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Uni International 300 N. Zeeb Road Ann Arbor. Ml 48106

1325399

Arvanitopoulos, Constantine

CONSTANTINE KARAMANLIS; A LEADERSHIP PROFILE

The American University M.A. 1985

University Microfilms I nternâtiOnsi 300 N. zeeb Road, Ann Arbor. Ml 48106

Copyright 1985 by Arvanitopoulos, Constantine All Rights Reserved

CONSTANTINE KARAMANLIS;

A LEADERSHIP PROFILE

by

Constantine Arvanitopoulos

submitted to the

Faculty of the College of Public and International Affairs

of the American Unviersity

in Partial Fulfillment of

The Requirements for the Degree

of

Master of Arts

in

International Relations

Signatures of Committee:

Chairman

Dean of the College

Date

1985 The American University Washington, D.C. 20016

THB AMERICAS UNIVERSITY LIBRAlfV © 1985

CONSTANTINE ARVANITOPOULOS

All Rights Reserved CONSTANTINE KARAMANLIS:

A LEADERSHIP PROFILE

BY

CONSTANTINE ARVANITOPOULOS

ABSTRACT

Karainanlis' career as a politician lasted 50 years

(1935-1985), though it was twice interrupted: once by the prewar dictatorship of Metaxas and the Second World War, and again by Karamanlis' self-imposed exile in Paris and another military dictatorship. His career ended with his resignation from the Presidency on March 9, 1985.

This thesis will be divided into four chapters.

Chapter I will be the theoretical framework. Chapter II will be a political profile of Karamanlis. Chapter III will be his operational code, and Chapter IV will be the analysis of three important decisions that Karamanlis made as Prime Minister.

The purpose of this analysis will be to reveal

Karamanlis' belief system and to assess the impact of his operational code beliefs on his policy preferences and choices of action.

XI TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ...... Ü

INTRODUCTION ...... 1

Chapter

I. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ...... 3

Elite Images ...... 5 The Interaction Model ...... 7 The Operational C o d e ...... 7 Cognitive Mapping ...... 10 Theoretical Framework ...... 11 The Congruence Procedure ...... 15 The Process-Tracing Procedure...... 16

II. POLITICAL PROFILE OF CONSTANTINE KARAMANLIS . . . 17

III. KARAMANLIS' OPERATIONAL CODE ...... 50

Philosophical Beliefs ...... 50 Instrumental Beliefs ...... 66

IV. ANALYSIS OF THREE FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS . . . 73

Decision I: Withdrawal from the Military Part of NATO ...... 75 Decision II: Greece's Entry into the EEC . . 85 Decision III: E x i l e ...... 89

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 93

111 INTRODUCTION

Instability is the word most frequently used to describe Greek politics. Foreign observers repeat it

compulsively; Karamanlis has often used it himself. It is

therefore worth recording that Karamanlis held office as

Prime Minister for a total of fourteen years — longer than any British Prime Minister since Gladstone, and perhaps

longer than any Prime Minister of a democracy in the

twentieth century. He won twelve popular elections, held

five different ministries, and formed seven governments, each of them based on a single party. He dominated the

Greek political scene to a degree rivaled only by

Elevtherios Venizelos, who was indeed his favorite model, but whose mistakes he succeeded in avoiding.

Karamanlis' career as a politician lasted 50 years

(1935-1985), though it was twice interrupted: once by the prewar dictatorship of Metaxas and the Second World War,

and again by Karamanlis' self-imposed exile in Paris and another military dictatorship. It was marked by a politi­

cal transition of exemplary smoothness, when the Presidency of the Republic, the leadership of his party and the premiership changed hands within a few months from May 1930

to 1981. It ended with his resignation from the Presidency on March 9, 1985. This thesis will be divided into four parts. Chapter

I will be the theoretical framework. Chapter II will be a political profile of Karamanlis. Chapter III will be his operational code and Chapter IV will be the analysis of three important decisions that he made as Prime Minister.

The purpose of this analysis will be to reveal

Karamanlis' belief system, and moreover, to assess the impact of his operational code of beliefs on his policy preferences and choices of action. CHAPTER I

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

In the early 1930s, many scholars of international relations began to apply psychological approaches to the study of international phenomena. Specifically, the psychological concepts were used in order to improve one's understanding of the phenomena of war and peace. Most of this research was oriented toward national stereotypes, attitudes toward war, and public opinions of foreign policy issues.^ Most of these studies were made at the individual level of analysis.

Those attempts to link psychological concepts with 2 international behavior met many difficulties. First, since there were concepts used from in-depth psychology, individual irregularities and pathologies were projected into the international realm, thus stressing the importance

H.C. Kelman, "Social-psychological Approaches to the Study of International Relations: Definition of Scope." in International Behavior; A Social-psychological Analysis, ed. H.C. Kelman (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965), p. 4. 2 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univer­ sity Press, 1976), pp. 3-10. of emotional, rather than cognitive, factors. Secondly,

most of the data in support of these studies resulted from

laboratory experiments. Thirdly, the nature of the inter­

national system and the constraints it imposed were usually

ignored or misunderstood.

The result was that these efforts were criticized by many political scientists as irrelevant to the study of

international relations. The problem was clearly stated by

Herbert Kelman: "Only if we know where and how these

individuals fit into the larger process, and under what

circumstances they operate, are we able to offer a relevant

psychological analysis."^

Although these first attempts failed, beginning in the mid-1950s, the contribution of psychological approaches to

the study of international relations grew in importance as

a result of the interaction of the peace research movement

and the development of the behavioral revolution. The new

writings showed an increasing theoretical and methodologi­

cal sophistication, with greater awareness of the complex­

ities one encounters in moving across different levels of

analysis.

A wide variety of psychological literature has been

applied to the study of international relations. Most of

these works can be included in four general approaches:

^Kelman, "Social-psychological Approaches," p. 6 personality, thought process, belief systems, and group communications process. Studies in personality were concerned with the origins and evolution of an actor's personality and the identification of major idiosyncratic motivational characteristics. Studies in thought process were concerned with the decision-makers and modes of thinking that depart from rationality and affect the intellectual process. Studies in belief systems were concerned with the analysis of international behavior by utilizing such concepts as perceptions, images, attitudes, and opinions. Finally, studies in group communication were concerned with individual interaction within groups and organizations.

This study will focus upon the role of belief systems in explaining and predicting international behavior.

Many scholars of international relations have syste­ matically applied a belief system approach to the study of international phenomena. Four major research efforts have been identified: elite images, the interaction model, the operational code, and cognitive mapping. These works differ considerably in their conceptual orientation and their substantive nature.

Elite Images

These concern images held by different elites concern­ ing various aspects of the international system. These studies can be categorized in three general research efforts: elite images of the opponent, elite images of the international environment, and national elite self-images.

The studies that examine images held by elites regard­ ing the opponent have been mainly devoted to analyzing the major powers within the international system: the United

States, the Soviet Union and China. For example, Holsti

(1962, 1967a, 1967b), Lampton (1973), and Ben Zvi (1975,

1978) have studied American elite images of the Soviet

Union, China, and Japan. Other scholars have attempted to explain and predict the interactive behavior between two or more states by examining the interplay of elite images.

Bronfenbrenner's (1961) and White's (1966, 1970) seminal work introduced the notion of "mirror images" on the United

States and the Soviet Union.

A number of other studies went beyond the image of the opponent and focused on other aspects of the international environment. One example was the view of the world ap­ proach (Brecher, Steinberg, Stein 1969), which was applied to the views of Krishna Menon, the assistant of Prime

Minister Nehru of India, from 1953 until 1962.

Another approach within the elite image framework has been to examine the national self-images of international actors. However, most studies of self-images have been just an elaboration of enemy-image theories. Few scholars have sought to study national self-images in their own right and to explain or understand policy in terms of 4 them. An exception has been a focus on "national role conceptions," meaning foreign policymakers' perceptions of their nation's position in the international system.

However, the study of national role conception is still in its first stages (Holsti, 1970; Walter, 1979).

The Interaction Model

The interaction model is based on a two-step mediated stimulus-response model comprised of four elements:

S-r:s-R. An actor perceives a stimulus which is any action of another sector. Based on his perception of this stimu­ lus he responds. The intervening variables (r) and (S) are the actor's perception of the stimulus (S) and his own intentions and actions (s), respectively.

The interaction model was applied primarily to an examination of the events leading up to World War II

(North, 1967). It was also applied to the Cuban missile crisis (Holsti, Brody, North, 1965).

The Operational Code

The operational code approach has been one of the most widely used approaches for describing an actor's belief system. The operational code consists of a "political

R.N. Lebow, Between Peace and War; The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore : Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), p. 195. 8 leader's beliefs about the nature of politics and political conflict, his views regarding the extent to which histori­ cal developments can be shaped, and his notions of correct 5 strategy and tactics." The operational code was first developed by Nathan Leites in his work on the Soviet Union and especially Bolshevism (1951, 1953). However, it was

George who developed the construct and gave it its final shape, in which it was been widely used.

The operational code approach is comprised of two fundamental types of beliefs: philosophical and instrumen­ tal. The philosophical beliefs refer to "assumptions and premises... regarding the fundamental nature of politics, the nature of political conflict, the role of the individu­ al in history, etc."^ Instrumental beliefs refer to ends-means relationships in the context of political action. George developed two sets of questions in order to discover an actor's philosophical and instrumental beliefs:

Philosophical Beliefs

1. What is the "essential" nature of political life? Is

the political universe essentially one of harmony or

conflict? What is the fundamental character of one's

political opponents?

A.L. George, "The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision- Making," International Studies Quarterly 13 (1969): 197.

^Ibid., p. 199. 2. What are the prospects for the eventual realization of

one's fundamental political values and aspirations?

Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on

this score, and in what respects the one and/or the

other?

3. Is the political future predictable? In what sense

and to what extent?

4. How much "control" or mastery" can one have over

historical development? What is one's role in "mov­

ing" or "shaping" history in the desired direction?

5. What is the role of "chance" in human affairs and in

historical development? (George, 1969)

Instrumental Beliefs

1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or

objectives for political action?

2. How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?

3. How are the risks of political action calculated,

controlled, and accepted?

4. What is the best "timing" of action to advance one's

interests ?

5. What is the utility and role of different means for

advancing one's interests? (George, 1969)

The operational code approach has been applied many times in analyzing foreign policy behavior, and it has focused mainly on individual political leaders: heads of state, foreign ministers, and legislators. Many heads of 10

State have been studied, such as Willy Brandt (Ashby,

1970), Lyndon Baines Johnson (Malone, 1971), Mao-Tse-Tung

(White, 1970), John F. Kennedy (Hoagland, 1978; Stuart,

1982). Many foreign ministers have been studied — all of

the American Secretaries of State; Dean Acheson (McLellan,

1971), John Foster Dulles (Holsti, 1970), Dean Rusk

(Gutierrez, 1973), and Henry Kissinger (Walker, 1975,

1977). Many legislators have also been studied with this approach; J. William Fulbright, Mark Hatfield, and Arthur

H. Vandeberg.

Cognitive Mapping

Cognitive mapping presented the beliefs of decision­ makers in a more rigorous way. It is based upon the

seminal works of Robert Axelrod (1972) , and Michael J .

Shapiro and G . Matthew Bonham (1973).

The cognitive map represents the basic beliefs of a

decision-maker and the interrelationship of those beliefs.

By focusing on the interrelationship of central beliefs,

the "cognitive process model" sheds light on the way that

an individual explains and predicts international behavior.

According to Bonham and Shapiro, when a decision-maker

perceives a new international situation which may require a

policy response, he or she invokes five cognitive stages;

initial amplification, search for antecedents, search for

consequences, search for policy alternatives, and policy

choice (Bonham, Shapiro, and Nozicka, 1976). 11

Cognitive mapping has been used in many ways in order to explain foreign policy behavior. Most of the works have focused on individuals (Bonham, 1976; Bonham and Shapiro,

1976, 1977), but some have focused on the group (Axelrod,

1976b) and the nation-state (Hart, 1976).

Theoretical Framework

This study will employ the operational code construct to explore the belief system of Constantine Karamanlis.

However, whereas most of the studies of operational code have been concerned with deriving the beliefs of a specific political leader by answering the "philosophical" and

"instrumental" questions, this study will attempt to focus in the direction of assessing the impact of an individual's operational code of beliefs on his policy preferences and choices of action.

Recent developments in cognitive balance and disso­ nance theories, attribution theory, attitude theory, social learning theory, and personality theory have moved each of the elements into an information processing framework. Two important aspects of this paradigm shift should be noted;

(1) a shift from the stimulus-response (S-R) model of radical behaviorism, which represents man as a passive agent, toward a conception of man as an intuitive scientist

"who seeks to explain behavior and to draw inferences about actors and their environment" (Lee Ross, 1977); (2) a 12 second shift, within the conceptualization of man as an active agent, away from the fundamental premise of earlier cognitive balance theories, which viewed the individual as a "consistency-seeker" and toward the quite different premise of recent attribution theory (and other psychologi­ cal theories as well), which view man as a "problem solver"

(George, 1979).

Thus, man's status has been elevated from that of a

"consistency-seeker" to that of a "naive scientist" who tries

...to infer the causes of social events in everyday life, to discern the attributes of other actors and social phenomena, to predict histori­ cal trends and the behavior of other persons, all in order to exercise some cpntrol over the outcome of social situations.

The political scientists have applied these findings of cognitive psychology, claiming that the policy maker is often a "naive scientist."

If man is a "naive scientist" and not a "passive agent" or a "consistency seeker," his basis for action will be his belief system. His decision-making behavior is to be influenced by beliefs that have centrality, rather than by beliefs that occupy a secondary or peripheral role in the hierarchy of cognitive belief structure. Operational

Alexander George, "The Causal Nexus Between Cognitive Beliefs and Decision-Making Behavior; The 'Operational Code' Belief System," in Psychological Models in Interna­ tional Politics, ed. Lawrence S. Falkowski (Colorado: Westview Press, 1979), p. 98. 13 code beliefs do have centrality. Unlike attitudes, they are concerned with fundamental, unchanging issues of politics and political action. They give us the basic framework within this the actor attempts to process avail­ able information and to engage in rational calculation in pursuit of his values and interests (George, 1979).

The first theoretical assumption is that central beliefs influence decision-making indirectly by influencing the information process tasks that precede and accompany the decision-maker's choice of action. The information processing consists of two stages; the definition of the situation and "option development." At both stages, operational code beliefs can have an impact. At the first stage, the definition of the situation, under the influence of his beliefs the decision-maker may eliminate some policy options and favor others. An actor's image of the opponent is very important in shaping his definition of the situa­ tion, particularly with respect to his assessment of the threat posed by the adversary's behavior. Also, if an actor believes that chance and unpredictable circumstances shape human affairs and historical developments (the fifth philosophical belief), he is less likely to engage in extensive search behavior.

An actor's operational code beliefs can also have an impact on the option development stage of the information processing. For example, his choice can be affected by his 14 second philosophical belief: if the actor is optimistic about his ability to achieve his fundamental political goals, he is likely to avoid choosing high-risk options.

If he believes that the political future is predictable

(third philosophical belief), he is more likely to engage in extensive analysis of the possible consequences of various policy options. Consequently, as George, claims:

The author's operational code beliefs introduce two types of propensities, not determinants, into his decision-making: (a) diagnostic propensi­ ties, which extend or restrict the scope of search and evaluation and influence his diagnosis of the situation in certain directions and (b) choice propensities, which lead him to favor g certain types of action alternatives over others.

Therefore, we can say that the operational code beliefs in decision-making serve as a set of general guidelines -- heuristic aids to decision — and not as a set of ready solutions automatically applied to an actor's decision-making. We also have to take into consideration that operational code beliefs do not unilaterally determine a decision-maker's choices of action. The decisions are influenced by a variety of other variables, too: personal considerations, domestic politics, organizational inter­ ests, national interests, etc. We can only conclude from this that the influence of an actor's operational code beliefs is likely to be bigger in determining his policy

^George, "The Causal Nexus," p. 103. 15 preferences -- the option he prefers -- than in determining the option he finally chooses,

George has introduced two techniques to assess the impact of a policy maker's operational code beliefs on his decisional choices. The first is the procedure of estab­ lishing "congruence" (or consistency) between the set of given beliefs and the content of his decisions. The second is the procedure of tracing in some detail the steps in the process by means of which given operational code beliefs influence the assessment of incoming information, help to shape the individual's definition of the situation, and influence his identification and evaluation of options.

These two techniques will be used in this paper to assess the impact of Karamanlis’ operational code beliefs upon three major decisions he made.

The Congruence Procedure

Following this technique and having first established

Karamanlis' beliefs, I will consider whether his policy preferences and his subsequent three decisions are consis­ tent with his beliefs. The determination of consistency will be made deductively. From his operational code beliefs I will deduce what implications they have for decision. If the characteristics of the decision are consistent with his beliefs, there is at least a presump­ tion that the beliefs may have played a causal role in this 16 particular instance of decision-making. Moreover, confi­ dence that consistency between beliefs and actions is of causal significance can be enhanced if it is found repea­ tedly in a sequence of interrelated decisions taken by an actor over a period of time.

There are some critical questions that have to be asked: Could the decision have occurred in the absence of these particular beliefs? Is it possible to conceive of any credible policy options in the same situation that would not have been consistent with those same beliefs? If all the possible actions that the decision maker might have taken would be consistent with his operational code be­ liefs, then the explanatory power of those beliefs is negligible. Conversely, if other policy options were available which were not consistent with the decision­ maker's own beliefs, then the investigator has additional presumptive evidence of the explanatory power of his beliefs,

The Process-Tracing Procedure

This procedure seeks to establish the ways in which the actor's beliefs influenced receptivity to and assess­ ment of incoming information about the situation, his definition of the situation, his identification and evalua­ tion of options, as well as his choice of a course of action (George, 1979). 17

CHAPTER II

POLITICAL PROFILE OF CONSTANTINE KARAMANLIS

Karamanlis was born in Eastern Macedonia on March 8,

1907. His village was called Küpkdy, the "village of jars," which derived its name from its famous local prod­ uct. The area was liberated from the Turks after the

Balkan wars of 1912-13. Like other great men in Greece's history, including Elevtherios Venizelos, Karamanlis was born an Ottoman subject. When the Treaty of Bucharest ended the Balkan wars in August 1913, Macedonia was liber­ ated and Karamanlis became a citizen of the Kingdom of

Greece.

However, even then, the part of Greece he came from was not secure, for the Bulgarians were still hoping to annex eastern Macedonia. The Bulgarians attempted twice to incorporate Macedonia during the two world wars, but were unsuccessful.

Karamanlis' village would be for many years a victim of attacks by the Bulgarian nationalists. Their irregular komitadjus (men of the Committee) provoked a nationalist reaction among the Greeks of whom George Karamanlis,

Constantine's father, became the local leader. 18

George Karamanlis was a schoolmaster and had four sons and four daughters. The schoolmaster's nationalist activi­ ties continued during Constantine's childhood, which was stigmatized by memories of the troubled life of Macedonia.

His father was arrested, imprisoned and tortured twice: by the Turks in 1908 and by the Bulgarians in 1917. His first conflict with the Bulgarians was caused by his refusal to issue orders addressed in Bulgarian to his village at the time of Bulgarian occupation of Küpküy. On that occasion, the little boy literally saved his father's life by cling­ ing to his legs with tears in his eyes, inducing the

Bulgarian officer to let him go.^

Even though the child had seen through his father the costs associated with leadership, his ambition, as ex­ pressed to the chief organizer of the movement in Eastern

Macedonia, was to become a guerrilla captain (kapetanios).

Following the conclusion of the Balkan wars, the position of kapetanios lost its preeminent leadership connotation and, as a result, the ambition of young Karamanlis was redirected toward a political aim. "I am going to be a 2 leader....''

^C.M. Woodhouse, Karamanlis: The Restorer of Greek Democracy (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1982). 2 Maurice Genevoix, The Greece of Karamanlis, trans­ lated from the French (London: 1973), p. 45. 19

In 1913 Macedonia was liberated, and in 1919, at the

age of twelve, Constantine Karamanlis was sent to Nea

Zikhni, 15 miles away, where there was a secondary school of two classes, for boys up to thirteen. The boy was miserable at first and tried to run way twice. In the end,

locked in the house of his family friends, he compromised.

After a year at Nea Zikhni, he moved on to the larger, better-equipped secondary school at Serres for three years.

However, his father's doubts concerning whether local education would ensure his son entry into the University

induced him to send the young Karamanlis to Athens for completion of his secondary education. It was 1923 when

Constantine Karamanlis arrived in Athens.

Unlike his friends, Karamanlis was stubborn, hot- tempered and quarrelsome, "I was the terror of the neigh­ bourhood," he admitted; "everyone I met, I fought."^ He was not a model student either. He attended classes so irregularly that his friends could not understand how he passed the examinations. The key to his success in the exams was hard work during the time he went home for vacation. For example, before his final exams he would go home, and in a period of four months study what he had not studied for four years.

^Woodhouse, Karamanlis, p. 7. 20

In November 1925 Karamanlis entered the University of

Athens and took the four-year course in law. Karamanlis, already interested in politics, often attended debates in the Parliament, where he was introduced into the art of politics by Athanasios Argyros, an influential Populist deputy from Serres.

During Karamanlis' youth, Greece was experiencing a national division between the republicans and the royal­ ists. There were also troubles with Greece's neighbors — a war with Turkey in 1921-22 and another with Bulgaria in

1925. These two wars, as well as the national split, shaped Karamanlis' pessimistic philosophy of politics.

In his personal life he had the reputation of a "lone wolf." He would not conform to a conventional pattern, even in friendship. To say "thank you," he once admitted, was a formality he found difficult; so he decided to be indebted to no one. In 1935 he suffered from otosclerosis, which caused deafness, thought to be incurable. In addi­ tion to his personal problems, he also had to deal with family problems. His father's tobacco business went bankrupt and Constantine Karamanlis found employment as an agent of an Italian insurance company, for which he worked throughout 1928-33 in order to pay his father's debts. His employment with the insurance company offered him the opportunity to travel all over the country and get in touch 21

with the people and their problems — an experience which would be very helpful to his future political career.^

On December 13, 1929, he got his law degree, and three months later, on March 8, 1930, he reported for duty at the

headquarters of the Nineteenth Infantry Regiment in Serres.

Due to family responsibilities, his period of service was

reduced from 18 to four months. After he completed the

conscription-based military service in the army, he was

free to practice law, which he did with some success.

However, the ambitious Karamanlis was not content with a

career in law.

In 1932 he became a candidate for the Popular Party

(Laiko Komma) in his district. His father, however,

strongly opposed his candidacy and warned him of the

pitfalls of politics: "Either you will become untrue to

yourself in order to succeed, or you will remain an honest man and fail; in both cases you will suffer enormously."^

Constantine Karamanlis would later recall the substance of

his reply:

If what you have in mind is my settling down, living an orderly family life, you must realize that I will never be reasonable in that way. If I am ambitious, it is because I am concerned with other things, much more important than myself. Is that naivete? Perhaps I am naive. But I still do not believe that one's existence on

^Ibid., p. 9.

^Ibid., p. 11. 22

earth is justified by cultivating a bit of personal happiness. Everyone is a man in rela­ tion to other men — you know that very well, you have given proof of it. but everyone gives himself in his own way, according to time and circumstances. Today, for me, politics offers this opportunity. It is to my people that I want to devote myself, for them and through t h ^ I would justify my passage through the world.

The quarrel made it difficult for Karamanlis to take the decisive step immediately. He withdrew his candidacy from the general election of September 1938 and returned to his law practice in Serres. On November 21, 1938, his father died, knowing all along that one day his son would bypass his advice and get into politics.

There was another general election in March 1933, but naturally Karamanlis did not participate, owing to the fact that just four months had elapsed since his father's death.

Being the oldest son, he spent the next few years taking care of his family. In this regard, he ensured through his advice and financial resources that his three sisters would be provided with the necessary conditions that would lead to successful marriages, and his three brothers be given the opportunity to continue their education.

On June 9, 1938, Karamanlis took part in the general elections, and he was elected as a Deputy for the Popular

Party, When he returned to Athens for the first time since he was a student, he developed new social circles as a

^Genevoix, The Greece of Karamanlis, pp. 68-69. 23

Deputy. At first, Argyros was his political mentor, but he

soon formed a group with two or three other Deputies.

Among them was Lambros Eutoixias, a wealthy bachelor.

Other politicians soon noticed him, including the

Prime Minister, Panagis Tsaldaris. Although Karamanlis might still have given the impression of a self-conscious

provincial, his natural dignity and forthright speech

attracted notice-

His early progress, however, was soon interrupted.

His government was overthrown by militant royalists who,

following a plebiscite on November 3, 1935, restored King

George II by an overwhelming majority. The king, after his

return, dismissed the government and dissolved the Parlia­ ment to hold new elections in January 1936.

The Republicans participated in those elections, and

as a consequence the Popular Party fared badly. Even

though his party lost six out of the eight seats in

Karamanlis* district, Karamanlis managed to get re-elected.

Once again his political career was short-lived. On

the pretext of danger from the Communists, who had won 15

seats in the Parliament, Metaxas, an army general, persuad­

ed the king on August 4, 1938 to dissolve the Parliament,

to suspend parts of the constitution, and to grant him

emergency powers. His dictatorship, known as "Fourth of

August," lasted until his death in January 1941. By that

time Greece was at war with Italy, and a German invasion 24 was imminent. The Germans occupied Greece from 19 41 to

1944. The Greek Parliament did not meet from 1936 until 1946.7

During those ten years of political inactivity,

Karamanlis showed a capacity for silence and patience that would later exhibit itself in self-imposed exile from 1963 to 1974. It is striking that almost half (21 years) of his

50-year-long political career were spent in inactivity.

Although many political observers saw his aloofness and reserve in those years, beneath the surface his political fervor was unquenched.

In 1940 Karamanlis' mother died. The same year, he reported to join the army to fight against the Italians and later the Germans, but he was categorized as unfit for active service because of his deafness. After that, he returned to Athens, where he spent part of the four-year

German occupation. He rejected any collaboration with the enemy as well as he rejected armed resistance, because, as he put it later, "no movement of that period reflected my O own political ideas."

While in Athens, he took part in a group of Athenian intellectuals who had been meeting from time to time to discuss their nation's future. Many of them later played

7 Woodhouse, Karamanlis, pp. 21-22. Q Genevoix, The Greece of Karamanlis, p. 117'. 25 leading roles: Professor Constantine Tsatsos as President of the Republic, Professor Xenophon Zolotas as Governor of the Bank of Greece, Professor George Mavros as Foreign

Minister and leader of the centrist party.

In 1944 Karamanlis escaped from Athens in a fisher­ man's boat from Sounion and after many adventures arrived in Cairo at the time Athens was being liberated. Upon finding out of this event, he expedited his return to

Greece by flying back on a British aircraft with other political colleagues.

In 1946 the first elections were held. Constantine

Tsaldaris, the leader of the Popular Party, won the elec­ tions, and Karamanlis was elected in his district.

In the summer of 1946, he travelled to New York, where he was successfully operated on for his deafness. While in the United States, he paid a short visit to Washington, where he met an economic mission from Greece. Upon his return to Athens, he was appointed Minister of Labor on

November 24, 1946. At the age of 39, he had entered ministerial office for the first time.

On January 24, 1947, Tsaldaris' government was forced to resign and a coalition government was formed under

Demetrios Maximos. Although Karamanlis was appointed

Minister at the beginning, he was left with no ministerial post after a restructuring of the government on February 17 of that year. 26

On August 24, 1947, Maximos' government was replaced by another coalition government under Sophoulis, but

Karamanlis was not appointed Minister. It was only when

Sophoulis reformed his government in May 1948 that

Karamanlis was appointed Minister of Transport, Although his tenure as a Minister of Transport lasted only six months, his performance was noteworthy.

From November 18, 1948 to January 5, 1950, he headed the Ministry of Social Welfare. His new position was decisive in establishing his reputation. Apart from the normal problems of a relatively underdeveloped country, there were now nearly 700,000 refugees from the civil war, including some 400,000 in northern Greece. He faced the problems in such a way that he gained unanimous support from the press, which even used the term "indispensable" to 9 characterize his political and administrative skills.

In December 1949 the civil war ended with the Commu­ nist defeat. The coalition government which had ended the civil war broke up early in January 1950.

In the March 1980 elections the Popular Party was defeated. Karamanlis was re-elected but he was now in opposition. Some justification of Karamanlis' pessimistic view of Greece's political system can be traced to the fact that no less than 44 parties contested the 1950 elections.

^To Vima (Athens daily), August 11, 1949 27

In August 1950, Venizelos replaced Plostiros as Prime

Minister, and on September 13 he appointed Karamanlis, who was a representative of the Popular Party, to head the

Ministry of Defense. Testimony to the political instabil­ ity prevailing in Greece at that time was the fact that, from 1946 to the end of 1950, Greece had 11 different governments.

This period of uncertainty was ended by Papagos, a field Marshall hero of the civil war, who resigned his post as Commander in Chief at the end of May 1951 and entered politics. On the 30th of July, Papagos formed a new party called the "Greek Rally," and Karamanlis was the first to join it.

The general elections were held of September 9, 1951, and the result was a political deadlock. The Greek Rally won most of the seats, but without an overall majority.

Therefore, the opposition formed a coalition government.

In September 19852, a new electoral law introducing the majority system was presented to the Parliament. In the meantime, a major event happened in Karamanlis' life. He married Amalia Kanellopoulos, the niece of his political colleague Panayotis Kanellopoulos.

The period of political stagnation ended with the dissolution of Parliament in September 1952 and proclama­ tion of general elections for November 16. The Greek Rally won the elections by a landslide, winning 235 out of 300 28

seats. Although Karamanlis' relations with Prime Minister

Papagos were not warm, he managed to secure a cabinet position as Minister of Public works.

In three years, even though his relations with the

Minister of Finance, upon whom he was heavily dependent, were not very good, Karamanlis consolidated and expanded

his reputation.

Just as he had made the electricity supply his primary

target in 1948, he now gave the same priority to Athens' water supply. His way of acting was characteristic. He

solved Athens' water supply problems, ending a long disa­

greement about the way that this should be done. He

reorganized the administration of the two most important

harbors in Greece; Pariaeus and Thessaloniki. He initi­

ated a program of building new highways across Greece, and

in a few months he had changed the whole appearance of

Athens and Thessaloniki. He removed the rails and the obsolete trams, which obstructed the traffic in Athens, in

one night. To promote industrial developments in the

provinces, he increased hydroelectric power by building

dams on the Rivers Aliakmon and Axios in the north and

Acheloos in central Greece.

No one had dealt with practical problems in this way

before, and the press started praising Karamanlis. Even an

^^Woodhouse, Karamanlis, pp. 45-47 29 opposition paper wrote, "People believe he is the only 11 member of the government who actually works,"

By 1955 Papagos, in spite of attempts by other Minis­ ters who felt threatened and wanted to dismiss Karamanlis, recognized Karamanlis' assets to the government and added the Ministry of Communications to his jurisdiction.

The press had unanimously accepted Karamanlis and admitted that few Ministers had ever captured the public's esteem in such a comparatively routine department. A professor of architecture wrote in October 1954: "As one who has often in the past criticized the planning anarchy of Athens, I can not omit to praise the truly tremendous work of Karamanlis as unexampled in the history of .12 Greece.

In 1955 Prime Minister Papagos became seriously ill.

The king called Karamanlis and suggested to him that he would request Papagos' resignation and appoint Karamanlis in his place. Karamanlis expressed his gratitude for the king's confidence, but advised him against this idea, partly because it would be fatal for Papagos and partly because it would be attributed to the unhappy relationship between the king and Papagos.

^^Ebertheria (Athens daily), October 6, 1953. 12 Woodhouse, Karamanlis, p. 49. 30

Papagos died on October 4, 1955 and Karamanlis'

appointment came as a surprise. Many interpreted

Karamanlis' selection as an act of favoritism. However, no one could deny Karamanlis' record of achievement.

Karamanlis, upon taking power, disassociated himself

from the extreme right by announcing on January 4, 1956

that he would form a new party, the National Radical Union

(ERE), to contest the forthcoming general elections.

Although he did not achieve the overwhelming victory of

Papagos in 1952, he managed to emerge from the polls in

February 1956 with 165 seats out of 300. He governed from

1956 to 1963, winning the two consequent elections. In

those eight years in power, he was preoccupied mainly with

four issues.

The Cyprus Issue. Cyprus, occupied by Britain in 1878 and colonized by the same country in 1925, had a population

80 percent Greek and 18 percent Turkish. The Greek Cypriot

claim for self-determination, which aimed at uniting the

island with Greece, was confronted by British reluctance to

abandon its strategic presence in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The Greek Cypriot claim for self-determination and Britain's

intransigence inflamed nationalistic feelings in both

Greece and Turkey.

From 1950 to 1954, an anticolonial struggle was waged

on the island against the British, who at that juncture

decided to introduce Turkey as a counterweight to Greek 31

Cypriot demands for independence. The Turkish government

(apathetic vis-a-vis the conflict before 1954) assumed responsibility for the welfare of the Turkish Cypriots and eventually assumed full control of their affairs.

Britain's policy of "divide and rule" paved the way to an inter-communal conflict which gradually evolved into a confrontation between Greece and Turkey.

In 1959, after major diplomatic efforts undertaken by

Karamanlis, the three sides (Greece, Turkey, Great Britain) came to an agreement. In the meantime. Archbishop

Makourios, the political and spiritual leader of the Greek

Cypriot community, abandoned the "enosis" (unification) aspiration, which was countered by the Turks, and moved closer to Cypriot independence. Under these circumstances,

Greece, Turkey, and Great Britain signed the London-Zurich agreements in 1959 which, imperfect as they were, gave a realistic accommodation to the Greek-Cypriot demands at that time and also neutralized the dangerous MacMillan plan, which was paving the way for Cyprus' partition. Therefore, in 1959 Cyprus was proclaimed an independent republic, with

Britain, Turkey and Greece as its guarantors.

Industry. Another major aim of Karamanlis was to transform Greece into a modern industrial state. Drawing

P. Kitromilidis and T. Couloumbis, "Ethnic Conflict in a Strategic Area: The Case of Cyprus," The Greek Review of Social Research 24 (1975) ; 271-291. 32 from his previous successful ministerial experiences,

Karamanlis was one of the few leaders who could revitalize the Greek economy. Karamanlis had first-hand experience of the structural problems facing the Greek economy. He was the first Prime Minister who had known the hardships of village life and had himself worked in the fields with his hands. He had seen in his father's experience the risks of bankruptcy. As an insurance salesman he had come in con­ tact with the problems of middle- and working-class Greeks.

He had witnessed the sterile decade of dictatorship, war, and enemy occupation. Life had taught him what every peasant knew: that one cannot reap when one does not sow.

During the eight years of his premiership (1955-63), it was the first time that Greece embarked on the task to rid itself of the status of underdeveloped nation. In

1961, the government was able to issue a statement declar­ ing its intention of progressively converting the focus of national economic development from intensive agriculture to industrial expansion.

Relying upon foreign investments and foreign aid,

Karamanlis succeeded in transforming his country from a raw-material-exporting peripheral country of the world capitalist economy to a country of the European semiperi­ phery. This effort came to full fruition in 1979, with

Greece' full membership in the EEC. 33

When Karamanlis' first eight years of office ended in mid“1963, there were grounds for optimism about the nation­ al economy. The national income had nearly doubled in real terms. Income per capita had grown from $305 to $565 a year. Fixed capital investment, agricultural and industri­ al production, energy consumption all grew by nearly 100 percent. Examined by any economic standards, the rate of growth was impressive. The growth of agriculture and industry, together with that of tourism, substantially relieved the balance of payments. Reserves of foreign currency were more than doubled. Both public and private investments were also more than doubled, and private savings deposits were multiplied nearly ten times. The social sector was not neglected, while the national income grew by 96 percent in eight years. Expenditure on welfare grew by approximately 15% percent, and educational expendi­ ture by nearly 200 percent. For the first time, hospitals, schools and athletic facilities became virtually free of charge. Agricultural workers in particular benefited from free medical treatment, social insurance, pensions, subsi­ dies on marginal land, land distribution to poor peasants, and the rebuilding of homes destroyed by war and other disasters.

Looking back at Karamanlis' handling of the economy,

Greece had reached the state of economic development called

"take-off." Before leaving his premiership for the 34

Presidency in 1980, Karamanlis wrote a revealing note to explain his passionate dedication to economic development:

I believed that the defeats of our race were due to its age-old poverty, from which even ancient Greece was not free. And the worst thing was that these weaknesses manifested themselves principally in our political life, which was permanently unstable and erratic for precisely that reason. So my political philosophy was based on the view that for Greece to become a serious modern power, the Greeks must become good responsible citizens. But in order to become good citizens they must be freed from their weaknesses; and to be freed from their weaknesses they must first be freed from their poverty.

Reforming public life. Karamanlis had often spoken of this task. What he meant was that Greece should develop the habits of Western democracy. Politics meant more than the party system. It comprised the whole scope of organ­ ized life in a human community. What was needed, according to Karamanlis, was not simply a reform of the party system, but a modernization of Greek society. The modernization of the bureaucracy, the civil service, and the armed forces became his main goals. Karamanlis also tried to synchro­ nize Greece's institutions: the Church, the monarchy and the constitution itself.

He believed in homogeneous parties possessing coher­ ence and continuity. He wanted the parties to be unified by policies rather than personalities. He disliked coali­ tions, more so if they were formed only for electoral

14 Woodhouse, Karamanlis, p. 116. 35 purposes with no common policy and no intention of forming a united government.

Karamanlis' efforts to reform public life in Greece were partly frustrated by the centrist opposition and the extreme rightist parallel state, forces which had in common an aversion to Karamanlis' program.

The Crown was unfortunately involved in this internal situation which became no less than chaotic after the murder of Grigoris Lambrakis, an EDA Deputy (the front of the outlawed Communist Party), in Thessaloniki.

Karamanlis' relations with the royal family were far from normal. Beginning in 1960 with minor disputes over minor issues, such as the king's speeches, the royal expenditure and so on, Karamanlis' relationship with the Crown had reached an impasse by 1963.

The final friction came with the royal visit to

London. The queen had been the victim of attack by the wife of a Greek-imprisoned Communist on her previous visit to London, and Karamanlis objected to her visit because he was afraid that the recent embarrassment in London could be repeated.

The friction, which had deeper causes (the Crown extending its already powerful constitutional prerogatives in the political arena), was decisive, and Karamanlis resigned. The king, instead of dissolving Parliament and calling for elections, decided to appoint a government 36 which, following its confirmation by the Parliament, would

facilitate the Crown's goals; first to ensure that the royal visit to London would take place with the support of a government enjoying the confidence of Parliament; second­

ly , to change the electoral system to simple proportional representation, a system that would clearly favor the opposition.

Karamanlis was faced by a clear dilemma: either to back down or to deprive the new government of a vote of confidence, and in a sense to upset the Crown's plans. For

Karamanlis, both alternatives were unacceptable. His final decision amounted to no less than withdrawal from the Greek political scene. He saw it as the only way to resolve the dilemma between the two alternatives: either an open struggle with the Crown or a deviation from legality, with the inevitable consequence in either case of a renewal of the national schism. Moreover, his withdrawal was also an expression of his disappointment with the political system and the political morals prevailing at the time. In a letter addressed to his party before his departure for

Paris, he revealed:

My withdrawal from politics is not a consequence of personal bitterness. It is due to the absence of conditions which would make it possible to fulfil my mission, at least as I understand it. As I could not reform the political system in the way I saw it necessary^^it is better to withdraw than to compromise....

^^Constantine Tsatsos, 0 Agnostos Karamanlis [The Unknown Karamanlis] (Athens: Akdotiki, 1984), p. 171. 37

Looking back at his career during his self-imposed exile, Karamanlis summarized his pre-1963 political perfor­ mance under three headings : in foreign policy he had

inherited the problem of Cyprus, the quarrel with Turkey and Britain, the breakdown of the Balkan Pact, and uncer­ tainty about France's future in NATO. By settling the

Cyprus problem, he had averted war and restored the tradi­

tional ties of Greece with the West. Moreover, he had

formed a link with the EEC.

At home he had established a strong new party with a realistic program, turned his back on old divisions, pursued a democratic course, and avoided extremism.

Between 1955 and 1963 there had been eight years of poli­ tical stability, in contrast with the 15 governments of the pre-1955 11-year period and the nine governments of the

1963-1967 period.

In the economic field, Karamanlis claimed that the work of his government had been difficult but impressive.

He had inherited a backward country with a budget deficit and huge debts, and turned it into a potentially prosper­ ous, growth-oriented country.

Concerning accusations that he had tyrannically opposed the left, Karamanlis answered with numbers:

I found 4,498 Communists in prison and reduced them to 937.... I found 858 Communists in exile and reduced them to six. Moreover, all the measures against the left -- the imprisonment and exile of Communists, the security laws and 38

outlawry of the KKE, the introduction of 'certi­ ficates of political reliability,' and so on — had taken place before 1951, and most of them had been relaxed under my government.

Also, during his government annual expenditure on welfare had increased by 150 percent, and educational expenditure had increased from 7 to 10 percent of the budget.

As previously stated, his resignation had been caused by a dispute with the Crown. There had been four specific points of disagreement: the king's rejection of his advice to postpone the visit to London; the king's refusal to dissolve the Parliament after Karamanlis' resignation; the king's refusal to limit Papandreou's mandate in November

1963 to one of "exploration;" and the king's reluctance to summon the newly-elected Parliament immediately in order to clarity the political situation. In several cases, the king had given in entirely to Papandreou's demagoguery, according to Karamanlis.

Everything seemed set on a downhill course after the election of 1963. Karamanlis had forecast the inevitability of a "deviation" (ektropi) from constitutional democracy in

Greece, and unfortunately he was proven right. On April

21, 1967, a military group seized power in Athens.

Karamanlis remained in Paris during the dictatorship and made strong statements against the regime, characteriz­ ing it as a "tyrannical and illegitimate institution that

^^Woodhouse, Karamanlis, p. 168. 39 did not intend to restore democracy." He characterized the

17 dictatorship's political ideas as "medieval and theocratic."

The year 19 70 was perhaps the most depressing time of

Karamanlis' self-imposed exile. Apart from the failure to make an impression on the junta with his statements, it was also the year in which his marriage finally broke down. He divorced his wife Amalia, who returned to Athens in 1970 and remarried. Karamanlis did not. At that time it was confirmed that he was thinking of a return to political life by a question he put to his old-time friend Constantine

Tsatsos. Specifically, Karamanlis asked Tsatsos if a divorce would damage him politically; Tsatsos replied that 18 it would not, but that a remarriage would.

In 1974, the Greek junta launched a coup in Cyprus against Makarios which temporarily succeeded, but the attempt to assassinate Makarios failed. The Turkish government, exercising its right of unilateral action under the Treaty of Guarantee, invaded Cyprus on July 20, 1974 with the sole aim of establishing the state of affairs that that existed prior to the coup.

On July 22, the Athens junta collapsed and the Presi­ dent (General Gizikis) summoned a council of past Ministers

^7paulos Tjermios, 0 Karamanlis tou Andididaktorikou Agona [Karamanlis During the Dictatorship] (Athens: Roes, 1984), p. 201.

18 Tsatsos, O Agnostos Karamanlis, p. 122. 40

and other civilian leaders. After the meeting, and while no decision had been made, Avenoff (minister in the

Karamanlis governments from 1955 to 1963) foresaw that only a powerful man like Karamanlis could lead the country out

of its impasse. He called Karamanlis and begged him to

return. Karamanlis would not make his decision hastily in

response to Averoff's call. Then the Chiefs of Staff called him up, begging him to return at once. He replied

that he would come on the following day, but his plan met with the Chiefs' reply that Greece was involved in a crisis that did not allow even 24 hours' delay. Gizikis offered to send an aircraft to fetch Karamanlis at once, but in the meantime, French President Giscard d'Estaing, who had been closely following events in Athens, offered his own air­ craft, which Karamanlis accepted. It was a symbolic gesture of recognition that quickly echoed around the 19 w o r l d .

Karamanlis landed in Greece at 2:00 in the morning of

July 24, 1974. Big crowds were out in the airport and the streets to welcome him, holding candles. Recalling this occasion three years later, Karamanlis said:

I had often thought of the emotion I should feel when I set foot again on the soil of my country. And I may tell you that the thought brought tears

19 Roger Massip, Karamanlis; O Ellinas Pour Xehorise [Karamanlis: The Outstanding Greek] (Athens: Sideris, 1982), pp. 120-130. 41

to my eyes in anticipation. And yet never was I calmer, never did I have myself more completely under control, than at the moment when I arrived at the airport. And the reason was that my sense of the responsibilities which I was about to undertake was so intense as to stifle, to banish every other thought.

Karamanlis formed his first Council of Ministers, which was a coalition of personalities across the political spectrum. Meanwhile, a Constitutional Act promulgated on

August 1 , 1974 , restored the constitution of 1952 with certain modifications, including one crucial revision: the

President was substituted for the king until the people would decide by a plebiscite the type of Greece's political system.

Things were gloomy at the time. "The government was a 21 prisoner of the Army," as Averoff put it. There was a disproportionate concentration of troops in Attica, around

Athens. The Army had proved absolutely incapable of mobilizing against Turkey; it was seemingly incapable of carrying out its tasks aside from another coup d'etat.

Karamanlis' first major aim was to contain the crisis

in the armed forces. He presided at a conference in the

Pentagon, at which he demanded the dispersal of the mili­ tary units concentrated around Athens, partly because they were a threat to civil government and partly because they

20 Woodhouse, Karamanlis, p. 213. 21 Stavros P. Psycharis, Oi 70 krisimes imeres (Athens, 1976), p. 22 42 were needed to protect Greece's frontiers. When the generals raised objections, they met the full force of

Karamanlis' rage. It was then that he uttered the famous phrase, "Either me or the tanks," threatening that if they refused to implement his orders he would call for a mobili­ zation of the people at Syntagma square and use his appeal to public opinion to compel the generals to obey. His orders were duly carried out. The first battle on the 2 2 internal front had been won decisively.

On the external front the situation was ominous. In

Cyprus, legitimacy had been restored by the collapse of the coup and the replacement of the insurgents by Glavkos

Kleridas, the President of the Cypriot Assembly, who at the time assumed the position of Acting President of the

Republic, in accordance with the Constitution. A cease­ fire was achieved and talks had started in Geneva between

Great Britain, Greece and Turkey. However, on August 14, the Turks suddenly broke the talks, suspended the case-fire and renewed their advance on Cyprus at 5 a.m. The second invasion of Cyprus brought 40 percent of the island under

Turkish control.

As soon as Karamanlis found out about the attack, he convened a meeting at the Pentagon. He asked the Chiefs of

Staff whether any military action were feasible. He put

^^Ibid., pp. 15-37 . 43 before the Chiefs a proposal that called for a dispatch of three submarines to Cyprus aimed at attacking Turkish ships, and the dispatch of jet aircraft from Greece aimed at targets on Cypriot land. The Chiefs of Staff replied that any operation against Turkey was impossible because of the bad condition of the Greek army, the structure of which had been disrupted after seven years of corrupt dictator­ ship. Karamanlis accepted their advice, but after the meeting he summoned the full Council of Ministers. With their agreement, he instructed the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs to inform the NATO ambassadors that Greek forces were withdrawing from NATO command, though Greece would remain a member of the Alliance. Later he justified his decision on the following grounds :

I had to give some satisfaction to public opinion and to the armed forces; the decision gave enhanced prominence to the fate of Cyprus in the eyes of the world; it also created a reasonable expectation that the allies would take some initiative over Cyprus as the price of Greece's full return to NATO. Finally, under the threat of war, I had to have _full control over the country's armed forces.

During the next years, countless conferences followed and resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assem­ bly of the United Nations over Cyprus, but there was no substantive change.

23 Woodhouse, Karamanlis, p. 219 44

On the internal front Karamanlis had to complete the regeneration of the high military command, which had drawn the country into so many adventures. The regeneration was completed with the replacement of all the undemocratic elements of the army and with the trial of the colonels.

In the case of the Three Colonels it was foreseeable that sentences of death would be passed on them. As soon as they were announced, on August 23, 1975, Karamanlis sum­ moned a Council of Ministers. With their approval, he recommended to the President that the sentences be commuted to life imprisonment. His recommendation was accepted unanimously. He justified his decision by arguing that

Greek democracy would have been in much greater danger from the memory of three executed martyrs than from three foolish old men squabbling in jail.

On October 2, he called for elections for November 17,

1974. Two days later, a second Constitutional Act laid down the subsequent procedure. It provided that within 15 days after the election, the incoming government was required to proclaim a plebiscite on the form of the democracy. According to the outcome, either the king would immediately return to the throne or Parliament would elect a temporary President.

In the elections Karamanlis and his newly formed party,

"New Democracy," won 220 seats out of 300 and a majority of

54 percent. Less than a month later, on December 8, a 45 plebiscite was held to determine whether Greece would become a presidential or a royal democracy. Karamanlis took a strictly neutral position on the issue and forbade his Ministers to express their preference publicly, while at the same time allowing them a free vote. Karamanlis intended the plebiscite to be a genuine test of public opinion. Moreover, he wanted to avoid Venizelos* 1915 mistake of identifying his party with a particular system.

The result clearly showed the public preference for presidential democracy, by a margin of two to one.

In the subsequent years Karamanlis had a huge and complex task. At home he made democracy work again by eradicating all traces of the junta, purging pro-junta elements from the public services, re-equipping the armed forces, reviving the crippled economy, modernizing the country's institution and education, and restoring the people's self-respect. He solved Greece's constitutional problem decisively and in a way that nobody could dispute

— a problem that had divided Greece's political world for more than 60 years. He legalized the illegal (up to 1974)

KKE, the Greek Communist party. He put the dictators in jail with life sentences. In foreign affairs, he re­ established Greece's alliances, normalized Greece's rela­ tions with its northern neighbors, avoided a war with

Turkey, and joined the European Economic Community. 46

All these goals were not easily achieved and not without danger. During the first six months after his return, four attempts to eliminate him and one unsuccessful effort for a return to dictatorial rule were undertaken.

Even his personal life was at stake. The first years after his return he made a small motor yacht his home, anchored off Glyfada, within easy reach of a destroyer in case of any attempt against him.

With the réintroduction of the parliamentary process, a new constitution was adopted by 208 votes.

In 1977, new elections were held and Karamanlis and

New Democracy won again, capturing 4 2 percent of the popular vote and occupying 173 seats in Parliament.

Andreas Papandreou was now the official leader of the opposition.

During Karamanlis' second premiership, his principal aim became to finish the negotiations about Greece's entrance into the EEC. After intense personal diplomacy,

Greece signed the Treaty of Accession on May 28 in Athens.

During those years, Karamanlis initiated what could be termed "multi-dimensional foreign policy." The rapproche­ ment with Greece's northern neighbors was completed, while in relations with Turkey the way of negotiations was followed. The accession into the EEC was the end of a journey, as Karamanlis characterized it. It was "the 47 identification of our destinies.In this speech,

Karamanlis spoke of his personal emotion, of his "steady vision and unwavering faith in the need of a united

Europe," of the fulfillment after 18 years of one of his central beliefs, which he expressed as "the European 25 destiny of my country."

In 1980, an agreement allowing Greece's re-entry into the military command of NATO was concluded. The agreement was the culmination of hard negotiations between Greece and other NATO countries which had started in 1978, At the same time, negotiations about a new contract for the U.S. facilities in Greece began, and the the conclusion of a final agreement on the status of U.S. bases in Greece took place in 1983 under the government of Andreas Papandreou.

Under Karamanlis, the Greek right in 1974 underwent and apparently overcame a traumatic break with its past.

Ever since 1915, Royalism had been the most effective and central element of its ideology. Since at least 1935, it had been supplemented by virulent anti-communism, and after

1947 by unconditional Atlanticism as well. With the return to constitutional rule in 1974, the future prospects of the

Greek right urgently required a liquidation of this legacy, and a novel political project.

24 Speech for Greece's entrance into the EEC, May 28, 1979.

^^Ibid. 48

The remarkably smooth and successful transition would have been unthinkable without the charismatic authority and consummate leadership of Constantine Karamanlis. With New

Democracy, he was founding a new party in several respects

— a party of the moderate and modern right, or even the center-right. Under his firm guidance, the party emphati­ cally defined its ideology as "radical liberalism;" devel­ oped a modern organizational structure; espoused an ambi­ tious program of bourgeois modernization, crowned by Greek accession to the EEC; and finally chose George Rallis as

Karamanlis' successor to party leadership in 1980 (when

Karamanlis became President of the Democracy), in what was clearly the most orderly, close-run, and democratic elec­ tion of its kind in modern Greek history.

Having achieved many of his goals, in 1980 Karamanlis was faced with a crucial decision concerning his political future. The first five-year term of Constantine Tsatsos as

President was due to end in June. If Karamanlis wanted to succeed him, the decision had to be made soon. He decided to run for the presidency, and was elected President of the

Democracy by the Greek Parliament in the third ballot, in

May 1980, taking 183 votes.

The hardest task for Karamanlis was yet to come. In

October 1981, Pasok (Panhellenic Socialist Movement) and its leader, Andreas Papandreou, won the elections. From

1981 to May 3, 1985 (when Karamanlis resigned from the 49

Presidency), the coexistence of a conservative President

and a radical Socialist Prime Minister was unimpeded. The

Socialists implemented many internal social reforms without

any obstruction by Karamanlis, but stopped short of

withdrawing from NATO and the EEC and closing the U.S.

facilities in Greece, as they had promised before the

elections. The cooperation between President and Prime

Minister was ideal, and Papandreou went so far as to

characterize Karamanlis' Presidency as exemplary and to

propose Karamanlis as his party candidate for the new

Presidential election of 1985. However, five days before

Karamanlis' re-election, Papandreou withdrew his support.

Political analysts said Papandreou made the switch because

he felt he needed Communist support to win a new

parliamentary mandate in elections due in October.

The next day, March 10, 1985, Karamanlis resigned,

saying: "In view of the projected developments, in which I

cannot participate, as of today I terminate my services as

President of the Republic, resigning from the rest of my

term.

^^The New York Times, March 11, 1985. CHAPTER III

KARAMANLIS' OPERATIONAL CODE

Philosophical Beliefs

The Nature of Politics

Belief: The basic form of human interaction is conflict. Karamanlis postulates that individuals have needs and want to satisfy them. Selfishness in this sense

is a basic human instinct.^ One source of conflict is material goods. They corrupt people and create conflict 2 between the "haves" and the "have nots."

According to Karamanlis, the world today is in the midst of a crisis at the political, economic, and cultural

levels.

We are in a transitional period, characterized by uneasiness. People disappointed with their present way of life are searching for a new one. They mistrust the existing institutions and they are in search of new ones. They search for new values without, however, having defined their shape and context. This crisis threatens basic values^of our lives, like freedom, justice, and pea c e .

^Speech in Aihen, 4 May 1978. 2 Address to the Greek Parliament, 10 February 1975,

^Speech in Unesco, 25 November 1982.

50 51

According to Karamanlis, the locus of important causes of this crisis is found in the nature and behavior of man.

Karamanlis thus would fit perfectly in the first of the three images presented by Waltz in his classic book "Man, the State, and War."

The crisis of our era emanates from the minds and souls of people. There is the real front where the battle for the future of humanity will be given. The enemies are; selfishness — fanati­ cism -- intolerance — chauvinism — lust for power — and materialism. The battle, therefore, will be between ideas and materialism. Those ideas are the ideas of the classical years combined with the ideas of Christianity, The first taught us the power of logic, while the latter taught us the power of faith and love. These are the ideas that constituted the founda­ tion of Western civilization and led to the creation and development of the free democratic societies. Our duty is to reinforce those ideas; to show that detachnjpnt from them can lead humanity to disaster.

More specifically, Karamanlis attributes war to such causes as selfishness, narrow-mindedness, pusillanimity, and anachronistic nationalisms.

Belief; There is a variety of conditions that are indispensable for the establishment of peace.

(1) Able leadership.

Only an able leadership will master the uneasi­ ness of the people, which by itself is a force that cannot be ignored. An able leadership can guide this force and transform it into a creative one. This leadership should try to combine freedom with order and order with social justice. This leadership should try to advance our civilization and project, through education.

^Address to Pope John Paul II, 7 April 1982. 52

those values that can lead us out of the impasse. Education can help people to improve their lives and live peacefully. However, knowledge and education will be sterile if they do not have a human mission. We need this kind of education that will provide people not only with knowledge, but with morality too.

(2) Democratic conscience. According to Karamanlis:

Democratic conscience is essential not only for the formation and the prosperity of a national, but of the international community as well; because as in the national community arrogance for the laws turns democracy to anarchy, in the same way in the international society the nega­ tion of some fundamental rules of justice dis­ rupts the world order,

Karamanlis believes that it is unrealistic to underes­ timate the difficulty of harmonizing the conflicting interests and trends in a dynamic international society.

However, he argues, it is equally unrealistic to believe that the clash of those interests creates a balance of pow e r .

Belief: Conflict is a zero-sum game.

What is the fundamental character of one's political opponents and of other significant actors?

We can classify Greece's opponents during Karamanlis' partnership into two categories: (1) countries with different political systems, like Greece's northern Commu­ nist neighbors (Bulgaria, Rumania, Albania, Yugoslavia); and (2) an ally in NATO: Turkey.

^Speech in Unesco, 25 November 1982.

^Ibid. 53

Belief; With respect to the countries with different political systems from that of Greece, the two sides can exist peacefully and have friendly relations as long as they respect the other's political system and they do not challenge the existing status quo in the Balkan peninsula.^

Belief; Conflicts in the Balkan peninsula, as well as conflicts in any part of the world, could be solved by able leaders who can set aside the ephemeral antagonisms between their countries. This belief became strongly linked with

Karamanlis' policy choices. Namely, he managed with intense personal diplomacy to neutralize the "threat from the North" and establish such good and friendly relation­ ships with the three Presidents (Tito, Chamesky, Zivkov) that war with these countries is considered impossible today. Especially after 1974, Greece has strong economic, cultural, and political relations with those countries.

Those countries have ceased their demands over Macedonia, and therefore there are no more obstacles in their rela­ tions with Greece.

Belief; With respect to Turkey, this country has showed aggressiveness, especially after 1974, and aims to upset the balance of power in the Aegean. Karamanlis attributes Turkish aggressiveness to a chaotic internal political situation.

7 Address to the President of Rumania, 26 May 1975, 54

For many years, since he first came to power in 1955,

Karamanlis tried to avoid treating Turkey as an out-and-out

ineluctable foe. Karamanlis hoped that policies might be devised that would minimize the conflict and bring the two

sides to an agreement. His efforts brought the two sides to the London agreements concerning Cyprus in 1959, and generally introduced a climate of detente between the two countries up until 1963, when he was self-exiled. When he came back in 1974, after the restoration of democracy, relations between the two countries were at their lowest point. After the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, he introduced peaceful mechanisms to the solution of the conflict. He tried to solve the differences with Turkey with negotia­ tions (summit meetings with Turkish leaders) and adjudica­ tion (International Court of Hague).

Despite the clash of interests and the threat of another Turkish invasion, Karamanlis believed that peaceful g coexistence could be achieved. Belief; Nothing could bring Greece into a war with

Turkey unless Turkey violates Greece's national and terri­ torial integrity.

War can be avoided. It is our responsibility to find ways of solving our differences without resorting to war, and we have to exhaust every possibility in that effort. There are three ways to solve differences with another state; negoti­ ations, arbitration, war. Nations should exhaust

g Letter to Turkish Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel, 21 May 1976 55

all the peaceful procedures before resorting to war.

"However," he argued, "if Turkey perceives Greece's desire for negotiations as weakness it has committed a grave 10 error." Although the Turkish invasion of Cyprus was a profound shock to the relations between the two countries, this did not change Karamanlis' commitment to peaceful coexistence with Turkey and peaceful settlement of the dispute.

What is the nature of the contemporary international system?

Belief; The international system is one of anarchy, lacking a law-enforcing authority. It is a system charac­ terized by a struggle for power.Karamanlis' beliefs regarding the nature of the international system are linked with his orientation toward the two superpowers, the United

States and the Soviet Union. Almost all his statements characterize the international system as essentially conflictuel. Karamanlis argues that the East-West antago- 12 nism affects relations among all states.

g Address to Greek Parliament, 16 January 1979.

^^Address to Greek Parliament, 10 February 1975.

^^Speeches of 10 February 1975, 16 May 1975, 30 July 1975.

^^Speech in Helsinki, 30 July 1975. 56

Besides the East-West antagonism, there are other crucial issues that, according to Karamanlis, can threaten peace; the economic division of the world (North vs.

South, the demographic problem, and the energy problem.

Belief; An essential step to peace is disarmament.

"To achieve this goal," Karamanlis argues,

. . .we have first to establish security, because no one can decide to disarm if he does not feel secure. If we want to achieve a solution to the problem of disarmament and peace, we have first to arrive at a very advanced form of internation­ al society, which by itself will eliminate fear, distrust, prejudice, which are the main obstacles to disarmament.

To reach such an advanced form of international society,

Karamanlis postulates that we have to secure (1) universal respect of the charter and decisions of the United Nations and (2) the mechanisms through which the United Nations will impose its decisions. "Disarmament will provide the nations with the economic sources essential to treating human misery.

Belief; The two superpowers can coexist peacefully.

They both have an interest in pace and this can be a basis for the improvement of their relations. Two essential steps have to be made toward this goal, according to

Karamanlis: (1) they both have to respect the other's political system; (2) an effort should be made for the

^^Speech to the International Labor Organization, 17 June 1980. 57

elimination of mistrust and misperceptions between the two ^ . 14 countries.

Belief: The existence of a strong and prosperous

China will be an important factor in the future of the

balance of power of the world. The most important post-

World War II fact has been, according to Karamanlis,

China's exodus from its isolation and its projection into

the international scene. China, with its huge population

and its material and cultural forces, is destined to play

an important role in the international system.

Belief: The foreign policy of small nation-states is determined by the structure of the international system.

Karamanlis maintains that in a bipolar international

system, Greece cannot remain neutralized, because it will

be isolated and this will reinforce its adversary's

(Turkey's) position. An isolated small state can easily

become the victim of aggression, especially if it occupies

such a sensitive geopolitical location as Greece does.

Therefore, Greece has chosen to belong to the Western camp, with which it has the political-cultural and economic

affinities.

^^Speech in Helsinki, 30 July 1975.

^^Speech in China, 12 November 1979.

^^Address to Greek Parliament, 17 April 1976. 58

Belief; Greece's foreign policy is determined by its size and its capabilities. Greece is a small power, and therefore its influence on international events is limited.

However, Greece can use the only weapon of the small state, the international fora and International law, to promote 17 peace and justice in the world.

What are the Prospects for the Eventual Realization of One's Fundamental Political Values and Aspirations?

Belief; Democracy and political stability are essen­ tial for a nation's progress.

The selection of the appropriate political regime and the unimpeded function of it is essential for the progress of a nation. This regime should be selected according to the specific social, economic and cultural conditions of the country that will be applied. For Greece the ideal regime is a Western-type democracy, a democracy based upon (a) alternation of parties in power, (b) many parties, (c) popular mandate. Democracy is reliant upon self-restraint and respect for the laws. The function of democracy presupposes the existence of parties with long traditions, principles and programs, and respon­ sible leadership. The Constitution is just the framework of democracy and can not guarantee the existence of democracy in the absence of the above elements. If there is not a balance between the instinct of freedom that people have and respect for the laws, then^ gdemocracy becomes either anarchy or tyranny.

l^Ibid. 18 Letter to the ex-president of the Greek Democracy and friend of Karamanlis, Constantine Tsatsos, written in 1966 . 59

Belief; National unity is important for the survival of small nations.

Karamanlis knows that the political parties have their own interests and programs and therefore can sometimes be very antagonistic. "However," he argues,

...those antagonisms should not surpass the limits drawn by basic morality and national interests. Interests which, aside from the ideological differences, can not be ignored by. nation without the danger of self-destruction.

Drawing from Greece's history and having experienced a national schism between the king and Venizelos, many coups, dictatorships, a civil war, and many governmental crises,

Karamanlis believes that Greece has to be united in order to prosper. To avoid another national schism, Karamanlis preferred 11 years of exile in Paris when he disagreed with the king in 1963. Moreover, when democracy was restored in

Greece in 1974, Karamanlis solved Greece's political problem by letting the people choose by a referendum the type of political regime they wanted (royal or presidential democracy), thus terminating a problem that had aggravated

Greek political life for more than 60 y^ars. In this referendum, Karamanlis and his party held a neutral stance in order to avoid influencing the votes.

Belief; Unity is essential at the regional level too.

Europe's unity has to be achieved in order for it to survive. A united Europe would create a more

19 ^Ibid. 60

balanced international system. It would secure Europe's independence and would contribute to the consolidation of world order and peace. A united Europe will have the power to influence decisive­ ly international developments. Only within a united Europe is there a chance for democratic institutions to be re^ymed and adapted to the conditions of our era.

A united Europe, according to Karamanlis, will give economic solutions to its people and will serve the idea of economic justice and development of the less-developed countries. Isolationism and tariff barriers are, according to Karamanlis, obsolete models of economic and political development. Europe's and humanity's problems presuppose the logic of bigger space and bigger numbers to find their right solutions. Solutions to those problems can be given by Europe's political unification.

Karamanlis is pessimistic about the future of demo­ cracy. Belief: There are two elements that threaten democracy: (a) totalitarian elements like communists and

fascists who exploit the democratic institutions in order to overthrow democracy, and (b) the indifferent/apolitical citizens who are not eager to defend themselves and demo­ cracy. These two elements make maneuvers in foreign policy very difficulty, and also make the imposition of unpopular but necessary economic and social measures, especially necessary during periods of crisis to save the economy and

20 Speech at the ceremony for Greece's entrance into the EEC, 28 May 1979. 61

democracy, impossible. These two elements have paralyzed

democracy.

Belief; Stable democracies are those that are based

on two elements; government and opposition. According to

Karamanlis, the opposition in a democracy plays a role as

important as that of the government.

In the early 1960s, two main leaders of the opposition

in the Greek Parliament, George Papandreou (father of

Greece's Prime Minister, Andreas Papandreou) and Sofoklis

Venizelos, asked Karamanlis to collaborate with them and

allow them to participate in his government. Karamanlis,

instead of accepting their proposals and therefore elimi­

nating the opposition, advised them to unite and form a 21 strong party that could alternate with his party in power.

It is not an exaggeration to say the Karamanlis thus

contributed to the foundation of Center Union, which

succeeded him in power and governed Greece from 1964 to

1966.

Belief: The world situation is bad and seems hope­

less, but by doing what must be done one may save the world

from becoming worse. According to Karamanlis, there is no

promise or guarantee that the world can avoid war or

catastrophes. The record of the past does not offer

grounds for much hope. The two world wars, the armament

21 Tsatsos, O Agnostos Karamanlis, p. 204. 62 race, anachronistic nationalisms, selfish economic competi­ tion, narrow-mindedness and pusillanimity do not offer ground for much hope. However, besides all these problems and besides the ethnic, geographic, ideological and other differences, there are points of congruence between people, on the basis of which trust can be built that will bring about security and peace. The answer to those problems lies with people themselves.

With respect to Greece, Karamanlis was pessimistic about the seeming incapacity of Greek citizens to do what was needed to be done in time to regain control over their destiny. "If there is one general deficiency of Greeks it is our failure to recognize the length of time it takes to achieve good results. We lack the patience, persistence 22 and coordination in order to succeed in our efforts." In the same interview Karamanlis said,

I have failed in the most important aim of my career; that was to make the Greeks responsible, democratic citizens. When I first went into politics, I thought Greeks were very individual­ ist and poor at working collectively because they were poor. Being poor makes you cunning and conniving. So I thought, well. I'll make them richer. to some extent I did. But nothing changed.

22 Interview in the Washington Post, Sunday, 29 April 1984 . ^^Ibid. 63

Mastery or Control of Historical Development

Belief: Man has it within his power to control and master his destiny. In the aftermath of the Cyprus inva­ sion, when dictatorship had fallen in Greece, leaving

Karamanlis with an onerous and heavy heritage, he believed that things could change to be better. He argued then that

"national crises like this one usually lead to disaster.

However, it is up to the people’s will to make this nation­ al crisis a starting point of a national regeneration."^^

Belief: Control and mastery of our historical devel­ opment can be achieved by applying pragmatic approaches to politics instead of theoretical abstractions.

Belief; The problems people face in their social life are problems created by the working or not working of human intelligence; in other words, by our own actions. "It is widely accepted," Karamanlis argues,

...that the biggest and most permanent problems of humanity are war and human misery. The solution of those problems is possible and easy if logic prevails. If we gradually reduce defense expenditures, we will have eliminated the dangers that threaten peace and will have foun^^ the economic sources to eliminate human misery.

Karamanlis believes that we have the power to give shape and direction to reality. He recognizes that no

24 Speech over Greek television, 8 November 1974. 25 Speech at Unesco, 25 November 1982. 64 policy is a universal solution, but he believes that many problems can be solved, provided that the statesmen discov­ er the "missing components," the presence of which would make a difficult solution manageable. Such a missing component that, if found, could solve many international problems is, according to Karamanlis, trust between people and countries. The elimination of distrust is an essential step in East-West relations, in order to proceed to disar­ mament.

Belief; The dynamic prevails over the static.

Karamanlis believes that life is dynamic and not static.

Deterministic philosophies of history often pose a knotty dilemma for the political sector. For Karamanlis, theoret­ ical abstractions have no value whatsoever. What is important is their real application. If history is moving inexorably toward some fixed end, then what is the role of political man? Karamanlis, although a Christian, believes that progress would be conditional upon action by the people to hasten the processes of history, and not only upon a moral or natural law about humanity, determining right and wrong.

Predictability of Historical Development

Belief: The only thing one can anticipate is the unexpected. The future is not predictable, according to 65

Karamanlis. In a complicated and incongruous world, things can not be easily predicted. Karamanlis argues that, in the social/political world, the same decision made in a 2 6 different time can yield different results.

The Role of Chance

Belief; Chance can not be eliminated, but can be reduced to a minimum. Karamanlis believes that important events in world politics, like war, that are often regarded as determined largely by chance, are in fact subject to an important measure of control.

Belief: The statesman must base his decision upon the greatest amount of knowledge and information possible, not upon mere intuition. Karamanlis accepted the incomplete­ ness of his information about situations with which he had to deal. However, that was no excuse for not knowing as much as one could or for relying upon others to do one's thinking.

Belief: War by miscalculation represents a great danger to peace. Referring to the Greek-Turkish conflict,

Karamanlis has repeatedly stated that the two sides should eliminate any misperceptions that exist between them.

Belief: History provides us with knowledge that can help us understand or predict (to a certain extent) the

2 6 Address to Greek Parliament, 28 February 1975. 6 6

future. Karamanlis is very well read in Greek and diplo­ matic history, as well as ancient Greek philosophers. He

argues that the problems within and between nations are

similar to those described by Plato and Thucydides.

Instrumental Beliefs

Selecting Goals for Political Action

Belief: A pragmatist approach to international

politics is much better than an ideological approach.

Karamanlis believes that a pragmatist approach to interna­

tional politics, one that sees things in a problem-solving way, is more flexible than an ideological approach and can

adapt more easily to the situation.

Studying Karamanlis' foreign policy, one can define

two facets of it without necessarily contradicting each

other. As a leader of a small nation, Karamanlis based his

foreign policy on moralistic principles and always stressed

the importance of international law, international organi­

zation, and the United Nations Charter. As a pragmatist

leader, however, he had the virtue of accepting an imper­

fect solution to a difficult issue rather than holding out

for the ideal. As a pragmatist leader, he signed the

Zurich-London agreements in 1959 which, imperfect as they were, gave a realistic accommodation to the Greek Cypriot

demands at that time and also neutralized the dangerous Mou 67

Millou plan, which was paving the way for Cyprus' bisec­

tion .

Belief: Some parts of the world are more important

than others. A pragmatist strategic view, as distinguished

from a ideological one, requires that the statesman differ­

entiate among various areas of the world in order of their

strategic importance. It also requires that judgements be made about the risks and cost-effectiveness of undertaking

action in one area as opposed to another.

Because of Greece's geopolitical location and its

cultural affinities with Western Europe, Karamanlis consid­ ered Western Europe very important to Greece. Another

important area, for its own reasons, was the Balkan coun­

tries. Even though he had to deal with countries of

different political systems based on different ideologies,

Karamanlis managed to develop relations of mutual respect

and friendship. Even with Turkey he had established good

relations during his premiership from 1955 to 1963, and

there are many observers who argue that had he been prime minister in 1974 the Cyprus invasion would have been

avoided.

How Are the Goals of Action Pursued More Effectively?

Karamanlis' major foreign policy objective was based

on three elements: national independence, national secur­

ity, and national dignity. To achieve these three 68 objectives, Karamanlis had two prerequisites: (1) Greece has to maintain its democratic institutions and its politi­ cal stability and unity. The political parties have to abandon demagoguery and put the national interests above their antagonisms. (2) Greece can achieve its foreign policy objectives only within the Western camp. That, however, did not mean that Greece would continue to be heavily dependent upon the West, especially the United

States. Karamanlis* motivation was to make Greece an equal member of the EEC. Therefore, the relationship of depen­ dence with the United States would give place to a rela­

tionship of interdependence with the countries of the EEC, wherein Greece could veto any decision against its national

interests. Moreover, strong cultural affinities with

Western Europe made Greece's entry into the EEC a primary goal for Karamanlis.

We should not forget that Europe, with its Greek name, has a civilization which is a synthesis of the Greek, the Roman and the Christian spirit. A synthesis in which ancient Greece has offered the ideas of freedom, truth and beauty; the Romans contributed the ideas of state and law; and finally, Christianity contributed the ideas of faith and love.

Greece's membership in the EEC assured that within the

framework of European solidarity, national independence and democratic institutions are secured for all countries and

27 Speech for Greece's entrance into the EEC, 28 May 1979 . 69 the economic development of the less-developed countries will be accelerated.

Greece's participation in NATO is essential according to Karamanlis, because withdrawal from NATO and consequent withdrawal of U.S. bases would tilt the U.S. policy consid­ erably toward Turkey, reinforcing the letter's position economically and militarily. This consideration made him return to the military part of NATO from which he had withdrawn after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus.

Belief; Every nation can progress only if challenged with a new ideal, a national goal toward which to strive.

Since 1821, when the Greek state gained its independence from the Ottoman Empire, the national goal was the libera­ tion of that part of Hellenism that was still under Turkish domination. This was the Megali Idea (Great Idea), which ceased to exist after Greece's defeat by Turkey in 1897.

Therefore, Karamanlis' aim was to inspire the Greek nation with new ideals. These new ideals were (a) Greece's entrance into the EEC and its contribution to the effort of

Europe's political unification, and (b) emphasis on

Greece's historical and cultural presence. Karamanlis recognized that it is difficult for Greece to contribute to the world's technological advancement. However, Greece could contribute to the progress of the world's civiliza­ tion and culture. 70

Calculating and Controlling the Risks of Political Action

Belief: The slow, deliberate process of negotiations is the best means to maximize the chances for realizing one's goals. Negotiations and arbitration occupy a pivotal position in Karamanlis' operational code. It is much safer than the use of force. Morally, the negotiation process is the most appropriate way to insure that foreign policy is based on a sense of self-limitation, respect for human dignity, and tolerance for the aspirations of others.

Strategically, according to Karamanlis, negotiations are necessary in order to establish trust between countries, an essential step toward peace.

Because Karamanlis' own philosophy contains the principles of self-limitation and tolerance for other philosophical positions, his transcendent negotiating objective is to communicate this aspect of his own foreign policy to other nations and persuade them to have their policies on a similar sense of limits. A characteristic example, again, is his policy vis-a-vis Greece's Communist neighbors who, although they had repeatedly made claims on

Greek sovereignty, finally accepted the status quo.

With Turkey, Karamanlis followed the road of negotia­ tion and arbitration, even after the Turkish invasion of

Cyprus. 71

What is the Best Timing of Action to Advance One's Interests?

Belief: Timing is very important to the achievement

of major long-term aspirations.

Belief: In dealing with allies and others, it is

appropriate to act rapidly and decisively to exploit every

opportunity for developing strength and unity and accommo­

dating one's demands.

By its very nature, problem-solving diplomacy requires

a sense of timing. A statesman cannot simply wait to

react; he has to be alert to the possibilities and be prepared to take advantage of them. A statesman has to work patiently to get one situation in order to be able to

arrange the next.

An example of the personal diplomacy and perfect

timing was the decision about Greece's entrance into the

EEC. After the restoration of democracy in Greece in 1974,

Karamanlis felt that the time was appropriate for Greece to

apply for membership in the EEC. However, this application was followed by an intense personal diplomacy in Europe, especially West Germany, France, Italy and Great Britain, which avoided all the obstacles and culminated finally in

Greece's accession to the EEC in 1979. 72

Utility of Means for Advancing One's Interests

Belief; War is not the best means for advancing one's

goals. A war with Turkey would not advance Greece's

interests, according to Karamanlis, This did not mean that

a nation should not prepare for war. But Greece should not

rely upon war as a means of accomplishing its objectives.

There is no doubt that the conviction that war is the wrong way for Greece to accomplish its objectives led

Karamanlis to avoid war with Turkey in 1974 after the

Turkish invasion of Cyprus and prefer the method of negoti­ ation and arbitration.

Belief; The means employed by a democracy must be consistent with its ideals and with the limits imposed by

the nation-state system. CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS OF THREE FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS

In this chapter I will examine three major foreign policy decisions undertaken by Karamanlis, and I will try to assess the impact of his operational code beliefs, analyzed in the previous chapter, on his policy preferences and choices of action.

Foreign policy decisions can be subdivided into three major categories.^ The first category is that of "crisis decisions." Crisis can be defined in terms of sudden and grave threat, limited time in which to respond, and ad hoc reaction in the sense that there are no planned responses available. One such important crisis decision was made by

Karamanlis in August 1974. It was the decision to withdraw from the military branch of NATO following the second wave of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus.

The second category is that of "programmatic deci­ sions." These are decisions that can lead to a series of long-range consequences as a result of an important foreign

Theodore A. Couloumbis, "The Structures of Greek Foreign Policy," in Greece in the 1980s, ed. Richard Clogg (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1983), pp. 95-122.

73 74

policy choice. One such important decision was Greece's entry into the European Economic Community.

The third category is that of "tactical decisions."

These decisions have short-term, rather than strategic,

significance, but they help us shed light on the nexus of the relative potency of influential factors in the foreign policy formulation process.

Prior to 1974, the political authorities of Greece

(Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Coordination Minis­

ter) were heavily influenced in their decision-making by

the following factors: (a) the throne (prior to 1967);

(b) the military; (c) the United States, acting through diplomatic channels or through pressures applied by factors a and b; (d) the Greek diplomatic services; (e) public opinion and the press; (f) government and opposition party planks.

Since July 23, 1974, after the collapse of the junta, the situation has changed dramatically. The throne has been removed from the scene. The role of the military has been limited. The influence of the United States has been decreased. The role of the diplomatic service has also been decreased, and the center of decision-making gravity has moved to the cabinet (especially the office of the

Prime Minister).

Since 1974, and until his elevation to the Presidency

in May 1980, Constantine Karamanlis, supported by his 75

National Security Advisor, Petros Molyviatis, a member of the career diplomatic service, has emerged as the single overwhelming influential locus of decision-making author­ ity. Hence, cognitive variables play a dominant role, in the case of Greece and Karamanlis, in the analysis of important foreign policy decisions. Three such decisions will be examined: (1) Greece's withdrawal from the mili­ tary part of NATO, (2) Greece's entry into the EEC, and (3)

Karamanlis' decision to go into exile in 1963.

Decision I : Withdrawal from the Military Part of NATO (1974)

In July 1974, the Greek dictatorship launched a coup against Archbishop Makarios in Cyprus. The dictators had despised Makarios from the first minute of their accession to power, because they claimed that Makarios, with his alleged Communist sympathies, jeopardized both the prospect of "enosis" (unification) with Greece and the position of the Western Alliance in the Eastern Mediterranean. Fur­ thermore, they believed that unification (with some conces­ sions to Turkey) had been blessed by the United States as the best way of bringing Cyprus within NATO, at the same time getting rid of the "red priest." The junta saw

Makarios as an independent presiding over half a million

Greeks. It was under these assumptions that the Greek military regime launched the coup against the Archbishop in 76

July 1974 and subsequently allowed Turkey to invade the island.

It was obvious that the Turkish factor had been underestimated in this naive equation of the junta's interests with those of the United States. Turkey, already on bad terms with the Greek dictatorship over claims on the continental shelf of the Greek Aegean islands, had an uncompromising attitude over Cyprus. Furthermore, U.S.- 2 Turkish relations had evolved since the Johnson era.

Prior to the coup against Makarios, Ankara had informed

Washington of its decision to obstruct restrictions of opium production, thus asserting its own interest on that matter over American pressures.

Although the Turks did not react to the coup immedi­ ately, they soon saw it as a golden opportunity to exercise the right of intervention conferred to them by the 1980 3 Treaty of Guarantee. International detente had minimized the possibility of an effective Soviet reaction, and the junta's choice of an old enemy of the Turkish community,

Nicos Sampson, to replace Makarios, sealed the fate of the island. As an important Turkish diplomat put it:

2 In 1964, fighting broke out between the two communi­ ties on the island, which caused considerable hardships to the outnumbered Turkish Cypriots. It was through President Johnson's personal warning to the Turkish Prime Minister, Ismet Inonu, that an invasion was warded off that summer.

^T. Ehrlich, Cyprus 1958-67 (Oxford: 1974), pp. 65-86. 77

The Greeks committed the unbelievably stupid move of appointing Sampson, giving us the opportunity to solve our problems once and for all. Unlike 1964 and 1967, the U.S. leverage on us in 1974 was minimal. We could no longer be.scared off by the threats of the Soviet bogeyman.

As the Turkish forces landed near Kyrenia, the junta in Athens ordered a chaotic general mobilization, the implementation of which betrayed the regime's total unpre­ paredness for such an eventuality. According to a Greek official who had access to classified records of the invasion ;

Even as the Turkish ships were steaming towards the shore, the Greeks had no orders from their commanders to shoot. The national guard was sending messages: "The ships are coming, there are planes overhead, but have no orders to fire." It was only when the Turkish paratroopers began landing over Nicosia tha± a reaction was ordered by the Greek commanders.

In a matter of days the military regime disintegrated. On

July 23, 1974, the junta handed over power to a civilian government under Karamanlis, who was summoned from Paris after an absence of eleven years.

While the invasion had stopped and talks had started in Geneva, the Turks broke the cease-fire and put into effect the second phase of their invasion, known as Attila

II, on August 14. By August 16, 40 percent of the island had come under Turkish control, and 200,000 (roughly a

4 Lawrence Stern, The Wrong Horse (New York: Time Books, 1977), p. 117.

^Ibid., p. 121. 78 third of the island's population) Greek Cypriots, displaced from their homes, flocked into improvised refugee camps in the southern part of Cyprus. Since the status quo had been restored during the first days of the invasion, Attila II had no legal basis, except to consolidate Turkey's position on the island.

Following the second Turkish invasion, Karamanlis called for a meeting at the Pentagon at 6:00 in the morning of the 14th of August, one hour after the invasion had begun. The participants were: Karamanlis (Prime Minis­ ter) , Evangelos Averoff (Minister of Defense), George

Rallis (Minister to the Prime Minister), and the Chiefs of

Staff.

After the Chiefs of Staff gave a background of the situation, Karamanlis asked them whether any military solution was feasible. In particular, he proposed to dispatch three submarines to Cyprus to attack Turkish ships, and jet aircraft from Crete to attack Turkish targets on Cypriot land. Following a staff conference which lasted half an hour, the Chiefs of Staff replied that those operations were impossible. Karamanlis accepted their advice, but ordered the concentration of a division in Crete, with armored fighting vehicles, for a convoy to

Cyprus. As soon as the meeting ended, he summoned the full

Council of Ministers, together with former Prime Ministers.

With their agreement, he instructed the Ministry of Foreign 79

Affairs to inform the NATO ambassadors that Greek forces were withdrawing from NATO's military command, though

Greece would remain a member of the alliance. The remark­ able speed of his reaction can be judged from the fact that his decision was made public at 9 a.m. on August 14, four hours after the Turkish attack had begun.^

His proposal for military action might at first be considered short-sighted. However, given the fact that the second intervention was clearly an aggressive expansionist drive, which was in direct violation of international law,

Karamanlis had no other choice but to defend Greek national interests. It is yet unclear whether this proposal for the specific military action was conceived by Karamanlis himself or was recommended to him by a group of military and civilian advisers.

Turning to his decision to withdraw from NATO on

August 14, 197 4, one realizes that the choices were limit­ ed. Since the option of going to war with Turkey was excluded, Karamanlis was left with the following options;

(A) withdraw from both parts of NATO, political and

military ;

(B) withdraw from the military command of NATO;

(C) remain in NATO but suspend the operation of U.S.

installations in Greece;

^Psycharis, Oi 70 krisimies imeres, pp. xO-37 80

(D) remain in NATO and allow the functioning of U.S.

installations in Greece;

(E) withdraw from NATO and suspend the operation of U.S.

bases in Greece.

I will now examine each option separately and assess the influence of Karamanlis' operational code beliefs on his final decision.

A. Withdrawal From Both Parts of NATO

Such a decision seems not favored by Karamanlis for the following reasons:

(a) Greece's withdrawal from NATO would cut any link with

the West, since Greece had yet to become a full member

of the EEC, and it would put Greece in an isolationist-

neutralist position. Such a decision would have run

against Karamanlis' instrumental belief concerning the

need for Greece to achieve its foreign policy objec­

tives only within the Western camp.

(b) Greece's withdrawal from both parts of NATO might have

hampered Karamanlis' long-term plan for a full member­

ship in the EEC. One of the reasons that Greece

returned to the military command of NATO concerned the

easy and fast accession of the country to the EEC.

This fact must have influenced Karamanlis in his deci­

sion because, according to a source, he believed the

Greece's entry into the EEC is the most significant 81

event in Greece's history in the last 100 years, even

the last 1,000 years.^

(c) Greece's total withdrawal from NATO would immediately

tilt the United States and NATO toward Turkey, rein­

forcing the letter's position politically and militar­

ily.

(d) Such an action would have been applauded by Greek

public opinion. It was a way to diffuse the extreme

public pressure that had built up at that time.

(e) Greece's total withdrawal from NATO would have ham­

pered, to a considerable degree, the acquisition of

arms or spare parts for the Greek military, at a time

when the modernization of the Greek army was vital to

the country's security.

(f) Greece's total withdrawal from NATO would have sig­

nalled Greece's dissatisfaction with all of the

guarantor powers of the Treaty of Guarantee (Great

Britain and Turkey). It would also acknowledge United

States inaction, as well as complicity to Turkish

invasion.

Complete withdrawal from NATO was avoided mainly

because of idiosyncratic variables: Karamanlis' beliefs were against a complete disruption of links with the West,

which would lead to Greek isolation. The idiosyncratic

^Couloumbis, "The Structures of Greek Foreign Policy," p. 122. 82 variables were reinforced by situational factors as well, namely the fact that complete withdrawal from NATO would reinforce Turkey's position and, moreover, deprive Greece of the necessary military aid.

B. Withdraw from the Military Part of NATO

Such a decision would have the following effects;

(a) It would acknowledge Britain's complicity (as a member

of N A TO).

(b) Since a military option was foreclosed, it would

"punish" Turkey (as a member of NATO).

(c) It would not sever Greece's links with the West.

There was also the precedent of France, which does not

participate in the military command of NATO but is,

after all, a Western power.

(d) It would not hamper Greece's entry into the EEC.

(e) It would not stop the flow of arms to Greece.

(f) It would not alienate the U.S. and would not disrupt

the 7:10 ratio.

(g) Greece would maintain its leverage to exercise pres­

sure on Turkey through NATO.

(h) It would not impede communication with the West.

(i) It would satisfy public opinion.

(j) It would boost the Cyprus issue on the international

scene. 83

It is obvious that such a decision could be made without threatening Karamanlis' central beliefs. Specific­ ally, it did not jeopardize Greece's position in the

Western camp and did not hamper Greece's entry into the

EEC.

C. Remain in MATO but Suspend the Operation of U.S. Facilities in Greece

This option would have the following consequences:

(a) It would satisfy Greek public opinion to a certain

extent.

(b) It would trigger a decisive U.S. tilt toward Turkey,

possibly disrupting the 7:10 ratio of aid to Turkey's

favor.

(c) It would hold the U.S. responsible for the dictator­

ship in Greece and the Cyprus tragedy, but it would

have sent no signal for punishing Great Britain's

complicity and Turkey's aggressiveness.

(d) It would not hamper Greece's entry into the EEC.

This option does not seem inconsistent with Karamanlis' beliefs. By suspending U.S. facilities in Greece, Greece's links with the West would not be severed to a damaging degree, and Greece's entry into the EEC would not be hampered. However, such a decision would have put the blame for the dictatorship in Greece and the Cyprus tragedy on the wrong parties. Moreover, it would have reinforced 84

Turkey's position and disrupted the 7:10 ratio of aid and would have left Turkey and Great Britain unpunished.

D. Remain in NATO and Allow the Functioning of U.S. Installations in Greece

This option was excluded because it would have alien­ ated public opinion, and it would have meant the acceptance of Turkish aggressiveness as well as the new status quo.

Such a decision would have amounted to political suicide.

E. Total Withdrawal from NATO and Consequent Suspension of U.S. Installations in Greece

This decision, if made, would have isolated Greece from the Western camp and would have hampered Greece's entry into the EEC. It was therefore inconsistent with

Karamanlis' beliefs. Moreover, it would have reinforced

Turkey's position dramatically.

This decision was a maximalist position with some gains in the short run (public opinion, bringing Cyprus to the fore of the international scene), but catastrophic in the long run.

Conclusion

Looking back at the aftermath of Karamanlis' decision to withdraw from the military branch of NATO and not suspend the operation of U.S. bases, it becomes clear that his decision was appropriate. As Figure 1 shows, it was 85 the only option that was consistent with Karamanlis' central beliefs and at the same time satisfied all the situational variables without incurring unacceptable costs to Greece.

Figure 1.

Option

AB C DE

Consistent with Karamanlis' beliefs No Yes Yes Yes No

Satisfy situational variables No Yes No No No

Decision II: Greece's Entry into the EEC

From the early steps of his career, Karamanlis was determined to make his country a member of the EEC. As early as the middle of 1958 the prospect of a Treaty of

Association with the EEC, leading eventually to full membership, was discussed within the Council of Ministers, 86

After talks with the Germans, the French, and the

Italians, Karamanlis opened formal negotiations with the

EEC in 1959. By June the negotiations were in progress.

There was initially some reluctance on the part of the six members of the EEC. However, agreement in principle was eventually reached, and announced in a joint communique on

October 17. After the removal of a few obstacles, intro­ duced mainly by the Italians, the treaty was formally signed in Athens on July 9, 1961.

During the dictatorship the treaty was "frozen" as the

EEC's reaction to the dictatorship.

When democracy was restored in 1974 and Karamanlis became Prime Minister again, one of his primary goals was

Greece's full membership in the EEC. Early in 1975, he started a program of acute personal diplomacy, visiting all the member countries of the EEC and trying to surmount any obstacle in the way of Greece's entry into the EEC. This effort ended on May 28, 1979, when Greece's treaty of accession was signed in Athens.

This decision was a programmatic foreign policy decision made by Karamanlis himself and largely influenced by his operational code beliefs. Studying the process of this decision, we can trace its origins back to 1958, merely one year after the Treaty of Rome in 1957. The fact that this was a personal decision clearly influenced by his belief system was revealed by Karamanlis himself when he 87

spoke of "my personal emotion, my steady vision and unwa­ vering faith in the need for a united Europe... the fulfill­ ment after eighteen years of my belief in the European g destiny of my country." Karamanlis believed that Greece's entry into the EEC was the most significant event in Greek 9 history for years to come.

The degree of influence of his central beliefs upon

the decision is revealed by the fact that he implemented the decision himself, with intense personal diplomacy and summit meetings, instead of entrusting it to the Greek diplomatic corps. This effort caused former French Presi­ dent Giscard d'Estaing to comment, "It is Karamanlis who entered the EEC and not Greece.

Karamanlis' decision to bring Greece into the EEC was influenced by the following central beliefs;

His belief that a small nation-state in a bipolar international system cannot remain neutral because it will be isolated and this will reinforce its adversaries' position. An isolated small state can easily become the victim of aggression, especially if it occupies such a sensitive geopolitical location as Greece does. Therefore, it was better for Greece, according to Karamanlis, to

^Speech for Greece's entry into the EEC, May 28, 1979. 9 Couloumbis, "The Structures of Greek Foreign Policy," p. 122.

^^Kathimerini (The Athens Daily), 31 March 1985. 88 belong to the Western camp with which it has many cultural, political, and economic affinities.

His belief that democracy and political stability are essential for a nation's progress. Karamanlis saw Greece's entry into the EEC as the only way to secure the stability of Greece's political life and its democratic institutions.

He believed that the democracies of the EEC would never let the democracy of one of its members be disrupted.

He saw unity as essential at the regional level.

Europe, according to Karamanlis, had to be united in order to survive. Such a united Europe would create a more balanced international system. It would secure its inde­ pendence and would contribute to the consolidate of world order and peace. A united Europe would give economic solutions to its people and would serve the idea of econom­ ic justice and development of the less-developed countries.

In our time, Karamanlis argued, Europe's and humanity's problems presuppose the logic of bigger space and bigger numbers to find the right solution.

Greece can achieve its foreign policy objectives only within the Western camp. Karamanlis' motivation was to make Greece an equal member of the EEC so the relationship of dependence with the United States would give place to a relationship of interdependence with the countries of the

EEC, wherein Greece could veto any decision against its national interests. Moreover, he saw that Greece's entry into the EEC would help the country's economic development. 89

Karamanlis believed that a nation can progress only if challenged with a new ideal, a national goal toward which to strive. Since the 1897 Greek defeat by Turkey, the national goal of the Megali Idea (Great Idea) ceased to exist.Therefore, Karamanlis' aim was to inspire the

Greek nation with new ideals. One of those ideals was

Greece's entrance into the EEC and its contribution to

Europe's efforts for political unification.

Decision III: Exile

By the 1960s, Karamanlis' efforts to reform public life in Greece had been frustrated by the centrist opposi­ tion and the extreme rightist parallel state which, with the Crown's tolerance, had created a chaotic political situation. This situation came to an impasse after the murder of an EDA Deputy, Grigoris Lambrakis, in

Thessaloniki in 1961.

Karamanlis' relations with the royal family were far from normal. Beginning in 1960 with minor disputes over minor issues, such as the king's speeches, the royal expenditure, and so on, Karamanlis' relations with the

Crown deteriorated rapidly. The final friction came with a royal visit to London. The Queen had been a victim of an attack by the wife of a Greek-imprisoned communist during

^^"Megali Idea" was the goal of acquisition of the Greek land occupied by the Turks. 90

her previous visit to London, and Karamanlis objected to

her visit because he was afraid that the recent embarrass­ ment in London would be repeated.

The friction, however, had deeper causes. The Crown

had been trying to extend its already powerful constitu­

tional prerogatives in the political arena, which was

unacceptable to Karamanlis. The friction was indeed

decisive, and Karamanlis resigned. The king, instead of

dissolving Parliament and calling for elections, decided to

appoint a government which, following its confirmation by

Parliament, would facilitate the Crown’s goals: first, to

ensure that the royal visit to London would take place with

the support of a government enjoying the confidence of

Parliament; secondly, to change the electoral system to

simple proportional representation, a system that clearly would favor the opposition.

Karamanlis was faced with a clear dilemma : either to

back down or to deprive the new government of a vote of

confidence and in a sense upset the Crown's plans. For

him, both alternatives were unacceptable. His final

decision was total withdrawal from the Greek political

scene. He saw it as the only way to resolve the dilemma

between the two alternatives: either an open struggle with

the Crown or a deviation from legality, with the inevitable

consequence in either case of a renewal of national divi­

sion. Moreover, his withdrawal was also an expression of 91 his disappointment with the political system and the political morals prevailing at the time.

Karamanlis' decision to exile himself was a crisis decision in the sphere of domestic politics, highly influ­ enced by his operational code beliefs. His option to stay in Greece was inconsistent with two of his central opera­ tional code beliefs:

His belief that national unity is important for the survival of small nations. Karamanlis knew that if he decided to stay in Greece and tried to upset the Crown's plans, this would lead Greece to another national division

(as in 1928 between Venizelos and the king), with destruc­ tive consequences for the nation.

The political morals at the time had deteriorated to an unprecedented degree. There did not exist a strong and responsible opposition which, according to one of Karamanlis' philosophical beliefs, is the prerequisite of a stable democracy. The parties of the opposition had concentrated their efforts in eliminating him, using every method from demagoguery to fraud.

Since the political elites were corrupt and national unity was endangered if Karamanlis stayed in Greece, he decided to withdraw from politics rather than be inconsis­ tent with his beliefs. In a letter addressed to his party, he revealed: 92

My withdrawal from politics is not a consequence of personal bitterness. It is due to the absence of conditions which could make it possible to fulfil my mission, at least as I understand it. As I could not reform the political system in the way I saw it necessary*^it is better to withdraw than to compromise....

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