United N ation..'i FIRST COMMIITEE, 730tb GENERAL MEETING ~SSEMBLY Friday, 26 November 1954, at 3 p.m. NINTH SESSION Official Records New York

CONTENTS The motion was adopted by 25 votes to 2, with 3 Page abstentions. l.genda item 61: The meeting was suspended at 3.50 p.m. and resumed The question of \Vest Irian (West New Guinea) (con- at 4.20 p.m. tinued) ...... 417 Mr. Johnson (Canada), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair. Chairman: Mr. Francisco URRUTIA (Colombia). 8. Mr. MUNRO (New Zealand) described the rea­ "ons why his delegation had been unable to support the inscription of the item on the agenda. Previous United Nations consideration of the question had been AGENDA ITEM 61 in another organ and another context. Although a prima facie case for competence might exist, the new circumstances of the item required consideration of rhe question of West Irian (West New Guinea) the desirability of its inscription on practical as well (A/2694, A/C.l/L.l09) (continued) as legal grounds. After listening to the debate and considering the only draft resolution (AjC.1/L.109) Sayed ABOU-TALEB (Yemen) felt that there before the Committee, his delegation doubted whether .'as no doubt as to the competence of the United any useful purpose would be served by the considera­ htions to discuss the question of \Vest Irian. The tion of the item. vorld was fortunate to be able to bring such issues 9. New Zealand was intervening in the debate to efore the United Nations and thereby avert further place on record both its friendly feelings towards eterioration in international relations. It was from the parties and its own keen interest in the particular 1at point of view that his delegation was taking an problem at issue. It had followed with close and 1terest in the question before the Committee. ~ympathetic interest the emergence of Indonesia as a The delegation of Yemen felt that provisions of new nation, one of the most important in South-East 1e Linggadjati Agreement of 1947 and the Renville Asia. The stablility and security of that region was lgreement of 1948, to the effect that \Vest Irian, as uf direct concern to New Zealand. It was for that rell as other territories, had to gain independence or reason that New Zealand had entered into important e transferred to Tndonesia, had not been completely treaty commitments in the area, subscribing to the uried out. · Pacific Charter, as well as to the Manila Tr<>atv. New According to article 2 of the Charte-r of transfer Zealand, as a member of the Colombo Plan, was f sovereignty of 1949 (Sj1417jAdd.1), the dispute gratified to be able to make a contribution to the de­ ver \"rest Irian was to be settled by negotiations velopment of the Asian members, including Indonesia. etween the parties within one year from the date of New Zealand had equally friendly feelings towards 1e signing of that charter. It was unfortunate that the Netherlands. o agreement had been reached within the specified 10. \Vith Australia, New Zealand was intimately as­ eriod. It was because of that failure that Indonesia :,ociated geographically, and both were members of the ad rightly brought the matter before the United Commonwealth. In particular, the two countries shared rations. their security problems. The delegation of Yemen realized that the Nether­ 11. Mr. Munro then took up the speech made by mds had major economic interests in the area, but the representantive of Indonesia at the 726th meeting, noted with satisfaction that Indonesia was prepared in which the latter had described the current item as a political rather than a legal problem. The Indonesian > negotiate agreements guaranteeing those interests. case was nevertheles~ based at least in part on legal Indonesia was anxious to resume negotiations in a 1·gumentation. rder to reach a satisfactory solution, and the delega­ 12. The Indonesian representative had argued that on of Yemen felt that that was not too much to the term "Indonesia", as used in the Charter of transfer sk. It was to be hoped that the parties would come of sovereignty, comprised the whole of the former > an agreement and would not compel the United Netherlands East Indies, no more and no les-; ; that rations to study the problem again at a later time. \Nest New Guinea must, therefore, be included therein; Mr. MUNRO (New Zealand) proposed that, in and that article 1 of the Charter of transfer, in provid­ iew of the vital interest his country had in the ques­ ing for the complete transfer of sovereignty, must on and the importance of the issues involved, the therefore be construed as providing for the transfer ommittee should suspend its meeting until the Gen­ of sovereignty, inter alia, over West New Guinea. ·al Committee had finished its work. 13. Mr. Sudjarwo had further pointed out that in the The CHAIRMAN put the motion for the suspen­ Exchange of letters of 2 November 1949, interpreting on of the meeting to the vote. the phrase in article 2 of the Charter of transfer, "the 417 AjC.1jSR.730 418 General Assembly - Ninth Session - First Committee status quo of the residency of New Guinea shall be the administering Powers should carry out their obliga maintained ... '', the word "sovereignty" was nowhere tions under that chapter, it could in the present cas used. From that he had argued that the Netherlands take into account the specific undertaking which th claim to sovereignty was not recognized or sup­ Netherlands had given voluntarily in pursuit of it ported by that Charter. general obligations, and even going beyond thos 14. If that argument were accepted, one must as­ obligations. Mr. Munro recalled the difficulties tha ;:;ume that the maintenance of the status quo meant the Netherlands faced in the administration of We> the retention of something less than sovereignty­ New Guinea. Although he did not wish to belittle th in other words, of administrative control onlv. But achievements of the young State of Indonesia, he que~ even on the basis of Mr. Sudjarwo's arguments, one tioned what Indonesia could contribute from its straine had to conclude that the Charter of transfer equally resources, to the well-being of the people of We'­ failed to recognize or support the Indonesian claim New Guinea. to sovereignty over \Vest New Guinea. No geogra­ 21. Mr. Sudjarwo had said that if sovereignty wer phical definition of Indonesia was to be found in transferred to Indonesia, the population of West N e\ article 1 ; nor was there any specific reference to Guinea would participate in free and secret electiow transfer of sovereignty over \Vest New Guinea. There­ The Indonesian Government must be well aware of th fore no limitations on the application of the term difficulty of carrying out such an election for the fin "status quo" could be read into the terms of the agree­ time in a territory with a low literacy rate and rudi rlent. It simply meant "the position as before". mentary political organization. 15. The New Zealand delegation therefore agreed 22. Finally, the representative of Indonesia had n \Yith the statement of the representative of the N e­ iterated that the problem was one of colonialism agaim therlands (726th meeting) to the effect that the status freedom, and of freedom against colonialism. Th3 quo had been, and still was, that the Kingdom of the statement should be read in the light of what the tw Netherlands exercised full and complete sovereignty parties to the dispute respectively had undertaken t over \Vest New Guinea. New Zealand continued to do if the Territory either was transferred to Indc 1 ecognize that sovereignty. nesia's control or remained under the Netherlan& 16. Referring to Mr. Sudjarwo's statement that the Whereas the Netherlands had undertaken that the ir dispute >vas not a legal matter of sovereignty, but hbitants of the territory in due course would be give <1 moral and political issue of a high order, Mr. an opportunity to decide their own future, followin Munro wished to say that, provided legal rights were transfer of the territory to Indonesia, they woul respected, account might also be taken of the relevant become Indonesian citizens and would be given als political and moral principles, as well as of the prac­ at a future date, the opportunity to elect representativE tical considerations involved. to a unitary parliament, a choice which was not in lin with the principle of self-determination of people: 17. He had been interested to hear the representatives the development of which was one of the purposes c of Indonesia and India r728th meeting) refer to the the United Nations. irrelenncy of considerations of race in dete,.mining the future of West New Guinea. 23. Mr. Munro hoped that the Assembly would a< cept the views presented by his delegation. The logic; 18. As to Mr. Sudjarwo's contention that the ques­ consequence was that no action should be taken b tion was a colonial problem, Mr. Munro profoundly the Assembly which would directly or indirect! disagreed with it. The issue was in fact not colonial, promote the claim to the territory advanced bv Indc Lut territorial. It was a claim by one State to territory nesia. Without in the least disinteresting itself in th under the sovereignty of another. There was no ques­ advancement of the people of \Vest New Guinea, th tion of a colonial people demanding a change in their Assembly should refrain from intervening in a terr status, as no one could seriously contend that the torial dispute which at best could only delay thei primitive people of \Vest New Guinea h3.d asked that advancement and make them the pawn of an argumer their territory should be transferred to the jurisdic- which they did not know, much less understand. 1ion of Indonesia. In fact, if sovereignty were trans­ ferred to Indonesia, there Yvould be no opportunity 24. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru), emphasizing the man of determining the wishes of the indigenous inhabitants. links of friendship, of history and of community c 19. The representative of New Zealand wished to interest between his country and Indonesia and th Nether lands, said that his delegation had equal respe< submit that claims of that kind, as well as the revision ±or both those countries. However, he found himsel of treaties, the alteration of boundaries or the transfer overwhelmed by the complexity of the problem befor of hundreds of thousands of human beings without proof of their wishes, were not matte1·s with which the Committee. the Assembly was called upon or, indeed, equipped to 25. The problem, indeed, involved the interpretatio deal. A dispute of the kind to which C~apter VT of of the most fundamental aspects of the Charter, an the Charter was applicable could only arise if Tndo­ concerned the essential problem of politics. namel: Jlesia were to hack its claim with a threat of force. the making of the legal personality of the State an 1-1 e was confident that Indonesia had no such intentions. the integration of its constituent elemmts. In tl­ £yen Article 14 of the Charter could scarcely apply, presmt case, that problem was affected by geo-politica tor it woul(l be absurd if any State, by advancing a economic and anthropological considerations. As if th; claim against another, could thereby establish that the \vere not complexity enough. the problem was set i tlOn-~ati5'faction of its claim was in itself likely to the context of the insecure situation prevailing in tl- 1mpair friendly relations among nations. world. . 20. l\Tr. Munro then went on to consider the question 26. In that connexion, Mr. Belaunde remarked th; in the light of Chapter XI of the Charter. \Vhile it was c,ptimism about relaxation of tension had somewh; not the Assembly's function to determine how or when diminished. A conference was to be held in Moscov 730th meeting- 26 November 1954 419 apparently to form an Eastern European bloc: three prtwicled for in article 2 of the Charter of transfer Chine~e divisions had been reported in Indo-China : c•f sovereignty, which, if approved, would be tan­ threatening moyes were being made against various tamount to full acceptance by the Unitefl Nations of islands on the Chinese coast; and, in violation of the 11egotiations on such a basis. Mr. Belaunde added that terms of the Korean armistice, prisoners of w;u· were while he had always regarded negotiations as desirable, to suffer punishment in a spirit of veng-eance which they could not be so viewed in the absence of the all humanity must condemn. population directly concerned. If that population could 27. Referring to the question of the competence of not express its views. the United Nations must safe­ the General Assemblv to deal with the item. l\f r. Be­ guard its rights. The representative of Peru would launde said that he ~upporteri the theory of the juri­ consequently. be unable to vote on a draft resolution clical personality of States. Sowreignty, once it had based on the integral acceptance by the Assembly of bern constituted, was intangible and could be limited that clause of the Charter of transfer of sovereignty. only by the State possessing it. The questions within 30. l\1 r. Belauncle expressed confidence that a solu­ the domain of a State's sovereignty were p:1rt of tion could be found in conformity with the United that State's intangible personality. There were certain Nations Charter. At present the only thing that was limitations on sovereignty, however, imposed by in­ clear was what could not be done. The population of ternational order. Article 73 of the Charter, deal­ the territory concerned must not be deprived of its ing with Non-Self-Governing Territories, clearly rights under Article 73 as a result of bilateral nego­ made an exception to the general rule of sovereignty. tiations between the two States involved in the matter. \Vhile it might no doubt be said that the categorical It might be possible to find a formula based on the c,bligations set forth in that article were of a moral, provisions of Article 73; the General Assembly might rather than a legal, character, they clearly f'ntailed merely express the wish that the parties agree on the translation into juridical fact. States administering basis of some such formula. Non-Self-Governing Territories had to prepare those territories for soyereignty and independence in ac­ 31. In conclusion. Mr. Belaunde emphasized the im­ cordance ·with the obligations enumerated in Article portance of allowing adequate time for the study of 73. Those obligations in turn established the moral in­ problems of that nature. Their solution was perhaps terest of the United Nations in Non-Self-Governing urgent, but hasty action sometimes endangered the Territories. The principle that the interests of the work to be accomplished. inhabitants must be paramount was fully recognized 32. Mr. URQUIA (El Salvador) noted that the ques­ in the practice of the General Assembly. The ques­ tion of \Vest Irian, or West New Guinea, which was tion of competence, therefore, was perfectly clear. before the General Assembly for the first time, was Article 73 clearly led to the consequence that in all an important problem affecting the interests and tran­ problems relating to such territories there was what quillity of three Member States, namely, Indonesia, might be called a third interested party, the most the Netherlands and Australia, and consequently was important one, represented by the legal personality, the concern of the United Nations as a whole. in process of formation, of the population of the territory concerned, uncier the gu:lrdianship of the in­ 33. Reviewing the geographical and historical aspects ternational community --- the ci1•itas maxima of Sua­ of the problem, he pointed out that whereas, until rez. That was a point which no Latin American could 1948, article 1 of the Netherlands Constitution had ignore and which was an essential part of the Latin used the name "Netherlands East Indies", in that American le~al tradition of respect for less devel­ year the word "Indonesia" had been substituted in oped peoples. response to the desire of the nationalists in that area to abolish a name which was a painful reminder of the 28. Turning to the Charter of transfer of sover­ colonial system under which they had lived for so eignty, by which Tndonesia had formally acquired long. · ''' its independence. Mr. Belaunde stressed the importance of article 2. which provided that the question of the 34. The emancipation movement had resulted in a political status of the residency of West New Guinea number of agreements between the Government of the 1vas to be determined by negotiation between the N e­ Netherlands and the heads of the movement, agreements ther lands and Indonesia. He asked, in that connexion, concluded under the aegis of the United Nations. whether it was possible, under international law, to The principal agreement, the Charter of transfer of ag-ree that the fate of the population of a territory sovereignty, had emerged from the Round Table Con­ could be determined hy two States without reference ference held at The Hague between the Netherlands, to the wishes of that population. It would no doubt the Republic of Indonesia and the Federal Consultative be said that it \vas impossible to hold a plebiscite Assembly, with the help of the United Nations Com­ owing to the conditions in that territory, but that mission for Indonesia. Bv article 1 of that charter. "Jbjection dicl not remove the problem. It would probably the Netherlands had unc~nditionally and irrevocably -d;o be said that the General Assemblv could not now transferred complete sovereignty over Indonesia to the :liscuss the value of a charter of transfer of sovereignty Republic of the United States of Indonesia. lrawn up under the aegis of the United Nations. While 35. Although Indonesia included the territory of \Vest 1e would not deal with that point, it was certainly open Irian, or \Vest New Guinea, the Charter of transfer ~o doubt whether that manner of determining the fate of sovereignty contained a stipulation, in article 2, -,f an inhabited territorv was in conformitv with the 1 eferring specifically to that territory. No agreement, :::barter and \vith traditions ,..,-hich had been clearly however, had so far been reached through negotiations, -·stablished in international law since the nineteenth as provided for in that article. In the meantime, the :entury. Netherlands had again modified article 1 of its Consti­ ~9. The draft resolution before the Committee ( Aj tution, placing the name "Netherlands New Guinea" :.1JL.109) contained a reference to the negotiations vvhere previously it had listed Indonesia. 420 General Assembly - Ninth Session - First Committee 36. Against that background, the Indonesian delega­ posals. The question was thus whdher the Assembly tion aske(l the General Assembly to call upon the two could consider the Indonesian draft resolution ( Aj Governments to resume negotiations without delay, and C.1/L.l09). A1 tides 10. 12 and 14 of the Chartet also to invite the Secretary-General to assist the parties made it perfectly clear that the Assembly was com­ <,nd, if he deemed fit, and in consultation with the petent. In particular, Article 14 referred to measures parties concerned, to appoint a person to exercise good for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless offices. In that connexion, the representative of the of origin, which the General Assembly deemed likely Netherlands should recognize that the General As­ to impair the general welfare or friendly relations sembly 'vas not being asked to decide a controversy among nations, and the question of \Vest Irian was over property, as he had said ; it was only being asked certainly such a matter. The provision in Article 12. to call upon the two Governments to use one of the paragraph 1, did not apply, since the Security Council methods enumerated in the Charter for the peaceful was not exercising its functions in the matter. Finally. settlement of disputes, with a view to achieving early no question of revision of a treaty was involved, sincE vgreement on the political status of West Irian, as Indonesia did not ask for a decision on the substance stipulated in article 2 of the Charter of transfer of of the dispute. sovereignty. The Netherlands was reluctant to renew 40. \Vhile reserving his position on the details of negotiations on the grounds that, when the Charter of the Indonesian draft resolution, Mr. Urquia em­ transfer had been signed, Indonesia had been a de­ phasized that the least the Assembly could and should mocratic State with a federal structure, and had formed do was to invite the parties to resume friendly negotia­ part of a Union 'vith the Netherlands established for tions. His delegation was thus prepared to support the purpose of friendly co-operation, whereas Indo­ possible amendments to the Indonesian draft resolu­ nesia was now a unitary State and the Union had tion or to support any other draft resolution that might been dissolved by mutua1 agreement. better satisfy the interests of both parties and safe· 37. Mr. Urquia asked whether there was still a desire guard the powers and responsibilities of the Genera on the part of the Netherlands and Indonesia to Assembly. settle the political status of West Irian, or whether that 41. The view of the representative of Peru that thE desire had disappeared because one of the parties clause of the Charter of transfer of sovereignty relat· considered it unnecessary or useless to renew negotia­ ing to N evv Guinea violated the principles of interna· tions. Unilateral considerations and decisions could be tiona! law had brought out an important aspect of perfectly honourable, but the problem should be solved. the matter, and might be regarded as weakening thE 38. El Salvador had often joined other countries in arguments presented by the Indonesian delegation disapproving of the existence of colonial systems at which the delegation of El Salvador accepted in part the present stage of civilization, and could not hide However, the Indonesian draft resolution provided tha1 its sympathies for those who fought for their in­ the United Nations should play a predominant part ir dependence. The dispute concerning \Vest Irian seemed the negotiations between the parties, that part taking to it to represent only another aspect of that struggle. the form of assistance to be furnished by the Secretary­ The great majority of the peoples of the territory might General. The draft resolution might consequently bt not be in a position to express their political desires. but improved if a reference werC' also made to the para­ there were others who had spoken for them. Conse­ mount importance of the welfare of the populatior quently, El Salvador could not accept the Netherlands of the territory. The two States concerned in thE argument that there was no longer any dispute over dispute had similar views vvith regard to that popula· \Vest Irian, and that that territory was one with regard tion; but the best solution for the latter might be t( to which the Netherlands had asumed obligations under come under the administration of the government oJ Article 73 of the Charter. a new State, like the Republic of Indonesia, compris· ing populations of different ethnic origins which wen 39. The argument that the Assembly was not com­ striving to achieve progress in every respect. Un petent to deal with the item, on the grounds that the doubtedly, a government of that kind would not ex· provisions of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter ercise a colonial type of rule. applied, in fact begged the question, since the basic 42. In conclusion, Mr. Urqufa reiterated that tht problem was to determine the political status of a General Assembly would be fulfilling its obligation~ territory which should normally have formed a part if it were to accept a draft resolution of the typt of the Republic of Indonesia from the outset, but proposed, requesting, the parties to resume negotiation: which it had been agreed to make the subject of and gi,·ing predominant importance to the fate of tht subsequent negotiation,;. Rules 81 and 122 of the rules population of the territory in question. of procedure interpreted questions of competence in a restrictive way. because they referred to concrete pro- The meeting rose at 6 p.m.

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