment, Nicholas abolished the CSD, sacked General Rediger, who had been closely associated with it, and replaced him with General V.V. Sukhomlinov.30 Octobrists resented the government’s commandeering of the military reform not only because they were excluded from it, but also because a system immune to oversight was a trademark of the old order. The promise of the October Manifesto and the promulgation of the State Duma suggested an evolution from the arbitrariness (proizvol) of pure autocracy to a more rational polity based on the rule of law and sanctity of constitutional rights. In addition to staking their reputation on Russia’s renewal abroad, Guchkov’s faction characterized themselves as defenders of society’s new political freedoms. In the aftermath of the Octobrists’ challenge to the SGO, Stolypin had incurred the ire of the Tsar for bringing to power a faction Nicholas deemed as much of a rival as the Kadets in the First Duma. The Prime Minister responded by courting the favor of Duma devoted to the defunct autocratic ideal. Together, government policies had made a decisive turn to the right, including for example, obstruction of a Duma bill to lift the centuries-old discrimination against Old Belief in conformity with the October Manifesto.31 By 1911, foreign humiliation and politics convinced Guchkov that a clash with the “irresponsible” elements of the government could very well be on the horizon.32 It came in the spring of that year. The showdown commenced over the extension of the institution of the zemstvo into the western provinces of . Signed into existence in 1864 by Tsar Alexander II, zemstva had been created to provide representative, rational self- government at the local level. However, the distribution of zemstva throughout the empire was by no means uniform, and in the western and southwestern marches heavily populated by

30 Hutchinson, “Octobrists,” 229.

31 Gleason, “Guchkov,” 41; Pinchuk, Octobrists, 87-89.

32 Pinchuk, Octobrists, 138, 141.

59 Byelorussians, Ukrainians, Poles, and , there were none to be found. In these areas, Polish noblemen enjoyed political and economic supremacy over Orthodox peasants, and since 1909, deputies from the far right had been lobbying him to erode their power both in the west and their elections as delegates in the State Council.33 Stolypin assumed the project would provide no scandal to Octobrist nationalism or fondness for zemstva themselves. Indeed, the Octobrists supported his initial proposals to the Duma, with the deputy N.I. Antonov lamenting only that the bill had taken so long to be drawn up.34 Although the Octobrists, rightists, and government supported the proliferation of zemstva westward, controversy arose over voting qualifications. On one hand, if representation was based on property, zemstva would only entrench Polish dominance in the region. On the other, if nationality were the key factor, it was likely that uneducated peasants would have a preponderance in modern self-government. Stolypin’s solution was a complicated system that took both factors into account and placed quotas both on the Polish and non-Polish representation. The Duma passed his proposal, although narrowly and after considerable wrangling and attempted revisions.35 Stolypin believed the zemstvo legislation would meet no opposition in the State Council, such that he did not think it a problem to address a less-than full house. To his utter shock, though, the bill was rejected. In a huff, the embarrassed and offended Prime Minister sought an audience with Tsar Nicholas and threatened to resign if the State Council could not be persuaded to take another look at the bill. The Tsar resented such an ultimatum and refused to reconvene the State Council or to accept his resignation, although Nicholas was eventually persuaded to dissolve the legislature for three days under Article 87, to sign the zemstvo bill while the houses were prorogued, and then to reintroduce the bill as a fait accompli. For Stolypin, this was a foolproof situation. The deadlock would be broken and the law passed. He anticipated no resistance from the Octobrists as the Duma, under their majority, had approved the bill in the first place.36

33 Kokovtsov, My Past, 261; Hosking, Russian Constitutional Experiment, 117-119.

34 Hosking, Russian Constitutional Experiment, 120.

35 Ibid., 122, 131.

36 Kokovtsov, My Past, 264.

60 He could not have judged the situation any more poorly. When Stolypin told Guchkov of his intentions, the backlash caught him unprepared. To the Octobrists, the Prime Minister’s proposed plan of action trampled the October Manifesto underfoot. Even though the Octobrists had indeed been in favor of the legislation, Article 87 had a specific and defined purpose, one that did not apply in this case. Stolypin sought to invoke an emergency procedure as a tool to break normal deadlock inherent in any parliamentary or constitutional government.37 Furthermore, his chosen application of the law was extra-legal, as if Article 87 was invoked, a new Duma would have to be elected, not simply barred from the legislative process only to be brought back to ratify what had been accomplished behind its back. What Stolypin failed to understand was that in a new era of civic responsibility and nascent constitutionalism, political ends no longer justified the arbitrary means of the old order. Although Guchkov asserted the Octobrists would vote down the bill if Stolypin dissolved the Duma, the Prime Minister was not deterred. On 12 March the Duma was locked out and two days later, Nicholas signed the zemstvo bill into law.38 The Octobrists were scandalized at Stolypin’s unabashed circumvention of the Fundamental Laws, and went on the offensive to discredit the Prime Minister in the eyes of Russian society to increase their own credibility. Guchkov ostentatiously resigned his chairmanship of the Duma in protest and publicly stated he would be taking a trip to the Far East to ascertain what measures the government was making (or not making) to relieve famine there.39 What can be called the “Guchkov Manifesto” was similar to Muromtsov’s declaration at Vyborg in 1906, in that it was a display of showmanship designed to cast shame upon the government while maintaining the Octobrists’ image as a force for change and progress. In Guchkov’s own words, “If we ma[de] no protest, what kind of party shall we be? Our role would be reduced to nil.”40 On the Duma floor, Octobrist deputies mirrored their former leader’s reaction by drafting an interpolation against Stolypin, asking whether or not he understood the illegality of his recent action, and demanding to know what he planned to do to redress the

37 Hosking, Russian Constitutional Experiment, 143.

38 Ibid., 138.

39 Pichuk, Octobrists, 144.

40 Hosking, Russian Constitutional Experiment, 138.

61 injustice. To achieve this effort, they were all too happy to partner with Kadets and other leftist parties, whom the government had slighted and whom Octobrists had previously considered too radical and unfit for true reform of the Russian state.41 Thus, through its assault on the liberties of society and humiliating misadventure in Bosnia, the government totally alienated from its side the Union of October 17. The Octobrists, who had once been willing to cooperate with the regime, had been transformed into an opposition party.42 In the words of the Octobrist deputy P.B. Kamenskii, Stolypin’s most recent action portended “a return to our not so old and good memory of the past.”43 Kamenskii’s observation speaks to the heart of the matter and explains why the prestige crises between the government and Duma were so acute. They turned on legacy. For the former, reclaiming the legacy of Peter the Great and Nicholas I from the capitulation of 1905 was crucial to its viability in the new system. The Kadets and Octobrists, on the other hand, sought to define themselves and pave the way for their political futures by wresting away the prerogatives the government gripped with white knuckles. Just as in Russian foreign policy, seemingly every piece of legislation became an image “crisis,” as the miscue in Bosnia, discussions of credits for the navy and zemstvo proliferation devolved into the question of which side truly enjoyed true political supremacy in Russia. Although the government had largely succeeded in retaining its prerogatives in the first three , its apparent victory eroded what little faith educated society still had in it. At an Octobrist party conference in November 1913, Guchkov weighed in on the very question of the government’s authority and legitimacy. His speech, which reflected the mood of a demoralized society, was an assertion that while still in of the empire, the government was steering the Russian people to a second .44 According to Guchkov, the state’s efforts to return to the pre-1905 era had so disgraced it among the society it ruled that very few any longer considered it worthy of respect. The same lack of authority at home, he continued, manifested itself abroad, as evidenced by the capitulations to Austria-Hungary in Bosnian Crises and the recently concluded Balkan Wars. The government was no longer a

41 Pinchuk, Octobrists, 146.

42 Hosking, Russian Constitutional Experiment, 146.

43 Pinchuk, Octobrists, 149.

44 Guchkov, “Impending Disaster,” Major Problems, 641.

62 partner in, but an obstacle to, meaningful reform and the defense of Russian honor in the realm of foreign policy, a legacy quite opposed to what it had intended to leave for itself.45

45 Ibid., 639-640.

63 CHAPTER 6

THE JULY CRISES OF 1914—THE FINAL SHOWDOWN

By 1914, the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires had weathered, with different levels of success, a series of challenges to their image for nearly a decade. Instead of achieving meaningful reform of their precarious domestic situations, St. Petersburg and Vienna used displays of strength and of their reputations as Great European Powers to compel continued loyalty from their subjects. For the Habsburg government, the ruses had been as successful as they could have been. Austria had increased its prestige against Serb pretensions in Bosnia in 1909 and again in 1912 with the delimiting of Albania’s western frontier. Although the protracted struggle with King Nikola of Montenegro over Scutari had been a foreign and domestic embarrassment, a decisive ultimatum to Serbia redeemed somewhat the Dual Monarchy’s honor and garnered it more respect from its German ally. Still, the nationalities question was as volatile, divisive, and unresolved as it had ever been, and the preserving of Vienna’s status as Balkan suzerain had come at the price of animosity from its Serb neighbor and rival. And although the Habsburg ship managed to stay afloat during the tempest of Balkan diplomacy ever since the Pig War, a stable Balkan status quo was its most helpful friend. As long as the waters were calm, the Monarchy could rest on the laurels of its most recent diplomatic triumph and incur no further challenges to its image. Unfortunately for Russia, however, Austrian triumph in their prestige rivalry meant its disgrace. Unlike the Dual Monarchy after its early twentieth-century crucible, Russian prestige had not been redeemed after the humiliation of the Russo-Japanese conflict. Because the military continued to languish in disrepair and disorganization years after 1905, Pevchevskii Most’s ability to put force behind its demands and threats was severely constrained. Its dependence on the unreliability of collective diplomacy from its partners in the Entente had completely failed in Bosnia and in Contsantinople, leaving Russian honor tarnished and legitimacy as a Great Power in question. Domestically, the fallout from Balkan diplomatic disasters only confirmed to conservatives and moderates that the government was incapable of righting the Russian vessel, which for years had been taking on water and listing towards the side of social collapse. To the government and to its estranged society, the consequences of yet

64 another diplomatic disgrace could prove incalculable. Like those of their Danubian rival, Russian statesmen desired peace in the Balkans to avoid further discrediting in the eyes of Europe and the society they governed. The outbreak of the Great War in August 1914 was precipitated by what scholars of European diplomacy “The ,” the diplomatic chaos and standoff between all the Great Powers, but specifically between Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Serbia. However, the storminess between 28 June and 2 August was, in reality, two separate crises of image and prestige: the Dual Monarchy’s ability to squash a lingering Slav annoyance and Russia’s resolve not to retreat from a threat to the Balkan status quo or to its Serb client. Thus, as in Bosnia six years before, Austria-Hungary and Russia stared each other down in a dangerous image standoff from which disengagement meant disgrace and the forfeiture of Great Power status. Statesmen in both empires considered the fate of the tiny Serb kingdom linked inexorably to the legitimacy of their regimes. As evidenced by the language of the diplomatic correspondence, economics or the prospect of territorial aggrandizement was of no concern. Rather, the impetus behind each monarchy’s actions was the preservation of its imperial dignity and honor, especially after the issuance of threats from the Ballplatz and Pevchevskii Most. The controversy turned on whether Russia and Austria-Hungary would either defend their status as European Great Powers or be demoted to second-class states. On 28 June, the murder of Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the throne, shattered the fragile status quo and initiated the final prestige standoff between the two eastern monarchies before their collapses in 1917-1918. Gavrillo Princip, a Bosnian Serb nationalist, gunned down the archduke and his wife in cold blood on the streets of Sarajevo. Naturally, all of the crowned heads of Europe were shocked and deeply offended by Princip’s act of anti- monarchist terrorism, but none more so than Franz Joseph in Vienna. The Dual Monarchy considered the assassination a plot orchestrated by Belgrade, and to be sure, some high-ranking Serb officials had participated. Whether or not these men had aided Princip as a matter of policy is not known, although this consideration was irrelevant to Franz Joseph and the highest ministers of his empire. Although as a person, Franz Ferdinand had never been the most popular figure at court, Vienna simply had to respond to such an assault. Officials who had disliked him

65 viewed his death as a strange sort of blessing, as it provided the pretext to destroy Serbia as an independent state and put to rest the bane of South Slavic nationalism.1 The Habsburg government blamed Serbia from the very beginning, and the Emperor himself, in a letter to Kaiser Wilhelm, accused the Serbs of agitating to unite the Balkan Slavs under their aegis and to topple the Monarchy. The only course of action for the survival of the empire, he maintained, was to squelch the Serb menace for once and for all.2 General Conrad von Hoetzendorff, Chief of the General Staff, agreed wholeheartedly. For years he had been a vociferous war-hawk, advocating preemptive attacks on all of Austria’s rivals, including Russia, Italy, Montenegro, and Serbia in 1908 and 1911. During the Italo-Turkish War he was even dismissed temporarily from his post after clamoring for a surprise attack while the Italians were busy with the Turks in North Africa. In any event, Hoetzendorff, like Plehve a decade earlier, connected quick and successful wars with domestic stability.3 For the decision-makers in the Habsburg government, Austria-Hungary’s status as a Great Power was on the line.4 To them, anything less than a swift, direct, and decisive response was tantamount to a retreat, and as Russia experienced in 1908-1909, the right of the Habsburgs to claim their position as a Great Power would be determined by the vigor of their response. Perceptions of weakness or lack of resolve after such an egregious attack on the ruling dynasty’s legitimacy could, in their minds, only invite more challenges from other nationalities within the Empire and from abroad. The Dual Monarchy, in the words of the Ballplatz’ legal council, “hated as she is, now appears to the Servians [sic] as powerless, and as scarcely worthy of waging war with; contempt is mingled with hatred; she is ripe for destruction and she is to fall without trouble into the Great-Servian [sic] Empire, which is to be realized in the immediate future.”5

Thus, to the officials of the Dual Monarchy, prestige and preservation were one in the same.

1 Hamilton and Herwig, Origins, 131-132.

2 W. Henry Cooke and Edith P. Stickney, eds., Readings in European International Relations Since 1879 (London: Harper and Brothers, 1931), The Emperor of Austria to the Emperor of Germany in His Own Handwriting, pgs. 311- 312.

3 Hamilton and Herwig, Origins, 121.

4 Cooke and Stickney, Readings, von Giesl to Berchtold: pg. 329-331.

5 Collected Diplomatic Documents, von Giesl to Berchtold, No. 6 (Austro-Hungarian Red Book), pg. 451.

66 Throughout early July, the Ballplatz planned its response secretly. Unlike its actions in Albania, Vienna did not attempt to conceal its weakness behind collective demonstrations of Great Power solidarity. Such efforts had come up woefully short in the past, embarrassing the government and allowing challenges to its image to linger unresolved. After all, the pathetic collective naval demonstration in spring 1913 had not dislodged the Montenegrins from their trenches around Scutari. Rather, what forced a conclusion to the crisis was the threat of Austrian intervention coupled with Montenegrin exhaustion. Habsburg statesmen were determined to act regardless of the support they received from their more powerful German ally, but to ascertain what kind of foreign support on which they could count, Berchtold dispatched Count Alexander Hoyos to Berlin on 4 July. The foreign minister had deliberately chosen him to represent the Empire because of his staunch belief in the necessity of war to maintain his government’s reputation. The Kaiser was evidently convinced by Hoyos’ case and his resolve to stand up to another gauntlet presumably thrown down by Belgrade. He responded by informing the Ballplatz of the now infamous carte blanche: unconditional German support for whatever action Austria deemed necessary.6 Assured of Berlin’s backing, Habsburg diplomats and officials immediately began crafting the specifics of their response, and after little discussion, settled on the idea of presenting a list of demands to the Serbs with an ultimatum attached. Should Belgrade reject the list or fail to meet the deadline, Austria-Hungary would break off diplomatic relations and immediately initiate hostilities. The Habsburg note was specifically designed to be so onerous as to be rejected, virtually assuring that the score would be settled once and for all. Were the nationalities question to ruin the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Franz Joseph preferred at least to go down fighting.7 The list of demands was patronizing and chastising, citing the previous few years of Balkan diplomacy as seen through the Dual Monarchy’s eyes. According to the tone of the demands, the Serb government was obstreperous, conspiratorial and ungrateful for Austrian benevolence. Essentially, the language chosen for this document played the same game of humiliation that had been in progress for over a decade, asserting Serbia had refused to know its

6 Hamilton and Herwig, Origins, 135-136.

7 Mark Cornwall, ed. The Last Years of Austria-Hungary: A Multi-National Empire In Early Twentieth Century Europe (Exeter: University Of Exeter Press, 2002), 15.

67 place in the peninsula, to live on “good neighborly terms” and to accept its junior partnership vis- à-vis Austria-Hungary.8 As if this were not offensive enough, articles five and six were so injurious to Serb national honor that Belgrade could not but refuse the list outright. These articles ordered the government to allow Austrian officials to undertake the murder investigation within the borders of Serbia and to try and prosecute those whom it found guilty. This effectively undermined the sovereignty of a state independent for decades.9 Serbia could never swallow such a bitter pill and submit to this degree of humiliation, and that was precisely the point. As the piece de resistance of this litany of disgraces, the Ballplatz attached a forty eight- hour deadline for Serbia either to accept or reject the note entirely.10 Regardless of the cost, the Dual Monarchy had fully committed itself to war in order to uphold its honor. That Austria would use the assassination to seek its pound of flesh from Serbia surprised no one in St. Petersburg and Pevchevskii Most. In fact, very soon after the news of the Archduke broke, N.N. Shchebeko, Russian ambassador to Austria, warned the Habsburgs that unwarranted action against Serbia would compel Russia to intervene on the latter’s behalf.11 Russia could not allow Austria-Hungary to overrun its tiny Balkan friend and evaporate what little influence it still possessed in the peninsula. Unfortunately for the Tsarist regime, tension between Austria and Serbia had plunged Russia into another image crisis, as unilateral action by the Dual Monarchy’s against Serbia and keep the matter out of the hands of Europe was, like the annexation crisis in 1908, a threat to Russia’s already tenuous position in the Balkans and an affront to its membership in the European Great Power fraternity. Image and honor were, thus, the sole motivating factor for Russian interest in the matter. No military alliance, defensive or otherwise, between Belgrade and St. Petersburg existed, meaning that were Russia to intervene it did so completely on its own volition. Were Austria- Hungary to invade Serbia, or even to vanquish it, neither an inch of Russian soil nor one Russian life would be lost in the process. Rather, a decade of humiliations, including a horribly botched war in Manchuria and disgraceful Balkan capitulations, had so tarnished the image of a once influential and mighty empire that the Russian state was fast on the road to irrelevance in

8 Collected Documents, Berchtold to Mensdorff, No. 4, pgs. 3-4, 10-11.

9 Ibid., pg. 8.

10 Hamilton and Herwig, Origins, 140.

11 Collected Diplomatic Documents, de Bunsen to Grey: No. 40, pg. 37.

68 European affairs. It had been excluded from the decision making process during the annexation of Bosnia, in which Austria-Hungary and its German ally not only affected a change in the Balkan status quo, but forced Russia to accept it at the risk of war. The German powers had denied Russia its right as a Great Power to participate in the settlement of the issue, and Petersburg’s military enfeeblement and diplomatic isolation at the time had forced Russia to accept this affront. The result had been dishonor, humiliation, a diplomatic Tsushima and a relative loss of influence in the region. Again in December 1912, the Triple Alliance had presented it with a fait accompli during the question of Serb access to the Adriatic. And one year later, Germany had shown its disregard for Russian interests at the Straits, neatly sidestepping Russian demands by promoting, rather than withdrawing the controversial General Otto Liman von Sanders. The diplomacy of empty threats and cheap prestige tricks, the cornerstone of Russian foreign policy since 1904, had ended with Kokovtsov’s political downfall over the German military mission to Constantinople. Similar to Austria at the outset of the crisis, the Russian government believed its reputation as a Great Power was at risk, to be lost at the expense of continued legitimacy as a state. There simply could be no more retreating, and Russian statesmen were determined, like Franz Joseph, that if the empire were to be ruined over this issue, they preferred it to exit the stage of European politics with honor. This is not to suggest that St. Petersburg was as anxious for war as Vienna. A peaceful outcome was certainly the desire of the Russian government, and if Austria-Hungary could be convinced to adopt a levelheaded response to the crisis, Russia could exit the stage without a loss of face. However, should the controversy between Serbia and the Dual Monarchy degenerate into war, for the first time in nearly a decade Russian statesmen felt the empire was poised to make a successful defense of its image as a European Great Power. Ever since 1910, the army’s fighting capability had increased dramatically, imparting a sense of optimism into the government and society. After the Bosnian Crises, War Minister General V.A. Sukhomlinov oversaw large-scale reforms of the army, proposing a reorganization scheme designed to streamline the awkward concentration and distribution of forces throughout the empire, and in so doing, increase the amount of available units without significant cost to the state.12

12 Menning, Bayonets Before Bullets, 227.

69 The potential benefits of his efforts, although never fully realized, contributed an inflated optimism in Russian military circles, particularly in the field of war planning. Although serious, the threat of a war against Austria-Hungary in which Germany would become involved was not new. For decades, army planners had wrestled with the prospect of doing battle with both Germanic powers on Russia’s western border, complete with the threat of a Polish insurrection behind the lines should Austrian or German troops penetrate too deeply.13 Nevertheless, in 1912 Russian planners submitted a revised version of their mobilization strategy, dubbed “Plan 19,” calling for an offensive against Germany only fifteen days after the commencement of general mobilization.14 The prospect of a reorganized and more efficient army blinded Russian military planners to the exigencies of mobilization. Even though Sukhomlinov’s reforms promised much on paper, the fact of the matter was that the army was still not capable of fighting a modern war. Although it seemed as if the problem of organization had been solved, the question of unit strength and concentration still remained unanswered. One of the most pressing issues was Russia’s relative lack of strategic railways, crucial to the rapid deployment of troops. Indeed at the outbreak of hostilities, transportation experts considered Russia’s rail networks, especially in its territories abutting Germany and Austria-Hungary, inadequate for the business of twentieth- century warfare.15 Even if Russian divisions could be mobilized quickly, the issue of unit strength would quickly become a concern, as the offensive into Germany through East would have to be divided into two prongs around its massive lakes.16 Military spending had also undergone significant changes since 1909, vaulting from 643 million rubles to over 965 million in 1913, accounting for nearly 30% of the state’s budget. The funding spike had helped reequip Russian forces with hundreds of modern artillery pieces, machine guns, trucks, automobiles, and even 240 aircraft by the time of the opening volleys in August.17 In addition, saw the signing into law of the “Big Plan” for military reform, which allocated an additional 433 million rubles for defense spending through the year 1917. All

13 Fuller, Strategy and Power, 440-441.

14 Ibid., 444.

15 Ibid., 440, 444.

16 Menning, Bayonets Before Bullets, 244-246.

17 Ibid., 232-233.

70 the while, information about Habsburg war planning and troop concentrations had been flowing into St. Petersburg via Alfred Redl, an Austrian staff officer on the Tsar’s payroll. Although Viennese authorities discovered his treachery and forced him to commit suicide in 1913, Habsburg military secrets still continued to make their way eastward.18 The combined effect of all these factors imbued Russian decision makers with the confidence, however inflated, that the gap between what they believed to be Russia’s capabilities and what they really were had been sufficiently narrowed since the last conflict. Although confidence was high in Russia’s ability to overcome the risks of taking the field in defense of its image, Sazonov still preferred a peaceful outcome if it could be achieved, and set about admonishing Belgrade to keep a lid on the polemics in the Serb press. Tension between Serbia and its rival on the Danube had been rising steadily ever since the assassination, and the last thing Pevchevskii Most wanted was the Dual Monarchy to use the fiery language of Serbian newspapers as pretext for coercive action that could force Russian involvement.19 On 22 July, though, it was Austria, and not Serbia, that abandoned moderation. That day, the Ballplatz issued a copy of the ultimatum it had been drawing up throughout the month to all the capitals of the Great Powers and to its legation in Belgrade. Austria-Hungary had clearly drawn a line in the sand, and from the standpoint of prestige, had passed the point of no return. The deliverance of the note to Serbia on 23 July irrevocably committed the Habsburg Empire to action, as to issue such a statement and then to retreat would suggest that Vienna only issued empty threats. Russia, on the other hand, without the knowledge of the Kaiser’s pledge to back Austria whatever the cost, now had only a forty-eight hour period to diffuse the situation before mobilizing for war. In Sazonov’s own words, his government could not afford to disinterest itself from the crisis, especially in the wake of the Austrian saber- rattling, lest the whole of Europe consider it a “decadent State [that] would henceforth have to take second place among the powers.”20 Thus, on 24 July Sazonov entered into discussions with the Council of Ministers, composed of the heads of Russia’s main bureaucratic apparatuses. That day, the Council

18 Fuller, Strategy and Power, 438, 443.

19 Edmund von Mach, Official Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1916), Spalaikovitch to Pashitch, Serbian Blue Book No. 14, pg. 13.

20 Hamilton and Herwig, Origins, 215. Quoted in MacDonald, United Government, 204.

71 approved a proposal for Pevchevskii Most to convince the other Great Powers to demand that Austria-Hungary extend the deadline of the ultimatum. Claiming the Austro-Serb dispute was a European question, and not one for Vienna to decide, allowed Russia to assert itself in the settlement of the issue and suggested that Russia could compel Europe to respect its wishes. It was hoped that the Austrian challenge to its Great Power status could be answered with diplomacy rather than with the bayonet.21 However, Sazonov’s proposal also contained a resolution for the mobilization of fourteen army corps from the westernmost military districts of Moscow, Kazan, and Kiev, and even the Black Sea and Baltic Fleets of the Russian navy if peace talks broke down.22 That 1.1 million men would come under arms as a result of partial mobilization marked the government’s resolve to avoid a repeat performance of the Bosnian and von Sanders humiliations.23 Upon receiving the demarche from the Ballplatz, Serb Alexander telegraphed Tsar Nicholas that his government was, in the interest of peace, prepared to accept all of the Austrian demands except those that subverted its dignity as an independent state. In other words, Serbia would handle the investigation of the murder itself, and not allow Austria- Hungary to be the self-appointed judge, jury, and executioner. Also in his telegram was the appeal for military aid, as to add force to Austrian demands, the Habsburg army had undertaken partial mobilization near the Serb frontiers.24 Throughout the next two days Sazonov’s office pursued a similar, two-pronged line of action as Izvol’skii did in the , urging moderation and complete compliance in Belgrade while attempting to diffuse the volatile situation with the help of other European states. Sazonov and Russian diplomats abroad worked at fever pitch to convince Austria-Hungary to accept a mediation of the dispute without knowing their entreaties were falling on deaf ears. For a moment on 26 July, Sazonov was filled with optimism. That afternoon, he met with the Austrian ambassador Count Friedrich Szapary for a discussion of the terms presented to Serbia. Sazonov declared to him that he had no objections to most of the points in Vienna’s list

21 “Special Journal of the Russian Council of Ministers, 24 July 1914,” in July 1914, The Outbreak of the First World War, Selected Documents. Ed. Immanuel Geiss (London: William Clowes and Sons, Ltd., 1967), 186-87.

22 Ibid, 187; Menning, Bayonets Before Bullets, 225.

23 Hamilton and Herwig, Origins, 221.

24 Ibid., 109.

72 of demands, but that perhaps even if the most odious of the terms could be changed in form rather than substance, then Serbia might acquiesce. If Austria were willing to modify its tone toward the Serbs, Sazonov would see to it that Pasic’s government would accept the altered list of demands. Perhaps to disguise Vienna’s true intentions, in response Szapary said that he had no objection to a compromise, and the German ambassador Pourtales also declared his own personal approval. Sazonov left the discussion beaming with satisfaction and, thinking he had achieved a breakthrough in the negotiations and kept Russia from humiliation, immediately began to draft a compromise.25 Whether or not Pourtales’ desire to settle the matter at the mediation table was sincere is irrelevant. The spirit of cooperation was not a sentiment shared by his government, and because Vienna was loathe to renounce its course of action in full view of Serbia and Russia, Aehrenthal refused to countenance overtures for any solution not involving unilateral action against Belgrade. Even more unfortunately for Russian statesmen, as Pevchevskii Most formulated its plans for a conference between Sazonov, Szapary, and Pourtales, the Russian charge-de-affairs in Prague telegraphed St. Petersburg that the order for Austrian mobilization against Serbia had been declared.26 Although Pasic submitted his government’s official response before the expiration of the ultimatum, he could not assent to the erosion of its sovereignty and thus refused to accept the demand for Austrian investigators to set foot on Serb soil. Two days later Austria- Hungary officially declared war on Serbia for its refusal to submit to Vienna’s satisfaction. In the early morning on 29 July, a month after the Archduke’s assassination, gunboats from the Habsburg Danubian flotilla began shelling the Serb capital.27 Because Pevchevskii Most had staked Russia’s honor and dignity as a Great Power on defending Serbia from Austrian aggression, the moment of truth was now at hand. The implications of Russian action or inaction would be felt all over Europe. Abroad, Sir George Buchanan, British ambassador to St. Petersburg, remarked that the regime could not retreat from the situation without international humiliation.28 Domestically, the anti-Germanic and pro-Slav

25 Friderich Pourtales, “Pourtales to Jagow, 26 July 1914,” in July 1914, 230.

26 Collected Diplomatic Documents, Russian Consul at Prague to Sazonov: No. 24, pg. 274.

27 Ibid., Berchtold to Serbian Foreign Office in Belgrade, No. 37, pg. 515; Hamilton and Herwig, Origins, 110.

28 G.P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, eds. British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, Volume XI, The Outbreak of War (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1926), Buchannan to Grey, No. 276, pg 177.

73 sentiments of the educated public had been stirred to indignation. Russian society bitterly denounced Austrian aggression, prompting the outbreak of massive demonstrations along the Nevskii Prospekt in the capital. Chanting, “Down with Austria!” and singing patriotic songs, the crowds, composed of every social strata, were so vociferous that Russian police repeatedly broke up riots before the German and Austrian embassies. Gendarmes failed to keep the masses from congregating at the Serb legation to hear passionate and moving speeches by the Serb ambassador.29 Thus, eyes within and outside Russia were fixed on the government, awaiting either its response to Austria’s casting down of the gauntlet or the disgraceful surrender of its status as a European and Slavic Great Power. Russia chose response. On 28 July Sazonov telegraphed Berlin that Russia was beginning a partial mobilization against Austria-Hungary, but not against Germany, by activating the military districts of Moscow, Odessa, Kiev, and Kazan. War was not declared. The regime still desired, if at all possible, an outcome not involving the deployment of Russian troops, who would be slow to mobilize and concentrate, to armed struggle. Sazonov urged Count Bekendorff, Russian ambassador to London, to impress the urgency of the situation upon British diplomats, hoping they would step up their efforts to dissuade Austria-Hungary from its present plan of action.30 Berchtold, as he had done two days previous, refused once more to acquiesce to Sazonov’s pleas for mediation, asserting that he could not change course without incurring damage to the Monarchy’s image. Furthermore, Berlin’s ambassador in St. Petersburg asserted that mobilization against Austria-Hungary would compel German intervention against Russia.31 Frustrated and convinced that Russian prestige would have to be defended on the battlefield, Sazonov gained the ear of the Tsar on 30 August to brief him on the most recent developments. He, along with Sukhomlinov and Chief of the General Staff N.N. Yanushkevich, argued that a full mobilization of the Russian military was urgent, as it was clear that Vienna would not alter its course with regard to Petersburg’s tiny Slavic ally or for Russia’s interests as a Great European Power. Even though war with Austria-Hungary meant war with Germany as well, the

29 Gooch and Temperley, Vol. XI, Buchanan to Grey, No. 289, pg. 184.

30 Collected Diplomatic Documents, Benckendorff through Sazonov to Sverbeiev, No. 70, pg. 55-56.

31 Cooke and Stickney, Readings, Sazonov to Izvolski, pgs. 370-371.

74 government was willing to risk defeat for the sake of legitimacy in the eyes of Europe and its own estranged subjects.32 Tsar Nicholas held out hope that conflict with Berlin could be averted, and as such, kept himself in close contact with his regal German cousin in the midst of Sazonov’s entreaties to declare general mobilization. However, when the Kaiser was made aware of Russian military measures already in motion, he issued his first ultimatum to the Russian government since the 1909 Bosnian Crises: stand down or face war with Germany. Sazonov implored the Tsar to act, asserting that Germany sought a disgraceful “capitulation…for which Russia would never forgive the Sovereign and which would cover the good name of the Russian people with shame.”33 The following day, 31 July, Nicholas signed the order for full mobilization, followed quickly by a German declaration of war on 1 August.34 Austria-Hungary followed suit five days later.35 The European Great War was on, initiated by notions of image and prestige so coveted by Russia and Austria-Hungary that their statesmen considered their loss equivalent to the surrender of their raison d’etre. For these empires, redeeming sixty years’ worth of military and diplomatic humiliations since the had been their chief concern of their foreign policy for over a decade. Their determination to rectify their tarnished reputations as Great Powers of the first rank returned them to the very place on which their status was crafted: the battlefields of Europe. Unfortunately, neither the Habsburg nor the Romanov dynasties could know that their decisions to take to the field in defense of their prestige would collapse the states they were trying to save. It is the height of irony, then, that just as Austrian and Russian glories against Napoleonic France had propelled them to the positions they enjoyed for the next century, another European war became the crucible in which both empires, once deemed the arbiters of the eastern status quo, met their utterly ignoble demise.

32 McDonald, United Government, 206

33 Hamilton and Herwig, Origins, 225.

34 Ibid.

35 Fuller, Strategy and Power, 448.

75 CONCLUSION

The great prestige rivalry in the decade before the Great War can best be described as an exercise in futility, a policy of form over substance. As a foreign policy goal, prestige-garnering was a high-risk, low-reward adventure that offered only short term victories. Thus, while it cannot be said that Austria-Hungary played the game better than Russia, it is true that it managed to play less poorly. After the Pig War Vienna never retreated in humiliation from Russian or South Slav intransigence. Even though Montenegro defied the Austrian-led European mandate for northern Albania, King Nikola, exhaustion not withstanding, did eventually withdraw his troops at the threat of intervention from Vienna. Only a few months later, the Ballplatz answered Pasic’s challenge by laying down an ultimatum to the Serbs and forcing their evacuation of Albania. Though the Dual Monarchy did triumph against its Slavic rivals when they challenged Habsburg preeminence, they were hardly competitors of Austria’s calibre. Serbia and Montenegro were tiny and relatively poor Balkan states carved from the Ottoman Empire, while Russia, considered a European Great Power of the first rank, was nursing a broken and disorganized army. Thus, Austrian triumph in the short term was more attributable to the relative weakness of its rivals than its own inherent strength, although in the years pre-1914, perception mattered the most. As well as it seemed to perform in individual situations like the Bosnian and Albanian Crises, Austrian victories were always pyrrhic. Humiliation of the Serbs and Montenegrins did not solve the problem of Slavic nationalism, but enflamed it by creating a deep-seeded desire for revenge. Russia proved the more inept illusionist. Unlike its Danubian rival, who preferred not to show a potentially weak hand if at all possible, Tsar Nicholas had no qualms about the active pursuit of glory, going so far as to commit Russian forces to war against Japan despite gross tactical disadvantages. The loss to Japan effectively created more of an image problem for Tsarism, as its military ineptitude played a decisive role in waves of social upheaval that forced Nicholas II to sign away the autocracy. After 1904, the task facing the government was to put up a show of strength to screen the truly awful effects of military defeat and domestic revolution. But as energetically as the Tsar and Pevchevskii Most strove to convince Europe of Russia’s continued relevance, Izvol’skii and Sazonov’s inadequacy in this struggle was truly remarkable.

76 The former’s attempt to force Europe to recognize Russia’s prerogative to fortify the Aland Islands bordered on pathetic. Shortly thereafter, he crafted a scheme to humiliate a Great Power rival out of overconfidence and without even the rudiments of a contingency plan, a flaw that manifested itself in Sazonov’s handling of von Sanders Crisis as well. The results of these poorly planned prestige tricks mimicked the imbroglio in Manchuria, as the government retreated from these situations not only without the redemption it sought, but with a fresh humiliation to offset. Thus, as a supposed creator of illusion, throughout the decade Pevchevskii Most committed the cardinal sin of repeating a failed trick in front of the same audience. One of the keys to Pevchevskii Most’s failure, and Austria-Hungary’s success, was the lack of support from its allies, Britain and France. With the army in shambles and without reliable backing from its partners in the Entente, Russian bluffs were seen for what they were: utterly hollow. During the Bosnian Crises, Balkan Wars, and the von Sanders Incident, neither Whitehall nor Quay d’Orsai had any significant investments over which to risk war with the Triple Alliance. Conversely, although Austria-Hungary’s and Germany’s interests conflicted during the Balkan Wars, Vienna’s counter-thrusts against the Serbs and Russians in Bosnia in 1909 had been backed by its German ally, who later issued a carte blanche for support in the wake of Franz Ferdinand’s assassination. The tension surrounding the outbreak of hostilities and the outbreak of war itself was, then, the culmination of both empires’ shortcomings over the previous decade. For the decision makers in Vienna and St. Petersburg, the assassination provoked an existential crisis from which retreat meant their deaths as viable political systems in an age of constitutions and nationalism. Austria-Hungary, while treating the malady of Serb obstreperousness, had never cured this threat to the state’s viability. The July Crises presented the Dual Monarchy with the chance to either crush Balkan nationalism once and for all or, in failing, at least to have its status as a Great Power wrested from it on the battlefield. On the other hand, the litany of Russia’s unredeemed humiliations convinced the Tsar’s statesmen that the empire’s legitimacy rested on a decisive response, and for the first time in a decade, most assessments of the army’s fighting capacity were favorable enough to countenance warfare with optimism. It is truly a human tragedy, then, that by 1918 millions of Austrians, Russians, Germans, Frenchmen, Britons, and Serbs had to perish over such a fleeting and ineffective goal.

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81 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

William Weston Nunn

Weston Nunn was born and raised in Florence, South Carolina. He double-majored in History and Religion at Presbyterian College, from which he graduated summa cum laude in 2007. Weston enrolled in the Master’s program in History in the fall of 2007. His research interests include Imperial Russia, Russian and European military history, Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, and the Middle East.

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