THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES ECONOMIC SANCTIONS TO THE VOTING BEHAVIOR OF IRANIAN PEOPLE IN IRAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (2010-2013)
By
AZHAR FUADI ID no. 016201100089
A thesis presented to the Faculty of Humanities President University In partial fulfillment of requirement for Bachelor Degree in International Relations Major in diplomacy Studies
2015
THESIS ADVISER RECOMMENDATION LETTER
This thesis entitled “The Impact of United States Economic Sanctions to The Voting Behavior of Iranian People in Iran Presidential Election (2010-2013)” prepared and submitted by Azhar Fuadi in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts in International Relations in the Faculty of Humanities has been reviewed and found to have satisfied the requirements for a thesis fit to be examined. I therefore recommend this thesis for Oral Defense.
Cikarang, Indonesia, 15 January 2015
Thesis Adviser
Dr. H. Munawar Fuad Noeh, MA
DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY
I declare that this thesis, entitled “The Impact of United States Economic Sanctions to The Voting Behavior of Iranian people in Iran Presidential Election (2010-2013)” is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, an original piece of work that has not been submitted, either in whole or in part, to another university to obtain a degree.
Cikarang, Indonesia, 15 January 2015
Azhar Fuadi
PANEL OF EXAMINER APPROVAL SHEET
The Panel of Examiners declare that the thesis entitled “The Impact of United States Economic Sanctions to The Voting Behavior of Iranian people in Iran Presidential Election (2010-2013)” that was submitted by Azhar Fuadi majoring in International relations from the Faculty of Humanities was assessed and approved to have passed the Oral Examinations on 25 February 2015.
Hendra Manurung, SIP., MA. Chair-Panel of Examiner
Prof. Anak Agung Banyu Perwita, Ph.D. Examiner
Witri elvianti, MA. Thesis Advisor
ABSTRACT
Title: The Impact of United States Economic Sanctions to The Voting Behavior of Iranian people in Iran Presidential Election (2010-2013)
Among the discussion about the efficiency of economic sanctions as a foreign policy, this thesis will try to give political analysis on the usability of economic sanctions to achieve expected goals. By the purpose of analyzing the relevance of economic sanctions with a political leadership transition in the receiver country, this thesis could give an understanding on how we see the concept of economic sanctions implementation on a country could give impacts not only to economical aspect, but also to the political aspect. Are economic sanctions a viable strategy in this globalizations era especially in regards to influencing domestic political aspect of the target country? The author uses study case of Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA) imposition on Iran (2010-2013). This thesis will analyze the impacts of the economic sanctions as independent variable into the Iran presidential election in 2013 as the dependent variable. The results show that the surprising victory of Hassan Rouhani was the impacts of CISADA 2010 toward Iran Presidential Elections 201. The author believes that the CISADA could affect the outcome of Iranian presidential election 2013 by casting great audience cost to Iranian people which then could influence the Iranian constituents to behave as expectation of United States.
Key Word: Economic Sanctions, CISADA, Bilateral Relations, Iran Presidential Election 2013, Audience Cost, Voting Behavior.
i
ABSTRACT
Title: The Impact of United States Economic Sanctions to The Voting Behavior of Iranian people in Iran Presidential Election (2010-2013)
Di tengah-tengah panasnya diskusi mengenai keefektifan sanksi ekonomi sebagai alat kebijakan luar negeri, skripsi ini akan mencoba untuk menyuguhkan pandangan berbeda terhadap konsep keefektifitasan sanksi ekonomi sebagai alat kebijkan luar negeri. Skripsi ini mencoba untuk menganalisa hubungan antara sanksi ekonomi dengan transisi kepimpinan politik di negara penerima sanksi. Skripsi ini memberikan pandangan berbeda bahwasanya sanksi ekonomi tidak hanya semata dapat mempengaruhi keadaan ekonomi suatu Negara, namun juga berdampak kepada politik dalam negeri. Apakah sanksi ekonomi adalah kebijakan yang tepat terlebih dalam fungsinya untuk mempengaruhi keadaan politik dalam negeri dari Negara penerima sanksi? Dalam rangka untuk mencari jawaban tersebut, penulis menggunakan kasus dari implementasi Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA) terhadap Iran (2010-2013). Skripsi ini akan menganalisa pengaruh dari sanksi ekonomi sebagai variabel independen terhadap pemilihan presiden di Iran tahun 2013 sebagai variable dependen. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa sanksi ekonomoi dari Amerika Serikat melalui pelaksanaan CISADA telah memainkan peran yang penting di dalam terpilihnya Hassan Rouhani. Penulis percaya bahwa CISADA dapat mempengaruhi hasil akhir dari pemilihan presiden di Iran dengan mengakibatkan audience cost terhadap masyarakat Iran sehingga dapat mempengaruhi mereka untuk memilih calon yang diharapkan oleh pihak Amerika Serikat.
Key Word: Sanksi ekonomi, CISADA, Hubungan Bilateral, Pemilihan Presiden Iran 2013, Audience Cost, Voting Behavior.
ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
In the name of Allah, The Merciful, The Compassionate
All thanks and praises be to Allah, the Lord of the worlds, the Almighty, on whom ultimately this thesis would not be done without Allah‘s permission and power. May blessings and peace be upon Prophet Muhammad, his family and companions. I would never have been able to finish my thesis without the guidance of my supervisors, lecturers, family, and friends. Therefore I would like to express my deepest gratitude to both of my advisors, Mr. Munawar Fuad and Ms. Witri Elvianti, for their excellent guidance, caring, patiently corrected my writing, and providing me with handful of suggestions. I would also like to thank the fabulous lecturers of International Relations president University, Mr. Eric Hendra. Mr. Agung Banyu Perwita, and Mr. Teuku Rezasyah which whom also have given me so much suggestions, and humbly provided great assistance not only to me, but also to all the IR students. I also wish to thank wish my most awesome companions during this thesis writing, Mahfudz, Rajiv Ambara, Aris Munandar, Nuraya Widhantisa, Dina Herliana, who were always supporting and encouraging me through day and night. Not to mention, biggest gratitude to all of my dearest friends of International relations 2011, Zahirul Ma‘ala who have always inspired me all along during the process. Special thanks, tribute and appreciation to all those their names do not appear here who have contributed to the successful completion of this study. Finally, I am forever indebted to my parents and sisters. They were always supporting me and encouraging me with their best wishes.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ...... i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ...... iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS ...... iv
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES ...... vii
LIST OF ACRONYMS ...... viii
CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION ...... 1
1.1 Background ...... 1
1.2 Problem Identification ...... 5
1.3 Statement of the Problem: ...... 6
1.4 Research Objectives: ...... 7
1.5 Research Methodology ...... 7
1.5.1 Case Study ...... 8
1.5.2 Research Framework ...... 8
1.5.3 Research Time and Place ...... 9
1.5.4 Data Collection ...... 9
1.6 Significance of Study: ...... 10
1.7 Theoretical Framework ...... 11
1.7.1 Domestic Audience Cost ...... 11
1.7.2 The Public Choice Approach ...... 13
1.7.3 Hegemonic Stability Theory ...... 15
1.8 Scope and Limitation of Study: ...... 15
1.9 Definition of Terms ...... 16
iv
1.9.1 Economic Sanctions...... 16
1.9.2 Voting Behavior...... 17
1.10 Thesis Outline: ...... 19
CHAPTER II LITERATURE REVIEW ...... 21
2.1 Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work by Robert A. Pape (1997) ...... 22
2.2 Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Leaders? By Nikolay Marinov (2005) ...... 25
2.3 Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd edition by Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliott, and Barbara Oegg (2007) ...... 29
2.4 Do Threats or Impositions of Sanctions Destabilize Leaders? By Thomas Reinholdsson (2011) ...... 30
CHAPTER III UNITED STATES – IRAN POLITICAL RELATIONS ...... 33
3.1 United States – Iran Relations before the era of Ahmadinejad ...... 33
3.2 United States – Iran Relations in the era of Ahmadinejad ...... 36
3.2.1 US – Iran Relations in Obama Administration ...... 39
3.3 United States‘ Interest in Iran ...... 43
3.3.1 Oil ...... 44
3.3.2 Arms Industry ...... 47
3.3.3 Protect Israel ...... 48
3.4 Nuclear Iran Issue ...... 50
3.5 U.S. Economic Sanctions to Iran ...... 53
3.5.1 Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA) ...... 54
CHAPTER IV ANALYSIS ON THE IMPACT OF CISADA ON THE VOTING BEHAVIOR OF IRANIANS IN IRAN PRESEDENTIAL ELECTION 2013 ...... 56
4.1 Iran Presidential Election 2013 ...... 56
v
4.2 Ayatollah Ali Khamenei‘s Position in Iran Presidential Election 2013 ...... 60
4.3 Interest Group in Iran Presidential Elections 2013 ...... 62
4.3.1 Pro-Khamenei Conservative ...... 63
4.3.2 Pro-Rafsanjani Technocrats ...... 63
4.3.3. The Reformist ...... 64
4.4 Iranian Electorate in the Iran Presidential Election 2013 ...... 64
4.5 The Candidates in Iran Presidential Election 2013 ...... 65
4.5.1. Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf ...... 66
4.5.2. Ali Akbar Velayati ...... 66
4.5.3. Saeed Jalili ...... 67
4.5.4. Mohsen Rezai ...... 67
4.5.5. Hassan Rouhani ...... 68
4.6 Surprising Victory of Hassan Rouhani ...... 68
4.7 Why Rouhani Win? ...... 72
4.7.1 Economic Sanctions as Determinant Factor behind the Victory of Hassan Rouhani ...... 73
CHAPTER V CONCLUSION ...... 84
5.1 Conclusion ...... 84
REFERENCES ...... 88
APPENDIX ...... 100
vi
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES
List of Charts
Chart 1.1 Research Framework 8
Chart 3.1 Chart of Annual Level energy Consumption of US 46
Chart 4.1 Voting result of Iran Presidential Election 2013 69
Chart 4.2 Tracking Polls Trend of Iran Presidential election 2013 70
Chart 4.3 Chart of Iran Misery Index 78
Chart 4.4 Chart of Iran Inflation Rate (2005-2014) 79
Chart 4.5 Chart of Iran Unemployment Rate (2005-2014) 80
Chart 4.6 Survey on Expectation of Hassan Rouhani 81
Chart 4.7 Survey on Iranian Opinion on Nuclear Program 83
List of Charts
Table 1.2 Research Timeframe 9
Table 3.1: Table of Proven Oil Reserve and Oil Production 45
Table 3.2: Table of Consumption of United States per sector 46
Table 4.1: Table Effect of Sanctions on Iranian Livelihood in 2012 76
vii
LIST OF ACRONYMS
US : United States
UNSC : United States Security Council
UK : United Kingdom
EU : European Union
EU+3 P5+1 : The United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Russia, and China.
JPOA : Joint Plan of Action
UN : United Nations
IAEA : International Atomic Energy Agency
HSE : Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffery J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliot
TIES : Threat and Imposition of Sanction
CIA : Central Intelligence Agency
OPEC : Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
NPT : Non-Proliferation Treaty
CISADA : Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act
viii
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
Nowadays, International economic sanctions appear to be a common and recurring trend in political interactions between states. The United States, in fact, has been the favorite country in imposing economic sanctions after World War II.1 In a parallel way, there are several sanctions imposed by a multilateral organization such as the United Nations which have been used in recent years and some of them are still in force. In fact, since the Berlin Wall fell, sanctions have become a common instrument of the United Nations Security Council in several cases to deter the member countries.2
Economic sanctions have become the bottom line in the relations between United States and Iran since economic sanctions have been a regular United States foreign policy towards Iran for more than three decades. There are 5 administration of United States have imposed sanctions on Iran, accordingly the Carter administration, Reagan Administration Clinton Administration, Bush Administration and recently Obama administration. Good relations of United States and Iran have to end in 1979 when The US-backed Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlevi, is forced to leave country followed by the returns of Ayatollah Khomeini to Iran, usually called as Iranian Revolution. The first sanctions imposed on Iran in 1979 over the United States Embassy seizure by
1 Becker, Richard. (2012). Why No Economic Sanctions against the US? Retrieved from http://www.globalresearch.ca/why-no-economic-sanctions-against-the-us/31802 accessed on 1 October 2014. 2 Sanction list countries. (2014). Business & Sanctions Consulting Netherlands. Retrieved from http://www.bscn.nl/sanctions-consulting/sanctions-list-countries accessed on 19 October 2014.
1
Iranian, which then was lifted after the hostages release in 1981. The allegation of Iranian involvement in sponsorship of terrorism in 1984 has made the embargo gradually being imposed to Iran again. In 2002, United States accused Iran of trying to acquire nuclear weapons program, which Iran denies. Only since 2007, the unilateral sanctions of United States have moved into multilateral economic sanction with the support of the United States Security Council (UNSC) regarding the alleged proliferation nuclear program of Iran.3 The interest of United States in Iran is clear that to maintained the balance of power in the Middle East which will ensure the sustainability of the oil resources.
However, the case of United States economic sanctions on Iran is one of the examples where it‘s considered as failed. Many argue that the policy of United States to Iran proliferation program has failed to change the behavior of Iran. Up until 2013, the objectives of the economic sanctions deter and alter the policy of Iran on nuclear proliferation has never been achieved. Even though there is no agreement among U.S. officials on the specific objectives of sanctions on Iran, which make it hard to judge how successful they have been. But Obama administration has not had any success in persuading Iran leadership to fully cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency on its controversial nuclear program.4
Not to mention, the cost from the economic sanctions also cannot be ignored as it caused billions of Dollars. According to The National Iranian American Council (NIAC), a group that aims to enhance relations between both countries has published a report titled, ―Losing Billions: The Cost of Iran Sanctions to the U.S. Economy.‖. It was being reported that from 1995 to 2012, the U.S. sacrificed between $134.7 and $175.3 billion in potential export revenue to Iran. On average, the lost export revenues translate into between 51,043 and
3 U.S. Sanctions. UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE. The Iran Primer. Retrieved from http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/us-sanctions accessed on 19 October 2014. 4 Ibid
2
66,436 lost job opportunities each year. In 2008, the number reaches as high as 214,657-279,389 lost job opportunities.5
Even though technically speaking, it does not mean that the everlasting economic sanction on Iran has no effects on Iran economically. Nearly half of Iran‘s government expenditures fund from the oil export, and, by late of 2013, sanctions had reduced Iran‘s oil exports to about 1 million barrels per day, which is cannot be compared to 2.5 million barrels of oil per day Iran exported during 2011.6
Moreover, during 2012-2013, at the end of Ahmadinejad administration, the economy of Iran was deteriorating due to loss of revenues from oil, and also from the restriction of access for Iran from International banking system. It has caused a dramatic drop in the value of Iran‘s currency (rial) which raised inflation to more than 50%; and cut off Iran‘s access to most of its hard currency held outside the country. Many Iranian firms reduced operations and gone bankrupt due to Iran‘s economy shrank by about 5% in 2013.7
Nevertheless, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, with the autocratic style of leadership have always been the most vocal leader against the imperialistic United States and have always insisted that the Nuclear program of Iran was solely for the sake of people‘s energy need, not for the nuclear weapon. The torment from the severe of economic sanctions could not change the stance of the leadership as the citizens also tied to believe their leader.
However, the lights of hope have shined when Hassan Rouhani came to power replace Ahmadinejad who has been in the office for two periods. The election of Rouhani was followed by glimmers of hope from international community that this political leadership transition could to some degree have
5 Leslie, J., Marashi, R., Parsi, T. (2014). Losing Billions: The cost of Iran sanctions to the U.S. economy. Retrieved from http://www.niacouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Losing- Billions-The-Cost-of-Iran-Sanctions.pdf accessed on 20 October 2014. 6 Katzman, Kenneth. (2014). Iran Sanctions. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved from http://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS20871.pdf accessed on 19 October 2014. 7 Ibid
3 positives impacts on the nuclear talks. However, it was proven when on 24 November 2013, Iran had concurred an interim deal the US, UK, France, China, Russia plus Germany which are called P5+1. Iran passed on their dedication for a six-month period to control its uranium enhancement activities. Iran likewise concurred not to commission or fuels the Arak Uranium reactor, which is spent fuel plutonium could be removed. The two sides subsequently concurred that the interim deal would be executed on 20 January 2014.8 As a matter of fact, on July 19, 2014, the P5+1 and Iran asserted that they will keep on their commitments described in the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) and the U.S. government has extended until November 24, 2014.9 Which until right now, there‘s no significant progress on the nuclear negotiation between both parties.
As an exchange, the P5+1 and EU will give sanctions easing that the White House estimated at between $6bn and $7bn. They have resolved to suspend authorizes on Iran's petrochemical fares; imports of merchandise and administrations for its car producing segment; and its import and fare of gold and other valuable metals. They will likewise permit the supply of extra parts and administrations for Iran's civil aviation area; help secure a monetary channel to help helpful exchange and encourage installments for UN commitments and educational cost installments for students studying abroad; and alter EU methods for the approval of financial transactions.10 Therefore, Iran commitment on agreeing the interim deal was seen by international community as sign which indicate the changing political leadership of Iran into a more accommodative and moderate.
8 Ibid 9 Official website of U.S. Department of treasury. Iran Sanctions. Retrieved from http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/pages/iran.aspx accessed On 1 October 2014. 10 Ibid
4
1.2 Problem Identification
Meanwhile, years of struggle of United States to impose economic sanctions against Iran has never been giving a realistic achievement on deterring the behavior of Iran, however Iran has open their heart to listen to United States and United Nations demands, and even agreed to the interim agreement to halts expansion of its nuclear program in exchange for modest sanctions relief. Whether it‘s just a strategy of Iran to release the sanction on temporary manner meanwhile preparing the next strategy to counter US & UN sanctions or it was not only truly a sign of the economic sanctions have finally affected on changing the behavior of Iran, but also it was surely a positive sign for the bilateral relations between United States and Iran.
The turning point of this game happened when the nations have successfully held a democratic presidential election of Iran. Hassan Rouhani, a 65 years of age cleric frequently depicted as the only reformist and moderate figure in presidential competition has beaten all other four candidates which hardline candidates include Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, leader of Tehran – who is categorized as a pragmatic conservative figure, Saeed Jalili, a noble nuclear negotiator who was said to be the successor of Ahmadinejad, Mohsen Rezai a former leader of the powerful Revolutionary Guards, former Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati, and also the former Telecommunications Minister Mohammad Gharazi. Hassan Rouhani has won the election by more than a half of vote or 50.88% of the vote which evade a second round of race. It demonstrates an overwhelming victory of the reformist and moderate groups.1112
This leadership alteration of Iran in 2013, which resulted on the election of Hassan Rouhani to precede the notorious leadership of Ahmadinejad as the president of Iran have made it even more interesting considering the possibility of
11 Sadjapour, Karim. (2013). Iran‘s Presidential Election: An Autocracy Votes. Retrieved from http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/06/12/iran-s-presidential-election-autocracy-votes accessed on 19 October 2014. 12 Asgari, Mohsen. (15 June 2013). Hassan Rouhani wins Iran Presidential Election. BBC News. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-22916174. On 19 October 2014.
5 leadership transformation factor as one of the key moment which change the game. From all pain no gain condition in Ahmadinejad era into a prospective re- alignment of friendship under Rouhani leadership. This dramatic turnover raise questions to author mind. The scenario turned out to be pretty convenient and favorable for the United States as the victory, Hassan Rouhani is a moderate figure. It will obviously ease the path of United States to resolve the iran nuclear issue. Therefore the author had begun questioning whether there are some several pushes from the United States which directly or indirectly are stimulating the victory of Hassan Rouhani repeating the same pattern of Shah Pahlevi which backed by United States, except in more deliberative and respectable way. In this sense, the author would like to explore the political impacts of the economic sanctions which were severely imposed to Iran in recent decades. Does leadership really matters on the efficacy of economic sanctions, meanwhile the supreme leader, the one considered the most powerful in Iran, is actually not changing. Or the election of Rouhani was just a turning point of Iran people who have enough of economic restrictions? This research will try to answer those questions while believe that in this interconnected era, economic sanctions gain more efficiency and the recent behavior of Iran was actually the result of economic sanctions which has begun to pay off.
1.3 Statement of the Problem:
Topic : This research is about the impact of United States economic sanctions to the voting behavior of Iranian people in Iran Presidential Election 2013: Case Study of The imposition of Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA) against Iran (2010-2013)
Question: what is the impact of United States‘ economic sanctions against Iran on the Iran Presidential Election in 2013? And how the United States economic sanction on Iran could influence the voting behavior of Iranian constituent?
6
1.4 Research Objectives:
The objectives of this research are:
1. To attest whether if economic sanctions are a reliable foreign policy in achieving the goals of sender states. 2. To analyze the relevance between economic sanctions and the dynamic of political leadership in a particular country by assessing the impact of the economic sanctions to the voting behaviorchang in the Iran presidential election in 2013.
1.5 Research Methodology
The methodology of this research is using a qualitative research method by describing and analyzing. This thesis will try to find the relevance between economic sanction and political aspect by describing and analyzing the United States economic sanctions on Iran and also the political dynamic of Iran especially the momentum of Iran presidential election in 2013.
The author will use qualitative approach in this research as the author think qualitative approach is the most suitable method in defining this issue. Even though the subject of this research is economic sanctions, since this research emphasize in trying to capture its relations with political leadership in a country, not the amount of the economic sanctions itself, thus the author prefer to use qualitative approach. Due to the unique and complex domestic politics and political system of Iran and the unique nature of sanctions against Iran, the method of study best suited for this thesis is a single case study approach which then followed by descriptive analysis. By using the economic sanctions of US against Iran, the author will analyze the impacts of the economic sanctions to the political leadership transformation in Iran which will be highlighted in the Iran Presidential Election in 2013.
7
1.5.1 Case Study
The imposition of Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA) against Iran (2010-2013)
1.5.2 Research Framework
In this research, economic sanctions work as the independent variable. Meanwhile, the people of Iran work as the dependent variable. This research will try to analyze how the economic sanctions as independent variable could influence the people of Iran as dependent variable which results on the elections of moderate figure in 2013 beaten all the conservative figures. In order to the answer, the author will use the research framework as the basis of this research to find the relevance between the two variables. The chart below to illustrate the framework:
Chart 1.5.2.1 Methodology Framework
Voting The victory Economic Iranian Behavior of Hassan Sanctions Government of Iranian Rouhani People
8
1.5.3 Research Time and Place
Place of research : President University Student Library
Freedom Institute Library
Table 1.2 Research Timeframe
Name of October November December January February March Activity 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 Research Writing of
Thesis Submission of
Final Draft Defense Revision of
Thesis
1.5.4 Data Collection
The data gathered for this research will mainly acquire from the previous literature related with the issue of this research whether in forms of books, journals, magazines, and articles from newspaper. The author will also gather the resources from internet in form of official document from related institution, e- book, e-journal, or information found from authenticated websites.
Moreover, this research also will try to capture the relations between the countries by reflecting on the official statements of the leader of each country such as the speech, letter, and interview by media, or by the analyst who is expert in the issue. The official; statement of the leader could be retrieved from the official website of the government and mostly from an internationally proven media who reported the events such as BBC, CNN, Reuter, and etc.
9
Data of Iran's economy and residential legislative issues is best assembled from the regional journals such as the Middle East Journal, Middle East Quarterly, and Middle East Economic Digest. Author also collected the data from news magazines like The Economist. Ideally, this thesis would depend absolutely on scholar insightful articles, yet when considering a country like Iran we must consider all conceivable information. Beside journals and newsmagazine articles, research institution such as RAND is very essential in assisting the author, since they produced sophisticated reports on Iran Presidential Election 2013.
Since this thesis aim to assess the voting behavior of Iranian people, author used trusted poll institution or individual such as Gallup survey, IPOS (Iranian elections Tracking Polls), and poll by expert Ebrahim Mohseni. United States government reports and sources, while potentially biased due to political appointments, are also excellent sources of information especially as related to sanctions and their effects.
Therefore this thesis will try to get the best results from studying different books, presenting viewpoints of different writers and gathering data together in order to give full description of the issue and using the theoretical framework which used by this research to obtain the answer being sought.
1.6 Significance of Study:
This study will be a significant reference for the decision maker of any countries on the implementation of economic sanction. As the economic sanction has nowadays seems the favorite kind of power demonstrated by United States and also other advance countries. This research could add more reference on the efficacy of the economic sanctions as well as to give more update on the development of economic sanction concept in international relations field of study.
Not only for the decision maker, it will also add the scholarly literature in International relations especially in the topic of economic sanctions and US-Iran
10 relations. As previously mentioned that the most well-known literatures in economic sanction issue are the books of Hufbauer, Economic sanctions reconsidered and the book of Robert A. Pape, why economic sanctions still do not work, which basically imply that the economic sanctions is not really effective foreign policy. This study will test their hypothesis on the recent case to contribute in the development of the tested theory in International relations practical studies. Moreover, this study will also serve as a future reference for researchers on the subject of economic sanction implementation.
1.7 Theoretical Framework
1.7.1 Domestic Audience Cost
Despite of the fact that there are enormous numbers of literatures to the study of economic sanctions has been already made by scholars, there is one key aspect that may have played as an important factor on the success or failure of economic sanctions: domestic audience costs within the target state. Indeed, there are numerous cases where the sanction actually targeted to the figure of the government; however it damaged the innocent citizen‘s economy either directly or indirectly.
An audience cost is a term in international relations theory that portrays about the punishment of a leader brought from his or her constituency if they raise a foreign policy crisis.13 It resembles with the phenomenon where the leadership of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad were not very successful later at the end of his period. This theory explains generally the reason behind the leadership transformation in Iran.
13 Tomz, Michael. (2005). Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach. Retrieved from https://web.stanford.edu/~tomz/pubs/Tomz- AudCosts-2007-09.pdf accessed on 21 October 2014.
11
The term was popularized by James Fearon in his article in 1994. With respect to the situation of economic sanctions the audience costs ought to be first be incorporated with the individual‘s impression on the sanctions, which is, whether they feel that the sanctions are really targeted at the country as a unitary substance or the people as a whole. In this case, if sanctions are aimed at obliterating and deteriorating the target country‘s economy and every resident then sanction are seen to be ―personal‖. In this case, nationalism or patriotism are prone to increment. Accordingly, people prefer to endure the inconveniences caused instead of consent and are unlikely to generate high expense for the state. The effectiveness of economic sanctions is hence prone to decrease. 14
By this theory, it means that the regime type of a country would have influences the way of people perceive the imposed sanctions and how they are going to respond to them, either by tolerating or pressuring the government. In this case, clearly at the end of Ahmadinejad period, the pressure and the scream of the innocent people were increasing in line with the increasing voices seeking for a compliance with the United States demand to loosen the economic restriction which lead into the election of Hassan Rouhani.
A standout amongst the most essential standards of democracy is freedom of choice, free and fair election of leaders. In this conditions individual have a tendency to analyze the potential candidates, consider their recommendations, their reputation and dependability, and they compare them with each other. Finally, they vote in favor those whom they consider to be the best or less disappointing candidate. In every period, each move made by the legislatures or executives would have great impacts on the likelihood of him being picked again in the following election, or in any event the pupil who brought the same approach or ideology. This implies that if a democratic government seeks after an approach that incites the foreign pressure, it will confront greater audience cost. People are unlikely to bear enduring and burden if they don't see any reasonable
14 Fearon, James D. (September 1994). Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Dispute. American Political Science Review vol. 88 no. 3. Retrieved from http://web.stanford.edu/class/polisci243b/readings/v0002544.pdf accessed on 21 October 2014.
12 cause to do so. The extent that democracy is described by a variety of opinions, a great reason behind one voter may not be the same for an alternate. It is hence practically impossible to make consistent support for a government‘s political stance and urge people to bear the outcomes of the economic sanctions.15 They would rather coerce the government into compliance. Just like what described on the transformations of Iran‘s leadership.
This theory could also answer the relations of autocratic leadership of Ahmadinejad could last for eight years where it‘s seen very solid to oppose the United States and not being bothered by the economic sanctions being imposed. When people are being restricted to various important public goods and freedoms (for example, freedom of choice, freedom of expression, or freedom to choose religion) autocratic leaders require a certain ‖spiritual joints‖ that unite and tie people together, keeping them from challenging and endeavoring to overthrow the regime. The image of an external enemy, eager to damage and ruin the state and an external enemy, who has specific goals to force the state to comply in order to humiliate them, is a typical apparatus in such circumstances. Just like the support to Ahmadinejad to oppose United States which considered as the enemy of Shia twelve as the main religion of Iran. Therefore, people are likely to feel more nationalistic, to be more willing to endure enemies‘ pressures and they are more likely to resist economic sanctions.16
1.7.2 The Public Choice Approach
Considering that economic sanctions generally have powerless effects on target economies and impose high costs on the sender, Anton Lowenberg and William Kaempfer have endeavored to explain why sanctions are imposed by researching the internal instruments of political decision making, for example by using public choice theories. Indeed, they argue that, mindful of the above, the
15 Economic sanctions why do they not work. Retrieved from http://www.futureforeignpolicy.com/economic-sanctions-why-do-they-not-work/ accessed on 22 October 2014. 16 Ibid
13 traditional yardstick for measuring the success of sanctions may be flawed. What they have deemed to be failures, may very well have been successes, had other criteria been used. 17
Public choice theory is an economic theory of politics in which policy arrangement is clarified by the rational maximizing decisions of people made as per the standard opportunity cost considerations of microeconomics. The Policies of governments are seen as endogenous and not given. Thus, according to public choice theories, policies are formed by choices of individual political agents inside countries. These agents can be lawmakers, politicians, voters, civil servants, or interest parties and it is basic to comprehend that these agents may seek after their own individual plans or their own ideas of the public good. The focus ought to be on the behavior of these agents as oppose to the behavior of the nation states. It ought to be noted that this competition gets considerably more intricate in the US case, because of its political framework that allows outside entryways to weight American legislators and decision-makers. 18
The public choice approach might likewise be utilized to clarify the political impacts of economic sanctions on the target state. Sanctions send signs to contending groups and factions inside the target state that at times are sufficient to affect political change. Once again, the rationale this non-financial and non- market channel of impact gets from the public choice perspective of the policymaking is determined by interest groups. Anyway since the results sought by these groups are public goods, all interest group activity is tormented by free incentives and aggregate action issues. The costs imposed on interest groups through sanctions alter the political equilibrium in the target state. Therefore, by the accesses of political flagging, even sanctions that carry minimal immediate economic impacts can change the political equilibrium in the target state by changing the relative influences of key interest groups.19
17 Kaempfer, W., Lowenberg, A. International Economic Sanctions. Retrieved from http://www.sfu.ca/~schmitt/sanctions.pdf accessed on 22 October 2014. 18 Ibid 19 Ibid
14
1.7.3 Hegemonic Stability Theory
Hegemonic Stability Theory is a hypothesis created by numerous political researchers including Robert Keohane George Modelski, Stephen Krasner, and Robert Gilpin. A hegemon is a state that has the capability and the will to lead and overwhelmed other countries in the international system.20 The primary idea of this hypothesis is that the stability of the international system obliges a solitary predominant state to enforce and articulate the guidelines of interaction among the most essential members of the system. A hegemon state must have three attributes: the capacity to enforce the rules of the framework, the will to do so, and a pledge to the system that is seen as mutually gainful to the major states. A hegemon's capacity rests upon any semblance of an extensive, growing economy, strength in a main technological sector or financial sector, and political force supported by predominant military force. An unstable framework will come about if financial, technological, and different changes dissolve the international hierarchy and undermine the position of the overwhelming state.21 By this theory describe the interest of United States as the country act as hegemonic country in Iran as an action to balance the geopolitical security situation in Middle-East when Iran under suspicion by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for nuclear proliferation for nuclear weapon.
1.8 Scope and Limitation of Study:
As this research uses study case approach to seek the answers, the scope of this research only include the economic sanctions in the era of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad especially the imposition of Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA) against Iran in 2010 until the Iran
20Hegemonic stability theory. Retrieved from http://mediawiki.middlebury.edu/wiki/IPE/Hegemonic_stability_theory accessed on 22 October 2014. 21 Extract from lecture notes on the theory of hegemonic stability by Vincent Ferraro, Ruth C. Lawson Professor of International Politics at Mount Holyoke College, Massachusetts. Retrieved from http://www.irtheory.com/know.htm. On 22 October 2014
15 presidential election in 2013. Since this thesis also talking about the voting behavior of Iranian people in Iran Presidential Election 2013, the object is limited to the Iranian electorate in the election.
1.9 Definition of Terms
1.9.1 Economic Sanctions
As Indicated by Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffery J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliot (HSE) in their book, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, HSE characterize economic sanctions as ―a well-planned, government-roused withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of trade or monetary relations.22
Donna Kaplowitz defines economic sanctions as financial disallowances taken by one or more states, the sender is the one who punish another state or states, and the target is the one being imposed change in the target‘s policies, or exhibit to a domestic or international audience the sender‘s position on the target‘s policies.23
As stated by Robert A. Pape in his book, Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work, Pape asserted that the goals of economic sanctions is trying to bring down the aggregate financial welfare of the target state by lessening international
22 Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffery J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliot. (1990). Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy, 2nd ed. Washington, D.C.: Institute of International Economics p. 2. Cited from Anatomy of Economic Sanctions. Retrieved from https://www.google.co.id/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved =0CB0QFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww3.nccu.edu.tw%2F~ctung%2FDissertation%2FChapt er%25203%2520%2520Anatomy%2520of%2520Economic%2520Sanctions.doc&ei=feyBVOS3 Nc2jugS0poHADQ&usg=AFQjCNHEsoswUQd8EKtYbSkWsPqvxC3VlQ&bvm=bv.80642063,d .c2E accessed on 23 October 2014. 23 Kaplowitz, Donna. (1995). Anatomy of a Failed Embargo: The Case of the U.S. Sanctions against Cuba, vol. I, Ph.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, p. 32. Cited from Anatomy of Economic Sanctions. Retrieved from https://www.google.co.id/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved =0CB0QFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww3.nccu.edu.tw%2F~ctung%2FDissertation%2FChapt er%25203%2520%2520Anatomy%2520of%2520Economic%2520Sanctions.doc&ei=feyBVOS3 Nc2jugS0poHADQ&usg=AFQjCNHEsoswUQd8EKtYbSkWsPqvxC3VlQ&bvm=bv.80642063,d .c2E accessed on 23 October 2014.
16 trade in order to constrain the target government to change its political conduct. As indicated by him, economic sanctions are diverse with trade war and economic warfare. Trade wars do not try to influence the nation's target political conduct, yet to influence its international financial policies and just to degree that they influence the economy of the sender states. In the meantime, economic warfare seeks debilitate the enemy aggregate economic potential in order to debilitate its military capacities, either in a peacetime or in a continuous war.24
1.9.2 Voting Behavior
Voting is the main form of political participation in liberal democratic societies and the study of voting behavior is a highly specialized sub-field within political science. The analysis of voting patterns invariably focuses on the determinants of why people vote as they do and how they arrive at the decisions they make. Sociologists tend to look to the socio-economic determinants of support for political parties, observing the correlations between class, occupation, ethnicity, sex, age and vote; political scientists have concentrated on the influence of political factors such as issues, political programs, electoral campaigns, and the popularity of party leaders on voting behavior. However, both disciplines share much the same terrain, and increasingly have tended to overlap in their analytical approaches.25
Understanding voters' behavior can explain how and why decisions were made either by public decision-makers, which has been a central concern for political scientists or by the electorate. To interpret voting behavior both political science and psychology expertise were necessary and therefore the field of political psychology emerged. Political psychology researchers study ways in which affective influence may help voters make more informed voting choices,
24 Pape A. Robert. (1997). Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work. International Security, volume 22, issue 2. Retrieved from http://web.stanford.edu/class/ips216/Readings/pape_97%20(jstor).pdf accessed on 23 October 2014. 25 M. Harrop and and W. L. Miller.(1987). Elections and Voters: A Comparative Perspective.
17 with some proposing that affect may explain how the electorate makes informed political choices in spite of low overall levels of political attentiveness and sophistication.26
A number of different (but not mutually exclusive) approaches to the explanation of voting behavior can be distinguished in the literature. Structural (or sociological) approaches concentrate on the relationship between individual and social structure, place the vote in a social context, and examine the effects on voting of such variables as social class, language, nationalism, religion, and rural- urban contrasts. Ecological (or aggregate statistical) approaches relate voting patterns to the characteristic features of a geographical area (ward, constituency, state, or whatever). Social psychological approaches relate voting decisions to the voter's psychological predispositions or attitudes, for example his or her party identification, attitudes to candidates, and such like. Finally, rational-choice approaches attempt to explain voting behavior as the outcome of a series of instrumental cost-benefit calculations by the individual, assessing the relative desirability of specific electoral outcomes in terms of the issues addressed and policies espoused by the different parties or candidates. Each of these broad approaches tends to be associated with different research techniques and each makes different assumptions about what motivates political behavior.27
26 Goldman, Sheldon. (1964). Voting Behavior in United States Courts and Appeal. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/1953364?sid=21105580904251&uid=4&uid=3738224&ui d=2 accessed on 7 March 2015. 27 J. Eldersveld, Samuel. (1951). Theory and method in Voting Behavior Research. Retrieved from http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=6340400 accessed on 7 march 2015.
18
1.10 Thesis Outline:
This thesis consists of five chapters:
I. Introduction
This chapter contains the background of United States economic sanctions on Iran and several data which make it interesting to be researched. It starts with a subject overview, problem identification, purpose of the research that will be conducted, the questions being asked, research method, study scope and limitations, theoretical framework, definition of terms and the last thesis outline.
II. Literature Review
This chapter will basically convey all the literatures or the thoughts of any prior researchers or experts on the efficacy of the economic sanction as the basis of this research to analyze the United States sanctions against Iran. It shows the discussion among the experts on the implementation of the economic sanctions. Moreover, this chapter will also try to explain why this research is unique and different from the previous study in the same topic.
III. United States – Iran Political Relations
This chapter will firstly give insight to the readers about the historical relationship between United States and Iran in order to give pictures of ups and downs in the relationship between both countries. The author will also describe the actual United States economic sanctions imposed to Iran. Then, the author will also give analysis on the reasons why this issue has become the interest of United States.
IV. Analysis
This chapter will encompass analysis on the pre-condition and post- condition of the Iran presidential election 2013. The author will give analysis on the importance of the election to Iranian people, the position of Supreme Leader
19 on the elections, and then the role of economic sanctions in influencing the result of the Iran presidential election 2013.
V. Conclusion
As the last chapter in this research, this chapter explains the conclusion of this research.
20
CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
As this research uses literatures as one of the sources of the research, the literature review is very important to explore many views, diverse ideas, which allow the author to learn from either successes, partial successes, or the failures of previous researchers. This research will use the previous research as based to meet the objectives of this research.
In this literature review, the author decided to write selective literature review by discussing only the most fundamental literature in economic sanctions study and also the literatures which has direct bearing to the topic. The author values all the previous research on the topic whether it is the recent research or old research, thus author will also input the review of old literatures which considered has giving high contribution on the development of the study. However, the review is only encompassing the literatures which the author able to gathered either from library or internet.
The literature review will give the summary which is mainly consist of the purpose, research questions, hypothesis, comment on methodology, result of the research, and the comments from the author regarding the relevance of the literature to this particular research. The review will be sorted in chronological order based on the year of when the books had published as the literatures are all connected and equally important as the basis of this research.
Most of the literatures in this literature review are basically interconnected each other which has contributed a lot to the development of economic sanctions concept. As the aspect of economic sanctions which have been always a very interesting issue up until now is whether economic sanctions is an effective foreign policy as it is now become the trend of nowadays diplomacy, especially
21 by major countries. Therefore, this literature review will mainly describe about the debate or discussion on the efficacy of economy sanctions among the experts represented by their works. However, the particular issue of this research about political leadership will also be presented by the view of the previous researches.
2.1 Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work by Robert A. Pape (1997)
In this books, Robert A. Pape referring to the work of Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliot (HSE) as the basis of the research where Pape challenged the rising optimism about the effectiveness of economic sanction as a an instrument to attain international political objectives. Pape casted doubts on the claim of economic sanctions have the capacity to attain major foreign policy goals. Moreover, Pape contested to find in what conditions that economic sanctions are more effective.
Not only to challenge, but also to evaluate and examine the HSE data base as Pape argued that the study of HSE has a flaw and Pape intended to fill the gap on the study of effectiveness of economic sanctions. Pape contended that the claimed of HSE on 40 successes of economic sanction out of 115 cases happened in 1914–1990, just 5 of them are appropriately considered as successes.
Pape disagree on HSE view about the expectation of economic sanctions should be more effective in the future due to enhancing international cooperation. Pape attested that most advanced countries will have a tendency to oppose external pressure. Nationalism frequently makes states and the people are willing to bear on extensive punishment as oppose to desert the state‘s interest or the society‘s interest. In addition, advanced countries have abilities to typically relieve the economic harm of sanction through substitution and other way. This thought of Pape is quite relevant with the case of United States sanctions against Iran where even after decades of economic restrictions; the people of Iran still resist refusing to comply with the foreign pressure. The effect of economic
22 sanctions on the economy of Iran especially trade is also decrease by mitigating the trade partnership with other states such as China and Russia.
In this book, Pape also disagree with the view of David A. Baldwin, the author of economic statecraft, which argued that the idea of economic sanctions ought to be expanded to incorporate all part of financial statecraft including not just economic coercion for political objectives or to change the target‘s conduct, additionally participating in economic warfare, encouraging domestic political support, exhibiting resolve to third party audiences, or basically to rebuff. As indicated by Pape, the determinants accomplishments for diverse classifications of objectives are not prone to be the same, as it obliges separate hypothetical examinations. Therefore, speculations of determinants of achievement in trade disputes, international economic threats, or economic warfare as a domestic political apparatus are not the same as hypothesis of economic sanctions.
Moreover, Baldwin argued that the mere imposition of economic sanctions could be automatically qualify for a success as Pape believe that the influence of the sanctions to pay the price of non-compliance is to be at least partially successful. However, the author incline with Pape which believe that if failure is characterized to be unimaginable, the dependent cannot fluctuate consequently the hypothesis can't be misrepresented. Meanwhile the standards of success according to him are:
1. The target state yielded to a significant and critical part of the sender state‘s demand. 2. The economic sanctions were really implemented prior to the target alter its conduct. 3. No more-credible clarification exists for the sender state‘s change of conduct.28
28 Pape, Robert. (1997). Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work retrieved from http://web.stanford.edu/class/ips216/Readings/pape_97%20(jstor).pdf
23
As for the case of economic sanctions of United States against Iran 1979- 1990 (up to period he wrote the book), Pape assessed that this was an instance of successful Iranian coercion on United States, not of successful United States economic pressure on Iran.
In summary, the appropriate conclusions to be drawn from the re- assessment of the HSE‘s book are from economic sanctions episode from 1914 to 1990, sanctions have been only successful less than 5 percent of the time instead of 34 percent as claimed by HSE and multilateral cooperation might take economic sanctions even averagely effective alternative to military power have minimal experimental premise. In author opinion, the less success rate of economic sanctions as assessed by Robet A. Pope is the result of different kind of perception of the concept of economic sanctions itself. Meanwhile HSE and Baldwin tend to be looser in defining economic sanctions and the criteria of the successes, Pape used more narrowed and strict framework to assess the successfulness of the economic sanctions case. In his research, Pape emphasized on examining the role of force to avoid conceivable methodological lapse typically happened in an investigation of economic sanctions, since economic sanction or force frequently employed simultaneously, making it immensely essential to recognize which kind of pressures that in charge for the particular concessions.
Pape claimed that there are three conditions where economic sanctions more effective.
1. Economic sanctions would be more viable in a dispute including minor problems that do not influence the target state‘s security, territory, wealth, or the regime‘s domestic security. 2. Economic sanctions would be more effective against target state whose trade is totally subject to the sender or coercer.
24
3. Economic sanctions would be more effective against societies with rather great uneven income distributions than against those with income equality.29
Given the fact that Pape especially has doubt on the effectiveness of economic sanctions on attaining major foreign policy objectives, however Pape recommended to employ military power together with economic sanctions. Perhaps his idea on this is similar with the concept of smart power conveyed by Hillary Clinton as American way of war.
However, Pape did not talking much about the correlations between economic sanctions with the political regime within the imposed country. Even though Pape stated that the economic sanctions might be more effective if the sanctions did not target the domestic regime, however, he did not include the indicator of regime change as the determination whether the economic sanctions is effective or not. Pape tends to narrowed the criteria of success economic sanctions meanwhile the author believe that the success of economic sanctions is depends on the intention of the sender country in the first place not only on complete changing behavior of target country.
Therefore, the author will try to assess the impacts of the economic sanctions in influencing the domestic regime in a way of changing the people perception especially in fully or partially democratic country. The research will begin with determining the intention or the objectives of the economic sanctions in the first place, which then will be easier to determine whether the economic sanctions is success, partially success or failed.
2.2 Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Leaders? By Nikolay Marinov (2005)
Sanctions appear to convey minimal immediate weight concerning autocratic leaders‘ choice to curb their own people. However, because sanctions
29 Pape, Robert. (1997). Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work retrieved from http://web.stanford.edu/class/ips216/Readings/pape_97%20(jstor).pdf
25 destabilize incumbents, it may deteriorate the record of rights protection in the target state.30 This hypothesis derives from the work of Nikolay Marinov, an article in his book tittle ―Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Leaders? Marinov presented a theoretical argument that explains why destabilization is a required circumstance for successful economic sanctions.
According to Marinov, in his research that looks to relieve possible problems in the HSE study of economic sanctions reconsidered, Marinov finds that economic sanctions are apparently works in at least one aspect: it destabilizes the target state‘s leader. Marinov Analyzed data on 136 states, observed over 37 years, Marinov reported that the danger of losing power increments by 28 percent regarding to the baseline if an incumbent leader is the subject of sanctions. It implies that the vicinity of sanctions against government leader in a given year makes him or her typically more inclined to lose control or power in the following year. Thus economic sanctions appear to be converged with the battle for political survival. 31 This theory of Marinov would be the main theory which explained the moment of transformation of leadership in Iran from the Autocratic leadership into Rouhani as a moderate leadership.
Marinov was using different kind of methodology with the existing work on economic sanctions as he compared cases which coercion took place and to case it was absent. Marinov asserted that to understand and examine the record of success of economic sanctions, a justified mechanism is importantly needed. If the question is ―does coercion work?‖ Marinov compares cases where the economic sanctions were implemented and those in which it was not.
He believes that democracy and its relations with years in office are noteworthy. In the state of economic sanctions being implemented, Democratic leaders are more prone to be substituted and the danger of being overthrown
30 Marinov, Nikolay. (2005). Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Leaders? Retrieved from http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2005.00142.x/abstract 31 Carneiro, C., & Elden, D. (2009). Economic Sanctions, Leadership Survival, and Human Rights. University of Pennsylvania Law School vol. 30 issue. 3. Retrieved from https://www.law.upenn.edu/journals/jil/articles/volume30/issue3/Carneiro30U.Pa.J.Int%27lL.969 %282009%29.pdf accessed on 23 October 2014.
26 grows over time. It's exceedingly rely on the political responsibility if it‘s not fulfill the public‘s demand, public would, if they could, replace the leader with a more flexible figure. The same dynamic likewise applies to mixed regimes. Leaders in mixed regimes can anticipate a more serious danger of being overthrown than autocrats. Concerning autocrats, any political change is prone to risk for the residency of an autocrat. Therefore there are four conditions of target state which more destabilizing than others:
1. Economic sanctions against democracy. 2. Economic sanctions that is more costly to target states. 3. Economic sanctions that is targeting a state with small economy. 4. Economic sanctions that involving international institution (multilateral sanctions)32
Marinov argues that the clear achievement of sanction is closely related with the use of force. Thus, Marinov included power check for optional approaches to evaluate the role of economic sanctions and foreign military intervention in a specific state. Marinov used a dataset by Hassan and Fearon (2003) about codes the frequency of political violence in leadership changes for all autocratic states in the period 1947-2001. Indeed, the data deny democratic countries, somehow the results still relatively useful according to him. As the result, Marinov inferred that there are 70 leadership changes because of economic sanctions without the shadow of force. Second, there are seven situations where both economic sanctions and the use of force lead to authority alteration. Therefore, by imposing economic sanctions, military intervention is more likely to be success. However, Marinov failed to define each of the variables clearly as the use of force is not only in forms of military intervention.
According to Marinov, one of two approaches of how the sender state use economic sanctions to surrender policy changes is by destabilizing the incumbent, sanctions may cause the election of a more flexible figure and the sender state
32 Marinov, Nikolay. (2005). Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Leaders? Retrieved from http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2005.00142.x/abstract
27 may attempt to achieve a trade off with the incumbent by offering to lift sanctions in return for at least some change in as an exchange for at any rate some change in policy. Marinov also stated that in several cases, the entryof the new leader in targeted states produce the policy alteration demanded by the sender states. Marinov affirmed that sanctions are more inclined to be lifted after a change of power in target state, especially if moderate or more pliant figure elected. Despite of the result of his research which contradicts the pessimistic existing literature on the effectiveness of economic sanctions, at the end of his research, Marinov concluded that the economic sanctions would not work.
The author is mainly agreed with the work of Marinov as this literature is the main inspiration of this research. However, the author found that Marinow did not address his theory in a partial democratic country by mean that there are countries which have general elections for the leader but it is actually did not any impacts on the regime being ruled in the country or it is a set up election. Marinov only mentioned that the economic sanctions would be more effective against a democratic country, but what a partially democratic or autocratic country?
That is why the author eager to seek the answer on this question, whether economic sanctions tend to success, partially success, or failed if being imposed in a partially democratic country. The author found that Islamic Republic of Iran is a perfect example as partially democratic where Iran has presidential election, but the main power or ruling entity in the country remains the Supreme Leader. The author will assess on whether the economic sanctions have succeed on degrading the ruling regime of Iran or not by assessing the presidential election in 2013 as the main turning point. By the result of the election, the author can assess whether the sanctions is success on delivering it goals or not.
28
2.3 Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd edition by Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliott, and Barbara Oegg (2007)
In fact, this book is a revised and updated version of the previous HSE‘s work on economic sanctions originally published in 1983 which is hugely influential for this subject. HSE reevaluate the aggregate effectiveness of sanctions, based on extra confirmation earned from cases launched amid the 1990s, and overhauled approach proposals for the 21st century. The works of HSE is very influential in the development of economic sanctions concept as most of the literatures mention this book as reference.
This book updated the research due to the development of international event for instance the closure of cold war, economic global crisis, and globalization. HSE assessed that The United States keeps on being the dominating sender state, yet the occurrence of unilateral actions fell significantly as United States used more multilateral economic sanctions after the breakdown of the Soviet Union and as the European Union got to be more active. Lobbying and advocacy groups in the United States have frequently succeeded in activating congressional or statehouse help for sanctions, even despite restriction from the foreign policy foundation. Those have brought about new or tightened sanctions against Nigeria, Cuba, Iran, Libya, Burma, and Sudan.
Overall, HSE discover that economic sanctions are partially successful in 34 percent of the cases they have observed. However, the success rate imperatively relied on upon the sort of governmental or policy changes. Cases including limited and humble objectives, for instance the arrival of a political detainee, succeeded a fraction of the time. Cases involving endeavors to change regimes for example by pushing an autocrat to retire or by destabilizing leader, to debilitate a foreign enemy‘s military potential succeeded in about 30 percent of the cases.33
33 Peterson Institute for International Economics. (2005). Sanctions Success Is Possible But Not Common. Retrieved from http://www.iie.com/publications/newsreleases/newsrelease.cfm?id=136 accessed on 20 november 2014.
29
HSE contended that sanctions are more prone to succeed if it is more focused on the objectives thus have greater impact on the target state‘ economy. Economic sanctions are additionally more prone to succeed when the target country is relatively close to the sender state. Moreover, multilateral economic sanctions are also more than unilateral sanctions.34
This literature is one of the cornerstones of economic sanction study up until now. However, since HSE was assessing all of the economic sanctions cases or about 174 cases, the author realized that this literature addressing the economic sanctions in a very broad definition, not a very detail definition. The author believes that the indicator of whether the economic sanctions is success or not is rely on the objectives of the economic sanctions itself whether it is to cripple the economy, changing behavior over a particular issue, destabilizing the leader, or else. Therefore, the author agrees with Pape which criticized that HSE was using too broad indicator of economic sanctions success.
2.4 Do Threats or Impositions of Sanctions Destabilize Leaders? By Thomas Reinholdsson (2011)
This work of Reinholdsson is basically a literature which followed the previous literature especially literature of Nikolay Marinov about the relations of economic sanctions and destabilizing leader. Therefore this research is basically seek to replicate the estimation done by Marinov in different methodological method in order to give another possible perspective on whether threat or sanctions is of any importance when it comes to the destabilizing of leaders. Meanwhile the research done by Marinov used dependent variable representing change of leaders individually, this research of Reinholdsson tried to seek for answer for whether the imposition of sanctions have any impact on regime changes as a whole.
34 Cooper, Rychard. (2008). Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd ed. Retrieved from http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64489/richard-n-cooper/economic-sanctions-reconsidered- 3rd-ed accessed on 19 November 2014.
30
In conducting his research, Reinholdsson were using the conditional logstic regression (CLR) method using maximum likelihood estimation, the same of method used by Marinov. In contrast with most of the empirical work on sanctions, a dataset known as Threat and Imposition of Sanction (TIES) has been used instead of the well-known Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot dataset. The TIES dataset contains information on 888 cases in which sanctions were threatened or implemented in the time period between 1971 and 2000.35
In his result, Reinholdsson asserted that the economic sanctions have become less efficient over time as in recent years, it is more difficult to prohibit countries from the international market due to globalization. It is easier for the target states to mitigate their trade activity with other countries which not align with the sender countries as today there are more alternative trade partners. For instance, Reinholdsson took the case of United Sanctions on Iran, the same as case of this research. Reinholdsson mentioned that when United States imposed the economic sanctions on Iran, the target state could instead increase their foreign trade with China which implies that in the recent decades, economic sanctions are less costly for the target state, compared with the period before the Cold War due to globalization.
Besides, Reinholdsson likewise discovers that if economic performance of earlier years is high, it lowers the risk of the leader to lose his or her power in the following year. Regarding democratic state, inferred that for every extra year a leader stays in power, the danger of losing his or her position increments. Since that for a president or prime minister the length of one term is limited for instance United States the term is four years and the leader is not eligible to serve for more than two terms.36
Reinholdsson found that once a state turns into democratic state, it is less likely to change to another regime type. Thus, once a state becomes a democratic
35 Reinholdsson, Thomas. (2011). Do Threats or Impositions of Sanctions Destabilize Leaders? Retrieved from http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=1895379&fileOId=1895381 36 Ibid
31 state, it is more likely to remain of its type than for its leader to stay in office. Moreover, Reinholdsson implied that the older the regime is, the less likely it is to be changed. However, Reinholdsson presumed that the impact of the economic sanctions ends up being roughly immaterial contrast with Marinov claimed. Reinholdsson believed that the prerequisites in terms of economic sanctions efficiency have changed due to globalization.37
This work of Reinholdsson is the following research of Marinov assessing the impacts of economic sanction on regime change by using different methodology. However, Reinholdsson was only retesting the finding of Marinov thus did not find any significant finding except on addition that he added that the effectiveness of economic sanctions might decrease due to the globalization. However, Reinholdsson did not really elaborating that statement why he came up with that notion of economic sanctions get less effective due to globalization.
Moreover, the same Marinov, Reinholdsson did not any differentiate the political system of the assessing country and generalize all as democratic country. Therefore, this research will further examining the impacts of economic sanctions in degrading the ruling regime especially in an autocratic country or partial democratic such as Iran which resembles these criteria the best. By assessing the result of presidential election of Iran in 2013, the author will assess on its impacts on voting behavior of Iranian people whether it is successfully dragging the country into the expected outcome of the sender country or not. Moreover, the author will give the analysis on the position of the ruling entity or in Iran case Supreme Leader before and after the election in order to assess the credibility of the ruling regime for Iranian people.
37 Ibid
32
CHAPTER III
UNITED STATES – IRAN POLITICAL RELATIONS
3.1 United States – Iran Relations before the era of Ahmadinejad
Since the turmoil of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, United States and Iran severed official diplomatic relations and currently has no official relations. At the moment, in order to serve Iranian in United States, Iran has interest section at the Pakistani Embassy in Washington D.C.38 In the meantime, United States also has interest section at the Swiss Embassy in Tehran.39 United States also has an online virtual embassy to serve the American in Iran.40
However, it was in contrary in the mid-1800s and during the Second World War. The United States and Iran established diplomatic relations in 1883.41 They exchange ambassador as Iran collaborated with the allies allowing the transportation of war material through Iran to the Russians in the Caucasus region. In the Cold War era, their relations tie depended as the United States sought further Iranian cooperation in containing communism in Asia while on Iran received military and economic support and technological assistance for the activity of oil exploration.42 The relations continued to be positive until the years of the government Mohammad Mossadeq, who was overthrown reportedly by a
38 Official website of interest section of Iran in Pakistan Embassy. Retrieved from http://www.daftar.org/far/default.asp accessed on 4 November 2014. 39 Official website of United States interest section in Swiss Embassy. Retrieved from https://www.eda.admin.ch/countries/iran/en/home/representations/embassy-of-switzerland- foreign-interests-section.html accessed on 4 November 2014. 40 Virtual Embassy of the United States in Tehran, Iran. Retrieved from http://iran.usembassy.gov/index.html accessed on 4 November 2014. 41 Official website of U.S, Department of State. U.S. Relations with Iran fact Sheet. Retrieved from http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5314.htm accessed on 4 November 2014. 42 Milinski, Martin. (2010). Case Study: Iran and the United States. ICD Academy for cultural Diplomacy. Retrieved from http://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/pdf/case-studies/cs- martinmilinski.pdf accessed on 4 November 2014.
33 coup organized by Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and also MI6 (United Kingdom‘s secret service).43 It was then followed by an era of an extremely close alliance under the government of Mohammad Reza Pahlevi and the United States government. Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlevi maintained close relationship with United States in his reign. Most of his reign was highlighted by westernization agenda whether in modernizing economy policy, and also a pro-western foreign policy. Within his period, he also went to visit America for several times and regarded as a close friend by United States.44
Good relations of United States and Iran were deteriorating since a huge reversal of event in the 1979 Iranian Revolution which then resulted in the rising up of an anti-American Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini replacing the pro-American Shah. On February 1, 1979, Khomeini became the new leader of Iran. Khomeini regarded Mohammad Reza Pahlevi‘s regime as corrupt and illegitimate and also referred United States as the ―Great Satan‖.45
The United States broke its well established diplomatic relations with Iran on April 7, 1980. This action was taken following a group of revolutionary Iranian students, angered that the Shah which was diagnosed with cancer has been allowed to enter the United States, seized the United States Embassy Tehran and took 52 Americans hostage.46 It was followed by the official economic sanctions ever imposed to Iran as United States responded to the situation through diplomacy and also economic pressure. Jimmy Carter, as the current President of United States of America at that time, stopped United States oil import from Iran, Frozen Iranian assets in United States banks, and United States ceases all trade
43 Bryne, Malcolm. (18 August 2013). CIA Admits It Was Behind Iran's Coup. Foreign Policy. Retrieved from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/08/18/cia_admits_it_was_behind_irans_coup accessed on 4 November 2014. 44 History of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. Iran Chamber. Retrieved from http://www.iranchamber.com/history/mohammad_rezashah/mohammad_rezashah.php accessed on 4 November 2014. 45 U.S-Iran Relations researched by The Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law retrieved from https://strausscenter.org/hormuz/u-s-iran-relations.html accessed on 4 November 2014. 46 Official website of U.S, Department of State. U.S. Relations with Iran fact Sheet. Retrieved from http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5314.htm accessed on 4 November 2014.
34 with Iran except for humanitarian goods. However, the economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure was not success, and then United States. United States Responded with a rescue mission with military action which also failed resulting in the death of eight Americans.47 Within a day of Ronald Reagan taking the oath as President of United States, or 444 days since the crisis started, the hostages were released and returned stateside. This hostage crisis was considered as a defining moment of the United States and Iran relations as describe by a historian, Gaddis Smith. He described this crisis absorbed more concentrated effort by American officials and had more extensive coverage on television and in the press that any other event since Second World War48
In 1997, sense of optimism for United States-Iran relations grows after the election of Mohammad Khatami which in campaign and post-election he express that he wanted to improve Iranian relations with United States. Khatami argued that the two countries begin to build relations through informal way such as cultural exchanges which followed by Clinton sent an American wrestling team to compete in Iran. The United States even lifted the embargo on two import goods, rugs and Pistachios. However, the relations remained stalled. Iran‘s conservative remained unwilling to make further concession and to negotiate terms on discussion including changes in Iranian foreign policy on Israel, nuclear energy and support for terrorism.49
In 2002, in President Bush‘s state of the Union Address, President Bush addressed Iran as a part of the ―Axis of Evil‖ along with Iraq and North Korea. It was a warning of the proliferation of long-range missiles being developed in these countries and being a clear threat to international security. The speech cause
47 U.S-Iran Relations researched by The Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law retrieved from https://strausscenter.org/hormuz/u-s-iran-relations.html accessed on 4 November 2014. 48 US-Iran relations: A brief guide. (17 June 2014). BBC news. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24316661 accessed on 4 November 2014. 49 U.S-Iran Relations researched by The Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law retrieved from https://strausscenter.org/hormuz/u-s-iran-relations.html accessed on 4 November 2014.
35 outrage in Iran and is condemn by reformist and conservatives alike.50 Many analysts argued that this speech dealt a death-blow to the reform movement in Iran.51 It reflected the relations of United States of Iran where there is no improvement in the era of Mohammad Khatami.
3.2 United States – Iran Relations in the era of Ahmadinejad
In August 2005, a conservative figure, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became the new President of Iran. Some scholars believe that Ahmadinejad adopted both confrontational-assertive and accomodationist-active foreign policy at the same time.52 The figure of Ahmadinejad was notorious in United States as he often stated controversy in public about United States. Therefore the relations of Iran and United States could clearly be seen by the actions of each leader of states. However, the relations between United States and Iran in the presidencies of Ahmadinejad and Bush did not improve markedly during their terms in office.53
Ahmadinejad determined to continue the nuclear program which had temporarily stopped or slowed down in the Khatami‘s administration (1997- 2005). Ahmadinejad argued that Iran has the rights to develop nuclear power for the sake of Iranian need of energy and have tried to enhance the capability of nuclear proliferation of Iran. Nevertheless, United States and its allies, Israel, extremely opposed that notion and did anything they could to stop the nuclear program of Iran including by Economic sanctions.54
50 Iran Profile. (10 September 2014). BBC News. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14542438 accessed on 5 November 2014. 51 Kessler, Glenn. (23 July 2002). U.S. Halts Overtures to Iran‘s Khatami; Reformist Faction Viewed as Unable To Achieve Change. Washington Post. Retrieved from http://www.hartford- hwp.com/archives/45/286.html accessed on 5 November 2014. 52 Haji-Yousefi, Amir. (2010). Iran’s Foreign Policy during Ahmadinejad: From confrontation to Accommodation. Concordia University, Montreal, Canada. Retrieved from http://www.cpsa- acsp.ca/papers-2010/haji-yousefi1.pdf accessed on 5 November 2014. 53 U.S-Iran Relations researched by The Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law retrieved from https://strausscenter.org/hormuz/u-s-iran-relations.html accessed on 4 November 2014. 54 Rahman, R., & Othman Z. (2014). Kepentingan Amerika Serikat Terhadap Isu Nuklir iran. Article from Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report.
36
On 8 May 2006, Ahmadinejad sent an official letter to President Bush through the consulate of Swiss. Reports said it was the first official letter ever sent by the president of Iran to United States leader following the Iranian Revolution in 1979.55 On the other hand, United States authorities denied that letter is a welcome to arrange nuclear issue and it did not crossed over United States‘ concerns about Iran's nuclear program.56 From the transcript of the letter which spread in the internet, indeed the author read there is no proposal regarding the Iran‘s nuclear talks; instead Ahmadinejad mostly invited Bush to justice.57
Direct contact from president Ahmadinejad to leader of United States proceeded as Ahmadinejad has required an "uncensored" broadcasted debate with President Bush. By this invitation, it was the second time Ahmadinejad attempted to reach the leader of United States. It demonstrates the certainty of Ahmadinejad to the stance of Iran government for their rights to develop nuclear program furthermore Iranian's stance in a few global issues. However, the invitation was rejected by White House spokesman Tony Snow.58
Once again Ahmadinejad seek to voice the concerns and anxiety of Iranian people, but this time not addressed to the President, but to the people of America. On November 2006, Ahmadinejad wrote an open letter stating about the urgency to have dialog because of the activities of the United States administration in the Middle East, Ahmadinejad intend to reveal the truth being conceal by United States government. It was an effort followed by the failure to have a dialogue with the government of United States and in the letter Ahmadinejad voice his believe that the American people did not approve of all
55 Ahmadinejad sends letter to Bush. (8 May 2006). BBC News. Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4983868.stm accessed on 5 November 2014. 56 Vick, K., & Lynch, K. (9 May 2006). No Proposals in Iranian's Letter to Bush, U.S. Says. Washington Post Foreign Service. Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2006/05/08/AR2006050800141.html accessed on 5 November 2014. 57 Ahmadinejad sends letter to Bush. (8 May 2006). BBC News. Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4983868.stm accessed on 5 November 2014. 58 steel-cage, grudge match' between Bush, Ahmadinejad. (7 September 2006). CNN News. Retrieved from http://edition.cnn.com/CNN/Programs/situation.room/blog/2006/09/no-steel-cage- grudge-match-between.html accessed on 5 November 2014.
37 the concealed-crime done by their government.59 However, the government of United States has not answered to that open letter and there was no notably reaction by the American towards the letter.
On 26 September 2007, The United States Senate passed a disputable resolution of 76-22 which listed Iran‘s Revolutionary Guard Corps, the nation's 125,000-strong elite military branch, as a "exceptionally assigned global terrorist," as per United States authorities.60 The Iranian government additionally answered by the parliament of Iran who voted to assigned the United States' Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the United States Army as terrorist association. Iranian Parliament named the United States' Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the United States Army as trained terrorists and underpinned terrorism, and they themselves are terrorists, as per IRNA the Iran‘s state-owned news agency.61 By the time the relations was deteriorating as Ahmadinejad was so frontal against the imperial hegemonic of United States.
In 2008 the contact between Ahmadinejad and the Leader of United States got intensified. In April 2008, Ahmadinejad has depicted the 9/11 attacks on twin towers in New as a "suspect occasion" in a discourse. Ahmadinejad scrutinized that the victimized person's names were never distributed and how with the best radar framework and sagacity arranges, the planes could crash assembling in the heart of United States. Ahmadinejad denounced that the assaults were utilized as pretext to assault Afghanistan and Iraq which have murdered in excess of million individuals.62 Iran, as OPEC‘s second biggest producer country, also has completely stopped conducting oil transactions in U.S. dollars in endeavor to
59 Ahmadinejad‘s letter to American. (November 29, 2006). CNN News. Retrieved from http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/11/29/ahmadinejad.letter/ accessed on 5 November 2014. 60 Iranian Unit to be Labeled Terrorist. (August 15, 2007). Washington Post. Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/14/AR2007081401662.html accessed on 5 November 2014. 61 Iran's parliament votes to label CIA, U.S. Army 'terrorist' groups. (29 September 2007). CNN News. Retrieved from http://edition.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/09/29/iran.parliament/index.html?_s=PM:WORLD accessed on 5 November 2014. 62 Ahmadinejad: 9/11 ‗suspect event‘. (16 April 2008). BBC News. Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7350830.stm accessed on 5 November 2014.
38 diminish dependence on United States. Ahmadinejad in a summit in Saudi Arabia called the US dollar as a useless piece of paper in front of state leaders from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.63
3.2.1 US – Iran Relations in Obama Administration
The relations of United States with Iran begin with a very good atmosphere in the beginning of Barrack Obama was elected as president in November 2008. President Barrack Obama in his campaign or post-election always expressed his concerns in developing good relations with Iran as a strategic actor in Middle East region. Obama became the first United States president in history to utilize word ―Muslim‖ in his inaugural speech. He expressed that United States is searching for a leap forward in US-Iran relations, and ready to help Iran the length of Iran met their worldwide commitments in regards to Nuclear Weapon program.64
The Muslim countries were respecting the good intention of Barrack Obama and expect for better approach to the Islamic World. Interviewed by VOA News a Tehran occupant communicated his positive thinking that it was the best opportunities for Iran to enhance its relations with United States.65 Obama‘s good intention as likewise answered by Iran‘s leader with the congratulatory on Obama as newly elected as American president which has not happened since Iranian Revolution 1979. Ahmadinejad in the letter communicated that Iran praise on Obama's decision by most of the American electorate. Ahmadinejad likewise passed on his plan to Obama will ready to exploit the chance to serve and abandon a constructive legacy by putting the genuine enthusiasm of individuals
63 Iran Ends Oil Transactions in U.S. Dollar. (30 April 2008). CBS News. Retrieved from http://www.cbsnews.com/news/iran-ends-oil-transactions-in-us-dollars/ accessed on 5 November 2014. 64 Neumann, Johanna. (21 January 2009). Obama‘s Muslim Outreach. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved from http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/washington/2009/01/obamas-muslim-m.html accessed on 6 November 2014. 65 Muslim Nations React to Obama Inaugural Speech. (2 November 2009). VOA News. Retrieved from http://www.voanews.com/content/a-13-2009-01-22-voa25-68626652/407461.html accessed on 6 November 2014.
39 and additionally value and equity ahead or more the voracious requests and egotistical and unworthy minority.66 Even though in author perspective, Obama‘s election has not brought any apparent changes in policy or behavior as well.
In March 2009, in the beginning of festival of Norwuz67, Obama spoke directly to the people of Iran through a video. Obama said his administration was committed to pursue a constructive relation between United States, Iran and the international community. Obama also added that by the name of United States people, he wants the people of Iran to have their rights in a proper position among the international community, but as long as it comes with responsibility. Obama also warned that the process will not advance by threats and the United States seek honest and mutual engagement with Iran.68
Paul Reynolds, a world affairs analyst, tried to interpret the speech of Obama. According to him, despite the fact that President Obama were not specifically said it, yet Obama obligingly asked Iran to surrender their nuclear program and acknowledge the United States' offer to give helps in peace nuclear program, to quit encouraging terrorism exercises as United States continually blamed for Iran, and to quit undermining Israel. In return to that, Iran will have Acceptance of its entitlement to advance uranium, an end to United Nations sanctions, an end to United States sanctions, and an end of severe relations between United States and Iran.69 However, until the end of Ahmadinejad first period as President of Iran, the breakthrough still was not there.
In 2009, Ahmadinejad won in Presidential Election as he continues became Iran‘s President for the second period. However, the victory of Ahmadinejad in his second election was not smooth which led to fraud
66 Slavin, Barbara. (6 November 2008). Ahmadinejad Congratulates Obama. The Washington Times. Retrieved from http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/nov/06/letter-ahmadinejad- congratulates-obama/ accessed on 6 November 2014. 67 The Persian national festivals, the New Year celebrations are at once the most important and the most colorful. 68 Obama offers Iran ‗new beginning‘. (20 March 2009). BBC News. Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7954211.stm accessed on 6 November 2014. 69 Reynolds, Paul. (21 March 2009). What Obama's message to Iran means. World affairs correspondent BBC News. Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7954408.stm accessed on 6 November 2014.
40 allegations, widespread protests, and established the Green Movement of Iran who opposed the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and demanded for his removal from the office.70 However, the protests which exist for several months did not succeed to bring down President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as the Iran‘s legitimate President. As can be predicted, the relations between United States and Iran did not find any breakthrough yet, especially in nuclear talks. In this period, John Limbert71 summed that the political exertion by both states foundered on shared suspicion, political incompetence, misreading signs, awful timing and power of inertia.72
In the second term of Ahmadinejad, the relations keep on deteriorating. Several notably events occurred in confrontation between both states including the tension when Iranian government threatened to close the Straits of Hormuz. It was a response if the West imposes more sanctions over its controversial nuclear program.73
In 2011, in U.N. general assembly, Ahmadinejad over and again censured the United States and associates. This activity was trailed by walk out of the delegations from United Kingdom, Germany France and United States. Comparable with his comments in 2008, Ahmadinejad called the 9/11 assault is complex and it was a vindication for United States to pronounce war against Afghanistan and Iraq. Ahmadinejad scrutinized the conduct of United States that wanted to murder Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden rather than allotting a fact investigator to find the truth from the 9/11 attack as United States was never attempted to discover reality from the earliest starting point. Ahmadinejad reprimanded United States for its mastery on world's strategy making foundation,
70 Athanasiadis, Iason. (June 16, 2009). Iran Protest biggest since revolution. The Washington Times. Retrieved from http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jun/16/iran-protest-biggest- since-revolution/ accessed on 6 November 2014. 71 John Limbert is the distinguished professor of international affairs at the U.S. Naval Academy and former deputy assistant secretary for Iran in the State Department‘s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. 72 Limbert, John. (2013). The Obama Aministration. United States institute of Peace: The Iran Primer. Retrieved from http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/obama-administration accessed on 5 November 2014. 73 Iran threatens to block Strait of Hormuz oil route. (28 December 2011). BBC News. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-16344102 accessed on 6 November 2014.
41 overspending in military, printing trillion of dollars that activated expansion. Also, Ahmadinejad said United States government sees Zionism as holy and United States partners still utilize the Holocaust following six decades as a reason to pay payoff to the Zionist.74 Ahmadinejad indeed has known for his disdain on Zionist and United States as Zionist most reliable servant.75
Several days after that walkout episode at New York in United Nations General Assembly, Barrack Obama was being interviewed by media in Persian television, which broadcasted to Iran and Afghanistan. Obama communicated his judgment on Ahmadinejad discourse at UN as it was unforgivable to make such comments in New York itself, where a large portion of the casualties of 9/11 passed on.76
Bridget Kendall, a BBC Diplomatic analyst, analyzed that the interview was really aim at the Iranian people instead of the Iranian Leader. In the interview, despite Obama‘s criticism, he comparing the Iranian leadership to the Iranian people that there are interconnected ideas between the Iranian Leadership and the people of Iran, which he referred as respectful and thoughtful about the issue. Obama implied that the wrong is on Iranian leader, in this context Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and Iranian people have done nothing wrong. Kendall argued that Obama was trying to reach the Iranian people beyond the government and said it directly that the problem is the President Ahmadinejad. By suggestions, until the people dispose of Ahmadinejad and have more moderate leader, there will be no solution to Iran‘s problem including United States opposition on Iran Nuclear Program, and this is the purpose behind the economic sanctions.77
74 Walkout at U.N. as Ahmadinejad speaks. (23 September 2011). CNN News. Retrieved from http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/meast/09/22/un.ahmadinejad/ accessed on 6 November 2014. 75 Benhorin, Yitzhak. (14 November 2011). Ahmadinjead: Zionist started both world Wars. Israel News. Retrieved from http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4122450,00.html accessed on 6 November 2014. 76 Ibid 77 Ibid
42
In the same occasion, Obama once again defended the Iranian people that they are innocent in respect to United States economic sanctions on Iran. Obama said that it was not a matter of United States was choosing to impose punishment on the Iranians, but this is a matter of the Iranian government ultimately betraying the interests of Iranian people by isolating it further. Obama added that those sanctions are targeted to the ruling regime in which is not reflecting the interest of Iranian people.78
By the statement of Obama, it is clear that the United States government viewed the leadership of Ahmadinejad as the main threat for their interest in Middle East especially in Iran. By the nature of United States as a state act as hegemonic power, they will try to eliminate the regime of Ahmadinejad from Iran by any means just as what they have done to Saddam Hussein, Moamar Khadaffi, and recently Bashar Al-Assad in Syria. In the next section, author will elaborates some analysis on the national interest of United States in Iran and how dangerous Mahmoud Ahmadinejad for the interest of United States in Middle East.
3.3 United States’ Interest in Iran
United States recorded always interfered with any events in Middle East whether it was national events or regional events, including the tension between United States and Israel with Iran for the Nuclear Proliferation issue. It is very important to analyze the interest of United States as the economic sanctions sender country, in order to understand the relations of both countries and to analyze the expected outcomes of the economic sanctions itself. To begin with, the author will firstly elaborate the interest of United States in Middle-East are and then proceed to the importance of United States and Israel to stop the Iran‘s nuclear enrichment activities.
Middle East arguably is the center of world event not only in this millennium but also has started from the age of Before Christ. The region of
78 Ibid
43
Middle East is also known as Mesopotamia which means ―Land between the Two Rivers‖, where many huge civilizations have taken place.79 This historical place remain a bone of contention between several entity either it‘s for the holy place seizure, ideology struggle, civil war, and also humanitarian intervention from United States. Not to mention that this region also geographically very strategic.
Geographically, Middle East is connecting three continents, Asia, Africa, and Europe. Besides, Middle also has Mediterranean Sea, Red Sea, Black Sea, Caspian Sea, and Persian Gulf which connecting the nations from those three continents. Moreover, in Middle East region also has Bosporus Straits, Hormuz Straits, and Suez Canal as the most hectic and very important trade route for the access of especially Oil from this region to any places worldwide.80 Therefore, this region is very important for United States especially for the importance of controlling the region with the most oil contained in it, arms industry, and to protect Israel.
3.3.1 Oil
One of the interest of United States in middle east region is obviously to secure and retain the source of oil in this region since this region is knowingly contain abundant potential of oil.81 The eminent American geologist, Everette Lee Degolyer depicted this zone as 'The Center of gravity' because of its hydrocarbon vitality contain underneath it. Undoubtedly, the picture of 'Middle East' and "oil" are effectively joined in the public mind. It is likewise normally concurred that Middle East oil reserves and production have gigantic pertinence for the worldwide economy. A research professor, Rasoul Sorkhabi estimated that the Middle East‘s conventional oil is nearly half of the world‘s proven recoverable
79 Ancient Mesopotamia - The Sumerians. The World's first Great Civilization. Retrieved from http://www.penfield.edu/webpages/jgiotto/onlinetextbook.cfm?subpage=1525827 accessed on 11 November 2014. 80 Dipoyudo, Kirdi. (1977). Timur Tengah dalam Pergolakan. Centre for Strategic and International Studies. 81 Rahman, R., & Othman, Z. (2014). Kepentingan Amerika Serikat Terhadap Isu Nuklir iran. Article from Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report.
44 crude. Not to mention, with only 2% of the world‘s producing wells, the Middle East‘s output is over 30% of the world‘s crude. In addition, the Middle East holds 40% of the world‘s conventional gas reserves.82 The table provided below:
Table 3.3.1.1: Table of Proven Oil Reserve and Oil Production
LEFT: Proven recoverable conventional oil reserves of the Middle East in 2013 according to Rasoul Sorkhabi. RIGHT: Oil production in Middle Eastern countries according Rasoul Sorkhabi.
Rahul Mahajan stated that it is no longer a secret that the foreign policy of United States in Middle East region is in relations with their need of oil.83 From the table above, it is quite clear that the countries with the most oil reserve and biggest oil producer are in the Middle East including Iran. According to EIA (Energy Information Administration), Iran holds the world's fourth-largest proved crude oil reserves and the world's second-largest natural gas reserves.84 The desire of United States in Iran is in purpose to control the ‗black gold‘ of Tehran and
82 Sorkhabi, rasoul. (2014). How much Oil in the Middle East. GEO EXPRO Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.geoexpro.com/articles/2014/02/how-much-oil-in-the-middle-east accessed on 12 November 2014. 83 Mahajan, Rahul. (2005). Melawan Negara terroris: Dominasi AS terhadap Irak dan kedaulatan dunia. Mizan. Jakarta. 84 Energy Information Administration data on Iran. Retrieved from http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=IR accessed on 12 November 2014.
45 controlling the most beneficial place on earth.85 Energy, especially oil is proven to be very important for United States as the biggest economy at the moment to run their economy especially transportation sector, industry, residential and property, electricity. See the table below:
Table 3.3.1.2: Table of Consumption of United States per sector
Source: U.S. Energy information Administration86
From the table above, it is clear that United States portion of energy consumption is still using the fossil fuel as the biggest source of energy. Thus, it is very important for United States to retain their economic activities by maintaining the distribution of their most important source of energy. United States also has the oil reserve and oil production domestically, but then the amount is far below the need of American public consumptions as illustrated in the graph below.
Chart 3.3.1.3: Chart of Annual Level Energy Consumption of United States
85 Rahman, R., & Othman, Z. (2014). Kepentingan Amerika Serikat Terhadap Isu Nuklir iran. Article from Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report. 86 http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/aeo/tablebrowser/#release=AEO2014&subject=0-AEO2014&table=2- AEO2014®ion=1-0&cases=full2013full-d102312a,ref2014-d102413a
46
Source: U.S. Energy information Administration87
From the graph shown above, we can see that the level of consumption of United States keep on increasing in the period of 1949-2010. Even though there was a slight reduction several years, but the consumption of energy is undeniably is increasing as the years goes by for United States. Meanwhile, the level of domestic production tend to decline, thus have to increase the amount of oil imports. The government of United States surely perceived this problem as very serious as if they failed to meet the demand of energy in the country, it will surely affect the economy of United States, in worst case could cause economic collapse for United States. Therefore, it can be concluded that United States is highly dependent on the fossil fuel energy resource as the foundations of economic activities and the fuel Fossil source of energy such oil and gas as extremely important for the sustainability of United States. Thus, United States tried to retain and control the source of fossil fuel in the Middle East region, including Iran.
3.3.2 Arms Industry
As the region which contains so much conflicts and wars, Middle East region is very beneficial for United States economically since United States as the biggest global arms dealer. United States is the largest global supplier of major weapons from 2009 to 2013.88 In 2009, United States holding 30% of the global arms market.89Andrew Gavin Marshall conveyed that arms sales are a major method of United States and other powerful nations to increase their hegemony,
87 http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/aeo/tablebrowser/#release=AEO2014&subject=0-AEO2014&table=2- AEO2014®ion=1-0&cases=full2013full-d102312a,ref2014-d102413a 88 Carter, Sara. (2014). Inside the secret world of a US arms dealer. The Blaze. Retrieved from http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2014/04/30/inside-the-secret-world-of-a-u-s-arms-dealer/ accessed on 12 November 2014. 89 Bridgeman, Maggie. (29 July 2010). Obama seeks to expand arms exports by trimming approval process. Retrieved from http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/07/29/98337/obama-seeks- to-expand-arms-exports.html accessed on 12 November 2014.
47 by either directly or indirectly fueling civil wars and conflict, and then gain the capital from arms sales as they have the world‘s major weapons manufacturers.90
Even though Iran has persistently insisted that their nuclear program is merely for the public need of electricity and did not pursue for nuclear weapon, however it made the other countries became anxious and prejudice and felt that they need to arms themselves better in order to balance the influence of Iran also Israel as a nuclear power country. This condition is very beneficial for United States as it will benefit their arms industry. It‘s proven that be the report by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute as above, the United States have 45 percent of arm sales to the Middle East region especially to the Persian gulf States including UAE, Qatar, Oman and Kuwait. It might not involve directly to Iran as Iran has good relations with rival of United States in arm industries, Russia. But, the security climate produced from the situation caused many Persian Gulf Countries were forced to strengthen their military force in order to maintain their domestic security. Blenheim Capital Partners, a consultancy firm which assist to manage arms deals, noted that Middle Eastern and Southeast Asian countries were replacing Western European nations as the largest arms purchasers.91 In this regards, the party which gains the benefit the most is United States as the seller of the arms.
3.3.3 Protect Israel
The interest of United States is also to protect Israel from all the potential threats cause by Iran, Syria, and Egypt and also from ‗terrorist‘ movement such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and Islamic State. It could be seen from the United States military bases in Middle East. As we know that United States is deployed in more than 150 countries around the world and as in Middle East region, United States
90 Marshall, Andrew. (2013). In the Arms of Dictators: America the Great… Global Arms Dealer. Retrieved from http://andrewgavinmarshall.com/2013/03/26/in-the-arms-of-dictators-america-the- great-global-arms-dealer/ accessed on 12 November 2014. 91 Khalaf, R., & Drummond, J. (20 September 2010). Gulf states in $123bn US arms spree. The Financial Times. Retrieved from http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ffd73210-c4ef-11df-9134- 00144feab49a.html#axzz2O8uMZ7cn accessed on 12 November 2014.
48 has 7 military bases, in Kuwait, Bahrain, Egypt, Oman, Turkey, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates.92
Moreover, in March 2006, President George W. Bush declared in media that he would help to protect Israel from Iranian nuclear treat using military force. ―The threat from Iran is, of course, their stated objective to destroy our strong ally Israel. That's a threat, a serious threat. It's a threat to world peace; it's a threat, in essence, to a strong alliance. I made it clear, I'll make it clear again, that we will use military might to protect our ally, Israel," Bush said.93 Not to mention President Obama also ever conveyed his commitment in building an ever-lasting strong alliance with Israel in 2009. Obama said, ―Many of the same forces that threaten Israel also threaten United States and our effort to secure peace and stability in Middle East. Our alliance with Israel serves our national security interest‖.94 In 2013, Obama once again stressed on how strong the relations between United States and Israel following the sharp public disagreements with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. "The United States is proud to stand with you as your strongest ally and your greatest friend…. Our alliance is eternal, it is forever,‖ Obama declared at in a welcoming ceremony at Tel Aviv‘s Ben Gurion airport.95 Despite of the current media‘s speculation on the relations between United States and Israel regarding the disagreement of United States on Israel acts to build more residents in West side of Jerusalem, it is undeniable that the interest of United States in Middle East is serving the interest of Israel.
92 Total Military Personnel and Dependent End Strength By Service, Regional Area, and Country. Retrieved from https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/rest/download?fileName=SIAD_309_Report_P1406.xlsx&gr oupName=milRegionCountry accessed on 12 November 2014 93Bush willing to US military to defend Israel from Iran. (21 March 2006). Israel Today. Retrieved from http://www.israeltoday.co.il/NewsItem/tabid/178/nid/6919/Default.aspx?archive=article_title accessed on 13 November 2014. 94 America Israel Public Affairs Committee official website. Retrieved from http://www.aipac.org/learn/us-and-israel/strong-allies accessed on 12 November 2014. 95 Barrack Obama in Israel: ‗our alliance is eternal. (20 March 2013). The Telegraph. Retrieved from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/barackobama/9942391/Barack-Obama-in- Israel-our-alliance-is-eternal.html accessed on 13 November 2014.
49
Iran had a potential to be a dominant and influential power in Middle East according to Barry Rubin.96 Especially in the era of Ahmadinejad who is very actively enhancing the military power of Iran. If it is true that Iran is close to acquiring the nuclear weapon, then Iran will undoubtedly become a very influential actor in Middle East. This condition is surely threatens the Israel as the dominant power in Middle East and of course also threaten the interest of United States. Speaking of military, Iran is a huge threat to Israel as Iran at the moment, even without the nuclear power is already one of the strongest powers in Middle East. According to Global Fire Power, Iran in 2013 listed as the fourth largest military power in Middle East are, meanwhile Israel is the top followed by Pakistan and Egypt.97
Not to mention, Iran have composed a good relations with the rival of United States such as Russia, China, Cuba, Venezuela, Syria which ideologically anti-America. They have cooperated in many sectors including trade, economy, construction, weapon, technology and etc. By this situation, it is very important for United States to cut down the development of Iran and make them as weak as possible. Especially if Iran could earn the nuclear weapon, it makes United States have to do everything they could to stop the program and avoid Iran become the power in Middle East who could equalize Israel‘s power and influence.
3.4 Nuclear Iran Issue
Iran‘s nuclear program was actually started prior to the Iran Revolution in 1979. It was at the time of the Pro-American Shah, Mohamed Reza Pahlevi (1941-1979) who are the close friend of United States and also Israel. In 1970s, the Shah desired to establish 23,000 Megawatt electricity power comes from Nuclear reactor. At that time, the Shah was agreed to sign the Non-Proliferation
96 Rubin, Barry. (2006). Iran: The rise of regional power. MERIA (Middle East Review International Affair), Vol. 10 No.3 97 http://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp accessed on 13 November 2014.
50
Treaty (NPT)98 as the guarantee that Iran would not expand the capability of the nuclear program to pursue the Mass Destruction Weapon, Nuclear Weapon. Beside the United States, other European countries also sponsored this international treaty seeing that Iran could be used as the fort of United States and allies to protect and promote their interest in Middle East region.99 The Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant was the first nuclear power plant in Iran located 17 kilometres (11 mi) southeast of the city of Bushehr100. The development of this nuclear reactor was sponsored by Germany and France Companies. Thus, the initiation of the nuclear program of Iran was actually built by the United States and allies who was thinking that Iran could be used as their allies to protect their interest in Middle East region.
Nevertheless, the Shah apparently did not satisfy with the notion of using the nuclear reactor as a merely the source of electricity, and he has a desire to develop it into a nuclear weapon. The Shah‘s desire was motivated by the anxiety and prejudice to the Israel who was suspected developing nuclear weapon at that time. Even though the relation between Iran and Israel is considerably good as ally, however, the shah also tried to find a way to balance the influence of Israel in the Arab Gulf region.101 Therefore, the Shah seeks for United States‘ help and cooperates to develop the nuclear program further into a nuclear weapon. Under the administration of President Gerald R. ford, United States offered help to Iran to extract the Plutonium from the nuclear reactor so that it will be able to become the nuclear bomb. Thereby the Iran could be the second country in Middle East area that possesses the nuclear power after Israel at that time. It is worth noting
98 The NPT is an international treaty whose goal is t to keep the spread of atomic weapons and weapons innovation, to advance participation in the serene uses of atomic energy and to further the objective of attaining to atomic demilitarization and complete demobilization. 99 Naji. 2009. Kisah Rahasia Sang Pemimpin Radikal Iran. Jakarta. PT Gramedia Pustaka Umum. 100 Novoski, Ria. (12 September 2011). Iran launches bushehr nuclear power plant. Sputiknews. Retrieved from http://www.sputniknews.com/world/20110912/166785925.html accessed on 12 November 2014. 101 Naji. (2009). Kisah Rahasia Sang Pemimpin Radikal Iran. Jakarta. PT Gramedia Pustaka Umum.
51 that, once again, the one who was actually helping Iran in developing nuclear weapon was United States itself.102
Unfortunately, the United States who was initially believe with the Iran as Iran still have the shah as the leader, have nothing to do when the revolution happened in Iran and brought down the hands of United States in Iran substitute by an anti-American figure. The desire of the Shah to develop nuclear weapon also diminished by that incident as the new leader, Ayatullah Khameini, stopped the program and cutted the connection with the United States.103
However, in 1995, Iran who was commanded by hashami Rafsanjani (1989-1997), continued the nuclear program by the assistance of Russian at that time. It was considered as not a threat by both United States and also Israel as the program was only still in the beginning phase. In 2002, Iran was suspected by the opposition has developed the nuclear reactor for the purpose of acquiring the nuclear weapon. Even though the Iranian government ever denied the allegation, in 2003 Mohammad Khatami eventually announced that Iran has succeeded to build nuclear reactor in Isfahan and Kashan. Then, by at that time, the United States and Israel begun to feel threatened by the Iran‘s nuclear program thus the pressure also intensified to stop the program. As a matter of fact, United States and Israel ever threatened Iran to stop the program by force or militarily before United States ended up chose to use economic pressure as the foreign policy towards that issue. However, Israel did not agree with his ally decision and supporting the idea to invade Iran. After that, the P5+1 were established to push Iran to stop their nuclear enrichment activities by diplomatic pressure.104
The election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as the new president of Iran in 2005, have even further threatened United States and Iran as Ahmadinejad set the nuclear program as one of his main agendas. Ahmadinejad intended to continue the nuclear program which was slowed down in Khatami era due to economic and
102 Ibid 103 Ibid 104 Ibid
52 diplomatic pressure. This fact has obviously bothered the interest of United States and allies in Middle East, thus decided to put on the economic pressure even further.
3.5 U.S. Economic Sanctions to Iran
As discussed in previous sections about the relations of United States and Iran and also the interest of United States in Iran, we can clearly state that the main problem which have made United States to impose the economic sanctions is the nuclear program of Iran. Even though there were also sanctions which imposed in regards to United States allegation to Iran for supporting Terrorist movement including the regime Bashar Al-Assad in Syria. However, as elaborated previously, the main objective of United States is to restrain Iran to acquire Nuclear Weapon as it will endanger the national interest of United States in the Middle-East region. It is also confirmed by the United States Department of State through its official website, they stated the objective of the sanctions against Iran:
1. To obstruct the transfer of weapons, technology, or components used in Iran‘s proliferation nuclear program. 2. To aim the sectors of the Iranian economy which relevant to Iran‘s proliferation program. 3. To induce Iran to engage constructively, through discussions with P5+1countries to fulfill Iran‘s nonproliferation obligations.105
They also have made it clear that they expect for Iran‘s full compliance to international nuclear obligations and in return Iran will get its proper treatment as a normal non-nuclear-weapon state under The Nonproliferation Treaty and sanctions will be lifted.106
105 Official website of United State Department of State. Retrieved from http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/index.htm accessed on 10 November 2014. 106 Ibid
53
3.5.1 Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA)
On July 1, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA). This law is an extended version of UNSCR 1929 by strengthening existing United States sanctions with regards to the Iranian energy industry, and adds the imposition of serious restrictions on foreign financial institutions‘ access to the United States financial system if they involved in transactions with Iran.107
The Act revises the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (ISA) which obliges sanctions be forced for organizations or companies that are resolved to have made certain interests in Iran's energy sector. CISADA extends the energy-related activities that are sanction-able and includes new sorts of sanctions that can be imposed. CISADA support an effort to increase pressure on Iran to return constructively to diplomatic negotiations to address the international community‘s concerns about Iran‘s resistance with its international obligations.
The financial provisions of CISADA are implemented through the Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations (IFSR), which the Treasury Department issued in August 2010. The IFSR prohibit entities owned or controlled by U.S. financial institutions from knowingly engaging in transactions with or benefiting Iran‘s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Additionally, foreign financial institutions that engage in certain transactions with specific, troubling Iran-linked individuals and entities risk impeding their access to the U.S. financial system. Under the IFSR, the Secretary of the Treasury may prohibit or impose strict conditions on the opening or maintaining in the United States of correspondent
107 CISADA. The New US Sanctions on Iran. The Department of The Treasury of United States. retrieved from https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CBwQFjAA&u rl=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.treasury.gov%2Fresource- center%2Fsanctions%2Fprograms%2Fdocuments%2Fcisada_english.pdf&ei=X8P5VK- lLNGwuASY0YGQBw&usg=AFQjCNEe0CRJ_BzQsgV_TdS3zcD-RSAY-g&sig2=4j4Fel-2- y5DBmrfKKdoww on 22 November 2014.
54 accounts or payable-through accounts for foreign financial institutions that the Secretary finds knowingly engage in one or more sanctionable activities.108
This act requires the President to impose sanctions on persons or institutions that are proven to be engaged in the activities in Iran‘s energy sector. Activities that can trigger sanctions include:
1. Making an investment that directly and significantly contributes to the enhancement of Iran‘s ability to develop its petroleum resources, of US$20 million or more or US$5 million per investment, totaling $20 million or more in a 12-month period. 2. Selling, leasing, or providing goods, services, technology information or support that could directly and significantly facilitate the maintenance or expansion of Iran‘s domestic production of refined petroleum products2, with fair market value of $1 million or more or aggregate fair market value of $5 million or more in a 12-month period. 3. Selling or providing Iran with refined petroleum products, with fair market value of $1 million or more or aggregate fair market value of $5 million or more in a 12-month period. 4. Providing goods or services that could directly and significantly contribute to the enhancement of Iran‘s ability to import refined petroleum products, including insurance or reinsurance services, financing or brokering services or ships and shipping services, with fair market value of $1 million or more or aggregate fair market value of $5 million or more in a 12-month period.109
If it was found to be an entity either individual, state, or organization who is violating the provisions of financial and delivery of goods exports to Iran as mentioned in the document CISADA, the sanctions imposed by the US government will take effect in the form of freezing property and property interests as well as violations of the transaction foreign exchange.
108 Ibid 109 Ibid
55
CHAPTER IV
ANALYSIS ON THE IMPACT OF CISADA ON THE VOTING BEHAVIOR OF IRANIANS IN IRAN PRESEDENTIAL ELECTION 2013
4.1 Iran Presidential Election 2013
For the leaders of Iran, the Presidential Elections is problematic. The country has to hold the presidential elections in a state of severe international isolations, economic sanctions, domestic economic problem, and potential internal turmoil. On one side, the Iranian people might choose to stay at home in fear of repression and apathy. On the other side, they can choose to take part in the election which no real alternative to the regime are allowed to shared and voted. However, this 2013 Presidential Elections undoubtedly is one of the most important moments for the history of Islamic Republic of Iran.110
The Iran presidential in 2013, is indeed far more important for the Iranian that it is for the international community as it will determine the direction of their life for 4 years ahead. For Iranian people, it will give a huge impact on their lives as it will determine the Iran‘s foreign policy or nuclear policy. For them, the foreign policy will give direct impacts on them reflecting on 8 years of Ahmadinejad era where the people is the one who actually have to pay for the un- compliance cost of Iran to international pressure especially economic sanctions.
In the Iran presidential election in 2009, was running with major issues to the winner, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, where the elections were condemn by the
110 Seeberg, Peter. (2013). The Iranian presidential election, EU sanctions and the regional perspectives. Center for Mellemostsudier. Retrieved from http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/F/2/D/%7BF2DFC580-B268-4190-89C9- D59F9842D545%7D0213PS.pdf accessed on 12 November 2014.
56 people who felt that the elections was cheated, and refuse to acknowledge Ahmadinejad as President for second time. The people of Iran called this moment as the ‗Iranian Green Movement‘. However, this movement could not bring down Ahmadinejad from his throne as the supreme leader still believe in Ahmadinejad, thus the foreign policy of Iran towards western countries also did not change including the policy on nuclear issues. As the result, in the second term of Ahmadinejad (2005-2013), the relations between Iran and United States allies were deteriorating and followed by series of economic sanctions by United States, European Union, and United Nations. Therefore, the Iranian Presidential Elections in 2013, could be marked as a very important occasion for the Iranian people as it could be considered as the second chance for the people who wants a relieve from economic suffer.
The Iranian Presidential Election in 2013 is also very significant for the international community especially for United States and allies as they are expecting for a more moderate figure in the Iranian administration thus they could make a positive impacts on the nuclear negotiations. It could be also regard as the moment to find out whether the strategy or foreign policy of United States to impose economic sanctions rather than military action is proven to be efficient to resolve the nuclear issue or at least to end the regime of Ahmadinejad or radical regime.
Indeed. In political hierarchy of Iran indicates that at the top of Iran‘s power structure is the supreme leader. The current supreme leader of Iran is Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (1989-present) who succeeded Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini (1979- 1989). There are only two supreme leader of Iran until this moment.111
As indicated in Iran‘s constitution, the supreme leader has the obligation to set the directions of Iran's residential and foreign policy including nuclear
111 Iranian Laws & Government. The structure of power in Iran. (18 November 2014). The Iran Chamber. Retrieved from http://www.iranchamber.com/government/articles/structure_of_power.php accessed on 18 November 2014.
57 program policy. The Supreme Leader additionally is commander-in-chief of the armed forces and controls the Islamic Republic's security and intelligence operations, this makes Supreme Leader is able to declare war or peace by himself. Meanwhile the president is the second highest ranking authority in Iran. Despite who wins the race, Ayatollah Khamenei as the current Supreme Leader, will keep on having the final call on relations with United States and nuclear program.112 In other words, all the key choices are in the hands of Supreme Leader. Despite the fact that the President is not the primary decision maker on foreign policy, the president has capability to choose key cabinet officials such as the defense, foreign, and intelligence ministers which frequently serves to shape the tone Iran‘s foreign policies.113
Not to mention, the president is able to play an essential figure in organizing and dealing with Iran‘s economy and since the Supreme Leader is scarcely change. The president is frequently seen as the face of Iran to the international community. In the era of Mohammad Khatami as a reformist figure president, there was an air of greater social and political tolerance than during Ahmadinejad‘s era. Meanwhile Khatami is most associated with his motto asking for dialogues of civilizations, Ahmadinejad will be associated with his tirades against Israel which caused Iran earned six UN Security Council resolutions and a hearty international sanctions regime.114
Since the supreme leader is chosen and administered by the Assembly of Expert115, and the president is chosen by fair general election by the Iranian people, the president regularly viewed as the genuine trust and face of Iran since he is chosen directly by the people. Not to mention, the prerequisite of Supreme
112 Ibid 113 Thaler, E., & Nader, A., & Chubin, S., & D. Green, J., & Lynch, C., & Wehrey, C., Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads. (2010). An Exploration of Iranian Leadership Dynamics. RAND Corporation, MG-878-OSD. Retrieved from http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG878.html accessed on 18 November 2014. 114 Sadjapour, Karim. (2013). Iran‘s Presidential Election: An Autocracy Votes. Retrieved from http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/06/12/iran-s-presidential-election-autocracy-votes accessed on 19 October 2014. 115 is a deliberative body of Mujtahids (Islamic theologians) that is responsible to elect and to remove the Supreme Leader of Iran and administering his activities. Members of the assembly are chosen from lists of candidates by direct public vote for eight-year terms.
58
Leader to declare peace and war has to be approved by a two third majority of the parliament which will be comprised of the legislatures from the victorious party.116 Therefore the Supreme leader will also have a difficulty in setting unpopular foreign policy which opposes the will of people reflected on the figure being chosen by the Iranian people.
The indicator is very clear that the Iran presidential election in 2013 is the representative of the will of majority of Iranian people, whether they were expecting for continuity of leadership or demand for a change in leadership of Iran. In this context, the will of people is surely to have a better live in all aspects especially economical aspect. The Iranian Presidential in 2013 will be the moment to determine whether Iranian people are agree with a radical or conservative leader which will continue Iran‘s bad relations with western or a moderate figure which offer a more openness to western which will give relieve on economic restriction for decades.
Indeed, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was unable to enter the presidency candidates again as he has been the president for two period. However, in the elections there were several candidates who represent the same minded of Ahmadinejad, meanwhile the number of moderate or reformist candidate in Iranian Presidential Elections in 2013 was only one.
From the previous chapter, it is elaborated that the main purpose of the economic sanctions are mainly to bring down the radical regime from Iranian leadership. That‘s why, the author believe that if then the result of the presidential elections was resulting on another figure with radical view minded on western, it means that the economic sanctions of United States and allies is not effective and failed. If the moderate figure wins, it means that the economic sanctions have succeeded in influencing the people of Iran to demand for openness to western countries and end the radical regime of Iran.
116Abrahamian, Ervand. (2008). Who's in Charge? London Review of Book. Retrieved from http://www.lrb.co.uk/v30/n21/ervand-abrahamian/whos-in-charge accessed on 18 November 2014.
59
4.2 Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s Position in Iran Presidential Election 2013
As Iran‘s Supreme Leader, Khamenei has faced a lot of challenges from many directions which endanger not only his personal power, but also his political agenda. The 2013 Iran Presidential election comes at a time of intense pressure from both domestic and foreign. The contention over the nuclear program of Iran has prompted to phenomenal sanctions that are deteriorating the Iran‘s economy. Khamenei has a huge responsibility to patrol and guide the election so it is running smoothly not like the unprecedented 2009 election with its violent after result. His concern is clearly concerning about the elections‘ authenticity and legitimacy. It is clear that a Supreme Leader has a complete responsibility above all else to make sure a fair and safe election, but his objective is to have an election that produces a president loyal to him personally. For some Iranian, the democratic election as just an absolutist theocracy drove by the Supreme Leader and the Revolutionary Guards. It has indicated by the minimization of progressive figure Rafsanjani from the race.117
Khamenei and the Guardian Council have excluded Rafsanjani from the presidency candidates. Khamenei view him as a strong risk to his power and could accumulated backing from the reformist. Despite the fact that, the Rafsanjani's preclusion was likewise could represent a danger as it could jeopardize the election‘s authenticity and obviously the regime‘s credibility.118 Not to mention, Khamenei likewise look to firmly control the information in public and media by threatening any independent media who do not comply and even restrict the internet.119 From the action of Khamenei who closed the access for reformist for the presidency, it shows that Khamenei is seeking to preserve the radical regimes, which in fact there were no reformists who have major role in the
117 Nader, Alireza. (2013). Iran’s 2013 presidential election: its meaning and implication by. RAND Corporation. Retrieved from http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE109/RAND_PE109.pdf accessed on 18 November 2104. 118 Ibid 119 Tajdin, Behrang. (April 27, 2013). Will Iran‘s National Internet Mean No World Wide Web?. BBC Persia. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22281336 accessed on 20 November 2014.
60 elections since the 1979 revolution. However, he also realizes that his regime has lost much support due to economic decline and isolations from western. Therefore the Iran presidential election in 2013 is very significant for the continuity of conservative regime in Iran. The election of a loyal president to Khamenei likely make Iran becomes even harsher on the nuclear program. On the other hand, the election of radical figure who more likely to dig in rather than concede on the nuclear issue will also increase the economic sanctions which will even jeopardize Khamenei‘s position as Supreme Leader.
Ahmadinejad‘s period was presumably suited the Khamenei's aspirations more than any other previous presidents in Khamenei‘s regime. Ahmadinejad was not very friendly with Rafsanjani, seeing him as antirevolutionary and corrupt. Ahmadinejad was likewise profoundly hostile to reformist, embraced an assertive foreign policy. However, Ahmadinejad has caused so many problems for Khamenei due to his forceful attitude in opposing Israel and United States. Therefore, the economic sanctions have impacts on the actions of Khamenei in order to preserve him as the Supreme Leader which make him do not have flexibility in the 2013 presidential elections and take it for granted for the winner, even though in candidates list is very oppose to reformists.120
The next president of Iran must also come with the solution of nuclear crisis as Iran‘s most challenging and complex foreign policy issue. Despite of the fact that the Iranian nuclear policy is controlled by the Khamenei, and Iran‘s mediators with P5+1 are under direct order of Khamenei, However, the role of Ahmadinejad as president in nuclear policy likewise cannot be denied. His forceful approach in Iran‘s nuclear issue has made him and Iran notorious in the eye of western which led to the massive economic sanctions. Nevertheless, the
120 Nader, Alireza. (2013). Iran’s 2013 presidential election: its meaning and implication by. RAND Corporation. Retrieved from http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE109/RAND_PE109.pdf accessed on 18 November 2104.
61 following chosen president will have an essential role in determining which way the nuclear talks are going to wind up.121
Undoubtedly, Khamenei as the Supreme Leader will even now play an important role on nuclear policy after the election. However, the following Iranian President could have the opportunity or capacity to diminish the strains which made by Ahmadinejad. It does not mean that the election will bring about an immediate resolution to the Iranian‘s problems, but it is obvious that the following Iran president will have a huge burden and responsibility to solve the problems and to be more diplomatic than his predecessor.122
4.3 Interest Group in Iran Presidential Elections 2013
In the Iran Presidential Election 2013, there are three interest groups which competing. According to Ali Saidi, all of factions were actually could be followed back into the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Despite of the fact that in recent days, the Supreme Leader manipulated the elections, however each faction has been contending with one another since the revolution. The three interest groups are pro-Khamenei conservatives, pro- Rafsanjani technocrats, and reformists. Each group has their economic and political plan and a specific vision of about where Iran is heading to. One thing notably here is, the three groups upheld and recognized Iran's entitlement to enrich uranium, which implies they may differ in several issue but in regards to nuclear program, they support it yet just vary on methods to attain to that objectives. 123
121 Nader, Alireza. (2013). Iran’s 2013 presidential election: its meaning and implication by. RAND Corporation. Retrieved from http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE109/RAND_PE109.pdf accessed on 18 November 2104. 122 Ibid 123 Iran‘s election called a race among four groups. (17 April 2013). Retrieved from http://archive.radiozamaneh.com/english/content/iran%E2%80%99s-election-called-race-among- four-groups accessed on 19 November 2014.
62
4.3.1 Pro-Khamenei Conservative
This group is the most influential group among alternate factions as it focuses on the Supreme Leader, Khamenei. This group support in the status quo more than the others. They have conservative perspectives on society and religion, and have a tendency to support a strategy of resistance to United States. They oppose the reformist. There are four out of seven candidates, who are nearly connected with this group, Saeed Jalili, Gholam Ali Haddad-Adel, Ali Akbar Velayati , and Baqer Qalibaf.124
4.3.2 Pro-Rafsanjani Technocrats
This group is traditionalist, yet less ideological and more technocratic in contrast with other moderate groups. Most the supporter of this group is the supporter of Rafsanjani, who was considered as an Islamic modernizer. An extremely well off man by most gauges, Rafsanjani endeavored to design a more effective monetary framework under his administration. He likewise supported less ideological foreign policies that could ease his objective of having a more globally Iranian economy. Rafsanjani has likewise discussed decreasing pressures with the United States, and even Israel. This group has unequivocally associated with reformist against Ahmadinejad, and verifiably against Khamenei. Tragically he was restricted by the ruling regime and his political rights were being limited. He has been disqualified from presidency contenders for obscure reasons. Nonetheless, Hassan Rouhani, one of eight contenders approved by the Guardian Council, is closely associated to this group and backed by Rafsanjani.125
124 Ibid 125 Ibid
63
4.3.3. The Reformist
This group is the direct opposition of traditionalist or conservative group. The noticeable figure of this group is Mousavi, Khatami, and Mehdi Karroubi. They trust it is conceivable to rescue the Islamic Republic through changes that increment political cooperation and individual flexibilities. A large portion of reformists have been imprisoned, tormented, and banished to United States and Europe since 2009 after the Iranian Green Movement including Karroubi and Mousavi. Despite the fact that Khatami confronted a tremendous support from reformists to run for presidency, he rejected it. As the result, there were no noticeable contenders from reformists group in the presidential race. Mohammad Aref who is the genuine reformist likewise withdraws from the race and going down Hassan Rouhani as the figure who is the closest to the reformist. Despite the fact that Rouhani has not pronounced he is a reformist, a portion of the reformist united to him.126127
4.4 Iranian Electorate in the Iran Presidential Election 2013
Iran has a population of approximately 79 million, and there are about 50 million eligible voters. Iranian officials have called for a high turnout, stressing that it would lend legitimacy to the presidential office and counter the embarrassment that the establishment suffered in the international arena as a result of the 2009 mass protests. Every Iranian 18 or over, including those living abroad, may vote. For this presidential election, there are 50,483,192 eligible voters. The Elections Office compiles an overview of the number of eligible voters for each election using information provided by Iran‘s Statistical Center; the Civil and Registration Office; and statistical experts in the offices of Governor
126 Conservative drops out of Iranian presidential election. (11 June 2013). CNN News. Retrieved from http://edition.cnn.com/2013/06/10/world/meast/iran-elections/?hpt=hp_t3 accessed on 19 November 2014. 127 Nader, Alireza. (2013). Iran’s 2013 presidential election: its meaning and implication by. RAND Corporation. Retrieved from http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE109/RAND_PE109.pdf accessed on 18 November 2104.
64
Generals in Iran‘s 31 provinces.128 The electorate of this elections is the main target of this research since they are the voter who determine the outcome of the elections.
4.5 The Candidates in Iran Presidential Election 2013
As per constitution, anybody can enlist himself as the presidential applicant; then again, he must be affirmed by the Guardian Council. The Guardian Council is comprised of six clerics and six laymen who analyze each candidate‘s legal and Islamic qualifications. The clerics are picked by the Supreme Leader, while the six legal experts are picked by the Judiciary chief, who thus is named by the Supreme Leader. This permits Khamenei has a final call on who is chosen in presidential contenders.129 There were accounted for 40 generally noticeable figures enrolled for the presidency, however just eight who were approved by the Guardian Council. There were such a variety of reformists or moderate figure that was excluded by the Guardian Council including Rafsanjani, which however activated contention before the election.130 Two of eight candidates, Gholam Ali Haddad-Adel and Mohammad Reza Aref have proclaimed for withdrawal on 10 and 11 June. It makes the main six remaining competitors which will be voted in the Election Day.131 It additionally makes Hassan Rouhani as the main moderate and partial reformist left in the competition. Nonetheless, there were just 5 competitors which are genuinely remarkable figures since Mohammad Gharazi is moderately obscure in Iran.
128 Official website of Minister of Inferior Iran. Retrieved from http://www.moi.ir/portal/Home/Default.aspx?CategoryID=03e36add-16ee-4151-949e- 9233a35f6795# accessed on 2 March 2015. 129 Ibid 130 Dailey, Kristin. (8 June 2013). Iranian reformists struggle to settle on candidate. Daily Star. Retrieved from http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2013/Jun-08/219775-iranian- reformists-struggle-to-settle-on-candidate.ashx#axzz2VcnkTzZx accessed on 19 November 2014. 131 Iran's Mohammad Reza Aref quits presidential race. (11 June 2013). BBC News. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-22851764#TWEET785230 accessed on 19 November 2014.
65
4.5.1. Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf
Qalibaf is the current leader of Tehran. He is considered to a traditionalist Politian in however in contradict to Ahmadinjead who he saw as inadequacy in organization. He was likewise a candidate of Presidential Election 2005 but beaten by Ahmadinejad. He was additionally memeber of
Picture 1. Mohammad Baqer Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, administrator of Qalibaf. Image taken from the Islamic republic of Iran Air Force and the head http://www.theepochtimes.c om/news/5-6-2/29242.html of Iranian police Forces. Be that as it may, he was anticipated as a solid competitor because of his position in conservative group and popularity particularly in Tehran.132
4.5.2. Ali Akbar Velayati Velayati was Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1981 to 1997 and Deputy Minister of Health from 1980 to 1981. He was a part of the Parliament from 1980 to 1981.133 Velayati is considered as a principlist and a faithful consultant to Supreme Leader. Velayati has expressed his will to lessen strain over Iran's nuclear program if he wins. He is considered as the less Picture 2. Ali Akbar Velayati. Image taken from conservative and more diplomatic among the other http://backchannel.al- monitor.com/index.php/tag/ principlist figures. Nonetheless, since he is not a ali-akbar-velayati/ politician, he is not popular among Iranian.134
132 Nader, Alireza. (2013). Iran’s 2013 presidential election: its meaning and implication by. RAND Corporation. Retrieved from http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE109/RAND_PE109.pdf accessed on 18 November 2104. 133 Iran's Presidential Campaigns Get Off to Very Early Start. (2013). Al-Monitor. Retrieved from http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2012/08/an-early-entry-in-the-atmosphere.html accessed on 19 November 2014. 134 Nader, Alireza. (2013). Iran’s 2013 presidential election: its meaning and implication by. RAND Corporation. Retrieved from
66
4.5.3. Saeed Jalili Jalili is chief nuclear negotiator and Iran‘s national security adviser. Jalili is a committed supporter of Khamenei, and has all the earmarks of being an implementer of policy, instead of a unique mastermind and theoretician. He is remarkable as righteous Islamic principles and hostile against the
Picture 3. Saeed Jalili. Image United States, which shared the same view with takenfromhttp://mic.com/art icles/45215/iran-presidential- Khamenei. which had the same perspective with election-2013-saeed-jalili-is- no-different-than-mahmoud- Khamenei. Western media frequently depicted him ahmadinejad 135136 as a fighter of Iran in nuclear negotiation.
4.5.4. Mohsen Rezai Rezai is a former commander in chief of the Revolutionary Guards. He additionally ran into presidency both in 2005 and 2009. He served as Secretary of the Expediency Council under Rafsanjani, yet distinguishes himself as a principlist. Rezai is ideological yet is not as forceful
Picture 4. Mohsen Rezai. as Ahmadinejad. Rezai is not exceptionally Image taken from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ prominent figure, and gossipy also is disliked by middle_east/8081440.stm Khamenei.137
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE109/RAND_PE109.pdf accessed on 18 November 2104. 135 Nader, Alireza. (2013). Iran’s 2013 presidential election: its meaning and implication by. RAND Corporation. Retrieved from http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE109/RAND_PE109.pdf accessed on 18 November 2104. 136 Sadjapour, Karim. (2013). Iran‘s Presidential Election: An Autocracy Votes. Retrieved from http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/06/12/iran-s-presidential-election-autocracy-votes accessed on 19 October 2014. 137 Nader, Alireza. (2013). Iran’s 2013 presidential election: its meaning and implication by. RAND Corporation. Retrieved from http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE109/RAND_PE109.pdf accessed on 18 November 2104.
67
4.5.5. Hassan Rouhani He is the only remaining candidate who categorized as moderate and reformist. Rouhani is the head of Center for Strategic Research (CSR) since 1992 which gives strategic guidance to the Iranian government. Rouhani was Iran's top nuclear mediator during the Khatami era. Rouhani has expressed his criticism against nuclear and foreign Picture 5. Hassan rouhani. policy of Ahmadinejad which have driven into Image taken from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki pulverization of Iranian economy and seeking after /Hassan_Rouhani the nuclear program as Khatami era where it made advancement without inciting strong foreign pressures. Rouhani promised to Rouhani guaranteed to take care of Iran's financial and discretionary issues if chosen.138
4.6 Surprising Victory of Hassan Rouhani
Rouhani has shockingly won the presidential races with 18,692,500 votes or equal to 50.88 persentage of the votes. By that number of vote, it makes Hassan Rouhani as the seventh president of Islamic republic of Iran straight in round keeping away from the second round since Rouhani got more than a half votes. The second place is the chairman of Tehran, Mohamad Baqer Ghalibaf with a far contrast, 6,077,292 votes or equal to 16.46 % of the aggregate votes. It is trailed by other traditionalist figures, ordely Saeed Jalili, Mohsen Rezai, Ali Akbar Velayati, and Mohammad Gharazi in the last place with just 1.22 % votes.
138 Nader, Alireza. (2013). Iran’s 2013 presidential election: its meaning and implication by. RAND Corporation. Retrieved from http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE109/RAND_PE109.pdf accessed on 18 November 2104.
68
Authorities said that 72 percent of the 50 million qualified Iranians had used their rights to vote.139
Chart 4.6.1: Voting Result of Iran Presidential Election 2013
Sources the Ministry of Interior of Iran140
The triumph of Hassan Rouhani in Iran's presidential is surprising since Rouhani got votes which far higher than alternate candidates and avoid the second run-off. It was astounding in light of the fact that before all else, Rouhani was not supported in the race, rather the leader of Tehran, Qalibaf who got the most noteworthy score in the surveys. IPOS (Iranian Elections Tracking Polls) is guaranteed as the stand out official survey framework for the presidential race which ran an everyday survey polls for the election. IPOS is focused around telephone interviews with an example estimate around 1,000 individuals every day. The surveys began from two weeks prior to the Election Day on 14 June 2013.141142
139 Hassan Rouhani wins Iran presidential election on 15 June 2013. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-22916174 accessed on 19 November 2014. 140 http://www.moi.ir/portal/Home/Default.aspx?CategoryID=03e36add-16ee-4151-949e- 9233a35f6795# 141 Official website of IPOS (Iranian Elections Tracking Poll) http://www.ipos.me/en/ accessed on 20 November 2014. 142 Fisher, Max. (10 June 2013). A rare Iran presidential poll shows Tehran mayor Ghalibaf as runaway favorite. Washington post. Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/06/10/a-rare-iran-presidential-poll- shows-tehran-mayor-ghalibaf-as-runaway-favorite/ accessed on 20 November 2014.
69
Chart 4.6.2: Tracking Polls Trend of Iran Presidential election 2013
Source from http://www.ipos.me/en/
From the chart above, it is clear that Qalibaf is the major contender of the race and dominance among the other. From 31 May until 6 June, Qalibaf held strong lead in the poll with the support of 39 % of decided voters. Other conservative figure like Rezai and Jallili had the second and third place with 16.8 % and 13.9 of decided voters respectively.143 Meanwhile Rouhani was always in the bottom of table below the conservative figures.
On 10 June, 3 days before the D-Day, the tension was increasing because of the day is getting closer and the third national TV debate held on 7 June 2013. Qalibaf still held a lead in the poll, but this time with a step down with only the support 27% of decided voters. But the table still does not show a significant change. Jalili and Rezai still had the second and the third place with 16.5 % and 16 % of decided voters respectively. However, meanwhile Qalibaf show negative trend after the third national debate, Rouhani started to increase after the third
143 Ghalibaf, Rezaei, Jalili Trending Upwards. (2013). Official website of IPOS (Iranian Elections Tracking Poll) http://www.ipos.me/en/post/16 accessed on 20 November 2014.
70 national TV debate reaching from 8 % to 14 %, but still below the prominent conservative figures.144
Not until two days prior to the Election Day, Rouhani at last made a remarkable lead in the presidential race by 32 % of decided voters. Meanwhile Qalibaf pattern has kept on declining to 24.4 % of decided voters. Jalili, Rezaee and Velayati had the third to fifth spot with a rally little edge of distinction.145 It continued until the Election Day which resulted on the unexpected victory of Hassan Rouhani.
It was also surprising because Rouhani was the lone moderate-reformist in the race and surrounded by conservative candidates and also the conservative Supreme Leader. This straight victory of Rouhani is a strong indication of the will of Iranian people keen on a reformation politically and economically. Rouhani himself said that this victory was a victory of wisdom, maturity and modernism over radicalism.146 Karim Sadjapour described it as an impression of significant discontent with the status quo instead of a profound situated natural inclination for the candidate himself.147
What most shocking was that Khamenei, permitted Rouhani to win, after 10 years of methodically eliminating reformists and moderates figures from the power struggling utilizing intimidation or even force. Khamenei even praised Rouhani for the triumph, he urges Iranian to Rouhani, as he is the president of the entire country.148 Meir Javedar, an Iranian governmental lecturer at the Inter- disciplinary Centre in Israel, depicted the results as an aggregate and supreme
144 Rohani Gains As Ghalibaf Continues Slide. (2013). Official website of IPOS (Iranian Elections Tracking Poll) http://www.ipos.me/en/post/29 accessed on 20 November 2014. 145 Last Minute Changes. (2013). Official website of IPOS (Iranian Elections Tracking Poll) http://www.ipos.me/en/post/34 accessed on 20 November 2014. 146 Hassan Rouhani wins Iran presidential election. (15 June 2013). Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-22916174 accessed on 19 November 2014. 147 Sadjapour, Karim. (18 June 2013). ELECTIONS IN IRAN: THE REGIME CEMENTING ITS CONTROL. Congressional Testimony in House Foreign Affairs Committee Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee. Retrieved from http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Karim_Sadjadpour_Revised_Testimony_06182013.pdf accessed on 22 November 2014. 148 Hassan Rouhani wins Iran presidential election. (15 June 2013). Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-22916174 accessed on 19 November 2014.
71 shock since based on 2009 results; he believes that Rouhani's authentic vote would not be considered because Rouhani perspective was not in accordance with Iran‘s Revolutionary Guard Corp and the Supreme Leader. 149
Even though, as analyzed in the previous section, in this presidential election, Khamenei has less flexibility in manipulating or purging the outcome of the elections due to the domestic and foreign pressure which made him in a difficult situation. Khamenei could not deny the urge of the Iranian people for an evaluation of current extremism and demanding for a more moderate state of actions or policies which will help the Iranian to have a better economy.
4.7 Why Rouhani Win?
The triumph of Rouhani indicated that Iranians were desperate for changes. The public support of Rafsanjani and particularly the withdrawal of Mohammad Reza Aref a few days before the Election Day have made the voice of Pro-Rafsanjani and a large portion of the reformist united around Rouhani and support Rouhani's votes.150 The withdrawal of Reza Aref for the presidency played a significant role in Rouhani‘s victory since it avoided a split vote between the moderates and reformists. Rafsanjani and Khatami both as prominent figure of both moderates and reformists truly understand that in order to win the elections they have to cooperate to bring down the radical-conservative regimes.
Meanwhile Rouhani received several support and favor from both moderates and reformists, conservative figures were split into three or even four candidates. It makes Rouhani could accelerate passing through into the top of the table. However, nobody would anticipate that Rouhani won the race by an enormous gap until avoiding second round. People Iranian basically imagined that there would be the second round between Qalibaf as the most well-known one
149 Dehghan, S. Kamali. (2013). Iran: Hassan Rouhani wins presidential election on 15 June 2013. The Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/15/iran-presidential- election-hassan-rouhani-wins accessed on 20 November 2014. 150 Ibid
72 with either other conservative one or Rouhani as the lone moderate and reformist.151
It confirmed by a University of Tehran lecturer and University of Maryland doctoral candidate, Ebrahim Mohseni, who exhibited his work of arrangement of surveys taken previously, then after the election at the New American Foundation. He concurred that the variable of Rafsanjani and the withdrawal of Reza Aref helped the votes in favor of Rouhani. Notwithstanding, he additionally included that the infighting between conservative figures and their incapability to form a solid coalition.152
4.7.1 Economic Sanctions as Determinant Factor behind the Victory of Hassan Rouhani
The indication of economic sanctions have played an important factor in the victory of Hassan Rouhani is started with the third National TV debate which took place a week before the election. It was the most important debate as it will touch the hottest issue of economic sector and foreign policy. In short, the conservative figures were attacking each other. Qalibaf attacked Velayati and Rouhani which is not effective. Velayati also attacked against Jalili which makes the priciplist or conservative point of view even worse especially in regards to nuclear program and foreign policy.153Meanwhile the other candidates attacking each other over almost the same perception on issue, only different view on strategy to achieve it, Rouhani did exceptionally well in this debate. He questioned the necessity on expanding security of a state but ignoring the real need of the civil society. Rouhani additionally represented the need for a greater freedom of press and speech recalling the abuse of the current regime (Khamenei regime) to the press. Besides, Rouhani likewise passed on his thoughtfulness
151 Ibid 152 Mohseni, Ebrahim. (31July 2013). Presentation at the New American Foundation. Video retrieved from http://newamerica.net/events/2013/attitudes_from_tehran accessed on 20 November 2014. 153 Ibid
73 regarding ladies' privilege issues and guaranteed to secure a ministry for women‘s affairs.154
In economic aspect, all the candidates surely promised to address the problems of inflation and unemployment. But Rouhani also focused on the problem of economy to the institutional level that make the most rational economic possible. Not only the economic policy, Rouhani also stressed on the important of appropriate Iranian foreign policy since the economic problem of Iran (inflation and unemployment) most as the result from the isolation from western countries. In the middle of conservative view which against those who naively believes that to compromise with the United States will have positive impacts, Rouhani stressed on the importance to find a way to resolve the tension created by Ahmadinejad on Iran‘s nuclear issue and to end Iran‘s diplomatic isolation. Rouhani favored in a softer line on nuclear issue as adopted by the president of Mohammad Khatami when Rouhani served as the head of Iran‘s chief nuclear negotiator. He believes that at that time the nuclear program ran well without an immense pressure from foreign entities.155
Therefore, the author believes that the third presidential national live TV debate played a crucial factor for the popularity of Hassan Rouhani. Yes, it means that the concept of balance and modernity in economy policy and foreign policy brought by Rouhani was the idea that the Iranian are looking for. The Iranian people was seeking for reformation on economic and foreign policy which indicated that Iranian people had enough suffer from inefficient economic and foreign policy from the previous administration especially Ahmadinejad. Both categories are closely related with the United States economic sanctions, which direct and indirectly affect the lives of Iranian people. Iran‘s foreign policy to resist from cooperating with United States and allies have cost them great inflation and unemployment as the result of the economic sanctions imposed by
154 Bakhash, Shaul. (2013). Rouhani‘s Suprising Election. Viewpoints No. 28. George Mason University. Retrieved from http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/rouhanis_surprising_election_0.pdf accessed on 20 November 2014. 155 Ibid
74
United States and allies. That‘s why the author believes that the economic sanctions have at least partially succeeded in influencing the perception of Iranian people to demand for moderation and against further harsh political actions.
According to Ebrahim Mohseni‘s research and survey, which involve over 2000 samples before and after the elections, 89 percent of Rouhani‘s voters mainly chose Rouhani because of the qualities Rouhani Had. Meanwhile 6 percent chose Rouhani mainly to prevent another candidate to win (mostly Saeed Jalili). And 5 percent said both. From 89 percent who chose Rouhani for Rouhani‘s qualities, there are various (over 30) reasons why they chose Rouhani. Mostly voters said that because they agree with Rouhani‘s program and statements, because of track record and past experience, because convince by his ability to fix the economy, and because being a centrist or moderate. Again, it shows that the reasons why the majority of Iranian people chose Rouhani because of his modernity approach in economy and foreign policy issue.156
Mohseni also noted there was a changing perception of Iranian people on domestic and foreign policy. According to him, the public is becoming more pragmatic and moderate both in their approach and in their demands since they frustrated with the condition during eight years of Ahmadinejad‘s administration. The public also demand for a more pragmatic foreign policy as there was a slight increasing of optimism towards the possibility to avoid further sanctions without having to suspend the nuclear program. Rouhani‘s campaign was effective because he is not a pure reformist or conservative but a pragmatic moderate. Not to mention, the track record of Rouhani as Iran‘s chief nuclear negotiator also showed progress.157
IPI (International Peace Insitute) Iran Poll also found that three-to-one majority of Iranian want an improvement on relations with the West, not the other
156 Mohseni, Ebrahim. (31July 2013). Presentation at the New American Foundation. Video retrieved from http://newamerica.net/events/2013/attitudes_from_tehran accessed on 20 November 2014. 157 Ibid
75 way around. They also support the Western criticism of Iranian human rights violations and aid to Iranian non-governmental organizations.158
A survey done by IPOS (Iranian Elections Tracking Polls) also shows that, in general, Rouhani was able to win the support of all segments of Iranian society, not only particular society. Votes for Rowhani were roughly proportionate in all other ways (gender, age, education, socioeconomic status). However, the people who are living in smaller cities and rural areas were slightly more likely to vote for Rouhani.159 It is make sense because the problem of economy, inflation and unemployment in Iran, will mostly have a greater impacts to those who living in smaller cities and rural area.
Another survey by Gallup survey conducted in Iran in December 2012, a year before the presidential election. The economic sanctions have affected their livelihoods as shown in a table below:
Table 4.7.1.1: Table Effect of Sanctions on Iranian Livelihood in 2012
Source: Gallup160
158 IPI (International Peace Institute Iran Polls.2013 159 Scenarios: Rohani And Ghalibaf Go to Runoff or Rohani Wins. (2013). Official website of IPOS (Iranian Elections Tracking Poll) http://www.ipos.me/en/post/36 accessed on 20 November 2014. 160 Iranians Feel Bite of Sanctions, Blame U.S., Not Own Leaders. (2013). Retrieved from http://www.gallup.com/poll/160358/iranians-feel-bite-sanctions-blame-not-own-leaders.aspx accessed on 20 November 2014.
76
It shows that the economic sanctions have given immense impacts and hurt the livelihood of Iranian people, especially in economic aspect. Majority of the samples admitted that economic sanctions have hurt Iranian‘s livelihood and also each personal livelihood. Only, 10 percent who were not admitted it. In addition, Gallup also found that by the December of 2012, 74 percent of Iranian described that moment as a bad time to find a job which an increase in compare to 66 percent in the previous year.161
Economic sanctions undeniable have leaved a catastrophe to the Iran‘s economy. The author will use ―misery index‖ as the barometer to measure how the economic degradation have caused Iranian people suffering. Misery index is a measurement developed by Arthur Okun who use inflations rate and unemployment rate as major indicators macroeconomic policy because these two indicators believed by policy makers has adversely effect on people welfare. Okun believe that both high rate of inflation and unemployment would make financial and social expenses for a nation precisely as assigned for economic sanctions objectives.162
Chart 4.7.1.2 Chart of Iran Misery Index
161 Ibid 162 Blanchflower, David. (2013). Forget inflation – what hurts the most is unemployment. The Independent. Retrieved from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/comment/david- blanchflower/forget-inflation--what-hurts-the-most-is-unemployment-8556261.html accessed on 3 December 2014.
77
Source: http://www.cato.org/blog/iran-stable-miserable
From the chart above, especially in the administration of Ahmadinejad, the misery index reaches the highest level since 1991 under Hashemi Rafsanjani era. It begun to climbing up into the highest level in 2010, since CISADA were imposed on Iran and series of economic sanctions were imposed by United States, United Nations, and European Union. This index shows how miserable the life of Iranian since the economic sanctions being rapidly imposed.
Undeniably, the economic sanctions have caused big problems to the Iranian economy especially cause high inflations rate and high unemployment rate. Moreover, the inflation rate and unemployment were sky-rocketing in the second term Ahmadinejad where the Iran has to receive series of economic sanctions from United States, European Union, and United Nations as shown in the chart below:
Chart 4.7.1.3 Chart of Iran Inflation Rate (2005-2014)
Source: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/iran/inflation-cpi
From the chart below, it shows that there were up and down of inflation rate. The inflation rate was begun to increase in 2006 until 2008. Then the inflation was stepped down the leader slowly after the election of Ahmadinejad for his second term in 2009. However, the inflations rate of Iran since 2010 until
78 the middle of 2013 was increasing rapidly. From only below 10 percent of inflations rate in the 2010, it keep on increasing until more than 40 percent of inflations rate in Iran. Immediately after the imposing of CISADA in 2010, the inflations rate is increasing again until a very bad point for the Iranian people. It shows the impacts of series of economic sanctions which begin to get deadly as the economic sanctions get harder and bigger. If we compare to the current inflations rate of Indonesia following the increasing of fuel price, with around 7-8 percent only and the people Indonesia have demonstrating in every corner begging for a cancellation. With the inflations rate over 40 percent, the cost of live in Iran is surely extremely increasing and high resulting into a suffering of people.
As the result of super high inflation rate, the price of bread as primary nourishment of Iranian expanded by 40 percent in June 2012. The cost of chicken and vegetables climbed by 3.7 percent and 10 percent, separately, amid the most recent two weeks of June 2012. Iranian family unit spend, in normal, was expanding 50 percent of their monthly salaries simply just for nourishment thing. likewise has end subsidies for energy products. It makes the oil price is no longer very cheap. This high living cost has caused a nationwide outcry. 163
Not to mention, the unemployment rate also increasing in Iran as shown in the chart below:
163 Y. Issapour. (2012). Inflation and Iran‘s Regime. Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304211804577504400138905994.html accessed on 3 December 2014.
79
Chart 4.7.1.4 Chart of Iran Unemployment Rate (2005-2014)
Source: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/iran/unemployment-rate
The unemployment rate also showed a negative number for Iran in the period of economic sanctions. Even though not as severe as the inflations rate, but unemployment have reach 14.1 percent in 2012 and 12.4 percent in 2013. It was because of the industrial facilities are not able to import imperative merchandise and supplies from United States, or European nations in light of the economic sanctions and as the results are compelled to sack their workers.164 It considers as very bad if we compare to Indonesia‘s unemployment rate which at 5-6 percent only.
The number shown above apparently shows real inter-relations with the expectation of Rouhani‘s voters which assessed by Ebrahim Mohseni as shown below:
164Iran‘s Weekly Gasoline Consumption Drops by 200,000 Liters. (April 22, 2012). Tehran Times. Retrieved from http://tehrantimes.com/economy-and-business/97176-irans-weekly-gasoline- consumptiondrops- by-200000-liters/ . accessed on 3 December 2014.
80
Chart 4.6.1.5 Survey on Expectation of Hassan Rouhani
Source: PPT Presentation of Ebrahim Mohseni presentation at the New American Foundation
By the chart above, it is clear that the expectation of Iranian people is to fix the high inflations rate in Iran as much as 31 percent. The second expectation is relatively similar to fix the Iran‘s economic problems with 21 percent. The third expectation is to fix or to bring down the unemployment rate which is also an economic macroeconomic indicator with 20 percent. Then, the hope to remove the sanctions imposed and to decrease the foreign pressure which in the author opinion is the core cause of the economic problems in Iran. Therefore, it is clear that the series economic sanctions imposed by United States have played a significant role in deteriorating Iran‘s economy and have people of Iran suffering which influence the perception of Iranian from acceptable to conservative approach in domestic and foreign policy into demanding to more pragmatic and moderate foreign policy approach in order to alleviate the economy of Iran. As the consequences, Hassan Rouhani as the lone moderate-reformist in the presidential candidates which brought the light of change in the approachment towards the sensitive issues has won the Iran Presidential Election in 2013.
81
Apparently, the author‘s argument is in line with the current President of United States in analyzing the victory of Rouhani in the presidential election. In the Saban Forum which held on 7 December 2013, Obama had a chance to give his remarks. Besides conveying his congratulations to Rouhani who became the new President of Islamic Republic of Iran, Obama is also conveying his view on the victory of Hassan Rouhani. Obama said:
“We put in place an unprecedented regime of sanctions that has crippled Iran’s economy ….. it is precisely because of the international sanctions and the coalition that we were able to build internationally that the Iranian people responded by saying, we need a new direction in how we interact with the international community and how we deal with this sanctions regime. And that’s what brought President Rouhani to power.” President of United States, Barrack Obama.165
Even though the economic sanctions have played a significant role in changing the perception of Iranian people thus they will demand for a more moderate leader which then resulting in the unexpected victory of moderate Hassan Rouhani, However the economic sanctions still failed in changing perception of Iranian people towards the Nuclear issue. As shown in the survey done by Ebrahim Mohseni after the election of Rouhani below:
Chart 4.7.1.6 Survey on Iranian Opinion on Nuclear Program after The Election
Source: PPT Presentation of Ebrahim Mohseni presentation at the New American Foundation
165 Official website of White House. Remarks by the President in a Conversation with the Saban Forum on 7 December 2013. Retrieved from http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press- office/2013/12/07/remarks-president-conversation-saban-forum accessed on 20 November 2014.
82
From the chart below, we can assume that majority of Iranian people still regards the nuclear program of Iran as an important policy of Iran especially for their self-esteem as a country. More than 60 % conveying their agreement on continuing the program, meanwhile only 17 % who contradict with that notion.
The author believe that the economic sanctions still could not shift the paradigm of Iranian people to acknowledge the nuclear weapon since it‘s related into the nationalism and self-esteem as Iranian. The nuclear program regarded as important in order to bring more self-esteem of Iran in international environment as establish themselves among nuclear power, thus they can balance the security equilibrium especially in Middle East with Israel and United States. This, or national pride, may be the motivation behind why a majority of Iranians (96%) concur with the statement that "keeping up the privilege to propel a nuclear program is justified regardless of the cost being paid in economic sanctions and worldwide confinement‖166
It indicates that the imposition of economic sanctions is still not effective in changing the perception of target country towards important subject especially a policy in touch with their main national interest. However, from the surprising victory of Hassan Rouhani, the strategy of United States to impose economic sanctions instead of military force is partially success in changing the behavior of Iran. Even though the economic sanctions still cannot influencing the ruling regime or government to change their behavior, but at least the economic sanctions have succeed in influencing the economic life of Iranian people thus make them demanding for more moderate ruling government, and increasing the potential of overthrowing the ruling regime if the their life even get suffer because of the economic isolation. The election of moderate figure as president will also definitely give positive impacts on the Iran attitude towards United States.
166 Sir Bani Yas Forum. (September 2013). Iranian Attitudes. Zogby research service. Retrieved from http://static.squarespace.com/static/52750dd3e4b08c252c723404/t/5294bfbee4b0303133d2fe5f/13 85480126124/Iran+October+2013+FINAL.pdf accessed on 2 December 2014.
83
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
5.1 Conclusion
The Iran presidential election 2013 was a very fundamental moment for Iran since it was held in the middle of strong pressure from the outcry of Iranian people and also foreign pressure in regards to Iran controversial nuclear program. This election was regard as a golden opportunity for the Iranian people to directly voice their aspirations by choosing the president who accommodate the will of people the most. This election will determine whether there will be an improvement in Iranian people especially economically or they have to suffer another four years period of catastrophe. Therefore, any outcome of this election will directly or indirectly determine the direction of Iranian foreign policy and also their stance on the nuclear negotiation process.
The economic sanctions has undeniably influence the economy of Iran especially the livelihood of Iranian. The economic sanctions were not only causing of deficit in trade activities of Iran but most of all, the economic restriction imposed by United States has triggered the increasing of inflation and unemployment rates. These two macroeconomic factors are the indicators which affect directly to the welfare of people especially in regards to living cost in Iran. There was significant rise of living cost in Iran especially in the rural area which caused suffering and declining of quality of Iranian people life. Therefore, in this regards, the economic sanctions have directly and indirectly cause audience cost to Iranian people.
The audience cost is the factor which stimulating the changing of mindset or perception of Iranian people. There was a changing perception from relatively
84 acceptance into the government radical foreign policy or status quo into demanding for a softer or more moderate type of foreign policy towards the Western countries in order to improve relations with Western countries thus maybe could release some economic restrain which cause economic problems domestically. The audience cost is also the factor which makes the Iranian people was looking for a promising president who can accommodate their aspiration in this regards. This is an explanation of why and How Hassan Rouhani could surprisingly won the election because he was the only one candidates who represented the group of moderate and reformists. Hassan Rouhani was the only candidates which emphasized on a prospect to repairing relationship with Western countries especially United States without sacrificing the national interest to prosper the Iranian people.
Therefore, it can be concluded that the economic sanctions of United States has casted great audience cost on Iranian people which directly or indirectly have influenced the outcome of Iran presidential election 2013 by inducing voting behavior of Iranian people to choose the lone moderate Hassan Rouhani as the most promising leader who could improve both their relations with Western countries especially United States and improve the people‘s economy.
However, the author is not concluding that the economic sanctions as the sole deciding factors in the election of Hassan Rouhani in the presidential election. As explained in the chapter four that there are several factors which influence the victory of Hassan Rouhani including the ineffective political maneuver of conservatives group which deteriorating the trust of Iranian people towards the conservative figures in presidential candidacy. Yet, it cannot be denied that the economic sanctions have played an important role in changing the perception of Iranian people to choose Hassan Rouhani as the new president.
Moreover, it does not mean that the economic sanctions have completely succeeded in its implementation in Iran. It is clear that the purpose of these economic sanctions on Iran is so that Iran could comply on the rules set by United
85
States in regards to nuclear proliferation and ownership. There are two ways of United States in order to achieve that. Firstly is to persuade the current ruling regime or the status quo to comply with them. Secondly, to overthrow the regime and backing up an America assigned figure to take the crown as ever happened in Iran with the coup d‘état of Muhammad Reza Pahlavi which overthrowing Mohammad Mossadeq as Syah of Iran back in 1965. The first option is obviously very difficult since the conservative regime led by Khamenei as Supreme Leader was so persistent in enriching the nuclear, especially by the support of Ahmadinejad. The most possible strategy is overthrowing the radical regime in Iran, however a backing coup d‘état is no longer feasible in Iran as the majority of Iranian people was also supporting the radical actions of government. The election of Hassan Rouhani is also not changing the fact that the most powerful in Iran who had said in every crucial decision in foreign policy and nuclear talks remain Mohammad Khamenei as the Supreme Leader of Iran.
However, the author believes that the victory of Hassan Rouhani as a moderate in a fair presidential elections is a positive outcome of the economic sanctions. By the implementation of economic sanctions, the United States have succeeded in influencing the perception of Iranian people for a more moderate approach. It leaves not much choices for Khamenei but to accept the results otherwise it might endanger his position as Supreme Leader and might cause unrests among people to overthrown him. By the election of a moderate president also will at least giving positive impacts on the nuclear negotiation as Khamenei could not be as radical as before because both the president and people are demanding for softer actions. It is surely a big leap in United States‘ effort to resolve the issue with Iran.
Therefore the author concludes that economic sanctions as a foreign policy is still a reliable foreign policy, but depends on the strategic conditions between sender and receiver states. In this case, United States‘ strategy to imposed economic sanctions on Iran has partially succeeded in limiting the power of ruling regime thus making United States a step forward in achieving the goals.
86
However, there are still a lot of challenges for United States as the economic sanctions still unable to overthrow the Supreme Leader and changing the perception of Iranian people on their rights to acquire nuclear weapon. The prospects created by Hassan Rouhani are also still not a guarantee for improvement of relations between both countries. Therefore, there will be rooms for the next research to analyze the impacts of Hasan Rouhani as the new president of Iran into the relationship of United States and Iran.
87
REFERENCES
Abrahamian, Ervand. (2008). Who's in Charge? London Review of Book. Retrieved from http://www.lrb.co.uk/v30/n21/ervand- abrahamian/whos-in-charge
Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988 (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America) — Iranian submission: Part IV B, The shooting down of flight IR 655, International Court of Justice. Retrieved from http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/79/6639.pdf
Ahmadinejad: 9/11 ‗suspect event‘. (16 April 2008). BBC News. Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7350830.stm
Ahmadinejad sends letter to Bush. (8 May 2006). BBC News. Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4983868.stm
Ahmadinejad‘s letter to American. (November 29, 2006). CNN News. Retrieved from http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/11/29/ahmadinejad.let ter/
An Experimental Approach. Retrieved from https://web.stanford.edu/~tomz/pubs/Tomz-AudCosts-2007-09.pdf
Ancient Mesopotamia - The Sumerians. The World's first Great Civilization. Retrieved from http://www.penfield.edu/webpages/jgiotto/onlinetextbook.cfm?sub page=1525827
Asgari, Mohsen. (15 June 2013). Hassan Rouhani wins Iran Presidential Election. BBC News. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world- middle-east-22916174
Athanasiadis, Iason. (June 16, 2009). Iran Protest biggest since revolution. The Washington Times. Retrieved from http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jun/16/iran-protest- biggest-since-revolution/
Bakhash, Shaul. (2013). Rouhani‘s Suprising Election. Viewpoints No. 28. George Mason University. Retrieved from
88
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/rouhanis_surprising _election_0.pdf
Barack Obama condemns Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's UN speech. (25 September 2010). BBC News. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-11407326
Barrack Obama in Israel: ‗our alliance is eternal. (20 March 2013). The Telegraph. Retrieved from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/barackobama/994239 1/Barack-Obama-in-Israel-our-alliance-is-eternal.html
Becker, Richard. (2012). Why No Economic Sanctions against the US? Retrieved from http://www.globalresearch.ca/why-no-economic-sanctions- against-the-us/31802
Benhorin, Yitzhak. (14 November 2011). Ahmadinjead: Zionist started both world Wars. Israel News. Retrieved from http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4122450,00.html
Blanchflower, David. (2013). Forget inflation – what hurts the most is unemployment. The Independent. Retrieved from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/comment/david- blanchflower/forget-inflation--what-hurts-the-most-is- unemployment-8556261.html
Bridgeman, Maggie. (29 July 2010). Obama seeks to expand arms exports by trimming approval process. Retrieved from http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/07/29/98337/obama-seeks-to- expand-arms-exports.html
Bryne, Malcolm. (18 August 2013). CIA Admits It Was Behind Iran's Coup. Foreign Policy. Retrieved from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/08/18/cia_admits_it_ was_behind_irans_coup
Bush willing to US military to defend Israel from Iran. (21 March 2006). Israel Today. Retrieved from http://www.israeltoday.co.il/NewsItem/tabid/178/nid/6919/Default .aspx?archive=article_title
Carneiro, C., & Elden, D. (2009). Economic Sanctions, Leadership Survival, and Human Rights. University of Pennsylvania Law School vol. 30 issue. 3. Retrieved from
89
https://www.law.upenn.edu/journals/jil/articles/volume30/issue3/C arneiro30U.Pa.J.Int%27lL.969%282009%29.pdf
Carter, Sara. (2014). Inside the secret world of a US arms dealer. The Blaze. Retrieved from http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2014/04/30/inside-the-secret- world-of-a-u-s-arms-dealer/
Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffery J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliot. (1990). Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy, 2nd ed. Washington, D.C.: Institute of International Economics p. 2. Cited from Anatomy of Economic Sanctions. Retrieved from https://www.google.co.id/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=we b&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CB0QFjAA&url=http%3A%2F %2Fwww3.nccu.edu.tw%2F~ctung%2FDissertation%2FChapter% 25203%2520%2520Anatomy%2520of%2520Economic%2520San ctions.doc&ei=feyBVOS3Nc2jugS0poHADQ&usg=AFQjCNHEs oswUQd8EKtYbSkWsPqvxC3VlQ&bvm=bv.80642063,d.c2E
Conservative drops out of Iranian presidential election. (11 June 2013). CNN News. Retrieved from http://edition.cnn.com/2013/06/10/world/meast/iran- elections/?hpt=hp_t3
Dailey, Kristin. (8 June 2013). Iranian reformists struggle to settle on candidate. Daily Star. Retrieved from http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2013/Jun- 08/219775-iranian-reformists-struggle-to-settle-on- candidate.ashx#axzz2VcnkTzZx
Dehghan, S. Kamali. (2013). Iran: Hassan Rouhani wins presidential election on 15 June 2013. The Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/15/iran-presidential- election-hassan-rouhani-wins
Dipoyudo, Kirdi. (1977). Timur Tengah dalam Pergolakan. Centre for Strategic and International Studies.
Economic sanctions why do they not work. Retrieved from http://www.futureforeignpolicy.com/economic-sanctions-why-do- they-not-work/
Energy Information Administration data on Iran. Retrieved from http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=IR
90
Fearon, James D. (September 1994). Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Dispute. American Political Science Review vol. 88 no. 3. Retrieved from http://web.stanford.edu/class/polisci243b/readings/v0002544.pdf
Fisher, Max. (10 June 2013). A rare Iran presidential poll shows Tehran mayor Ghalibaf as runaway favorite. Washington post. Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/06/10 /a-rare-iran-presidential-poll-shows-tehran-mayor-ghalibaf-as- runaway-favorite/
Ghalibaf, Rezaei, Jalili Trending Upwards. (2013). Official website of IPOS (Iranian Elections Tracking Poll) http://www.ipos.me/en/post/16
Haji-Yousefi, Amir. (2010). Iran‘s Foreign Policy during Ahmadinejad: From confrontation to Accommodation. Concordia University, Montreal, Canada. Retrieved from http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers- 2010/haji-yousefi1.pdf
Hassan Rouhani wins Iran presidential election. (15 June 2013). Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-22916174
Hegemonic stability theory. Retrieved from http://mediawiki.middlebury.edu/wiki/IPE/Hegemonic_stability_th eory
History of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. Iran Chamber. Retrieved from http://www.iranchamber.com/history/mohammad_rezashah/moha mmad_rezashah.php
Image taken from http://backchannel.al-monitor.com/index.php/tag/ali-akbar- velayati/
Image taken from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hassan_Rouhani
Image taken from http://mic.com/articles/45215/iran-presidential-election-2013- saeed-jalili-is-no-different-than-mahmoud-ahmadinejad
Image taken from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8081440.stm
IPI (International Peace Institute Iran Polls.2013
Iran Ends Oil Transactions in U.S. Dollar. (30 April 2008). CBS News. Retrieved from http://www.cbsnews.com/news/iran-ends-oil-transactions-in- us-dollars/
91
"Iran", Investment regulations, Economist Intelligence Unit. Retrieved from http://country.eiu.com/iran
Iran Profile. (10 September 2014). BBC News. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14542438
Iran threatens to block Strait of Hormuz oil route. (28 December 2011). BBC News. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle- east-16344102
Iran TV debate challenge to Bush. (29 August 2006). BBC News. Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/5295550.stm
Iran‘s election called a race among four groups. (17 April 2013). Retrieved from http://archive.radiozamaneh.com/english/content/iran%E2%80%9 9s-election-called-race-among-four-groups
Iran's Mohammad Reza Aref quits presidential race. (11 June 2013). BBC News. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east- 22851764#TWEET785230
Iran's parliament votes to label CIA, U.S. Army 'terrorist' groups. (29 September 2007). CNN News. Retrieved from http://edition.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/09/29/iran.parliament/ index.html?_s=PM:WORLD
Iran's Presidential Campaigns Get Off to Very Early Start. (2013). Al-Monitor. Retrieved from http://www.al- monitor.com/pulse/politics/2012/08/an-early-entry-in-the- atmosphere.html
Iran‘s Weekly Gasoline Consumption Drops by 200,000 Liters. (April 22, 2012). Tehran Times. Retrieved from http://tehrantimes.com/economy- and-business/97176-irans-weekly-gasoline-consumptiondrops- by- 200000-liters/
Iranian Boats May Not Have Made Radio Threat, Pentagon Says. (January 11, 2008). Washington Post. Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2008/01/10/AR2008011000692_2.html?hpid=t opnews&sid=ST2008011001831 1988: US warship shoots down Iranian airliner
Iranian Laws & Government. The structure of power in Iran. (18 November 2014). The Iran Chamber. Retrieved from
92
http://www.iranchamber.com/government/articles/structure_of_po wer.php
Iranian Unit to be Labeled Terrorist. (August 15, 2007). Washington Post. Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2007/08/14/AR2007081401662.html
Iranians Feel Bite of Sanctions, Blame U.S., Not Own Leaders. (2013). Retrieved from http://www.gallup.com/poll/160358/iranians-feel-bite- sanctions-blame-not-own-leaders.aspx
Just Who Is Iranian Presidential Hopeful Qalibaf? (2005). The Epoch Times. Retrieved from http://www.theepochtimes.com/news/5-6- 2/29242.html
Kaempfer, W., Lowenberg, A. International Economic Sanctions. Retrieved from http://www.sfu.ca/~schmitt/sanctions.pdf
Katzman, Kenneth. (2014). Iran Sanctions. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved from http://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS20871.pdf
Kaplowitz, Donna. (1995). Anatomy of a Failed Embargo: The Case of the U.S. Sanctions against Cuba, vol. I, Ph.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, p. 32. Cited from Anatomy of Economic Sanctions. Retrieved from https://www.google.co.id/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=we b&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CB0QFjAA&url=http%3A%2F %2Fwww3.nccu.edu.tw%2F~ctung%2FDissertation%2FChapter% 25203%2520%2520Anatomy%2520of%2520Economic%2520San ctions.doc&ei=feyBVOS3Nc2jugS0poHADQ&usg=AFQjCNHEs oswUQd8EKtYbSkWsPqvxC3VlQ&bvm=bv.80642063,d.c2E
Khalaf, R., & Drummond, J. (20 September 2010). Gulf states in $123bn US arms spree. The Financial Times. Retrieved from http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ffd73210-c4ef-11df-9134- 00144feab49a.html#axzz2O8uMZ7cn
Kessler, Glenn. (23 July 2002). U.S. Halts Overtures to Iran‘s Khatami; Reformist Faction Viewed as Unable To Achieve Change. Washington Post. Retrieved from http://www.hartford- hwp.com/archives/45/286.html
Last Minute Changes. (2013). Official website of IPOS (Iranian Elections Tracking Poll) http://www.ipos.me/en/post/34
93
Leslie, J., Marashi, R., Parsi, T. (2014). Losing Billions: The cost of Iran sanctions to the U.S. economy. Retrieved from http://www.niacouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Losing- Billions-The-Cost-of-Iran-Sanctions.pdf
Limbert, John. (2013). The Obama Aministration. United States institute of Peace: The Iran Primer. Retrieved from http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/obama-administration
Mahajan, Rahul. (2005). Melawan Negara terroris: Dominasi AS terhadap Irak dan kedaulatan dunia. Mizan. Jakarta.
Marinov, Nikolay. (2005). Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Leaders? Retrieved from http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1540- 5907.2005.00142.x/abstract
Marshall, Andrew. (2013). In the Arms of Dictators: America the Great… Global Arms Dealer. Retrieved from http://andrewgavinmarshall.com/2013/03/26/in-the-arms-of- dictators-america-the-great-global-arms-dealer/
Matt Sugrue. (29 September 2010). GAO Report on U.S. Arms Sales, 2005-2009. Arms Control Now. Retrieved from http://armscontrolnow.org/2010/09/29/gao-report-on-u-s-arms- sales-2005-2009/
Milinski, Martin. (2010). Case Study: Iran and the United States. ICD Academy for cultural Diplomacy. Retrieved from http://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/pdf/case-studies/cs- martinmilinski.pdf
Mohseni, Ebrahim. (31July 2013). Presentation at the New American Foundation. Video retrieved from http://newamerica.net/events/2013/attitudes_from_tehran
Muslim Nations React to Obama Inaugural Speech. (2 November 2009). VOA News. Retrieved from http://www.voanews.com/content/a-13- 2009-01-22-voa25-68626652/407461.html
Nader, Alireza. (2013). Iran‘s 2013 presidential election: its meaning and implication by. RAND Corporation. Retrieved from http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/P E109/RAND_PE109.pdf
94
Naji. 2009. Kisah Rahasia Sang Pemimpin Radikal Iran. Jakarta. PT Gramedia Pustaka Umum.
Novoski, Ria. (12 September 2011). Iran launches bushehr nuclear power plant. Sputiknews. Retrieved from http://www.sputniknews.com/world/20110912/166785925.html
Neumann, Johanna. (21 January 2009). Obama‘s Muslim Outreach. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved from http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/washington/2009/01/obamas- muslim-m.html
Obama offers Iran ‗new beginning‘. (20 March 2009). BBC News. Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7954211.stm
Official website of White House. Remarks by the President in a Conversation with the Saban Forum on 7 December 2013. Retrieved from http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/12/07/remarks- president-conversation-saban-forum
Official website of interest section of Iran in Pakistan Embassy. Retrieved from http://www.daftar.org/far/default.asp
Official website of America Israel Public Affairs Committee. Retrieved from http://www.aipac.org/learn/us-and-israel/strong-allies
Official website of United States interest section in Swiss Embassy. Retrieved from https://www.eda.admin.ch/countries/iran/en/home/representations/ embassy-of-switzerland-foreign-interests-section.html
Official website of U.S. Department of treasury. Iran Sanctions. Retrieved from http://www.treasury.gov/resource- center/sanctions/Programs/pages/iran.aspx
Official website of United State Department of State. Retrieved from http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/index.htm
Official website of White House. Remarks by the President at Signing of the Iran Sanctions Act. Retrieved from http://www.whitehouse.gov/the- press-office/remarks-president-signing-iran-sanctions-act accessed on 9 December 2014.
Official website of U.S, Department of State. U.S. Relations with Iran fact Sheet. Retrieved from http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5314.htm
95
Official website of The United States Department of State. Fact Sheet: Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA).. Retrieved from http://www.state.gov/e/eb/esc/iransanctions/docs/160710.htm
Official website of The United States Department of State. Fact Sheet: Iran Sanctions Contained in the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act (ITRSHRA). Retrieved from http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/fs/2012/198393.htm
Official website of United States State of Department. Fact Sheet: Energy-Related Sanctions Under Executive Order (E.O.) 13590. Retrieved from http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/fs/2011/177760.htm
Pape, Robert. (1997). Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work retrieved from http://web.stanford.edu/class/ips216/Readings/pape_97%20(jstor). pdf
Rahman, R., & Othman Z. (2014). Kepentingan Amerika Serikat Terhadap Isu Nuklir iran. Article from Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report.
Reinholdsson, Thomas. (2011). Do Threats or Impositions of Sanctions Destabilize Leaders? Retrieved from http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId =1895379&fileOId=1895381
Reynolds, Paul. (21 March 2009). What Obama's message to Iran means. World affairs correspondent BBC News. Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7954408.stm
Rohani Gains As Ghalibaf Continues Slide. (2013). Official website of IPOS (Iranian Elections Tracking Poll) http://www.ipos.me/en/post/29
Rubin, Barry. (2006). Iran: The rise of regional power. MERIA (Middle East Review International Affair), Vol. 10 No.3
Sadjapour, Karim. (2013). Iran‘s Presidential Election: An Autocracy Votes. Retrieved from http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/06/12/iran-s- presidential-election-autocracy-votes
Sadjapour, Karim. (18 June 2013). ELECTIONS IN IRAN: THE REGIME CEMENTING ITS CONTROL. Congressional Testimony in House Foreign Affairs Committee Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee. Retrieved from
96
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Karim_Sadjadpour_Revised_T estimony_06182013.pdf
Sanction list countries. (2014). Business & Sanctions Consulting Netherlands. Retrieved from http://www.bscn.nl/sanctions-consulting/sanctions- list-countries
Scenarios: Rohani And Ghalibaf Go to Runoff or Rohani Wins. (2013). Official website of IPOS (Iranian Elections Tracking Poll) http://www.ipos.me/en/post/36
Seeberg, Peter. (2013). The Iranian presidential election, EU sanctions and the regional perspectives. Center for Mellemostsudier. Retrieved from http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/F/2/D/%7BF2DFC580-B268-4190- 89C9-D59F9842D545%7D0213PS.pdf
Sir Bani Yas Forum. (September 2013). Iranian Attitudes. Zogby research service. Retrieved from http://static.squarespace.com/static/52750dd3e4b08c252c723404/t/ 5294bfbee4b0303133d2fe5f/1385480126124/Iran+October+2013+ FINAL.pdf
Slavin, Barbara. (6 November 2008). Ahmadinejad Congratulates Obama. The Washington Times. Retrieved from http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/nov/06/letter- ahmadinejad-congratulates-obama/
Sorkhabi, rasoul. (2014). How much Oil in the Middle East. GEO EXPRO Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.geoexpro.com/articles/2014/02/how-much-oil-in-the- middle-east
Steel-cage, grudge match' between Bush, Ahmadinejad. (7 September 2006). CNN News. Retrieved from http://edition.cnn.com/CNN/Programs/situation.room/blog/2006/0 9/no-steel-cage-grudge-match-between.html
Tajdin, Behrang. (April 27, 2013). Will Iran‘s National Internet Mean No World Wide Web?. BBC Persia. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22281336
Tehran Mayor to Run in Presidential Election. (16 July 2012). Fars News Agency (Tehran). Retrieved from http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9104250154
97
Thaler, E., & Nader, A., & Chubin, S., & D. Green, J., & Lynch, C., & Wehrey, C., Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads. (2010). An Exploration of Iranian Leadership Dynamics. RAND Corporation, MG-878-OSD. Retrieved from http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG878.html
Tomz, Michael. (2005). Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations:
Total Military Personnel and Dependent End Strength By Service, Regional Area, and Country. Retrieved from https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/rest/download?fileName=SIA D_309_Report_P1406.xlsx&groupName=milRegionCountry
US-Iran relations: A brief guide. (17 June 2014). BBC news. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24316661
US – Iran sanctions fact sheet. Solutions Limited. Legal and Claim Consultant. Retrieved from http://www.treasury.gov/resource- center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/iran.pdf
U.S-Iran Relations researched by The Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law retrieved from https://strausscenter.org/hormuz/u-s-iran-relations.html
U.S. Sanctions. UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE. The Iran Primer. Retrieved from http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/us-sanctions
Pape A. Robert. (1997). Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work. International Security, volume 22, issue 2. Retrieved from http://web.stanford.edu/class/ips216/Readings/pape_97%20(jstor). pdf
Vincent Ferraro, Ruth C. Lawson Professor of International Politics at Mount Holyoke College, Massachusetts. Lecture Notes. Retrieved from http://www.irtheory.com/know.htm.
Vick, K., & Lynch, K. (9 May 2006). No Proposals in Iranian's Letter to Bush, U.S. Says. Washington Post Foreign Service. Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2006/05/08/AR2006050800141.html
Virtual Embassy of the United States in Tehran, Iran. Retrieved from http://iran.usembassy.gov/index.html
98
Walkout at U.N. as Ahmadinejad speaks. (23 September 2011). CNN News. Retrieved from http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/meast/09/22/un.ahmadinejad /
Website of IPOS (Iranian Elections Tracking Poll) http://www.ipos.me/en/
Y. Issapour. (2012). Inflation and Iran‘s Regime. Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270230421180457750 4400138905994.html
99
APPENDIX
MANUSCRIPT DOCUMENT OF COMPREHENSIVE IRAN SANCTIONS,
ACCOUNTABILITY AND DIVESTMENT ACT
OF 2010 (CISADA)
100