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GENERAL MEETING ~SSEMBLY Friday, 26 November 1954, at 3 P.M

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GENERAL MEETING ~SSEMBLY Friday, 26 November 1954, at 3 P.M United N ation..'i FIRST COMMIITEE, 730tb GENERAL MEETING ~SSEMBLY Friday, 26 November 1954, at 3 p.m. NINTH SESSION Official Records New York CONTENTS The motion was adopted by 25 votes to 2, with 3 Page abstentions. l.genda item 61: The meeting was suspended at 3.50 p.m. and resumed The question of \Vest Irian (West New Guinea) (con- at 4.20 p.m. tinued) . 417 Mr. Johnson (Canada), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair. Chairman: Mr. Francisco URRUTIA (Colombia). 8. Mr. MUNRO (New Zealand) described the rea­ "ons why his delegation had been unable to support the inscription of the item on the agenda. Previous United Nations consideration of the question had been AGENDA ITEM 61 in another organ and another context. Although a prima facie case for competence might exist, the new circumstances of the item required consideration of rhe question of West Irian (West New Guinea) the desirability of its inscription on practical as well (A/2694, A/C.l/L.l09) (continued) as legal grounds. After listening to the debate and considering the only draft resolution (AjC.1/L.109) Sayed ABOU-TALEB (Yemen) felt that there before the Committee, his delegation doubted whether .'as no doubt as to the competence of the United any useful purpose would be served by the considera­ htions to discuss the question of \Vest Irian. The tion of the item. vorld was fortunate to be able to bring such issues 9. New Zealand was intervening in the debate to efore the United Nations and thereby avert further place on record both its friendly feelings towards eterioration in international relations. It was from the parties and its own keen interest in the particular 1at point of view that his delegation was taking an problem at issue. It had followed with close and 1terest in the question before the Committee. ~ympathetic interest the emergence of Indonesia as a The delegation of Yemen felt that provisions of new nation, one of the most important in South-East 1e Linggadjati Agreement of 1947 and the Renville Asia. The stablility and security of that region was lgreement of 1948, to the effect that \Vest Irian, as uf direct concern to New Zealand. It was for that rell as other territories, had to gain independence or reason that New Zealand had entered into important e transferred to Tndonesia, had not been completely treaty commitments in the area, subscribing to the uried out. · Pacific Charter, as well as to the Manila Tr<>atv. New According to article 2 of the Charte-r of transfer Zealand, as a member of the Colombo Plan, was f sovereignty of 1949 (Sj1417jAdd.1), the dispute gratified to be able to make a contribution to the de­ ver \"rest Irian was to be settled by negotiations velopment of the Asian members, including Indonesia. etween the parties within one year from the date of New Zealand had equally friendly feelings towards 1e signing of that charter. It was unfortunate that the Netherlands. o agreement had been reached within the specified 10. \Vith Australia, New Zealand was intimately as­ eriod. It was because of that failure that Indonesia :,ociated geographically, and both were members of the ad rightly brought the matter before the United Commonwealth. In particular, the two countries shared rations. their security problems. The delegation of Yemen realized that the Nether­ 11. Mr. Munro then took up the speech made by mds had major economic interests in the area, but the representantive of Indonesia at the 726th meeting, noted with satisfaction that Indonesia was prepared in which the latter had described the current item as a political rather than a legal problem. The Indonesian > negotiate agreements guaranteeing those interests. case was nevertheles~ based at least in part on legal Indonesia was anxious to resume negotiations in a 1·gumentation. rder to reach a satisfactory solution, and the delega­ 12. The Indonesian representative had argued that on of Yemen felt that that was not too much to the term "Indonesia", as used in the Charter of transfer sk. It was to be hoped that the parties would come of sovereignty, comprised the whole of the former > an agreement and would not compel the United Netherlands East Indies, no more and no les-; ; that rations to study the problem again at a later time. \Nest New Guinea must, therefore, be included therein; Mr. MUNRO (New Zealand) proposed that, in and that article 1 of the Charter of transfer, in provid­ iew of the vital interest his country had in the ques­ ing for the complete transfer of sovereignty, must on and the importance of the issues involved, the therefore be construed as providing for the transfer ommittee should suspend its meeting until the Gen­ of sovereignty, inter alia, over West New Guinea. ·al Committee had finished its work. 13. Mr. Sudjarwo had further pointed out that in the The CHAIRMAN put the motion for the suspen­ Exchange of letters of 2 November 1949, interpreting on of the meeting to the vote. the phrase in article 2 of the Charter of transfer, "the 417 AjC.1jSR.730 418 General Assembly - Ninth Session - First Committee status quo of the residency of New Guinea shall be the administering Powers should carry out their obliga maintained ... '', the word "sovereignty" was nowhere tions under that chapter, it could in the present cas used. From that he had argued that the Netherlands take into account the specific undertaking which th claim to sovereignty was not recognized or sup­ Netherlands had given voluntarily in pursuit of it ported by that Charter. general obligations, and even going beyond thos 14. If that argument were accepted, one must as­ obligations. Mr. Munro recalled the difficulties tha ;:;ume that the maintenance of the status quo meant the Netherlands faced in the administration of We> the retention of something less than sovereignty­ New Guinea. Although he did not wish to belittle th in other words, of administrative control onlv. But achievements of the young State of Indonesia, he que~ even on the basis of Mr. Sudjarwo's arguments, one tioned what Indonesia could contribute from its straine had to conclude that the Charter of transfer equally resources, to the well-being of the people of We'­ failed to recognize or support the Indonesian claim New Guinea. to sovereignty over \Vest New Guinea. No geogra­ 21. Mr. Sudjarwo had said that if sovereignty wer phical definition of Indonesia was to be found in transferred to Indonesia, the population of West N e\ article 1 ; nor was there any specific reference to Guinea would participate in free and secret electiow transfer of sovereignty over \Vest New Guinea. There­ The Indonesian Government must be well aware of th fore no limitations on the application of the term difficulty of carrying out such an election for the fin "status quo" could be read into the terms of the agree­ time in a territory with a low literacy rate and rudi rlent. It simply meant "the position as before". mentary political organization. 15. The New Zealand delegation therefore agreed 22. Finally, the representative of Indonesia had n \Yith the statement of the representative of the N e­ iterated that the problem was one of colonialism agaim therlands (726th meeting) to the effect that the status freedom, and of freedom against colonialism. Th3 quo had been, and still was, that the Kingdom of the statement should be read in the light of what the tw Netherlands exercised full and complete sovereignty parties to the dispute respectively had undertaken t over \Vest New Guinea. New Zealand continued to do if the Territory either was transferred to Indc 1 ecognize that sovereignty. nesia's control or remained under the Netherlan& 16. Referring to Mr. Sudjarwo's statement that the Whereas the Netherlands had undertaken that the ir dispute >vas not a legal matter of sovereignty, but hbitants of the territory in due course would be give <1 moral and political issue of a high order, Mr. an opportunity to decide their own future, followin Munro wished to say that, provided legal rights were transfer of the territory to Indonesia, they woul respected, account might also be taken of the relevant become Indonesian citizens and would be given als political and moral principles, as well as of the prac­ at a future date, the opportunity to elect representativE tical considerations involved. to a unitary parliament, a choice which was not in lin with the principle of self-determination of people: 17. He had been interested to hear the representatives the development of which was one of the purposes c of Indonesia and India r728th meeting) refer to the the United Nations. irrelenncy of considerations of race in dete,.mining the future of West New Guinea. 23. Mr. Munro hoped that the Assembly would a< cept the views presented by his delegation. The logic; 18. As to Mr. Sudjarwo's contention that the ques­ consequence was that no action should be taken b tion was a colonial problem, Mr. Munro profoundly the Assembly which would directly or indirect! disagreed with it. The issue was in fact not colonial, promote the claim to the territory advanced bv Indc Lut territorial. It was a claim by one State to territory nesia. Without in the least disinteresting itself in th under the sovereignty of another. There was no ques­ advancement of the people of \Vest New Guinea, th tion of a colonial people demanding a change in their Assembly should refrain from intervening in a terr status, as no one could seriously contend that the torial dispute which at best could only delay thei primitive people of \Vest New Guinea h3.d asked that advancement and make them the pawn of an argumer their territory should be transferred to the jurisdic- which they did not know, much less understand.
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