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The Political Events in the Repuhlic of Lndonesia

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The Political Events in the Repuhlic of Lndonesia The Political Events in the Repuhlic of lndonesia • Pnbllihed by TUE NETUERLANDS INFORMATlON BUREAU 10 ROCKEFELLER PLAZA NEW YORK CITY < DI.tttbuted b:r the Netherltuuü lnfor.maUon B~ ... 10 Boek.,ellel' p ...... New Yqrk• .N. Y •• _bIeb lt NClM«ed wUh tb. JroPt'lJ'u A ..ent. ...atJ&atlon 8eoUoDo- ~ent ot "Jutlee, WaablapOIl. 1;). C., .... -.eD" ot tiro. Bq).. l Nethel'- land. aoYennnent. A coPJ' ot til'- materIal I. betn. 6led ..Ith the Depart.meoi al iJ ..... w~ the ~on .t.... ent of ihe NetberlanclJl .JDfol'lltAUcm Dure,t:U I. aTaIlable fOf' blatMctJoll. 'Ee1'l4Ihtlotl under the Jterelp qf'a,Q ~a1 ... _don Ad doe. Doi buUeate appl'Ovai or ar.pproYal of thb maUrlai hJ' 'he UnJted. 8tate. GoUftlDlen\' The Political Events in the Republic of Indonesia A Review of the Developments in the Illcloneûan Repltblic (Java aml Sumatra) since the Japa Tlese slurender. Togcther with Statements hy the Netherlands and Netherlands Indies Governments, and Complete Text of the Linggadjati Agreement. J r Contents PART I Chapter I. General Charaeter of the Republic........................... .. .5 Chapter 2. Netherlands Poliey in Indonesia ......... 8 Chapter 3. The N egotiations ....................................................................................... 11 Chapter 4. Review of Negotiations from May 27 to July 20, 1947 13 Chapter 5. Propaganda in the Rep ublic. .................................... 17 Chapter 6. The Republic aud th e Truc<-...................................... 21 Chapter 7. Republican Activities against East Indoncsia and Bo rn co ..... _.... _........ ___ .. __ ... __ ........ __ ..... _.... _.. _.. ....... 23 Chapter 8. The Republic aud the Food Supply.................... 27 Chapter 9. Two Months after the Military Action ........ .. 30 PART IJ I. Text of the Linggadjati Agreement ................................................................ 34 2. Text of Queen Wilhelmina's Radio Address of December 6, 1942 .............................................................. _ ............................................... 38 3. Statement of July 20, 1947, by P rem ier Louis J. M. BeeL. ....... _ 41 4. Memorandum of July 20, 1947, !rom Lieutenant Governor .. General Dr. H. J. va n Mook to the Government of the Republic of IndonesiL ............................................. __..... ....................... _ 46 5. Press Statement issued on July 20, 1947, in Batavia by Lieutenant Governor .. Generai Dr. H. ]. va n Mook. ......... _......... 49 6. Radio Address of July 25, 1947, of Lieutenant Governor.. General Dr. H. J . van MooL............ ............... "....... _................................. 51 7. Radio Address of August 3, 1947, of Lieutenant Governor .. General Dr. H. ]. van Mook. ........................................................... 54 8. Radio Address of August 20, 1947, of Licutenant Governor- General Dr. H. J . van MooL... .............................. _ .................................. 57 Part I r Chapter 1 General Character of the Republic A review of the revolution and the establishment of the Republic of Indonesia in Java and Sumatra must of nccessity begin with thc question whether thc revolution has been thc product of purely ]apanese machinations or whether therc have been more realistic and more deep­ lying C3uses. It is difficult ta give a conclusive 3nswer ta th is question. It is gene rally conceded that it would be unfair to look on the revolution as exclusivcIy ccmadc in Japan," Long before the war, a nationalist rnovc­ ment had sprung up in thc Indies which, although vague in its ultimate airns aod Iirnited in the number of its adherents, had taken rQot among several groups of intellectuals who wished a reIationship with Thc Nctherlands different from the ane then in existence. On the other hand it is cqually eertain that the J apanese made a skilfuI and intensive usc of the prevai ling nationalist tendencies ilnd tltted thcm into their plans to make the situation for the Allies, af ter their capitulation, as diRicult as they could. Equally certain it is that the delay in the arrival in Java of Allied forces after the Japanese surrender enabled the Japancse to develop their scheme for disruption even further. There is little doubt that these well-conceived Japanese plans were part of a far-seeing poliey envisaging at some future date a return conquest of the Indonesian isles. But whether the revolution is the culmination of graduatly developed nationalist tendencies or the explosive effect of Japanese strategems, it is ineontestable that the viewpoints and methods of the Republiean Ad­ minÎstration are a Japanese be ri ta ge. The Republican le:lders tried to imitate a pattern without comprehending its limitations, with the result that they adopted only its bad points and were ineapable or unwilling to develop the good sides this pattern might conceivably have had. Ta make matters worse) many contributing factors set their fateful seal on the record of fait ure and impotence displayed sa far by the Republican leade",hip. First of all, Republican insistence on authority over an extensifJe terri­ tory, w ithout sulfident competent personnel to carry out th eir tas/u, resulttd, as it was hound to result, in widespread in efficiency and laek [5] of rerponsibility. The majority of the newly~ mul ()fle1l self-appointed~ funetionaries~ many of whom stood intellectually but liltJe above the masses~ relied exclusively on armed force and eonsequently the burden of authority and its attendin!l life of luxury buame too heavy for them to hear. C()rruption became 1Ilore and more a general praetiee. Of eooperatÎon between tlIe various strfJÎees and departrnents there was none. Society became disorganized-sinister dements IauJ tlleir chance for murder and plunder~ acquired a number of lollowers and gradually increased their own power tmder the emblem of patriotism. And so t/ze RepubJic~ founded on a pervtrted nationalism~ eould mainta;11 i/sell only by hidin g the truth~ 10 the world and to itsell. This is tll e more tmgic because the possibilities toward a more ItlfJorable developmen t were eer/ainly not laeking in de be!Jinnin!J. An enthusiastic beginning Undeniably, the lndoncsian people had become fu!ly carried away by the currents of nationalism generated b}' a group of sincere intellectuals and left no doubt that they would no longer accept Netherlands sovereignty. At first, the aims of these Republican leaders were weIl calculatcd: befare everything eIse, they wanted to take over complete autharity and concentrate it in ane central organization. They set to worle with great enthusiasm and soon achieved the aims for which they had set out. With thc majority of officials. who had served under the Dutch and thc ]apanese remaining at their posts, thc Republic made a good start and ere long assumed the aspects of a real state, as yet in­ complete but definitely on its way toward a well-functioning organization. In the course of the next few months, however, certain changes became apparent. There was na Iowering of enthusiasm but the Republic's initia} and unexpected success created an atmosphere of self-satisfaction and security which soon changed into a conviction that the exercise of authority was af ter all a very pleasant and not toa difficult occupation. The obligations that go with authority were taken lightly. The number of mistakes and wrong judgments increased, without creating any incentive for corrective measures. Thoughts of reconstruction gave way ta more revolutionary ideas. Within six months, the deve/opment of the Republic toward political unity had come to a s/andstill~ while elemenlt ol dissolu/ion and con­ lusion widened their inroads info all sectÎons ol gO'lJernmeTJt. Toward the lat/er part of 1946 these disintegrating elements gained more and [ 6] mOre illflutwce, although e).·l enwlly the R,prtblic appellrt'd 10 ptlrSUt Ihr C071solidatiolz of the cOlwlry's unity. Disillusion and discontent Symptoms of ineptitude and failure multiplied. Efforts to maintain law and order, ta extend the government's authority, to bring efficiency to thc various departments, grew more and more feebie and finally came to • halt. Disillusion followed disillusion, yet the outside world was allowed to see nothing except a facade of success and infallibility. Only the Indonesian people themselves, and especially the intellectual groups among them, could not be kept in the dark as to the truc conditions. When the Republican Government found it impossible to meet even the normal demands of a well-organized state, discontent spread through all layers of the populace, and especially among the intellectuals, and although it was held in check through fear of reprisals, it could not he silenced completely. A few intellectuals, who formerly had worked in the various departments of the Netherlands Indies Government, sought contact with Dutch Iriends, disregarding the danger to whieh they ex· posed themselves in doing 50. Yet, even thou gh these intellectuals longed desperately for some method to cleanse the young Republic of its evil outgrowths, they were weIl aware that thc building of a real opposition party within thc Republic was impossibIe, not only because of threats .nd fear, but also because of political inexperience on the part ol those opposed to the regime. The recent Netherlands militaryaction and the subsequent occupatiol1 of Republican areas have brought to light much of the drama that has been and still is being enactcd behind the curtain of propaganda sur~ rounding the J ogjakarta
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