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First Thoughts on the 25 January 2015 Election in Greece
GPSG Pamphlet No 4 First thoughts on the 25 January 2015 election in Greece Edited by Roman Gerodimos Copy editing: Patty Dohle Roman Gerodimos Pamphlet design: Ana Alania Cover photo: The Zappeion Hall, by Panoramas on Flickr Inside photos: Jenny Tolou Eveline Konstantinidis – Ziegler Spyros Papaspyropoulos (Flickr) Ana Alania Roman Gerodimos Published with the support of the Politics & Media Research Group, Bournemouth University Selection and editorial matter © Roman Gerodimos for the Greek Politics Specialist Group 2015 All remaining articles © respective authors 2015 All photos used with permission or under a Creative Commons licence Published on 2 February 2015 by the Greek Politics Specialist Group (GPSG) www.gpsg.org.uk Editorial | Roman Gerodimos Continuing a tradition that started in 2012, a couple of weeks ago the Greek Politics Specialist Group (GPSG) invited short commentaries from its members, affiliates and the broader academ- ic community, as a first ‘rapid’ reaction to the election results. The scale of the response was humbling and posed an editorial dilemma, namely whether the pamphlet should be limited to a small number of indicative perspectives, perhaps favouring more established voices, or whether it should capture the full range of viewpoints. As two of the founding principles and core aims of the GPSG are to act as a forum for the free exchange of ideas and also to give voice to younger and emerging scholars, it was decided that all contributions that met our editorial standards of factual accuracy and timely -
1 America's Relations with Greece to 1945: from Aloof Soft Power to The
1 AMERICA’S RELATIONS WITH GREECE TO 1945: FROM ALOOF SOFT POWER TO THE ONSET OF REGIONAL HARD POWER The Inaugural Demetrios and Demetra Partalis Kales Annual Lecture in Modern Greek History delivered at the Michigan League on November 12, 2009 by S. Victor Papacosma, Emeritus Professor of History and Director of the Lemnitzer Center for NATO and European Union Studies at Kent State University, Executive Director of the Modern Greek Studies Association The interest and involvement of the United States in Greek affairs began a slow trajectory from rather peripheral in the early nineteenth century to a level of increased concern by the end of World War II. But even by the beginning of 1945, as the following comments will try to point out, projections pointed to a limited regional presence for the United States, essentially a continuation of softer, relatively idealistic policy objectives. By early 1947, however, a dramatic reorientation would manifest itself, and not just for US relations with Greece. We must start at the beginning. George Washington in his 1796 Farewell Address had advised American abstention from European political and military entanglements. The level of American contact with the more distantly located, Ottoman-dominated Balkans developed even more slowly than that with other European regions during the nineteenth century. If any official American policy existed toward the problematic Eastern Question with its accompanying great power rivalries, it was that, in the issue of the Turkish Straits, freedom of the seas and therefore freedom of transit and navigation in the Straits should prevail both for naval and commercial vessels.1 The first Balkan people to attract the significant attention of America were the Greeks. -
Report from Greece
Reprinted fro~ THE AMERICAN Scuo~, Volume 119, Number 11, Summer, 1970 Copynght@ 1970 by the Umted Chapters of Phi Beta Kappa. REPORT FROM GREECE Under the Junta NICHOLAS GAGE and EUAS KULUKUNDIS The hold of Greece's military dictator arrested for insulting a representative of ship on the average Greek citizen might the regime, condemning the coup or other be compared to the effect of a choke col such offenses. But they have been held lar on a dog. The colonels hold the leash only briefly and then released. In one vil carefully-the repression, the controls are lage in the northwest corner of the coun there-but the leash is so long that it is try, for example, a merchant was arrested not felt until someone forgets and steps for calling the new junta-appointed mon too far, and is brought to the realization arch of the province a thief, in the heat of that the initiative for his actions is not his a debate with fellow villagers. He was own. arrested, imprisoned for a month and The regime has an unusually good sense then tried and acquitted. The purpose of of when to pull and when to give rein. such arrests is to cut off open criticism At the funeral of the late Premier George by making the threat of imprisonment Papandreou, the junta did not use its real in every village. People are made an full police power to scatter the huge example of, and then freed to create the crowd that had gathered. Had it done so, impression that the regime is not arbitrary it probably would have caused further and oppressive but capable of compas demonstrations that would have been sion and even justice. -
Evanthis Hatzivassiliou Greek-Yugoslav Relations Is A
Evanthis Hatzivassiliou From Adversity to Alliance: Greece, Yugoslavia and Balkan Strategy, 1944-1959 Greek-Yugoslav relations is a subject of pivotal importance for understanding the shaping of twentieth century Balkan balances. In the post-war period this relationship became even more interesting: Greece and Yugoslavia had radically different political, economic and social systems; they were bitterly divided in 1944-1948, but then they norma lized relations, participated in a Balkan alliance together with Turkey, and when this alliance broke down, they continued their co-operation on a bilateral basis. In this paper it will be argued that the factor which divi ded Greece and Yugoslavia in 1944-1948 was not ideology, but strate gy; and it was strategy that brought them closer after Tito’s split with Stalin. After 1948 both countries shaped their policy on the basis of a mild realism, and their relationship was dominated by their perception of their respective national interests. In this paper, emphasis will be placed on Greek perceptions and assessments, but Yugoslav views will also be mentioned. I During the inter-war period Greece’s major problem with Yugo slavia derived from the latter’s great size: Belgrade was a powerful neighbour, capable of pressing Athens and of attracting support from the great powers, mainly France. At that time Greece was afraid of Yugo slavia’s hegemonist tendencies in the Balkans, as well as of its desire to pose as the protector of the Slav-speaking minority of Greece and as a suitor for the port of Thessaloniki. It was clear that, facing Bulgarian revisionism, it would be impossible for Athens to resist pressures from both its northern neighbours; this was why the possibility of a Bulgarian- Yugoslav rapprochement was the nightmare scenario of the Athens policy-makers'. -
Ten Nobel Laureates Say the Bush
Hundreds of economists across the nation agree. Henry Aaron, The Brookings Institution; Katharine Abraham, University of Maryland; Frank Ackerman, Global Development and Environment Institute; William James Adams, University of Michigan; Earl W. Adams, Allegheny College; Irma Adelman, University of California – Berkeley; Moshe Adler, Fiscal Policy Institute; Behrooz Afraslabi, Allegheny College; Randy Albelda, University of Massachusetts – Boston; Polly R. Allen, University of Connecticut; Gar Alperovitz, University of Maryland; Alice H. Amsden, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Robert M. Anderson, University of California; Ralph Andreano, University of Wisconsin; Laura M. Argys, University of Colorado – Denver; Robert K. Arnold, Center for Continuing Study of the California Economy; David Arsen, Michigan State University; Michael Ash, University of Massachusetts – Amherst; Alice Audie-Figueroa, International Union, UAW; Robert L. Axtell, The Brookings Institution; M.V. Lee Badgett, University of Massachusetts – Amherst; Ron Baiman, University of Illinois – Chicago; Dean Baker, Center for Economic and Policy Research; Drucilla K. Barker, Hollins University; David Barkin, Universidad Autonoma Metropolitana – Unidad Xochimilco; William A. Barnett, University of Kansas and Washington University; Timothy J. Bartik, Upjohn Institute; Bradley W. Bateman, Grinnell College; Francis M. Bator, Harvard University Kennedy School of Government; Sandy Baum, Skidmore College; William J. Baumol, New York University; Randolph T. Beard, Auburn University; Michael Behr; Michael H. Belzer, Wayne State University; Arthur Benavie, University of North Carolina – Chapel Hill; Peter Berg, Michigan State University; Alexandra Bernasek, Colorado State University; Michael A. Bernstein, University of California – San Diego; Jared Bernstein, Economic Policy Institute; Rari Bhandari, University of California – Berkeley; Melissa Binder, University of New Mexico; Peter Birckmayer, SUNY – Empire State College; L. -
Austerity, Collapse, and the Rise of the Radical Left in Greece
Austerity, Collapse, and the Rise of the Radical Left in Greece This article and its title are based on a presentation made at the Mapping Socialist Strategies Conference, hosted by the Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung–New York Office at the Edith Macy Conference Center, New York, August 1-4, 2014. 2010-2014: The Establishment of Austeritarianism as the “New Normality” and Its Lethal Consequences Although signs of financial and fiscal instability became more than evident in the last decade, the global crisis officially struck Greece in 2010 under a government of the Panhellenic Socialist Party (PASOK), the forty-year-old social democratic party led by George Papandreou. Papandreou’s was the first eurozone government to invite the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to interfere in Greece’s internal European Monetary Union affairs through the formation of the troika (the IMF, the European Union, and the European Central Bank). During the period of the implementation of the first “Memorandum of Understanding” with the troika (May 2010), the government quickly understood that it would be almost impossible to maintain social peace and consensus while applying the barbaric austerity provisions of this framework. That’s why it decided to unleash an unprecedented smear and terror campaign against its own citizens. As always, major corporate media immediately became the pioneers of this new neoliberal crusade. Their main argument was that the application of the memorandum was the only solution to avoid an imminent Greek exit from the eurozone. They embellished this narrative by building up a sense of collective guilt: The crisis was presented as a “Greek particularity,” because a) Greeks had been living beyond their means; and b) public spending had grown excessive due to an “over-sized,” “non- efficient,” and corrupt public sector. -
Analyzing the Telecoms Privatization in Greece from a ‘Discursive Institutionalist’ Perspective
Privatization in the Name of ‘Europe’: analyzing the telecoms privatization in Greece from a ‘discursive institutionalist’ perspective Christos Dimas GreeSE Paper No 41 Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe NoveNovembermber 2010 All views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Hellenic Observatory or the LSE © Christos Dimas _ Table of Contents ABSTRACT ______________________________________________________ iii 1. Introduction______________________________________________________ 1 2. Theoretical Background ____________________________________________ 4 2.1. Discursive institutionalism _______________________________________ 4 2.2. Europe as a legitimating factor ___________________________________ 6 3. The case-study ___________________________________________________ 10 3.1. The pro and anti European politics in Greece during the 1970s and 1980s 10 3.2. The Greek disjointed corporatist system ____________________________ 15 3.3. OTE as a case study ___________________________________________ 17 4. Empirical Analysis _______________________________________________ 19 4.1. The Mitsotakis government 1990-1993 ____________________________ 19 4.2. Papandreou governments 1993-1996 ______________________________ 24 4.3. The Simitis governments 1996-2004 ______________________________ 32 4.4. The Karamanlis governments 2004-2009 __________________________ 37 5. Conclusion______________________________________________________ 41 References ________________________________________________________ -
The Making of SYRIZA
Encyclopedia of Anti-Revisionism On-Line Panos Petrou The making of SYRIZA Published: June 11, 2012. http://socialistworker.org/print/2012/06/11/the-making-of-syriza Transcription, Editing and Markup: Sam Richards and Paul Saba Copyright: This work is in the Public Domain under the Creative Commons Common Deed. You can freely copy, distribute and display this work; as well as make derivative and commercial works. Please credit the Encyclopedia of Anti-Revisionism On-Line as your source, include the url to this work, and note any of the transcribers, editors & proofreaders above. June 11, 2012 -- Socialist Worker (USA) -- Greece's Coalition of the Radical Left, SYRIZA, has a chance of winning parliamentary elections in Greece on June 17, which would give it an opportunity to form a government of the left that would reject the drastic austerity measures imposed on Greece as a condition of the European Union's bailout of the country's financial elite. SYRIZA rose from small-party status to a second-place finish in elections on May 6, 2012, finishing ahead of the PASOK party, which has ruled Greece for most of the past four decades, and close behind the main conservative party New Democracy. When none of the three top finishers were able to form a government with a majority in parliament, a date for a new election was set -- and SYRIZA has been neck-and-neck with New Democracy ever since. Where did SYRIZA, an alliance of numerous left-wing organisations and unaffiliated individuals, come from? Panos Petrou, a leading member of Internationalist Workers Left (DEA, by its initials in Greek), a revolutionary socialist organisation that co-founded SYRIZA in 2004, explains how the coalition rose to the prominence it has today. -
The National Data Center Proposal of 1965 and Its Descendants
Statistical Déjà Vu: The National Data Center Proposal of 1965 and Its Descendants by Rebecca S. Kraus, Ph.D. History Staff U.S. Census Bureau For presentation at the Joint Statistical Meetings Miami Beach, FL, August 1, 2011 This paper is to inform interested parties of ongoing research and to encourage discussion. Any views expressed on historical issues are those of the author and not necessarily those of the U.S. Census Bureau. Abstract Issues concerning sharing of statistical information, linking data sets, and storing and preserving data collected by the federal statistical agencies have long sparked debate. This paper focuses on the National Data Center proposal of 1965, ensuing public concern over its privacy implications, and the response of the Bureau of the Budget and the U.S. Census Bureau. The purpose of this study is to identify the issues leading to the development of the proposal, as well as the consequences of the proposal, in order to inform current policy decisions, particularly in regard to the U.S. Census Bureau. Examples of subsequent efforts at statistical consolidation and data sharing highlight the persistent theme of statistical déjà vu. The author would like to thank the following staff of the U.S. Census Bureau for their review and comment on the contents of this paper: Francis Grailand Hall, Division Chief, Administrative and Customer Services Division (ACSD); Claudette Bennett, Assistant Division Chief, Product Development and Publications Services, ACSD; Bill Maury, Chief, History Staff, ACSD; Nick Birnbaum, History Staff, ACSD; Nancy Gordon, Associate Director for Strategic Planning and Innovation; Mary Frazier, Privacy Office; and Kathleen Styles, formerly of the Policy Office. -
The Brookings Institution Greece and the Economic
GREECE-2013/01/22 1 THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION GREECE AND THE ECONOMIC CHALLENGES AHEAD: A CONVERSATION WITH GREEK OPPOSITION LEADER ALEXIS TSIPRAS (remarks translated) Washington, D.C. Tuesday, January 22, 2013 Introduction: WILLIAM ANTHOLIS Managing Director The Brookings Institution Moderators: WILLIAM ANTHOLIS Managing Director The Brookings Institution DOMENICO LOMBARDI Senior Fellow The Brookings Institution Featured Speaker: ALEXIS TSIPRAS Leader SYRIZA * * * * * ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100 Alexandria, VA 22314 Phone (703) 519-7180 Fax (703) 519-7190 GREECE-2013/01/22 2 P R O C E E D I N G S MR. ANTHOLIS: Welcome, everyone. It’s a full house. Welcome to Brookings. Welcome particularly to members of the diplomatic community. Ambassador Panagopoulos from Greece. I see that Ambassador Anastasiades from Cyprus is here and Ambassador De Puget from Malta. And of course, a special welcome to Ambassador Eleni Tsakopoulos Kounalakis, the U.S. ambassador to Hungary and her husband, Markos, who are here. So many of you are here -- I know many were here for the inauguration and today is the first working day of the second term; our first major event here at Brookings in the second term. And yesterday President Obama’s second inaugural address has already been called a manifesto for liberalism. He bolstered his supporters on a range of issues, and his critics are already complaining that he was preaching to the choir, or worse, that he reaffirmed their worse feelers that he’s a socialist. (Laughter) And President Obama anticipated that criticism by putting his talk into the context of his included ongoing skepticism of central authority and calling it a fiction that all societies’ ills can be cured through government alone. -
West European Politics the Transformation of the Greek Party
This article was downloaded by: [Harvard University] On: 11 July 2010 Access details: Access Details: [subscription number 915668586] Publisher Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37- 41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK West European Politics Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713395181 The transformation of the Greek party system since 1951 Takis S. Pappasa a Politics at the Aristotle University, Thessaloniki, Greece To cite this Article Pappas, Takis S.(2003) 'The transformation of the Greek party system since 1951', West European Politics, 26: 2, 90 — 114 To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/01402380512331341121 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402380512331341121 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material. -
An Analysis of the Greek Economic and Military Mobilization of the 1909-1923 Period.1
Journal of Military and Strategic VOLUME 20, ISSUE 1 Studies The Economic forces of victory versus those of defeat: An analysis of the Greek Economic and Military Mobilization of the 1 1909-1923 period. Dr. Ioannis-Dionysios Salavrakos (*) Introduction. The intellectual aspiration of the paper is to highlight the economic forces, which played an immense role in the wars in which Greece participated during the 1909-1923 period. These were four major conflicts: The two Balkan wars of 1912-1913 against the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria; the First World War (1914-1918) and the Greek-Turkish war of 1919-1922. The tragic period started with Greek victories and ended with the greatest defeat of the modern Greek state. Although these conflicts were different, there is a clear nexus between them. In the Greek as well as the international bibliography, the majority of studies highlight the strategic, tactical, operational, diplomatic, psychological dimensions of the conflicts of the period, as well as, the personal motives of political and military leaders. Under this intellectual framework, the economic forces of the conflict are marginalized by most academics. The final conflict of the period is primarily known as the ‘Campaign of Asia-Minor’ in the Greek bibliography, whereas in the Turkish bibliography it is considered as ‘the Great Patriotic War.’ Thus in this article we aim to demonstrate that the conflicts of the period are connected and also that the Greek defeat 1 This article is dedicated to the memory of my beloved grandmother Stavroula Poulea Koutsikou (1921- 2019) who passed away. She had lived the Second World War and had told me many stories from that era.