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Home , Ioannis Metaxas, Mouvement Franciste, Panagis Tsaldaris

The ‘National Socialist Party of ’ and its Contacts with : Contribution to the Study of Greek

Eleftheria MANTA *

Keywords: George Merkouris, National Socialist Party of Greece, fascism abroad, Greek fascism, CAUR

Abstract: The economic crisis of the early 1930s facilitated the spread of ideas in Greece. It was in this context that George Merkouris founded the National Socialist Party of Greece, on 7 April 1933. Merkouris’ contacts with and the CAUR began in February 1934. What the Greek politician wanted was support for the National Socialist Party and help with propagating fascist ideas in Greece. Having secured assurance of financial support from Italy, Merkouris decided the publication of a newspaper called Ethniki Simaia (‘National Flag’). Its first number appeared on 9 December 1934. The purpose was to disseminate the ‘new ideas’ to the mass of the people, these ‘new ideas’ representing the need to change the that had led the nation into an impasse. Merkouris also participated to the Montreux Conference (December 1934), which was organised by PNF and the CAUR, intending to serve as a forum for Europe’s fascist forces. He was elected as a member of the Organising Committee, which would prepare the next International Fascist Conference the following year. The political developments in Greece of 1935, put an end to any dealings between Merkouris and the Italian Fascist Party. Finally, with its ban on all political parties the Metaxas of 4 August, 1936 spelled the end for the National Socialist Party itself.

The economic crisis of the early 1930s, which brought about the devaluation of the drachma (1932) and the paralysis of Greece’s political system, also affected the country in other ways, one of which was facilitating the spread of fascist ideas. Up until 1932, Greece’s bourgeois political class remained oriented towards the parliamentary tradition, even as the democratic deficit became more and more obvious. It concurred in the repression of labour demands and social unrest and from time to time expressed admiration for the Italian regime, but for all that fascist-type expressions remained circumscribed trends within the bourgeois parties. With the eruption of the economic crisis in Greece in 1932, however, this picture changed, as the political climate became more polarised and anti-parliamentary fascist ideas spread, challenging the parliamentary system ever more vigorously and overtly. 1 One characteristic sign of the new current was the complicity of the larger middle class parties, corrupted by fascist ideas, in weakening the work of the Greek Parliament and thus in effect debilitating parliamentary democracy per se . Several representatives of the more conservative and royalist factions intensified their contacts with retired and serving

* Lecturer of Modern History, Department of History and Archaeology, Aristotle University of ([email protected], [email protected]). 1 Spyros Marketos, Πώς φίλησα τον Μουσολίνι ! Τα πρώτα βήµατα του ελληνικού φασισµού (: Vivliorama, 2006).

Studia Universitatis Cibiniensis. Series Historica, vol. 9-2012, p. 89-108 90 Eleftheria MANTA

military officers, paving the way for more sweeping changes; although few in number, they formed a particularly dynamic strand within the political fabric. This new internal schism deepened early in 1933, when the confrontation between the rival political factions fomented active movements, further deteriorating the already tragic image of the political climate and poisoning Greek society. The impossibility of forming stable governments in the wake of the 1932 and 1933 elections created in Greece conditions similar to those that in other countries had opened the door to fascism. It is, therefore, unsurprising that from the beginning of that decade a segment of urban society was seeking in Italian fascism models for institutions and ways of dealing with the ‘crisis of democracy’ for which that movement was entirely responsible. Throughout the 1920s the ‘splendid virtues’ of fascist Italy and the achievements of Mussolini’s regime had been systematically reported, and by 1930 Italian fascism had become an ‘acceptable’ regime in the eyes of many Greeks, perhaps even a ‘good and desirable’ one, and in any case an effective system. Mussolini was idolised as the man who had saved Italy from the ‘communist peril’ and set it on the path of progress, making it a shining political example and the first successful fascist paradigm. The collapse of democracy was rendered less disturbing by the existence of this glorious Italian precedent. And so fascist discourse in Greece steadily moved onto a higher plane. The major difference between Greek and Italian fascism, of course, lies in the absence in Greece of a broad popular base; in the Greek version, there was no mass, nation-wide fascist movement. The Greek approach, as has been correctly observed, was more selective, the Greek admirers of Mussolini seeing in fascism a regime, a type of state, a technical solution, rather than a social movement. 2

The founding of the “National Socialist Party of Greece” It was in this context, the paralysis of the parliamentary system, that George Merkouris, son of Athens mayor Spyros Merkouris, founded the National Socialist Party of Greece, which came into existence on 7 April 1933, 3 although its advent had been announced in the press at least two months earlier. 4 From his first appearance on the political stage, in 1916, as a member of the Populist Party, George Merkouris had held high office, including ministerial posts, and had always been close to George Kondylis, 5 whom he admired. In 1932 he was elected deputy in Athens with more votes than any other candidate, but disagreed with party leader on the question of forming a grand coalition cabinet. 6 In March 1933 he left the Populist Party to form his own group, which despite its

2 Christos Chatziiossif, “ Κοινοβούλιο και ∆ικτατορία ,” in Ιστορία της Ελλάδας του 20 ού αιώνα , vol. B2 (Athens: Vivliorama, 2002), 37-124. 3 The party was officially recognised as a political association by the Athens Court of First Instance on 2 August 1933. 4 Iakovos Chondromatidis, Η µαύρη σκιά στην Ελλάδα . Εθνικοσοσιαλιστικές και φασιστικές οργανώσεις στην Ελλάδα του Μεσοπολέµου και της Κατοχής (1941-1944) (Athens: Periskopio, 2001). 5 General and statesman (1879-1936). One of the country’s most royalist politicians, he put down the Venizelist insurrection of 1935 and was the prime mover in the restoration of King George II. 6 After the elections of 25 September 1932 neither of the two main parties, the Populists and the Liberals, was able to form a government alone. Following lengthy negotiations and under pressure from Liberal leader for a coalition cabinet, the Populists under Panagis Tsaldaris eventually formed a minority government that the Venizelists agreed to allow to function.

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name was not in fact an expression of national socialism. As we shall see, its tenets, positions and contacts place it closer to those parties that were leaning towards fascism and right-wing and seeking the support of and association with Italy, the “great and mighty” state that was the chief protagonist and unchallenged model for the system: “The National Socialist Party of Greece turns spontaneously to the principles of Fascist belief and embraces it fraternally ”. 7 George Merkouris himself admired the Mussolini, felt himself “drawn sympathetically” towards the Italian state, and sought to introduce many of its principles into the Greek reality. Let us, then, take a closer look at this newly founded political entity. Its purpose, as declared in its Constitution, was to “restore National Unity, Social Solidarity and Discipline as a means of achieving the fuller moral and material well-being of the people”. This aim would be pursued through labour in the service of the country’s interests, the moral and political education of the people, strengthening patriotic, religious and family feeling and inspiring national self-confidence. Another point worth noting is the fact that one element of the organisational structure described in that Constitution was the “National Socialist Combat Units” that were to be set up at the party headquarters in each prefecture, 8 in obvious imitation of the corresponding “Italian Fasci di combattimento”, the political organisations through which Mussolini entrenched his authority at local level before his October 1922 ‘March to Rome’, and the German paramilitary “Freikorps”. Their founder and leader was, of course, George Merkouris. The party flag was a white cross on a blue ground with the figure of Herakles severing the heads of the Lernaean Hydra in the centre, a symbol intended – according to Merkouris – to express the party’s determination to “fight evil and anarchy in every imaginable form and variety”. 9 As for the party’s name, it proclaimed precisely its ideological and programmatic orientation: it signalled on the one hand the activation of the nation as an historic entity and cultural value, as the projection of the individual, the family, the community, the homeland, national traditions, and on the other the defence of social justice. It aimed, in other words, at uniting all social groups in common action, at an ideal union of not only capital and labour but indeed of all the country’s productive forces: 10 “ Our movement is a national one… We are indeed a political and a social revolution ”. 11 The state envisioned by the National Socialist Party was a paternal one, which would devote itself to the improvement of the people and to public health, which would seek to heal society from corruption and modernisation, which would provide the means “to create a valiant Youth” and give it a healthy education in accordance with the traditional values of religion, family, country and devotion to God, which would encourage Greek women to be good wives and mothers, and which would defend the against vulgarisation. The national socialist state would ensure economic recovery by strengthening the country’s productive forces and exploiting national wealth and resources, would fight unemployment through the combined efforts of capital on the one hand and the

7 Εθνική Σηµαία , December 18, 1934. 8 Constitutional Chart of the National Socialist Party of Greece, art. 1. 9 From a speech given by George Merkouris, founder and leader of the National Socialist Party of Greece, in the Kentrikon Theatre on 22 July 1933. 10 Interview of George Merkouris, Ταχυδρόµος , November 12, 1933. 11 Εθνική Σηµαία , December 10, 1934.

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professions, labour and farmers on the other, these being the “ steely muscles of the organism of State ”, would seek the subordination of private interests to the general good and absolute discipline towards the authority of the state. The state would inspire stability and confidence at home and abroad: “ Greek National Socialism is based on the traditions of the Nation and the principles of Religion, Family and Country ”. 12 If elected, the National Socialist Party proclaimed, it would suspend the operation of Parliament (which was in any case bankrupt) for at least three years, abolish the Senate and rewrite the Constitution. The gap would be filled by creating a professional and economic assembly of delegates representing all productive classes (employers and workers), and by expanding the jurisdiction of the Council of State, which would assume the task of drafting legislation. It also called for elections to elect, by popular vote, a president with increased rights and responsibilities. 13 Once again, the pattern for this political and governmental organisation is not hard to trace: indeed, George Merkouris himself admitted that his programme followed the general tenets of Italian fascism, as devised by Mussolini:14 this, according to Merkouris, was a positive element, since apart from anything else the Mussolini regime was the only one that had managed to root out communism, 15 the major enemy of the National Socialist Party. 16 The basic pillars of the party’s ideology may be summed up in the following fundamental articles: firstly, that the nation is not simply a set of living persons, but an organism that includes the endless succession of generations, the supreme synthesis of the moral and material forces of the tribe, and that ranks above all other principles; secondly, that the state is the personification of the nation and exercises popular sovereignty in the name of the people; thirdly, that political institutions are effective to the extent that they express the national values; fourthly, that the organised guilds and unions promote the working classes and their interests by the leave of the state, but always in the framework of the general interests of the nation; and fifthly, that the professional Parliament constitutes the genuine manifestation of political and social justice. 17

The “Action Committees for the Universality of Rome” At this point, before turning to the relations that, based on the ideological proximity demonstrated above, developed between the National Socialist Party of Greece and the Italian regime, it is, I believe, essential to consider how Italy had, from an early date, taken action to propagate the fascist model in Europe and the world. This was the role assigned in the 1930s to the Action Committees for the Universality of Rome ( Comitati d’Azione per l’Universalità di Roma / CAUR), which came into being

12 Ταχυδρόµος , November 12, 1933 and Εθνική Σηµαία , December 18, 1934. 13 From a speech given by George Merkouris, Ταχυδρόµος , November 12, 1933. 14 Εθνική Σηµαία , December 10, 1934. 15 Εθνική Σηµαία , January 15, 1935. 16 Archivio Storico Ministero Affari Esteri (ASMAE), Serie Affari Politici, Grecia 1933, b. 5, f. 1, No. 8779/1083, Legazione Atene a Ministero Affari Esteri, Atene 20 November 1933. 17 From a speech given by George Merkouris, Ταχυδρόµος , November 12, 1933. These positions were the points where, as Merkouris acknowledged, Greek nationalsocialism met Italian fascism. Εθνική Σηµαία , January 15, 1935.

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on 15 July 1933 under the leadership of Eugenio Coselschi, 18 a lawyer and ultra-nationalist from Florence and a militant champion of the idea of the universal role of Rome and fascist ideology in general. The new organisation adopted as its symbol the she-wolf on the Capitoline Hill and a capital ‘M’, for Mussolini, and the motto Roma Universa (Universal Rome). The idea, however, was not new. Rather, it grew out of pre-existing similar ideas and plans that were born with the rise to power of the fascist party but had not been able to flourish in the climate of the times. More suitable conditions were provided by the situation that developed towards the end of the 1920s, by which time the Fascist Party had created the Fasci italiani all’estero (‘Italian leagues abroad’) as a means of propagating fascism beyond the country’s borders, proclaiming that a nation can only exist and become great when it carries out a civilising mission, all the more so in the case of the ‘great nations’ like Italy, which have a duty to spread their culture throughout the world. 19 By 1929 Mussolini and his supporters were entertaining the idea of converting fascism into a political model, or better still a powerful – and indeed the only – alternative to the capitalist system that appeared to be collapsing in a terrifying manner, an alternative that would be attractive to the liberal middle class that could not turn to Soviet Bolshevism, which indeed was considered very dangerous. Consequently, if we wish to give a precise definition of the universality of fascism as possible, we might say that it was a political- ideological movement that appeared in the middle of the 1920s and gained great strength in the wake of the global economic crisis of 1929, and which was the brain-child of the young intellectuals of the regime or former members of the paramilitary troops of the fascist party of the early days. 20 In essence, it was a revival of the myth of a Grand Italy, less territorially than as a country with a new leading role to play in the 20 th century, front and centre on the world stage. 21 Fascism’s greatest ambition was to be the primal creator of a new global civilisation based on its own institutions, totalitarian principles and values: to imprint the Italian seal on contemporary civilisation. 22 The fascists were not content to remain within the narrow confines of their own nation; on the contrary, they argued that “ the nation is the essential first step, the starting point for expansion; and expansion means not so much territorial acquisition as, above all, spiritual and political conquest ”. 23

18 Coselschi had been active for some time. In 1914, he left the Associazione nazionalista in Florence to found the Committee for Dalmatia ( Comitato pro Dalmazia ), exhorting the Italian people to liberate their fellow- countrymen in Dalmatia from the Hapsburgs. He fought as a volunteer in WWI, actively sided with Gabriele d’Annunzio in the Fiume question and later took part in anti-bolshevik actions and organisations. In 1922 he was inspired by the Fascist Party (PNF), which he joined two years later, thereafter serving it in various positions, particularly in connection with foreign policy. 19 Em. Gentile, La Grande Italia. The Myth of the Nation in the 20 th Century (Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2009), 172. Historian Jerszy Borejsza added that the Fasci all’estero later evolved into a sort of body of commissars charged with ensuring the ‘conformity’ of the diplomatic corps, since for several years after 1922 many of the country’s diplomats were anti-fascist. See J. W. Borejsza, Il fascismo e l’Europa orientale. Dalla all’aggressione (Bari: Laterza, 1981), 103. 20 Marco Cuzzi, L’internazionale delle camicie nere. I CAUR 1933-1939 (Milano: Mursia, 2005), 13-14. 21 Gentile, La Grande Italia, 88. 22 Gentile, La Grande Italia , 149. 23 Critica fascista, August 15, 1930. See also Em. Gentile, La Grande Italia, 171.

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The movement was welcomed by Mussolini, who embraced the idea of propagating the fascist ideal throughout Europe and the world, with the ultimate aim of securing for Italy a leading (and guiding) role on the ideological and political/diplomatic level. Italy had a duty to prepare itself in every possible way to handle its dominant new position. 24 In any case, he was by now firmly convinced that Europe’s democratic governments were ready to fall, one after the other, because of their impotence in the face of the crisis, which meant that fascism’s hour had come. 25 Two things were necessary in order to achieve this goal: to find suitable external ‘ambassadors’ who could promote the idea, and to establish a network of relations and communication between these figures or small political organisations and the Italian Fascist Party (PNF) as centre and prototype. It was the duty of the Italian Foreign Ministry and the Action Committees for the Universality of Rome (CAUR) to create, organise and cultivate these contacts. Hitler’s rise to power and the organisation, under Goebbels, of a propaganda system for promoting national socialist ideas can fairly safely be considered as the event that spurred Mussolini to accelerate the implementation of this plan. 26 The Nazi success was received in Italy with mixed feelings. On the one hand, it represented Germany’s most revisionist face, which created problems connected with the Austrian question, one of the ‘national issues’ facing Italy given the strong Italian minority living in the Brenner region; on the other, it was favourably regarded by a section of the diplomatic corps, particular those who had worked to break the Franco-German axis in order to pave the way for a rapprochement between Italy and Germany. In any case, however, it marked the appearance of a dynamic ideological centre that was patiently attracting attention in Europe, if not around the world, and that constituted a double threat: on the one hand, it casted Italian fascism into the shade, and with it Mussolini’s own lustre as political and ideological leader, and on the other it acted as a magnet, or a pattern, for other fascist or quasi-fascist movements across Europe. This threat spurred Mussolini to give a clearer ideological definition of his own model and at the same time to differentiate the position and character of his movement from that of the ‘anti-Semitic, racist and xenophobic’ Hitler. 27 The CAUR were thus born as a means of promoting fascist propaganda abroad and to foreign residents in Italy, unifying and codifying all the different manifestations and currents relating to the universality of fascism that had appeared. It was the Italian answer to the Reich’s Ministry for Propaganda, and this to a great degree determined its – fairly short-lived – existence. The beginning of its action coincided with the re-activation of Italian diplomacy and the revival of its interest in ‘foreign-born’ , after a long interval of inertia and navel-gazing. According to the first articles of their Constitution, the CAUR would engage in cultural and propaganda activities, mainly via the publication of material intended “ to affirm the

24 Cuzzi, L’internazionale delle camicie nere, 13-14. See also Renzo de Felice, Mussolini il . Gli anni del consenso 1929-1936 (Torino: Einaudi, 1974), 589, and Borejsza, Il fascismo e l’Europa orientale, 139-165. 25 de Felice, Mussolini il Duce, 590. While this conviction dated from 1922, it apparently grew even stronger in the early 1930s, and was frequently affirmed by Mussolini in his public statements. 26 Cuzzi , L’internazionale delle camicie nere, 86, 418. 27 de Felice, Mussolini il Duce, 408, 592.

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global mission of ‘romanità ” (Romanness), and “ become an effective voluntary instrument for an ever greater affirmation of the universality of Mussolinian thinking ”. Membership of the Action Committees was open to Italian men and women over the age of eighteen who shared their ideas and agenda. They also welcomed foreign citizens living in Italy who, apart from their appreciation of the principle of romanità and “ the spiritual value ” of Mussolini’s dogma, “ wanted to see Europe unified and its civilisation rescued on the basis of that dogma ”. 28 In the preliminary stages of their activity, these committees focused their attention primarily on the interior of the country, in order to create an organisational structure. Coselschi set about his presidential duties energetically and enthusiastically. Making use of pre-existing irredentist organisations, he developed a network of local centres in major cities across Italy and established contacts with people sharing similar views. The membership of these committees rapidly exceeded sixty thousand, while the central office in Rome soon turned into a reception centre for visitors from abroad, and aspired to become a sort of institute of international political studies. From the outset, Coselschi had the intention of holding an international CAUR congress, preferably in Switzerland, for the purpose of bringing together the committees that had already been formed and were continuing to be set up in Europe and the individual figures who supported Italian fascism, in order to strengthen the bonds between them and, of course, their ties with and dependence on Italy. To this end, Coselschi began to devote his energies to promoting the fascist network abroad, a task facilitated by the important preliminary work done by the Fasci italiani all’estero . Thus, by October 1933, as Coselschi informed Mussolini, Action Committees had been set up in Switzerland, Germany, and Hungary, 29 as well as Tunisia, Brazil, Argentina and other countries outside Europe, 30 while he himself and his senior associates had embarked on a series of visits to the larger European capitals to promote the principle of the universality of Rome and to tighten the organisation’s relations and collaboration with pro-fascist movements, parties and associations. From 1934 on Coselschi’s attention was focused on Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. In a number of cases, however, this official description of the role of the CAUR was only a screen for other – darker and often illegal – external activities of Italian fascism, most frequently espionage, as we shall see. Every journey abroad ended with a detailed report to Mussolini himself on the political situation in the particular country. 31 Early in 1934, this activity was extended to Greece. In February of that year the General Council of the CAUR sent General Mario Sani to Athens with orders to find a person of confidence to serve as the organisation’s representative in Greece, whose mission would be to establish communication and contacts with political groups or figures that shared the fascist outlook. More generally, Sani was to present a detailed analysis of the situation in Greece and the Balkans in the light of the Balkan Entente that had been

28 Comitati d’Azione per l’Universalità di Roma, Manifesto Statuto, art. 4. 29 Archivio Centrale di Stato (ACS), Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri (PCM), b. 2122, f. 1.1.8.3.2967, CAUR, Rapporto al Duce no. 1, Roma 16 October 1933. 30 de Felice, Mussolini il Duce, 587. Some of them were short-lived, as de Felice himself noticed. 31 Cuzzi, L’internazionale delle camicie nere, 110.

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signed earlier that month, a pact of particular interest to the shapers of Italian foreign policy. 32 In the framework of this mission, Sani met various national figures, including Loucas Kanakaris Roufos, former Foreign Minister and President of the Athens-Rome Union (of which, more later), whom Sani described in his report to Rome as an admirer of Mussolini and of fascism. He also met Achilleas Kyrou, owner of the newspaper Hestia, and , 33 “mouthpiece of the monarchist wing of the army”. Sani described Metaxas as a moderate figure, who admired Mussolini and had all his writings in his own personal library. Nonetheless, he felt, and this chimed with the views of other Greeks he met, Metaxas was not the right person to undertake the organisation of a fascist group in Greece. 34 The only people that Sani met, liked and considered suitable for the project in question were George Merkouris, leader of the National Socialist Party of Greece, and Miltiadis Iossif, 35 the party’s general secretary. Apart from his admiration for fascist ideals, Merkouris had two further advantages that made him of particular interest to the Italians: as president of the Union for Hellenic-Turkish Friendship he could open doors to political circles in Ankara, and he was on good terms with General George Kondylis, another person the Italian fascists wanted to approach. 36 Their acquaintance and collaboration thus dates from this visit.

George Merkouris’ contacts with Italy George Merkouris’ contacts with the Action Committees thus began in February 1934. What the Greek politician wanted from this organisation was support for the National Socialist Party and, especially, help with projecting its positions and propagating fascist ideas in Greece. One of the first matters he raised was the idea of publishing a daily party- sponsored newspaper; the idea appealed to Sani, who hastened to refer the proposal to CAUR chief Coselschi. This also appears to have been one of the subjects that Merkouris discussed with Mussolini when they met in Rome in May of that year. Meanwhile, the first examples of that kind of collaboration and help the CAUR was expected to provide through its contacts with the National Socialist Party were beginning to appear: on 11 May 1934 Miltiadis Iossif dispatched a secret report to Sani, in Rome, with information about the movements and repercussions of different anti-fascist groups and individuals in Athens, and particularly communist and labour activities, as well as information about promoting of German Nazi propaganda and the people who seemed to share the Nazi ideals, a matter of particular interest to the Italian fascists. One of the objects of the CAUR was to strengthen its collaboration with the National Socialist Party, and in this context Iossif suggested that a group from the Fascist Youth of Athens should

32 Cuzzi, L’internazionale delle camicie nere, 115. 33 General and statesman (1871-1941). Leader of the dictatorship inaugurated on 4 , he resisted the Italian invasion in and remained in power until his death. 34 ACS, PCM, b. 2122, f. 1.1.8.3.2967, Mario Sani, Relazione sul viaggio in Grecia dal 15 al 25 febbraio 1934. 35 Born in to a prosperous Greek family, Iosif lived a turbulent life. As an admirer of the fascist regime and a student of its principles and achievements in Italy, he frequently wrote propaganda articles in favour of the Italian model. 36 Cuzzi, L’internazionale delle camicie nere, 116.

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take part in the celebrations marking the first anniversary of the founding of the National Socialist Party’s Greek Youth Organisation. 37 The Italian Embassy in Athens, however, headed by Ambassador De Rossi del Lion Nero, frequently expressed reservations about this policy in its reports to Rome on the aims and actions of Merkouris and the National Socialist Party, with comments less enthusiastic than those Rome was receiving from its CAUR representative in Greece. Thus, while holding to its initial assessment that Merkouris had founded his new political party as a ‘’, allowing Greece to escape the deeply divisive Liberal/Populist fork, the Embassy observed that Merkouris himself was neither able to carry out such a difficult task nor, unlike party secretary Miltiadis Iossif, a genuine champion of fascist ideology. On the contrary, he was using his personal as a vehicle to keep him on Greece’s political stage. And his success in doing so was in no small measure due to the rise to power of the German national socialists. 38 The Embassy was just as negative regarding the National Socialist Party, which it said had too few members (no more than thirty thousand in Athens and the provinces) to play a real role in shaping political events, and those of doubtful quality, being in the main elderly political clients of Spyros Merkouris, whose name was in fact his son’s chief political capital. 39 Nonetheless, for all its defects Merkouris’ party was the only one in Greece that was even close to the fascist ideological and systematic model. That being the case, and given the fact that both Merkouris and Iossif had shown themselves to be sympathetic towards the Italian Government, the Embassy proposed to maintain, albeit with prudence and caution, its contacts with and indirect support for the National Socialist Party, since it could well prove useful in some future political conjuncture. 40 Italy’s object had to be the installation of a pro-fascist dictatorship in Greece, which would facilitate the opening of the Greek arms market to Italian industry, a market then supplied chiefly by the United Kingdom and France. 41 Sani’s next visit to Athens took place on 12–24 July 1934. 42 His report on that visit is truly a mine of information about his activities in Greece, although he himself freely admitted that he had met fewer people than he would have liked, which he attributed to the fact that it was high summer and many Greeks were away at the seaside. He purposely avoided contact with reporters and journalists, since his mission had to maintain a degree of secrecy, which made him prefer not to attract unwarranted attention.

37 ACS, Ministero della Cultura Popolare (MCP), b. 348, f. 2, Μiltiadis Iossif al generale Mario Sani, CAUR, Atene 11 May 1934. 38 ASMAE, Serie Affari Politici, Grecia 1933, b. 5, f. 1, No. 8779/1083, Legazione Atene a Ministero Affari Esteri, Αtene 20 November 1933. 39 ACS, MCP, b. 348, f. 2, no. 2683/404, Legazione Atene all’Ufficio Stampa della Presidenza del Consiglio, Atene 11 Aprile 1934. 40 ACS, MCP, b. 348, f. 2, no. 2683/404, Legazione Atene all’Ufficio Stampa della Presidenza del Consiglio, Atene 11 Aprile 1934. 41 ACS, MCP, b. 348, f. 2, Riservata. Μario Sani al Presidente dei CAUR, Roma 27 July 1934. 42 In his post-visit report he mentioned that, on the advice of persons he trusted, he had chosen to stay in Kifissia rather than the centre of the city so as to escape the attention of the police, who were already suspicious of his movements. ACS, MCP, b. 348, f. 2, no. 2683/404, Legazione Atene all’Ufficio Stampa della Presidenza del Consiglio, Atene 11 Aprile 1934.

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One of the things he was interested in was, naturally, the domestic political situation, which he analysed in detail in his report. The first of his conclusions is particularly worthy of note, namely, that he may have been wrong in assuming, as he did on his previous visit, that Greece was “ infertile territory for the fascist idea and hostile to the universality of Rome ”. He now believed that the idea of the failure of parliamentary democracy and the need for a more centralising regime was constantly gaining ground. Metaxas, with whom Sani and Ceresole, the secretary of the Athens , had a lengthy discussion, was entirely of the same mind. Metaxas declared his conviction that parliamentary democracy was no longer viable in Greece, had reached an impasse, and that dictatorship was the best alternative solution. In his estimation, however, conditions in Greece were not the same as in Italy, and therefore those who would achieve the same result (imposition of a centralised administration) had to follow a different road from that which made use of combat forces. The goal had to be a dictatorship supported by the people, who were tired of the endless political controversies and ultimate incapacity of the political parties. Sani reported that while despite his obvious admiration for Mussolini Metaxas could not possibly be described as a sort of Greek fascist, he was an ambitious man who, with the proper groundwork could serve as an agent of fascist interests in Greece. From this point of view, Sani’s personal opinion was that Italy had nothing to lose and much to gain from supporting those who looked forward to the overthrow of parliamentary democracy in the country. Sani, naturally, had more meetings with George Merkouris, 43 at which – in addition to the Greek political situation – they discussed the organisation of Action Committees in Athens and Merkouris’ plans to publish a newspaper promoting his party’s views. This, in Merkouris’ view, was a necessity, for he felt that the Athenian press did not give the activity of the National Socialist Party and its leader as much attention as he would have liked. As regards the organisation of Action Committees in Greece, it seems that Sani had already begun to revise his earlier opinion that this would be a difficult enterprise given the Greek unwillingness and reluctance to recognise the spiritual precedence of Rome. He acknowledged that progress had been made in the interim, a number of important people had displayed interest, while Mussolini had appointed George Merkouris as General Representative of the CAUR in Greece, a role he accepted with pride and enthusiasm. His partner in this enterprise was the ever-reliable Colonel Ceresole, who had resigned his position as Secretary of the Athens Fascio to devote his time to developing the activity of the CAUR. His new duties included regularly drilling Merkouris on fascist principles, urging him to more energetic and more spectacular activity, and using him to approach George Kondylis and Ioannis Metaxas, who in the view of the Italian fascists were the ablest and most likely candidates to establish a dictatorship in Greece. 44

43 Sani reports that on this trip he found Merkouris extremely enthusiastic about the idea of setting up a core of the CAUR in the city, and that he was fervently studying the principles, ideas and organisation of the fascist movement so as to be able to implement them as soon as he came to power. ACS, MCP, b. 348, f. 2, no. 2683/404, Legazione Atene all’Ufficio Stampa della Presidenza del Consiglio, Atene 11 Aprile 1934. 44 ACS, MCP, b. 348, f. 2, no. 2683/404, Legazione Atene all’Ufficio Stampa della Presidenza del Consiglio, Atene 11 Aprile 1934.

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The only thing that seemed to worry Merkouris, on the moral as well as the practical level, was his dual role as leader of the National Socialist Party and General Representative of the CAUR in Greece. The answer he came up with was to find new name for the Action Committees to be set up in Athens, something more abstract and less obvious, which would make his position easier. This proposed solution encountered certain obstacles, and caused Merkouris, Sani and Ceresole considerable difficulty, for some of the initial proposals using the term ‘associations’ were rejected by the Italians, there being already a number of these, none of them particularly effective. In the end, they agreed on the term ‘Union’. The second issue that arose concerned the choice of person to head the Union; but that matter was settled fairly easily: the three associates agreed unanimously on Loucas Kanakaris Roufos, 45 who is reported to have accepted the post most willingly. Regarding the character of this Union, Sani’s thoughts were that it should proceed slowly and carefully; in order to preserve Greek sensibilities, as well as to maximise the project’s chances of success, it would be wise to cultivate the impression that the organisation had originated in Athens (i.e. was not imposed by Rome), created by political and other figures, its pre-eminently fascist orientation assured by suitable Italian and Greek members. In this general context, then, Roufos organised a meeting on 20 July 1934, at which Sani undertook to inform those present about the nature and purpose of the CAUR, and also to allay their fears and reservations about promoting fascist ideas, 46 declaring that “yes, of course, we the prime movers are fascists and we do not intend to mask the fact that we are active in Athens ”, but that the object of the Union was not propaganda in the sense of coercion; what was intended was to develop an action aimed at better mutual understanding and rapprochement , a cool-headed examination of the pragmatic and beneficial results of fascism. This was also the image that was subsequently publicly projected. Sani’s reservations and cautiousness concerning the need to proceed with discretion were shared by Leon Makkas, 47 who thought that Greek public opinion was not yet ready to accept a CAUR agency in Athens. Presenting the new action as a local movement, on the other hand, would overcome many obstacles. In the end, after lengthy discussion it was unanimously decided at that meeting to create the “Athens-Rome Union”, the name put forward by Dimitrios Chatziskos as corresponding most closely to what Sani wanted. Makkas drew up its founding document, which was accepted by all those present, who were named as its founders: Loucas Kanakaris Roufos, who became its first President, George Merkouris, Dimitrios

45 MP representing Achaia, who occupied various ministerial posts between 1917 and 1926, but was not re- elected in 1932. 46 Reservations concerning the propagation of fascist ideas were first expressed by Dimitrios Chatziskos, Minister of Education in two Populist party governments headed by Panagis Tsaldaris (1932-33 and 1933- 35), who declared that while he was not averse to fascism, his political position required absolute clarification of this point. ACS, MCP, b. 348, f. 2, no. 2683/404, Legazione Atene all’Ufficio Stampa della Presidenza del Consiglio, Atene 11 Aprile 1934. 47 MP representing Athens, lawyer, Deputy Prime Minister in the short-lived Venizelos government of 5 June-3 November 1932. His chief interest was in foreign policy. Although a Venizelist he was, as Sani confirmed, an admirer of Mussolini.

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Chatziskos, Leon Makkas, Ippokratis Karavias, 48 Thanos Petralias, 49 Odysseas Lappas 50 and of course Colonel Ceresole and Mario Sani. The expansion of the group would be carefully controlled, so as to keep it under fascist control. The whole organisation, however, was seen by the Italian fascists as the first, preparatory step towards the founding of a CAUR agency in Greece, following the model used in other European capitals, which would in any case be linked with the Athens-Rome Union. This process seems to have been satisfactory to the Italian Embassy in Athens. The responsibility for its selective expansion, which was the first priority, was in the hands of Merkouris, who continued to be the General Representative of the CAUR in Greece, and Ceresole. 51 The second priority was to determine the best way of conducting its future operations. Regarding the second item on the agenda, the publication of a National Socialist Party newspaper, a topic that had also been raised at earlier meetings, Party Secretary Miltiadis Iossif argued that in order to succeed the project would require an annual subsidy of 240,000 pounds from the Italians, payable in equal monthly instalments. Part of this sum would have to be received before the newspaper was launched (specifically, 15,000 pounds by the end of June and 40,000 by the end of August 1934). Sani’s question, then, was whether and to what extent the publication of a newspaper with concealed Italian support would actually serve Italy’s interests. Under the existing system, there were two ways of promoting fascist ideas through the foreign press: one was via occasional payments made to periodicals to publish one-off texts on behalf of the Action Committees, and the other was via fully funded in-house publications. In the case of Greece, Sani thought the second way would be more effective, and was therefore in favour of approving such funding. Given the consensus of opinion, rapid progress was made, and by the time of Sani’s next visit to Athens, on 15–25 October 1934, 52 Merkouris had secured assurance of financial support from Italy and, on this foundation, had taken the first steps: he had secured suitable premises and reached agreements with future contributors. The newspaper was to be called Ethniki Simaia (‘National Flag’). Merkouris himself would serve as director, M. Papamanolis, who had lived in Italy, would be Editor-in-Chief, while the ostensible owner would be D. Georgakopoulos, Director of the Ministry of National Economy.

48 Lawyer, journalist and writer, first representative of the Greek government in Limnos after the island’s liberation (1913). In 1932 he was also president of the Parnassus Literary Society. 49 A former MP for Achaia, he had followed King Constantine into exile in Italy (1920-23). 50 Tenor with an international career (Milan, , Chicago). 51 The figures involved in the first expansion, on the Italian side, had apparently already been chosen: they were the new Secretary of the Athens Fascio , Tormene, the Director of the Italian Cultural Institute, dott. Carlo Alberto Grillenzoni, the Director of the Italian Archaeological School, prof. Alessandro della Seta, the Director of the Banca Commerciale Italo-Greca Commendatore Marmont, and other prominent members of the Italian community, all convinced fascists. 52 ACS, MCP, b. 348, f. 2, Riservata. Mario Sani a CAUR, Relazione sulla missione compiuta in Grecia (15- 25 ottobre 1934-XII).

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The newspaper would print 25,000 copies a day, and would have to sell at least 15,000 to cover its expenses. 53 At that point it had in its coffers the first 40,000 pounds from the CAUR, 54 30,000 drachmas from a personal donation made by Merkouris, and another 30,000 from a bank loan. Sani’s personal view was that, assuming sales of 10,000 copies a day, the newspaper could survive on that amount for 4-5 months. Content would be provided by the CAUR and by Merkouris, who had asked for the name of a correspondent in Rome who could supply political coverage; he also asked for free copies of the Italian press and news photographs, as well as copies of political and literary texts which he could have translated into Greek. 55 It was, finally, agreed that Radio Bari would advertise the new newspaper and devote a special broadcast to it at least a week before its launch. 56 The first number of the newspaper finally appeared on Sunday, 9 December 1934. Its announced purpose was to disseminate the ‘new ideas’ to the mass of the people, these ‘new ideas’ being the need to change the parliamentary system that had led the nation into an impasse. It was made very clear that the first leaders to diagnose the failure of parliamentary democracy were Mussolini and Hitler. Meanwhile, little progress had been made with the Athens-Rome Union, 57 mainly for legal reasons, since Greek legislation barred foreigners from membership of the board of directors of such organisations. This meant that other directors had to be found, while the Italians were simply designated as honorary members of the presidency, with voting rights. After this, and following the official recognition of the Union and the ratification of its Constitution, its officers would pay a formal visit to the Italian ambassador in Athens; this was scheduled for 28 October 1934. 58 With regard to its further activity, Sani reminded the Union that it needed to go beyond the narrow circle of politicians who were its first targets and open up to other social groups, especially young people and students. Its objectives remained the same, namely encouraging closer ties between the two nations and advertising modern Italy’s progress and achievements. 59

53 According to Merkouris’ calculations, with expenses amounting to 15,000 drachmas a day, or 450,000 a month, and the revenue from the projected sale of 10,000 copies totalling 11,000 drachmas a day, or 330,000 a month, the newspaper could not hope to survive for long. 54 Although paid to Merkouris, this sum was presented, for form’s sake, as having been paid to Georgakopoulos, as proprietor of the newspaper, and his signature appears on the receipt. 55 On 27 December 1934 Merkouris received a first consignment of 38 Italian books, most of them being theoretical and practical treatises on fascism, ‘works and days’ of Mussolini, and ‘behaviour manuals’ for students and young people. ACS, MCP, b. 348, f. 2, no. 70/7, Legazione Atene al Sottosegretariato per la Stampa e Propaganda, Αtene 4 January 1935. 56 Merkouris’ requests were forwarded to the Italian Propaganda Ministry by CAUR president Coselschi, who recommended that they be met. ACS, MCP, b. 348, f. 2, no. 7/30, Coselschi al Sottosegretariato per la Stampa e Propaganda, Roma 7 November 1934. A few days later, Mussolini himself, who had been advised of the matter, gave instructions that Merkouris’ requests be fulfilled. ACS, MCP, b. 348, f. 2, no. 28/251, Ministero Affari Esteri al Sottosegretariato per la Stampa e Propaganda, Roma 24 November 1934. 57 Sani called it an “official political screen”. 58 The choice of date was by no means random, since it coincided with the 12 th anniversary of the , which marked the rise of the fascist party ( Partito Nazionale Fascista – PNF) to power. 59 To this end it was proposed that a group of Greek intellectuals should, in the near future, pay a five-day official visit to Rome, for political/propaganda purposes rather than tourism. This group could include (ideally) journalists and university professors, representing the major Athens newspapers and educational institutions, the final choice being left to the Italians. Most of the cost would be covered by the CAUR. In

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Over and above these specific issues, however, Sani’s interest was once again focusing on more general aspects of the political developments in Greece, 60 with particular emphasis on the activities of Kondylis 61 and Metaxas, the latter being, in his opinion, already on the threshold. His assessment of Merkouris remained unchanged: his party and its impact were based more on the name of its founder and the clientele he had built up using the political legacy inherited from his father, the former mayor. In his efforts to create a third political pole between the two main parties, the Populists and the Liberals, he embraced the fascist ideas and platform of the PNF, and it was now in Italy’s interest to help him, especially given the opportunities presented by the political instability prevailing in Greece.

The Montreux Conference and George Merkouris The PNF and the CAUR had, as we have seen, already begun to contemplate the idea of a European Conference of Fascist and Pro-fascist Movements, an idea that to a considerable extent underlay the development of their activity outside Italy. The conference was intended to serve not only as a forum for Europe’s fascist forces, but also as a celebration of fascist Italy, of the “myth of Rome”, and of Mussolini himself. This, then, was the thought that laid behind the “Montreux Front”, a project brought to fruition thanks to the intense activity of Coselschi and under the aegis of the CAUR. In the minds of its organisers, however, beyond the praise and propaganda there were specific, tangible long-term goals: the programmatic rapprochement of the forces taking part and, more importantly still, the clarification of the term ‘European fascism’, the determination of the particularities distinguishing it from other phenomena and ideologies, such as national socialism, extreme , simple , etc. 62 The co-ordination would be handled by a permanent international committee. We see, in other words, that the whole project as it had taken shape in the minds of the Italian fascists was nothing less than the first step towards a ‘Fascist International’, but diametrically opposed to the socialist “Third International” (Comintern). Mussolini liked the idea of the emergence of a European sphere of influence for Italian fascism, with Europe’s fascist parties and movements politically, ideologically and – why not? – financially dependent on the PNF, and where, in their turn, these parties and movements would link with and follow Italian fascism via the network of CAUR. While preparations for the conference had begun in July 1933, it was not until 16–17 December 1934 that it finally took place, in Montreux, with delegates from fourteen fascist parties or organisations from countries in Europe: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France (), Ireland, Lithuania, Norway ( was the representative),

return, they would write articles about their trip for the major newspapers and magazines in Athens. This could be followed up by a corresponding Italian visit to Greece, while the Athens-Rome Union also proposed holding an Italian Cultural Week the following spring. ACS, MCP, b. 348, f. 2, Riservata. Sani a CAUR, Relazione sulla missione compiuta in Grecia (15-25 ottobre 1934-XII). 60 This second part of Sani’s report was for Coselschi’s eyes only. 61 Who, in a subsequent meeting with Sani, repeated his opinion that the Duce was the greatest man of the century, a new Napoleon. 62 The Conference was held “at the initiative of quasi-fascist organisations, as a forum for an exchange of views and for discussing the establishment of a new public order in the various countries”. Εθνική Σηµαία , December 12, 1934.

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The Netherlands, , Sweden, Spain, Portugal and Switzerland; 63 Greece was, of course, represented by George Merkouris. 64 With the exception of Portugal and Lithuania, however, whose delegates belonged to governing parties, the rest represented small political organisations of limited scope and importance, and with little voter support. We shall not dwell on the general work or specific agenda of the Montreux Conference, which progressed very much as its organisers had planned, 65 but shall limit our focus to the Greek presence there. Merkouris is reported as having taken an active part in the discussion of specific topics, such as the theoretical finding that two schools of fascism were developing in Europe, a ‘Mediterranean’ and a ‘Northern European’, the latter (Scandinavian/Flemish, through to Romania and Switzerland) displaying a stronger affinity with German national socialism. Merkouris, along with the Belgian (Walloon) representing the National Legion , the Irish Blueshirt and the delegate from the French , adhered to the first school, which patently had a closer affinity with Rome. This trend sharpened into a clear dividing line, which appeared during the Montreux Conference and undermined the solidarity of the various movements, as well as the final outcome of its work. 66 Albeit absent, the German factor nonetheless had an influence on the proceedings when the discussion turned to the thorny racial – or, more precisely, Jewish – question, as the differences between the hard-line anti-Semites and the more moderate elements divided the participants and nearly shipwrecked the whole Conference. George Merkouris assigned himself the role of mediator, arguing that the Jewish question was outside the remit of the Conference, since it was an internal problem that each movement would have to confront within its own national context. 67 Merkouris’ resolution was initially accepted, but later, after counter-proposals from Marcel Bucard, Charles Somville (Belgium) and (Denmark) had been discussed, was couched in the following terms: “ The

63 One striking feature of the Conference was the absence of any representative from Germany. No invitation had been extended to the National Socialist Party. See Cuzzi, L’internazionale delle camicie nere, 136. 64 Because Merkouris was attending the Conference, the National Socialist Party newspaper Ethniki Simaia published extensive coverage of the discussions. See Εθνική Σηµαία , December 12, 17, 18 and 24, 1934 and Ianuary 4, 1935. 65 The main items on the Conference’s agenda were, of course, the consolidation of co-operation and shared ideological models of European fascism along three main lines: the struggle of the young European generation against Bolshevism, selfish capitalism and paganism, promotion of the guild model, and respect for the national particularities of each movement or party. For more see de Felice, Mussolini il Duce, 594. Also Michael A. Ledeen, Universal Fascism. The Theory and Practice of the Fascist International 1928- 1936 (New York: H. Fertig, 1972), 151. 66 According to Italian historian Renzo de Felice, both the goal of a Fascist International, pursued by Mussolini and the CAUR, and the general success of universal fascism as an exportable product, as the ideological platform which would rally the other fascist movements, foundered on these general oppositions and the more specific confrontations between the different fascist bodies, whether they sprang from national conflicts or from personal rivalries and egotisms. See de Felice, Mussolini il Duce, 594-596. 67 Cuzzi, L’internazionale delle camicie nere, 144. Merkouris’ proposed statement was that: “...Each nation and each people has the right and the duty to behave in accordance with its traditions and its particular constitution and to find in those and through their own means the possibility of resolving its internal difficulties”. Εθνική Σηµαία , December 24, 1934.

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Conference declares that the Jewish question cannot be converted into a universal campaign of hatred against the Jews ”. 68 Specifically as regards Greece, Merkouris accepted that the Jewish community had shown itself to be law-abiding and patriotic and had deservedly won full equality and freedom from discrimination. 69 On another occasion, indeed, he had declared a wholly non-hostile attitude towards the Jewish question, at least as it was presented by European national socialism at that time. 70 The conference’s final decision – beyond the ideological and programmatic level – was to set up an Organising Committee, headed by Coselschi and including George Merkouris, which would meet twice a year to prepare for the next International Fascist Conference the following year. Returning from Montreux, Merkouris stopped in Rome, where he met Mussolini, who congratulated him on the views he had expressed at the Conference, while Merkouris for his part assured the Duce that he would continue to work in Greece for the propagation of fascist dogma and a closer alliance between the two countries. 71 The first meeting of the Committee was held in Paris, on 30 January 1935. Among those attending, apart from Coselschi, was George Merkouris, as a member elected by the Montreux Conference. The aims and action plans for the following months were rapidly established: interventions in the national governments, press campaigns, meetings, public speeches, co-ordination of all friendly forces so as to achieve, “ thanks to a rebirth of minds and institutions, a European unity capable of saving the continent from moral and economic ruin and assuring the progress of mankind ”; the fascist idea, as a dogma tending towards universality, was set firmly against communism, while the Action Committees in their turn aimed at awakening a spirit of common defence against the economic, social and political upheavals of Bolshevism, 72 calling first and foremost upon the youth of Europe to dedicate itself to the struggle against the selfishness of capitalism, materialism, etc., and to join the new fascist movement. 73 At this meeting in Paris, the Committee approved the new Constitution which Coselschi proposed for the CAUR, which clarified the framework of the organisation’s ideological orientation, structure and operating plan, having become, by this time, more than obvious that a network was being created, with its hub in Rome and branches in most European capitals. It is probably fair to argue that the Paris meeting marked the high point of the history of the CAUR. New memberships soared in its aftermath, which in turn accelerated the procedures for the convocation of a second session of the Co-ordinating Committee, this

68 Εθνική Σηµαία , December 24, 1934. Mercouris’ statement concerning Greek Jews was added at the Conference proceedings. 69 Εθνική Σηµαία , December 24, 1934. Mercouris’ statement concerning Greek Jews was added at the Conference proceedings and Iakovos Chondromatidis, Η µαύρη σκιά στην Ελλάδα . Εθνικοσοσιαλιστικές και φασιστικές οργανώσεις στην Ελλάδα του Μεσοπολέµου και της Κατοχής (1941-1944) (Athens: Periskopio, 2001), 28. 70 In an attempt to highlight this position of the Greek National Socialist Party, the newspaper Ethiniki Simaia a few weeks later presented, and commented warmly upon, activities of the Jewish community of Thessaloniki. Εθνική Σηµαία , October 30, 1935. 71 Εθνική Σηµαία , December 24, 1934. 72 Εθνική Σηµαία , February 10, 1935. 73 Cuzzi, L’internazionale delle camicie nere, 151.

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time in Amsterdam, on 29 th March 1935. 74 George Merkouris did not attend this second meeting, however, perhaps because of the stormy turn of events within Greece.

Developments on the Greek political scene Sani’s last mission to Athens took place during the week of 3–10 April 1935, 75 a visit that acquires a particular interest since it was made just a month after the failed Venizelist coup of March; and it gave the Italian cadres a detailed picture of the anarchy prevailing in Greece. Judging by Sani’s discussions and interests, from the fascist point of view the situation could not have been better for the collapse of parliamentary democracy in the country, the installation of a dictatorship and further rapprochement with Italy, and it seemed that Merkouris, Metaxas and Kondylis were pressing hard for that outcome. Tsaldaris, however, described as “ old and weak ”, dragged his feet, and the opportunity was lost. Political passions nonetheless continued to run high, and the country remained divided. Sani’s chief puzzlement, meanwhile, was this: in this conjuncture, what was George Merkouris doing, or what could he do? He surely wanted to play an active role in the developments, but he lacked the means and the support to do so, which is why he confined himself to inciting Kondylis to adopt the solution of overthrowing parliamentary democracy. Merkouris’ position “ for strengthening the state ” now boiled down to the following points: Constitution of a national government led by Merkouris, Kondylis and Metaxas, dissolution of all political parties, abolition of Parliament (Lower House and Senate), a referendum on the imposition of a five-year dictatorship, immediate application of the laws against insurgents, establishment of a professional parliament, creation of a Press and Propaganda Office and imposition of , realisation of public works, and improvement of welfare structures. 76 The influence of Italian fascist models is again more than obvious. Consequently, Italy’s interests were best served at that particular moment by strengthening the role that could be played by Merkouris, the National Socialist Party and its mouthpiece in these new circumstances, and maintaining relations with George Kondylis. It was thus no accident that at this particular conjuncture and by Mussolini’s personal instruction the PNF poured additional funds into the Ethniki Simaia , to enable it to continue its pro-Italian editorialising: 50,000 pounds were paid in May 1935, while in June it was decided to grant Merkouris a monthly stipend of 10,000 pounds, up to a total sum of 140,000. 77 Regarding Kondylis, Sani met him once more during his sojourn in Athens, and invited him to visit Rome, an invitation which Kondylis accepted in theory. He intended, indeed,

74 The choice of city apparently reflects Coselschi’s determination to detach the Dutch from the powerful German influence and bring them within the Italian sphere. Cuzzi, L’internazionale delle camicie nere , 154. 75 ACS, MCP, b. 348, f. 2, no. 28/251, Sani a CAUR, Relazione sulla missione compiuta in Grecia (3-10 aprile 1935-XIII). 76 ACS, MCP, b. 348, f. 2, no. 28/251, Sani a CAUR, Relazione sulla missione compiuta in Grecia (3-10 aprile 1935-XIII) and Εθνική Σηµαία , March 22, 1935. 77 ACS, Gabinetto, b. 9, f. 68, Riservata. Ciano [ministro per la Stampa e la Propaganda] al Capo della Polizia Bocchini, Roma 4 February 1936.

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to make the trip during the month of June of that same year, with his close friend Stamatis Merkouris, George’s brother, and of course Ceresole, who worked hard to bring this about. Kondylis wanted to meet Mussolini, to visit Italian military camps, and to watch military exercises. 78 In practice, however, things did not work out as planned as regards George Merkouris, who received only one third of the sum agreed for 1935, while in February 1936 the remaining money was returned to Italy and all funding ceased. 79 What had happened to bring about this change? It seems that the political developments in the wake of the events of March 1935 had proved fatal for the future of the Greek politician. According to the latest information that Sani received concerning developments in Greece and the status of Merkouris, despite the initial attempts to achieve electoral co- operation between Tsaldaris’ Populist Party, the National Radical Party of Kondylis and the National Socialists of Merkouris, 80 the latter broke with Tsaldaris when he was asked to renounce his fascist platform 81 and join the Populist Party in order to claim a seat in the next elections, which Merkouris refused to do. If true, then according to Sani Merkouris had thus given proof of his political ethos and his consistency of word and action; on the other hand, however, he was now alone and in a difficult position, like “a shipwrecked sailor seeking a lifeline” . Sani’s conclusions confirmed the assessments and repeated reports of the Italian ambassador in Athens, De Rossi del Lion Nero, whose reservations about the personality and effectiveness of Merkouris and the usefulness of an Athens-Rome Union had remained unchanged throughout this period. Merkouris’ defeat at the polls in June 1935 was simply perceived as a tangible proof of his words. This was also why De Rossi del Lion Nero had expressed his scepticism concerning Mussolini’s decision to finance Merkouris personally. In the ambassador’s view, prior to receiving any type of financial support Merkouris needed to make it perfectly clear just what political activity he was in a position to carry out, now that he had been relegated to the margins of Greek political life, how he could be useful, and what, in his view, was his party’s future. 82 De Rossi’s disbelief in Merkouris was obvious in all his correspondence with the central service at that time, and up to a certain point seems to have influenced Ciano’s decision to stop financing the newspaper. Finally, the political developments in Greece proved as fatal for the Athens-Rome Union as for the future of Merkouris himself. As a Venizelist, the Union’s president, Loukas Kanakaris Roufos, was automatically discredited, while another two members of the administrative board, Makkas and Melas, were jailed for the same reason. Any move to replace them at that particular conjuncture would, it was felt, be ill-timed, at least so long as the political scene remained fluid. Consequently, further action to fill the gaps would

78 ACS, MCP, b. 348, f. 2, no. 1/30, CAUR (Ceresole) a Ciano, Roma 22 July 1935. 79 ACS, Gabinetto, b. 9, f. 68, Riservata. Ciano [ministro per la Stampa e la Propaganda] al Capo della Polizia Bocchini, Roma 4 February 1936 80 Although the Ethniki Simaia reported extensively on the discussions between the three politicians from the end of March on, it said nothing of the reasons that led Merkouris to refuse to take part in the agreement between the other two to create a common front for the elections. 81 As the Italian fascists saw it, Tsaldaris had a low opinion of Mussolini and his work, and was almost hostile towards Italy. ACS, MCP, b. 348, f. 2, no. 1/30, CAUR (Ceresole) a Ciano, Roma 22 July 1935. 82 ACS, Gabinetto, b. 9, f. 68, De Rossi Del Lion Nero a Ciano, Atene 11 June 1935.

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have to be left for a more appropriate moment. In fact, nothing was ever done either to restructure the Union or to carry out its planned activity, thus erasing any further thought of reviving CAUR's activity in Greece. 83 The ceasing of funding naturally upset Merkouris, who turned to his faithful associate Ceresole for enlightenment about the reasons for this change and to ask for an immediate grant of at least 15,000 pounds to meet the most pressing expenses. Miltiadis Iossif, number two in the hierarchy of the National Socialist Party, adopted a harsher stance with Ceresole, threatening a complete ceasing of co-operation with the CAUR and total independence from Italian control if funding was not restored. Ceresole found himself in a difficult and an uncomfortable position. More disturbing than these threats was the deafening silence from Rome, and particularly from Coselschi. Unless Sani soon put in an appearance to patch matters up, his mission in Athens would have come to an end. 84 And that, it seems, is what happened. The political failure of Merkouris and his party in Greece put a final stop to the flow of Italian funds to the National Socialist Party, leading to the closure of its newspaper. In any case, Italian interest had already turned far more towards two other Greek figures who appeared much more decisive and very promising: Ioannis Metaxas, of course, and George Kondylis, whose relations with Coselschi had already been restored thanks to the intervention of Merkouris and who had been Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of War since 1935, a position of strategic significance for Italy. It is in this light that one must interpret Coselschi’s invitation to Kondylis to visit Rome, a visit that was made, as we know, on 8 July 1935 (despite the objections and obstacles raised by the French and British ambassadors) and which the Italians deemed successful. 85 Accompanied by Coselschi, Kondylis met Mussolini in the Palazzo Venezia, where they discussed matters relating the Aegean and the Dodecanese; Kondylis also promised to use his good offices with Belgrade to help restore relations with Rome, which had been disturbed due to Italy’s support for anti-Serbian separatist movements and the assassination of King Alexander in Marseilles. Ceresole ascribed Kondylis’ newly pro-Italian stance to a considerable degree to his relationship with Merkouris, with whom he was in frequent (and often secret) contact. This channel of communication had enabled the Italian embassy in Athens to keep informed throughout this period about what was happening within the Greek Cabinet, and to tailor its movements accordingly. Ambassador De Rossi del Lion Nero himself, who had on other occasions expressed his doubts as to Merkouris’ usefulness, now accepted that his action in this regard was important and valuable. His ally in this endeavour was of course Ceresole, now converted into a friend and confident of Kondylis. In closing, Coselschi expressed the hope that Kondylis would in future act in accordance with the instructions (‘ direttive ’) he received from Rome. 86

83 ACS, MCP, b. 348, f. 2, no. 28/251, Sani a CAUR, Relazione sulla missione compiuta in Grecia (3-10 aprile 1935-XIII). 84 ACS, Gabinetto, b. 9, f. 68, Promemoria di Ceresole, Αtene 2 July 1935. 85 Documenti Diplomatici Italiani, Serie VIII, vol. I, No. 400, 416-418. 86 ACS, MCP, b. 348, f. 2, no. 1/30, CAUR (Ceresole) a Ciano, Roma 22 July 1935

108 Eleftheria MANTA

Coselschi, for his part, was delighted with the prospects opened up by the contact with Kondylis for the possibilities of drawing the two countries closer together, and with how successfully he had accomplished his mission for Mussolini in Belgrade. 87 The subsequent political developments in Greece, with the return of King George II from exile in the autumn of 1935 and the change in priorities as Metaxas grew steadily stronger, seem to have put an end to any dealings between Merkouris and the Italian Fascist Party; there is no trace of any contact between the two after the summer of 1935. Similarly, with its ban on all political parties the Metaxas dictatorship of 4 August 1936 spelled the end for the National Socialist Party itself. Merkouris returned to the political stage in 1941, with the German invasion of Greece, as a close collaborator of the Occupation Forces. He served as Governor of the Bank of Greece until his death in 1943.

87 ACS, MCP, b. 93, f. 2860, Riservata. Coselschi a Ciano, Roma 31 July 1935.