DOCSLIB.ORG

The Centrality of Prestige in Russian and Austro-Hungarian Foreign Policy, 1904-1914 William Weston Nunn

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Centrality of Prestige in Russian and Austro-Hungarian Foreign Policy, 1904-1914 William Weston Nunn Florida State University Libraries Electronic Theses, Treatises and Dissertations The Graduate School 2009 Image Is Everything: The Centrality of Prestige in Russian and Austro-Hungarian Foreign Policy, 1904-1914 William Weston Nunn Follow this and additional works at the FSU Digital Library. For more information, please contact [email protected] THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES IMAGE IS EVERYTHING: THE CENTRALITY OF PRESTIGE IN RUSSIAN AND AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1904-1914 By WILLIAM WESTON NUNN A Thesis submitted to the Department of History in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Degree Awarded: Fall Semester, 2009 The members of the committee approve the thesis of Weston Nunn defended on July 22, 2009. __________________________________ Jonathan Grant Professor Directing Thesis __________________________________ Peter Garretson Committee Member __________________________________ Michael Creswell Committee Member The Graduate School has verified and approved the above-named committee members. ii This thesis is an offering dedicated to the glory of God, the fountain from which flows all truth and knowledge. Sola Dei Gloria. iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS There are many important people who have assisted in the completion of this thesis. I first want to express my gratitude to the departments of History and Religion at Presbyterian College, specifically Drs. Richard Heiser and Roy Campbell, FSU alumni who were not only my teachers, but my advisors, Dr. Mike Nelson, Dr. Anita Gustafson, Dr. Bryan Ganaway, Dr. Craig Vondergeest, Dr. Bob Bryant, and Dr. Peter Hobbie, my teacher, confidant, and friend. Thank you all for your investments in me as a person and as a student. My family, my parents, Mike and Lee Nunn, also deserve recognition and many thanks for supporting me, emotionally and financially, in my pursuit of this career path. Finally, I owe Mr. Kevin Smith an incredible debt of gratitude, as his passion for teaching and the past first inspired a high school sophomore to make the study of history his vocation. I also want to express my sincerest appreciation to the History faculty and staff at Florida State, including Chris Pignatiello and Anne Kozar, but especially my committee members for their thoughtful and sage advice. Thank you to Dr. Peter Garretson and to Dr. Michael Creswell for sitting on my panel, and spasibo bol’shoi to Dr. Jonathan Grant, my good-humored, patient, encouraging advisor and professor of Russian history. A “thank you” also goes out to all my colleagues in the department for their support and friendship, especially Sarah Burns, Sean McCafferty, Tim Fitzpatrick, Chris Gunn, Dan Blumlo, Tim Corradino, Jonathan Sheppard, Robert Vaughan, Andy Zwilling, Kelly Elliott and Jeremy Elliott. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract ...................................................................................................................vi 1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................1 2. PRESTIGE AS PANACEA? 1904-1906………………………………………...5 3. THE BREACH: CRISES IN BOSNIA, 1908-1909...............................................17 4. MOLEHILLS INTO MOUNTAINS, 1913…………………………………….30 5. PRESTIGE, LEGACIES, AND DUMA POLITICS, 1905-1914……………….50 6. JULY 1914--THE FINAL SHOWDOWN……………………………………...64 CONCLUSION........................................................................................................77 REFERENCES ........................................................................................................78 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ..................................................................................82 v ABSTRACT This thesis examines and analyzes Russian and Austro-Hungarian foreign policy and the rivalry between them between 1904-1914. It asserts the centrality of prestige-garnering as a motivator of their Balkan diplomacy, not only to project an image of strength to their European rivals, but to distract from each’s volatile and parlous domestic situation. Both Russia and Austria-Hungary pursued a Balkan policy that emphasized form over substance in order to convince their subjects and rivals that their integrities were intact and unassailable. Instead of more tangible foreign policy goals like territory or economics, abstract notions of imperial dignity, honor, and Great Power status, ideas that became the primary reason for the Great War’s outbreak, fueled the rivalry between the two eastern monarchies. The scope of this study is a departure from other accounts of European Great Power diplomacy because it concentrates on the decade before the war instead of a lengthy narrative since the defeat of Napoleon in 1815. In addition, instead of bringing into the discussion the entirety of the European Congress, this thesis focuses on the struggle between the Romanov and Habsburg states to be recognized as the mistress of southeastern Europe. By focusing on the prestige rivalry between St. Petersburg and Vienna, this study shifts the focus from the Anglo- Germany naval rivalry in the North Sea to the wrangling over the Balkan Peninsula, the region in which the war’s first shots were fired. As a result, it challenges the notion that Germany is most responsible for the chaos, asserting instead that Austria-Hungary is the most to blame. vi CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Magicians are masters of illusion, and they have to be. They are human beings, devoid of special metaphysical gifts or the ability to manipulate natural laws. They cannot saw beautiful women in half and put them back together again. They cannot really defy gravity with unintelligible incantations and cause their assistants to levitate above tables. Because of this, the most crucial factor in a magic show is the magician’s maintenance of his image, his reputation, as an illusionist. If he executes his tricks well, he will not jeopardize the audience’s perception that he is, in fact, capable of supernatural feats. His prestige as a magician thus rests on his continued ability to deceive his audience into thinking, or at least suspending belief to the contrary, that he is something greater than what he really is. However, if the magician blunders in his execution, if he performs the same trick twice, if the audience is made aware of a bungled attempt to deceive them, his credibility evaporates into thin air. Exposed as a fraud and a charlatan in the eyes of his audience, he will no longer be able to draw paying and loyal crowds to the venues where he performs his ruses. The fact that the maintenance of image has tangible consequences was not lost on the Romanov and Habsburg dynasties, which like magicians, strove to maintain their “moral and material” authority against the skepticism of their subjects and foreign rivals.1 At the beginning of the twentieth century the reputations of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian states as Great European Powers and masters of eastern Europe had been fading into anachronism. Eighty years after the vanquishing of Napoleonic France, a laundry list of humiliating military defeats, the wear and tear of domestic strife, economic and political backwardness, and the centrifugal pulls of nationalism had significantly eroded the authority, might, and status of each empire. Revolutionary discontent was rife, and to a great extent, the former august and powerful monarchies had lost the respect and reverence they once commanded. Early twentieth-century statesmen in Vienna and St. Petersburg were all too aware of their governments’ parlous positions as absolutist, multi-ethnic empires in an age of electricity, constitutions, and nationalism. They recognized an intimate connection between domestic 1 William C. Fuller, Jr. Strategy and Power in Russia, 1600-1914 (New York: The Free Press, 1992), 422. 1 tranquility and their perception of the monarchy’s strength, and were thus jealous of their traditional statuses as Great Powers of the first rank, a designation that was increasingly under question from within and without.2 Crucial to the status of a Great Power was its ability to command respect from other states and its willingness to defend its honor and interests against trespasses from its rivals. Over time, the inability to respond to affronts against its influence telegraphed weakness and decay, while successful assertions of authority suggested that the state’s legitimacy was too strong to be challenged successfully. The Russian and Habsburg empires had no desire to follow the path of their Ottoman counterpart, which they perceived to have declined from the conqueror of southeastern Europe to Europe’s own “sick man.” To them, the loss of respect, influence, and relevance in Europe meant their exclusion from the ranks of their former peers. The consequences of such a retreat, they thought, would certainly give their foreign and domestic enemies the confidence to attempt the final dismantling of their empires.3 Thus, this study argues that furthering the perception of strength was the driving force behind the two eastern monarchies’ foreign policy in the decade before the First World War. Because good publicity was in such short supply, the governments in Vienna and St. Petersburg sought to fabricate their own in an attempt to convince Europe and their restive subjects that their political integrity was beyond reproach. Instead of actually curing their political and social problems, though, both empires sought only to distract from them by scoring diplomatic victories against each other over
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Crimean Khanate, Ottomans and the Rise of the Russian Empire*
    STRUGGLE FOR EAST-EUROPEAN EMPIRE: 1400-1700 The Crimean Khanate, Ottomans and the Rise of the Russian Empire* HALİL İNALCIK The empire of the Golden Horde, built by Batu, son of Djodji and the grand son of Genghis Khan, around 1240, was an empire which united the whole East-Europe under its domination. The Golden Horde empire comprised ali of the remnants of the earlier nomadic peoples of Turkic language in the steppe area which were then known under the common name of Tatar within this new political framework. The Golden Horde ruled directly över the Eurasian steppe from Khwarezm to the Danube and över the Russian principalities in the forest zone indirectly as tribute-paying states. Already in the second half of the 13th century the western part of the steppe from the Don river to the Danube tended to become a separate political entity under the powerful emir Noghay. In the second half of the 14th century rival branches of the Djodjid dynasty, each supported by a group of the dissident clans, started a long struggle for the Ulugh-Yurd, the core of the empire in the lower itil (Volga) river, and for the title of Ulugh Khan which meant the supreme ruler of the empire. Toktamish Khan restored, for a short period, the unity of the empire. When defeated by Tamerlane, his sons and dependent clans resumed the struggle for the Ulugh-Khan-ship in the westem steppe area. During ali this period, the Crimean peninsula, separated from the steppe by a narrow isthmus, became a refuge area for the defeated in the steppe.
    [Show full text]
  • The South Slav Policies of the Habsburg Monarchy
    University of South Florida Scholar Commons Graduate Theses and Dissertations Graduate School January 2012 Nationalitaetenrecht: The outhS Slav Policies of the Habsburg Monarchy Sean Krummerich University of South Florida, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd Part of the American Studies Commons, Ethnic Studies Commons, and the European History Commons Scholar Commons Citation Krummerich, Sean, "Nationalitaetenrecht: The outhS Slav Policies of the Habsburg Monarchy" (2012). Graduate Theses and Dissertations. http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/4111 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Nationalitätenrecht: The South Slav Policies of the Habsburg Monarchy by Sean Krummerich A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Department of History College of Arts & Sciences University of South Florida Major Professor, Graydon A. Tunstall, Ph.D. Kees Botterbloem, Ph.D. Giovanna Benadusi, Ph.D. Date of Approval: July 6, 2012 Keywords – Austria, Hungary, Serb, Croat, Slovene Copyright © 2012, Sean Krummerich Dedication For all that they have done to inspire me to new heights, I dedicate this work to my wife Amanda, and my son, John Michael. Acknowledgments This study would not have been possible without the guidance and support of a number of people. My thanks go to Graydon Tunstall and Kees Boterbloem, for their assistance in locating sources, and for their helpful feedback which served to strengthen this paper immensely.
    [Show full text]
  • CAUSES of WORLD WAR I Objective: Analyze the Causes of World War I
    CAUSES of WORLD WAR I Objective: Analyze the causes of World War I. Do Now: What are some holidays during which people celebrate pride in their national heritage? Causes of World War I - MANIA M ilitarism – policy of building up strong military forces to prepare for war Alliances - agreements between nations to aid and protect one another ationalism – pride in or devotion to one’s Ncountry I mperialism – when one country takes over another country economically and politically Assassination – murder of Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand Causes of WWI - Militarism Total Defense Expenditures for the Great Powers [Ger., A-H, It., Fr., Br., Rus.] in millions of £s (British pounds). 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1914 94 130 154 268 289 398 1910-1914 Increase in Defense Expenditures France 10% Britain 13% Russia 39% Germany 73% Causes of WWI - Alliances Triple Entente: Triple Alliance: Great Britain Germany France Austria-Hungary Russia Italy Causes of WWI - Nationalism Causes of WWI - Nationalism Pan-Germanism - movement to unify the people of all German speaking countries Germanic Countries Austria * Luxembourg Belgium Netherlands Denmark Norway Iceland Sweden Germany * Switzerland * Liechtenstein United * Kingdom * = German speaking country Causes of WWI - Nationalism Pan-Slavism - movement to unify all of the Slavic people Imperialism: European conquest of Africa Causes of WWI - Imperialism Causes of WWI - Imperialism The “Spark” Causes of WWI - Assassination Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand visited the city of Sarajevo in Bosnia – a country that was under the control of Austria. Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife Duchess Sophie in Sarajevo, Bosnia, on June 28th, 1914. Causes of WWI - Assassination Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife were killed in Bosnia by a Serbian nationalist who believed that Bosnia should belong to Serbia.
    [Show full text]
  • Bill Clinton, the Bosnian War, and American Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, 1992-1995
    VISIONARY POLICY: BILL CLINTON, THE BOSNIAN WAR, AND AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA, 1992-1995 James E. CovinGton III A thesis submitted to the faculty at the UniveRsity of NoRth CaRolina at Chapel Hill in paRtial fulfillment of the RequiRements foR the deGRee of MasteR of Arts in the Military History program in the DepaRtment of HistoRy. Chapel Hill 2015 AppRoved by: Michael C. MoRgan Wayne E. Lee Joseph W. Caddell © 2015 James E. CovinGton III ALL RIGHTS RESERVED ii ABSTRACT James E. CovinGton III: VisionaRy Policy: Bill Clinton, the Bosnian WaR, and AmeRican Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era, 1992-1995 (Under the direction of Michael C. MoRGan) Bill Clinton assumed office duRinG a particularly challenging peRiod of AmeRican histoRy. AfteR the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States enjoyed a period of unprecedented power and authority. Clinton was elected to office laRGely for his domestic policies, howeveR, his vision foR AmeRica’s position in the post-Cold War woRld steeRed his foReign policy, particularly with respect to Europe. Clinton’s vision was moRe inclusive and encompassinG than that of his predecessor, George H. W. Bush. During the post-Cold WaR yeaRs, Bush was moRe inclined to let EuRope soRt out theiR own pRoblems, particularly in the case of Bosnia. Clinton, however, was moRe willing to see post-Cold WaR EuRopean pRoblems as AmeRican issues. The Bosnian WaR RepResents a point wheRe these two ideals collided. Guided by this vision, Clinton oveRcame challenGes fRom the EuRopean Community, political adveRsaRies, and even his own public en Route to inteRveninG in Bosnia.
    [Show full text]
  • Introduction When the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes – from 1929 Kingdom of Yugoslavia – Was Formed in 1918, One of I
    Introduction When the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes – from 1929 Kingdom of Yugoslavia – was formed in 1918, one of its most important tasks was to forge a common collective identity. Intellectual elites in the young state with great optimism agreed that education would play a crucial role in this process. It should come as no surprise, then, that a relatively rich tradition of scholarly research into the representation of collective identities in Yugoslav education has originated, precisely to account for the failure of the Yugoslav project in the long term. Recently, a growing body of scholarly research has established textbooks as one of the more rewarding sources for studying collective identity in education, focusing on ‘what knowledge is included and rejected in ... textbooks, and how the transmission of this selected knowledge often attempts to shape a particular form of national memory, national identity and national consciousness’.1 For the Yugoslav case this emerging research field so far has primarily examined textbooks which were used in the period directly preceding, during and following the disintegration of Yugoslavia.2 However, as the present article hopes to illustrate, textbook analysis can also provide the historian with interesting new elements for the study of collective identities in Yugoslavia’s more distant past. With its focus on national identity in Serbian, Croatian and Slovenian textbooks before the First World War, and later also in interwar Yugoslavia, the work of Charles Jelavich still occupies a somewhat
    [Show full text]
  • American and Russian Imperialism
    American and Russian Imperialism American Imperialism At the end of the 19th century, the USA tried successfully to enlarge its spheres of influence* inside and outside the Americas. It started to play a more active role in global politics than it did before and used military force to achieve its goals. But which driving forces were responsible for such a change? First, the industrial revolution* had created challenges that required a new outlook. The production of more 5 goods and the need for additional sources of raw materials and new markets called for Americans to begin to look further than their home country. Second, the USA had been driven by the idea of Manifest Destiny,* the idea that the U.S. was to expand over the whole continent of North America. With the ending of the frontier* and the completion of westward expansion, the conviction grew that the United States would have to find new outlets for its increasing population as well as its agricultural and industrial production. Other reasons to take part in the 10 Imperialist struggle were national prestige as one of the global powers and also security concerns. The seizure of the Philippines from Spain was – at least in part – driven by an American desire to keep the islands out of Japan - ese hands. To promote its new policy of expansion, the USA needed more military power, especially sea power. This was in part due to the success of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, founder of the Naval War College in Newport, 15 Rhode Island. He wrote a popular book – The Influence of Sea Power upon History – that called for the USA to improve its strength on the basis of sea power which he thought to be a decisive force, making nations and em- pires great and able to stand the test of time.
    [Show full text]
  • Absolute Monarchy in Russia
    wh07_te_ch04_s05_MOD_s.fm Page 168 Monday, March 5, 2007 12:28WH07MOD_se_CH04_S05_s.fm PM Page 168 Thursday, January 25, 2007 2:45 PM The palace (left) of Catherine the Great (far left) reflects both European and traditional Russian architectural styles. Step-by-Step SECTION Instruction 5 WITNESS HISTORY AUDIO A Foreign Princess Takes the Throne Objectives For twenty years, the German princess Catherine lived As you teach this section, keep students at the Russian court, enduring an unhappy marriage to focused on the following objectives to help the Russian heir apparent, who was widely considered them answer the Section Focus Question to be insane. She filled her time reading, studying and master core content. French philosophy, building alliances behind the scenes, and biding her time. When her husband ■ Explain how Peter the Great tried to became emperor in 1762, she called on her allies to make Russia into a modern state. act. Within a few months he had been deposed and ■ Identify the steps Peter took to expand Catherine proclaimed empress of Russia. Like Peter the Russia’s borders. Great before her, Catherine would rule with intelligence, a firm hand, and a mind set on ■ Describe how Catherine the Great modernization. strengthened Russia. Focus Question How did Peter the Great and Catherine the Great strengthen Russia and expand its territory? Absolute Monarchy in Russia Prepare to Read In the early 1600s, Russia was still a medieval state, untouched by Objectives the Renaissance or Reformation and largely isolated from Western Build Background Knowledge L3 • Explain how Peter the Great tried to make Russia into a modern state.
    [Show full text]
  • Nations and Citizens in Yugoslavia and the Post-Yugoslav States: One Hundred Years of Citizenship
    Štiks, Igor. "Brothers United: The Making of Yugoslavs." Nations and Citizens in Yugoslavia and the Post-Yugoslav States: One Hundred Years of Citizenship. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015. 25–36. Bloomsbury Collections. Web. 26 Sep. 2021. <http:// dx.doi.org/10.5040/9781474221559.ch-002>. Downloaded from Bloomsbury Collections, www.bloomsburycollections.com, 26 September 2021, 07:06 UTC. Copyright © Igor Štiks 2015. You may share this work for non-commercial purposes only, provided you give attribution to the copyright holder and the publisher, and provide a link to the Creative Commons licence. 1 Brothers United: The Making of Yugoslavs The revolver came from Serbia, but the finger that pulled the trigger that would kill Franz Ferdinand and thus announce the end of one world and the birth of another acted upon two strong beliefs. If one can judge from his statement, underage Gavrilo Princip, like so many of his peers, was foremost convinced that South Slavs should be liberated from a foreign yoke and unite in their own state; this belief was strongly though not articulately mixed with another conviction that the world about to come must be the world of profound social transformation. Two motives with which our story of ‘one hundred years of citizenship’ begins will be repeated in many different forms during this century: should South Slavs have their own common state? Or form separate ones? And, regardless of the answer, should political transformations entail more social equality or only a change of the rulers at the top of the existing hierarchy? Every idea often has deep roots and various historic materializations.
    [Show full text]
  • World War I 1914-1918
    A Significant War Over 16 million people died in WWI and over 20 million were wounded, totaling over 37 million. There are 317 million people in the United States today. That means, that if the casualties from WWI were applied to the United States today, one in every nine people would be dead or wounded. That is how much of an impact this war had on the world, especially Europe, and why it is important to know and understand. World War I What was the correlation between the Age of Imperialism and the outbreak of World War I? Long Term Causes Militarism- Glorifying Military Power Keeping a large standing army prepared for war Arms race for military technology Long Term Causes Nationalism- Deep Devotion to One’s Nation Competition and Rivalry developed between European nations for territory and markets (Example France and Germany- Alsace-Lorraine) Long Term Causes Imperialism- European competition for colonies Quest for colonies often almost led to war Imperialism led to rivalry and mistrust amongst European nations Long Term Causes Alliance System- Designed to keep peace in Europe, instead pushed continent towards war Many Alliances made in secret By 1907 two major alliances: Triple Alliance and Triple Entente The Two Sides Triple Alliance Triple Entente Germany England Austria-Hungary France Italy Russia Central Powers Allied Powers Germany England, France, Austria-Hungary Russia, United Ottoman Empire States, Italy, Serbia, Belgium, Switzerland Game of Allegiance Did it get confusing trying to keep your allegiances
    [Show full text]
  • Alliance System
    Alliance System Triple Alliance Triple Entente How did the nations of Europe find themselves in this situation? In order to answer this question you need to focus on the events that occurred in continental Europe following the end of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. Germany’s role is very important. Historical Context – 1870’s Great Britain had adopted a policy of “Splendid Isolation” – which meant that it had chosen to stay out of the affairs of the nations of continental Europe as long as these nations did nothing to challenge the British status as the dominant global superpower. Traditional Order France – British Enemy #1 Germany – Viewed as friendly state Following the end of the Franco- Prussian War of 1870-71 German unification is complete. Kaiser Wilhelm the First makes the decision to establish Germany as the dominant power in Continental Europe. He will challenge France to do this but has no intentions of challenging Great Britain. Task is given to his most senior advisor – Otto Von Bismarck. Bismarck initiates an elaborate system of alliances aimed at isolating France within the confines of continental Europe. • Dual Alliance – 1879 ( Austria-Hungary ) • Triple Alliance – 1882 (adds Italy ) • Reinsurance Treaty with Russia - 1887 Dual Alliance / Triple Alliance / Reinsurance Treaty These alliances accomplish two things for Germany • Isolates France • Does this without angering Great Britain • Avoids imperialism • No naval challenge Turning Point - 1888 Kaiser Wilhelm 1 dies and is replaced by his “ambitious” son – Wilhelm II. Wilhelm II makes several mistakes Fires Bismarck Allows Reinsurance Treaty with Russia to lapse – causes Russia to turn to France.
    [Show full text]
  • The Alliance System Before 1900
    How and why did the Alliance System form? L/O – To understand the key features of the alliance system before 1914 Starter – How was the most powerful nation in Europe? Who was second? What is an Alliance? An alliance is an agreement between one or more states to work together. Alliances usually involve making promises to protect the other country against nations who are not in the alliance. These promises are usually made by the signing of treaties. Why were Alliances made? The aim of forming alliances was to achieve collective security – having alliances with other powerful countries deterred your enemies from attacking you. If a country started a war with one nation it would have to fight all its allies as well. Alliances were often made in reaction to national rivalries – when one country felt threatened by another, it often looked to secure friendships with other nations. By 1900, Europe was full of national rivalries. Why were alliances made? There were two main sources of national rivalries: The creation of Germany in 1871 out of the many smaller Germanic states had been opposed by France, resulting in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71. The Germans invaded France and forced the French to sign a humiliating peace treaty. This meant that France and Germany hated each other. The Ottoman (Turkish) Empire in Eastern Europe was crumbling. Russia sought to take advantage of this to expand west into the Balkans. Austria-Hungary wanted to prevent Russian expansion. National Rivalries A dinner party The Rise of Germany • By 1900, the Great Powers in Europe were beginning to divide themselves into two separate groups.
    [Show full text]
  • The German Fear of Russia Russia and Its Place Within German History
    The German Fear of Russia Russia and its place within German History By Rob Dumont An Honours Thesis submitted to the History Department of the University of Lethbridge in partial fulfillment of the requirements for History 4995 The University of Lethbridge April 2013 Table of Contents Introduction 1-7 Chapter 1 8-26 Chapter 2 27-37 Chapter 3 38-51 Chapter 4 39- 68 Conclusion 69-70 Bibliography 71-75 Introduction In Mein Kampf, Hitler reflects upon the perceived failure of German foreign policy regarding Russia before 1918. He argues that Germany ultimately had to prepare for a final all- out war of extermination against Russia if Germany was to survive as a nation. Hitler claimed that German survival depended on its ability to resist the massive faceless hordes against Germany that had been created and projected by Frederick the Great and his successors.1 He contends that Russia was Germany’s chief rival in Europe and that there had to be a final showdown between them if Germany was to become a great power.2 Hitler claimed that this showdown had to take place as Russia was becoming the center of Marxism due to the October Revolution and the founding of the Soviet Union. He stated that Russia was seeking to destroy the German state by launching a general attack on it and German culture through the introduction of Leninist principles to the German population. Hitler declared that this infiltration of Leninist principles from Russia was a disease and form of decay. Due to these principles, the German people had abandoned the wisdom and actions of Frederick the Great, which was slowly destroying German art and culture.3 Finally, beyond this expression of fear, Hitler advocated that Russia represented the only area in Europe open to German expansion.4 This would later form the basis for Operation Barbarossa and the German invasion of Russia in 1941 in which Germany entered into its final conflict with Russia, conquering most of European 1 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, trans Ralph Manheim (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1943, originally published 1926), 197.
    [Show full text]