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ENERAL Lssembly United Nations fiRST COMMITTEE, /31st ;ENERAL MEETING Saturday, 27 November 1954, lSSEMBLY at 10.30 a.m. VINTH SESSION Official Records New York CONTENTS the Netherlands East Indies should become an inde­ Page pendent State as soon as possible'? ~enda item 61: 5. A commission had been set up by the first Round The question of \Vest Irian (West New Guinea) (con- Table Conference to inquire into the situation in New tinued) . 421 Guinea, but difficulties had arisen at the second con­ ference held at The Hague, and it had been to meet those difficulties that article 2 of the Charter of trans­ Chairman: Mr. Francisco URRUTIA (Colembia). fer of sovereignty (Sj1417/Add.1), relating to West Irian, had been drafted. While, as the representative of Liberia had said (729th meeting), the interpreta­ tion given by the Australian representative (727th AGENDA ITEM 61 meeting) was possibly not without some foundation, it was pointless to make the subtle distinction which lie question of West Irian (West New Guinea) the representative of Australia had made between a (A/2694, A/C.l/L.l09) (continued) complete transfer of sovereignty and a transfer of sovereignty over the whole territory. The wording of Mr. TRUJILLO (Ecuador) recalled that one dele­ article 1 of the Charter of transfer was perfectly tion had expressed the fear that the present discus­ clear, and it would therefore only complicate matters m would cause dissension. However, if only minor to resort to an interpretation of the spirit of that word­ oblems which, unlike the one which the Committee ing. The Netherlands had indeed "unconditionally and lS now examining, did not affect peace and sec4rity, irrevocably" transferred to the Republic of Indonesia ~resubmitted to the United Nations, the Organization "complete sovereignty over Indonesia", recognizing it )Uld fail in the task assigned to it by Article 1, para­ "as an independent and sovereign State". As for the aph 1, of the United Nations Charter, and would argument that the transfer had been agreed to in view entually lose its raison d' etrc. of the federal character of the Indonesian State, it was a well established legal principle that the obliga­ He would endeavour to define the problem, deal tions of a State were not affected by a change in its th the competence of the United Nations in the internal structure. 1tter and, lastly, discuss possible solutions. 6. The problem had really arisen from the drafting What exactly was the problem before the Com­ of article 2 of the Charter of transfer, which had been ittee? It was generally known how the Netherlands accepted by statesmen still somewhat inexperienced. But dies had come into being. If there had been any the status quo referred to in that article should be ~rit in the colonial regime, it had been that different understood as referring merely to the residency of mic, linguistic and cultural elements had been amal­ New Guinea, and not to sovereignty, which had been mated into a single political and economic whole, completely transferred. During subsequent negotiations, 1ose individual character had slowly developed Indonesia had suggested a de facto transfer of sov­ rough the Netherlands administration. Such was the ereignty, followed by a progressive transfer of admin­ 1litical entity destined later to become Indonesia. It istrative power. The Netherlands had then made its 1ttered little, therefore, that Indonesia, like some counter-proposal that sovereignty over West New :nerican countries, was composed of different ethnic, Guinea should be transferred to the newly created ltural and linguistic elements : that in no way affected Union, and not to Indonesia. Indonesia had rejected e unity of a State of which West Irian was an the counter-proposal, considering that de jure sover­ tegral part. Moreover, the political and social move­ eignty had been transferred by the Charter of transfer. ~nt which had culminated in independence had spread Finally, the Netherlands had stated that it was impos­ West Irian, one of whose leaders, a hero of the sible to negotiate because Indonesia demanded sover­ ~ht for freedom against the Japanese, was at present eignty over West Irian, and Indonesia had drawn the member of the Indonesian Parliament. It had been same conclusion from the fact that the Netherlands re­ e whole of the Netherlands Indies territory which fused to transfer that sovereignty. Indonesia had refused .d negotiated with the Netherlands. to refer the matter to the International Court of Justice, and the Netherlands had refused to bring it before the It should be noted that the United Nations had, United Nations. The truth was that the two parties om the beginning, taken its part in the conferences had refused to make any concession. But it was tween the two parties. When the question of decid­ precisely the function of the United Nations to find a g the status of the new entity had arisen, Indonesia solution which would enable both parties to reach an d been defined as including all the islands which made understanding. If it were held that the question, as 1 the Netherlands Indies. Later, when the transfer the Belgian representative had said (727th meeting), sovereignty had been negotiated, Mr. van Royen d used a similar definition in the Security Council 1 See Official Records of the Security Council, Third Year, l 22 December 1948, stating that "what used to be No. 132, 388th meeting. 421 AjC.ljSR.731 422 General Assembly - Ninth Session - Firat Committee came within the domestic jurisdiction of the Nether­ had firmly established that West Irian had alwa~ lands, international law would cease to exist, because formed an integral part of what was now known : all questions, even those which arose between two sov­ Indonesia. Long before the establishment of the Dut< ereign States, would, in that case, come within the East India Company, West Irian had been bound : domestic jurisdiction of one State or another. the other areas of the Netherlands Indies by politic:: economic, administrative and cultural ties. Similar! 7. If the United Nations allowed the situation to deteriorate, it would be disregarding the fact that the a number of delegations, including that of India, he most serious political or social incidents, like certain pointed out the secular ethnic affinity which he disasters, sometimes originated in events of minor im­ resulted in the creation of an indissoluble whole. C portance. Indonesia, which threatened no one, was very the other hand, the Netherlands representative (7261 justly claiming sovereignty over one of the elements meeting) had adduced arguments devoid of all hi of its personality as a State, i.e. the former colony tori cal and juridical value, and had even stated th there was no similarity between the peoples of Ind1 solemnly transferred to the Republic of Indonesia. nesia and those of West Irian who, he claimed, lackt 8. Some had argued that it was a choice between the all national consciousness. administration of a Non-Self-Governing Territory by 14. A number of speakers had already cited doc1 the Netherlands and the conquest by Indonesia of a ments which proved that the Netherlands had reco: territory which would be incorporated in it. To present nized the independence and sovereignty of the R the question in such a way was evidence that the old public of Indonesia at the 1949 Round Table Confe notion of the superiority of a certain race still sur­ ence. Although a definite agreement regarding We vived, the notion that it was better for a territory to Irian had not been concluded, a provisional compromi remain a colony than to be a sovereign entity within had provided in particular for the peaceful settleme the Republic of Indonesia. Although colonies had of all disputes and the determination of the status ' changed their titles and had been first "mandated" and West New Guinea by bilateral negotiations. Indonesi then "Trust Territories", the problem was still that of however, had spent four years of fruitless negotiati< colonialism, which the United Nations Charter had in a vain attempt to achieve a peaceful solution. Co· abolished in words rather than in fact. cessions by Indonesia had not been lacking : at tl 9. The Netherlands had unilaterally violated the un­ second conference of Ministers of the Netherland dertakings it had assumed under article 2 of the Char­ Indonesian Union, in December 1950, the Indonesie ter of transfer of sovereignty, which had provided that Government had expressed readiness to grant We the parties should resolve "by peaceful and reasonable Irian a wide measure of autonomy and to safegua· means" any differences that might thereafter exist or Netherlands interests such as, for example, the rete arise between them. When the Netherlands had found tion of Netherlands officials in certain posts and tl the Indonesian proposals unsatisfactory, it had uni­ granting to Netherlands citizens of the right to imrr laterally broken off negotiations and modified its Con­ grate. On the other hand, the attitude of the N ethe stitution so that West Irian might be fitted in, in lands had been purely negative. In December 1951, flagrant violation of the treaty concluded with Indo­ the third Netherlands- Indonesian conference, Ind nesia. nesia had gone still farther, proposing a tempora 10. How then could it have been said that Indonesia "joint responsibility" over West Irian. Finally, at tl aimed at a revision of treaties, which, incidentally, conference held in July 1954, the Netherlands h: would not by any means necessarily be a bad thing? refused to continue the negotiations. It was clear th On the contrary, Indonesia had requested that a treaty the Netherlands had used the negotiations to strength' which had been solemnly concluded should be carried its position in West Irian.
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