The Decline of European Sea Power Europe's Navies in a Time of Austerity and Brinkmanship

Diplomarbeit

zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades eines Magisters der Philosophie

an der Karl-Franzens Universität Graz

vorgelegt von

Jeremy STÖHS

am Institut für Geschichte Begutachter: Ao.Univ.-Prof. i.R. Mag. Dr. phil. Siegfried Beer

Graz, 2015

Acknowledgments

First and foremost, I want to express my profound gratitude to my parents. This thesis is the result of their unconditional support throughout my life. I owe all of my achievements to them. I also want to thank Professor Siegfried Beer for encouraging me to pursue excellence in my studies and for providing me with so many opportunities to study, discuss, and write about what interests me most. Finally, I want to thank Diana for all her love.

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Table of Content

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations ...... 3

List of Figures: ...... 5

PART ONE ...... 7

1) Introduction ...... 7

2) Principles of Sea Power ...... 14

3) The ‘Pivot’ Towards Asia – and the Consequences for Europe ...... 23

PART TWO ...... 30

4) Case Studies: Analyzing Europe’s Navies ...... 30

5) The UNITED KINGDOM: Keep Calm and Get Those Carriers Operational ...... 33

6) FRANCE: Stretched but Willing – Europe’s Most Capable Naval Force ...... 50

7) ITALY: The Marina Militare – Between Global Interest and Regional Necessities...... 65

8) SPAIN: Creating a Well-Balanced Fleet – and Maintaining It ...... 81

8) TURKEY and GREECE: Allies and Yet Not Friends – Diverging Naval Powers ...... 96

8.1) Turkey ...... 100

8.2) Greece ...... 105

9) GERMANY: Reluctance and Reductions – Not Stepping Up to the Plate ...... 111

10) DENMARK and the NETHERLANDS: Commercial Might and Military Inaptitude 127

10.1) Denmark ...... 131

10.2) The Netherlands ...... 140

11) FINLAND, SWEDEN, NORWAY: Scandinavian Navies Sticking to their Guns ..... 147

11.1) Finland ...... 150

11.2) Sweden ...... 153

11.3) Norway ...... 159

PART THREE ...... 166

12) Analysis and Observations – Quo Vadis Europe? ...... 166

13) Conclusion ...... 174

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Appendices ...... 183

Selected Bibliography ...... 189

List of Illustrations ...... 207

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

 A2/AD: anti-access/area-denial  AAW: anti-air warfare  ABM: anti-ballistic missile  APAR: active phased-array radar, also AESA: active electronically scanned array  APR: Asian-Pacific Region  ASN: anti-ship missile  AsuW: anti-surface warfare  ASW: anti-submarine warfare  CATOBAR: catapult-arrested take-off barrier-assisted recovery  CIWS: close-in weapon system  CODOG: combined diesel or gas  COIN: counterinsurgency  CT: counterterrorism  CTF: combined task force  DoD: United States Department of Defense  EEZ: exclusive economic zone  EMI/EMC: Electromagnetic interference / electromagnetic compatibility  EMPAR: European Multifunction Phased Array Radar  ERAM: Extended Range Active Missile (RIM-174 Standard SM-6)  ESSM: Evolved Sea-Sparrow Missile  EU: European Union  FREMM: Frégate européenne multi-mission  GDP: gross domestic product  GIN: Greenland-Iceland-Norway (gap)  HADR: human assistance and disaster relief 3

 ISIS: Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (also IS: Islamic State)  LCF: Luchtverdedigings en Commando Fregat, Dutch air defense frigate  LCS: littoral combat ship  LHA: landing helicopter assault (amphibious assault ship)  LHD: landing helicopter dock  LPD: landing platform dock  LSD: landing ship dock  MCM: mine countermeasure  MM: Marina Militare  MN: Marine Nationale  MoD: Ministry of Defense (general)  MW: mine warfare  NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization  NLG: Netherlands Guilder  OPV: offshore patrol vessel  OSCE: Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe  PAAMS: principle anti-air missile system  RAM: radar absorbing material,  RDN: Royal Danish Navy  RIMPAC: Rim of the Pacific (exercise)  RN: Royal Navy  RNLN: Royal Netherlands Navy  RNoN: Royal Norwegian Navy  SAM: surface to air missile  SAR: search and rescue  SDR: Strategic Defense Review (U.K.)  SDSR: Strategic Defense and Security Review (U.K.)  SIGINT: signal intelligence  SLBM: submarine launched ballistic missile  SLOC: sea-lines of communication  SMART-L: Signaal Multibeam Acquisition Radar for Tracking, L-Band  SNMG: Standing Naval Maritime Group

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 SSBN: ship submersible ballistic missile nuclear (nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines)  SSK: ship submersible conventional (diesel-electric powered submarine)  SSM: surface to surface missile  SSN: ship submersible nuclear (nuclear powered attack submarine)  STANAVFORLANT: Standing Naval Force Atlantic  STANAVFORMED: Standing Naval Force Mediterranean  STOVL: short take-off or vertical landing  TEU: Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit (standard container)  UK: United Kingdom  UN: United Nations  UNIFIL: United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon  UNISON: United Nations Operation in Somalia  US: United States  USN: United States Navy  VLS: vertical launch system  VSTOL: vertical and/or short take-off and landing

List of Figures:

Figure 1: United Kingdom – Defense Spending ...... 33 Figure 2: United Kingdom – Number of Major Vessels ...... 34 Figure 3: France – Defense Spending ...... 50 Figure 4: France – Number of Major Vessels ...... 51 Figure 5: Italy – Defense Spending ...... 65 Figure 6: Italy – Number of Major Vessels...... 65 Figure 7: Spain – Defense Spending ...... 81 Figure 8: Spain – Number of Major Vessels...... 81 Figure 9: Turkey – Defense Spending ...... 96 Figure 10: Turkey – Number of Major Vessels...... 97 Figure 11: Greece – Defense Spending ...... 97 Figure 12: Greece – Number of Major Vessels...... 98 Figure 13: Germany – Defense Spending ...... 111

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Figure 14: Germany – Number of Major Vessels...... 112 Figure 15: The Netherlands – Defense Spending ...... 127 Figure 16: The Netherlands – Number of Major Vessels...... 127 Figure 17: Denmark – Defense Spending ...... 128 Figure 18: Denmark – Number of Major Vessels...... 128 Figure 19: Finland – Defense Spending ...... 147 Figure 20: Sweden – Defense Spending ...... 147 Figure 21: Sweden – Number of Major Vessels...... 148 Figure 22: Norway – Defense Spending ...... 148 Figure 23: Norway – Number of Major Vessels...... 149 Figure 24: United United States – Defense Spending ...... 183 Figure 25: United States – Number of Major Vessels...... 183 Figure 26: Japan – Defense Spending ...... 184 Figure 27: Japan – Number of Major Vessels...... 184 Figure 28: South Korea – Defense Spending ...... 185 Figure 29: South Korea – Number of Major Vessels...... 185 Figure 30: China – Defense Spending ...... 186 Figure 31: China – Number of Major Vessels...... 186 Figure 32: India – Defense Spending ...... 187 Figure 33: India – Number of Major Vessels...... 187 Figure 34: Russia – Defense Spending ...... 188 Figure 35: Russia – Number of Major Vessels...... 188

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PART ONE

1) Introduction

There are no trends extant – technological, economic, political, or military – which suggest an imminent diminution in the strategic leverage of sea power.1 (Colin S. Gray)

For over the past five hundred years, every single century can be considered a maritime century. Decade after decade, seafaring nations such as the Portuguese, Spanish, French, Dutch and English ventured farther out into the vast realms of the blue waters in search of uncharted lands, new trade routes, and vast riches. In essence, these efforts can be considered one of the driving forces behind globalization. However, this process was by no means always peaceful and many wars were fought to decide who was to command the sea. In those days it was necessary for economic power to be backed by military force and few rulers were foolish enough to underestimate the utility of naval forces when it came to protecting their interests – the maritime realm was no exception to that rule. It was this competitive nature of trade among the leading European powers and the useful marriage of commercial and military sea power that put the West far ahead of the rest, thus permitting the creation of great colonial empires.2 Consequently, other powers unwilling or unable to follow suit, such as the Chinese Ming Dynasty or the Ottoman Empire were degraded to second or even third- rank powers.3 Today, naval scholars rejoice at the achievements of those exciting times. Historians marvel at the superb seamanship of Magellan, Vasco da Gama, and Sir Francis Drake and study the military feats of Lord Nelson, Tōgō Heihachirō, and Admiral Nimitz. The sea is no longer the great unknown it once was – full of opportunities as well as danger. As a matter of fact, naval conflict has become a rare sight and only a few people are still alive to tell the tales of the last Great War at sea. Yet the underpinning rules of geopolitics remain constant and the oceans of this world, as we shall see, will continue to constitute the most important medium of power distribution on this planet. As Colin S. Gray states: “If the coming of the railroad, internal combustion engine, air, missile, nuclear, and space eras could not demote the strategic

1 Colin S. Gray, The Leverage of Sea Power, The Strategic Advantage of Navies in War (New York: The Free Press, 1992): 289. 2 See Chris Parry, Super Highway, Sea Power in the 21st Century (London: Elliot and Thompson Limited, 2014): 65. The economist and historian, Niall Ferguson discussed Western ascendency more broadly. See Niall Ferguson, Civilization: The West and the Rest (New York: Penguin Books, 2011). 3 See Parry, Highway, 10-23. 7 value of sea power significantly, it is difficult to see what could emerge to do so over the next several decades.”4 It may seem somewhat peculiar for a scholar from Austria to write about a topic concerning naval matters. The end of World War I and the subsequent provisions of the Treaty of Saint-Germain not only stripped Austria of its entire naval fleet but, more importantly, also of its access to the sea. Therefore, (except for the period under Nazi rule) since 1918, Austria has been a landlocked country and thus part of only 11 percent of the world’s states that do not to have a coastline.5 However, its prosperity and wealth for a large part depend on the sea – even if the average Austrian citizen wastes little time pondering on this circumstance. Life on our planet finds its origin in the salty matter we call the ocean. Over two-thirds of the earth’s surface is covered by this enormous body of water which, together with the seabed below, provides mankind with a precious source of food, energy, and raw materials. However, of equally great importance is the ability to carry these goods in the currently safest and most cost-efficient way – by sea. In fact, 90 percent of global commerce is currently transported by ships, along lines that span across the oceans from continent to continent, which one can imagine as great highways at sea.6 What many people in Austria, and elsewhere for that matter, forget is that in the globalized world of today every single state is either directly or indirectly dependent on the unimpeded flow of maritime commerce. Although Austria does not import and export goods by ship its two largest trading partners, Germany and Italy, do. As a matter of fact, together with their European partners both countries have significant stakes in seaborne trade. Were a crisis to arise somewhere in the world to make trade via these sea lanes impossible, and be it for just a short period of time, the global supply chain would falter, possibly having severe repercussions on the industries, economies and people across the globe.7 The decision of Iran’s leadership to close the Strait of Hormuz – through which over 17 billion barrels of oil pass every day –would, for example, quickly be felt across Europe, even in a state as ‘benign’ as Austria. Therefore, the freedom of navigation, or the ‘good order at sea’ as it is often referred to, is of utmost importance.

4 Gray, Leverage, 290. 5 Parry, Highway, 37. 6 The term “great highway” was coined by Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, one of the most prominent naval strategists. See Alfred Thayer Mahan, Mahan On Naval Warfare. Selections from the Writing of Rear Admiral Alfred T. Mahan, ed. Allan Westcott (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 1999 [1941]): 17. 7 NATO, Alliance Maritime Strategy, 18 March (2011): II. 4. http://www.nato.int/cps/ar/natohq/official_texts_75615.htm. 8

For the past seventy years the United States and its navy have protected the international system of maritime trade. As the retired Admiral Chris Parry observes, “America [has been] able to protect – and guarantee itself and its friends – access to the world’s resources and deny access to an opponent or other disturber of the international peace.”8 However, the tides are turning. As we speak we are witnessing fundamental changes in geopolitics, the likes of which we have not seen in the last five hundred years. For the first time in modern history, the center of power is shifting from the West (the Atlantic and Europe) to the East (the Indian Ocean and Asian-Pacific Region). In light of this evolution there is the possibility that the United States, like Britain before, will no longer be willing or able to perform the role as the global guardian of the seas.9 Yet security at sea will remain of pivotal importance, not least for Europe. Hence, it is also in Europe’s interest to make provisions to maintain sufficient military power in case of an emergency, something, as we will see, the European states have neglected over the last twenty-five years. Sea power, both of economic and military nature, “will be critical to the world’s future, one way or another”, Till concludes.” The only real question”, he adds, “is whose seapower it will be?”10 Over the course of the following chapters I intend to provide some answers to this pressing question. The main aim of this thesis is to gain insight into the development of Europe’s naval forces since the end of the Cold War. In order to better comprehend the drastic changes the European navies have undergone over the past twenty-five years, I will conduct a thorough analysis of the countries’ defense policies as well as the evolution, deployment, and capabilities of their naval forces. In particular, the focus of my thesis will lie on the effects the Soviet dissolution had on European naval strategy. In an increasingly diverse security environment, states and their armed services have had to deal with an emergence of new technology, growing threats and conflict running the entire gamut of the intensity spectrum. Many European states have grappled with this seismic shift by drastically transforming their military forces in an attempt to deal with a widening range of security challenges. As a consequence, today many European naval forces bear little resemblance to the respective fleets at the end of the Cold War. With the Soviet Union and its Communist Party relegated to the pages of history in December 1991, to many it seemed as if the threat to Europe’s security had disappeared once

8 Parry, Highway, 85. 9 Ibid. 10 Geoffrey Till, Seapower. A Guide for the Twenty-First Century: Revised and Updated Third Edition (New York: Routledge, 2013): xv. 9 and for all. After almost sixty years of militarization and the looming threat of nuclear war within the heart of Europe, peace had finally come. As an immediate reaction, military funding was cut across the board as the large armies, fashioned for the cataclysmic showdown with the forces of the Warsaw Pact, were no longer needed. As I will show, nearly all the European countries reduced their defense spending in the initial aftermath of the Cold War. For the most part, these reductions have continued to the present day. Unsurprisingly, this has led to Europe’s armies being considerably smaller in size. Germany’s military, for example, had roughly 330,000 active duty personnel and 700,000 reservists in 1990. In comparison, the current land forces have been reduced to around 60,000 service members. At the same time the number of tank units has dropped from 16 panzer brigades to 12 panzer companies.11 Or put differently, out of the 2,125 Leopard 2 main battle tanks delivered to the Bundeswehr only 176 remain in operational units.12 Similar examples can be found across Europe. Not only had the threat of the Red Army and its large mechanized forces disappeared but, more importantly, the military operations in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan heralded a paradigmatic shift in how land warfare was fought.13 Although heavy armored units represented the only credible protection against improvised explosive devices, rocket- propelled grenades and road-side bombs in these contingencies, the evolution of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism warfare made large numbers of mechanized units seem anachronistic and therefore unnecessary. Naval warfare, on the other hand, has also witnessed a significant – yet somewhat less profound – change. The primary functions of naval forces, as we shall see later, have largely remained constant over the centuries and navies today conduct very similar missions as they did a quarter century ago, albeit over a far broader range of possible contingency. For example, today a greater emphasis is being placed on projecting power from the sea onto land or using naval assets for human assistance operations. Notwithstanding this the evolution of naval theory and the different interpretations of what navies ought to be able to do,14 the maritime sphere, by nature, precludes similar developments as have been witnessed on land. Asymmetrical warfare, despite being a buzzword in naval quarters, will arguably have far less impact on naval planning and the shape of naval forces than the unconventional fighting

11 F. Stephen Larrabee et al, NATO and the Challenges of Austerity (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2012): 28. 12 Ezio Bonsignore et al, “Germany,” Military Technology The World Defense Almanac 2014, Issue 1 (2014): 130. 13 For an excellent account of the development of war, see Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force. The Art of War in the Modern World (London: Penguin, 2005). 14 For a detailed description of naval functions see Till, Seapower, 32-35. 10 which has taken place in Baghdad, Mosul or Helmand Province has had on the general perception of land warfare. The “wars among the people”15 we see on land today cannot be fought at sea. As Sir Julian S. Corbett wrote in his seminal work, Principles of Maritime Strategy, “[y]ou cannot conquer sea because it is not susceptible of ownership [and] you cannot subsist your armed forces upon it as you can upon enemy’s territory”.16 Therefore, because the oceans are uninhabited by man no person can be subjugated to the maritime forces at sea. While there is a general reluctance among Western states to engage in ground operations after the experiences in the so-called ‘War on Terrorism’, the number of naval operations conducted by European states, however, has continuously expanded over the past decade. Yet the drastic decline of available naval assets, a concomitant of general downsizing of Europe’s armed forces and the consequent reduction of capabilities have left operational gaps and precarious shortfalls in training and readiness. These developments pose grave risks to the future of Europe’s ability to protect its interests at sea.

This thesis is divided into three parts. Part One introduces the general topic, as well as the research question, whereupon Chapter Two will examine the fundamental elements of the maritime domain, as well as the basic principles of sea power. Based on the writings of the two most renowned naval strategists, Alfred T. Mahan and Julian S. Corbett, as well as more recent publications by, inter alia, Colin S. Gray, Geoffrey Till, and Chris Parry, the utility of naval forces will be discussed. Chapter Three focuses on the current shift in geopolitics – from Europe and the Atlantic Ocean towards the Asian-Pacific Region (APR). This trend, as I will show, will be one of the defining factors of power distribution in the 21st century. As a matter of fact, the United States, as Europe’s closest ally and most important NATO member, is in the process of “pivoting”17 towards the Asia-Pacific in order to secure its national interests there. At the same time, numerous countries in the region (in particular China, India, Japan and South Korea) have become regional powers in varying degrees and all wield substantial political, economic and military might. While most of the actors in the APR have apparently understood the importance of robust naval forces, Europe, in comparison, continuous to suffer under an austere financial environment, budget deficits and the lack of political will, as well as public support, to strengthen its naval capabilities.

15 Smith, Utility, 3. 16 Julian S. Corbett, Principles of Maritime Strategy, (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications 2004 [1911]): 89. 17 The rebalancing of the United States towards the Asian-Pacific Region is described in further detail in Chapter Three. 11

Part Two represents the mainstay of my thesis. In it, Chapter Four will provide an outline of the parameters according to which the analysis of the subsequent case studies will be conducted, while Chapters Five to Eleven cover the majority of Europe’s naval forces. On the one hand, my research will be based on each country’s defense policies and naval doctrine, promulgated in official documents, white papers, and public statements. On the other hand, the composition, size, and capabilities of the individual fleets will need to undergo close examination. To begin with, the development of the four major European naval powers, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Spain, will be construed. All four fleets continue to maintain capabilities over the entire spectrum of naval warfare but have also been considerably reduced in size, allowing some of them to just barely operate a so-called balanced fleet. Thereafter, the navies of Turkey and Greece will be compared. Despite both countries being NATO members, their strained relationship has had substantial ramifications on naval doctrine and the composition of their naval forces. While Turkey is apparently aspiring to become a regional power in its own right, thereby going to great lengths to modernize its fleet, Greece is unable to maintain such an arms race with its larger neighbor and has relapsed to a defensive naval strategy. Germany is also a country which is likely to play an increasingly important role in Europe’s development in the 21st century. However, the German Navy has been considerably truncated over the last two decades and despite commissioning highly sophisticated warships, its surface and submarine fleet is far smaller than at the end of the Cold War. The Netherlands and Denmark have a rich history as seafaring nations. Although their naval heydays, during which they had a major influence on the events in Europe and the world, have passed, they continue to be major players in maritime trade. Thus, it could be expected that both states operate reasonably capable naval forces. In fact, the Dutch and Danish navies have made some substantial improvements in terms of the capabilities of the warships they have put into service over the last two decades. On the other hand, as will be discussed, both countries’ naval forces have been drastically reduced in the same period of time, both in number and in the range of operations they can perform, ceding some critical capabilities along the way. The northern European nations of Norway, Sweden and Finland provide interesting examples of relatively small states effectively dealing with sinking defense budgets and the rising costs of equipment and personnel. Despite Sweden and Finland being neutral and

12 therefore self-responsible for their national defense – while Norway’s national security is assured through NATO’s Article 5 – these countries’ navies will be examined in conjunction. Some countries, such as Poland, the Baltic States, and Belgium will only be mentioned in passing and other states will not be addressed at all. However, I am confident that my analysis includes all major European naval forces and provides a comprehensive overview of naval strategies, defense procurement policies, naval capabilities and recent operations. The findings of my case studies will support my assessments, predictions, and conclusion of this thesis. It is worth noting that an analysis of the Coast Guards is beyond the scope of this study, despite their great importance regarding littoral security. Part Three will finally recapitulate on the main tenets of the preceding chapters. In the penultimate Chapter Twelve, I will provide substantial evidence that the previous and continuing budget cuts to the naval branch of the armed forces should be considered serious brinkmanship. Ultimately, I will conclude that based on the understanding of sea power as a prerequisite for political influence and economic health, the geopolitical shift towards the Asian-Pacific Region, and most importantly the general decline of European naval capabilities, Europe’s role and influence in the world will be seriously jeopardized in the future. To avoid the possible detriment such a development could have on the prosperity and security of the continent and the people living on it, the European states, (in particular its NATO members), need to revoke their propensity for saving as much money as possible on their naval forces. History has provided numerous examples in which the rise and fall of great powers was decided by a state’s or an alliance’s ability to successfully engage in trade by sea, and if challenged, protect its vital interests by hard power in the form of its naval forces. Four hundred years ago, Sir Walter Raleigh famously stated that “whoever commands the sea, commands the trade; whosoever commands the trade of the world commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world itself.”18 So far his words have held true. Despite dramatic changes in the global security environment over the last two decades, there is no indication that the fundamental axioms of sea power will be called into question any time soon. Therefore, it lies in the responsibility of current and future governments to decide whether Europe will be relegated to the outermost fringes of a world centered on the Pacific Ocean, or if in fact, Europe can reverse its growing geopolitical and strategic irrelevance by reviving and committing to its naval capabilities.

18 Sir Walter Raleigh quoted in Parry, Highway, 3. 13

2) Principles of Sea Power

Earth is called the Blue Planet for a reason. From space the shimmering blue orb allows the observer to comprehend the sheer vastness of the world’s oceans. 70 percent of its surface is covered with water and 80 percent of the world’s population lives within 150 kilometers of the coast.19 Although we neither find shelter nor sanctuary among its waves, we have been able to access the valuable resources it contains and found means to move upon its surface in a most cost-efficient manner. Thus, the world’s trade is dependent on the waters connecting the continents. In fact, 90 percent of global commerce flows by sea. What is more, the unique characteristics of the continental landmass and demographic factors have led to 75 percent of this trade having to pass a small number of narrow canals and straits.20 The moment man ventured out to sea, the maritime realm became a sphere of conflicting interests. Different parties sought to expand their influence by peaceful means of commercial enterprise as well as by the use of force. Hence, the concept of sea power was born. Despite the dramatic evolution of mankind over the ages, many principles which govern this concept have remained constant. “[M]uch about sea power is enduring” former British Admiral Chris Parry notes. “[It] can be best expressed as the combined investment in the sea of the various components and resources of a state or enterprise in the pursuit of favourable outcomes”.21 These investments, are neither constant nor can they be strictly categorized, but instead depend on a multitude of factors. In general, a distinction can be made between hard power and soft power. The former is based on the use or threat of force (economic or military), while the second is understood to be ruled by the principles of cooperation and consensus, by means of diplomacy, respectable policies, and other ‘benign’ measures.22 Over the last centuries, those countries capable of merging hard and soft power, such as Portugal, Spain, Denmark and England, have created vast colonial empires and could make their economic and military presence felt around the world.23

19 NATO, Alliance Maritime Strategy, 18 March (2011): II. 4. http://www.nato.int/cps/ar/natohq/official_texts_75615.htm. 20 Ibid. 21 Parry, Highway, 258. 22 The term was coined by Joseph Nye in his book, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power and expanded in 2004 in Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. In the preface of his latter publication the author briefly defines what he considers to be ‘soft power’: “What is soft power? It is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies.” Joseph S. Nye Jr., Soft Power: The Means To Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004): Preface. 23 Parry, Highway, 65. 14

From this bipartite, sea power can be subdivided into four elements: 1) the business of international commercial trade by sea; 2) the utilization of the ocean’s resources, be it the exploitation of oil and gas under the seabed or creating energy from the ocean’s continuous tidal flow; 3) using naval forces or economic instruments in support of national interests in time of peace; and lastly 4) naval operations in war.24 As we can see, sea power cannot be fully understood without considering all these aspects of maritime operations. “In this regard, appearance can be deceptive”, Parry notes: “[T]he most powerful navy in the world is that of the USA; the largest merchant fleet is held by the Greeks; the largest fishing fleet, by volume and activity, is the Chinese; and the biggest commercial shipping company is Danish. In this sense, sea power is diffused.”25 Trying to address all forms of sea power is well beyond the scope of this thesis. My main aim therefore, as was stated in the introduction, is to focus on Europe’s naval forces; in other words the individual states’ naval hard power. Although mainly European naval issues – in peace as well as in crisis and war – will be analyzed, the economic factors of sea power, (commerce and the exploitation of natural resources) merit close attention and will therefore also be addressed over the course of the following chapters. History has shown that the marriage of naval sea power and commercial sea power constitutes a principal factor in a state’s ability Illustration 1: Arguably most renowned naval to gain power, wealth and prosperity. As A.T. strategist: Alfred Thayer Mahan. Mahan famously stated “Control of the sea by maritime commerce and naval supremacy means predominant influence in the world … (and) is the chief among the merely material elements in the power and prosperity of the nations.”26 Abbildung 1 Much has changed since Mahan published his profound writings in 1890. However, his ideas and those of his British contemporary, the naval strategist Julian S. Corbett, remain quintessential for the understanding of sea power. Their insight into maritime strategy remains

24 Parry, Highway, 4. 25 Parry, Highway, 4. 26 Mahan quoted in Till, Seapower, 57. 15 as timely as ever, in regard to military as well as economic issues. Of course, from a modern- day perspective, the two strategists based their presumptions on the somewhat “old fashioned [concept of the] nation-state as the basic unit of concern”; while today we are already witnessing a period in which these formally established systems of statehood, society and civilization are being perforated by the profound changes in the way peoples engage with each other. Notwithstanding these developments, any scholar concerned with maritime issues needs to indulge in these “seminal and enduring works of maritime strategy”, Till underscores.27 This is because the elements of sea power are governed by “the unchangeable, or unchanging, order of things remaining the same in cause and effect, from age to age.”28

They belong, as it were, to the Order of Nature, of whose stability so much [was heard of in Mahan’s days]; whereas tactics, using as its instruments the weapons made by man, shares in the change and progress of the race from generation to generation. From time to time the superstructure of tactics has to be altered or wholly torn down, but the old foundations of strategy so far remain, as though laid upon a rock.29

Therefore, we can assume that the principles of sea power, described in this chapter will continue to remain applicable in the decades to come. In regard to maritime strategy, war on and from the sea, and the utility of sea power in general, a close reading of history is of paramount importance in forming viable conclusions and making meaningful predictions of the future. As Mahan wrote in the opening pages of his chapter on Naval Principles, “a study of the military history of the past, […] is enjoined by great military leaders as essential to correct ideas and to the skillful conduct of war in the future.”30 He continues by arguing that throughout time military tactics have often undergone change due to the evolution in weapon technology, while other aspects of war at sea have remained unaltered and universally applicable, thereby forming general principles.31 One of these general principles is the purpose of naval forces. The British scholar Ken Booth argued that the three basic functions of a navy are its military, diplomatic, and policing roles. Of the three elements the military function represents the foundation of this trinity.32 Essentially, military force can be utilized to attack an enemy, to defend oneself against attack,

27 Till, Seapower, 349. 28 Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 1890): 88. A digital version is freely accessible under: https://archive.org/details/seanpowerinf00maha. 29 Ibid. 30 Mahan, Naval Warfare, 4. 31 Ibid. 32 Ken Booth in Karl Rommetveit and Bjørn Terjesen, “Introduction,” in: The Rise of naval power in Asia and Europe’s decline, (eds.) Bjørn Terjesen and Øystein Tunsjø (Oslo Files: Dec. 2012): 10. 16 or to deter an enemy from attacking. 33 Naval forces are in many cases the best tool to perform these tasks. They are able to react to crisis quickly and can project power over great distances. At the same time, navies have distinct advantages over other military forces because they are able to operate freely in the vast realms of international waters. As Admiral Carlisle A.H. Trost put it “[o]perating in international waters, [navies enjoy] the unique advantage of being able to signal menace without violating sovereignty, and once the need is past, of being able to sail over the horizon without signaling retreat.”34 However, ultimately navies have one sole purpose “to influence decisions and events on land, because that is where people live.”35 In order to have an influence upon history, as the title of Mahan’s book indicates, a country’s navy has to command the sea. However, it would seem obvious that given the vastness of the oceans any effort to patrol its entire surface at all times would be a hopeless undertaking. “You cannot conquer the sea because it is not susceptible of ownership”, Corbett rightfully pointed out. “You cannot, as lawyers say, ‘reduce it into possession,’ because you cannot exclude neutral from it as you can from territory you conquer [and] you cannot subsist your armed force upon it as you can upon enemy’s territory.”36 Therefore, so his conclusion, the natural state for it is to be uncommanded.37 So how can a naval force exercise sea power if it cannot command the sea such as an army can command enemy territory? According to Mahan the key lay in ‘communications’. “[The term designates] the lines of movement by which a military body, army or fleet, is kept in living condition with the national power.”38 However, such lines of communication are not limited to military strategy but rather can be applied more generally to any form of communication between two geographical points of distribution.39 For example, the great highways at sea on which 90 percent of global commerce travels represent such strategic lines of communication. A navy capable of controlling this maritime traffic is, in turn, able to greatly influence decisions made on land. Both Mahan and Corbett therefore ascribe to the principle that controlling these strategic lines of communications (SLOCs) is the key to preeminent sea power.

By winning command of the sea we remove [a possible] barrier from our own path, thereby placing ourselves in position to exert direct military pressure upon the national life of our enemy ashore, while at the same time we solidify it against him and prevent

33 James Eberle, “Maritime Strategy,” Naval Forces, Vol. 8, 2 (1987): 38. 34 Carlisle A.H. Trost, “Looking beyond the Maritime Strategy,” in: U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s, Selected Documents, (eds.) John B. Hattendorf and Peter M. Swartz (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2008): 263. 35 Parry, Highway, 64. 36 Julian S. Corbett, Principles of Maritime Strategy, (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications 2004 [1911]): 89. 37 Ibid., 87. 38 Mahan, Naval Warfare, 52. 39 Corbett, Principles, 90. 17

his exerting direct military pressure upon ourselves. Command of the sea, therefore, means nothing but the control of maritime communications, whether for commercial or military purposes. The object of naval warfare is the control of communications, and not, as in land warfare, the conquest of territory.40

Concordantly, since the end of World War II the U.S. Navy has been able to fashion a fleet powerful enough to control the global SLOCs. In fact, throughout this period only the Soviet Union seriously challenged U.S. naval preponderance. However, throughout its history Russia had been a continental land power, and despite its impressive naval buildup during the Cold War, it failed to overcome Western naval dominance. Ultimately, the NATO alliance and its principles of sea power withstood the test.41 Gray further expands on the superiority of sea powers over land power:

One argument is that modern history has shown the inability of preponderant continental power to fashion potent enough maritime (or air) instruments for the defeat of offshore sea powers. Another, more convincing is that no land power has been sufficiently preponderant on land as to have the surplus resources necessary for the conduct of successful war against great-power enemies offshore.42

Today, the pillars on which U.S. naval strategy rests are a reiteration of this “maritime narrative.”43 Despite criticism for not having a comprehensive maritime strategy, provisions are being made for the U.S. Navy to remain the world’s only globally steaming navy, capable of substantial forward presence in the most important regions of the world, maintaining credible nuclear and conventional deterrence, exacting sea-control and power projection globally, providing maritime security, and lastly supporting human assistance and disaster relief (HADR).44 The conclusion we can draw from over five hundred years of predominance through sea powers would likely have us believe that the Western European states also understand the importance of powerful naval fleets as a guarantor for economic wealth and prosperity. However, it seems that in the wake of the Soviet demise, the security of Europe as well as the safety of international system of trade was considered to be inviolable by the leadership in London, Paris, Berlin and Rome. How else can the dramatic decline in the size and capability of Europe’s naval forces since the end of the Cold War be explained?

40 Ibid., 90. 41 Till, Seapower, 1-5. 42 Gray, Leverage, 281. 43 Ibid., 5. 44 See Department of Defense, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea Power, (Washington DC, 2007). 18

This is my prediction for the future – whatever hasn’t happened will happen and no-one will be safe from it.’ […] in the dynamic security environment, any assessment of the future is truly only as valuable as its facility for being up-graded.45

Today, the process of designing and building capital warships can take up to three decades. Therefore, by the time a ship enters service the strategic environment in which it operates might differ greatly from that which it was designed for. Similarly, if a government decides to cancel the procurement of new weapon platforms or finds itself under financial pressure to reduce the size of its fleet, this will entail profound strategic ramifications for the country’s naval forces down the line. Therefore, eliminating naval capabilities, such as the ability to operate submarines due to short-term fiscal restraints, can be considered brinkmanship of the first order. In practice, it strips the country of an important political tool of hard power and in most cases the enormous costs to regain such capabilities make amendments unfeasible. What is more, modern warships have to be capable of conducting a vast variety of different missions. During the greater part of the Cold War NATO destroyers and frigates were generally designed to protect the convoys from the United States to Europe against Soviet submarines, while guided-missile cruisers provided the necessary air defense for carrier battle groups. Nowadays, new surface combatants are no longer classified as cruisers, while modern-day destroyers and frigates conduct everything from anti-piracy operations to fleet air defense tasks. Therefore, they need to incorporate built-in redundancies and sufficient room for incremental upgrades over the course of their service life – which in many cases can reach fifty years. As a result, a trend is currently noticeable among most naval forces in the world towards operating large, multi-purpose surface combatants. As the size and sophistication of these platforms grow, so does the price tag of each individual ship. It is important to note that this development constitutes one of the reasons for the shrinkage of many navies over the last decades. For most states it is no longer feasible to operate fleets of dozens – and sometimes hundreds – of warships. At the same time Gray observes “[t]here is a centuries-long pattern of democratic, or relatively democratic, commercial-minded sea powers choosing to neglect their defenses in peacetime”.46 With a decrease in defense expenditure among all but a few European states after the Cold War and exploding costs of building and operating naval vessels, the logical consequence has been a

45 J.B. Haldane quoted in Geoffrey Till, “A global survey of naval trends: the British approach,” in: Oslo Files on Defence and Security, The Rise of naval powers in Asia and Europe’s decline, ed. Bjørn Terjesen and Øystein Tunsjø, Dec. (2012): 17. 46 Gray, Leverage, 284. 19 drastic reduction in the number of ships, submarines, aircraft and their crews. As will be discussed in further detail later, advanced weapon systems and sensors can compensate for the decline of a fleet’s size to a certain extent, providing long distance radar coverage or a greater operational radius for search and rescue missions (SAR), for example.47 However, there is no substitute for a relatively large, well-balanced fleet, in order to command the sea, control the critical straits through which commerce passes, and to maintain a credible deterrent force. In fact, in this day and age, deterrence has replaced the destruction of the enemy as the principle function of naval forces. Therefore Lord Nelson’s famous lines “What a country needs is the annihilation of the enemy. Only numbers can annihilate”48 can be translated into: What a country needs is a sufficiently large forced with the potential capability to inflict unacceptably high losses to the enemy in the case of belligerence. This is more likely to be achieved with superior forces, both in quality and quantity. Deterrence is a complex concept. Clearly, a good case can be made that nuclear deterrence has worked over the past six decades. However, one cannot be as confident in claiming that the same has been the case for conventional deterrence. Recent history has demonstrably shown otherwise. Neither Saddam Hussein nor the Argentinean Junta shied away from invading foreign territory, despite their respective opponents possessing far superior firepower.49 Sam J. Tangredi, a senior American defense planner, makes an excellent point by arguing that even though predictions about another country’s intentions and possible actions are difficult, a less credible military capability increases the probability of the other side pursuing a more aggressive course. Moreover, “deterrence is not a physical property – it is a state of mind.”50 Therefore, to achieve credible deterrence, a nation’s military forces have to exhibit distinct capabilities and be deployed in a specific manner so that hostile actors believe they are unlikely to overcome them. The problem inherent to this equation is that it is often based on assumptions. Hundreds of billions of dollars are spent on military equipment every year in order to provide the countries with supposed, necessary deterrent capabilities. “Yet the forces themselves may never be used”, Tangredi continues. “This is not a standard business model.”51

47 An excellent article on the development of naval sensors and weapons and their effect on naval warfare can be found in Norman Friedman, “Technological Reviews – Naval Sensors and Weapons,” in: Seaforth World Naval Review 2010, ed. Conrad Waters (South Yorkshire: Seaforth, 2009): 167-176. 48 Lord Nelson quoted in Mahan, Naval Warfare, 80. 49 Sam J. Tangredi, Anti-Access Warfare, Countering A2/AD Strategies (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2013): 238. 50 Tangredi, Access, 78. 51 Ibid., 77. 20

Few battles at sea have occurred in the last seventy years and it is likely that for the foreseeable future naval forces will largely be deployed to fulfill diplomatic and policing tasks. Unfortunately, if history teaches us anything, it is that major inter-state conflict cannot be entirely ruled out. For that reason, the growing defense procurement in the Asian-Pacific Region, for example, must be monitored closely. “Indeed [contrary to European developments] one of the principal [observations] is that the naval build-up in the Asia-Pacific is significantly focused on war fighting capabilities and that Asian navies are better funded and provided with extra resources to perform non-traditional security tasks.”52 In particular, China’s military buildup is deeply vexing to U.S. defense planners, many of whom are already predicting the inevitable end of U.S. naval supremacy unless large-scale investments are made. It is important to bear in mind that Lord Salsibury, the British Secretary of State for India and later Prime Minister under the reign of Queen Victoria, once warned us from placing too much weight on the opinion of so-called ‘experts’. “No lesson seems to be so deeply inculcated by the experience of life as that you should never trust experts. If you believe doctors, nothing is wholesome: if you believe the theologians, nothing is innocent: if you believe the soldiers, nothing is safe. They all require their strong wine diluted by a very large admixture of insipid common sense.”53 Hence defense planners fall into the same category. Their predictions also have to be considered cum grano salis because from their perspective the greatest possible range of military capability should always be retained in order to deal with every possible contingency in the future.54 Although a healthy degree of skepticism towards overly pessimistic statements from the quarters of the military and defense establishment is warranted, common sense should nevertheless allow even the most casual observer to realize the utility of a well-balanced naval force. Budget cuts over the last two decades have caused many European navies to reduce the overall size of their fleets and increasingly focus on specific areas of naval warfare (i.e. air defense, expeditionary warfare, or the defense of the littorals). Based on the principle, “[b]etter to be master in some trades rather than mediocre at many”55 this niche specialization offers smaller states a number of advantages, not least because it is much cheaper to entertain such a force than a multi-purpose fleet. However, there are also serious drawbacks to this approach. Specialized fleets find it much more difficult to adapt to the emergence of new

52 Rommetveit, “Introduction,” 10. 53 From a letter to Robert Bulwer-Lytton, 1st Earl of Lytton, 15 June (1877). http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Robert_Gascoyne-Cecil,_3rd_Marquess_of_Salisbury. 54 Till, “British Approach,” 18. 55 Till, Seapower, 121. 21 threats, while “[a] navy that maintains a wide range of skills, is best placed to cope with a variety of expected and perhaps unexpected operational contingencies.”56 Today, many European states rely heavily on the naval forces of friends and allies (in particular the United States) to fill the capability gaps their austerity policies have created. As we shall see in the further course of the discussion, this trend entails considerable strategic risks in light of a profound shift in geopolitics. As a matter of fact, the Western European states often barely manage to conduct basic peacetime duties at the desired rate, and have very limited surge capacity in the event of war. Parry laments that “[i]n conflicts not involving the USA, these ‘come as you are’ navies will have to fight with what they have, or play for time.”57 What makes this situation even more precarious is that there is little certainty whether the “arsenal democracy” would be willing and able to quickly rush to Europe’s assistance.58 Over a hundred years ago “Mahan painted an encouraging picture of the manner in which naval strength underpins and encourages economic prosperity and then feeds from it in a kind of virtuous circle”, Till notes.59 This process is clearly visible in the Asian-Pacific Region, in which naval power is growing in lockstep with commercial maritime trade. This practice constitutes a core principle of sea power, as was described before. The more money that is allocated to naval shipbuilding programs, the faster naval sea power grows, thus providing the beneficial conditions for the sea-born trade industry to expand and vice-versa. However, “the arrows go both ways” and when countries are less willing to invest in their naval forces, for example in times of peace or during economic difficulties, the circle can run vicious.60 The British Royal Navy, for example, has not only been reduced by roughly 60 percent since the end of the Cold War, but at the same time the country’s merchant marine and shipping industry have also experienced recent years of hardship. Once commanding the largest trading fleet in the world, the island nation is currently ranked only twentieth among the biggest merchant fleets in the world in regard to registration and gross tonnage.61 In the end, sea power both in economic as well as in military terms will continue to underpin economic prosperity and political influence in the world. Although it is often overlooked in

56 Till, Seapower, 121. 57 Parry, Highway, 262. 58 Ibid. 59 Till, “British approach,” 21. 60 Ibid., 21. 61 Department for Transport, Statistical Release – Shipping Fleet Statistics 2014, 18 Feb. (2015). https://www.gov.uk/.../shipping-fleet-statistics-2014.pdf. For more information see: Parry, Highway, 48-51. 22 the public debate, the “mutually reinforcing relationship” between commercial and military elements of sea power is well worth the investments.62 In the coming decades of the 21st century the principles of sea power outlined in this chapter are likely to remain constant. The current economic and military maritime efforts by the United States, Russia and many Asian states allow us to infer that sea power will, by all reasonable estimates, remain an essential element of foreign policy in an increasingly competitive world.63 The sea lines of communication will continue to be essential for a prosperous global trade regime while well-balanced, general-purpose fleets will continue to constitute the most useful tools to project power, protect national interests abroad, deter aggressions and if need be underpin these interests by the use of force. As was the case in the many centuries before, those actors who are willing and able to utilize the maritime domain to a greater degree than their competitors will likely be able to secure more favorable outcomes for themselves.

3) The ‘Pivot’ Towards Asia – and the Consequences for Europe

Our problem is not that [the Europeans] doubt our commitment. […] The allies do about as much as they think they have to do. And they don’t think they have to do too much because the U.S. is there to bankroll them.64 (Barry S. Posen)

In this chapter I will take a closer look at the United States’ recent rebalancing towards the Asian-Pacific Region and outline the ramifications the ‘pivot’, as it is often referred to, will have on Europe’s maritime security. By and large, we are currently seeing a shift from a period of U.S. preponderance to a time of multipolar power-distribution. As a consequence, the United States has “come down from the peak of hegemony that it occupied during the unipolar era [after the Cold War]”,65 ceding some regulatory capabilities along the way. At

62 Parry, Highway, 326. 63 “It is always difficult to sketch out the future that defence planners need to prepare for, but never more so than now, since in addition to the usual sets of challenges to do with the rise and fall of nations and the deadly quarrels so often associated with this (which may well be hugely exacerbated by the perfect storm of shortages in energy, food and water foreseen by some by the 2030s), we also have to grapple with a range of asymmetrical threats from a variety of non-state actors including terrorists and pirates. And then there are the faceless threats and challenges brought about by climate change – such as the increased propensity for catastrophic weather events or the rising importance of the increasingly ice-free water of the High North both of which could have both a direct and an indirect impact on Alliance security.” Till, “British approach,” 17. 64 Barry Posen, “Panel Discussion: A Moment of Transition,” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MIg_ZDHeoJg, min 33:00. 65 John G. Ikenberry, “The Illusion of Geopolitics. The Enduring Power of Liberal Order,” in: Foreign Affairs, May/June (2014): 81. 23 the same time, globally networked, radical Islamic terrorism presents a threat to the spread of democracy, while the revisionist powers of China, Russia, and Iran are resisting the liberal order the United States has been promoting since the dissolution of the Soviet Union.66 Nevertheless, the United States remains Europe’s closest ally – politically, economically, as well as militarily. Unfortunately however, Europe remains utterly dependent on a number of key U.S. military capabilities in order to conduct medium and high-intensity warfare over longer periods of time and looks to the United States to protect the freedom of navigation at sea. Roughly 90 percent of global commerce travels by sea. Within this intricate system of trade we are currently witnessing a fundamental shift. Over the past decades, the focus of commercial and maritime activity has moved from West to East: from the Atlantic to the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Already in 1984, U.S. trade across the Pacific had eclipsed that of with Western Europe.67 Today, a greater value of goods is being imported and exported among developing countries (South-South trade) than between developing countries and developed countries (South-North trade).68 This dramatic geopolitical transformation had coincided with the “downwards drift of most Western navies and the growth of others most obviously in the Asian- Pacific, [which] promises a profound shift in the future world’s naval balance in the decades to come.”69 One of the major rising naval powers in the Asian-Pacific Theater over the past decade has been the People’s Republic of China. The country has emerged as a regional power in South–East Asia and, in many ways, can be considered a peer competitor to the United States. Therefore, the U.S. Armed Forces are shifting their attention from previous areas of operation, such as the Atlantic and Mediterranean, to the Asian-Pacific Region in order to underscore their continued interest in the region. Despite Europe remaining one of three areas in the world that is critical to the United States,70 conceivably, the Europeans could conceivably be able to defend their territory as well as their interests abroad on their own; especially if one considers that Europe as a whole has a larger economy and greater population than the United States. Many critics in Washington, therefore, argue that Europe has been on a long

66 See Walter Russel Mead, “The Return of Geopolitics. The Revenge of Revisionist Power,” in: Foreign Affairs, May/June (2014): 69-79. 67 John F. Lehmann, “The 600–Ship Navy,” in: U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s, Selected Documents, ed. John B. Hattendorf and Peter M. Swartz. (Newport: Naval War College Press, 2008): 248. 68 Parry, Highway, 58. 69 Till, Seapower, 2. 70 “Europe and North-East Asia matter because that’s where the great powers are, and they are potential threats to the United States; and the Middle East […] matters because that’s where the oil is, and oil is a critical resource like no other.” See John Mearsheimer, “Imperial by Design,” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sKFHe0Y6c_0. 24 procurement holiday while free riding on the backs of American taxpayers. John Mearsheimer, for example, leaves no doubt about his repugnance towards Europe’s reluctance to invest in their own defense: “When the Cold War ended […] I’d pull everything out of Europe, […] let the Europeans defend themselves.”71 Yet, there is no indication that the United States will reconsider its obligations towards its NATO allies anytime soon. In fact, in the light of Russia’s actions in the Ukraine, additional U.S. forces have been redeployed to Germany, Poland and the Baltic States as well as to the waters surrounding Europe.72 Despite these standing commitments, the geopolitical shift from West to East seems irreversible and will compel the United States to focus less on Europe and more on Asia. “Already much of the US Navy, […] sees the Atlantic merely as an area that must be passed through on the way to somewhere more important. And this perception is more likely to grow than to diminish in the future”,73 Till notes. “The result”, he predicts, “[will be] a fast developing and historic shift in the naval balance between East and West [Europe and Asia] which is likely to result in substantial but currently unknowable change in the world’s security architecture.”74 At present, China is the main motor behind the naval arms race currently underway in South-East Asia. Proof to this claim is the 175% increase in China’s defense budget since 2003.75 As a result, its ongoing military buildup is viewed critically by many of its neighbors, while in the United States it is largely understood to be specifically designed to prevent U.S. military forces from operating near, into, or within the South and East China Sea (also referred to as anti-access/area-denial or A2/AD).76 Therefore, the United States considers these developments as “primary strategic challenges to [its] international security objectives”77 and, in 2010, announced that it would “out of necessity rebalance towards the

71 Mearsheimer, “Imperial,” min. 17:00. 72 Only ten months after the last batch of M1 Abrams main battle tanks had left Europe in April 2013, 29 Army tanks arrived in Germany Ezio Bonsignore et al, “United States of America,” Military Technology: The World Defence Almanac 2014, Issue I (2014): 32. 73 Till, “British approach,” 23. 74 Till, “British approach,” 23. 75 Although the percentage of defense spending has remained relatively constant, the dramatic increase in total GDP has enabled China to allocate significantly more money to its defense sector. Sam Perlo Freeman et al, “Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2013,” in: SIPRI Fact Sheet, April (2015), 2. 76 Anti-access and area denial are strategic approaches to warfare. Their aim is to deny enemy forces the ability to operate in a contested area. Essential to this strategy, however, is the understanding that the enemy is strategically superior and a force-on-force engagement should be avoided by all means. Asymmetric technologies and tactics, as well as niche-capabilities, are sought by states relying on anti-access strategies to offset the opponents’ military advantage. For obvious reasons, superior intelligence, misinformation and deception play a vital role in A2/AD efforts. See Tangredi, Access, 1-5. 77 Ibid., 1. 25

Asian-Pacific region.”78 As a consequence, and in concordance with a decrease of its land forces, naval and aerial assets have been redeployed to the region. More than half of U.S. naval vessels, most notably its carrier strike groups, and 60% of the Air Force’s oversea-based assets have already been allocated to the Asian-Pacific. 79 As Øystein Tunsjø points out, “[already in] 2007, for the first time in 60 years, more [U.S.] ships were based in the Pacific than in the Atlantic. Two-thirds of the US Navy used to be located on the East coast and deployed in the Atlantic, but about two-thirds are now located on the West coast and operate in the Pacific. Newly commissioned ships are largely deployed to Asian waters.”80 Meanwhile, the Chinese are ramping up their military capacities. Apart from their enormous land forces, they have recently developed a number of weapon systems that have been widely discussed in public. In spite of being criticized in the past for obtaining many of these capabilities through reverse engineering, espionage, cyber-attacks and other such dubious measures, China has nonetheless been able to produce sophisticated fighter jets, long range ballistic missiles, as well add some credible warships and weapon systems to its fleet.81 According to the latest U.S. documents, China’s plan to expand its “comprehensive national power” and “[secure] China’s status as a great power” continues to be viewed skeptically.82 They point out that despite “Chinese leaders [expressing] a desire to maintain peace and stability along their country’s periphery; […] and [to] avoid

direct confrontation with the United Illustration 2: The two imagined lines of defense China might want to establish to expand its sphere of influence. States and other countries”83, the United

Abbildung 2 78 Department of Defense, Defense Strategic Guidance: Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership, Priorities for 21st Century Defense (Washington DC, GPO 2012): 2. 79 Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel quoted in Robert S. Dudney, “Verbatim,” Air Force Magazine, July (2013): 45. 80 Øystein Tunsjø, “Maritime developments in Asia: implications for Norway,” in: Olso Files on Defense and Security: The rise of naval powers in Asia and Europe’s decline, ed. Bjørn Terjesen and Øystein Tunsjø Tunsjø, Dec. (2012): 94. 81 According to many defense analysts, it will take three to five years for the LIAONING to become operational. See Dawei Xia, “China: The People’s Liberation Army Navy,” in Seaforth World Naval Review 2010, ed. Conrad Waters (South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2009): 56-65. 82 Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2014 (Washington DC, 2014): i,15. http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_DoD_China_Report.pdf. 83 See Ibid., i. 26

States has repeatedly urged the Chinese government to be more transparent regarding its military and security policies. Otherwise, Chinese actions could “[pose] risks to stability by creating uncertainty and increasing the potential for misunderstanding and miscalculation.”84 In particular, the latest efforts by the Chinese to forcefully expand their sphere of influence have caused much alarm. Currently, China is trying to reach and maintain military dominance in and over its adjacent waters. Therefore, in November 2013, the People’s Liberation Army established an air defense identification zone that overlaps with those of Japan and South Korea, adding to the already substantial tensions in the region. Moreover, China has claimed sovereignty over a number of islands, reefs and rocks ranging from the Korean Peninsula, Japan, southwards to Taiwan, the Philippines and Indonesia. These measures would not only significantly increase China’s exclusive economic zone, but in strategic terms constitutes part of an imagined first line of defense against possible foreign intervention. Moreover, the historic rivalry with Japan as well as the unresolved issues concerning Taiwan is being closely followed by the U.S., as China’s anti-access/area-denial networks within the first island chain are becoming increasingly formidable. In addition to the defense of the waters within the imagined ‘first-island-chain’, the Chinese Navy apparently also wants to establish what is called “Far Sea Defense”.85 This second line of defense stretches further out into the Pacific, well beyond the first line of defense, as is indicated in the map above. The need for these two lines of defense also finds its strategic reason in China’s dependency on

oil. The U.S. Defense Illustration 3: This map depicts the major trading routes to China and the critical choke points that lie between. Department estimates that

Abbildung84 Department 3 of Defense, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China (Washington DC, 2009): i. www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/China_Military_Power_Report_2009.pdf. 85 “The term ―yuanhai fangwei‖ (远海防卫) which translates to ‘distant/far sea defense’, began appearing with increasing frequency in Chinese publications. Authors associated with the Naval Research Institute (NRI) called the ‘shift from offshore to open ocean naval operations’ an ‘inevitable historic choice’ for China noting that naval power must ‘match the expansion of China’s maritime interests.’” Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China – 2010 (Washington DC, 2010). 27 although China still relies on coal as its primary source of energy, it will soon surpass Japan as the second largest oil importer, most of it from the Middle East and Africa. Therefore, China is keen on securing these SLOCs, particularly the numerous critical straits between the Middle East and South-East Asia, which in the case of war could be closed by the U.S. Navy.86 The United States, on its part, will for a number of reasons continue to rely on its naval forces to deter aggression and maintain its influence in the region. Firstly, since the Second World War the U.S. has been able to maintain a naval fleet that has been and will continue to remain unchallenged in a force-on-force engagement for the foreseeable future. Furthermore, the current global geographical and political parameters allow Alfred Thayer Mahan’s principles of controlling the SLOCs to insure economic, political and military dominance to become applicable.87 In addition, while U.S. capabilities during ground operations have been put to the test in asymmetrical conflicts such as in Afghanistan or Iraq, often causing painful casualties, this paradigmatic change of warfare does not affect the realm of blue-water operations to the same extent. Therefore, the United States Navy can continue to rely on its ability to ‘deter by presence’. However, this presence is growing somewhat thin. Given the numerous commitments the United States has across the globe, even a military giant like the United States finds itself in a dilemma. The U.S. Navy is by far the largest fleet, operating 283 ships, including ten aircraft carriers, 100 cruisers, destroyers, and frigates, over 50 attack submarines, and more than 30 amphibious warships. However, under the recently announced ‘Optimized Fleet Response Plan’ the U.S. will not increase its global deployed naval presence of around 95 ships, and as a retired naval officer claims, “the lethality inherent in this presence, based on the ship types deployed, [will] be less than today’s 95-ship presence.”88 In fact, only two carriers will be forward deployed at any given moment in time – down from three to four carriers. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that any European nation would come to the assistance of the United States in case naval conflict would erupt between China and the U.S., and if so, any such assistance would be rather insignificant, given the small number of assets available to Europe’s navies.

86 The United States’ ability to close the Strait of Malacca is one of the biggest concerns to the PRC. See DoD, China 2009, 3. 87 See Nikolaus Scholik, “Mahan oder Corbett: Das maritim-strategische Dilemma „Chinamerika“ im indo- pazifischen Raum,“ Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, Vol. 2 (2013): 140-151. 88 Robert C. Rubel, “Straight Talk on Forward Presence,” Naval Institute Proceedings, March (2015): 25. 28

So where does this fundamental shift leave Europe? As we will see over the course of the following chapters, most naval forces in Europe have suffered a significant decrease in size and funding since the end of the Cold War. As a consequence, many navies have either ceded key capabilities, or have tried to operate balanced fleets with very few reserves and therefore are barely able to fulfill the military, diplomatic and policing roles they are designed for. Although utterly dependent on trade by sea, it is questionable to what extent Europe can contribute to the protection of the SLOCs and, thereby, to the freedom of the sea. “On paper, NATO, with its Standing Maritime Groups, seems to be capable of deploying relevant naval Illustration 4: In the future the United States will continue to rely on its forces across the globe”, carrier battle groups to safeguard its interests around the globe. Felix Seidler points out. “In practice, however,” he relativizes, “any mission with a NATO logo needs approval of 28 memberAbbildung states 4[and] many members would object any new NATO involvement outside the Euro-Atlantic Area.”89 He continues by arguing that the European Union likewise has little leverage regarding security issues outside its rather limited sphere of influence “showing Brussels’ enduring strategic irrelevance in the Indo-Pacific.”90 In the future, the United States will “expect their partner to ‘man up’, in policy, capability and resource terms [because] the USA will not always be available as the force of first – or even last – resort”.91 However, as the following case studies will show, little such effort can be made out among the European partners.

89 Felix Seidler, “Europe’s Role in an East Asian War,” CIMSEC, 11 Jun. (2014), http://cimsec.org/europes-role- east-asian-war/11576. 90 Ibid. 91 Parry, Highway, 273. 29

PART TWO

4) Case Studies: Analyzing Europe’s Navies

The following case studies constitute the mainstay of this thesis. Over the course of the next chapters the development of European sea power since the end of the Cold War will be examined. The principle aim of each case study is to gain insight into the evolution of the respective naval forces. For that reason, the focus of this analysis will be twofold: Firstly, the differences in the general composition of each fleet over the course of time will be illustrated. To make the steep decline in both military expenditure and overall size of Europe’s naval forces more palpable, two separate graphs will provide an outline of each country’s annual defense spending and the number of warships. It is safe to say that throughout history the principle criterion of any naval force (and any military force for that matter) has been its size. Although, size – or in other words, the number of ships and naval aircraft – does not necessarily reflect a fleet’s capabilities per se, it nonetheless often represents a valid unit of measuring naval power. However, given the limited space of this study, not every type of naval vessel qualifies to be taken into consideration. Despite their importance, it would not make sense to count every training craft, transport ship, or helicopter, for example. Therefore, my analysis will mainly focus on four types of warships: aircraft carriers, large surface combatants (such as destroyers or frigates), submarines, and finally ships designed for amphibious warfare. Observant readers will have noticed that smaller surface combatants (torpedo boats, guided-missile attack craft, mine warfare ships) are not included in these categories. Although these kinds of vessels will also be discussed in some detail, they play a less important role in (European) naval planning than during larger parts of the 20th century. In particular, over the course of the last twenty-five years, many naval forces around the world have undergone drastic changes. In the light of the steadily evolving security environment, countires which had formerly focused on defending the littoral waters closer to their homeland are now building so-called ‘blue-water navies’. While fast attack craft, small diesel-electric submarines and mine warfare vessels had been the preferred tools for territorial defense in the ‘brown-waters’ close to shore, nowadays much larger, more sophisticated warships are needed in order to conduct operations for long periods of time and over great distances. What is important to note is that the classification of naval ships can be at least as misleading as simply comparing the number of warships between two navies. While, for

30 example, throughout the last century cruisers (nominally the second largest surface combatants92 after battleships) had a displacement of anywhere between 5,000 and 10,000 tons, nowadays ships of similar size, such as the British Type 45 Daring-class (nearly 9,000 tons), are designated as destroyers (generally ranked one tier lower). However, to make things more complicated, the new German Baden-Württemberg-class will displace more than 7,000 tons once she enters service, but is referred to as a ‘stabilization frigate’. Only two decades ago, many frigates in service in Europe’s navies were actually small warships (1,000-3,000 tons), primarily designed for escort duties and anti-submarine warfare. As Till notes, in this day and age, “the possession of given number of large surface combatants if often regarded as rough indication of relative strength and purpose.”93 Therefore, the inclusion of all larger surface combatants in one category not only provides us with better means of comparison between the different navies, but also illustrates the rapid decline in the number of Europe’s fleets over the last twenty-five years. 94 Apart from quantity, quality obviously plays a significant role in assessing naval power. However, evaluating a ship’s capability is a somewhat more difficult undertaking. First of all, we have not witnessed any major military confrontations at sea from which we

Illustration 5: A telling picture of Europe’s naval decline. Two older vessels are being replaced by a single new warship. Many navies have been literally cut in half over the last 25 years.

92 Note that aircraft carriers are generally not referred to as surface combatants. 93 Till, Seapower, 117. 94 See Ibid., 122-124. 31 could draw meaningful conclusions in more than thirty years. In fact, the last war to provide insight into major naval warfare dates back to the Falkland War in 1982. Even in that case, it was mainly a contest between the British surface forces, their carrier air wing, and the Argentinean air force. In absence of large force-on-force engagements, much of the debate regarding the ostensible capabilities of naval forces is theoretical (in particular, in regard to high-intensity warfare at sea). However, recent military interventions (Iraq, Bosnia, Afghanistan, Libya, and Georgia), naval exercises, live weapons tests, and technical analyses do give us some idea of the past, current, and future capabilities of Europe’s navies, their ships and their crews. For that reason a good part of each chapter will be dedicated to the examination of the technical aspects of modern warships, such as weapon and sensor systems. The second focus of attention in each case study will be the strategic framework in which the navies operate. Although all European states under scrutiny are either part of the European Union or NATO and hence share similar values and have a certain degree of common security interests, historical, political, and lastly geographical circumstances have resulted in each country identifying different key security needs. Accordingly, although many European naval forces are assigned to multinational operations, such as fighting piracy around the Horn of Africa, conversely they also have a very distinct strategic and tactical focus. While Norway, for example, will remain vigilant towards Russia’s growing naval power in the High North and therefore has strengthened its blue-water capabilities, Italy wastes little thought on the possible reemergence of Russian sea bastions around the Kola peninsula, as it is confronted with a human catastrophe unfolding right before its eyes. Smaller offshore patrol vessels are needed to rescue refugees from drowning as they seek to escape the horrors of wars that have engulfed larger parts of North Africa and the Middle East, while at the same time larger warships are critical in order to protect Italy’s interests in the greater Mediterranean region. Its neighbor Greece, on the other hand, is deeply vexed about Turkey’s growing military power at sea despite both countries formally being NATO allies and therefore remains focused on territorial defense. And lastly, the British Royal Navy is trying to reassert itself as a first-rate naval power with global power projection capabilities by rebuilding its fleet around two new aircraft carriers. As we can see, there are numerous and often conflicting strategic interests among and within Europe’s military services. What is more, continuous reduction in defense expenditure over the last two decades has only exacerbated the already difficult question of how to best allocate military funding. By taking a closer look at the provisions stipulated in each country’s defense white papers and other public statements over the last two decades, valuable insight

32 will be gained in regard to the core missions of the navies, as well as the degree of trust they enjoy within their respective country’s defense and security strategy. A comparison between each navy’s responsibilities – assigned to them by their political and military leadership – and its actual capabilities will provide evidence that many naval forces are barely able to fulfill these duties in times of relative peace. Moreover, in light of the United States’ rebalance towards the Asian Pacific Region, the studies will show that strategic foresight among Europe’s policymakers and defense planners alike is evidently sorely lacking. As a consequence, the following analysis will give little solace to those who are concerned that Europe might become increasingly marginalized in a maritime century in which the center of gravity will have finally shifted away from the Atlantic and towards the Pacific.

5) The UNITED KINGDOM: Keep Calm and Get Those Carriers Operational

Figure 1 U.K.: Defense Spending in % of GDP 4,5

4

3,5

3

2,5 Military Spending

2 % ofGDP % 1,5

1

0,5

0

1990-2014, Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database

Figure 1

33

Figure 2 U.K.: Number of Major Vessels Sources: The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, Military Technology Almanac, World Naval Review 60

50

40

30

20 Number ofVessels Number 10

0 1990 2000 2014 Aircraft Carriers 3 3 0 Large Surface Combatants 48 41 19 Submarines 22 16 10 Assault/Amphibious 7 8 6

Figure 2 Volumes could be written about the dramatic decline of British sea power over the course of the last one hundred years. Once the world’s preeminent sea power which ruled the waves of the seven seas, the British Royal Navy (RN) today can barely be considered Europe’s most capable naval force. As the adjacent Figure 2 indicates, the size of the British95 fleet has been reduced by roughly sixty percent since the end of the Cold War. Although the Royal Navy continues to operate a balanced fleet, the austerity measures over the last two decades have elicited this alarming decline. The Royal Navy is much smaller and less capable than it was in 1990; in particular, when compared to other naval powers of each era. These developments are likely to undermine Britain’s role in world affairs and risk the nation’s ability to defend its interests abroad. Within less than twenty-five years, the Royal Navy has been forced to cede some vital capabilities. The most visible among these cuts, without a doubt, has been the decision to decommission all of its aircraft carriers. After almost seventy years of successful carrier operations, the Royal Navy has lost its entire fleet of Harrier combat jets and its last remaining aircraft carrier was withdrawn from service in 2014. Meanwhile, the escort fleet has been reduced from 48 vessels in 1990 to merely 19 destroyers and frigates, while the

95 Despite not including the same geographical areas, the terms Great Britain and United Kingdom will be used synonymously. 34 number of attack submarines has been halved. Since the emergence of the Soviet submarine threat in the early 1960s, anti-submarine warfare (ASW) had been the forte of the British fleet. Faced with ongoing retrenchment, such as the cancelation of the Nimrod MRA.4 maritime reconnaissance aircraft and fewer ships available for these tasks, the Navy’s ASW capability has been severely atrophied. The only area not to be truncated to such an extent has been the Royal Navy’s amphibious forces. Over the course of the next chapters the reader will recognize a similar pattern among all but very few European countries. With the end of the Cold War, the enormous provisions for a cataclysmic showdown between East and West were no longer considered warranted. In the case of the Royal Navy, this meant that “[i]ts own Cold War mission of hunting Soviet submarines had vanished, and along with it the chief justification for large chunks of the Fleet.”96 Faced with new forms of conflict and the emergence of threats that ranged across the gamut of the intensity spectrum, many European countries had to make substantial adjustments to their national defense strategy. However, the most important question that needed answering was to what extent Europe’s governments would reduce their armed forces as part of the “peace dividend”.97 The United Kingdom presents us with a somewhat ambiguous case study. On the one hand, the country remains one of the few European NATO members committed to spending a significant percentage of its gross domestic product (GDP) on defense (well over the 2 percent margin), as well as actively participating in numerous U.N., NATO and U.S.-led military operations around the globe over the last two decades. On the other hand, since the end of the Cold War, it has Illustration 6: British destroyers are conducting operations on both been unable – or shall we ends of the intensity spectrum: Fleet-air defense in the Atlantic and anti-piracy operations off the Gulf of Aden. rather say unwilling – to

96 Nick Childs, Britain’s Future Navy. Rev. ed. (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Maritime, 2014, [2012]): 7. 97 The term ‘peace dividend’ refers to the practice of allocating money that would have been invested in defense to other areas, such as health care or social services, as the result of dramatic changes in the global security environment. 35 maintain its military capabilities in relation to other countries in the world. Numerous critics, therefore, have made a point to stress that as a consequence, the British Royal Navy has lost much of its former might and no longer qualifies as the great sea power it used to be. As a matter of fact, at the height of the Cold War only the two superpowers (the United States and Soviet Union) had more capable naval forces than Britain. Twenty-five years after the fall of the Iron Curtain, a brief comparison with other naval powers should suffice to comprehend the perilous situation the Royal Navy currently finds itself in. Clearly, the U.S. Navy remains the undisputed behemoth of sea power and despite recent discussions about its ostensible decline, will continue to operate the most powerful naval force for the foreseeable future.98 In addition, depending on one’s locus of analysis, a number of other navies can be considered superior to the Royal Navy. Russia, for example, is currently making a concerted effort to regain its former glory by modernizing its fleet of Soviet-era warships and also building new submarines and surface combatants. As a result, Russia maintains both substantial nuclear as well as conventional naval capabilities. China’s process of “national rejuvenation”99 has led to the construction of a sizable fleet of modern vessels within a very short period of time. The Chinese fleet is steadily becoming a more effective force in blue-water operations, causing the Americans to shift their strategic focus from the Atlantic to the Asian-Pacific Region. Similarly, the Indian Navy is also undergoing a significant modernization process and currently deploys two aircraft carriers, 13 submarines, as well as 31 destroyers and frigates. Nonetheless, its capabilities are still not considered on par with western naval forces. Indian Commodore Manohar K. Banger therefore rightfully asked why “[…] the Indian Navy is now a 100-ship navy yet [is] still considered by the major powers to be a brown-water force”, when Great Britain only has 25 surface combatants but remains adamant that it operates a credible blue-water navy.100 Unlike the Indian Navy, Japan’s naval forces (officially the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force), despite their lack of power projection capabilities, are understood to operate a larger and more

98 See Scholik, “Chinamerikas,“ 140-151. 99 See DoD, China 2014, i. 100 Manohar K. Bangar, “Nobody asked me but… The Royal Navy: Whither Goes Thou?” Naval Institute Proceedings, March (2008). http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2008-03/nobody-asked-me. Brown-water navies generally are not able to sustain operations over great distances and longer period of time on the open ocean. A brown-water fleet also tends to operate warships that are smaller than those of blue-water navies and which are designed for tasks closer to shore. 36 capable Navy than Great Britain. In fact, many consider the Japanese Navy to be the world’s second-most effective conventional naval power apart from the U.S. Navy.101 Even among the European navies, a case can be made that the French Navy actually would deserve to be put in the spotlight in any study of European sea power (a fact that is surely loathed by many Britons). Both the British and the French navies operate a similar number of frigates and destroyers. They each operate four strategic ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) as well as six nuclear powered attack submarines (SSN) and are both able to conduct sizable amphibious operations. What puts the French ahead of the British (at least until 2020) is the ability to deploy its naval air-arm from the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier. Apart from the United States, no other nation can project power to the same degree or conduct air-strikes with similar effectiveness as the French Navy’s naval air-arm – the Aéronavale. However, there is a silver lining on the horizon for the British Royal Navy. Notwithstanding its recent decline, there is reason to believe that it will again become Europe’s most effective naval fighting force.

Had the dissolution of the Soviet Union seemed implausible to many analysts during the mid-1980s,102 the dramatic events at the end of the decade heralded the beginning of a new era – even if subliminal tensions persisted. Great Britain was quick to interpret the fall of the Berlin Wall and the breakup of the Soviet Union as the harbingers of a drastic change in the global security environment. In light of these changes, the U.K.’s Armed Forces were considered to be too large and too expensive. Based on these conclusions “the MoD commenced a far-reaching study into future defense requirements and policy entitled ‘Option for Change’”, as John Roberts points out. “The fundamental aim of the study,” he explains, “was to find large-scale savings to fund the expected ‘Post-Cold War Peace Dividend’ whilst preserving as much of the front line as possible.”103 Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait and the consequent military operation, under the auspices of the United States, put a brief halt to the planned defense cuts. The military success of the Coalition vindicated the widely-shared concept of large-scale conventional

101 Yoji Koda, “Naval developments in Japan,” in: The rise of naval powers in Asia and Europe’s, eds. Bjørn Terjesen and Øystein Tunsjø (Oslo Files. Dec 2012): 57. 102 Few members of the intelligence community predicted the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Australian defense analyst Paul Dibb was one of them. In 1986 he published The Soviet Union: The Incomplete Superpower which pointed to the many weaknesses of the Soviet system. 103 John Roberts, Safeguarding the Nation: The Story of the Modern Royal Navy (Barnsley: Seaforth Publishing, 2009): 202. 37 warfare, despite asymmetric forms of conflict becoming far more common.104 However, regardless of their success in the liberation of Kuwait, the British Army and Air Force had to suffer the largest parts of the cuts postulated in the defense review.

The most significant cuts fell on the Army, which was reduced in strength by one third, from 160,000 to 120,000. The largest cuts were in the ground forces based in Germany which were reduced by over half. Tactical air power based in Germany was significantly reduced with the closure of two out of four RAF bases and the withdrawal of six RAF squadrons.105

These decisions were met with heavy criticism, mostly for the study having been written without carefully assessing the “exact nature of the [evolving] strategic security environment”.106 The Navy fared somewhat better than its sister services. Only a small number of older warships were initially to be taken from service while the number of personnel was to be reduced from almost 69,000 (including the Royal Marines) to 55,000 by the mid-1990s. Despite these cuts, the Royal Navy’s future

looked promising. All three 20,000 Illustration 7: The HMS Sheffield burns after being hit by Argentinean anti-ship missiles during the last major conflict ton Invincible-class aircraft carriers at sea: The Falkland War. and their respective rotary and fixed- wing detachments remained in service, providing significant operational flexibility to Western Abbildung 5 interventions in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan over the coming years. The United

Kingdom’s new nuclear deterrent, in the form of the 16,000 ton Vanguard-class SSBN, was also entering service, replacing the older Resolution-class. Close cooperation with the United States during the design and construction phase provided the British boats with the American Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). Each missile could be fitted with up

104 The paradigmatic shift in armed conflict and the consequences it had on the U.S. Armed Forces is discussed in Jeremy Stöhs, “US Defense Policy Since the End of the Cold War: The Difficulty of Establishing a Balanced Force Structure,” JIPSS, Vol. 8, 1 (2014): 139-153. Also discussed in Smith, Utility. 105 Claire Taylor, A brief guide to previous defense white paper (House of Commons Library, 2010): 9. www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN05714.pdf. 106 Ibid. 38 to 12 nuclear warheads. Four of these boats were built allowing the Royal Navy to continuously have at least one submarine with a maximum of 192 nuclear warheads at sea.107 In regard to the Navy’s attack submarine force, a final decision was made, namely to withdraw all of its conventionally powered submarines. Being subject to severe financial restrictions, the Navy concluded that operating a mixed fleet of nuclear and conventional diesel-electric submarines had become unfeasible as the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Benjamin Bathurst, noted at the time:

The judgment we made to withdraw the Upholder class [conventional submarines] was the toughest decision the Navy Board has had to make for many years. I would like to emphasize that […] we had a hard choice to make, and we decided to consolidate around SSNs because by retaining support for two types there came a point where we wouldn’t be able to afford to run both classes given the other resource needs within the Navy.108

On the other hand, experience from Operation Desert Storm had convinced the British of the utility of sea-launched cruise missiles and an initial order for 65 American Tomahawk land attack missiles, which would be fired from the attack submarines, was made in 1995.109 Meanwhile, the large escort fleet was undergoing constant modernization. Both the destroyers and frigates had shown significant vulnerabilities during the Falkland War when the ships’ air defense systems proved unable to effectively engage low-flying targets. In total, six ships were lost to enemy air attacks. As a result of this costly experience, the Royal Navy reacted quickly and introduced significant upgrades to its SAM (surface-air missile) systems and, like many other navies in the world, fitted their warships with close-in weapon systems (CIWS) like the American Phalanx. It is possible that these upgrades saved the battleship U.S.S. Missouri when it was fired upon by Iraqi forces during the Gulf War. Fortunately for the Americans, the Type 42 air defense destroyer Gloucester successfully tracked and destroyed the Silkworm missile racing towards the battleship.110 The slow and creeping reduction of surface forces during the later years of the decade was largely compensated for by the introduction of more capable units. In particular, the Type 23 Duke-class frigates represented one of the finest multi-purpose frigates in the world,

107 The number of warheads was later reduced to 48. Ezio Bonsignore et al. “United Kingdom,” Military Technology. The World Defence Almanac 1995-96, Issue 1 (1996): 168. 108 Benjamin Bathurst, “The Royal Navy in the 1990s,”Naval Forces Vol. 14, 4 (1993): 21. 109 See Bathurst, “Navy 1990s”, 21. Also in Bonsignore, “United Kingdom,” 168. 110 The Missouri, however, was also fitted with two Phalanx CIWS on each side of the ship. See Roberts Safeguarding, 214. 39 despite having been specifically designed for ASW missions in the North Atlantic.111 In total, 16 of these ships were built between 1990 and 2003 and all but three remain in service as the Royal Navy’s arguably most versatile asset. Despite the somewhat more capable Sea Wolf SAM system aboard the Type 23 frigates, the Navy exerted itself in finding a suitable replacement for the obsolescent Type 42 Sheffield-class destroyers, two of which were sunk by the Argentineans in 1982. “Particular weaknesses identified were the Type 42 destroyer’s inability to illuminate – and therefore engage – more than two targets simultaneously”.112 As we shall later hear in more detail, during the 1980s, the project for a common frigate design for most NATO allies was to alleviate the pressing need for a capable surface combatant. However, insurmountable differences over the respective capabilities and features of the ship ultimately led to the cancelation of the NFR-90 program. However, the idea of a joint venture between European NATO members persisted, not least because of immense costs of designing and building a class of such warships packed with sophisticated weapon systems and electronics. In 1992, the project ‘Horizon’ was brought into being. A trilateral cooperation between the United Kingdom, France and Italy set out to build a new class of destroyers which could provide a credible multi-tier fleet air defense against even the most advanced aerial threats. (A more detailed description of this program is provided in the chapter on the Italian Navy). Despite the U.K. abandoning the program in 1999, substantial progress had been made regarding the ship’s general layout as well as the radar and SAM systems and the British shipbuilders went on to

incorporate many Illustration 8: An artist’s impression of the cancelled Nimrod MRA.4 maritime design features found patrol aircraft. Such aircraft constitute an invaluable asset for any navy.

111 A.D. Baker III, The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World 2000-2001. Their Ships, Aircraft, and Systems (Annapolis MA: Naval Institute Press 2000): 860-862 112 A comprehensive article on the ship can be found in Conrad Waters’, “Significant Ships: HMS Daring: The Royal Navy’s Type 45 Air-Defence Destroyer,” in Seaforth World Naval Review 2010, ed. Conrad Waters (South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2009): 133. 40 in the Italo/French Horizon-class. In the end, Italy and France each commissioned a pair of nearly identical ships, while the British Royal Navy has received six Type 45 destroyers, known as the Daring-class. Apart from some smaller differences in the ships’ appearances, the main point of distinction between the Daring and her ‘cousins’ concerns the radar system. All ships are fitted with the SMART-L long range volume search and track radar as part of its principle anti-air missile system (PAAMS). However, while Italy and France have chosen to install the somewhat less capable EMPAR (European multi-function Electronically Scanned Adaptive Radar) for target search, acquisition, and tracking, the Daring-class is fitted with the BAE Systems Sampson multi-function radar, located on top of the ship’s main mast, thus providing an increased search radius. The intransigence on the part of the Royal Navy in incorporating the highly capable Sampson radar in spite of its costs was, for the most part, founded in the Navy’s contingency planning, which envisions “a much more demanding operational scenario than either the [Marina Nationale or the Marina Militare]”.113 Although the “[f]ocus of the Type 45’s air defense role has resulted in the remaining weapon fit being somewhat sparse for a ship of the Daring’s size”,114 (single 114mm 55 cal Vickers Mod. 8 gun, Lynx or Merlin helicopter, two single 30mm guns115) it is by no means a bargain. Increasing costs and the austere financial environment have led to the production being suspended after the completion of six vessels. Instead of the initially planned replacement of the 12 Sheffield-class destroyers at a rate of one-to-one, at the end of the day the Royal Navy will have to get by with only half as many ships. In contrast to the decline of the escort fleet, the Royal Navy’s amphibious capabilities were strengthened as part of the U.K.’s strategic reorientation towards joint-expeditionary operations. As we will see in the further course of this study, the majority of European states changed their naval doctrine over the last two decades, shifting from the previous prevalent concept of territorial defense to crisis-prevention and conflict-resolution further away from home. Projecting power from the sea onto land, therefore, became a desirable capability for most of today’s larger navies. The Strategic Defense Review in 1998 substantiates these aspirations by stating that “[i]n the post Cold War world, we must be prepared to go to the crisis, rather than have the crisis come to us.”116

113 Alcibiades Thalassocrates, “A Fateful Name - Horizon,” Naval Forces, Vol. 18, 2 (1997): 14. 114 Waters, “HMS Daring,” 143. 115 Considerable provisions for additional weapons have been made. Possible cruise-missiles of European or American make, Torpedo tubes, CIWS, Harpoon anti-ship missiles. 116 Ministry of Defense, Strategic Defense Review (London: 1998): np. 41

Against this background, the Review suggested a continuing shift in focus away from large-scale open-ocean warfare towards a wide range of operations in littoral areas. This reflects changes in the potential maritime threat, especially relative to NATO, the missions of our forces and the likely geographic location of future operations. These changes are a continuation of trends since the end of the Cold War. They include a decline in the likelihood of an open-ocean anti-submarine or anti-surface threat on the scale previously envisaged.117

The helicopter assault ship HMS Ocean was the first ship to epitomize the aforementioned strategic reorientation. By 2007 two Albion-class assault landing ships (LPD)118 and three Bay-class dock landing ships (LSD) had been added to the fleet, replacing the much less capable Fearless-class and elderly tank landing ships. Although the new warships represented a considerable financial burden to the defense budget, they gave the Royal Navy hitherto unprecedented capabilities to project power over great distances, and more importantly, into the littoral waters and onto distant shores. The most important procurement decision made by the British government since the end of the Cold War has to be the construction of two new aircraft carriers. Although this process has caused considerable debate among politicians, military brass and the broader public, the recent decision to commission both carriers can be considered a hallmark moment for the Royal Navy. Having experienced difficulties operating its Harrier jets from the short decks of the three Invincible-class carriers in hot weather conditions, most noticeably during deployments in the Persian Gulf,119 the Strategic Defence Review in 1998 announced that the three ships would be replaced by two new aircraft carriers capable of “[delivering] increased offensive air power, and an ability to operate the largest possible range of aircraft in the widest possible range of roles.”120 Initially planned to displace between 30,000-40,000 tons and embark up to 50 aircraft, the former figure has significantly increased while the latter figure no longer seems financially feasible. Apart from the aircraft carriers, further promising provisions were made in the Strategic Defence Review. For example, many observers at the time believed that the

117 MoD, SDR, np. 118 LPD stands for landing platform dock, LSD for landing ship dock. “An amphibious transport dock, also called a landing platform/dock (LPD), is an amphibious warfare ship, a warship that embarks, transports, and lands elements of a landing force for expeditionary warfare missions. Several navies currently operate this kind of ship. The ships are generally designed to transport troops into a war zone by sea, primarily using landing craft, although invariably they also have the capability to operate transport helicopters. Amphibious transport docks perform the mission of amphibious transports, amphibious cargo ships, and the older LPDs by incorporating both a flight deck and a well deck that can be ballasted and deballasted to support landing craft or amphibious vehicles.” “Amphibious transport dock,” Wikipedia. The Free Encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amphibious_transport_dock. 119 MoD, SDR, np. 120 Ibid. 42 procurement decision regarding the carriers necessarily meant that all twelve air defense destroyers would be built.121 As we now know, this was merely wishful thinking. On the other hand, the planned successor to the venerable Trafalger and Swiftsure-class submarines was to be increased to a total of five units and, in fact, by 2015 three boats of the new Astute-class have entered service while an additional three hulls are under construction. The seventh, and final, unit has been ordered and tentative plans see the SSN entering service in 2024.122 According to the white paper, only minor adjustments had to be made in other areas. The mine countermeasure (MCM) force was to be strengthened by five instead of ten ships, the existing Nimrod MR.2 maritime patrol craft were to undergo modernization while work on a successor, the Nimrod MRA.4, was already underway and, finally, the Air Force’s land- based Harrier GR7s were to merge with the Navy’s Sea Harriers and be put under joint command, “enabling them to operate equally effectively from both land and sea.”123 In toto, “[t]he Strategic Defense Review is an impressive document”, E.R. Hooton wrote at the time, “which seems to indicate that the Ministry of Defense has taken a cold, hard look at British defense policy for the next century in the

light of diplomacy and Illustration 9: The difference in size between the former Invincible-class carrier and the new Queen Elizabeth becomes apparent in this picture. industrial capability.”124 Hooton’s upbeat remarks regarding the Strategic Defence Review are quite justifiable, considering that its provisions apparently were made in a “time of relative plenty”125 and after a close study of the United Kingdom’s aims and needs in the post-Cold War security environment. The Royal Navy can be thankful for the prudence and strategic vision the political and military leadership displayed at the time. “It may not have seemed like it at the

121 E. R. Hooton, “Britain’s Strategic Defence Review: Smiles All Around,” Military Technology, Vol. 22, 9 (1998): 34. 122 “UK: BAE Systems Secures $1.92 Bln Submarine Deal,” Navaltoday.com, 11 Dec. 2012. http://navaltoday.com/2012/12/11/uk-bae-systems-secures-1-92-bln-submarine-deal/. 123 Taylor, Guide, 11-12. 124 Hooton, “Smiles,” 36. 125 Childs, Future Navy, 7. 43 time but, with the benefit of hindsight, the SDR probably marked [the] modern high-point for the Royal Navy […]”.126 Had the foundation for a well-balanced and capable fleet not been set during these critical years it is likely that the once proud British Royal Navy would by now have been reduced to a small regional force with limited power projection capabilities after the years of stringent defense cuts that followed. It goes without saying that the British Armed Forces have conducted a vast number of operations over the last two decades, ranging from large-scale mechanized warfare during Operation Desert Storm to current anti-piracy operations around the Horn of Africa.127 Moreover, the Royal Navy regularly participates in naval maneuvers and also hosts the annual Cougar exercises128 in the Mediterranean, Middle East and Indian Ocean. “[T]he UK still has expeditionary capabilities to join US-led operations [to the] East of Malacca” an analyst notes and the “[d]isaster relief after Typhoon Haiyan by the destroyer HMS Daring and the helicopter carrier HMS Illustrious prove that British capability.”129 The most costly deployments, both in terms of money and lives lost, however, have been the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a key ally to the United States, the U.K. has suffered considerable casualties in what is known as the ‘Global War on Terrorism’. In addition to the painful sacrifices the country has made in the last decade, the strategic focus on counterinsurgency (COIN) and counterterrorism (CT) operations has also created what critics, including Dr. Dave Sloggett calls, sea blindness: “[Many] countries in NATO are transfixed at the moment by the problems in Afghanistan [Syria, Iraq and North Africa] and the threat from transnational actors. In doing this they have developed a sea blindness that appears to forget and marginalize their maritime heritage.”130 The British military is no exception to this rule. Over the course of the last decade the British armed services were forced to come up with new strategies and tactics of how to fight land wars, which were anything but the conventional conflicts the military’s top echelon had known and trained for during the Cold War. With the British combat missions in Iraq and Afghanistan having come to an end, Britain must now look beyond Basra and Helmand Province. Nevertheless, much controversy remains in regard what future conflicts will look like. Some argue that if Western powers

126 Childs, Future Navy, 7. 127 For a excellent overview of the Navy’s operations during this period of time see Roberts, Safeguarding, 202- 234. Note that the book was published in 2009. For more recent information on deployments visit: http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/. 128 See “Cougar 14,” Royal Navy, http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/operations/mediterranean-and-black-sea/cougar. 129 Seidler, “Europe’s Role,” np. 130 Dave Sloggett, “Norway Leads Where Others Should Follow,” Warships, 5 (2009): 23. 44 again decide to intervene militarily, it will be in Afghanistan-like stabilization operations, fighting insurgencies with so-called ‘Joint Rapid Reaction Forces’ and large expeditionary contingents, meaning ‘boots-on-the-ground’. Others, however, state quite the contrary, namely that ground troops apart from Special Forces will not be needed and that air power alone, be it land or sea based – manned or unmanned, will be a sufficient coercive measure when the ground war is fought by rebels, self-proclaimed freedom fighters or other indigenous forces.131 This argument is often backed by the NATO-led air campaign in Libya, in which interdiction bombing gave the disjointed and rag-tag rebels a chance to overthrow the Gaddafi Regime. Still others argue that a potential interstate conflict is likely to occur in the next decades. In such a case, the counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy – which has affected all military branches by replacing high performance and heavy military assets with lighter but cheaper systems designed for COIN operations – has left armies vulnerable in high intensity conflicts.132 While considerable adjustments have been made to the force structure, enabling the British Army and Royal Marines to become far more effective in fighting asymmetric wars on land, the current Royal Navy cannot be considered more capable in dealing with emerging threats than it used to be. With the costs of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan continuously growing over the course of the last decade, the Navy’s large-scale procurement plans were causing an additional burden on the defense budget, which fortunately remained at a comparatively high level of around 2.5 percent of GDP. Therefore, it came as little surprise that after the attacks of 9/11 large and expensive programs such as the Daring-class destroyers were cut in order to allocate sufficient funds towards combating the “increased threat from international terrorism.”133 However, it should have at least occurred to some of the commentators, if not the political and military leadership at the time, that these decisions would have severe ramifications for the Royal Navy in the long term. It therefore seems inexplicable how a senior defense journalist such as E.R. Hooton, could dismiss the cuts to the destroyers’ force as “no surprise and in indeed not a ‘real’ loss.”134 Even the most casual

131 Stephan Maninger, “Der Schattenkrieg – Ergänzungen zur „Counterinsurgency“ – Debatte,” Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, Vol. 3 (2013): 305. An interesting article comparing the two forms of warfare is Michael J. Boyle, “Do counterterrorism and counterinsurgency go together?” International Affairs, Vol. 86, 2 (2010): 333-353. 132 Carlo Kopp, “COIN reorientation- too far or not far enough,” Defence Today, Vol. 9, 2 (2011): 24-27. 133 Ministry of Defense, Delivering Security in a Changing World, Defense White Paper, (London: 2003): 2-3. While in early 2001 the requirement stood at 12 vessels it was subsequently reduced, first to eight then to six ships. Compare E. R. Hooton, “Britain’s Type 45 Destroyers Advantage,” Military Technology, Vol. 25, 6 (2001): 57-60 and E.R. Hooton, “’Delivering Security in a Changing World’: UK Defence White Paper 2003,” Military Technology, Vol. 28, 2 (2004): 76-78. 134 Hooton, “Security”, 77. 45 observer should have realized that this would mean that, at the end of the day, the surface fleet would be reduced to a little over 20 vessels – and that this number represented a rather optimistic estimate. In 2010, the British Government published the already infamous Strategic Defense and Security Review (SDSR), titled: Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty.135 In the light of the global economic downturn, the European debt crisis and the ongoing war in Afghanistan, the entire Armed Forces were to become subject to a “draconian downsizing.”136 The Royal Navy’s combat air fleet was disbanded and in the process the aircraft carrier force was eliminated. Of the three Invincible-class carriers, the lead vessel had already been decommissioned in 2005, but was maintained in reserve. In 2011 the ship was towed to Turkey and scrapped. The second ship, the Illustrious, as we have heard, remained in service until 2014, albeit its capability being limited by the absence of fixed-wing aircraft. The Ark Royal had joined the fleet in 1985 and was previously scheduled to be withdrawn once the new class of aircraft carriers became available. In accordance with the SDSR, the British Government, however, decided to “decommission HMS Ark Royal immediately”,137 after only twenty-five years of service, thus creating a capability gap until the 65,000 ton Queen Elizabeth enters service around 2020. (By comparison, the recently decommissioned U.S.S. Enterprise was in service for over fifty years.) The lack of naval air power was clearly visible during the NATO-led air campaign against Libya in the summer of 2011. After axing the Ark Royal, Britain had to rely on the Royal Air Force’s Tornados and Typhoons to conduct strike missions from the homeland, while French Rafale combat aircraft flew sorties from the Charles de Gaulle carrier off the coast of Libya, as did the Italian and U.S. Harriers from the Giuseppe Garibaldi and U.S.S Kearsage. It goes without saying that operating a carrier would have made a crucial difference for the British forces, both in means of cost reduction and mission effectiveness. Moreover, the hiatus in carrier operations will also result in a considerable challenge to restore such capabilities. Fortunately, close ties with the United States have provided opportunities for British personnel to train on the U.S. Navy’s big deck aircraft carriers, in order to maintain their flying and flight-deck operation skills.138 As previously mentioned, the surface fleet has been consolidated around the six Type 45 destroyers and 13 Type 23 Duke-class frigates, with its successor, the Type 26, scheduled

135 Minstry of Defense, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty, The Strategic Defence and Security Review. (London: The Stationary Office, 2010). 136 Larrabee, Austerity, xii. 137 MoD, SDSR, 22. 138 Dr Dave Sloggett, Iain Ballantyne, “Charting a new course for the ‘Special Relationship’ at sea,” Warships, March (2015): 18-19. 46 to replace the Dukes in the course of the next decade. Cost overruns and delays in the Nimrod MRA.4 program ultimately led to the cancelation of the maritime patrol aircraft and with it the loss of an integral element of the U.K.’s ASW capabilities. These capabilities have been sorely missed, in particular more recently when a Russian submarine allegedly was sighted in the waters off Scotland. In a somewhat embarrassing move, the Royal Navy asked its American ally for assistance in the search for the submarine.139 What is more, a further round of cuts in manpower levels has left the Navy with a force of roughly 30,000 military personnel, less than half than at the end of the Cold War. To sum up these developments, a recent RAND study comes to the conclusion that “reduced manpower levels, curtailed equipment procurement, and [subsequent] capability gaps [have] direct consequences for the UK’s ability to carry out current and future missions.”140 Although the Royal Navy is making investments to maintain a balanced naval force – deciding to commission both new Queen Elizabeth-class carriers and planning a new class of ballistic missile submarines – some analysts ask themselves if the British Navy is not backing the wrong horse. “A key question, however, is whether a balanced force is ultimately in the strategic interests of the United Kingdom, or whether such a force should be abandoned in favor of a ‘cruising’ navy requiring a greater number of frigates and destroyers and providing more naval presence in a greater number of places than the current fleet plan can accomplish.”141 In fact, as McGrath continuous, “[c]onsidering the United Kingdom’s global economic interests and its desire to remain closely aligned with the US Navy, a force of less than 20 combatants might not suffice.”142 Over the past decade the Royal Navy, by and large, has tried to trade quantity for quality. By pursuing a strategy of ‘leapfrogging’, “cutting defense expenditure heavily today while investing in new types of capabilities”,143 the British Navy hopes to profit down the line, or in other words accepting “that there will be some significant long-term gain, but also some significant short-term pain.”144 However, this practice cannot be seriously considered an appropriate solution to the problem, especially if national security

139 Jamie Merrill, “MoD asks for American help in searching for Russian submarine near Scotland,” The Independent, 1 April, 2014. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/mod-asks-for-american-help-in-searching-for-russian- submarine-near-scotland-9966080.html. 140 Larrabee, Austerity, 6 141 Bryan McGrath, “NATO at sea: Trends in allied naval firepower,” American Enterprise Insitute, September 18, 2013: np http://www.aei.org/publication/nato-at-sea-trends-in-allied-naval-power/. 142 McGrath, “NATO Trends,” np. 143 Larrabee, Austerity, xvii. 144 Dr. Lee Willett, “The Strategic Defence and Security Review, A Preliminary RUSI Assessment,” min. 04:52- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yt0NOuFL_Ss. 47 is at stake. Furthermore, the shortage of surface combatants is unlikely to become any less critical in the future. At any given moment in time, British destroyers and frigates are conducting a number of tasks in different parts of the world as the former First Sea Lord, Sir Mark Stanhope pointed out:

Standing commitments [at the time included]: Protecting Iraqi oil infrastructure, anti- piracy, counter-terrorism, counter-drugs, safeguarding overseas territories and Crown Dependencies including the Falklands. Those missions require at least five or six ships at any one time and the wisdom is that you need three or four ships for each commitment, in order to guarantee having one on station. That means one out there, one, possibly two, in refit or maintenance and another training to deploy. In frigate and destroyer terms there is not a lot, if anything left over for emergencies such as war or for training with allies to underpin alliances that prevent wars.145

Clearly, such a high frequency of deployments also increases the wear and tear on the warships and their crews. Fatigue not only takes its toll on the ships’ hulls but also becomes visible among the men and women who do their utmost to protect the interests of the United Kingdom at sea. In order to alleviate this dire situation – as we shall see in the following chapters – many European states now operate flotillas of small ocean-going patrol vessels (OPV), specifically designed for the increasing number of low intensity anti-piracy, drug interdiction, fishery protection or search and rescue (SAR) operations. However, currently the Royal Navy merely has four such vessels in service, of which only one is assigned to operations outside of the British Isles’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ).146 As a consequence, the more capable frigates and air defense destroyers also have to conduct these operations, in which their multimillion dollar electronics and weapons suit are rarely needed. General Sir David Richards points to this paradox by stating, “‘You get to this ridiculous situation where in Operation ‘Atalanta’, off the Somali coast, we have £1bn (Type 45) destroyers trying to sort out pirates in a little dhow with RPGs […] costing $50 […]. That can’t be good.’”147 The Strategic Defense and Security Review in 2010 caused considerable capability gaps among all branches of the Armed Forces. However, there is cautious optimism in naval quarters, concerning the future of the Royal Navy. After years of defense cuts, military expenditure is to increase slightly from 2015 onwards.148 In the light of a somewhat better

145 Iain Ballentyne, “The Big Interview, First Sea Lord of the RN,” Warships, Sep. (2009): 7. 146 Richard Beedall, “The Royal Navy: Mind the Gaps,” in Seaforth World Naval Review 2014, ed. Conrad Waters (South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2013), 80. For information on EEZ, see Footnote 157. 147 Sir David Richards quoted in ibid. 148 Till, “British approach,” 25. 48 economic situation Prime Minister Cameron announced that, instead of selling or mothballing the second carrier, the Prince of Wales will join the fleet early next decade. “The second carrier will be brought into service. [This] means the Royal Navy will be able deploy a carrier 100 percent of the time,” Cameron stated.149 Moreover, the teething problems the new Astute- class SSNs have encountered will have been sorted out by the time the carriers arrive, making them some of the most capable hunter-killer submarines in the world. The design phase of the new Type 26 frigate and replacement for the four Vanguard ballistic missile subs is well underway and it is hoped that the current size of the fleet can be maintained. Anything short of the construction of 13 new frigates and four SSBNs would only exacerbate the already critical state regarding the size of the fleet, and therefore can rightfully be considered as possible brinkmanship on part of the government.150 Unless some unforeseen events occur which would necessitate substantial adjustments to be made to the current procurement plan, the British Royal Navy will operate a multi- purpose navy with increased power-projection capabilities by the beginning of the next decade. By and large, the Royal Navy will have emulated the United States’ naval forces. In fact, as a number of observers note, the Royal Navy already “looks strikingly like the US Navy, except [at] a fraction of its size.” However, “the resources necessary to achieve these goals are to some degree harvested from savings gained from a significantly smaller escort and combatant fleet” McGrath criticizes.151 Notwithstanding this predicament, operating a balanced naval force gives the political and military leadership the most effective tool to cope with the changing security environment and a myriad of emerging threats. “The general tendency [in the 21st century]”, Geoffrey Till observes, “is to guard against the difficulty of prediction by building general purpose fleet capabilities that can be adapted to respond to unexpected events and trends.”152 After having now reached its ostensible nadir since the end of the Cold War, the British Royal Navy is slowly recovering from the severe retrenchment that has befallen all of the United Kingdom’s Armed Forces. With numerous high-profile procurement projects underway, the Royal Navy can look forward to a somewhat brighter future. Britain is likely to

149 Andrew Chuter “Cameron: UK Will Operate 2 Aircraft Carriers,” Defense News, 5 Sep. (2014). http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20140905/DEFREG01/309050019/Cameron-UK-Will-Operate-2- Aircraft-Carrier. 150 In particular, if only three SSBNs would be built this would severely change the strategic principle of an at- sea nuclear deterrent force, as the U.K. would no longer be able to have one ship at sea all the time. Compare: “Debating Continuous-at-Sea Deterrence: Britain's Nuclear Security”. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jC3-TPRnXhM&list=PLFAgO2TZWpwBH9t3LB4CJscyDOo5M3dt9. 151 Mc Grath “NATO Trends,” np. 152 Till, “British Approach,” 18 49 once again deploy fast jets in the form of the Lockheed Martin F-35B from the decks of its aircraft carriers and thus regain substantial power projection and deterrent capabilities. Ultimately, however, the drastic reduction in the size of the fleet over the last twenty years has been a very costly one in strategic terms. As Till concludes, “a decline in the RN’s global footprint seems inevitable given the decline in the number of its ships and people.”153 Such a development is likely to accelerate the already ongoing shift in the global naval balance from West to East.154 This year, in 2015, the next Strategic Defense Review will be published. As a consequence some of the findings in this chapter regarding Britain’s Naval Forces might need to be qualified in view of the new provision made by the British Government. However, there is little reason to believe that significantly more money will be allocated to defense which would allow the Royal Navy to regain the status it enjoyed at the end of the Cold War.

6) FRANCE: Stretched but Willing – Europe’s Most Capable Naval Force

Figure 3 France Defense Spending in % of GDP 4 3,5 3

2,5 2 Military Spending

% ofGDP % 1,5 1 0,5 0

1990-2014, Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database

Figure 3

153 Till, “British Approach,” 26. 154 Ibid., 28. 50

Figure 4 France: Number of Major Vessels Sources: The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, Military Technology Almanac, World Naval Review 40

35

30 25 20 15

10 Number ofVessels Number 5 0 1990 2000 2015 Aircraft Carriers 3 3 1 Large Surface Combatants 38 30 20 Submarines 18 12 10 Assault/Amphibious 9 9 7

Figure 4

Over the centuries the French and British fought epic naval battles to decide who was to command the sea. In the end, French aspirations for global dominance ended with the crippling defeat at the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805 against Lord Nelson and the accreted might of the Royal Navy. From that point onwards the British would rule supreme for over a hundred years, until their power was finally eclipsed by the United States and its Navy. Consequently, during the Cold War the Royal Navy was subordinated to NATO’s naval strategy against the Soviet threat. As has been noted, the British slowly shifted their focus from a more general power projection capability to anti-submarine warfare in the North Atlantic, relying on the United States’ carrier battle groups to bring the fight to the enemy in the case of war. France, on the other hand, for both political and geographical reasons, had to build and maintain a balanced multi-purpose fleet, able to shoulder the entirety of conceivable maritime tasks. Firstly, in 1966, after apparently insurmountable differences between France and the United States regarding the Grand Nations status within NATO, President Charles de Gaulle announced the country’s withdrawal from the Alliance.155 Therefore, the French Navy, or

155 Although the French Armed Forces were no longer incorporated into NATO’s command structure, France had significant forces stationed in Germany. Throughout the Cold War NATO contingency planning was largely based on the assumption that France would join the other NATO forces in the event of war with the Soviet 51

Marine Nationale, not only had to be designed to provide credible nuclear deterrence in the form of its ballistic missile submarines (referred to as the force de frappe), but also had to be capable of conducting naval operations ranging across the gamut of the intensity spectrum: from fleet air defense to fishery protection. The second defining factor was the unique nature of France’s geography. While other European states such as Italy or Norway had (and still have) relatively confined spheres of interest – the greater Mediterranean region and High North respectively – France had access to the Mediterranean, the Atlantic and the English Channel, hence to the North Sea. Numerous sea lines of communication run through these waters and protecting them is of vital interest to France, which like so many other nations is dependent on seaborne trade. What is more, France still retains numerous oversea territories, including, inter alia, French Guiana in South America (home to Europe’s spaceport), Guadalupe and Martinique in the Caribbean, Réunion in the Indian Ocean, Adélie Land in Antarctica and French Polynesia in the middle of the Pacific Ocean. Apart from the U.S., France is the only country to have its naval forces continuously on station in all three oceans of the world156 and also possesses the second largest exclusive economic zone (EEZ)157 which stretches over more than 11,000,000 km². Accordingly, the French Navy has over the past decades operated a mix of ‘first-rate’ warships, as well as patrol vessels designed for low-risk sea surveillance, fishery protection and constabulary duties. Sustained military expenditure of over 3.5 percent of the nation’s GDP throughout the Cold War allowed the French Navy to become one of the most prominent sea powers in the world by the time the global confrontation between East and West had come to an end. Although its surface fleet was not as numerous as that of the British Navy (38 large surface combatants compared to Britain’s 48), the Marine Nationale had one distinct advantage over the British and other large naval forces. Instead of relying on small cruiser-sized aircraft carriers that could only deploy the Harrier jump-jets (such as the British Invincible-class, the Italian Giuseppe Garibaldi, or the Spanish Principe de Asturias), France operated two flat- deck carriers using a CATOBAR system (catapult assisted take-off barrier arrested recovery).

Union. See Norman Friedman, The Fifty Year War. Conflict and Strategy in the Cold War (London: Chatham Publishing, 2000): 295-298. 156 Seidler, “Europe’s Role,” np. 157 “An exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is a sea zone prescribed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea over which a state has special rights regarding the exploration and use of marine resources, including energy production from water and wind. It stretches from the baseline out to 200 nautical miles (nmi) from its coast. In colloquial usage, the term may include the continental shelf. The term does not include either the territorial sea or the continental shelf beyond the 200 nmi limit.” Quote from “Exclusive Economic Zone,” Wikipedia. The Free Encyclopedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exclusive_economic_zone. 52

This system allowed heavier aircraft like the Dassault Etendard IVPs, Grumman F-8E Crusaders, and the Alizé maritime patrol planes to safely operate from the carrier, thus increasing the naval air-wing’s combat radius and payload. In essence, the French carrier battle groups around the Clemenceau and Foch represented Europe’s most powerful naval assets. In addition, the Jeanne d’Arc helicopter carrier, somewhat similar in design to the Soviet Moskva-class, provided the fleet with ASW and amphibious capabilities. The escort fleet consisted of 18 cruisers and destroyers, as well as 24 smaller frigates. Although a considerable force, many of these ships had already been in service for nearly thirty years and were becoming increasingly expensive and difficult to operate. On the other hand, units such as the Cassard-class belonged to the most capable air defense destroyers of their time,158 while the new class of George Leygues ASW destroyers represents the core of the Navy’s multi-purpose surface capabilities to date. Like Britain, the French Navy operated a mix of nuclear propelled and conventional diesel-electric submarines, the latter of which, it was decided during the 1990s, were to be decommissioned in favor of the SSNs. A new class of boomers (SSNBs) had already been laid down at the national shipyards at Cherbourg159 and would slowly replace the six existing boats. Four nuclear power attack submarines of the Améthyste-class were also ordered to augment the existing Rubis-class, but in the end only two units were built, bringing the number of nuclear attack submarines to a total of six. Interestingly, these boats were very small compared to other SSNs and, in fact, displaced less than, for example, the Japanese Soryu and Oyashio-class conventional submarines.160 As mentioned, the French DCN shipbuilders had also constructed the highly capable Agosta and Daphné SSKs, which were

158 “The two frigates are the most modern and doubtless the best equipped in all the navies of Western Europe, in particular with respect to electronic warfare equipment.” Bernard Prézelin, Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World 1992-93. Their Ships, Aircraft, and Systems (Annapolis MA: Naval Institute Press, 1992): xiii. 159 “The system under which the French Navy procures its warships and naval equipment is unique. The main responsibility falls on the Direction des Constructions Navales [DCN], an official design bureau answerable to the General Armament Authority. This resembles the structure of other leading navies’ procurement processes, but the bureau is also responsible for running the dockyards, markets its products for export, undertakes a surprisingly wide range of manufacturing, and collaborates with industry.” Antony Preston, “Warship Design for the French Navy,” Naval Forces Vol. 13, 1 (1992): 16. 160 Tons submerged: Améthyste-class SSN, 2,680 tons; Oyashio-class SSK, 3,600 tons; Soryo-class SSK, 4,200 tons; Trafalger-class SSN, 5,200 tons; Los Angeles-class ca. 7,000 tons; Akula-class SSN, >9000 tons. See 160 Eric Wertheim, The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World. 16th Edition. Their Ships, Aircraft, and Systems, (Annapolis MA: Naval Institute Press, 2013): 34. 160 Ibid., 37, 200, 359, 581, 797, 847. 53 particularly useful in waters closer to shore. The vessels’ quality is underscored by their considerable commercial success.161 The need for offshore patrol vessels, sometimes referred to as surveillance frigates at the time, has already been briefly addressed. Although warships, such as the 17 D’Estienne D’Orves-class in service with the French Navy in 1990, would nowadays not be considered credible surface combatants bearing in mind their shortcomings in size, speed and armament (1,140 tons, 23kts, one 100mm gun, four Exocet missiles, ASW rocket launcher); at the end of the Cold War they provided an indispensible element of the Marine Nationale’s fleet, in particular because they could be built in great numbers. In comparison to the British Navy, France has always sought to maintain a sizable fleet of such OPVs. However, their design features and nature of deployment often blurs the line between the different classes of warship. (Offshore patrol vessels now have reached the size, and sometimes capabilities, of ships classified as destroyers twenty-five years ago). In terms of amphibious capabilities and auxiliaries, France had already made respectable investments by the time other European countries only started to realize the utility of such forces in time of crisis. One 9,300 ton large dock landing ship (LSD), a smaller 3,310 ton LSD, two older Ouragan-class ships and five medium sized landing ships provided comparatively robust power projection capabilities, despite some critics arguing at the time that the “amphibious assault capabilities [were] dangerously reduced”.162 With five large fleet replenishment ships and a sizable fleet of mine hunters, the French Navy could generally consider itself on par with the British Navy, only outclassed by the U.S. Navy and the Soviet naval juggernaut.163 The drastic changes at the end of the 20th century obviously also had serious repercussions on the French Armed Forces. Military spending was quickly reduced and the entire defense structure underwent radical reorganization. At its heart, the so-called ‘Optimar 95’ plan, formulated only a year after the Cold War had come to an end, provided for some far-reaching conditions, namely to disband all previous naval command structures. In short, the naval squadron and flotillas were to be dissolved and the “bulk of the surface fleet [was] subdivided into three large specialized structures, which could be looked at as coherent ‘force pools’.”164 Somewhat similar to the development of the Alpha and Delta groups in Spain165

161 A number of Agosta boats were sold to Pakistan, Spain and Malaysia, while the Daphné saw service with the Portuguese and Pakistani naval forces. See Chris Chant, Ships of the World’s Navies (London: Brain Trodd Publishing House, 1990): 30-31. 162 “‘Optimar 95’ For The French Navy,” Military Technology Vol. 16, 9 (1992): 52. 163 See Prézelin, Combat Fleets, xii-xiv, 136-181. 164 “’Optimar 95’,” 51. 54

“the Joint Chief of Staff [would] be able to ‘pick up’ at will the naval assets he [needed] to face a given crisis situation.”166 Space does not allow the listing of all the changes made as a consequence of the Optimar 95 plan, but in general it can be said that the foundation for the current force structure was laid during this period of time. The aircraft carriers

Illustration 10: The Singapore version of the French La Fayette frigate and the majority of the exhibits significant signal reduction features. surface fleet (including air defense and ASW frigates, the amphibious forces and fleet replenishment tankers), as well as the nuclear attack submarines, would henceforth be stationed at Toulon in southern France. The rest of the French fleet has its home at Brest on the Atlantic coast. The primary mission of the frigates and OPVs stationed there is to protect the SSBNs on their way to and from their nearby port at Ile Longue. The larger part of the mine countermeasure force also operates from Brest and is supported by replenishment vessels.167 Despite a serious effort being made to modernize the fleet during the 1990s, it was not long before the general state of the French Navy began to cause considerable alarm among defense analysts. Defense expenditure had remained remarkably high during the early 1990s (around 3.3 percent of GPD) but began to decrease drastically from 1995 onwards. By the year 2000, the budget had been reduced by nearly 25 percent (to 2.5 percent of GDP). Apart from the aforementioned streamlining measures, fiscal restrictions forced the Navy to make a number of concessions. While some of the procurement projects were cut, such as the second pair of Cassard air defense frigates,168 others were postponed or underwent “programme

165 Discussed in the chapter on Spain. 166 Ibid. 167 See for initial plan in “’Optimar 95’,” 51-54. Current forces in Jean Moulin, “France: The Marine Nationale: The Bare Minimum for the Job,” in Seaforth World Naval Review 2015, ed. Conrad Waters (South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2014): 85. 168 “It was originally planned to build four air defense destroyers to escort the Charles de Gaulle, but the Cassard-class was cut back to two ships. More air defense ships will be needed”. Preston, Antony. “France’s Naval Industry in the 1990s.” Naval Forces Vol. 13, 5 (1992): 16. 55 stretching measures”169 in order to avoid rash decisions, which might come back to haunt the Navy. As Jean-Louis Promé stated at the time, “[g]iven the very long delay between the launching of a modern weapon system and its eventual entry into service, a wrong decision today could compromise the credibility and effectiveness of the French defense posture as a whole in the 2000- 2010 timeframe.”170 However, regardless of these saving measures, the Marine Nationale found itself in gradual decline. By 1996 the last of the Daphné-class submarines had been decommissioned and ultimately the Navy “opted to abandon the conventional submarine component.”171 This is a shame given France’s continued proficiencies in building highly capable SSKs. The Clemenceau was taken from service in 1997, while her sister the Foch waited for the arrival of France’s new carrier before being decommissioned and sold to Brazil in 2000. Since then the French Navy has operated a single carrier: the Charles de Gaulle. Meanwhile, five new La Fayette frigates entered service, exhibiting groundbreaking design features, not seen before in any warship.172 The public interest in the ships was heightened when it was featured in the 1995 Bond movie GoldenEye. Stealth had become a buzzword of the post-Cold War era, as American stealth fighters and bombers could penetrate enemy air defense networks with seeming impunity. In the maritime realm, “[t]he best way to protect a ship is still to avoid detection”, a commentator stated.173 Designed to drastically reduce the ship’s radar cross section, the hull and superstructure of the La Fayette are slanted to “control radar reflectivity”174 and are covered with radar absorbing material (RAM). The usual openings one finds in the ship’s hull and superstructure are all covered with retractable screens to enhance stealth as the illustration above shows. Apart from their groundbreaking features, the ships provide a reasonable amount of firepower, despite having been designed for long-range missions, overseas possessions control, as well as defensive operations closer to home.175 A single 100mm 55 cal gun can be used against air, surface and land targets, while the eight Exocet SSMs and Crotale CN2 SAM systems provide additional effectiveness

169 Jean-Louis Promé, “The French 1992-94 Military Programme Law: A Case of ‘Let’s Wait and See’ While Adapting,” Military Technology Vol. 16, 9 (1992): 42. 170 Promé, “Military Programme,” 42. 171 Jean-Charles Lefebvre, interview by Naval Forces, “The French Navy in a Phase of Transition,” Naval Forces Vol. 13, 5 (1992): 41. 172 “La Fayette Frigate Programme: A Major Success.” Naval Forces. Special Issue: French Naval Technology (1994): 21-22. Alan Hinden, interview by Naval Forces, “La Fayette Ship Profile (I),” Naval Forces Vol. 19, 2 (1999): 45-47. 173 “La Fayette,” 22. 174 Wertheim, “Combat Fleets 16th,” 207. 175 Ibid. 56 in medium-intensity combat. A helicopter can be embarked, and owing to the ship’s sophisticated stabilization system it can land even in very rough seas.176 On the international market the La Fayette design has been highly successful. Modified versions of the ship have been sold to Singapore, Taiwan and Saudi Arabia. However, for the French Navy, the frigate has become a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it pioneered naval ship design and had significant influence on both France’s Horizon- class destroyer and FREMM-class frigate (FREMM stands for Frégate européenne multi- mission). At the time it gave the Navy exactly what it needed, namely a state-of-the-art warship and technology test bed, which could fill the gap between the fleet’s OPVs and aforementioned “first rank ships”.177 It is safe to say that very few people in the naval service at the time would have imagined the five vessels, referred to as second rank ships,178 to become front-line frigates, constituting a third of the Navy’s current escort fleet.179 Inherently slow, arguably too lightly armed for high-intensity conflict (although a more capable air defense system could be installed), the La Fayette exemplifies how important it is to build multi-purpose surface combatants, capable of conducting a wide variety of missions and which are able to quickly adapt to an ever changing security environment. In hindsight, one can question the decision to invest so heavily in signature reduction, instead of building more powerful and heavily armed warships. Even at the time, it was not reasonable to believe that the stealth frigate would ever have to avoid a modern anti-ship missile fired by an angry local fisherman while on station off the shores of Martinique or Tahiti. The French can rely on a powerful military industrial complex. Over the last decades, French companies have provided cutting-edge designs in many areas of military technology. In terms of shipbuilding, the French DCNS industrial group can rightfully be considered one of the most experienced and successful manufacturers of naval weapon systems. In fact, it is one of the few companies able to build nearly every kind of warship: from conventional and nuclear powered submarines, to patrol vessels, frigates, assault ships and aircraft carriers. More importantly, over the last two decades, the French naval industry has successfully teamed up with other European shipbuilders to design and manufacture some of the best naval vessels in service today (the trilateral Horizon-project has already been mentioned and will be described in further detail in the next chapter). Based on these experiences, the continued

176 A helicopter can land at up to sea state six. See “La Fayette,” 22. 177 Hinden, “La Fayette Profile,” 48. 178 Ibid. 179 Ministère de la Défense, French White Paper, Defense and National Security 2013 (Paris 2013): 131. 57 cooperation with Italy’s Fincantieri has led to the construction of the highly versatile FREMM frigates, eight of which have been ordered by the French Navy, called Aquitaine-class.180 Many design features of both the Horizon and the La Fayette are visible the Navy’s new warship. Most notably it incorporates signature reduction measures to make it arguably the most advanced warship in this area today.181 Despite its radar system being somewhat less sophisticated than on the Italian FREMMs (Herakles radar instead of the more capable Selex EMPAR radar), it nonetheless provides robust air defense capabilities. Besides its AAW weapons, Exocet anti-ship missiles, and the French equivalent to the U.S. Tomahawk land attack cruise missile (the MBDA SCALP), the ship’s anti-submarine warfare suit is most impressive. Apart from the obligatory torpedo launchers, the ship has a Thales low frequency, active and passive sonar mounted on the ship’s bow. “Providing long-range detection irrespective of environmental conditions, it is particularly effective at detecting targets above the thermal layer and has been influenced by Mediterranean anti-submarine conditions”, Waters comments.182 A second variable-depth sonar is deployed from underneath the flight deck and is designed to find submarines even at very great distances beneath the thermal layer. Once a submarine has been located the Aquitaine’s helicopter is mainly responsible for its pursuit. The current Westland Lynx model is currently being replaced by the more capable French Caïman version of the NH-90. 183 This brief description clearly shows that the French Illustration 11: The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dempsey, conversing with his counterpart, Pierre de Villiers aboard the Charles de warship relies almost Gaulle aircraft carrier. exclusively on European technical know-how. It is worth noting that as the defense spending, and thus the demand for new warships, among European states began to sink in the wake of the Soviet breakup, France

180 Conrad Waters, “France’s Aquitaine: First French FREMM Heralds a Renaissance for Its Surface Fleet,” in Seaforth World Naval Review 2013, ed. Conrad Waters (South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2012): 90-107. 181 Waters, “French FREMM,” 99. 182 Ibid., 95. 183 The thermal layer or thermocline is a general feature of large bodies of water, such as lakes or oceans. This layer separates the upper more turbulent and mixed layer from the calm dark water below. The depth of the thermocline is not constant but, generally, is found at around 100 meters below the surface. 58 was at the forefront of the attempt to maintain its industrial proficiencies, thereby also ensuring that Europe’s defense industry remained competitive on the international market.184 Successive French defense white papers underscored the vital necessity to strengthen the common European defense sector. “Industry must be European” they urged and made a point by stating that “[i]ndividual European countries can no longer master every technology and capability at national level. […] As regards the other technologies and capacities that it may wish to acquire, France believes that the European framework must be privileged: combat aircraft, drones, cruise missiles, satellites, electronic components etc.”185 While many European surface combatants had relied on American sensors and armament, such as the Tartar and Standard SM-1ER missiles for upper tier fleet air defense during the later years of the Cold War, the French were adamant that their future warships should be fitted with European weapon systems to the greatest possible extent. In regard to air defense capability – one of the primary elements of modern warships – a French and Italian defense consortium developed and introduced the Aster missile series in the late 1990s. Two versions of this highly capable SAM are currently in service: the short range Aster 15, for point and local air defense and the larger Aster 30, for long-range air defense. Both types have been successfully tested against a variety of targets and, owing to their active seeker and thrust vector control, are by some analysts considered superior to all but the newest American Standard missiles.186 Among the vessels fitted with the DCNS SYLVER vertical launch system firing the Aster missiles are the four French and Italian Horizon-class destroyers, the British Type 45 (which evolved out of the Horizon-project), the export versions of the La Fayette frigate, the Italian aircraft carrier Cavour, as well as all new FREMM-class frigates. The first ship to incorporate the Aster air defense missile, however, was the nuclear- powered Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier – the backbone of Marine Nationale. After the keel of the ship had been laid down in 1989 it took five years for the ship to be launched and, after numerous delays, another seven! years for her to enter service. At a displacement of over 37,000 tons and a length of 261 meters, the French carrier will remain Europe’s largest warship until the Queen Elizabeth joins the British fleet in around 2020.187 As was noted at the beginning of the chapter, the ship is more powerful than any other aircraft carrier currently

184 Ministére de la Dèfense, Livre Blanc sur la Défense 1994 (Paris, 1994): 117-119. 185 Ministére de la Dèfense, The French White Paper on defence and national security (Paris, 2008): Chapter 2, 9. 186 The new SM-3 is generally considered the currently best air-defense missile against high-altitude targets and has successfully been tested in the ballistic missile defense role. Moreover, Raython is now also building the Standard SM-6 ERAM with an active seeker in order to engage targets beyond the horizon of the ships sensors. 187 For general data on carriers see Wertheim, Combat Fleets 16th, 195-196. 59 in service, save the American supercarriers. Furthermore, the French Navy has a long and successful history of operating fast jets from the decks of its aircraft carriers. Apart from the ships’ nuclear propulsion, the most notable difference to similar ships in service today is the installation of catapults and arresting wires. France was not only able to benefit from the American’s experience in CATOBAR carrier operations, “[buying] important parts of these systems in the US”,188 but can also operate its Aéronavale detachment from the U.S. Navy’s carriers, as members of the respective naval air-arm explain: “The goal of the deployment [of French aircraft onboard the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt] was to demonstrate, on a large scale, our ability to integrate with US forces”, the commander of the French air group said,189 while a senior US pilot added that “[i]ntegrating with the French did not pose any major problem. […] Basically, we have the same mentality and all French pilots have been trained by the US Navy […]”.190 Close cooperation between the two countries has been quite common over the last decades, and it is safe to say that after rejoining NATO in 2009, “France today is much more integrated in NATO planning and operations than at any time since the mid-1960s.”191 Such interoperability and cooperation not only provides valuable trust-building measures but also enhances Europe’s ability to effectively deploy together with their most important ally, the United States. The Charles de Gaulle has been one of the most important assets in naval operations since its introduction in 2001. The Aéronavale conducted air strikes with its Super-Étendard and Rafale fighter-bombers against al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan as part of Operation Enduring

Freedom, (the French naval Illustration 12: French troops are heavily engaged along the operation was called Operation country’s geographical axis of interest, such as in Mali. Herakles), while E2-C Hawkeye surveillance aircraft provided radar coverage and airborne

188 Philippe Remon-Beauvais quoted in Jean-Paul Philippe, “The CHARLES DE GAULLE Takes Shape,” Military Technology, Vol. 16, 10 (1992): 45. This is a considerably well-written article regarding the envisioned design features and requirements towards the carrier in 1992. 189 Patrick Zimmermann quoted in Henri-Pierre Grolleau, “RAFALE Demonstrates Interoperability,” Military Technology Vol. 32, 10 (2008): 92. 190 Ibid., 94. 191 Larrabee, Austerity, 26. 60 early warning. In 2011, the Charles de Gaulle participated in the air campaign against Libya’s longtime ruler Muammar Gaddafi, while most recently the carrier made a high-speed transition from its previous station in the Indian Ocean to the Persian Gulf to join the U.S.-led airstrikes against the IS network in Syria and Iraq.192 Despite serious discussion of building a second carrier has been going on for over two decades (a possible cooperation with the British seemed to be the most cost-efficient solution) the topic has now been dropped indefinitely. As a consequence, not a single large-deck aircraft carrier will be operational in Europe between 2016 and 2018 when the French ship undergoes her mid-life refueling and overhaul, and only the Spanish and Italians will be able to deploy a very limited number of Harriers from their carriers. Meanwhile, India is already making progress in deploying MiG-29K jets from the deck of the refurbished Soviet-era Admiral Gorshkov, while the second carrier, the Viraat will await the introduction of India’s first domestically built aircraft carrier before being decommissioned. Similarly, China has also begun deployments of its first ‘flat-deck’, the Liaoning. While experts note that these efforts do no amount to a credible aircraft carrier capability, both China and India have made tentative provisions to build their fleet around numerous carrier battle groups. Moreover, considering the current naval arms race which is under way in the Asia Pacific Region, these developments clearly highlight the opposite trajectories that the European and Asian sea powers are on. In strategic terms France, however, remained steadfast. Despite increased political and economical headwinds, the French Armed Forces would maintain a “full spectrum”193 force and sufficient military means to conduct large-scale high-intensity interventions globally. Priority would be given to the “geographical axis from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean, the Arab-Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.”194 However, as the defense white paper in 2008 noted, for ‘significant’ and ‘major’ operations, assets from other countries would be needed.195 In other words, the United States’ heavy sealift, airlift and replenishment capabilities, its aerial refueling fleet, large stock of precision ammunition, command and control facilities, as well as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets (ISR)196 would in any case remain a sine qua non in Europe’s defense planning.

192 “France deploys aircraft carrier in Arabian Gulf for ISIL fight,” The National World 23 Feb. 2015. http://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/france-deploys-aircraft-carrier-in-arabian-gulf-for-isil-fight. 193 MdlD, Paper 2013, 12. 194 Ibid., chapter 2, 9. 195 Ibid., chapter 11. 196 An overview of American naval information warfare capabilities is provided in Jeremy Stöhs, “Intelligence and Deterrence at Sea. The Role of US Naval Information Technology During the 1980s and Today,” JIPPS, Vol. 8, 2 (2014): 73-91 61

Between 2008 and 2015, the size of the French Navy continued to decrease. The initial plan to scale down the escort fleet to 18 vessels was found to be too costly in the light of an 11 percent cut to the Navy’s budget.197 Consequently, instead of 11 FREMM-class frigates, (17 were originally planned in 2002) only eight would be procured, bringing the number of “front-line” frigates down to the aforementioned 15 ships. Six of these warships are designed for ASW tasks (in order to protect the force de frappe) while the last two units will be upgraded to provide fleet air defense. The number of ballistic missile and attack submarines remained untouched. On the other hand, in the past decade and in accordance with France’s defense strategy, its amphibious forces were considerably strengthened. Three Mistral-class (LHD) were built between 2003 and 2012198 and together with the Siroco LHD provide more than “[just] limited crisis response and humanitarian intervention”, as McGrath believes to be the case.199 In fact, apart from the British, France has the largest amphibious force in Europe.200 The Mistral has been in the media spotlight as of late. In 2010, after more than two years of secret negotiations, France and Russia signed a contract for four of these amphibious assault ships to be built in French and Russian naval yards. The decision elicited fear among some NATO members, not least because these ships would give the Russian fleet the amphibious capabilities it so sorely lacked during the war against Georgia in 2009. Therefore, it seems to be a somewhat peculiar historic coincidence that the second vessel under construction is named after the port city annexed by Russian troops in the summer of 2014; the Sevastopol. Given the renewed confrontation between East and West, the French government ultimately had to bow to pressure from its allies and at first postponed and then cancelled the delivery of the Vladivostok which already had a Russian crew onboard for training at sea.201

197 Larrabee, Austerity,19. 198 Keel of the lead vessel Mistral laid down in 2003. Third and final unit Dixmude commissioned in 2012. LHD stands for Landing Helicopter Dock. These vessels can embark helicopters as well as landing craft, small vessels, and in some cases hovercraft from its well deck. Examples would be the American Tarawa and America-class, the French Mistral-class, or the British HMS Ocean. 199 Compare McGrath “Decline,” np. 200 A summary regarding the vulnerability of the fleet’s large ships due to the lack of available escorts is provided on Wikipedia: ““Incidents such as the near-loss of the Israeli corvette INS Hanit to a Hezbollah-fired anti-ship missile during the 2006 Lebanon War have shown the vulnerability of modern warships to asymmetric threats, with the Mistral-class ships considered under-equipped for self-defence in such a situation.[26] Consequently, Mistral and Tonnerre cannot be deployed into hostile waters without sufficient escorting ships. This problem is compounded by the small number of escort ships in the French Navy; there is a five-year gap between the decommissioning of the Suffren-class frigates and the commissioning of their replacements, the Horizon-class and FREMM frigates.” “Mistral-class amphibious assault ship,” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mistral-class_amphibious_assault_ship 201 Dave Sloggett and Ian Ballantiyne, “Franco Russian Carrier Saga,” Warships 1 (2015): 13-14. 62

The dispute over the Mistral ships for the Russian Navy also offers two important insights into current naval issues. Firstly, regardless of claims that Russia’s naval industrial capacity will soon be back in full swing, the country remains unable to build large surface warships, or as Mikhail Tsypkin puts it “[t]he Russian defense industry is not dead by any means, but Russia is no longer an autarkic defense industrial power.”202 Secondly, France will have to pay a high price for not committing to its agreements. Not only will it have to pay back the money it has already received, but the French defense sector runs the risk of becoming stigmatized, incapable of securing any bids for new weapon systems in the future. Fortunately, the latter ostensibly has not become evident, as Egypt in late February 2015 placed an order of 24 Rafale jets, as well as two FREMM frigates.203 Among the European states, France remains the currently most capable naval force. It has for the most part maintained a well-balanced fleet, including carrier strike power and a nuclear deterrent. These assets, such as the assault ship Mistral which deployed

French forces to Mali in 2013, Illustration 13: Recent actions in Eastern Ukraine have persuaded will become increasingly the French government to cancel the delivery of the Mistral-class LHD to Russia. important as the United States slowly shifts its priorities away from Europe. Therefore, the French effort to cooperate more closely with its friends and allies, not only in operational terms but, moreover, in defense procurement projects has to be considered particularly laudable. The most recent defense agreement between the United Kingdom and France (The Lancaster House Treaties) “could provide a roadmap to more effective European defense cooperation, based on deeper capability planning and mutual dependency.” Although, as a senior defense advisor criticizes, “[the Franco-British cooperation] side-steps the strategic question of the role of NATO and the United States in European defense and security [and does not] address concerns among

202 Mikhail Tsypkin, “The challenge of understanding the Russian Navy,” in: Oslo Files on Defence and Security, The Rise of naval powers in Asia and Europe’s decline, Bjørn Terjesen and Øystein Tunsjø Dec. (2012): 90. 203 Frédéric Lert, “Egypt to acquire FREMM frigate,” HIS Jane’s 360, 23 Feb. 2015. http://www.janes.com/article/49163/egypt-to-acquire-fremm-frigate. 63 some European states over the long-term disengagement of the US from Europe”, it will nevertheless “set the ‘gold standard’ for defense cooperation [in Europe].”204 France is likely to remain actively engaged along its ‘geographical axis of interest’, which currently includes the Sahel, the European periphery, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Persian Gulf, the Horn of Africa and the Indian Ocean.205 Moreover, the French Navy will continue to commit naval forces to policing duties in its overseas territories and across France’s 11,000,000km² exclusive economic zones. However, as a result of the most recent austerity measures, the size of the naval fleet has been significantly reduced and former ‘second-rate’ vessels, assigned to the aforementioned tasks, are now part of the Marine Nationale’s ‘first- line’ of surface combatants. Jean Moulin somberly concludes that, “[t]he Marine Nationale finds itself in a difficult position, with no reduction in its commitment but fewer resources.”206 Finally, the last round of defense cuts in 2014 elicited stark reaction on part of the top military echelon, who warned that the Armed Forces were close to exacerbation. Only after the entire military leaderships threatened to resign did the French government promise to leave the budget untouched for the coming years.207 Fortunately for the French Navy many of its naval platforms remain highly effective and can rightfully be considered among the most sophisticated in the world. This includes its Rafel combat aircraft, the Aquitaine-class frigate, which likely incorporates the most advanced signature reduction features of any current warship, the Horizon air defense destroyers and the three Mistral-class LHDs. In the end, the French Navy will remain Europe’s most capable naval force for another five years, after which it will rank a close second to Britain’s strengthened Royal Navy. It will continue to be looked to when crises occur and in support of both French and European interests abroad. The Navy will continue to do what it must. It will be willing – but it will be stretched.

204 Ben Jones, “Franco-British military cooperation a new engine for European defence?” Occasional Paper 88, Feb. (2011): 5. 205 See MdlD, Paper 2013, 54. 206 Moulin, “Marine Nationale,” 87. 207 Francis Beaufort, “French Chiefs ‘In Revolt’,” Warships, July (2014): 3. 64

7) ITALY: The Marina Militare – Between Global Interest and Regional Necessities

Figure 5 Italy: Defense Spending in % of GDP 2,5

2

1,5

Military Spending % ofGDP % 1

0,5

0

1990-2014, Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database

Figure 5

Figure 6 Italy: Number of Major Vessels Sources: The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, Military Technology Almanac, World Naval Review 35

30 25 20 15 10 Number ofVessels Number 5 0 1990 2000 2014 Aircraft Carriers 1 1 2 Large Surface Combatants 30 29 22 Submarines 12 8 6 Assault/Amphibious 4 3 3

Figure 6 65

The strategic space where Italy feels herself involved has its centre of gravity in the Mediterranean Sea. It starts form Gibraltar and moves along two main lines one reaching the Black Sea and the Middle East through the Balkans and the Aegean Sea; the latter moving southward through the Red Sea down to the Indian Ocean, the Gulf, and including the Horn of Africa.208 (Admiral Angel Mariani, Chief of the Italian Navy)

For millennia the denizens of the Italian peninsula have looked towards the sea in hope of prosperity and wealth. In many cases they were not disappointed. Throughout history its geographical position has proved expedient to those prudent enough to take advantage of the waters surrounding Italy. The adjacent shores and the hinterland of the regions mentioned in the lines above represented some of the most fertile and prosperous lands in the world. Trade flourished as merchants transported and traded goods from near and far. Some made great fortunes on precious materials and useful goods, exchanged on the brisk market that connected the Levant with the Spanish Peninsula, the North African shores with the ports of the Turkish coast. Whereas the Phoenicians, Greeks, Carthaginians and the Roman Empire commanded the seas over hundreds of years, a millennium later, Italian military and commercial sea power again dominated events in the Mediterranean. Throughout the 13th, 14th, and 15th centuries, Italy’s princely states were able to fashion navies and merchant fleets large enough to dominate seaborne trade, thus elevating their cities to hitherto unseen cultural heights. However, given their geographic position – which confined them to Mediterranean waters – city states such as Genoa and Venice were not able to maintain their power once the New World was discovered. Ultimately, Italy’s states were “maritime state[s] with too narrow and geotropically too exposed a base of resources at home to compete with the emerging much larger sea and land powers”,209 such as Spain, France and Great Britain. Nonetheless, the Mediterranean would remain an important theater in world affairs and as of late has again become the strategic focus of attention.

Looking back on Italy’s more recent past, because of its role in the Second World War the Italian navy was reduced to less than a third-rate sea power by the provisos of the Paris Peace Treaty. However, over the course of following decades Italy’s Marina Militare, as the Navy is called, became increasingly relevant. The primary reason for this trend lay in the

208 Angelo Mariani, “A Strategic View of the Italian Navy,” Naval Forces Special Issue 1 (1997): 6. 209 Gray, Leverage, 135 66

Soviet Union’s vigorous attempt to wring naval supremacy from the NATO Allies in the 1970s and 80s. The hitherto unprecedented Soviet naval buildup made the need for Italy’s naval capabilities on the southern flank more pressing. Conrad Waters explains that “[a]fter a period of low-key performance,” the Soviets’ large-scale naval deployments to the Mediterranean elicited “a renewed Marina Militare [to abandon] its previous ‘silent service’ policy [and] become, almost overnight, a more overt player on the world stage.”210 Italy’s new vision was postulated in two major defense white papers, one in 1985 the other in 1991. Both represent a watershed for the Navy. Based on Italy’s aspirations to take on a more assertive role in international politics, the new doctrine underscored the importance of its armed forces in support of its national interests. Multinational missions further away from home (such as the Lebanon mission between 1982-84) were considered an essential element of Italy’s foreign policy. The defense papers, therefore, represented a major stepping stone for the country’s strategic reorientation and consequent modernization of its military, as Admiral Campo di Paolo states: “The White Paper of 1985 contained some important guidelines, aiming at restructuring defense towards a better integration of the forces at both operational planning and, management of resources levels; from the definition of missions, the unification of the line of command, to the organization of the industry and procurement policy.”211 Italy’s transition from a strategy of static-defense to engaging in an active role, either alone or as part of a multinational operation, continued throughout the decade. These changes were also heavily influenced by extrinsic political events, such as the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Gulf-War. As a result, the Modello di Difesa 1991 highlighted the increasing challenges in the post-cold war era and utility of military force in support of the government’s agenda. Multilateral cooperation within NATO, the European Union and United Nations was to be expanded in order to legitimize the use of force.212 Fabrizio Coticchia summarizes these tenets: “The key point of the whole document seems to be the identification between security and the safeguarding of political and economic interests abroad, by means of new power

210 Enrico Cernuschi and Vincent P. O’Hara, “Fleet Review – Italy: The Marina Militare: A Well-balanced Force in Time of Crisis,” in Seaforth World Naval Review 2013, ed. Conrad Waters (South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2012): 82. 211 Original quote: “Il Libro Bianco del 1985, […], conteneva alcune indicazioni importanti, mirando alla ristrutturazione della Difesa nella direzione di una migliore integrazione delle forze sia a livello operativo che di pianificazione e gestione delle risorse, a partire dalla definizione delle missioni, dall’unificazione della linea di comando, fino all’organizzazione del settore industriale e della politica degli approvvigionamenti.” Giampaolo Di Paola, “L’evoluzione della Difesa italiana negli ultimi trent'anni,” Ministero Della Difesa, September 28, 2012. http://www.difesa.it/Il_Ministro/Articoli/Pagine/LEVOLUZIONEDELLADIFESAITALIANA.aspx 212 Fabrizio Coticchia. “Il Lungo Sentiero sul Lago di Ghiaccio: L’Evoluzione della Politica di Difesa Italiana dalla Fine della Guerra Fredda all’Operazione Leonte,” (PhD diss., IMT Institute for Advanced Studies, Lucca, 2009): 185. 67 projection capabilities of the military instrument, as the heart of the country’s foreign policy.”213 Although the Modello di Difesa also included a general reduction of Italy’s force structure, Admiral Umberto Guarnieri, showed much certainty that the Navy at the time was well equipped to achieve these tasks. The force of the 1990s, he pointed out, “will be composed of elements of better quality, able to preserve the security and national interest of Italy, wherever necessary be it alone or in cooperation with its allies.”214 The basic “strategic functions” listed by Guarnieri have also not been altered to any considerable degree over the course of the last 25 years. In fact, the Marina Militare’s primary tasks nowadays are very similar to those mentioned back then:

- during peacetime, presence and surveillance in the areas of strategic national interest; - during times of tensions and crisis, protection of national interest and cooperation with international security organisations; and - during war, contribution to the combined defence of national and allied homelands.215

Based on Italy’s doctrinal continuity, the Navy’s fleet structure has also undergone little change since the end of the Cold War. Many vessels were commissioned during the modernization process in the 1980s, laying the foundation for the Italian naval forces we see today. Despite its declining numbers and ageing vessels, the Marina Militare, in general, continues to field a balanced fleet which can conduct operations over a wide range of contingencies. Moreover, in concordance with its defense policy it has been able to deploy naval air power, retain power-projection capabilities, deploy naval forces – both alone and with its NATO Allies – and promote maritime security for many years. However, similar to other European countries, (e.g. Germany, Netherlands), Italy’s continued cuts in defense expenditure have reduced the fleet to such an extent that the Navy might have to consider ceding some of its aforementioned capabilities altogether in the mid-term, as Figure 6 shows. One the other hand, the Italian Navy, arguably more than any other, is confronted with the problem of maintaining both high-intensity war-fighting capabilities as well as extensive naval provisions for low-intensity and humanitarian aid operations. The most challenging of

213 Original quote: “Il punto-chiave dell’intero documento appare l’identificazione tra la sicurezza e la salvaguardia degli interessi politici ed economici all’estero, attraverso una nuova capacità di power projection dello strumento militare, elemento cardine della politica estera del paese [italics in the original].” Ibid. 214 Umberto Guarnieri interviewed by Naval Forces, “Roles, Missions and the Force Structure of the Italian Fleet,“ Naval Forces Special Issue 1 (1997): 10. 215 Guarnieri, “Italian Fleet,” 10. 68 the latter is caused by the influx of refugees trying to make their way from North Africa and the Levant to Europe by sea.216 Migration, as Parry stresses, “is particularly acute in the Mediterranean where there is a marked disparity in wealth, opportunity and social provision between the northern and southern shores.”217 In these operations, which occur on a daily basis, the Marina Militare and Italian Coast Guard conduct search and rescue operations to save hundreds of refugees from drowning as they try to escape the war-torn regions of Africa and the Middle East via the Mediterranean. These missions require both resources and outstanding seamanship in humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HADR); qualities that often come at the cost of more traditional capabilities of naval forces. However, irrespective of this strategic dilemma, the “Marina Militare’s activities in this regard make it stand out in terms of its compliance with the duties imposed by treaty – and by humanity – in respect of the safeguarding of lives at sea.”218 Concerning its conventional naval forces, Italy has been able to rely on its substantial defense industry to develop state-of-the-art warships and weapon systems. This industrial base includes the Fincantieri shipyards, which are among the largest and most important shipbuilders in Europe, Agusta and OtoBreda as part of the Finmeccanica group, and the naval propulsion specialists of FIAT Avio.219 Italy’s ship designs are considered among the best in the world – “Italian naval architects are artists”220 – and have been considerably successful on the export market. Despite the “heyday [of] the Italian naval shipbuilding industry”, dating back to the 1970s and 1980s, the country remains at the forefront in the field of naval technology. 221 This can be explained, in part, by Italy’s ability to make smart choices when it comes to balancing “indigenous development, offshore procurement and license production.”222 Moreover, as Enrico Cernuschi and Vincent P. O’Hara point out, the Marina Militare does not simply rely on its naval vessels to exact its strategic interests, but in fact pays much attention to incorporating the latest weapon systems and electronics to its ships, as well as manning them with highly trained crews.223 This progressive way of thinking has been reflected in the fleet structure at least since the end of the Cold War.

216 Of the 42,000 refugees that registered in Italy in 2013, 34,141 had come by sea. Rivista Italiana Difesa, “Mare Nostrum: Commando e Controllo e Operazioni Aeronavali,” Foto X-tra’gli speciali di RID, 10 (2014): np. 217 Parry, Highway, 245. 218 Cernuschi, “Marina Militare”, 84. 219 “The Italian Naval Industry,” Naval Forces Naval Forces Special Issue 1 (1997): 36-46. 220 Prézelin, Combat Fleets, xv. 221 In particular, during 1970s and 1980s Italian shipbuilders spearheaded the design of minehunters. More recently the situation has become somewhat more difficult for Italy’s naval industry. Antony Preston, “The Italian Navy Today,” Naval Forces, Vol. 14, 6 (1993): 32. 222 Ibid. 223 Cernuschi, “Marina Militare,” 89. 69

By the time the military confrontation between East and West drew to a close, Italy’s Marina Militare had fashioned a sizeable fleet capable of conducting the entirety of naval operations, except nuclear war. After a hard-fought battle against its sister service, the more prestigious Aeronautica Militare, and some adverse political elements, the Italian Navy finally acquired its first STOVL, AV-8B+ Harrier II aircraft from the United States in 1989 to operate from the Giuseppe Garibaldi escort carrier. With this move the Navy was not only able to replace its increasingly obsolete helicopter carriers (Andrea Doria-class, in service since 1964) but, more importantly, Italy joined the small club of nations able to operate fixed wing aircraft from the sea.224 Unlike Australia, Canada and the Netherlands, who all lost their carrier forces throughout the Cold War, the Italian Navy was able to strengthen its doctrine of operating two

naval groups, each with an Illustration 14: The Albatros octuple SAM launcher is visible just behind the 100mm gun. aerial detachment.225 Akin to the envisioned “naval force with a nucleus of 18 combatant ships of the first echelon, of which two are flat deck aircraft carriers”226, Italy’s surface fleet was extensively modernized. In 1991, the average age of its ships was only eight years,227 with a pair of new air defense destroyers (Animoso-class) already under construction. Together with the two Audace-class vessels and the larger helicopter-carrying cruiser Vittorio Veneto, the ships would provide the fleet with the necessary defense against enemy aircraft and missiles throughout the 1990s. Smaller frigates and corvettes, such as the eight Maestrale, four Lupo and the eight Minerva-class ships were all designed to have substantial AAW, ASW, and ASuW capabilities. All cruisers, destroyers and frigates also had an aviation detachment and helicopters embarked, providing the Navy additional ability to find and track Soviet submarines. The anti-air systems deployed on these vessels merit some additional attention as

224 Among the states capable of operating aircraft carrier including fixed-wing manned aircraft are Argentina, India, Spain, US, UK, France, Russia. 225 Cernuschi, “Marina Militare,” 80-81. 226 Guarnieri, “Italian Fleet,” 16. 227 Prézelin, Combat Fleets, xv. 70 they are representative for Italy’s aforementioned ingenuity in combining domestic and foreign design in order to come to the best results. Mainly due to its complexity and proven effectiveness, at the time, the Italian Navy decided to procure the long-range Standard SM-1ER missiles directly from the United States, or ‘off-the shelf’ if you will.228 Its Albatros SAM launcher, visible in on the frigate in Illustration 14, however, basically consisted of a licensed-built American Mk29 octuple launcher that can fire both the RIM-7 Sea Sparrow as well as an improved version designed and produced by Alenia: the Aspide missile. Such development processes proved highly successful as the Albatros system found numerous international buyers and remains in service to date.229 What stands out when one compares Europe’s navies at the time of the Soviet dissolution with modern day naval forces, is that their fleets also included a number of small and very often obsolete vessels. The Greek Navy, for example, still retained the Cannon-class gun frigate (commissioned in 1944) as part of its fleet in 1990. Norway had the Sleipner-class (1965) and the Spanish Navy was phasing out its Atravida-class (1953). Italy, for its part, had both the Albatros (not to be confused with the SAM-system) and the De Cristoforo.230 With governments across Europe seeking to reduce their respective military budgets, there has been little place for such unnecessary addendum. While some of the older vessels had been used for training, patrol and constabulary operations in the fragile security environment of the Cold War, budget restrictions over the past two decades have made these maintenance-intensive platforms unfeasible. As a result, more funds and personnel could be allocated to modern platforms. The flipside inherent to any reduction of surface forces lies within the geographic realties of the sea. Technology can make up for some of the lost physical presence. However, the ability to operate numerous vessels at sea is an advantage not even a radically new concept in sensor-fusion and maritime awareness can provide. This is particularly the case in constabulary operations, such as “fishery protection, pollution control, drug interdiction, and control of illegal immigration”231, tasks the Marina Militare is only too familiar with. For more than three decades Italy’s naval ambitions have remained largely unaltered – deploying a well-balanced blue-water navy designed around two aircraft carrier groups and

228 See Preston, “Navy Today,” 28-32. 229 A basic overview of the SAM system can be found on Wikipedia. “Spada (Flugabwehrsystem),” Wikipedia. The Free Encyclopedia, http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spada_%28Flugabwehrsystem%29. 230 Chant, Ships, 144, 158, 160, 166. 231 Guarnieri, “Italian Fleet,” 10. 71 their escort fleet. Amphibious forces are to provide the Italian government with the ability to project power over long periods of time and into regions further away from home. These efforts have been hinged, for one, on Italy’s role as a founding NATO member and its subsequent emphasis on achieving sea-control in the Mediterranean Sea and, on the other hand, on Italy’s own strategic interests in the region. As Admiral Mariani explains, “[during the Cold War] a great deal of the NATO navies’ efforts were devoted to preparing for the battle for control of the sea.”232 With the decline of the Warsaw Pact, new challenges emerged. The shift within “the global strategic environment”, so Mariani elucidates, “have contributed to the birth of a new idea which draws attention to the coastal water, stirring up the interest in operations conducted in the littoral environment.”233 Unlike Germany, who had comparably few multi-purpose platforms capable of adapting to the new situation, Italy’s naval forces demonstrably proved they were both capable and willing to take a leading role on Europe’s southern flank. Cernuschi and O’Hara provide a excellent summary of Italy’s global presence since its re-emergence as a medium-sized naval power:

[This has] included naval and air confrontations with Libya off Malta in 1980 and 1986; constant naval patrol activities in the Red Sea since 1982; missions off Lebanon between 1982 and 1984 and, again, since 2006; international minesweeping operations in the Red Sea in 1983; Persian Gulf operations in 1987-88; the war against Iraq in 1991; Yugoslavia from 1991-97; Mozambique in 1993; Somalia from 1991-95; Albania in 1997; Eritrea in 1998; the conflict against Serbia in Kossovo [sic] from 1999 (where the AV-8Bs from Garibaldi conducted their first bombing missions); Timor in 1999; Afghanistan since 2001 (here again the Garibaldi’s air wing participated in combat); Iraq peacekeeping since 2003; and continuous anti-piracy patrols in the Indian Ocean. On 22 November 2011, for example, the new ‘Horizon’ class destroyer Andrea Doria exchanged gunfire with a motorboat suspected of pirate activities eight miles off the Somali coast.234

In addition, Italy also participated, even if somewhat hesitantly, in the NATO-led air- campaign against Libya in 2011, again demonstrating the utility of naval air power as well as the need for a balanced fleet in high-intensity combat operations. However, before we analyze the latest developments concerning the Marina Militare, Italy’s effort to maintain its naval capabilities during the 1990s and 2000s has to be outlined in more detail. Despite being a heavyweight among European shipbuilders, Italy’s maritime defense industry has also shown considerable interest in collaborating with other countries in order to reduce the costs of designing and constructing warships. Among the most successful bilateral

232 Mariani, “Strategic View,” 7. 233 Ibid., 7. 234 Cernuschi, “Marina Militare,” 82. 72 efforts has been the joint development of the Horizon, and FREMM-class frigates by France and Italy. These projects have shown that despite different operational requirements and numerous hurdles such large-scale projects entail, the European defense industry can successfully cooperate in putting highly-sophisticated ships to sea. The Horizon project, however, also lends itself to explain the problems Europe’s navies have had to face in the austere financial environment after the Cold War. After the idea of a common frigate design had finally been buried underneath the waves of conflicting views among the NATO partners regarding its specific capabilities, Italy, France and the U.K. joined forces in 1992 to design and construct a future air defense frigate. Largely based on the countries’ myopia towards the future trajectory of defense spending, the initial plan envisioned a class of 22 ships; 12 for the Royal Navy, six for France, and four for the Italian Navy. This highly optimistic calculation was soon understood to be entirely unrealistic. Already early on, it became apparent that the military budgets of each partner would allow far fewer units: “In all likelihood, the RN will eventually have to be contented with six-eight ships, and both the [Marine Nationale] and [Marina Militare] will each procure two to four”235, as a project insider, going by the pen name ‘Alcibiades Thalassocrates’, observed in 1995. Furthermore, due to their strategic incongruence of the states involved, there was considerable risk of the entire project failing before a single ship was built. This had not least to do with

the Royal Navy looking for a large (6,000+ tons) ship, featuring extended range for North Atlantic operations and offering quite considerable surface-to-air missile capabilities; the French, on the other hand, had more ‘modest’ aims, and were thinking in terms of a substantially smaller ship with reduced range and half the missile battery as called for by the UK.236

In the same vein, Italy’s requirements were more limited due to its fleet being able to operate in the Mediterranean (its primary theater of operation) under the aegis of Italian air power. Continued differences between the U.K. and its two partners finally caused the British to withdraw from the Horizon effort in 1999.237 Notwithstanding this setback, the two remaining countries would complete the project. The Marina National and Marina Militare each received two identical ships which continue to form the mainstay of their fleet air defense. Displaying considerable stealth features, highly sophisticated electronics – including the

235 Alcibiades Thalassocrates, “Glimmer on the HORIZON,” Military Technology, Vol. 19, 7 (1995): 17. 236 Thalassocrates, “Glimmer,” 10. 237 The numerous reasons are explained in Ibid., 27-34. 73

PAAMS (Principal Anti Air Missile System) with its Alenia EMPAR radar, DCNS SYLVER vertical launch system and Aster-15/30 short and long-range missiles – the Horizons are among the most capable air defense warship in the world. The allure of buying proven and capable systems from the United States also caused the U.K. to consider installing the Mk41 VLS on its domestic destroyer design (the Daring- class); although ultimately they also decided to rely on the SYLVER VLS. Similarly, the Horizon project was criticized for sticking to the tri-national PAAMS system instead of choosing the AEGIS combat system and SPY-1D radar as the Dutch and Spanish had done.238 Regardless of the obvious advantages the U.S. design could bring to the table, the Italians and French have to be credited with upholding a large part of the European defense sector and therefore remaining competitive on the naval market, even if this proved considerably difficult against their overbearing American competitors.

Of course […] adopting a US shipborne air-defense system, or even only the surface- to-air missile, would have meant the end of credible European alternative in many high-technology fields. To this [it] could be replied that maintaining these alternatives makes little sense, given that the chances of ever achieving export sales for PAAMS against the more mature US solutions are exceedingly faint.239

Notwithstanding the enormous effort poured into the Horizon project, the Italian and French cooperation has proved that such multi-national programs can have substantial cost saving benefits if conducted in a prudential fashion and, more importantly, are the “only way for European countries to remain present on the international market as designers and producers [of] major weapons systems.”240 In addition to the two air defense Horizon destroyers, the Andrea Doria and Caio Dulio, launched in 2005 and 2007, the Italian Navy was also able to commission its first batch of air-independent propulsion Type-212A submarines in 2006-07. Again, teaming up with other European partners (in this case Germany) in order to effectively modernize its fleet proved to be a wise choice by the Italian government.241 The currently largest European naval

238 Guarnieri, “Italian Fleet,” 15. 239 Alcibiades Thalassocrates, “A Fateful Name - Horizon,” Naval Forces, Vol. 18, 2 (1997): 15. 240 Thalassocrates, “Fateful Name,” 15. 241 A very detailed chapter on the Italian version of the FREMM can be found in Conrad Waters’, “Significant Ships – Italian Fremms: Carlo Bergamini (General Purpose) and Virginio Fasan (Anti-Submarine) Frigates,” in Seaforth World Naval Review 2015, ed. Conrad Waters (South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2014): 89. The Type 212 is discussed in more detail in the chapter on the German Navy. For more information on the Type 212 see Conrad Waters, “Significant Ships – Germany’s Type 212A Submarines: Cutting-Edge Technology Drives German Maritime Transformation,” in Seaforth World Naval Review 2014, ed. Conrad Waters (South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2013): 137-152. 74 project, with an estimated investment of over ten billion Euros, is the Italo-French FREMM- class frigate program.242 Planned as the successors to the two countries’ numerous surface combatants, the FREMM project was able to capitalize on the experiences gained during the development of the previously described Horizon-class. Furthermore, the new frigates’ design was based on features of both the air defense destroyers and French La Fayette stealth vessels (commissioned between 1991 and 1996).243 Unlike during their previous cooperation, the two countries decided to facilitate the process by allowing each navy to design major elements of the ship according to their specific requirements. The French, on the one hand needed a rather large number of ASW and AAW frigates to, firstly, replace the majority of its escort forces built in the 1970s, and secondly, to provide sufficient defensive capabilities for its most vital assets: its aircraft carrier and ballistic missile submarines. “Protection of the strategic missile submarines of France’s […] nuclear deterrent is a key mission for the new class, as evidenced by the principle ASW designation [of almost all units of the class].”244 France, moreover, has territorial interests in all three major oceanic regions of the world, hence has far more space to cover with its only somewhat larger navy than Italy, whose sphere of national interest was outlined at the beginning of this chapter. The French planners therefore chose to “select equipment sufficient to meet role requirements over more capable but costly alternatives” in order to “maintain its first-line surface fleet at roughly current strength”245 while most other European naval forces have to make concessions by reducing the size of their fleet even further. Italy’s FREMM frigates or Rinascimento as they are sometimes referred to, on the other hand, look distinctively different than the French version.246 At the end of the day, the difficulties of finding common ground led to the ships being “closely-related cousins”247 rather than sister-ships, with common hulls, similar propulsion and some shared equipment, electronics and weapon systems. As a consequence, however, “[a] key attraction of the FREMM concept”, as Waters argues, is “the ability to configure a common design to different

242 Waters, “Italian FREMMs.” 89-107. An article describing the early stages of the program can be found in “France and Italy Launch Joint Frigate Programme,” Military Technology, Vol. 27, 2 (2003): 64-68. 243 The FREMM frigates incorporate impressive stealth features and the French Aquitaine supposedly has an even smaller radar cross-section (RCS) than the La Fayette-class. For more see Waters, “Aquitaine,” 90-107. 244 Ibid., 94. 245 Waters, “Aquitaine,” 107. 246 Italy also looked into cooperating with Britain’s Future Surface Combatant (Type 24 frigate) and Germany’s F-125 project. However, because of the ageing fleet it was decided that a joint venture with France would be more favorable and make the frigates available at an earlier point. See “Joint Frigate,” 2003, 64-68. 247 Waters “Italian FREMMS,” 90. 75 roles through limited changes to new equipment outfit.”248 So far, the Marina Militare has received three vessesls; the lead-ship being the general-purpose design Carlo Bergamini, whereas the two following units are designed for ASW. The construction of six of these highly capable frigates has been approved by the Italian government with the fate of the pending order of the final two vessels being decided in the course of this year. There are two main reasons for the budgetary constraints that have caused the reduction of the FREMM-class (initially 10 were planned). The first goes by the name of Cavour, Italy’s second aircraft carrier, which, at a displacement of over 22,000 tons, constitutes the largest warship to be built in Italy since the end of World War II. The second reason is known around the world as fiscal crisis, debt crisis, or economic crisis. The former, it can be argued, has cost the Navy a pretty penny to build and due to its large crew of nearly 750 sailors also contributes to the Navy’s considerable “personnel costs, [which] are one of the highest overhead in any of the developed nations’ fleets.”249 The debt crisis which hit Italy’s defense sector hard in the immediate aftermath of the Libyan air-campaign in 2011, on the other hand, represented a real litmus test for the Marina Militare. However, before we come to the most recent fiscal realities, let us first take a brief look at the Navy’s most impressive addition to the fleet: the Cavour. Based on Italy’s two-carrier doctrine, discussed previously, the new and much larger successor to the Giuseppe Garibaldi provided Italy the flexibility and power-projection the nation’s strategic doctrine called for.250 Incorporating significant amphibious capabilities (it can carry a force of over 300 marines as well as deploy heavy equipment such as tanks into theaters of operation), medical facilities for HADR, substantial electronic warfare measures, a sophisticated air defense system relying on the same EMPAR Radar and Aster 15 missiles as on the FREMM frigates, and, last but not least, its air wing of helicopters and fast-jets, the Cavour offers the Marina Militare an essential tool to execute the country’s national

248 Waters “Italian FREMMS,” 89. 249 Ibid., 107. “The Italian defense budget is divided into three major areas: (1) investment (what the U.S. calls research and development, plus procurement), (2) personnel, and (3) training, maintenance, and operations. Since going to a volunteer military in 2006, the Italian goal was to spend roughly 50 percent of their budget on personnel, 25 percent on investment, and 25 percent on training, maintenance, and operations. In reality, personnel costs have consumed roughly 70 percent of Italian military spending.” Larrabee, Austerity, 36. 250 The defense white paper 2005 remains on point that: “[t]he multilayered and unpredictable nature of future threats […] demand development of a capability to prevent and, when necessary, to intervene quickly and efficiently even at a great distance from the homeland. In other words, unlike in the past, the military contribution to national security can no longer depend exclusively on the capability to guard and provide static defense of the metropolitan areas (“Homeland defense”); it must develop the capability to dynamically face threats whenever they occurs[sic].” Giampaolo di Paolo “Il Concetto Stregico del Capoi die Stato Maggiore dell Difesa. 2005,” 10-11. 76 strategy.251 Once the Lockheed Martin F-35B is embarked (early 2020s), this fifth generation combat aircraft, despite its bumpy development and numerous cost-overruns, will provide the Italian Navy with “unprecedented hitting power and protection.”252 The carrier Cavour did not take part in the NATO-led air-campaign against Libya’s long-time ruler, Muammar al-Gaddafi. However, Italy’s AV-8B Harriers flew 560 sorties against targets in Libya from the light carrier Giuseppe Garibaldi. The war in Libya has provided much insight into how future NATO operations will be conducted. In general, the decision of some NATO members to interpret the U.N. mandate as a green light to expand their mission from establishing a no-fly zone, to pursuing regime-change – ultimately creating the circumstances in which radical Islamic factions such as IS can thrive – has caused considerable criticism. I do not intend to reiterate the conflicting views on the issue or to lay blame. The following short summary of Italy’s participation should merely provide insight into Italy’s ability to deploy its forces in such multinational operations. As part of operation Unified Protector, ships assigned to NATO’s Standing Maritime Groups participated in strike missions and enforced the embargo against the Gaddafi regime. Italy’s contribution to the mission by the most honest examination has to be viewed as somewhat ambivalent. Conrad Waters, for example, points to both Italy’s initial reluctance to take action – due, in part, to its economic interests in Libya – and later restraint when it came to striking risky targets. He mostly emphasizes the Navy’s contribution to the naval blockade, the ability of Italy’s fleet to deploy its aircraft carrier into the vicinity of Libya’s coast, (greatly reducing the cost of strike-missions) and therefore concludes that “the Marina Militare [was able] to take satisfaction in its performance.”253 Bryan McGrath, setting his analysis in a somewhat larger strategic frame, on the other hand, comes to a different assessment regarding Italy’s resolve and commitment: “Britain and France proved both highly capable and highly committed,” he argues. Italy, however, only provided “partial […] support.”254 As a matter of fact, when the financial crisis finally caught up with Italy in the summer of 2011, the newly appointed government showed little interest in continuing the expensive deployment and withdrew its carrier, the Giuseppe Garibaldi, leaving the Coalition without its much needed naval aviation assets.255

251 Andy Nativi, “Mission Ready: Italy’s New Carrier Has Multiple Roles,” Defense Technology International, Vol. 2, 8 (2008): 19-20. 252 Enrico Cernuschi and Vincent P. O’Hara, “Significant Ships – The Aircraft Carrier Cavour: Doctrine and Sea Power in the Italian Navy,” in Seaforth World Naval Review 2010, ed. Conrad Waters (South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2009): 127. 253 Cernuschi, “Marina Militare,” 85. 254 McGrath, “Decline,” np. 255 Agence France-Presse, “Italy Removes Aircraft Carrier from Libya Campaign,” Defense News, 7 July 2011. 77

Gary J. Schmitt, the co-director of the Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies, points to a very important fact: “Like other European states that are reducing number of people and platforms, the pledge is that Italy’s military will be ‘of smaller dimension but with higher quality.’ Whether that will happen remains to be seen.”256 Given Italy’s unabated effort to take part in large-scale multinational combat missions, peacekeeping operations and continuous HADR in the Mediterranean and elsewhere, ongoing defense cuts will unquestionably cause precarious shortcomings among Italy’s armed forces and the Marina Militare in particular. In general, it can be said that Italy’s more recent defense white papers have only reiterated its grand strategy first postulated in the 1980s.257 In fact, in a special article of the Naval Institute Proceedings in 2012, Admiral Bruno Branciforte made a point to emphasize that “the navy will be guided by the operational experience gained in the past decade[s]”, remaining dedicated to the Navy’s expeditionary and amphibious capabilities, its fleet air arm, its multirole platforms designed to cope with the entire spectrum of possible conflict, and hence being able to underpin Italy’s national defense and maritime security.258 “The Italian Navy, in coming years”, so he claims “will boast the capabilities needed to fulfill its national and international commitments.”259 Regardless of what the future will bring, the strain on the naval force will undoubtedly remain continuously high, while at the same time older ships cannot be replaced at a rate of one to one. As the graph at the beginning of the chapter shows, in 1990, the Navy had a fleet of 47 large vessels, not counting the smaller and crucial offshore patrol vessels (OPV)260 and auxiliaries. By 2000 this number had dropped to 39, and yet another 15 years later has been reduced to 33. Unfortunately, Italy’s maritime surveillance is also diminishing in lockstep with Europe’s general difficulty in keeping pace with the rapidly developing sector of intelligence and surveillance. “The Breguet Atlantic maritime aircraft

http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20110707/DEFSECT05/107070311/Italy-Removes-Aircraft-Carrier- from-Libya-Campaign. 256 Gary J. Smith, “Italian Hard Power: Ambitions and Fiscal Realities,” American Enterprise Institute, 1 November (2012): np. http://www.aei.org/publication/italian-hard-power-ambitions-and-fiscal-realities/. 257 See Ibid., np. 258 Bruno Branciforte, “The Commanders Respond: Italian Navy,” Naval Institute Proceedings, March (2012). http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012-03/commanders-respond-italian-navy. 259 Ibid. 260 Italy has decided to build five new offshore multipurpose patrol vessels, with an option of four additional ships. “The Pattugliatore Polivalente D’Altura (PPA) vessel will replace Minerva-class corvettes, Cassiopea- class patrol vessels and two Duran de la Penne-class destroyers.” Needless to say the new class will in any case number fewer than the ships being decommissioned. Tom Kingston, “Italy Closing in on Patrol Vessel Deal,” Defense News, 26 October, 2014. http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20141026/DEFREG01/310260018/Italy-Closing-Major-Patrol-Vessel- Deal. 78 will be retired in 2012 and [like in the U.K.] there are currently no plans to fill its maritime surveillance capabilities.”261 Of course, the fleet has also been able to expand its capabilities in certain areas. New vessels, such as the Horizon destroyer, FREMM frigates, the Cavour, Type 212As, and Commandanti OPVs, are far more versatile than their predecessors, to some extent being able to compensate for their limited numbers with longer endurance, reduced maintenance and crew requirements, as well as more sophisticated combat systems. Over the last two- Illustration 15: The most recent tragedy in the Mediterranean, has finally plus decades the naval elicited a somewhat more immediate reaction by the European Union. However, it remains unclear as of how exactly the EU intends to deal with forces have been the incredible influx of illegal refugees. restructured and modernized, in concordance with Italy’s transition to an all volunteer force. From a platform-centric point of view, and considering Italian shipbuilding prowess, its leading position in naval gun technology and electronics, there is little reason to believe that the Marina Militare cannot operate a well-balanced fleet of state-of-the-art combat ships in the future. Undoubtedly, a somewhat larger defense budget will be needed in order to protect Italy’s interests in the future – at home and abroad. With a pending humanitarian catastrophe of hitherto unprecedented magnitude developing opposite Europe’s southern shores, Italy (as well as France and Spain) will need to make substantial investment in SAR assets and HADR capabilities in the coming years. Alone the Mare Nostrum mission, which was conducted by Italy’s Navy under the auspices of the E.U. between October 2013 and 2014, cost over nine million Euros a month262 and was conducted by numerous air and sea elements of the Italian Armed Forces. Its successor, the European FRONTEX mission Triton, paradoxically, has so far been more limited in its scope. However, with public pressure mounting and hundreds of refugees already having drowned in

261 Larrabee, Austerity, 41. 262 Lizzy Davies and Arthur Neslen, “Italy: end of ongoing sea rescue mission ‘puts thousands at risk’,” The Guardian, 31 October, 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/31/italy-sea-mission-thousands-risk. 79

2015, there is reason to believe Italy and its European partners will be forced to expand their efforts.263 If these circumstances alone are not enough to persuade Italy’s ministers to raise Italy’s defense budget to the 2 percent of GDP commonly agreed upon by all NATO members, the United States’ rebalancing towards the Asian-Pacific Region should by all means be a sufficiently compelling reason to do so. As the mighty United States Navy is currently coerced in shifting its forces from the Atlantic to the Pacific as a consequence of China’s emergence as a near-peer competitor, “[it] seems to be a reasonable assumption [that] the Cavour and the Italian fleet are effectively going to be a substitute [for the] American carrier battle group in the larger Mediterranean as the reduced US Navy carrier line-up is increasingly concentrated on the Pacific and Indian Ocean.”264 In 1990, the well-known Italian naval analyst Giorgio Giorgerini came to the following assessment regarding the future operational scenario of the Italian Navy.

It would indeed be difficult to foresee, with a reasonable degree of accuracy, what future situations may demand the intervention of the Italian Armed Forces, and particularly the Marina Militare. One point can, however, be taken for granted. Due to its geographical and political characteristics, the Mediterranean will remain what it has always been throughout the centuries – namely, an extremely sensitive basin from both the strategic and the political point of view, an area where tension and crisis can stream in from all cardinal points and criss-cross with each other.265

This profound insight applies just the same today as it did twenty-five years ago. No matter if for humanitarian reasons or out of strategic interest, Italy’s Marina Militare will consequently continue to be a most useful tool in Italy’s foreign policy toolkit. However, remedial actions have to be taken to ameliorate the increasingly difficult situation the Navy finds itself in and to guarantee that these tools do not suffer abrasion to an extent at which they can no longer be used. Similarly to France, Italy’s fleet has reached a point at which continued reductions of its force level cannot be compensated for by superior ship design and better training. Unless the current size of the Navy is maintained by increasing the nation’s defense budget, Italy’s government will likely have to accept limitations in the operational capability of the Marina Militare. As a result, Italy’s grand strategy – which for decades has relied on the Navy as a

263 Britain only has one officer as part of Frontex speaking of the “pull factor” if illegal immigrants knew that they would be saved. Joch Lowe, “EU Migration: why has the Home Office opposed rescuing migrants?” Prospect, 28 October, 2014. http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/blogs/prospector-blog/eu-migration-why-has-the-home-office-opposed- rescuing-migrants. 264 Cernuschi, “Marina Militare,” 86. 265 Giorgio Giorgerini, “The Italian Navy in the 1990s,” Military Technology, Vol. 14, 5 (1990): 48. 80 principle pillar of the nation’s vision of an indispensible power in the greater Mediterranean region and the world – could become unfeasible

8) SPAIN: Creating a Well-Balanced Fleet – and Maintaining It

Figure 7 Spain Defense Spending in % of GDP 2 1,8 1,6

1,4

1,2 1

0,8 Military Spending % ofGDP % 0,6 0,4 0,2 0

1990-2014, Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database

Figure 7

Figure 8 Spain: Number of Major Vessels Sources: The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, Mil itary Technology Almanac, World Naval Review 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6

Number ofVessels Number 4 2 0 1990 2000 2015 Aircraft Carriers 1 1 0 Large Surface Combatants 19 17 11 Submarines 8 8 3 Assault/Amphibious 5 4 3

Figure 8

81

For over five hundred years the Spanish navy has made its mark in the annals of history: From the discovery of the New World by Cristobal Colon, to Hernán Cortés’ campaign against the Aztecs and the subsequent Spanish colonization of large parts of the Americas over the course of the next three centuries. During this period of time, the Spanish navy provided the Spanish Crown with an indispensible instrument to pursue the ‘conquista’ of new territories and to transport its vast riches back to Europe. Spanish power grew corollary with its expansion abroad, while its military campaigns, both abroad as well as against its European opponents, were largely funded by precious metals from its colonies. The Spanish navy, however, is also known for suffering some of the most crippling defeats in naval history. To date, the arguably greatest calamity in Spanish history was the battle between the English fleet and Spain’s ‘Invincible Armada’. In 1588, the moribund Spanish Armada set sail in support of the Spanish Invasion of England, but found its doom in the form of the English galleons and the merciless nature of the sea. After having suffered severe damage in the battle at Calais, the Spanish commander Medina Sidonia chose to take a route around the north of Scotland and then down the Irish west coast to reach Spanish waters.266 “Freak storms turned their voyage home into a naval catastrophe. Scattered ships disappeared without trace in the Atlantic Ocean or were wrecked upon the wild north and west coast of Ireland. […] Just 67 ships out of the original fleet of 130 succeeded in making it back to Spanish shores.”267 Although the Spanish were able to reassert themselves as a naval power after the events of 1588, their maritime dominance was increasingly challenged by other powers such as the English, Dutch and, particularly on the continent, by France under King Louis XIV.268 Nonetheless, throughout the 17th century Spain was able to command a fleet of the first order and, for the most part, to protect its interests at sea. However, this would change after the Spanish War of Succession and the Utrecht settlements in 1713.269 Spain was essentially “stripped of all of its non-contiguous European territories, its succession was determined by

266 R.G. Grant, Battle at Sea: 3,000 Years of Naval Warfare (London: Dorling Kindersley Limited, 2008): 120. 267 Ibid. 268 In particular, as the Spanish also owned territories surrounded by major naval powers. 269 “Spain was the big loser of the war and the settlement. Although it signed a series of treaties with its military opponents, it never accepted their terms until forced to do so in 1719-20. As soon as the Succession War was over and the Utrecht Treaties signed, Spain set out to undo the entire settlement. It had been stripped of the Netherlands, all of its Italian holdings, and Gibraltar and Minorca. It was compelled to grant British participation in the Asiento trade, shipping African slaves to Latin America and to the Spanish West Indies. Philip V had been forced to renounce his claim to the French throne. The settlements were thus a major national and dynastic humiliation. […] The assault on the settlement came quickly.” Kalevi J. Holsti, Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648-1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998): 77-78. 82 outside powers, and it remained diplomatically isolated.”270 The country’s effort to undo these decisions was effectively cut short by British sea power and the French invading Spain in 1719.271 Thereafter, for almost a century, the Spanish and French naval forces would fight the growing British naval dominance (Spain’s fleet ranked third largest behind the two other great powers) but the alliance was ultimately defeated in the famous Battle of Cape St. Vincent, the Battle of the Nile, and the climactic Battle of Trafalgar in 1805. When the largest warship at the time, the Spanish flagship Santisima Trinidad – having lost all three of its masts as well as many of its men – surrendered to the British Forces, the ground was set for the Royal Navy’s unchallenged dominance that lasted for more than a century. Spain’s naval power declined even further as it lost many of its colonies in South America throughout the course of the 19th century. Yet it still retained some important territories in the Caribbean, South America and the Asia-Pacific Region. It is somewhat remarkable that Spain’s ultimate demise would be decided by its closest military ally today, namely the United States. In 1898 war broke out between the two countries effectively putting an end to Spain’s status as a great power. At the end of the 19th century the two nations were on entirely opposite trajectories. On the one side, the rising naval power of the United States under President McKinley was willing to use force in support of its national interests in the Caribbean and Pacific, which by itself represented a Copernican revolution in U.S. foreign policy. On the other hand the Spanish fleet, which was annihilated by the superior American warships and as a consequence Spain lost all but a small number of its colonial possessions. In effect, the Battle of Santiago de Cuba and Commodore George Dewey’s victory at Manila Bay relegated the Spanish naval power to the footnotes of history for decades to come.

Today the Royal Spanish Navy, or Royal Armada Española, again has found its place among the world’s medium-sized sea powers, albeit not attaining the glory of former days. As mentioned, Spain owes its naval resurrection in large part to the United States’ support during the Cold War. Despite the Franco Regime being largely isolated from the European reunification effort after the horrors of the Second World War, strategic imperatives of the evolving confrontation between East and West persuaded the U.S. to provide Spain with substantial military support. Similar to Italy, the Spanish Navy received two light aircraft carriers from the surplus U.S. fleet. While the Italian Marina Militare was not able to operate fixed-wing aircraft from their carriers due to a law dating back to the days of Mussolini that

270 Holsti, Peace, 78. 271 Ibid., 78. 83 granted the air force the sole right to maintain combat aircraft, the Spanish pioneered the use of VSTOL aircraft from its carriers.272 Despite closer cooperation with other European defense industries over the last years, Spain’s naval forces still exhibit their close ties to the United States. In general, Spain’s navy has not suffered the same reduction in size since the end of the Cold War as, say, the British Royal Navy or the German Bundesmarine. For the most part Spain has been able to make prudent choices in its procurement policy as well as its national defense strategy and has exhibited an adroit apportionment of its funds to build a small but modern multi-purpose fleet. As a consequence, the Armada Española is often compared to Italy’s navy and, in fact, has many similarities, despite being only two-thirds the size. Like the Italian Navy, the Spanish naval forces constitute a well-balanced fleet capable of conducting operations across the gamut of the intensity spectrum, both alone and in conjunction with friends and allies. Furthermore, the Spanish Navy has undergone a similar strategic reorientation from a sea-control navy to an expeditionary force that can “[exert] influence from the sea over coastal areas” in out-of-area operations. 273 Although the graph above indicates a reduction in amphibious platforms, the Navy’s actual expeditionary capabilities have increased dramatically as will be discussed later. Continuing our comparison, Italy operates its fast jets from its new Cavour aircraft carrier, while Spain, likewise, retains the ability to deploy naval air power in the form of a dozen AV-8Bs Harrier/Matador aircraft from its new amphibious assault ship/LHD, the Juan Carlos I. It is worth noting that Spain’s strategic framework differs from Italy’s, hence requiring the Armada Española to provide somewhat fewer capabilities. This is mainly due to the different roles the respective countries seek to play in world affairs. As I have pointed out, Italy as a member of the G-7 (formally G-8) and founding member of NATO has tried to assert itself as a regional power in the greater Mediterranean region and active player in world politics. In order to meet these ends, its navy also needs to represent a sizeable force – an undertaking that has become increasingly difficult over time. Spain, on the other hand, has somewhat more limited ambitions abroad and fittingly refers to itself as a “medium-power” with its main region of interests lying within the Western Mediterranean and the Atlantic waters between the Iberian Peninsula and the Canary

272 The Spanish Matador aircraft were based on the British Hawker Siddeley Harrier short/vertical take-off and landing (S/VTOL) aircraft. The Spanish version is almost identical to the U.S. Marine Corps’ AV-8A Harrier. 273 Minsterio de Defensa, Secretaría General Técnica, Defense White Paper 2000 (Madrid: Centro de Publicaciones, 2000): 193. 84

Islands.274 Consequently, its armed forces and the navy in particular are the smallest of Europe’s four major naval powers. From this brief description, one might conclude that the last twenty years have been plain sailing for Spain’s naval forces. Nothing could be further from the truth. As one of the NATO members with the smallest percentage of defense expenditure (in fact one of the lowest in all of Europe), the most recent financial crisis has hit Spain much harder than other European countries. As a consequence, the Armada Española once again is threatening to wither away as it had over 100 years ago. This time, however, its fate will not be decided by American guns but by political myopia and the fiscal restrictions of the post-Cold War era. It is safe to say that the Spanish Navy undoubtedly began the post-Cold War era on a high note:

The day of 31 May 1989 was auspicious for the Royal Spanish Navy. It was on that date that King Juan Carlos handed over to the Armada its new aircraft carrier Principe de Asturias in an imposing ceremony attended by a number of foreign warships, including the French aircraft carrier Foch and the antiaircraft frigate Cassard, assembled in the roads of Barcelona. With the commissioning of the new carrier, the glorious Royal Spanish Navy has reached today a level of power of which one must go far back into its history to find equivalent.275

Not only had the aforementioned aircraft carrier been put into service, but quite frankly the entire naval force was in the process of undergoing substantial modernization and restructuring. The year 1990, as a matter of fact, not only provided the Navy with a hitherto unprecedented strike capability in form of the Principe de Asturias, it also constituted a watershed moment in Spain’s force structure and long-term naval planning. The Alta Mar Plan, presented to the public in March of 1990, outlined the procurement plan over the course of the next 15 years and also had significant influence on the fleet’s reorganization into the Grupo Alfa and Grupo Delta over the course of the following years.276 The Grupo Alfa was formed around Spain’s capital ship (the carrier plus its aircraft) and included both fleet escort and fleet support vessels. The Grupo Delta, on the other hand, was later created in light of the increasing need for amphibious forces in the progressively diverse security environment.

274 MdD, White Paper 2000, 57. “Within the geostrategic unity of the Mediterranean, where problems and tension spread easily, Spain considers that its western basin requires much attention as a nearby area with specific characteristics.” Ibid., 65. 275 Prezelin, Combat Fleets, xv. 276 Íñigo Puente, “Plan Alta Mar: ¿sueño de lo que pudo ser o anticipo de lo que será?” Revista Naval, December 1997. http://www.revistanaval.com/www-alojados/armada/especial/planalta.htm. 85

Perhaps most importantly, the Alta Mar Plan was based on the premise that the Navy should have 15 frigates at any given time and therefore needed a concerted shipbuilding plan to mitigate the capability gaps the decommissioning of its older fleet escort would create.277

Given the upbeat economic Illustration 16: European aircraft carriers at the end of the Cold War. situation at the turn of the The French flat top is equipped with steam catapults, while the Italian and Spanish carriers rely on ski jumps to launch their Harrier jump- decade this was by no means jets. an unrealistic proposal. As it happened, the escort fleet at the time consisted of 15 major surface combatants, if one excludes the obsolete World War II ex-U.S. Gearing FRAM-I class destroyers. The Gearing- class, however, was not the only U.S. design in service with the Spanish Navy. As part of the greater Cold War picture, Spain played an important role in the United States’ strategic planning. Already under the Franco regime, the U.S. provided the Armada Española with second-rate warships. After Franco’s death the re-established Spanish Monarchy quickly – and officially – aligned itself with the Western Allies, becoming a NATO member in 1982 and a member of the European Union in 1986. As a quit pro quo for U.S. support, if you will, the Spanish Navy had provided the West with credible ASW and ASuW capabilities in the Atlantic and Western Mediterranean vis-à-vis from the Soviet Union.278 The principle task of the Navy was, therefore, to exercise sea-control and to protect the SLOCs around the Iberian Peninsula.279 In 1990, the Spanish Navy’s five Baleares-class and four Santa Maria-class frigates and half-dozen of the somewhat smaller Descubierta-class ships reflected this strategic requirement.

277 Camil Busquets i Vilanova, “The Spanish F-100 Frigates,” Naval Forces, Vol. 17, 5 (1996): 26. 278 It can be expected that Spanish naval forces would have provided support to NATO operations in the case of a military confrontation with the Soviet Union. The Spanish are described as specifically looking to the Americans for help. See F.J. West Jr., et al, “Sea Plan 2000,” in: U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1970s – Selected Documents, ed. John Hattendorf (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2007): 113. By the 1980s Spain’s maritime role within NATO was clearly laid out. See Watkins, “Strategy 1984,” 76. 279 “Grupo Alfa’ – the Spanish Navy’s Main Fighting Force,” Naval Forces Vol. 12, 5 (1991): 20. 86

The Baleares-class was an improved version of the American Knox-class. Constructed in the late 1960s and early 1970s, these capable ships had substantial weapons and sensor suits.280 The ships were continuously upgraded over the years to increase their capabilities. Nevertheless, the Royal Spanish Navy for some time had been hard pressed for a class of new frigates. Although a decision to build new warships was made as early as 1977, the construction of the carrier Principe de Asturias had taken priority over the frigate construction and it was not until 1986 that the first of six modified U.S.–design Oliver Hazard Perry frigates was delivered to the Royal Armada Española. Originally designed as part of the U.S. Navy’s maritime strategy of SLOC protection, together with the planned Sea Control Ship, the Perry-class was to safeguard American transport vessels from Soviet air and underwater threats, much the same as the Allies had done during the Second World War. Despite the aggressive strategic reorientation under President Reagan, the Perry-class was built in larger numbers than any other western major surface warship (total of 72) and was also successful on the international market.281 The Spanish variant of the frigate, the Santa Maria-class, has similar capabilities, including the Mk 13 Mod 4 launcher for both Standard SM-1 MR and Harpoon missiles, a 76mm OTO Melara gun, six torpedo tubes and a CIWS.282 As noted, the frigate’s design allowed substantial updates and the six ships remain a vital asset in the country’s current fleet structure. Interestingly, the Principe de Asturias was the second type of warship based on the U.S. vision of a sea-control Navy and a strategy of SLOC defense to be built by Spain. As Bernard Prezélin explains, the “[d]esign is essentially that of the final version of the U.S. Navy’s Sea Control Ship concept, with a 12-degree ski-jump bow added.”283

Inspired by the “Sea Control Ship,” that modern version of the last war’s escort carrier of which the U.S. Navy wanted to build several units when Admiral [Elmo] Zumwalt was at its head and which it renounced after his departure, the Principe de Asturias is now benefiting from all the progress that has since been achieved in naval architecture. […] Her very well conceived aviation installations enable her to house on her hangar deck seventeen aircraft […]. Counting aircraft parked on the flight deck, she can embark and put into action up to thirty aircraft, or roughly twice as many as the British Invincible, despite her inferior tonnage […].284

280 For more information see Christopher Chant, Ships, 474-475. 281 A more detailed description of these ships can be found in both Prézelin, Combat Fleets, 803-806. Also in Norman Polmar, The Naval Institute Guide to the Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet, 15th Edition, (Annapolis M.A: Naval institute Press, 1993): 143-146. 282 Prézelin, Combat Fleets, 473. 283 Ibid., 472. 284 Prézelin, Combat Fleets, xv. 87

Having outlined Spain’s comparatively well-balanced naval air and surface capabilities at the end of the Cold War, it is worth noting that her submarine flotilla at the time was equally effective. With eight submarines, four of which were older, continuously modernized French S60 Daphné diesel-electric submarines and four were of the highly capable S 70 Agosta series, built in Spain with French technical assistance, “the situation of the Submarine Flotilla of the Navy […] was superb, the best, certainly since the advent of the Second Republic in 1931 (or maybe even the best ever)”,285 Íñigo Puente points out. In line with most other European countries, the Spanish Armed Forces did their best to adapt and restructure their standing forces, as well as to align their procurement plan with the paradigmatic shift within the global security environment. In many ways their current naval force is a testament to this vigorous effort to maintain a balanced fleet while at the same time addressing the need for larger amphibious forces. This feat becomes even more impressive when one compares the Spanish approach towards the increased need for expeditionary capabilities with that of Germany. As we shall see in Chapter Nine, Germany has decided to solely rely on multi-purpose frigates to satisfy the needs for out-of-area capable platforms. The F-125 Baden-Württemberg represents the latest example of this approach. Regardless of their size and sophistication, none of the German frigates built since the end of the Cold War can be considered en par with even the smallest modern amphibious assault ships when it comes to projecting sea power onto land. It is not by chance that the German Defense white paper remains vague on how exactly the Bundesmarine intends to support ground operations on the shores of far-off regions.286 The Spanish naval strategy, on the other hand clearly describes why amphibious forces are of paramount importance for the nation’s security. Even before the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 and the subsequent shift towards counterterrorism, stability operations, and littoral combat, the Ministerio de Defensa published a white paper clearly stating that amphibious operations represented a cornerstone of Spain’s defense policy. More importantly, it also provides evidence for the general shift of most European states from the idea of sea- control to expeditionary capabilities:

285 In the original: “La situación de la Flotilla de Submarinos de la Armada a principio de los 90 era magnífica, la mejor, sin duda, desde el advenimiento de la II República en 1931 (o quizá, incluso, la mejor de su historia). Se hallaban en servicio 8 submarinos pertenecientes a dos series, cuatro del tipo Delfín (S-60), construidos en torno a 1970, y cuatro Galerna (S-70), construidos diez años después.” Puente, “Plan Alta Mar“ np. 286 “Neben ihrer [der maritimen Kräfte] Befähigung zum bewaffneten Einsatz auf See können sie wirkungsvoll zu Operationen an Land beitragen.”Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Weißbuch 2006, Zur Sicherheitspolitik Deutschlands und zur Zukunft der Bundeswehr (Berlin, 2006): 122. 88

The chief mission of the Navy is to ensure the free use of the maritime routes, which are a particularly significant interest in the case of Spain, as it is a country with vast coastline, archipelagoes and enclaves, heavily depended on trade and on the exploitation of marine resources. However the strategic environment does not pose great risks for navigation. Therefore, the navies of the allied countries – particularly that of Spain – currently gear their capabilities to exerting influence from the sea over coastal areas of operations far from national territory in what is also a characteristic mission of the Navy.287

The Spanish Strategic Defense Review in 2003 added that

[t]he very presence of an amphibious force has a deterring effect, obliging the enemy to carry out defensive deployment and distracting a disproportionate number of forces. Therefore it is important to acquire a greater capability for naval power projection over land, a fundamental capability that the Navy can contribute to joint and combined strategy.288

The Grupo Alfa and Delta have already been briefly mentioned. They, however, merely represent a stepping-stone (if but an important one) towards the Armada Española attaining a broader set of capabilities in a time marked by declining defense budgets and increasing needs. Only shortly after the aforementioned white paper had been published, a new directive unified the two groups under a single command.289 Regardless of its organizational structure, the Spanish Navy was able to secure the funds for building two Galicia-class dock landing ships. Profiting from the shipbuilding experience of the Dutch Royal Shelde and Spain’s Empresa Nacional Bazán (now Navantia), both countries received two units each, thus providing each navy with far greater amphibious, power projection and HADR capabilities than ever before.290 Along with two former U.S. tank landing ships transferred in 1994 and 1995, and the construction of a replenishment oiler, the Spanish Navy was able to incrementally expand its expeditionary capabilities. Despite growing financial difficulties, the Spanish Government could not bring itself to cancel the procurement of a new fleet escort. A class of four F-100, Álvaro de Bazán frigates was granted in 1997 and the first of these highly capable, domestically designed and constructed ships joined the Armada Española in 2002. Featuring American-designed Aegis

287 MdD, White Paper 2000, 193. 288Ministerio de Defensa, Secretaría General Técnica, Strategic Defence Review, (Madrid: Imprenta Ministerio de Defensa, 2003): 107. 289 Ministerio di Defensa, Directive 001/2000 Admiral Chief of Staff of the Navy, GRUFLOT is created http://www.armada.mde.es/ArmadaPortal/page/Portal/ArmadaEspannola/conocenos_organizacion/prefLang_en/ 03_Flota--02_Flota-Fuerza-Accion-Naval--023_COMGRUP2--02_historia_grup2_es. 290 Baker III, expands on the ships’ impressive features: “[These amphibious warfare ships] can carry up to 6 helicopters in the hangars. [They] have 1,010m² internal vehicle parking space and can use 885m² docking […] for additional vehicles; further vehicles can be carried on the helicopter deck and in the helicopter hangar.” Baker III, Combat Fleets, 723. 89 combat system (SPY-1D and Standard SM-2 Block IIIB), the class will provide the backbone of the Navy’s air defense for the next three decades. After the NFR-90 project had failed in the late 1980s, Spain joined Germany and the Netherlands in the cooperative development of a new class of air defense warships.291 Up until this point in time, all large surface combatants in service with the Armada Española had been of U.S. design. However, the only ships the United States could offer were the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, which, despite being considered the most capable air defense destroyers in the world, were far too expensive for Spain. Therefore, the state-owned Navantia shipbuilder made an effort to capitalize on general design features provided by its Dutch and German partners while relying on the American air defense system. “The selection of the Aegis/SPY-1D/VLS Mk 41 is a good decision given that it is sufficiently proven”, Busquets i Vilanova underscored. “Its large series production allows one to count on effective

Illustration 17: A cut-away of the Canberra for the Australian Navy. The ship is built by the Spanish Navantia shipbuilder.

291 “The three partners were able to agree on practically identical operational requirements, establishing the basis for a cooperation programme [in 1994].” Michael Herwig, “Trilateral Cooperation for a Frigate Programme – Spain, the Netherlands, and Germany,” Naval Forces, Vol. 15, 5 (1994): 35. 90 technical support incorporating without difficulty the successive improvements.”292 Undoubtedly, Spain had proven that in spite of its comparatively smaller industrial base it was able to build warships which could bear comparison with the best in the world. This claim can be supported by Australia’s decision to build three F-100 design frigates, the first unit (Hobart) entering service in 2016. The blocks for these ships are produced both in Spanish and Australian shipyards, while the final assembly of the parts takes place in Australia. In addition, the Australian government has also decided to award the Spanish shipyard with the construction of two 27,000 ton amphibious assault ships. “Built to Spain’s Juan Carlos I design, the ships’ hulls were fabricated by Navantia at Ferrol Spain prior to being transported by heavy lift vessels to Williamstown near Melbourne for installation of their island structure and final fitting out by BAE Systems.”293 Laid down during a period in which Spain’s defense budget was briefly increased, the Juan Carlos I LHDs are truly remarkable ships, expanding the Navy’s capabilities in numerous operational areas. Initially called the BPE, the Buque de Proyecciòn Estratégica, (Strategic Projection Ship) this is the largest warship ever to be built in Spain. Sometimes mistaken for an aircraft carrier like the Italian Cavour, the “BPE […] comes to very close dimension of the [Italian ship], and indeed she appears having been designed through a rather similar process based on the same operational considerations”.294 However, in addition to operating STOVL aircraft and helicopters from its deck, the Juan Carlos also has a large stern well dock for the deployment of landing craft and other small vessels. Furthermore, she can carry up to 46 main battle tanks and 925 troops. Like most other small carriers, LHAs and LHDs, the ship is much slower than the American supercarriers, largely because of her less powerful propulsion and different hull form.295 Nevertheless, the Juan Carlos is “the very first and only aviation-capable amphibious assault platform to be fitted with a ski-jump […] for a dramatic increase in the payload/range of fixed-wing STOVL aircraft” such as Spain’s AV- 8B Harriers.296

292 Busquets i Vilanova, “F-100,” 25. For more detailed information on the capabilities see Wertheim, Combat Fleets 16th, 672. 293 Conrad Waters, “Regional Review – Asia and the Pacific,” in Seaforth World Naval Review 2015, ed. Conrad Waters (South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2013): 28. 294 Massimo Annati, “European Aircraft Carrier Programmes,” Military Technology, Vol. 29, 10 (2005), 44. For more information also see article of Europe’s amphibious vessels in: Christina MacKenzie, and Andy Nativi, “Mission Ready: Amphibious Ship Designs Meet Diverse Operational Needs,” Defense Technology International Vol. 3, 3 (2009): 34-35. 295 The CODLAG (combined diesel-electric and gas turbine) in the Juan Carlos creates a thrust of 30,500 hp allowing speeds up to 21 knots, while the nuclear reactor on U.S. carriers can produce over 280,000 hp giving the ships’ sustained speed of over 30 knots. 296 Annati, “European Programme,” 44, 91

Unfortunately, the Navy’s submarine force has not done as well over the last two decades. As the graph at the beginning of the chapter indicates the total number of operational submarines has fallen to only three. This precarious shortfall in subsurface capabilities has been caused by major problems encountered during the production of Spain’s first AIP submarine, the S-80.297 To make matters worse, these circumstances will hardly help the S-80 compete against Germany’s Type 212A and Type 214 on the export market. Having outlined the modernization of the Spanish fleet over the course of the last twenty-five years, it is now time to briefly discuss its deployment during this period. “Spain’s contributions to NATO’s maritime roles, while not in the class of the United Kingdom or France, [has] remained relatively strong in what is admittedly an increasingly weak field”,298 McGrath summarizes. Between 1994 and 1996 the Asturias (F 74) and Reina Sofia (F 84) frigates took part in NATO operation Sharp Guard, enforcing the embargo against former Yugoslavia.299 Spanish naval forces have also provided its capabilities to NATO’s standing naval forces in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic – known since 2006 as the Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 & 2 – and at the time of writing, the Patiño replenishment oiler is deployed with the SNMG 2 in the Adriatic Sea.300 At the same time the Perry-class Canarias frigate is currently conducting anti-piracy operations as part of the NATO Operation Active Endeavour. This mission has been underway since Article 5 was invoked in the aftermath of 9/11. Although there is considerable question as to how effective these naval anti-terrorism operations have been over the past thirteen years, for now most NATO members judge the gains in “deterrence and collective defence, crisis management; cooperative security; and maritime security”301 worth the costs. The same can be said in regard to Spain’s military contribution to the War in Afghanistan. Despite the precipitous learning curve all NATO allies were confronted with,

297 “A major ongoing concern is the troubled S-80 submarine programme, which envisages completion of four boats to replace Spain’s existing underwater flotilla. Construction work has effectively been suspended until major weight and buoyancy problems identified in the first submarine, Isaac Peral in May 2013 are resolved. General Dynamics Electric Boat of the USA has been brought in to assist a major re-design, which will involve lengthening the submarines into a S-80 Plus configuration.” Conrad Waters, “Regional Review – Europe and Russia,” in Seaforth World Naval Review 2015, ed. Conrad Waters (South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2014): 65. The following quote is from Bryan McGrath, “NATO Trends,” footnote 38. See Jose Alberto Gonzalez, “La Armada da de Baja el ‘Siroco’ y Centra Sus Esfuerzos en Los Submarines S-80” [The Navy Withdraws the ‘Sirocco’ and Focuses Its Efforts on the Submarine S-80], La Verdad, 5 August, 2012, www.laverdad.es/murcia/v/20120508/cartagena/armada-baja-siroco-centra-20120508.html. 298 McGrath, “NATO Trends,” np. 299 “NATO/WEU: Operation Sharp Guard,” NATO, 2 October, 1996. http://www.nato.int/ifor/general/shrp- grd.htm. 300 The ship was in Trieste on the 2 March, 2015. See http://www.armada.mde.es/ArmadaPortal/page/Portal/ArmadaEspannola/_inicio_home/prefLang_es/. 301 NATO, “Operation Active Endeavour,” 3 March, 2015. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_7932.htm 92

Spain remained committed to the task, albeit on a relatively small scale. From a military point of view, however, “NATO troop contingents became divided into those who fought (the Americans, the British, the Canadians, and the Italians) and those who did not fight”. Together with France, Germany, and the Netherlands, the Spanish largely belonged to the latter group. This, as John Ballard et al, explain, was “mainly due to restrictions or ‘national caveats’ imposed by their political leadership.”302 The U.S.-led invasion in Iraq (2003) would underscore the deep rifts within NATO, rifts which have only grown bigger since the heavily criticized liberation of Iraq. Initially, the Spanish government under the conservative Prime Minister José María Aznar decided to take sides with the Americans and British and provided slightly over 1,300 military personnel to the so-called ‘Coalition of the Willing’. However, after the devastating terrorist attacks in Madrid in March of 2004, the deeply dissatisfied Spanish population voted the Aznar Government out of office. The decision of the newly elected government to withdraw all Spanish forces from Iraq reaffirmed the notion that Europe had become increasingly inconsistent and discordant concerning global security issues. As noted, the Spanish maritime contribution to multi-national operations has been somewhat more robust, owing to her geographic position and economic dependency on seaborne trade.303 Sadly, the brief period of economic growth during the first years of the 21st century granted the Navy only temporary respite. “[W]hen the global economic crisis began rippling across Europe in 2008, Spain took a bigger hit than other Western European states, and its defense budget was cut three separate times.”304 Over the following years, Spain’s Ministerio de Defensa tried to compensate for the lack of funding by stretching out their procurement plans from 15 to 20 years. Moreover, after having decided to acquire a fifth ship of the Bazán-class during the aforementioned favorable budgetary environment, plans for a sixth vessel were finally dropped. In addition, cuts in personnel had to be made across all services, opening up gaps in readiness and the ability to quickly deploy a large number of units.305 The overall number of troops has dropped from 32,000 (including 6,200 Marines), to

302 John R. Ballard et al, From Kabul to Baghdad and Back. The U.S: at War in Afghanistan and Iraq (Annapolis MA: Naval Institute Press, 2012): 137. As of 2013 Spain had 856 troops deployed to the relatively stable Badghsi province in the northwest. This is a small number when compared to other countries’ troop levels: Romania 1077, Italy 2825, Germany 4400. See “U.S. War in Afghanistan, 1999-Present,” Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/us-war- afghanistan/p20018. 303 Departamento De Securidad National, Presidencia Del Gobierno, The National Maritime Security Strategy 2013: Sharing a Common Project (Madrid, 2013): 35. http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/documents/estrategiaseguridad_baja_julio.pdf. 304 Larrabee, Austerity, 45-46. 305 Ìbid., 49-50. 93

22,000 (including 5,836 Marines) over the course of only six years. To make matters worse, Spain has decided that preserving its general purpose fleet has precedence over all other matters. “[O]ne of the ways the Spanish have ensured continuity of capabilities in the face of spending constraints has been to reduce overall training levels”, a RAND study points out. “All units are no longer required to undergo training to reach an established standard.”306 The costs of manning ships as well as training navy personnel have affected Europe’s naval forces across the board. However, although Italy, for example, is hard pressed to reduce the number of sailors in order to decrease their overall costs, its naval leadership remains adamant that highly trained crews are of paramount importance.307 The Spanish Navy, on the other hand, is willing to risk its overall degree of professionalism in order to preserve its fleet. Simply put, Spain’s brinkmanship stems from its negligently low defense expenditure. “The very low percentage of GDP spent on defense [0.9 percent in 2014] makes Spain one of the worst performers in terms of defense spending in Europe”308, and puts it in a league with Lithuania, Latvia, and Luxemburg.309 As of late, slight signs of improvement in the overall financial situation have come about. For the first time in seven years the government has approved an increase in its defense budget as the Armed Forces will receive an additional €57 million.310 Although honorable, these figures are far from the 2 percent benchmark agreed upon by all NATO members at numerous consecutive summits. What is more, the slight budget increase will not amend the shortfalls suffered by the naval forces over the last several years. Quite frankly, much of the damage to the Armada Española has already been done. As Conrad Waters states, “[p]revious rumors that the aircraft carrier Principe de Asturias, would be decommissioned were proven correct and the former fleet flagship was withdrawn from service in February 2013.”311 The Juan Carlos I now remains the sole platform for the reduced naval air-arm. Moreover, the lack of funding for the S-80 submarines and inability to quickly resolve their technical shortcomings has left the submarine force at its lowest level since the end of the Cold War. In fact, to permit the fleet to operate a minimum

306 Larrabee, Austerity, 49. 307 Cernuschi, “Marina Militare,” 89. 308 Larrabee, Austerity,51 309 For more information on defense spending, see SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database. 310 David Ing and Fenella McGerty, “Update: Spain to Increase Defence Spending,” Janes.com, 1 October, 2014, http://www.janes.com/article/43968/update-spain-to-increase-defence-spending. 311 Conrad Waters, “Regional Review – Europe and Russia,” in Seaforth World Naval Review 2014, ed. Conrad Waters (South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2013): 65. 94 of two submarines, while the third is undergoing an overhaul, the fourth unit of the Galerna- class (S-70) has been cannibalized for spare parts.312 What is equally vexing for Spanish naval commanders is the growing gap between the number of small surface combatants or offshore patrolling vessels (OPV) and the number of incidents regarding unlawful or criminal activities. As the National Maritime Security Strategy in 2013 points out “Ii]llicit trafficking is [particularly] common at sea [and] in a broad sense is one of the most serious risks and threats to National Security”.313 In line with many other European states, Spain is therefore participating in the U.S.-led “Africa Partnership Station” operations, providing maritime security to the African shores and thereby extending the cooperation between the numerous states and agencies in the region.314 However, these additional tasks will continue to put increased strain on the few ships in the Spanish fleet. In particular only four new OPVs have been built with an additional two under construction. (Originally a class of 14 was planned.) Given the increasing scope of maritime operations that have evolved since the conclusion of the Cold War, Spain’s initial effort to maintain a modern and well-balanced fleet is laudable, more so, if one considers the increasingly austere environment the naval forces found themselves in the 1990s and early 2000s. Unfortunately, it comes at a high price. As the rather positive financial situation turned sour in the face of Europe’s debt crisis and the severe cuts to military spending that followed, training and readiness have suffered greatly. In conclusion, the Royal Armada Española, notwithstanding these shortcomings, for now remains the fourth largest naval force in Europe, which actively participates in numerous international maritime missions despite continuing economic difficulties. On a more positive note, Spain’s naval industrial base has grown substantially over the last twenty-five years and was recently able to secure a number of high-profile export deals. Given the country’s unique geopolitical position on Europe’s southern flank and its close political ties to its European, African and American partners, Spain will likely want to continue to play an active role in world affairs. However, with the importance of the maritime realm steadily increasing over the coming decades, the Spanish Navy will be forced to make some substantial investments

312 As of early 2013 the Navy only had two submarines operating, with an average age of 27 years, the 'Galerna' and the 'Tramuntana', since the 'Mistral' was under repair until the spring of 2013. If delays occur in the delivery of the S-80, the complexity of the construction that will take it beyond 2016, the armed forces would be operating only one submarine. It would be the 'Mistral', which as of early 2013 was passing its last major review. Later in 2013 'Tramuntana', the most modern in the series, entered overhaul. The 'Tramuntana' ends its operational life in 2018. See: “Series 70 Galerna-type submarines,” np. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/s-70.htm. 313 DSN, Strategy 2013, 21. 314 Department of Defense: Africa Command, “African Partnership Station,” http://www.africom.mil/what-we- do/security-cooperation-programs/africa-partnership-station. 95 mid-term, in order to maintain a fleet capable of conducting the entirety of naval operations. These investments would include the F-110 successor for its Perry-class frigates, a larger number of OPVs, as well as purchasing the Lockheed/Martin F-35 Lighting II in order to retain a capable naval air-arm. All these projects, however, come with a significant price tag. Given the large number of maritime missions that are underway, as well as the need to recruit and train the necessary crews, it is hardly possible that this feat can be achieved under the current budgetary levels. It is therefore possible that over the next decades the Spanish fleet might have to slowly abandon its multi-purpose capabilities, ultimately arriving at a smaller, less powerful force, similar to that of Germany or Denmark. Such a development would, however, severely affect Europe’s naval power, adding to its overall decline.

8) TURKEY and GREECE: Allies and Yet Not Friends – Diverging Naval Powers

Figure 9 Turkey: Defense Spending in % of GDP 4,5 4 3,5

3 2,5 2 Military Spending % ofGDP % 1,5 1 0,5 0

1990-2014, Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database

Figure 9

96

Figure 10 Turkey: Number of Major Vessels Sources: The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, Military Technology Almanac, World Naval Review 30

25 20 15 10

Number ofVessels Number 5 0 1990 2000 2014 Aircraft Carriers 0 0 0 Large Surface Combatants 22 26 18 Submarines 16 14 14 Assault/Amphibious 4 4 3

Figure 10

Figure 12 Greece: Defense Spending in % of GDP 4 3,5 3

2,5 2 Military Spending % ofGDP % 1,5 1 0,5 0

1990-2014, Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database

Figure 11

97

Figure 11 Greece: Number of Major Vessels Sources: The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, Military Technology Almanac, World Naval Review 18

16

14 12 10 8 6

4 Number ofVessels Number 2 0 1990 2000 2014 Aircraft Carriers 0 0 0 Large Surface Combatants 10 16 13 Submarines 9 8 8 Assault/Amphibious 4 5 7

Figure 12

The last two European naval powers to have strategic interests in the Mediterranean theater are Turkey and Greece. Unfortunately, the two countries have a long history of mutual animosity and distrust tracing all the way back to the Greco-Persian Wars during the 5th century B.C. Over much of their history the two states have remained regional competitors, often resolving their differences by military means. Even today, Turkey and Greece “are widely considered to be major antagonistic powers in the region” as Christos Kollias and Gülay Günlük-Şenesen state.315 Paradoxically, they remain in an unstable limbo between being NATO allies, yet entertaining the possibility of going to war against each other in order to protect their individual national interests. Despite this strained relationship, the two countries’ geostrategic position as well as their interest and influence in the Mediterranean, the Aegean Sea, and the Black Sea lend themselves to be analyzed in conjunction. In general, Turkey and Greece make significant investments towards their national defense. In part, due to unresolved issues regarding Cyprus, the status of a number of small islands and rocks, (hence the issues regarding the EEZ), as well as the “nonexistence of an agreement determining the sea boundaries between Turkey and Greece on the Aegean Sea”,316

315 Christos Kollias and Gülay Günlük-Şenesen, Greece and Turkey in the 21st Century: Conflict or Cooperation. A political Economy Perspective, eds. Christos Kollias and Gülay Günlük-Şenesen (New York: Nova Science, 2003): 1. 316 Turkish Ministry of Defense, White Paper 2000, Section Five, np. 98 both countries maintain large armed forces. Their naval forces are also similar in size and capability; the Turkish Navy though being somewhat larger. Furthermore, both countries’ defense spending has for many years exceeded that of its European neighbors and, in fact, as the graphs show, has remained well over 2 percent of GDP since the end of the Cold War. Although the economic crisis has also affected Turkey and Greece, (especially the latter of the two), and both states have had to reduce their military budgets somewhat over the past decade, they still share the highest percentage of defense spending of all European NATO members.317 The hostility between the two has had profound influence on Turkish and Hellenic maritime strategy. During the 1990s, many European countries sought to attain a wider range of maritime capabilities; slowly shifting from the parochial tasks of ASW and ASuW against the Soviet Navy towards out-of-area operations, power projection, and littoral warfare far from home. However, given Turkey’s and Greece’s foreign policies their respective naval strategies have largely been dictated by the principles of sea-control and protection of the sea- lines of communication.318 As I will show, the largest part of both navies consists of platforms capable of conducting sea-control and sea-denial, while amphibious capabilities, for example, up until recently have only played a negligible role. The ongoing dispute in the Aegean Sea also provides a good example of what the future holds. While much attention is currently given to China’s claim over numerous islands in the South and East China Seas, thus creating tensions with its neighbors and the United States, it is often overlooked that the continued hostilities between Greece and Turkey are also caused by territorial feuds about the many islands and islets of the Aegean Sea – Cyprus in particular.319 It also goes to show how difficult these conflicts are to resolve, in particular in times of growing nationalism in many regions of this world. Quite frankly, the conflict between the Turks and Greeks remains a volatile situation, and crisis, such as imminent war over the Imia/Kardak islet in 1996, remains a possibility. However, what also bears mentioning is that despite all the criticism NATO and the United States have had to face since 1990, mutual NATO membership as well as pressure by the U.S. and European Union have very likely prevented outright war between the two countries. The fleets of Turkey and Greece show some resemblance and have also undergone a similar development since the end of the Cold War. As noted, both states have designed their

317 Greece Turkey and the UK account for the highest defense expenditure with 2.2 percent of GDP. 318 TMoD, Paper 2000, Section Five, Section Three, n.p. 319 Littoral disputes have also included Israel to which Turkey has frozen diplomatic ties with its former ally. See Burak Ege Bekdil and Umit Enginsoy, “Mediterranean Littoral Dispute Challenges Turkish Navy,” Defense News, 9 Jan. (2012): 10. 99 naval forces around the concept of sea-control and the protection of SLOCs.320 Thus, these territorial defense operations have taken precedence over other forms of naval capabilities, such as expeditionary warfare. Compared to the four major European navies already discussed in this thesis, the Turkish and Greek fleets lack large warships necessary to conduct large- scale out-of-area operations. Particularly, they have little capability to project naval power over great distances. The most obvious proof for this argument is the absence of warships capable of embarking aircraft and amphibious forces, such as small aircraft carriers, LHAs or LPDs. Therefore, the number of amphibious forces shown in the graph at the beginning of the chapter is somewhat misleading. While Greece retains seven ships capable of amphibious operations (including two Soviet-design air cushion craft),321 the aggregated power of these units is not comparable to, say, Spain’s two Galicia-class LPDs or its single Juan Carlos I LHD. Numbers do matter. However, any meaningful analysis has to take numerous other factors into account, as I have repeatedly pointed out. What the Hellenic and Turkish navies do have is substantial numbers of smaller warships, ranging from frigates and corvettes, to guided-missile craft and patrol vessels. Moreover, both maintain the ability to conduct sea- denial operations by fielding large submarine fleets of German-design as well as mine warfare vessels. This comes as no surprise. The geopolitical realities of the region have driven both states to invest heavily in such operational capabilities, not least due to the significance of the Bosporus and adjacent waters.

8.1) Turkey

Of the two navies, the Turkish Naval Forces are the somewhat larger and more capable. This goes hand in hand with Turkey being larger, more populous and enjoying the benefits of a more powerful economy. The Turkish industrial base has evolved drastically over the past twenty-five years; its naval branch in particular having profited immensely from this development.322 For this reason, Turkey has been able to expand its indigenous shipbuilding, whereas Greece remains largely dependent on foreign sales. For over two decades the Turkish leadership has made a concerted effort to modernize and strengthen its

320 TMoD, Paper 2000, Section Two, np. Also see Hellenic Ministry of National Defense, White Paper for the Armed Forces 1996-1997, Chapter 1, np. 321 These are the largest air cushion vehicle landing craft in the world, (Russian Zubr-class). See Wertheim, Combat Fleets, 253-254. 322 The article provides examples for the up-and-coming naval ship industry in the 1990s. “Turkish Navy – Reasons to Celebrate.“ Naval Forces, Vol. 15, 4 (1994): 23-24. 23-24. 100 armed forces and has in turn created one of the most capable armies in the world. American defense expert George Friedman points out that, by his estimate, Turkey’s conventional capabilities have surpassed those of France and Germany, also providing evidence for the general decline in military power among European states. “[Turkey] has one of the most substantial armies, not only in the region, but in Europe. Except for the British army – and it would be an interesting fight, I wish I could stage it – […] there is no European army that could face Turkey. […] And this is important, because Turkey was historically the dominant power in the region.”323 In line with the seismic shift that occurred at the beginning of the 1990s, Turkey’s security environment also changed drastically. For the larger part of the Cold War, Turkey had been subject to the constant threat of a Soviet military thrust southwards to take the Turkish Straits.324 Similar to the Germans in the Baltic Sea, the Turkish fleet, in the case of belligerence, was appointed with fighting the Soviet Black Sea Fleet as it moved to secure the exit to the Aegean.325 It is not by chance that the Turkish purchased and license-produced many warships of German design. The similar geographical constraints of the Baltic and the Black Seas,326 as well as the similar size of the Soviet Forces deployed to the respective theaters, demanded similar naval strategies and forces. As a result, in 1990, the Turkish fleet consisted of 16 submarines (including six German Type 209), 22 surface destroyers and frigates (mostly older American designs and four newer German MEKO 200-class), 22 German guided-missile and torpedo boats, as well as numerous other vessels designed for territorial defense.327 Unlike many European countries which reduced their naval forces as part of the post- Cold War peace dividend, Turkey gradually increased its naval power over the following years. Thanks to its significant defense budget, reaching over 4 percent of GDP in the mid and late 1990s, the country was able “[t]o maintain [its] ambitious growth programme and strengthen NATO’s southern flank”, by adding numerous new warships to its fleet.328 More than half of these ships were of American origin. (The U.S. Navy had a large surplus of frigates that were too expensive to keep in service). As part of U.S. military assistance to

323 “A forecast for the 21st century: George Friedman. ANU,” min. 46:40. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RiMRAhupqE0. 324 “The primary Soviet thrust would be in Central Europe. Smaller attack would also occur to attempt to seize Northern Norway and the Turkish Straits. A limited offensive is also possible in Eastern Turkey, to try to draw off forces defending the straits [italics in the original].” Watkins, “Strategy 1984,” 78. 325 Ibid., 76. 326 The Black Sea has a size of 436,000km and its average depth is 1200 m, The Baltic Sea is of similar size 377,000km but is much shallower at an average depth of 55 meters. 327 Prézelin, Combat Fleets, 533-552. 328 “Celebrate,” 24. 101 many NATO allies, a total of six Oliver Hazard Perry-class and eight Knox-class frigates were transferred to the Turkish Navy under ‘grant-in-aid’ programs during the later years of the Cold War. Also, the Gölcük shipyards, located on the southern coast of the Sea of Marmara, were awarded with the shared production of four improved MEKO 200TN-class frigates.329 These frigates provide impressive capabilities for such relatively small vessels (3,100 tons). All Turkish MEKOs have a hangar for a single helicopter, hull-mounted sonar, air and surface search and track radars, Harpoon-missile launchers, the widely used and powerful 127mm 54-cal Mk45 guns, Sea Sparrow air defense systems, and Sea Guard CIWS. Torpedoes, jammers and decoys complete the ships’ offensive and defensive capabilities. In addition, the navy can capitalize on the ships’ modular design which greatly facilitates the installation of new weapon and combat systems. The octuple Sea Sparrow launcher module atop of the hangar area has been exchanged for the Mk 41 vertical launch system firing the more advanced folding wing Evolved Sea Sparrow SAM in the last two units of the class (F 246 and F 247).330 By 2000, the submarine force was also making great strides to expand its capabilities. Most of the ex-U.S. submarines, dating all the way back to World War II, were being retired while license-built Type 209/1400331 were entering service at a rate of a ship per year.332 Therefore, although the total number of submarines had decreased, Turkey’s underwater fleet was in a much better state than it had ever been. Interestingly, the defense white paper published the same year mostly reiterated the same maritime tasks that had been expected of the Turkish Navy in the early 1990s, namely territorial defense (in particular of the Turkish Straits), protecting the SLOCs, participating in multinational operations, as well as humanitarian aid and search and rescue.333 Therefore,

[t]he operational requirements of the Turkish Naval Forces [dictated] owning modern platforms having the capacity and capability of undertaking Above Water Warfare, Anti Submarine Warfare and Air Defense Warfare. Reconnaissance, surveillance and submarine warfare for preserving and protecting maritime transport in the surrounding seas has an important place among the duties of the Navy.334

329 Two units were built by Blohm + Voss in Hamburg, two by the Gölcük shipyards. 330 Wertheim, Combat Fleets, 749. 331 These were somewhat larger and more capable than the Type 209/1200 already in service. 332 Wertheim, Combat Fleets, 802. 333 Admiral Vural Bayazit interview by Naval Forces “A Secure Turkey – A Secure Alliance.” Naval Forces Special Supplement: Turkish Naval Forces Today and Tomorrow (1992): 2-8. 334 TMoD, Paper 2000, Section Three, np. 102

Again, amphibious operations and power projection over great distances was not considered a primary concern. In fact, there is not a word of either concept in the 107-page document.335 It is also somewhat surprising that it would take another 15 years before the Turkish

leadership decided to Illustration 18: Turkey is one of the few nations able to strengthen its maritime forces with domestically designed and built warships. make large investments in these areas. Considering Turkey’s ambition to become a regional power, this fact remains quite astounding. In part, of course, the country’s military doctrine has to be ascribed to its unaltered geographical position and historical experiences. Surrounded by regions of instability and conflict – the Balkans to its northwest, the current civil war in the Ukraine to its north, the recent armed conflict in Georgia and war in Nagorno-Karabakh to its east, and ongoing turmoil and bloodshed along its border with Iraq and Syria, and, lastly its strained relationship with Greece to its west – Turkey is not in an enviable position. Moreover, domestic unrest, either in the form of the Kurdish resistance movement, known as PKK, or from regular citizens, frustrated by the country’s increasingly authoritarian leadership, have persuaded the government to deal with issues closer to home before spending time and money on regional crises on distant shores. Nonetheless, the Turkish Navy has contributed to a number of multinational operations. These have included operation Sharp Guard in the Mediterranean and Adriatic Seas, numerous deployments with NATO’s naval standing forces, as well as by taking a leading role in the creation of the Black Sea Naval Force in 2001. This effort was aimed at promoting closer cooperation among the states surrounding the Black Sea. In this particular case it is worth mentioning that joint exercises, such as those regularly conducted by the

335 Amphibious forces are only mentioned in the list of Turkish forces assigned to NATO: “The number of forces presently assigned to NATO by the Turkish Armed Forces is as follows: […]15 Frigates, 2 LSTs, 17 Patrol Boats, 9 Helicopters, 11 Minesweepers/hunters 1 Logistic Support Ship, 7 Submarines and 1 Amphibious Infantry Battalion.” Ibid., Part Two, np. 103

NATO allies, have many positive effects. Common goals and shared interests during these missions are largely responsible for fostering mutual trust and respect among the different services and can break down the wall of preconception and misunderstanding. As such, Greek and Turkish naval forces have operated together on numerous occasions in the past, which arguably could be a deciding factor in a naval stand-off between the two countries: It is much harder to shoot at someone you know and who you have learned to respect. Based on the Navy’s decision to continuously modernize its existing force and replace its ageing frigates with new warships on a one-to-one basis336, the Turkish naval forces set itself the goal of “transforming from a force structure required for coastal operations, to a structure that could have a say in the open seas”, over the next 15-20 years.337 Conrad Waters comes to the conclusion that as a result of this process over the last two decades, Turkey is the “[o]perator of what is numerically the strongest of Europe’s mid-sized naval forces”. Furthermore, he adds, “Turkey has managed to combine the creation of a modern and well- balanced fleet with a progressive increase in the involvement of domestic industry in warships construction.”338 With the development of the MILGEM corvette, Turkey has not only demonstrably shown its industrial capacity, but also “join[ed] the small group of countries able to both design and construct their own warships.”339 Yet, a number of hurdles remain. The announced development of the TF-2000 air defense frigate in 1996 can be seen as an important step in the fleet’s evolution into a blue-water navy, despite claims that “Turkey’s naval defense concept is almost exclusively littoral-based.”340 However, not a single ship has been laid down as of 2015. This unfortunate circumstance has caused a strategic “window of vulnerability” as Israeli defense analyst Micha’el Tanchum notes.341 So far Turkey has been able to balance its naval forces against both the Hellenic as well as Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. However, with Russia’s naval buildup under way, Turkey can no longer rely on its naval parity. “Prior to the Crimean conflict, Russia’s Black Sea fleet consisted of twenty-four major surface combatants and one diesel submarine while Turkey’s major naval assets consist of

336 Wertheim, “Combat Fleets,” 751. 337 TMoD, Paper 2000, Section Three, np, 338 Waters, “Europe 2010,” 99. 339 Ibid. 340 An early outline of shipbuilding for the first decade of the 21st century is provided in: “Ship Construction and New Projects.“ Naval Forces Vol. 18, 4 (1997): 27. Recent development found in: Umit Enginsoy and Burak Ege Bekdil, “Turkey Seeks Full Littoral Defense Architecture,” Defense News, 10 Jan. (2011): 13. 341 Micha’el Tanchum, “Turkey Vulnerable to Rising Russian Power in the Black Sea,” The Turkey ANALYST. A Biweekly Briefing on Current Affairs, 9 April (2014): np. http://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/101-turkey-vulnerable-to-rising-russian- power-in-the-black-sea.html. 104 approximately twenty-four surface combatants and fourteen submarines”,342 Tanchum elaborates. The deployment of Russia’s new Admiral Grigorovich-class frigates and Kilo- class submarines to the Black Sea (the first units will enter service this year), however, “will quickly tilt the balance of naval forces in Russia’s favor, giving Russia a significant strategic advantage for a window of four to eight years […].” The problem of insufficient fleet air defense capabilities will only be exacerbated by the introduction of the new assault ship in the near future. Although this ship and the addition of two new tank landing ships will, for the first time in recent history, give the Turkish Navy robust amphibious capabilities, the smaller version of the Spanish Juan Carlos is not intended to carry a SAM system, thus making it dependent on its escort for air defense. This circumstance goes to show how difficult it is to build a balanced fleet capable of conducting sea-control as well as expeditionary and amphibious operations. Even if there are significant funds available, building numerous different types of ships, as well as training its crews, is a significant challenge. Without previously gained experience in constructing and operating these new platforms, the learning curve is very steep for both the shipbuilders as well as for the Turkish Navy itself. It will be interesting to see how the government deals with the financial burden such grand visions of Turkey’s naval forces entails. One point many advocates of a large Turkish navy however stress, is that “Turkey, unlike many European countries, always has money for defense”.343

8.2) Greece

Similar to Turkey, the Hellenic Navy has profited from a sustained defense budget of over 2 percent of the country’s GDP. As a matter of fact, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Greece allocates the highest percentage of all European countries to national defense. Even the economic crisis and ongoing difficulties in reducing the national debt have not led to the cuts in military spending one would have imagined, given the severity of the Euro debt crisis. Despite this fact, it is not quite clear how the financial problems will pan out in the future and there is some evidence suggesting that the Hellenic Navy will be forced to forfeit some of its capabilities down the road. In short, it is unlikely that the Greece will be able to modernize its fleet at the same pace it has been able

342 Tanchum, “Turkey Vulnerable,” np. 343 Adnan Caglayan quote in Umit Enginsoy and Burak Ege Bekdil, “Does Turkey Need an Aircraft Carrier?” Defense News, 7 May, (2012): 13. 105 to over the last twenty-five years, and maybe more importantly (from a Greek point of view) the strategic balance will shift even more in favor of its neighbor, Turkey. As I have explained, the two countries share a common interest in a geopolitically highly volatile region. “Greece is located at the crossroads of three continents (Europe, Asia and Africa). It is an integral part of the Balkans […] and is also in close proximity to the Black Sea and oil-rich regions of the Middle East and Caucasus,”344 Kollias and Şenesen point out. Throughout history Greece was considered a seafaring nation. It is no surprise that even now its navy cherishes the country’s naval heritage that predates that of most modern- day sea powers. However, as Dokos and Tsakonas explain, “[Greece’s] strategic importance was eclipsed twice in history, once by naval technology, shifting the traffic of sea commerce to the Atlantic and the other, during the Cold War, when the central front of the continent attracted most allied attention.”345 In many ways, “[i]n the past NATO and the West had generally regarded the Mediterranean as the peripheral strategic theatre.”346 For Greece, however, the surrounding waters represented a national necessity. Therefore, capable naval forces were considered imperative for the country’s prosperity. Unfortunately, Greece and Turkey have not been able to put aside their differences over the islands and waters of the Aegean Sea and as a consequence Turkey’s military power continues to dictate Greece’s defense policies. Nowhere can this be observed better than in its national defense strategy. Although Turkey and Greece were essential NATO members (both joined in 1952) assigned with challenging Soviet expansion into the Mediterranean and Middle East, conflicting interests between the two NATO allies in the Aegean Sea led to a number of precarious situations throughout the second half of the 20th century. Even the conclusion of the Cold War had little positive effect on both countries’ oppugnancy. It is astounding that many Greeks – policymakers and citizens alike – perceive Turkey as an even greater threat than the Soviet Union.347 “In trying to understand how Turkey is seen from the other shore of the Aegean Sea, we can compare it with about the Turks’ perception of the USSR”,348 Sönmezoğlu and Ayman elaborate.

344 Thanos P. Dokos and Panayotis J. Tsakonas, “Greek-Trukish Relations in the Post-Cold War Era,” in: Greece and Turkey in the 21st Century: Conflict or Cooperation. A political Economy Perspective, eds. Christos Kollias and Gülay Günlük-Şenesen (New York: Nova Science, 2003): 10. Kollias, Greece and Turkey, 10. 345 Ibid. 346 Ibid. 347 See Kollias, Greece and Turkey, 37-48. 348 Kollias, Greece and Turkey, 38. 106

As a neighbor and a historically conflicting partner of Tsarist Russia Turkey has perceived (and continues to perceive) [its] northern neighbor as a source of threat regardless of its regime. With sizeable territory, large population, enormous natural resources and the perennial aim of reaching the ‘Warm Waters’ via controlling the Turkish STRAITS […], this ‘big neighbor of the North’ has put potential threat and sometime actual pressure on Anatolia [italics in the original]349

“Despite some differences, we can apply a similar scenario to the Turkish-Greek relationship”, the two authors continue. “With a big territory, a large population, and a dynamic economy […], Turkey seems to be perceived as a considerable source of pressure [and threat] by Greece.”350 Proof to this claim can be found in the Greek defense white paper from 1996. In this document the Ministry of National Defense postulated “the national military strategy which provides the directives for the use of the country’s military power, […] defense planning,

[…] structure of the forces, [and] Illustration 19: The Hellenic Navy remains focused on territorial decision-making in defense defense, thus relying on guided-missile attack craft. matters.”351 The Hellenic Armed F orces were to be designed around a defensive strategy capable of protecting the so-called ‘Greece-Cyprus Joint Defense Area’ against the most vexing enemy: the Turks. Therefore, the “central axis of Greece’s military strategy [was] the deterrence of the Turkish threat”.352 The Navy was to perform four principal tasks: 1) deterrence, 2) naval presence, 3) sea-control and 4) power projection ashore.353 (The last point, however, would have been difficult to achieve given Greece’s limited amphibious capabilities). In the early 1990s, the Hellenic naval forces reflected this defense strategy. Mostly designed for territorial defense among the many islets of the Aegean Sea against a possible Turkish incursion, the Navy exhibited effective ASW and ASuW capabilities. Its submarine force consisted of eight Type 209 vessels and two old U.S. subs for training. 11 destroyers and

349 Ibid., 39. 350 Ibid., 30. 351 HMoND, Paper 1996-1997, np. 352 HMoND, Paper 1996-1997, np. 353 Ibid. 107 frigates, mostly veterans from World War II, were in service and newer ships of Dutch and German design were either being bought abroad or built in Greek shipyards. The Dutch Kortenaer-class, for example, represented “an excellent general-purpose frigate type optimized for the anti-ship and anti-submarine roles”.354 Ultimately, ten of these warships would sail under the Hellenic flag. The second type of warship that came into service during the 1990s was the MEKO 200-class, similar to those built for the Turkish Navy, except for the propulsion system and CIWS. Four of these ships were built and remain in service today. Small surface combatants, especially patrol vessels and fast guided-missile attack craft, had always played an important part in Greece’s naval doctrine. As Conrad Waters observes “[t]here has been continued investment in this warship category in spite of the fact that it has increasingly fallen out of favour elsewhere.”355 With tensions between the two neighbors somewhat decreased at the beginning of the new millennium, so did Greek defense spending. While older vessels were decommissioned, the Hellenic Armed Forces made an effort to restructure and modernize its naval fleet. It had become apparent that an arms race with Turkey was neither useful nor could it be sustained. The Navy’s main role therefore remained hinged on the strategy of territorial defense and protection of the SLOCs. Investments were made to maintain the current fleet and replace older ships with more sophisticated ones. As a result, it can be argued that this decision was the only reasonable approach to the fiscal realities that confronted the Greek government. In his thesis from 2001 Major Stergio Tsilikas comes to the following assessment of Greece’s strategy:

Greek-Turkish relations have entered a period [in which] the prospects for resolution are better now than they have been in years. A new rapprochement effort has unfolded between the two countries since the 1999 destructive earthquakes in Turkey, and the two sides have made gestures of reconciliation. Unfortunately, experience has shown us that similar efforts in the past [were of only temporary nature and] in certain cases were followed by major crisis. Greece's deterrence doctrine includes those elements needed to restore the balance in the Greek-Turkish interaction and tries to ensure that a low or medium level crisis will not get out of hand.356

The modernization of the Hellenic Navy proved to be a significant challenge as payment difficulties postponed a number of naval projects. The procurement problem that

354 Chant, Ships, 126. 355 Waters, “Europe 2010,” 98. 356 Stergios Tsilikas, “Greek Military Strategy: The Doctrine of Deterrence and Its Implications on Greek- Turkish Relations,” (Master thesis, U.S. Navy: Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 2001). www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a397555.pdf. 108 caught the most public attention was that of a successor to the ageing Type 209 submarines. With Germany leading the field in AIP submarine technology, the Greek government awarded the Thyssen Krupp Marine Systems, who also owned Hellenic shipyards, to build four new Type 214-class boats. It was reported that despite these ships being launched as long ago as 2004, financial constraints enticed the Greek government to reject the vessels on the ground of alleged technical shortcomings.357 The legal feud which lasted for years “has become something of a cause célèbre in Greek political circles”, Waters notes. “A former Greek defense minister has been jailed over the alleged handing of bribes from another company […] and other Greek officials are under investigation.”358 It seems this might also have an effect on the decision from whom to procure a new air defense frigate. While the German shipbuilder was one of the primary contenders for the bid, more recently, Greece has showed interest in buying the French version of the FREMM frigate, which has already been sold to Morocco and Egypt. However, any such procurement is far from certain as declining funds make large-scale investments in the future seem increasingly unlikely. Greece’s obscure and sometimes dubious acquisition processes largely contribute to the difficulty of predicting the future of the Hellenic Navy:

There have been no comprehensive analyses or systematic studies of arms procurement decision making in Greece, despite the high level of resources allocated to defence. The lack of previous research is a major obstacle to examining this process. The Greek defence planning process and in particular the arms procurement decision-making process are also fairly closed in terms of public accountability, transparency, parliamentary scrutiny, monitoring and oversight.359

What seems to be clear is that the Greek Navy will want to retain a large number of warships in order to protect its interests in the region. The latest defense white paper, published in 2014, acknowledges the fact that the United States is in the process of pivoting to the Asian Pacific Region, which, as a consequence, will “create new conditions for the security and defence demands in the European area.”360 Greece intends to address these demands by participating in international peacekeeping operations, supporting the transformation of NATO, facilitating the creation of a joint European defense and security policy and

357 Wertheim, Combat Fleets, 248. 358 Waters, “Europe 2014,” 70. 359 Stelios Alifantis and Christos Kollias, “Greece,” in: Arms Procurement Decision Making Volume II: Chile, Greece, Malaysia, Poland, South Africa and Taiwan, ed. Ravinder Pal Singh (Oxford: University Press, 2000): 39-66. 360 Hellenic Ministry of Defense, White Paper, (2014): 18. 109 supporting the HADR effort in the Mediterranean Sea.361 Like Spain, France, and Italy, Greece will have to shoulder the growing burden of mass migration from the African and Asian continents towards Europe’s shores. Though specific requirements in terms of military capabilities is not provided in the white paper, it reiterates the basic tenets of Greece’s defense strategy, which has largely remained unaltered since the end of the Cold War (and in fact since the creation of the deterrent strategy after the Turkish Invasion of Cyprus in 1973).362 Greece will pursue the “[e]nhancement of Hellenic Navy capabilities, area air defense capabilities, maritime cooperation aircraft and modern submarines.”363 To what extent the Greek government will be able to provide the necessary funds to fulfill these needs remains to be seen. It is quite possible that the size of the fleet will decrease after 2020 if no replacement of the Kortenaer- class frigates and Type 209 submarines can be found. Moreover, unlike its neighbor, its “existing domestic construction appears to be paralyzed whilst longstanding plans of new orders have been stalled.”364 Furthermore, it is also questionable if a replacement for the Navy’s six P-3B Orion patrol planes (retired in 2011) can be found anytime soon.

Both Greece and Turkey currently entertain robust naval capabilities. However, although both countries allocate significant funds towards their national defense, Turkey has incrementally expanded its naval capabilities since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. It has also been able to revive a defense industry capable of building warships up to the size of frigates and fit them out with domestically developed electronics and weapon systems – a great achievement by any standard. But even Turkey has to make sure it does not get ahead of itself. With national pride soaring high, not least among the country’s elite and advocates of sea power demanding the production of an aircraft carrier to buttress Turkey’s status as a regional power, the country might outrun itself, both financially as well as politically. Maintaining a large naval force is both costly and manpower intense. Already there are too little funds to properly balance all the navy’s capabilities. This would only grow more difficult if a carrier would be put to sea, not to mention a naval air-wing of F-35s. Moreover, in the long term, Turkey will also need to revoke its increasingly authoritarian rule, or else it is likely to further alienate allies like the United States, and possibly reawaken hostilities with its neighbors such as Greece.

361 HMnD, Paper 2014, 42. 362 For more information on the development of Hellenic naval strategy see thesis by Tsilikas, “Military Strategy.” 363 HMnD, Paper 2014, 42. 364 Waters, “Europe 2014,” 69. 110

The future of the Hellenic Navy looks much bleaker. With the ongoing struggle between the European Union and the current Greek government regarding its financial debt, large-scale investments seem unlikely. It will, therefore, need to make smart choices in its future procurement policies, not least making them a less likely victim of corruption and dubious political schemes. Moreover, in the near and midterm Greece will likely have to streamline its forces and make a number of painful concessions. However, what is most important is that the two countries continue their political dialogue, put their differences aside and move closer together. Turkey and Greece will undoubtedly play an important role in Europe’s future. They will also determine to what degree Europe has a say in world affairs and their respective maritime forces will be a significant factor in this.

9) GERMANY: Reluctance and Reductions – Not Stepping Up to the Plate

Figure 13 Germany: Defense Spending in % of GDP 3

2,5

2

1,5 Military Spending % ofGDP % 1

0,5

0

1990-2014, Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database

Figure 13

111

Figure 14 Germany: Number of Major Vessels Sources: The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, Military Technology Almanac, World Naval Review

30 25 20 15 10 5 Number ofVessels Number 0 1990 2000 2014 Aircraft Carriers 0 0 0 Large Surface Combatants 21 14 16 Submarines 24 14 6 Assault/Amphibious 0 0 0

Figure 14 Since the end of the Cold War, the German armed forces have undergone one of the most drastic changes of all European states. As was pointed out in the introduction, since its founding in 1949 until the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Federal Republic of Germany invested heavily in its military forces. At the same time numerous other NATO members deployed large forces on German soil in order to deter a possible attack by the Warsaw Pact. Similarly, East Germany, officially the German Democratic Republic, had a huge number of men and military matériel deployed on its territory. As a matter of fact, at the height of the Cold War, the Soviets alone had more than 300,000 soldiers, organized in twenty tank and motorized rifle divisions, in East Germany. These troops were considered “Category I”: the best trained and equipped among the Soviet Army.365 During this period of time, the common assumption was that if deterrence were to fail and war was to break out, the decisive battle would be fought on the Central European Front: in Germany, France, Italy, and possibly also in Austria.366 American and NATO contingency planning called on the West German armed forces to share the burden of confronting the bulk of Soviet heavy mechanized forces. For that reason the German Army and Air Force received the lion’s share of military funding. The role of the German Navy, the Deutsche Bundesmarine, on the other hand, was for the most part limited to operations in the littoral waters of the North Sea and the Baltic Sea.

365 See William J. Lewis, The Warsaw Pact: Arms, Doctrine, and Strategy (London: McGraw-Hill, 1982): 180. 366 See Dieter Krüger, Felix Schneider (eds.), Die Alpen im Krieg: Historischer Raum, Strategie und Sicherheitspolitik (Munich 2012), 123, 243, 256, 269. 112

The Navy was designed to play a key role within NATO’s maritime strategy in case of conflict, conducting anti-submarine warfare (ASW), anti-surface warfare (ASuW) and mine warfare (MW) against Soviet naval forces.367 In particular, the mining operations of the Danish Straits, one of many critical-choke points in NATO planning, required the Germans to sustain a large fleet of mine warfare vessels and substantial mine inventory.368 When the Iron Curtain had finally fallen, the Berlin Wall had crumbled, and East and West Germany had finally celebrated their reunification, the German navy consisted of over a hundred vessels, including nearly a dozen destroyers and frigates, 42 guided-missile patrol boats and nearly 50 mine warfare ships. In addition, the Howaldtswerke in Kiel had designed and produced what were considered among the best diesel-electric submarines in the world. While the Bundesmarine had 18 Type 206, and six older Type 205 submarines in 1991, numerous modified versions were sold to other states, including Venezuela, Chile, Norway, Greece, and Indonesia.369 East Germany, on the other hand, had a much smaller force and many of the ships were quickly put out of service. Unlike some advanced Soviet technology, most notably the Mikojan-Gurewitsch MiG-29 combat aircraft, which was of interest to Western defense analysts, the handful of Soviet-built frigates, corvettes and missile patrol boats were of no relevance in the post-Cold War era and were quickly taken from service or sold.370 Compared to other European powers, such as Great Britain, Italy and France, Germany has for most of its history been considered a continental power. Its naval ambitions were squandered in both World Wars and therefore Germany lacks the naval history and culture of a blue-water fleet that is capable of conducting the full range of naval warfare.371 Despite the German Empire’s vigorous attempt to gain the strategic upper hand prior to the outbreak of World War I, by challenging Great Britain in a naval arms’ race, “the superiority of the British Grand Fleet to the German High Sea Fleet […] was such that even the most aggressive German commanders were loath to accept battle except in the most favourable

367 The naval strategy documents states that Americas allies would deploy their forces according to plan. “The West German Navy would move to conduct forward operations in the Baltic, and the Turkish Navy, especially its submarines would do the same in the Black Sea.” James D. Watkins, “The Maritime Strategy, 1984,” in: U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s, Selected Documents, ed. John B. Hattendorf and Peter M. Swartz (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2008): 76. 368 German mine inventory countered roughly 10,000 mines. See Arthur Moreau, “Maritime Strategy Presentation (for the Secretary of the Navy, 4 November 1982),” in: U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s, Selected Documents, ed. John B. Hattendorf and Peter M. Swartz. (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2008): 38. 369 Grant, Ships, 41-46. 370 “In a significant increase to the Indonesia Navy a total of 39 ships have been procured from Germany covering ships of the former East German Navy.” See Ezio Bonsignore et al. “Indonesia.,” The World Defense Almanac 1992-1993, Vol 17, Issue 1 (1993): 190. 371 McGrath, “NATO trends,” np. 113 circumstance.”372 As Geoffrey Till points out, Admiral Tirpitz, who oversaw Germany’s ascendance as a naval power, however, created a navy strong enough so that the Royal Navy was neither able to “impose a close blockade” nor to attack the submarine bases on the German coast.373 Moreover, the size and power of Tirpitz’s fleet limited Great Britain’s ability to use its superior forces elsewhere. Designed as a constant threat, the German battleships and battle cruisers were to tie down the Grand Fleet until favorable circumstances would come about that would make an engagement possible. These are also the basic elements of Mahan’s concept of a ‘fleet-in-being’.374 The only two battles involving larger formations of each side, the Battle of Dogger Bank and battle of Jutland (known to the Germans as the Skagerrakschlacht) were inconclusive. Ultimately, the German High Sea Fleet would fail to be a deciding factor in World War I. As Gray observes, “the Royal Navy had defeated German’s High Seas Fleet strategically in the war without benefit of victory in a major fleet-to-fleet battle.”375 The Second World War would provide a similar experience for the German navy as the Kriegsmarine attempted to draw strategic advantages from its war at sea. While Nazi Germany’s submarine war against the convoys reinforcing Great Britain and Russia from the United States was highly successful, Hitler’s surface fleet again posed little threat to major Allied naval operations. In total, the Kriegsmarine had only two battleships,376 (the Bismarck and Tirpitz), two battle cruisers (the Gneisenau and Scharnhorst) and a handful of heavy cruisers. Its only aircraft carrier, the famous Graf Zeppelin, was never put into service. German sea power in both World Wars, Gray argues, “was never imbued with that determination to close with, and destroy, the enemy which was the tradition in Britain’s Royal Navy.” As a large land power, “the Germans either lacked superiority in force or they had ulterior objectives in mind, in support of which the hazards of battle would be an arguably needless complication.”377 Considering the relative strategic inaptitude of naval forces throughout Germany’s history, the evolution of the Bundesmarine since the end of the Cold War seems quite

372 Till, Seapower 175. 373 Ibid. 374 “This approach is of particular value for a fleet that knows it is inferior to its adversary (in number and quality) and cannot realistically hope to gain or contest command of the sea by the normal method.“ Till, Seapower, 173. For information on the concept see Mahan, Naval Warfare, 255-275. The origin of the term is discussed in further detail in Corbett, Principles, 215-228. 375 Gray, Leverage, 18. 376 The Bismark was sunk in 1941, while her sister, the Tirpitz, saw little actual combat in the waters off the Norwegian coast and was sunk by a bomb raid in 1944. 377 Gray, Leverage, 225. 114 remarkable. Conceived as a littoral maritime force, limited both by its role and required capabilities within NATO, the navy has developed into a multi-mission fleet that can be deployed over great distances. The ability of this ‘Expeditionary Navy’ to conduct so-called ‘out-of-area operations’378 reflects the change in how the role of the Bundesmarine of the 21st century is perceived by the German government. The defense white paper, published by the German Defense Ministry in 2006 describes the capability of the navy as following:

[Die Marine wird] in die Lage versetzt sein, dauerhaft auch in großer Entfernung, im multinationalen Rahmen und unter Bedrohung vor fremden Küsten operieren zu können. […] Deutsche maritime Kräfte können ungehindert und frühzeitig in weit entfernte Regionen vorausstationiert werden und diplomatische Aktivitäten flankieren. Neben ihrer Befähigung zum bewaffneten Einsatz auf See können sie wirkungsvoll zu Operationen an Land beitragen.379

Based on these criteria and the numerous reform efforts, including the abolishment of conscription as a major goal of the Bundeswehrreform (initiated in 2000), the force structure has undergone drastic changes. As Figure 14 illustrates, the number of warships has plummeted over the last twenty years as older ships have been replaced by fewer, yet more capable, vessels. Moreover, the entire naval structure has undergone major reorganization and the current fleet is now divided into two flotillas, one in Kiel (Einsatzflotille 1: submarines, guided-missile craft, mine warfare vessels, K-130 corvettes and tenders) and in Wilhelmshaven (Einsatzflotille 2: frigates and larger support vessels); naval command (Marinekommando) has been consolidated at Rostock while the only remaining naval aviation base is located at Nordholz.380 Before I continue my analysis, it is important to briefly address some principal points of discussion. Currently, there is considerable debate among defense analysts whether the German armed forces in general, and the Navy in particular, can provide sufficient military readiness and will be able to deploy and sustain forces abroad in the near term. The reduced force level is likely to cause considerable strain on the available platforms and cause defense planners quite a headache. Moreover, there are numerous indicators suggesting that Germany

378 The term ‘out of area’ is explained by the Oxford dictionary as follows: “(Of a military operation) conducted away from the place of origin or expected place of action of the force concerned.” In the case of Germany it can be explained as, “NATO Alliance operations and non-NATO coalition operations in which the United States and other NATO allies participate and that occur outside or on the periphery of Alliance territory.” Myron Hury et al, Interoperability, A Continuing Challenge in Coalition Air Operations, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2000): Chapter 1, 1. http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1235.html. 379 BmdV, Weißbuch 2006, 112-115. 380 Ulf Kaak, Die Schiffe der Deutschen Marine: 1990 bis heute (München: GeraMond Verlag, 2013): 6-7. 115 will remain unwilling to conduct any form of high-intensity warfighting in the foreseeable future. Considering Germany’s experiences in Afghanistan and its reluctance to take part in other large-scale military operations in recent years (Iraq 2003, Libya 2011, Syria 2014), “[t]he key question is whether Germany will be willing [and able] to deploy forces in contingencies beyond its borders.”381 Lacking the ability to project significant military power at the upper end of the intensity spectrum, and with apparently no intention to make any large- scale investments to increase these capabilities in the near future, it is likely that we will see Germany only taking part in low-threat, peacekeeping operations, delegating responsibilities in high-risk operations to others. In the mid 1990s the German Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces published a number of strategic white papers in an attempt to define the role of its military in the new security environment. The Weißbuch 1994 put forward a defense policy framework in which the German naval forces where to be transformed from the aforementioned littoral to a modern blue-water navy (‘expeditionary navy’).382 As its principal task it was designed to support the freedom of the sea and undertake crisis-management operations further away from home: “[Die Neuausrichtung zu einer Marine, die] im Bündnisrahmen einen eigenständigen und sichtbaren Beitrag zur Aufrechterhaltung des Prinzips der ‚Freiheit der Meere’, insbesondere jedoch für maritime Maßnahmen in der internationalen Krisenbewältigung [leistet].”383 This reorientation also forced the Navy to reevaluate its fleet structure. Adjustments had to be made to guarantee its effectiveness and future procurement decisions had to be reconsidered, all under a far more restrictive financial atmosphere. By the mid-1990s many of the Navy’s vessels were nearing the end of their service life, or were no longer capable of conducting the new missions envisioned by the defense planners. For these reasons further goals of the Bundesmarine were outlined in what was known as the ‘Fleet 2005’ and ‘Marine 2005’ plans. Their basic tenet was to restructure the Navy, gradually reducing its size, but ultimately arriving at a force that constituted a well-balanced fleet, capable of conducting out- of-area operations, albeit not of the same order as the four major European naval powers.384 The initially and, as so often, overoptimistic procurement plan envisioned the fleet to be comprised of 16-20 frigates, 20-30 patrols boats, 20-30 MW vessels, 10-14 submarines, 15-17 support ships, 60-65 naval fighter-bombers, 35-40 search and rescue (SAR) helicopters

381 Larrabee, Austerity, 33. 382 Despite being outlined in earlier white papers the term was only used in the 2006 defense white paper. See BmdV, Weißbuch 2006, 112. 383 German Weißbuch 1994 quoted in Berthold Meyer, “Von der Entgrenzung nationaler deutscher Interessen. Die politische Legitimation weltweiter Militäreinsätze,” in HSFK-Report 10/2007, (Frankfurt a.M. 2007): 16. 384 See Jürgen Rhades, “The German Navy Faces the Future,” Naval Forces 6 (1992): 18-22. 116 and 12-14 ASW and marine patrol craft.385 In his article from 1992, Jürgen Rhades rightfully states that these numbers were merely provisional as “it [was] impossible to predict precisely what [would] be required after 2005.”386 In fact, the actual number of ships envisioned for the ‘Fleet 2005’ was quickly revoked as the magnitude of defense cuts became apparent as Figure 13 indicates. By the time 2005 came along, the austerity measures had reduced the Bundesmarine not by one-third, as Rhades had predicted, but effectively cut it in half. 387 Retired Admiral Sigurd Hess comments on this development by pointing to the fact that the German Navy had to realize that it could neither replace its aging vessels to a satisfactory degree, nor could it build and deploy the platforms necessary to conduct the envisioned operations.

Die Marine bemühte sich zunächst mit gewissem Erfolg, für ihren Beitrag zum Fähigkeitenkatalog der Bundeswehr den Vorteil zu nutzen, den ihr die parlamentarische Unterstützung des Neubauprogrammes „Flotte 2005“ bot. Sie musste jedoch sehr bald zur Kenntnis nehmen, daß der in diesem desaströsen Ausmaß noch 1991 für unmöglich gehaltene Einbruch der investiven Mittel mehr und mehr das in Frage stellte, was das Ziel der „Flotte 2005“ ausmachte. Bald wurde der Marine, sowohl aufgrund der Erfahrungen aus multinationalen Kriseneinsätzen, als auch durch die Mitverfolgung des konzeptionellen Geschehens bei ihren Bündnispartnern, immer klarer, daß sie sich einem doppelten Dilemma gegenübersah: Es fehlte ihr nicht nur das Geld, um ihren gegenwärtigen Komponenten rechtzeitig die für eine sinnvolle Durchhaltefähigkeit notwendige Anzahl von Neubauten zuzuführen, sondern ihr fehlten damit auch die Mittel, die Bundeswehr mit den nun zusätzlich erforderlichen Fähigkeiten ausstatten zu können, wie [die] Fähigkeit zum strategischen Seetransport. Für die militärische Führung war in den Jahren 1994 bis 2003 weder in verteidigungspolitischer noch in konzeptioneller Hinsicht eine wirkliche Perspektive erkennbar.388

Despite these drastic changes, Germany has been able to produce and deploy highly capable warships and weapon systems. Compared to the fleet of the 1980s, Germany gradually put newer (yet fewer) ships to sea. These surface and subsurface combatants were designed to conduct a larger variety of missions more effectively and over greater distances. Based on Germany’s industrial prowess, its shipbuilding facilities have substantial experience in producing state-of-the-art vessels. In particular, shipbuilders such as Blohm & Voss,

385 Rhades, “German Navy,” 20. 386 Ibid. 387 Ibid. 388 Sigurd Hess, “Die konzeptionelle Planung der Marine 1989-2002“, in: Die Wende. Die Deutsche Marine auf dem Weg in die Einheit, eds. Stephan Huck, Hartmut Klüver (Bochum: Dieter Winkler Verlag, 2007): 21-30. Quote taken from the author’s homepage: http://www.sigurd-hess.de/hauptseite-deutsche-version. 117

Thyssen Nordseewerke and the Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft have developed innovative designs and delivered cutting-edge technology. Besides the previously mentioned Type 206 submarine, the MEKO (Mehrzweck Korvette), built since the 1980s, is representative for German technical ingenuity. Although the MEKO design was never procured by the German Navy, it enjoyed considerable commercial success and units continue to be operated by, inter alia, Australia, Argentina and Turkey.389 As we shall later see, the modular design of the MEKO already incorporated many ideas of Illustration 20: Germany has established itself as the leading nation in the construction of diesel-electric submarines. This drawing later ship-building trends. illustrates the Type 214 AIP submarine sold to Greece. Parry points out that

“[reconfiguring] or [adapting] ships in the face of changing operational requirement […] has often proved prohibitively expensive.”390 Therefore, concepts like the German MEKO, the Royal Danish Navy’s Standard Flexible (Standflex) system on its Absalon-class command ships and Ivor Huitfeldt frigates, or the U.S. Navy’s littoral combat ship mission packages can save costs and provide the needed flexibility. As part of a more globally deployable naval force, Germany also sought to develop the first air-independent (AIP) diesel-electric submarine. In general, diesel-electric powered submarines need to surface regularly to reload their batteries and cannot stay submerged over longer periods of times.391 For many years, only nuclear powered submarines had such a capability. However, first tests of a fuel cell-based air-independent propulsion system were already conducted as early as 1988. Due to technical challenges and fiscal restrictions, it

389 While the German government decided not to procure any of these ships for its own navy the MEKO design was successfully sold to other states such as Turkey, Greece, Argentina and Nigeria. 390 Parry, Highway, 185-187. 391 “Submarines with diesel-electric propulsion generally have to surface every couple of days to run the charging generator and recharge the batteries. However, with a special fuel cell system, subs can remain under water for longer. The present record – set by an HDW Type 212A submarine – is 14 days. If a submarine is unable to surface, the regulations require that the crew is able to survive for at least six days.” Stefan Nitschke and Stephen Elliott, “Under Water,” Naval Forces, http://www.nafomag.com/2015/01/under-water-faq-on- submarines.html. 118 would take another 15 years until the first AIP Type 212A submarine was delivered to the German Bundesmarine. The new submarine, a joint venture between Germany and Italy, gave its commanders the unique ability to remain submerged for much longer periods of time than previously possible owing to the vessel’s fuel cells. What is so extraordinary about this technology is that the boats are very quiet, thus very difficult to locate by enemy forces. In general, diesel-electric submarines are known, and feared, for their ability to operate at a very low noise level, loitering in shallow waters where their comparatively louder and larger nuclear counterparts are less willing to venture. With the inherent limitations of the diesel- electric propulsion having been overcome, the new German submarines are even more difficult to locate. Operating the Type 212A the German Navy now “has a submerged endurance bettered only by those few navies able to afford nuclear-propelled boats, as well as an overall level of stealth that is perhaps second-to-none.”392 On the downside, Germany’s intention to build and deploy 10-14 such submarines as envisioned during the 1990s “is little more than a distant memory”,393 Waters remarks. All Type 206 subs have been decommissioned, leaving the Navy with no more than six submarines.394 What is more, despite the Type 212’s increased endurance – necessary in out- of-area operations – the Bundesmarine is “still some distance away from furnishing the true offensive oceanic proficiency of high-speed attack submarines powered by high-capacity nuclear reactors,”395 such as the United Kingdom or France operate. In regard to surface combatants, the shift towards a more globally-oriented navy is the most visible. Not only have many of the former MW and ASuW vessels, such as the Frankenthal minehunters and Tiger-class guided-missile craft, been taken from service, but much more capable platforms such as the F-123, F-124, F-125, and K-130 have been, or are in the process of being commissioned. Beginning with the F-123 Brandenburg-class, a ship with a total length of 139 meters and a displacement of over 4700 tons, the German navy commissioned the first of a number of very large and capable frigates. Despite being designed during the 1980s as an ASW frigate to replace the increasingly obsolescent Lütjens-class destroyers (commissioned in 1969), the F-123 carried a wide variety of ASW, ASuW, and AAW weapons and, at the time of construction, also incorporated novel elements of stealth in its design. In addition, the number

392 Waters, “Type 212A,” 152. 393 Ibid., 151. 394 The final two Type 212As for the German Navy will enter service in 2015. 395 Waters, “Type 212A,” 152. 119 of crew could be somewhat reduced due to increased automation and its maintenance cycles were prolonged.396 Its successor, the F-124 Sachsen-class, is in general a refined version of the F-123 and was based on a trilateral cooperation for a future frigate between Germany, the Netherlands and Spain. After the initial plan (the NRF-90 project) to build a common frigate for the eight most important NATO members failed in the late 1980s, a memorandum of understanding among the aforementioned three nations was signed in 1990.397 Its provisions required the future frigate to be deployable in operations across the intensity spectrum. In essence, the ship had to be a multipurpose platform. At the time, Michael Herwig pointed out that the focus had shifted away from anti-submarine warfare, towards anti-surface and anti-air warfare. Therefore, “[t]his new emphasis [demanded] improved equipment in the areas of surveillance, communications, air defence and C2 [command and control].”398 This, he concluded, could have “hardly been [achieved] by German, Dutch, or Spanish industry alone.”399 Although the final versions of each country’s ships (the Álvaro de Bazán, De Zeven Provinciën, and Sachsen-class) are different in design and combat systems, all of them exhibit substantial capabilities, hitherto unprecedented in vessels of this class. While the Spanish Bazán frigate (also known as F-100) relies on the American Aegis combat system to deal with aerial threats, the Dutch and German ships feature the long-range 3-D volume search radar (SMART-L) and APAR multi-function radar (an Active Electronically–Scanned Array, or AESA in short). Illustration 21: While other European navies have expanded their amphibious forces, Germany has invested in highly sophisticated frigates, 400 As Massimo Annati such as the F-124 Sachsen-class seen here firing a Standard SM-2 missile.

396 Chris Chant Kriegsschiffe Heute (Stuttgart: Motorbuch Verlag, 2006): 75. 397 Herwig, “Trilateral,” 35. 398 Ibid. 399 Ibid. 400 An interesting article regarding the German and Dutch AAW frigates can be found in Massimo Annati, “German and Dutch AAW Frigates at Sea,” Military Technology, Vol. 26, 3-4 (2002): 102-108. 120 notes, “the APAR represented a very significant design, development and industrial challenge,” while “the sophisticated technology used for [the SMART-L radar] allows its use even in littoral scenarios, [as] it was especially designed to deal with small low-flying targets”.401 Therefore, both radars on board the Sachsen-class are excellent examples of Europe’s defense industry holding its own in this specific sector.402 Another common feature is that all three classes deploy the American Standard SM-2 air defense missile fired from the ships’ Mk 41 vertical launch system. Finally, the three units of the Sachsen-class are among the most capable and well- balanced AAW-frigates in the world and are, in fact, the only frigates to deploy anti-air missile systems for all tiers of air defense.403 Moreover, Germany could integrate the SM-3 missiles in its frigates as part of the United States’ and NATO’s plan to establish a sea-based theater ballistic missile system. However, so far, there are few indications that the German government will go forward with such procurements.404 Within NATO, these vessels offer air and missile-defense to other, less capable units and have also been deployed together with U.S. carrier strike groups over the past years. In 2013, and for the first time in history, a German frigate (F220, Hamburg) was assigned to coordinate the air space around the strike group, thus being solely responsible for its air defense.405 The growing interaction with other fleets, however, is only part of Germany’s effort to increase its international presence. By and large, Germany’s involvement in international operations has grown considerably over the past two decades. In the context of its strategic reorientation and growing engagement abroad, the German Navy has been deployed in numerous missions: from clearing mines in the Persian Gulf to fighting piracy off the coast of Somalia. The post-Cold War Bundesmarine conducted its first larger operation “Southern Cross” in 1994, in an effort to evacuate German UNISOM II troops from Mogadishu, Somalia. Between July 1994 and July 1996 the navy also took part in enforcing the embargo against former Yugoslavia in the Adriatic. As a continuous part of NATO’s Standing Naval

401 “The programme was aimed at the realisation of a very advanced multi-function radar, in some way comparable to the US SPY-1 and able to offer adequate performance to control both SM-2 and ESSM missiles, but at the same time remain well below the size, weight and power characteristics of its US counterpart.” Ibid., 103. 402 The SMART-L and APAR were developed by the Dutch Signaal company, now Thales. 403 RIM-166 for low-tier AAW, ESSM for medium-tier, and SM-2 Block IIIb for high-tier air defense. 404 See Footnote 5, in Norman Friedman, “Technology Review. Ballistic Missile Defense And The USN,” in: Seaforth World Naval Review 2013, ed. Conrad Waters (South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2012): 191. 405 “Vom Flugzeugträgerverband verabschiedet - Fregatte "Hamburg" macht Heimatumdrehungen!” Presseportal 18.06.2013, http://www.presseportal.de/pm/67428/2495613/vom-flugzeugtr-gerverband- verabschiedet-fregatte-hamburg-macht-heimatumdrehungen. 121

Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED), German destroyers and frigates participated in nearly 6000 boarding operations and inspections at sea.406 The Navy’s longest-standing naval deployment thus far has been its anti-terrorism mission as part of Operation Active Endeavour. In an act of unprecedented solidarity, following the attacks of 9/11, the German Bundestag decided to deploy its naval forces to the waters around the Horn of Africa and consequently took command of joint task force CTF-150 on a number of occasions.407 Though publicly criticized, the German government remained adamant that the mission was necessary to counter the threat that terrorist activities posed to the good order at sea: “Bei der Bekämpfung des internationalen Terrorismus kommt Seewegen eine besondere Bedeutung zu. Im Vordergrund stehen dabei die Überwachung des Schiffsverkehrs und die Unterbrechung von Versorgungslinien terroristischer Organisationen.”408 Germany’s commitment to peacekeeping operations was buttressed by its leading naval role in the United Nation’s UNIFIL mission off the coast of Lebanon. Based on Resolution 1701, the Bundesmarine has been assisting and training the Lebanese Navy since 2006.409 The latest additions to Germany’s naval forces, the K-130 Braunschweig-class Corvette, the F-125 Baden-Württemberg-class frigate, and the Berlin-class combat support ship, reflect Germany’s effort to adapt to the new maritime security environment. As mentioned, the Navy’s guided-missile Tiger, Gepard, and Albatros class patrol boats had limited ability to perform out-of-area operations. As the maritime journalist Guy Toremans points out, “[t]he one-watch boats had a very limited endurance by nature of their limited seaworthiness and the fatigue factor impacting their crews.”410 Keeping these shortcomings in mind, in 2001 a consortium of three German shipbuilders was awarded a €880 million contract to build a first batch of five new corvettes. Incorporating signature-reduction features, modern combat systems and potent AAW and ASuW capabilities, the Braunschweig-class undoubtedly can meet a number of the Navy’s requirements over the next decades. However, despite being “dispatched worldwide to undertake surveillance missions, embargo and counter-drug operations, as well as, potentially, to participate in combat

406 “NATO/WEU Operation Sharp Guard,” IFOR Final Factsheet, 2 October 1996. http://www.nato.int/ifor/general/shrp-grd.htm. 407 Conrad Waters, “Regional Review – Europe and Russia,” in Seaforth World Naval Review 2010, ed. Conrad Waters (South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2009): 96. 408 “Die Operation Enduring Freedom,” Bundeswehr, 4 Dec. 2013. http://www.einsatz.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/einsatzbw. 409 Pierre Schubjé, “UNIFIL: Deutsch-libanesische Kooperation – Ein Zwischenbericht,” Marine Forum 1-2 (2014): 14-16. 410 Guy Toremans, “Significant Ships – Braunschweig Class Corvettes. Eagerly awaited by the German Navy,” in Seaforth World Naval Review 2013, ed. Conrad Waters (South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2012): 129. 122 missions,”411 the vessels remain quite small. “One of the lessons already learned from the K- 130 programme”, Toremans adds, “was that, although significantly larger than the fast patrol boats, the new corvettes have still proved to be a bit too small to operate comfortably and effectively in support of some of the German Navy’s growing mission requirements around the globe.”412 This will put more strain on the continuously shrinking number of large surface combatants, such as the F-124s and new F-125 ‘Stabilization Frigate’. If one thing the F-125 Baden-Württemberg-class does not lack, it is size. Its builders proudly state that with a length of 149 meters and a displacement of over 7,300 tons it will be the largest frigate ever built. The four ships of the class will replace the eight units of the Type 122 (Bremen-class), starting in 2016. Unlike its predecessors, (designed primarily for ASW), according to a German naval expert, “[t]he design of the new frigate class reflects everything that is important for littoral warfare.”413 These modern-day littoral operations, however, should not be confused with those against the Soviet Baltic Fleet. While during the Cold War German combatants could operate close to their homeports for shorter periods, the littoral operations nowadays take place hundreds and thousands of miles away from home. In concordance with Germany’s defense white paper the design of these ships reflects these missions-capabilities, namely to project power into foreign littoral waters for long periods of time, in order to conduct crisis management and conflict resolution operations:

[D]auerhaft auch in großer Entfernung im multinationalen Rahmen und unter Bedrohung vor fremden Küsten operieren zu können. Damit trägt die Marine dazu bei, Krisen und Konflikte bereits am Ort ihres Entstehens einzudämmen und – wenn politisch gefordert – zu bewältigen.414

For those reasons, the F-125 arguably will not provide the same high-end combat capabilities the Sachsen-class can bring to the table. In particular, its air defense and anti- submarine capabilities will be limited when compared to other ships of its size, notwithstanding that the ships have considerable room for upgrades. On the other hand, owing to increased automation, the crew will be considerably smaller than on previous ships (120 sailors, compared to 200 on the Sachsen) – an important factor in times of reductions in military personnel. Moreover, the Bundesmarine intends to employ a dual crewing concept

411 Toremanns, “Braunschweig,” 146. 412 Ibid., 147. 413 Sebastian Bruns, quoted in Albrecht Müller, “New Frigate Underscores Germany’s Shift From Cold War Naval Combat,” Defense News, 13 Jan. 2014. http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20140113/DEFREG01/301130031/New-Frigate-Underscores-Germany- s-Shift-From-Cold-War-Naval-Combat. 414 BmdV, Weißbuch 2006, 122. 123 much like that aboard U.S. submarines (rotating the crews while on deployment instead of long tours of a single crew), thereby allowing the frigate to conduct operations for up to two years and 5,000 hours at sea per year.415 Again, this analysis is not intended to be a simple “bean-counting exercise”.416 As was already pointed out in the introductory chapter to these case studies, apart from the number of hulls, other important factors, such as “technical quality, professional skill, and maintenance efficiency”, have to be considered in order to successfully come to a meaningful understanding of a navy’s capabilities. 417 As a matter of fact, the German Navy would by all means score high in the second and third category and her current ability to deploy naval forces, to many observers, also seems to be sufficient. The already quoted RAND study, for example, points out that Germany’s defense budget has remained constant during the financial crisis and in some cases has slightly grown over the past years.418 Furthermore, so the study went on, the “changes to the navy structure are expected to be less drastic than those to the army.”419 However, Germany’s commitment towards the maritime realm does not pass the test under closer examination. While the Navy arguably was not hit as hard by the recent cuts as its sister services, there is not much cause for celebration. The German Navy is being stretched increasingly thin in support of its many missions. Currently, its vessels are engaged in the UNIFIL mission and the E.U. anti-piracy operation Atalanta. They contribute warships to the Standing NATO Maritime Groups as well as the Standing NATO MCM Groups (mine-countermeasure) on a constant basis and, finally, air defense frigates regularly deploy with U.S.-carrier strike groups. At the same time, the force level has dropped to 11 frigates, five K-130 corvettes, and a small number of mine warfare vessels. While the third and final Berlin-class combat group supply replenishment ship represents an important addition to Germany’s ‘expeditionary fleet’ the decommissioning of the last Gepard-class guided-missile craft by 2016 will leave the Bundesmarine with alarmingly few combatants until the late 2020s (27 submarines and surface combatants in total).420 The aforementioned maintenance efficiency and ability to deploy forces will become increasingly challenging in the future, due to the wear and tear on the existing fleet. Moreover, given Germany’s economic health – and the political, as well as military influence it could thus conceivably wield – the government has to accept criticism for its

415 Wertheim, Combat Fleets, 233. 416 Till, Seapower, 117. 417 Ibid., 117. 418 Larrabee, Austerity, 34. 419 Ibid., 30. 420 Bonsignore, “Germany,” 131. 124 general reluctance to use ‘hard power’, even in cases where it would be generally considered justifiable. The NATO-led military intervention in Libya, for example, not only created deeps rifts between the NATO members and emphasized the absence of a common European defense strategy, but it also heralded the most likely form of the future Western response to conflict and humanitarian crisis. As part of the ad-hoc ‘Coalition of the Willing and Able’, neutral Sweden took part in enforcing the no-fly zone over Libya, while Germany, which for over 40 years owed its safety and security to her NATO allies, watched from the sidelines. At the time, “the German decision not to participate in the Libyan operation caught many officials by surprise and raises questions about whether the Alliance can rely on Germany’s support for future power-projection missions – even ones, like Libya, that are carried out under a UN mandate.”421 More recent events, such as the threat of force against Bashar Al- Assad’s regime in Syria in the summer of 2013, or the current effort against ISIS, underscore Germany’s antipathy to commit its military forces to operations that entail a certain degree of risk.

To sum up, since the end of the Cold War, the German Navy has undergone a drastic reform. Today it bears little resemblance to the Cold War fleet patrolling the waters of the North and Baltic Sea. Apart from a small number of increasingly obsolete ships, the Navy has commissioned a number of state-of-the-art submarines, corvettes and frigates. Germany continues to be a leader in key naval technologies and has had substantial commercial success on the naval market over the last two decades – gaining contracts from navies around the world. In addition, the Germans have successfully deployed naval forces in a number of contingencies, albeit most of them being on the lower end of the intensity spectrum. However, the drastic budget cuts that ensued as a consequence of the Soviet collapse have taken a detrimental toll on the naval services. Vice Admiral Hans-Rudolf Boehmer’s predictions from 1996 of the Navy’s future would almost seem laughable, would they not have such substantial ramifications for Europe’s security in an increasingly competitive maritime environment:

In the year 2010, [the Admiral predicted] the Navy will not be much different in size than it is today, however, it will be significantly more capable. There will be 15 frigates, 10-12 submarines and it will include a strong mine countermeasure capability

421 Larrabee, Austerity, 98. 125

– Further, there will be a mixture of modern corvettes and not-so-modern patrol boats [and the] naval air arm will still be flying the Tornados.422

Quite frankly, the Bundesmarine can call none of these capabilities its own. The surface and subsurface fleet remain considerably smaller than envisioned, while the naval air arm has long handed over its Tornados to the Air Force, and to date the Navy does not possess any noteworthy amphibious forces. Compared to other states of its size and wealth, (the other European G7 members for example) Germany’s naval commitment can be considered lacking. In his critical assessment of Europe’s navies, McGrath summarizes Germany’s naval abilities as “[falling] mainly within the lower end of the operational spectrum.”423 Although he recognizes Germany’s contribution to peacekeeping and stabilization efforts (which follow from its strategic reorientation throughout the post-Cold War era), he makes clear that its “cruising navy provides little in the way of power projection.”424 Given the considerable financial burden countries such as France and the U.K. and, to a lesser degree, Italy and Spain have to carry to maintain their well-balanced fleets, (which in the case of the former include costly nuclear deterrent forces) Germany’s naval investments seem disproportionally small. With tensions rising on Europe’s northern and southern flanks and Russia’s reemergence as a naval power, it remains to be seen if Germany’s policymakers will take these changes within the geopolitical security environment into consideration. Ultimately, however, “[t]he interesting question is not whether the navy supports Germany’s worldview and view of itself; [but]” so McGrath concludes ”it is whether a nation as powerful, rich, and networked as Germany, is underinvesting in naval power while free riding on the backs of US, UK, and French naval capabilities to a greater extent than other European nations.”425

422 Hans-Rudolf Boehmer, “… Today, the Navy is Better and More Capable Than Ever Before.” Naval Forces, Special Issue 5 (1996): 10. 423 McGrath, “NATO trends,” np. 424 Ibid. 425 Ibid. 126

10) DENMARK and the NETHERLANDS: Commercial Might and Military Inaptitude

Figure 16 Denmark: Defense Spending in % of GDP 2,5

2

1,5

Military Spending % ofGDP % 1

0,5

0

1990-2014, Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database

Figure 15

Figure 18 Denmark: Number of Major Vessels Sources: The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, Military Technology Almanac, World Naval Review

6

5 4 3 2

1 Number ofVessels Number 0 1990 2000 2014 Aircraft Carriers 0 0 0 Large Surface Combatants 3 3 5 Submarines 5 3 0 Assault/Amphibious 0 0 0

Figure 16

127

Figure 17 The Netherlands: Defense Spending in % of GDP 3 2,5

2 Military Spending 1,5

% ofGDP % 1 0,5 0

1990-2013, Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database

Figure 17

Figure 18 The Netherlands: Number of Major Vessels Sources: The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, Military Technology Almanac, World Naval Review

16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 Number ofVessels Number 0 1990 2000 2014 Aircraft Carriers 0 0 0 Large Surface Combatants 15 15 6 Submarines 5 4 4 Assault/Amphibious 0 1 2

Figure 18

Both the Netherlands and Denmark are interesting examples of how the principles of sea power have evolved over the course of history. Centuries ago, both countries belonged to the major sea powers of their time, fashioning large merchant fleets as well as powerful

128 armadas of warships.426 As a consequence of this union between military and commerce – conducted by many, but refined by the Dutch and ultimately mastered by the British –Mahan concluded that the “[c]ontrol of the sea by maritime commerce and naval supremacy [meant] predominant influence in the world”.427 As mentioned, many renowned naval strategists thereafter have generally accepted these principles.428 However, in this day and age, in the opinion of many European governments, large and highly-capable naval forces are no longer considered essential to the prosperity of their nations. Their country’s economy, despite being largely dependent on the transportation of goods by sea (even those of landlocked countries such as Austria), do just fine without maintaining large and expensive fleets. What is remarkable, however, is that even seafaring nations of old, such as those under discussion in this chapter, worry little about their inability to buttress their economic power with credible hard power in the form of a capable navy. There are a number of reasons for such a development given the extent of geopolitical changes over the last centuries. As we have heard, one reason that cannot be disregarded is that the Western world has evolved into a community of (mostly) shared values and comparatively little rivalry. More importantly, however, is that in a world of global commerce in which 90 percent of materials and goods are shipped, one country has taken it upon itself to protect the quintessential freedom of the sea, namely the United States by means of its navy and its citizens’ tax dollars. For other countries such as the Netherlands and Denmark, this of course represents a welcome convenience. Both states rarely have to fear that their commercial ships will fall prey to commerce raiders or are sunk by enemy sea powers, which in the past were often of European origin. They can expand their commercial activities and in turn gain large revenue by transporting goods to and fro between Europe, the United States, the oil-rich Middle East and Asia. As a matter of fact, both countries have expanded their commercial shipping capabilities, while their military capabilities have often been neglected. To briefly outline this disparity, it is important to mention that the Netherlands are dependent on the unimpeded flow of commerce at sea. Moreover, they have invested huge sums to develop their seaport complex at Rotterdam into the fourth largest port in the world and the largest in Europe (based on the amount of containers ‘TEU’ handled per day). At a size of over 12,500 ha it can accommodate even the largest ship and has a throughput of a

426 The Danish-Norwegian personal union included territorial possessions in the High North, the African West coast, India and the Caribbean. Its power was surpassed by the Dutch, whose East India Trading Company propelled it to the forefront of political power during the 17th and 18th centuries. 427 Mahan, quoted in Till, Strategy, 57. 428 See Ibid., 1-5. Till concludes that “So far, […] the maritime narrative seems to be holding true.” Ibid., 5. 129 mindboggling 450 million tons a year.429 Of even greater magnitude is the Danish commercial shipping industry. As Parry highlights, “the Danes are the understated, high achieving denizens of the maritime industry”.430 The Danish Møller-Maersk shipping company is the largest and arguably most famous shipping company in the world. Their huge Triple E container ships have been specifically designed for the route between Asia and Europe and can carry over 18,000 TEU.431 With over 249,000 tons, a single ship of this class has a displacement five times that of the entire Danish Navy combined (around 54,000 tons including its auxiliaries). Although many of these ventures are made by international consortium enterprises as well as private investors and are, strictly speaking, not state matters, it is nonetheless striking how successfully commercial shipping can be pursued in these countries without the military power one would expect necessary to underpin and protect it in times of crisis.

Illustration 22: A Dutch frigate makes a sharp turn starboard as a gigantic Triple E containership of the Danish Maersk shipping company passes by in the background. Both countries are heavily invested in commercial trade at sea, yet have relatively small naval forces.

With the end of the Cold War and the subsequent defense retrenchment among all European states, the naval forces of both the Netherlands and Denmark were slowly reduced. While initially, new and highly innovative designed warships were able to absorb the gradual decommissioning of older vessels, the latest defense cuts have either forced both navies to drastically reduce the size of their fleet (as in the case of the Netherlands), or to give up significant capabilities altogether (as in the case of Denmark). No matter how much better the

429 See Parry, Highway, 57. For more information see homepage of the Port of Rotterdam: ttp://www.portofrotterdam.com/en/Port/port-in-general/Pages/default.aspx. 430 See Parry, Highway, 52-53. 431 Ibid., 54. 130 new warships, OPVs, and replenishment ships are, current defense spending will not allow them to be used to their full potential, nor will it permit the navies to keep pace with naval developments elsewhere. This circumstance might in fact one day lead to a similar detriment both countries already had to painfully experience when their prosperous seaborne trade fell victim to extrinsic events and hostile actors, who chose to pursue their interest by military means, ultimately ending in years of hardship for many Danish and Dutch citizens.432

10.1) Denmark

Unlike some of its neighbors, the Danish military might was already eclipsed in the early 19th century. Throughout the last century, the Danish military were only able to maintain comparatively small naval forces considering its strategically important position.433 Hence, during the Cold War it was understood that the main brunt of a Soviet naval attack from the Baltic Sea had to be absorbed by West German, Dutch and Norwegian forces, whereas Denmark’s small flotilla could only provide modest support to ASW, and ASuW operations against the Soviets around the Danish peninsula and the critical outlet of the Baltic Sea in particular. Heavy mining of the critical chokepoint was in essence the Royal Danish Navy’s (RDN) primary task within NATO planning.434 By 1990 the Danish Navy maintained a fleet of five relatively old diesel-electric submarines of Norwegian and German design, three small Nils Jule-class frigates, a number of patrol vessels with limited war fighting capabilities (mainly used for protecting national fishing rights), as well as a number of guided-missile and torpedo boats from the 1960s and 1970s. All nine warships were of similar age.435 Noteworthy are Denmark’s icebreakers which are needed for operations around Greenland, part of the Danish Crown Lands. In the case of war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, however, Greenland could not have been reached by the small Danish fleet, thus making them irrelevant to the Navy’s contingency planning.436

432 Mahan discusses Holland’s dependence on the sea: “[I]f England was drawn to the sea, Holland was driven to it; without the sea England languished, but Holland died. In the height of her greatness, when she was one of the chief factors in European politics, a competent native authority estimated that the soil of Holland could not support more than one eighth of her inhabitants.” When the disastrous war with England in 1653-54 drew to a close it had turned the Dutch harbors into “a forest of masts; the country was full of beggars; grass grew in the streets, and in Amsterdam fifteen hundred houses were untenanted”. Mahan, Naval Warfare, 32-34. 433 Although it only had a relatively small Navy the Danes had some heavy mechanized forces stationed in Germany. 434 The Danish Navy had an inventory of roughly 6,600 mines. See Moreau, “Maritime Strategy,” 38. 435 Prézelin, Combat Fleets, 104-114. 436 In fact, the icebreakers were “civilian-manned and subordinate to the Ministry of Trade and Shipping. See Ibid., 113. 131

All in all, the Danish Navy could hardly be considered even a second-rate naval power at the time and further defense cuts proved to be hardly encouraging. Faced with increasingly strong headwinds, Danish shipbuilders, however, developed one of the most innovative ship designs to date – the ‘Standard Flex’. “It seems somehow appropriate that the country that produced Lego should have been a pioneer of naval warship modularisation”, Parry observes.437 Already in the 1980s, the naval service had come up with a similar idea as was pursued in the German MEKO design, namely that a ship should be able to quickly adapt and transform to the needs of the Navy. To make such a flexible design possible the Standard Flex 300 multi-role vessels (Flyvefisken-class) were built with four StanFlex container positions onboard. (See Illustration 23). In each position, “among others, medium caliber guns, anti- ship missile launching systems, air defense missile launching systems, MCM control systems, Variable Depth (VD) sonars, equipment for pollution control and hydrographic equipment”438 could be fitted and, if needed, swapped within a few hours.439 These containers, Parry explains, “are precisely engineered to allow connections with power, cooling, communications, water and data supplies [and the] weapon system or sensor is mounted on, or in the module, with the electronics, power machinery, magazine and supporting equipment inside.”440 As part of the necessary restructuring of the Danish Navy after the Cold War, the Committee Concerning the Danish Armed Forces’ Equipment laid down a long-term procurement policy which stipulated, or better said, recommended that a large part of the fleet (17 ships) should be replaced by a total of six large vessels, all of which were to incorporate the StandFlex modules.441 Two units would evolve into the Absalon-class command and support vessel, on which, in turn, the three highly innovative multi-purpose Iver Huitfeldt frigates are based. These five ships compose the largest part of the Dutch Navy and will be described in more detail shortly. The development of both the Dutch and Danish naval forces over the past twenty-five years mirrors that of most other European NATO members. As has been discussed, many navies – such as the British, the French, Italian, Spanish and German – have shifted their focus from operations against the Soviet Navy in the Atlantic, North Sea and Mediterranean

437 Parry, Highway, 186. 438 Hans Harboe-Hansen, “The Royal Danish Navy’s Modernisation Programme,” Naval Forces, Vol. 18, 6 (1997): 93. 439 For a description of Flyvefisken see Grant, Kriegsschiffe, 104. Initially, swapping StanFlex containers took 48 hours, but this time has been significantly reduced. See Guy Toremans’, “Significant Ships. Iver Huitfeldt Class Frigates: Spearhead of the Royal Danish Navy” in Seaforth World Naval Review 2014, ed. Conrad Waters (South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2013): 108. 440 Parry, Highway, 186 441 Harboe-Hansen, “Modernisation,” 92-93. 132 to expeditionary or out-of-area operations in littoral waters, most notably around the African continent. In essence, power projection over great distances, and more importantly, from the sea onto land has taken precedence over the concept of sea-control. Therefore, European fleets operate larger vessels with notably better sea keeping characteristics which are also capable of conducting amphibious operations and can remain at sea over longer periods of time. The general strategic reorientation during this period can be summarized as follows:

[T]raditional blue water navies are taking an increasing interest in littoral warfare and navies, which so far have focus upon operations in their national brown waters, may be seeking to improve their blue water capability in order to offer their littoral warfare experience in other parts of the world.442

It just so happens that this concept has been put into question as of late. This is most noticeable within the U.S. naval community, which has largely revoked its previous naval strategy focused on littoral warfare in light of China’s naval buildup. The U.S. Navy has ramped up its sea-control and anti-A2/AD capabilities by adding additional destroyers and attack submarines to its

fleet instead of the Illustration 23: A telling description of the possibilities the StanFlex formerly planned large system offers. number of littoral combat ships.443 Furthermore, resurgent Russian naval activities have painfully exposed Europe’s shortcomings in conducting ASW and ASuW warfare, a métier the European allies used to take great pride in. These aspects will be discussed in more detail in the penultimate chapter. Returning to Denmark’s growing blue-water capability, it is safe to say that the construction of the five large surface combatants has strained the small Danish defense budget to such an extent that as a consequence some vital capabilities were relinquished outright.

442 Harboe-Hansen, “Modernisation,” 92 443 Eight Block III Virginia-class attack submarines are on order with a class of 30 being planned. Four additional Arleigh Burke-class destroyers are being constructed and nine more have been ordered. See Ezio Bonsignore et al., “United States of America,” Military Technology: The World Defense Almanac 2014, Issue 1 (2014): 36. 133

Although Danish defense planners had made tentative provisions for a replacement of the nation’s ageing submarine fleet (a class of three or four AIP submarines were to be bought as part of the trilateral Viking program between Norway, Denmark and Sweden444), the underwater flotilla was disbanded in 2004 and it is highly unlikely that we will see her return anytime soon.445 Considering Denmark’s dependence on commercial shipping and its exposed position at the entrance to the Baltic Sea, more cautious observers may be tempted to question the decision to abandon the submarine program. In 2003, the keel of the first 4,500 ton Absalon-class flexible support ship was laid down in the Maersk Odense Staalskibsvaerft. At a length of 137 meters and a width of 19.5 meters this class of warship was much larger than the Niels Juels-class corvettes in service, which throughout their service life had suffered under their “inherent size handicap which basically is reflected in a limited endurance”.446 Not only was the Absalon much larger, it was an entirely different kind of ship, and in many ways one of a kind. The relatively large superstructure was designed to reduce the ship’s radar cross section and houses a multipurpose ‘flex deck’ which can carry various modules. Main battle tanks can be transported as well as containerized hospital modules for HADR operations. Two landing craft can be embarked and up to 46 vehicles can be taken aboard via the stern ramp. Even more flexibility is provided by the weapon modules installed amidships. Four quad Harpoon SSM launchers and three 12-cell Mk56 VLS find space between the main mast and funnels and are able deploy a total of 36 ESSM missiles in addition to the 16 Harpoon SSMs. A single 127mm/62 cal Mk 45 gun is mounted in the ‘A’ position on the bow which is overlooked by an Oerlikon 35mm CIWS. A second CIWS is mounted above the hangar. Finally the Absalon- class can engage enemy surface and subsurface threats with its ship and helicopter-launched torpedoes.447 Due to their impressive capabilities, these ships can rightfully be compared to other modern frigates, despite being appointed mainly to support duties.448 The reorganization of Denmark’s defense sector continued throughout the first decade of the new millennium. The Danish Defense Agreement 2005-2009, highlighted that “[c]hanges in the international security environment require[d] the Danish Defence to strengthen its capacities in two central areas: 1) Internationally deployable military capacities

444 See Baker III, Combat Fleets, 738. 445 See Harboe-Hansen, “Modernisation,” 95. 446 Ibid., 94. 447 Wertheim, Combat Fleets, 158. 448 Ibid., 158. 134 and 2) the ability to counter terror acts and their consequences.”449 As mentioned, the short- range submarine force disbanded and a number of StanFlex 300 and minelayers were phased out in order to gain sufficient funding for the rest of the fleet to actively take part in NATO’s Standing Naval Forces and Response Force.450 At the same time, the country committed itself to the U.S.-led global war on terrorism. In January 2002 the Danish Parliament decided to deploy its troops to Afghanistan as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. Its main battle tanks, infantry units and Special Forces were heavily engaged over the course of the mission to Helmand Province and among all contributors, the country suffered the highest percentage of casualties.451 With its sister services suffering painful casualties fighting the insurgencies in Afghanistan, the Royal Danish Navy has been spared such losses. It has, however, regardless of its size been no less active in conducting joint maneuvers, providing its warships to NATO’s joint forces, or participating in naval operations. The list of Danish deployments is long: From Operation Desert Shield, the aforementioned Operations Sharp Guard in the Adriatic, Operation Iraqi Freedom to the current deployments as part of the multinational Combined Task Force 150 and 151, where the Absalon has served as the task force’s flagship. She and her sister ship have also been part of the NATO anti-piracy operation around the Horn of Africa, called Ocean Shield. (The Combined Task Force 151 is a multinational operation that cooperates closely with the European Union’s Operation Atalanta and NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield.)452 It is worth noting that Denmark has shown estimable willingness to participate in military as well as peace-keeping operations beyond its shores. Apart from its previously mentioned naval activities and ongoing assistance to the Afghan Government,453 the Danish Air Force also took aggressive action in Libya in 2011. Surprisingly, the small number of Danish F-16 combat aircraft accounted for roughly 11 percent of all sorties flown against the Gaddafi regime. Considering that this is more than Italy, who had the Giuseppe Garibaldi

449 Danish Parliament, The Danish Defense Agreement 2005-2009, Preliminary translation, June (Copenhagen, 2004): 2. 450 Parliament, Preliminary, 7. 451 18,000 troops deployed over the course of 11 years, around 750 deployed at any given time. 43 were killed. See “Operation Enduring Freedom,” iCasualties.org. http://icasualties.org/oef/Nationality.aspx?hndQry=Denmark. 452 See “CTF-151: Counter-piracy,” Combined Maritime Forces, http://combinedmaritimeforces.com/ctf-151- counter-piracy/. 453 Denmark will provide 700 million kroner in aid annually, see “Norway Cuts Afghan Aid over Lack of Progress on Women’s Rights,” TOLOnews, 5 October (2013). http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/12168-norway-cuts-afghan-aid-over-lack-of-progress-on-womens- rights. 135 carrier stationed off the Libyan coast, this is quite a remarkable figure.454 The latest defense documents published by the Danish government indicate that the nation is willing to continue this effort, notwithstanding the significant shortage in personnel:455 “[T]he demand for Danish military contributions will not be diminished”,456 the document makes clear. The Danish Armed Forces, therefore, need to be able to conduct operations ranging from “armed conflict [to] stabilization tasks and international policing.”457 The production of the newest class of frigates, the much-discussed Iver Huitfeldt, constituted a vital step to “[enhance] the ability of the Navy to participate in international operations, to support ground operations and to perform tasks in the North Atlantic and the Arctic”.458 The Iver Huitfeldt multi-purpose frigate is one of the most discussed warships at the moment. It owes this flattering instance to the heated debate that is currently revolving around the U.S. Navy’s new frigate, also known as the littoral combat ship. Lightly armed and facing numerous teething problems, the current production variants of the LCS (the monohull LCS-1 Freedom-class and the trimaran LCS-2 Independence-class) have fallen out of favor in U.S. naval quarters. Despite their innovative design, which includes missions modules that are planned to be prepositioned in order for the ships to quickly be able to adapt to new tasks in combat theaters, the rebalancing to the Asian-Pacific region has led former Secretary of Defense, Chuck Hagel, to curtail their production. In a recent DoD press briefing, Hagel underscored these doubts by stating that “[r]egarding the Navy's littoral combat ship [LCS], [he was] concerned that the Navy is relying too heavily on the LCS to achieve its long-term goals for ship numbers. Therefore, no new contract negotiations beyond 32 ships will go forward”.459 Quickly, many defense analysts and armchair strategists were making the case for the United States’ dropping the LCS altogether and preferably buying the Danish Iver Huitfeldt instead. I do not intend to join the debate and would rather refer the reader to the numerous articles provided in the footnote.460

454 Cernuschi, “Marina Militare,” 85. 455 Danish Parliament, Danish Defense Agreement 2010-2014 (Copenhagen, 2009): 2 & 7. 456 Ibid., 2. 457 Ibid., 3. 458 Ibid., 9. 459 Department of Defense, Remarks by Secretary Hagel and Gen. Dempsey on the fiscal year 2015 budget preview in the Pentagon Briefing Room, Transcript, 24 Feb. (2014). http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=5377. 460 See T.X. Hammes, “Getting Our Money’s Worth: LCS VS Iver Huitfeldt-class,” War on the Rocks, 6 Aug. (2013). http://warontherocks.com/2013/08/getting-our-moneys-worth-lcs-vs-iver-huitfeldt-class/. Steven Wills, LCS Versus the Danish Strawman,“ CIMSEC, 19 Feb. (2015). http://cimsec.org/lcs-versus-danish-strawman/14974. Sam LaGrone, “Navy Asks Industry for Input for Follow-on to Littoral Combat Ship,” USNI News, 30 Apr. (2014). http://news.usni.org/2014/04/30/navy-asks-industry-input-follow-littoral-combat-ship. 136

The latest addition to the Navy’s fleet, however, deserves a closer look. Guy Toremans provides an excellent chapter on the Iver Huitfeldt-class in the 2014 issue of the Seaforth World Naval Review.461 In his opening remarks he underscores what has been stated thus far in regard to the Danish Navy’s reorganization over the past two decades:

With the introduction of the Iver Huitfeldt class frigates , as well as the two Absalon- class flexible support ships, the RDN has been transformed from a ‘small-ship’ navy – focused on its adjacent waters – to a small ‘big ship’ force geared towards expeditionary operations at range from its home bases.462

The second version of the Flexible Støtteskibe or Flexible Support Ship project capitalized on the experiences made with the successful Absalon-class. Given the tight defense budget the total number of ships was reduced to three instead of four and the advantages of the StandFlex system were utilized to the extreme. The hull is somewhat shorter than comparable ships of other European navies, such as the German Sachsen or Dutch Zeven Provinciën-class, but therefore visibly broader. Even though as many off-the- shelf components as possible are used to keep costs low, the frigates exhibit all aspects of a state-of-the art warship. This includes “a comprehensive approach to signature reduction” with the missile launchers and other weapons installed behind a flushed superstructure in order to reduce the ship’s radar cross section.463 One of the main missions of the frigate is air defense. The modularity of the StanFlex weapons containers has proved expedient, and thus the Iver Huitfeldt could conceivably deploy two Mk56 VLS for ESSMs in the ‘E’ and ‘F’ positions flanking the central Mk41 VLS centrally located between the main mast and the ships’ funnels. The latter is able to fire a total of 32 Raython Standard SM-2 Block IIIA missiles and could also be updated to fire the SM-3 (capable of ABM defense) and Tomahawk cruise missiles. In combination with its APAR active phased-array radar (also AESA) search and track radar and SMART-L long-range volume search radar the ships’ air defense capabilities can rightfully be considered among the best in the world. What is more, the radar system can be upgraded to track ballistic missile targets as the Dutch efforts have shown. In August 2014 the Danish Government decided to go forward with its plans to join the NATO ABM missile shield and will invest around $70 million into modifying their SMART-L radar. However, there are no plans to procure the SM-3 missile “the intention

461 Toremans, “Huitfeldt,” 105-119. 462 Ibid., 105. 463 Ibid., 107. 137 being that missile targets will be passed to other sea or land-based interceptors for engagement”.464 Money remains an issue within the Danish Navy, which is not surprising given the country’s sustained defense spending of only around 1.4 percent of GDP over the last ten years. The three Iver Huitfeldt frigates have also proved to be quite costly, despite their relatively modest production costs. As the Danish Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Frank Trojahn elaborates in a recent issue of the Naval Institute Proceedings, “[t]he high-end frigates/littoral combat ships are focused on international missions [They] have been heavily engaged [and the] operational tempo is likely to remain high”.465 This puts great strain on both men and material. Given the declared “manpower problems”466 the ships have all been designed to operate with a much smaller crew than their foreign counterparts. While the German, Dutch, and Italian frigates all require between 150 and 200 able-bodied men and women onboard, the Iver Huitfeldt was envisioned to get by with a crew of 100. Yet Commander Fjord-Larsen has pointed to the infeasibility of such lean ‘manning’. “The high level of specialization has potential problems because there is less slack available in the complement if someone goes sick or on leave. Personally, I think that we are at the lower end of the manning limit.”467 Lt. Commander Kenneth Jensen, deployed on the third unit of the class, the Niels Jung, acknowledges that the number was somewhat overoptimistic. (The case with the American LCS is similar). According to him, 17 more crew members are being hired in order to effectively operate the vessels.468 Given the Armed Forces’ manpower shortages, “the RDN may […] face [increasing] manpower issue […] because the current Danish defense agreement does not currently provide the resources needed for three full crews.” Toremans concludes.469 More signs of the austere financial environment can be made out when one takes a closer look at the current fitting of the ships. The two 76mm guns in the ‘A’ and ‘B’ positions are an interim solution until funds for the intended 127mm/62 cal Mk 45 gun and Oerlikon CIWS are found. The Mk41 VLS is not yet armed, as the Navy is waiting for the procurement

464 See Footnotes Friedman, “Missile Defense,” 191. The discussion concerning the possible expansion of the Navy’s air defense capability can be found as early as 2007. Both SM-3 and SM-6 missiles were proposed in Joris Janssen Lok’s article; neither have been procured though. See Joris Jansen Lok, “Danish Decision,” Defense Technology International, April (2007), 17. 465 Frank Trojahn, “The Commanders Response: Royal Danish Navy,” Naval Institute Proceedings, March (2015). http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2015-03/commanders-respond-royal-danish-navy. 466 Parliament, Danish Defense, 14. 467 Quoted in Toremans, “Huitfeldt,” 115. 468 Christopher Cavas, “Aboard Danish Frigate, Clean Lines and Room to Grow,” Defense News, 17 Nov. (2014), 11. 469 Toremans, “Huitfeldt,” 115. 138 of the Standard SM-2 missiles from the United States, while the two Mk52 VLS have neither been bought nor installed; and finally, the CIWS on top of the helicopter hangar is in fact a dummy.470 The ship’s potential is unquestioned. However, both the incremental fitting of new combat systems and continuous deployment will heavily burden the crews as well as the defense budget. The Royal Danish Navy has made great strides since the days of President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev. Over the last twenty-five years, the Odense Steel Shipyard has spearheaded the art of constructing multi-purpose warships that can quickly and easily be reconfigured to conduct different tasks. From the Navy’s small Thetis patrol boats to its large frigates, the StanFlex module fittings can accommodate anything from hydraulic cranes and towed sonar systems to rapid-fire guns and ESSM SAM launchers. What is more, the Danish Navy, despite its small size, has taken part in numerous multinational operations for over two decades, not least as an active participant in anti-piracy and anti-terrorism operations in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea. The fleet’s capable surface combatants also contribute to NATO’s standing naval and mine-countermeasure forces. Unfortunately, the fiscal realities over the last decades have ruled out the possibility of entertaining a balanced fleet. With the defense budget steadily decreasing throughout the 1990s and subsequently hovering at around the 1.4 percent mark, the Danish Armed Forces did what they could to modernize their fleet. A deliberate decision was made, namely to phase out the fleet’s numerous smaller combatants as well as its submarines and instead to build large multipurpose warships. As a result the Danish fleet has been able to drastically increase its power-projection, amphibious warfare, as well as air defense capabilities. Questions, however, remain as to its ability to deploy these platforms in an increasingly contentious maritime environment. The melting of the polar caps will create profound geostrategic ripples which are likely to be felt in Copenhagen as well as in Amsterdam and Washington D.C. The possibility of a North East Passage opening up for commercial shipping is both exciting and vexing news for Europe’s northern states. With Denmark’s industry heavily invested in commercial shipping – just barely maintaining their lead in this very competitive market – and the expansive EEZ around Greenland and the Faroer Islands demanding vigilance, it will have to be seen if Denmark’s small navy can protect the country’s national interests, when push comes to shove.

470 Cavas, “Frigate,” 11. 139

10.2) The Netherlands

When the struggle between the Warsaw Pact and NATO drew to a close in the early 1990s, the Royal Dutch Navy had rightfully earned its place among the world’s most powerful navies. Its large fleet had been a force to reckon with in both sides contingency planning and had provided the Western allies with important sea-control capabilities. It is no wonder that in his authoritative almanac, The Naval Guide to the Combat Fleets of the World, Bernard Prézelin mentions the Dutch Navy in the same breath as the U.S., Soviet, Japanese, Italian, and Chinese navy.471 Designed to defend the critical strategic lines of communication in the North Sea and through the English Channel, the Dutch Navy fashioned a large fleet of capable warship. In 1990, five domestically designed diesel-electric submarines (SSKs) were in service with the production of a follow-on class of four state-of-the-art boats underway. Two large guided- missile destroyers (the Tromp and De Ruyter), easily recognizable by their large dome- construction housing the SPS-01 3D radar, armed with both Sea Sparrow and Standard SM-1 MR missiles had served in the air defense role and as the fleet’s flagship since the mid 1970s. Two of the ten Kortenaer-class frigates had been sold to Greece in the early 1980s and were replaced by a modified version of the design which brought additional air defense capabilities to the table.472 A large class of minehunters was put into service throughout the 1980s and added significant capabilities to the already respectable MCM flotilla. Two large replenishment ships provided necessary fuel and supplies to the fleet conducting operations on the high seas. However, amphibious and littoral warfare capabilities were limited due to the geographical and strategic realities of the Cold War security environment. On the other hand, the Royal Dutch Navy operated a total of 13 P-3C Orion anti-submarine and maritime surveillance aircraft, and 22 WG-13 LYNX helicopters,473 thereby providing the Navy with a highly capable aviation element. Like most NATO allies, the Dutch Navy relied heavily on American weapon systems, in particular for AAW and ASW. However, the domestic defense industry had established itself as one of Europe’s leaders in the field of electronics and sensor technology in the later years of the Cold War. Over the course of time the Hollandse Signaal Apparaaten, or simply Signaal, established itself as a powerhouse in the design and manufacturing of combat systems and radars. Among others, the APAR and SMART-L radars already discussed, as

471 Prézelin, Combat Fleets, xvi. 472 Ibid., 377-391. 473 Ibid., 375. 140 well as other highly successful systems, were developed by what is now known as Thales Naval Nederland.474 The Netherlands were also able to maintain the capability of constructing very large vessels in its shipyards at Vlissingen, Rotterdam and Amsterdam and have cooperated closely with other European states to build very fine warships. The trilateral frigate project between Holland, Germany and Spain is but one example. It is therefore safe to say that the ships built for the Royal Dutch Navy have no need to shun comparison with the best warships on the market. Without wanting to sound boringly repetitive, a big BUT has to follow the aforementioned remarks. The Netherlands have a substantial industrial base, able to build and fit out modern warships, but the general reluctance of its political leadership to invest in its armed forces has, over time, substantially eroded the Navy’s capabilities. To exemplify this supposition, a brief analysis of the procurement policy over the last two decades is necessary. Though one runs the risk of confusing the procurement process of the Danish and Dutch naval forces since the end of the Cold War given the similar numbers, there are some considerable differences between the two states. Interestingly, the Danish long-term procurement plan in 1999/2000 recommended the decommissioning of 17 ships and replacement by six (ultimately 5) new multi-purpose ‘frigates’ by 2011.475 In the same period of time, the Dutch Navy took 17 frigates from service adding only four! new escort vessels to the fleet.476 The main difference in the outcome of this process is that while the Danish Navy nevertheless has been able to expand its naval capabilities in some important areas (owing to the obsolescence of its older warships), no such testament can be made for the Dutch fleet. As Conrad Waters laments, “Once one of the more significant European maritime forces, the Royal Netherlands Navy has been progressively reduced in size and stature since the end of the Cold War until it barely ranks amongst Europe’s second-tier fleet.”477 This remarkable decline can, for the most part, be ascribed to the austere financial environment during the decade following the Soviet dissolution in which the defense budget plummeted from 2.5 percent to 1.5 percent of GDP as Figure 17 shows. At the same time, the Royal Danish Navy was heavily invested in replacing its submarine and surface fleet. Four new Walrus-class submarines and eight Karel Doorman, or ‘M’-class frigates entered service between 1990 and 1998.478 In addition, the Rotterdam amphibious transport ship (a joint

474 An interesting article from the President of Thales Nederland can be found in: Arno Peels, “New Thinking in Netherlands Defense,” Military Technology, Vol. 25, 12 (2001): 93-96. 475 Harboe-Hansen, “Modernisation,” 93. 476 Waters, “Europe 2010,” 98. 477 Ibid. 478 The Karel Doorman-class is described in more detail in Chant, Kriegsschiffe, 79. 141 project between Spain’s E.N. Bazán and Netherlands’ Royal Schelde) was commissioned in 1998 and provided the Navy with the ability to deploy a battalion of marines from a single ship.479 (It goes without saying that the financial investments during that time were substantial.) Such capabilities, as has been pointed out, also allow naval forces to participate in multinational peacekeeping operations, as well as to project military power over great distances. Accordingly, the Commander in Chief of the Royal Netherlands Navy, Vice Admiral Luuk Kroon identified such tasks as the primary function of the Armed forces:

In order to fulfill these primary tasks [of crisis management as well as national and allied territorial defense] the Dutch armed force will be capable of: Maintaining a capacity for simultaneous participation in a maximum of four peacekeeping operations under the aegis of the United Nations or the OSCE. In either case the contribution will have the size of a battalion, or equivalent; [as well as maintaining] rapidly deployable assets in peacetime for the protection of the NATO treaty area and for adequate contribution to peace-enforcing operations.480

Admiral Kroon also stressed that although the new security environment the Navy found itself in “has its impact on the RNLN, the structure of the Navy [would] be unaffected.”481 Almost twenty years on, his predictions have long been forgotten in Dutch naval quarters. Initially however, only small reductions in the fleet’s size were made while the organizational structure was rearranged, shedding some unnecessary ballast in the process. Furthermore, a somewhat more upbeat financial development at the end of the 1990s provided the Armed Forces with an additional NLG 50 million (around €20 million) in funding.482 The two Tromp-class destroyers and four Kortenaer frigates were scheduled for withdrawal and, at the same time, the four new De Zeven Provinciën air defense frigates were laid down while further modernization to the fleet’s ageing ships and aircraft seemed to be secured. The acquisition of a second LPD as well as the procurement of the new NH-90 helicopter by 2007 was also put forward in the Dutch Defense White Paper in 2000.483 However, in hindsight, the principle goals of the white paper, namely to increase the Armed Forces’ combat readiness and ability to sustain power projection operations over longer periods of time, were probably

479 Two units of these ships were ordered by the Spanish Government as the Galicia-class. Up to 611 marines and their equipment can be embarked. See: Ibid., 88. 480 Luuk Kroon, “Roles, Missions and Force Structure of the Royal Netherlands Navy,” Naval Forces, Special Issue (1996): 4. 481 Ibid., 6. 482 Ministry of Defence, Summary of the Defence White Paper 2000 (The Hague, 2000). 1. 483 Ibid., 18. 142 overly optimistic and could only be met to a limited degree under the given fiscal restriction and political myopia.484 Marcial Hernandez of the American Enterprise Institute provides some insight into the momentous decline of the Netherlands’ Armed Forces throughout the last decade.

[W]ith the exception of the bump in the Dutch base defense budget in 2001, the increase in defense expenditures has largely gone to Dutch operations needs connected with the Netherlands’ deployment to Afghanistan. With the base defense budget […] remaining essentially flat until [2014] and with the government’s [recent decision] to cut planned defense spending substantially, the result is a Dutch military that falls well short of the 2000 white paper’s goals.485

A brief glance at the military force structure is telling. In 1990 the Dutch Army had 468 Leopard 1 and 445 Leopard 2 main battle tanks. Now the army has nil – having sold its remaining units to Finland in 2014.486 The air force has lost more than half of its F-16 fighters

Illustration 24: The backbone of the future Royal Netherlands Navy: The large Holland-class offshore patrol vessel, the Karel Doorman multi-purpose support ship and, the Zeven Provinciën frigate from left to right. Despite these additions the Dutch Navy will be relatively less capable than two decades ago.

484 NMoD, Paper 2000, 1-24. 485 Marcial Hernandez, “Dutch Hard Power: Choosing Decline,” American Enterprise Institute, 3 April, (2013): np. http://www.aei.org/publication/dutch-hard-power-choosing-decline/. 486 Bonsignore, “Finland,” Military Technology. The World Defense Almanac 1990, Issue 1 (1990): 116-117. “Finland is Buying Dutch Leopards for €200 Million,” DefenseUpdate, 19 January, 2014. http://defense-update.com/20140119_finland_buys_dutch_leopards.html#.VQSkpuFY5ew. 143 and the Navy was stripped of all its P-3C maritime patrol aircraft. Last but not least, the Navy’s escort fleet has been reduced from 15 frigates and destroyers to a total of merely six ships.487 This process has been accompanied by a reduction of the active-duty force from 103,000 to 53,300 by 2014. Alone since 2011 over 12,000 jobs have been cut. That such measures will have long-term effects on the Netherlands’ military capabilities should be evident even to the most casual observer. Before we dismiss the Netherlands’ naval capabilities outright, let us take a look at the latest additions to the Navy over the last decade. Firstly, the decommissioning of all but two Karel Doorman-class frigates (two were sold to Belgium with which the Netherlands have a joint defense agreement488) left a large gap in the Navy’s escort fleet. This gap has partly been filled by introducing De Zeven Provinciën-class air defense frigates, formally known as the LCF (Luchtverdedigings en Commando Fregat). The trilateral cooperation between Spain (F- 100), Germany (F-124) and the Netherlands (LCF) has been discussed at length. The ships’ capabilities are largely on par with the two foreign designs and can be considered among the best frigates in service today. In contrast to the Spanish Álvaro-de Bazán-class, which uses the Aegis combat system, the Dutch ships rely on the SEWACO IX combat system as well as the APAR and SMART-L radars, all built by Thales. The above-mentioned upgrades to the long- range radar in order to track (and engage) ballistic missiles are underway and scheduled to be completed by 2017.489 Akin to the decisions of Germany, Spain and Denmark, the Dutch government has not shown any intention to buy the Standard SM-3 missile, rather relying on U.S. ABM-capable ships in the region. These four ships, however, represent the only possible high-tier alternative to the Navy’s air defense destroyers. Secondly, based on “NATO’s perspective of naval operations and […] on the views of [the Netherlands’] main Allies [the U.S., U.K., and Belgium]”490 the Royal Dutch Navy continued to enhance its amphibious capabilities in order to deploy brigade-sized elements in high-intensity operations.491 The 28,000 ton Karel Doorman is arguably the most obvious result of this effort. Fighting an uphill battle against unabated defense cuts during the height

487 Hernandez, “Dutch Power,” n.p. 488 The defense agreement was established in July 1994 between the two states. The Belgian naval staff is integrated with the Dutch staff at Den Helder (NL). Although a commemorable effort among two European neighbors, the crux, despite a closer cooperation, remains that ultimately “command of each nation’s ships, however, remains with their respective national government. Each government reserves the right to deploy their ships independently, for instance for operations in former colonies. Dutch warships remain homeported in Zeebrugge and den Helder, respectively and the Belgian Navy will keep a command centre in Zeebrugge for its own national tasks.” See Guy A. H. Toremans, “Belgian-Dutch Naval Cooperation,” Naval Forces, Vol. 15, 6 (1994): 18-24. 489 Wertheim, Combat Fleets, 475-476 490 Ministry of Defence, Netherlands Defence Doctrine (The Hague: Defense Staff, 2005): 6. 491 Ibid., 39, Footnote 25. 144 of the European economic crisis, the completion of the Karel Doorman was under question as Waters points out: “[A]dditional reductions in defense spending revealed in September 2013 [threatened] to see the new JSS joint support ship […] sold before she had even entered into service.”492 Fortunately this pending decision was revoked and she formally entered service in 2014, adding power projection and HADR capabilities to the Dutch fleet. The third, high profile acquisition was the four Holland-class patrol vessels commissioned between 2011 and 2013. At a total displacement of 3,750 tons, these ships exhibit characteristic features of the current trend towards larger and more sophisticated offshore patrol vessels. Though being lightly armed, these new OPVs are well-suited for their respective mission environment. In fact, designed for low-intensity operations, they constitute the “workhorse of the maritime security mission.”493 With no need for expensive long-range weapon systems and powerful propulsion for sustained high speeds, they are far cheaper to build. Moreover, the systems onboard the latest OPV’s, such as the Holland-class, are specifically designed to conduct anti-terrorism, anti-piracy and other constabulary tasks on the high seas.494 Deploying an exorbitantly expensive air defense destroyer to stop and search a rogue motorboat in the Gulf of Aden, despite being common practice, does not represent the most efficient way of doing things. Therefore, the new patrol boats offer the Royal Dutch Navy much needed capabilities in low-threat environments. Conversely however, they do not qualify as ‘first-rate’ warships. Therefore, they also cannot provide the necessary deterrent and operational advantages a ship of similar size but heavier armament, such as former frigates (Karel Doorman) could.495 Considering the Netherlands’ self-imposed liabilities and the country’s continued effort to play an active role in multinational operations across the intensity spectrum, the decision to reduce the escort fleet to only six frigates can rightfully be viewed with reservation.

Since 1990, the size and capability of the Royal Dutch Navy has decreased substantially. While a similar development can be observed in nearly all other Western navies, over the last two decades successive Dutch governments have failed to successfully adapt to the post-Cold War security environment. As of now, the Dutch military and its naval branch are both smaller and less well-balanced than their equivalent twenty-five years ago.496 Despite

492 Waters, “Europe 2015,” 70. 493 Joris Janssen Lok, “On the Beat: Robust Ocean Patrol Vessels Maintain Law and Order on the Seas,” Defense Technology International, Nov. (2007): 33-39. 494 Operational environment include the North Sea, Atlantic, Caribbean and waters near their former colonies. 495 See Wertheim, Combat Fleets, 476. 496 This was predicted by a RAND study conducted in 2012. See Larrabee, Austerity, 52. 145 efforts to cooperate more closely with other NATO allies and to restructure its naval forces and military administration, these measures were not sufficient to outweigh the negative effects the fiscal restraints have had on the Armed Forces. This is not to say that the Netherlands should return to their former war footing, given the general security the country enjoys. “Obviously, no one expects the Netherlands to sustain a military the size and character of the one it had during the height of the Cold War”,497 Marcial Hernandez makes clear. However, a country with the fourth highest GDP per capita in Europe,498 which spends more than 50 percent of its budget on health care and social services,499 it can be argued, should be expected to allocate a little more than 1.4 percent to its national defense. However, according to a poll from 2012 a mere 8 percent of the Dutch population considers an increase in defense spending necessary.500 That the Netherlands are inevitably dependent on the security of the global SLOCs in order to maintain their wealth was pointed out at the beginning of the chapter but does not seem to strike a chord with the Dutch people and their leaders. More than in other states, the prosperity of Dutch citizens depends on the unimpeded flow of commerce to and from its ports. A slight hiatus in the global supply chain could possibly have detrimental effects on a country that is so dependent on the sea. However, making a case for increasing the navy’s capabilities in order to better protect the nation’s interests at sea would be an honorable yet futile effort in any election campaign.

497 Hernandez, “Dutch Power,” np. 498 Only Luxemburg, Norway and Switzerland, have a higher per capita GDP. 499 Hernandez, “Dutch Power,” np 500 Ibid. 146

11) FINLAND, SWEDEN, NORWAY: Scandinavian Navies Sticking to their Guns

Figure 19 Finland: Defense Spending in % of GDP 2 1,8 1,6

1,4

1,2 1 Military Spending

0,8 % ofGDP % 0,6 0,4 0,2 0

1990-2013, Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database

Figure 19

Figure 20 Sweden: Defense Spending in % of GDP 3

2,5

2

1,5 Military Spending % ofGDP % 1

0,5

0

1990-2013, Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database

Figure 20

147

Figure 21 Sweden: Number of Major Vessels Sources: The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, Military Technology Almanac, World Naval Review

14 12 10 8 6 4 2 Number ofVessels Number 0 1990 2000 2014 Aircraft Carriers 0 0 0 Large Surface Combatants 0 0 5 Submarines 12 9 5 Assault/Amphibious 0 0 0

Figure 21

Figure 22 Norway: Defense Spending in % of GDP 3,5 3

2,5

2 Military Spending

1,5 % ofGDP % 1 0,5 0

1990-2013, Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database

Figure 22

148

Figure 23 Norway: Number of Major Vessels Sources: The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, Military Technology Almanac, World Naval Review

12

10 8 6 4

2 Number ofVessels Number 0 1990 2000 2014 Aircraft Carriers 0 0 0 Large Surface Combatants 5 5 11 Submarines 11 10 6 Assault/Amphibious 0 0 0

Figure 23

The three Scandinavian countries described in this chapter provide a good example of how smaller European navies have successfully adapted to the changes in the global security environment since the end of the Cold War. Although the graphs above indicate a steady decrease in the countries’ defense budgets, the navies of Norway, Sweden and, to a somewhat lesser extent, Finland are far more capable than twenty-five years ago. Unlike some of their European partners, the governments in Oslo, Stockholm, and Helsinki have not succumbed to the general fallacy that the end of the Cold War has heralded an age of reduced threats and hence reduced needs. On the contrary, the political and military leaders of the three countries have made wise choices in the recent past in how to best modernize their fleets under the current fiscal conditions. Defense cooperation has been stressed at least to the same extent as the development of leap-ahead technologies. As a result, Finland maintains a relatively small flotilla of fast-attack craft and minehunters, sufficient in size to provide a respectable degree of defensive capabilities, while the navies of Norway and Sweden unquestionably rank among the most powerful and innovative small navies in the world. A major reason not to include Denmark in this chapter, but rather to draw comparisons between the Dutch and Danish navies, is founded in each state’s underlying strategic doctrine. As has been repeatedly pointed out, many European navies underwent a fundamental strategic reorientation after the close of the Cold War. The principle of sea-control, so it seemed, was slowly being replaced by the idea of expeditionary operations in the littorals of distant regions

149 of crisis. Both Denmark and the Netherlands made what they believed were necessary adjustments to their defense policies and built large (and expensive) warships capable of conducting amphibious operations, but consequently had to cede other capabilities in return. None of the other Scandinavian states pursued such a course in the aftermath of the Soviet breakup. Geographic realities, arguably, trumped the idea of expeditionary peace-keeping in distant regions of the world; a concept which, in fact, has already been called into question as of late.

11.1) Finland

Finland has one of the smallest naval forces of all the European states who have access to the ocean. One reason for this is that Finland is it demographics. Much of its territory is covered by lakes and its geographic location between the 60th and 70th latitudes has encouraged most of the 5.5 million inhabitants to live in the southern municipalities. Finland’s economy is heavily dependent on its wood industry and its electronics and machinery sector. However, the country is only ranked 41 in the world in total GDP and creates 250 billion less per year than Norway and roughly 300 billion less than Sweden.501 What is more, up until 1990, the size of the Finnish navy was subject to the provisions of the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947. Its fleet was limited to a total displacement of 10,000 tons and was banned from operating submarines and torpedo boats.502 Given its strategy of territorial defense503 no drastic changes were made to the fleet structure after the end of the Cold War. As a non-aligned state it maintained a military force of both western and eastern equipment. Manfred Sadlowski makes a point in stating “[w]hat is different in Finland from other countries [is] the fact that Finland […] is a bridge between Eastern, Northern and Western Europe.”504 In accordance with its political stance and its defense-oriented strategy, the Finnish Navy largely operated small corvettes, guided missile patrol boats and mine warfare vessels in the shallow waters of the Baltic Sea. Four of these small attack craft were the 250 ton

501 “List of countries by GDP nominal,” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_%28nominal%29. 502 Prézelin, Combat Fleets, 129-130. Also see Corporal Frisk, “Where are the Finnish Submarines?” Corporal Frisk Wordpress, 3 January, 2015. https://corporalfrisk.wordpress.com/2015/01/03/where-are-the-finnish-submarines/. 503 As stated by the Finnish Minster of Defense. See Anneli Taina “National Defence Vitally Important to Finland,” Military Technology: Special Supplement: Defence In Finland, Vol. 22, 6 (1998): 3 504 Manfred Sadlowski “What is different from Finland,” Military Technology: Special Supplement: Defence In Finland, Vol. 22, 6 (1998): 2. 150

Helsinki-class boats built during the 1980s which were armed with highly potent, RBS-15 long-range anti-ship missiles from Saab Bofors Sweden. Interestingly, the four Soviet-design Osa II-class, attack craft were armed with the famous Styx anti-ship missile providing a nice comparison between the capabilities of the early era Soviet anti-ship missile and the state-of- the-art Swedish design. Throughout the 1990s, the Finnish government strengthened its cooperation with many of its neighbors. “For obvious geographic and historical reasons, one of our special goals is to promote the development and expansion of Nordic cooperation […] in defence material”, Eero Lavonon stated.505 Finnish maritime forces also participated in joint exercises with NATO forces and the Russian Navy, while its army contributed to U.N. peacekeeping missions, for example in the Golan Heights. By the turn of the millennium the Finnish Ministry of Defense announced that “[e]quipment procurement in the Navy [would] focus on replacing essential vessels and improving the mobility of coastal defence.”506 Four stealth Rauma 2000 patrol craft were added to the fleet while the recent additions to the Navy, such as the Hämeenmaa-class minelayers and Helsinki II-class attack craft were steadily upgraded. With Europe enjoying a period of peace increased cooperation with the Russian Federation, the MoD saw little need in making adjustments to its defense posture. As a non-aligned state, Finland did not participate in many recent U.S.-led combat operations,507 nor was the country affected by the growing instability surrounding the Mediterranean, although a growing number of fugitives have been seeking refuge in Scandinavian countries. Strategic territorial defense remained a valid concept as the 2004 Defense White Paper underscores: “The Navy must be able to compile and maintain a recognized maritime picture, conduct surveillance of territorial integrity, repel any violations of territorial integrity, protect sea lines of communication and repel attacks from the sea in cooperation with the other services.”508 More recent events, however, have caused alarm among the Finnish government and military brass. Russia’s incursion into Georgia in 2009 can be considered a turning point in the hitherto quite amicable relationship between the European states and Russia. Finland’s

505 Eero Lavonen, “Finland’s International Cooperation For Defence Material,” Military Technology: Special Supplement: Defence In Finland, Vol. 22, 6 (1998): 6. 506 “Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2001: Report by the Government to Parliament.” 13 June (2001): 50. 507 Finland did send around 100 peacekeepers to Afghanistan. See “Finland’s participation in NATO-led crisis management operations,” Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=115832&contentlan=2&culture=en-US. 508 Prime Minister’s Office. Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2004: Government Report 6/2004, (Prime Minister’s Office Publications, 2004): 112. 151 strained history and its long border with the Russian juggernaut provided sufficient reason for Finland to reevaluate its national defense policy.

When it comes to Finland’s security environment, the most important questions relate to Russia’s political and economic stability and to the evolution of its international relations. Russia has political, economic and military interests in our neighbouring areas. Russia’s most stable neighbouring areas border on Finland and other countries in Northern Europe. Still, the possibility of change in the security situation of our neighbouring areas cannot be excluded, nor can the possibility of armed aggression or the threat thereof. During the Georgia crisis Russia demonstrated that it is willing and able to use military force in defending its interests. The crisis may have created long- term tensions in Europe, further complicating security cooperation. The crisis in Georgia also demonstrated that events even far from us can impinge on the EU-Russia relationship and thereby also affect Finland [emphasis in the original].509

With Russia showing aggressive irredentism – annexing Crimea and supporting the secessionist movement in Ukraine – it is likely that Finland will be encouraged to strengthen its ties with the West. Already now its close defense cooperation with Norway, Sweden, Denmark and the Baltic states (all apart from Sweden are NATO members and, save Norway, all are part of the E.U.) has secured numerous defense arrangements with the respective countries and institutions. “For example, Finland gains access to strategic airlift capabilities through a collaborative arrangement that encompasses ten NATO nations, Sweden and Finland.”510 Moreover, Finland has also pledged to support the European Rapid Reaction Force as part of the “mutual assistance obligation and the solidarity clause.”511 In comparison to other European armed forces, so far Finland, however, has for the most part only been able to deploy its Army for “crisis management operations.”512 In the future, the capability of her sister services, the Navy and the Air Force, will have to be expanded, in order to satisfy the need of power projection by air and sea.513 In general, the future for the Finnish Armed Forces looks quite promising. Close cooperation with its larger European partners will compensate for some of the shortcomings the country’s military, in particular its navy suffer from. Moreover, there are tentative plans to expand naval capabilities by building a class of larger surface combatants. This seems to be a

509 PMO. Defense 2009, 66-67. 510 Ibid., 113. A more general description of the collaboration can be found in NATO, “NATO’s relations with Finland,” March 4, 2015. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49594.htm. 511 PMO, Defense 2009, 109. 512 Ibid., 113. 513 Ibid. 152 wise decision, considering Finland’s exposed geographic position and the need to entertain capable armed forces in order to provide credible deterrence. Unfortunately, the continuation of a relatively low level of defense spending would likely cut short any effort to create a more robust Finnish Navy in the near future.

11.2) Sweden

In October of 2014, a number of eye-witnesses reported suspicious underwater activity near the Stockholm archipelago. In the days that followed the Swedish military conducted one of the largest submarine hunts since the end of the Cold War. To date, the identity of what was believed Illustration 25: Almost surreal looking, the Visby-class provides the Swedish Navy with increased brown and blue-water capabilities. to be a small submarine remains a mystery. This incident, however, came at a time of increased tensions between Europe and Russia due to the forceful annexation of Crimea and Russian support to the separatists in eastern Ukraine. Western media was quick to point to Russia’s aggressive naval buildup as the logical source of the incursion. Be it as it may, the incident provided the Swedish Armed Forces with an opportunity to display its credible naval capabilities. For over three decades, the Royal Swedish Navy has gone to great lengths to build and maintain a small but highly capable fleet. Similar to Finland, Sweden cannot look to any allies for help in case of war514 but has to be able to defend its territory and people on its own. As a result, the country’s national defense strategy has relied on the same strategic principle as its

514 Armed neutrality has a long history in Sweden. In particular during the Cold War, the Swedish government made a case to portray itself as a beacon of peace between the two blocks. However, secretly political reassurances were made with NATO for the case of war. “[I]n Sweden’s case, the official interpretation of the Cold War is not the whole story. Official armed neutrality was complemented by secret bilateral cooperation with the United States and select NATO countries that guaranteed Western support in case of a war with the Soviet Union. That duality worked for a long time, and Sweden’s political elites has been comfortable seeking security through informal bilateral ties to the United States and other European countries, rather than through official membership in NATO.” Jan Joel Andersson, “Nordic NATO. Why It’s Time for Finland and Sweden to Join the Alliance,” Foreign Affairs, April 30, 2012. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141377/jan-joel-andersson/nordic-nato. 153 neighbors to the east and west; namely territorial defense. The Navy’s job over the larger part of the Cold War had been to defend the country from aggression from the sea. For that purpose the fleet was conceived as a sea denial force. Even after the end of this monumental conflict, the Navy remained focused on protecting Sweden from invasion. While other European nations were quickly lulled to sleep by the ostensible economic benefits of the peace-dividend, the Swedes remained vigilant. This attitude is reflected in the remarks of Vice Admiral Peter Nordbeck in an interview from 1996. Although the Chief of the Swedish Navy pointed out that, at the time, there was no direct threat to Swedish sovereignty, caution was well advised:

The fact remains […] that Europe is still resolving many areas of conflict and that all nations do indeed value military strength to support their international security politics. Therefore we cannot, within the foreseeable future, neglect the risks of war and that Sweden could be subject to an armed aggression. [The] main task for the Swedish Armed Forces is to demonstrate such a wartime operations capability that it deters an aggressor from planning or executing any armed attack against our country.515

With these directives in mind, the Swedish Navy was designed to “[1] deny the aggressor secure sea lines of communication to Sweden; [2] establish full control over [Swedish] territorial waters; and [3] defend [Swedish] ports and naval bases.”516 To understand the evolution of the Swedish naval forces we have to go further back in time, to another fateful naval incident that occurred in October 1981. Hans Harboe-Hansen observes, “Seldom has a single peacetime event had such profound an impact on the development of a navy”.517 Supposedly having lost its ability to navigate, the Soviet S-363 Whiskey-class submarine ran aground only ten kilometers from a Swedish naval base. To many, the ‘Whiskey on the Rocks’ incident provided evidence that the Soviet Union was regularly conducting illegal intrusions into Swedish territorial waters. As a result, a vigorous effort was made to modernize the Swedish fleet. In particular, the Navy’s anti-submarine warfare capabilities were to be enhanced and also a more balanced approach towards ASuW and MCM capabilities was conceived. New submarines and larger corvettes were to

515 Admiral Peter Nordbeck interviewed by Naval Forces, “Preparing the Navy For the Next Century,” Naval Forces Special Issue: The Royal Swedish Navy – Today and Tomorrow 2 (1996): 5. 516 Ibid. 517 Hans Harboe-Hansen, “Swedish Naval Trends and Programmes,” Military Technology, Vol. 17, 12 (1993): 20. 154 complement sophisticated sea denial network composed of underwater acoustic sensors, minefield, and coastal artillery.518 By 1990 the Swedish Navy had evolved into an effective fighting force, operating within the confined waters of the Baltic Sea and adjacent North Sea. Its domestically produced submarine fleet consisted of four new Västergötland-class, three Näcken-class, and five older, but still capable, Sjöormen-class submarines. Pioneering the

Illustration 26: Territorial defense has been a principal part of concept of air independent Norway, Sweden, and Finland’s strategic planning during larger parts of the Cold War. Coastal guns, such as this one near propulsion, the Kockums Stockholm, are a reminder of this doctrine. shipbuilder in Malmö installed an additional Stirling closed-cycle diesel engine into a six- meter hull extension onboard the Näcken. This not only enabled the boat to carry out operations at much lower acoustic levels, but increased the time it could stay submerged to almost two weeks.519 The surface fleet consisted of nearly three dozen fast-attack craft, armed with torpedoes, Saab RBS-15 SSMs, the Norwegian Penguin Mk2 SSM, as well as 57mm Bofors guns. The RBS-15 was a fire and forget weapon and therefore no large ship-borne target illuminators had to be installed. Moreover, the Navy was designed to operate under the umbrella of the Swedish Air Force; hence anti-aircraft weapon systems (apart from the Bofors gun which could also be used against aerial threats)520 were also considered superfluous. As a result warships could be rather small in size and because the Navy was designed to operate close to Sweden’s coast, none of the ships needed a powerful propulsion system for high speed transitions over long distances. Worth noting is Sweden’s maritime intelligence gathering effort. Few navies, especially not small ones, are willing to invest their money in ships specifically designed to

518 For more information see Harboe-Hansen, “Trends,” 20-24. Also see Torbjörn Hultman, “Reforming the Swedish Navy,” Military Technology: Special Supplement: Defence Procurement in Sweden – FMV: The Swedish Defence Materiel Administration, (1993): 62-71. 519 Chris Bishop (ed.), The Encyclopedia of World Sea Power. A comprehensive Encyclopedia of the World’s Navies and their Warships (London: Guild Publishing, 1988): 52. 520 Explained in more detail in Bishop, Encyclopedia, 239. 155 conduct intelligence operations, i.e. collecting signal intelligence. In most cases regular naval vessels are assigned with such duties. Submarines, for example, lend themselves particularly well for conducting intelligence operations, as they can operate almost unimpeded and gain vital information regarding the enemy’s strength, movement and intent. In some cases submarines were also used to tap or cut underwater communication cables.521 However, it goes without saying that despite their cost, specialized vessels will be more effective in conducting these tasks. Thereby, the Orion intelligence gathering ship is one of very few such vessels in service among European navies. Based on the experiences gained with the Sterling propulsion in the Näcken, three AIP Gotland-class submarines were delivered to the Royal Swedish Navy in the later 1990s, underpinning the already renowned underwater capabilities. In his interview Admiral Nordbeck expands on the new class’ capabilities:

[T]he greatest threat against conventional submarines occur when they are forced to snort when charging their batteries. With the Gotland class we are receiving the first non-experimental AIP conventional submarine in the world. In combination with the diesel-electric machinery we are doubling the operational time at sea. [However this] is no reason to reduce the total […] number of submarines […].522

The second major procurement project underway in the early years of the new millennium was the YS2000 corvette. This radically different type of surface combatant can rightfully be described as a leap-ahead naval ship design. Already preliminary drawings of the ship hinted at the uncompromising application of state-of-the-art technology. Unlike the ships she would replace, the YS2000 would break new ground in nearly all areas of naval shipbuilding. Signature reduction across the entire spectrum lies at the heart of the corvette’s clean but sharp lines. Water jets, powered by a combined diesel or gas (CODOG) propulsion system, enables the ship to reach sprint speeds of up to 35 knots while long-duration missions are also possible at lower speeds. Substantial automation has also reduced the size of the crew. This is an important factor on a ship that displaced no more than 650 tons fully loaded. Despite the relative scarcity of space, “[t]he living conditions and accommodation provided for the complement of six officers, twenty petty officers and seventeen ratings is excellent”523, Toremans points out. “This is partly a reflection of the specialist nature of the crew,” he goes on, “who have to maintain high standards of efficiency and flexibility to operate and

521 Parry, Highway, 47. 522 Nordbeck, “Next Century,” 5-6. 523 Guy Toremans, “Significant Ships: Sweden’s Visby Class Corvettes: Stealth at All Levels,” in Seaforth World Naval Review 2012, ed. Conrad Waters (South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2011): 161. 156 understand multi-task software and to handle extremely complicated instruments and sensors.”524 The sensor and weapon suit of each vessel is impressive to say the least. Most systems on board are of Swedish design. The ship’s Sea Giraffe radar, for example, is built by Saab Systems, as well as the CEROS 200 fire-control director (also by Saab) which is necessary to direct the Bofors 57mm/70 Mk3 cannon. The gun is mounted in a stealth turret in order to minimize the ship’s radar cross section. Additional AAW capabilities have been tentatively planned for the future. However, for the moment, the reported price tag of $150 million for five South African Umkhonto SAM systems seems too high for the MoD to proceed with the purchase.525 Significant air defense capabilities will be necessary once the Visby-class ships increase their deployments further away from home. With the proliferation of advanced sea skimming anti-ship missiles in many regions of the world, “[s]uch a capability is an essential requirement for the Royal Swedish Navy if it is to participate in international naval activities.”526 The main reason to include the Visby-class in the graph above (although it cannot be classified as a ‘large surface combatant’ per se) is founded on the ship’s ability to effectively operate in littoral waters, as well as on the open seas, as Commander Erik Uhren remarks: “[The latest improvement, which include a sonar system and landing system for Lynx helicopter] are intended to allow the corvettes to participate in EU and NATO task groups on ‘out-of-area’ operations and exercises.”527 Its modular design enables it to quickly adapt to any new threat that might arise and will give these multi-purpose surface combatants sufficient room to grow in the future. As we have heard, cooperation between Sweden and its neighbor has grown significantly over the last two decades. As mentioned, the Nordic defense cooperation between the Scandinavian countries (which includes Iceland) has been greatly expanded and although the NORDEFCO is based on “a cooperation structure, not a command structure”528 a very high degree of political and military collaboration has been achieved. Moreover, the Swedish defense policy has highlighted the need to increase the Armed Forces’ participation in international operations and to provide significant capabilities to the European Rapid

524 Toremans, “Visby,” 161. 525 Leon Engelbrecht, “Fact file: Denel Dynamics Umkhonto naval short-range surface-to-air missile,” defenseWeb, 3 November 2008. http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=610. 526 Guy Toremans, „Sweden’s High Speed Stealthy V-Force,” Warships, Jan (2014): 31. 527 Commander Erik Uhren quoted in Ibid., 30. 528 Quote from the official website: “The basics about NORDEFCO,” Nordic Defense Cooperation. http://www.nordefco.org/The-basics-about-NORDEFCO. 157

Reaction Force.529 Of particular interest in this context is Sweden’s defense cooperation with Finland. Already outlined in the defense white paper ten years ago,530 Sweden’s Defense Minister, Karin Enström, reiterated this fruitful effort in a recent interview with Defence News:“As regards defense cooperation between Sweden and Finland, both countries signed an action plan for deepened cooperation in May [2014]. This plan aims at increasing capabilities and efficiency through combined use of resources, increased interoperability and a closer dialogue on common challenges.”531 Moreover, Sweden is strengthening its partnership with the Baltic States and, consequently, also with NATO in general. Although public support for joining the Alliance remains well below the 50 percent margin, this step remains a matter of discussion, not least because of Russia’s recent military action.532 Currently, Swedish forces are already contributing to NATO operations as part of the Partnership for Peace initiative and can be rightfully considered “NATO’s most active and most capable partner”.533 Moreover, Jan Joel Anderson also points to the fact, that “[m]any in the political and military establishments in Sweden and Finland have grown increasingly positive about the idea.”534 Ultimately, however, any such decision will have to stem from popular support among each country’s citizens, the majority of which remains skeptical towards the issue. Despite some analysts’ remarks that Sweden’s admission into NATO is a “no- brainer”,535 it is still not likely that the country will join NATO in the near future. Consequently, the Swedish Armed Forces will continue to invest in their robust navy to protect the country’s territorial integrity and increase its participation in multinational peace- keeping operations. In contrast to many other countries, Sweden has shown no interest in building an amphibious capability worth noting. Should the Swedes, however, become more engaged internationally, the need is likely to arise to create an even more balanced fleet. Costly provisions would have to be made to effectively project power over great distances as well to entertain a fleet capable of conducting sea-denial and sea-control.

529 Government Offices of Sweden, Swedish Government Bill 2004/05:5, Our Future Defence – The focus of Swedish defence policy 2005-2007 (2004): 13. 530 Ibid., 14. 531 Karin Enström interviewed by Defense News, “Interview Karin Enström. Sweden’s Defense Minister,” Defence News, 18 August (2014), 22. 532 Viribus Unitis, “Nordic NATO Nominees,” CIMSEC, 9 May, 2014. http://cimsec.org/nordic-nato-nominees/11192. 533 In fact, Sweden was the only country not part of the Arab League or NATO to participate in enforcing the no- fly zone over Libya in 2011. “Sweden sends eight fighter jets to Libya,” The Swedish Wire, 29 March, 2011. http://www.swedishwire.com/politics/9146-sweden-sends-eight-fighter-jets-to-libya. 534 Andersson, “Nordic NATO,” np. 535 Ibid., np. 158

For the time being, small but important steps are being made to steadily modernize the existing force. The introduction of two new A-26-class submarines is scheduled for the end of the decade, while the latest fitting of mine-clearance equipment onboard the Visby-class will contribute to the Navy’s mine warfare capabilities. In addition, $40 million are being allocated towards the procurement of a new SIGINT ship to replace the ageing Orion.536 With defense spending reaching an all-time low in 2014, the Swedish government has recently announced that is willing to invest over 700 million dollars over the next five years in order to strengthen its armed forces.537 It is fair to say that in the near term Sweden’s defense industry will be able to maintain its technical prowess and innovative naval craftsmanship and thus will allow the Royal Swedish Navy to live up to the high standards it has set itself.

11.3) Norway

The last navy that will be discussed in detail in this thesis is the Royal Norwegian Navy. From a naval perspective, the defense of Norway would have provided a litmus test for the United States’ effort to repel a Soviet attack on the West during the Cold War. Even if the initial thrust of the Red Army through central Europe could have been stopped, or at least slowed down, the European allies were dependent on reinforcements Illustration 27: The destructive firepower of anti-ship missiles has been demonstrated in a number of live-firing exercises by the from America via the strategic Norwegian Navy. lines of communication across the Atlantic to win a possible war of attrition against a numerically superior enemy. The Soviet’s Navy, so it was feared, would utilize their large submarine fleet to rush out from their sea bastion at the Kola Peninsula and raise havoc among the convoys crossing the Atlantic. While the U.S. Maritime Strategy during the 1970s had focused on the protection of these convoys and envisioned small carriers (such as the Principe de Asturias later built by

536 Gerard O’Dwyer, “Norway, Sweden Spending Billions To Secure Surrounding Seas,” Defence News, October 17 (2011): 19. 537 Charlie Duxbury, “Sweden Plan to Increase Military Spending,” Wall Street Journal, 12 March, 2015. http://www.wsj.com/articles/sweden-plans-to-increase-military-spending-1426198507. 159

Spain) to provide the necessary protection, John Lehman, Secretary of the Navy during the Reagan Administration, decidedly objected to any such defensive plans. Under his auspices, a new American Maritime Strategy was drafted, which was designed to put full-forward pressure on the Soviet Union’s flanks: the Mediterranean and North Sea, (as well as in other theaters of war – such as the Pacific.) Moreover, areas of Soviet sea-control, i.e. the sea- bastions in the High North, would be challenged by the deployment of large elements of U.S. naval forces, directly threatening the Soviet ballistic missile submarines, and thereby relieving pressure from the central front.538 Norway was crucial in this effort, also because Soviet naval forces had to be confined to the waters north of the GIN-gap (Greenland-Iceland-Norway) in order for NATO forces to reinforce the northern and central front.539 In fact, provisions were made for American, Canadian, British, and Danish ground forces to support the Norwegian army against the likely attempt by the Soviet Union to occupy as much of the Norway as possible. To this end, territorial defense lay at the heart of Norwegian defense planning. The concept of territorial defense was also reflected in the composition of the Royal Norwegian Navy (RNoN) at the end of the Cold War. Ten modernized German Type 207 submarines were operational with a class of six Ula (Type 210) boats entering service between 1990 and 1992. The five Oslo-class missile frigates were based on an older U.S. design, and exhibited robust ASW, AAW, and ASuW capabilities. The two Sleipner-class corvettes had been in service were over 35 years old. Although they were “attractively modelled corvettes, [they were] obsolescent even in the coastal protection role,”540 Chant notes. The opposite can be said about many of the Navy’s guided missile patrol craft. Their primary task was to defend the shores from an enemy invasion fleet. In this role alone their highly potent Penguin SSM qualified them as a significant deterrent force. The Norwegian naval shipbuilding industry also invested heavily in mine warfare vessels. A class of air- cushion minesweepers was under construction in the early 1990s representing a first step in Norway’s revolutionary utilization of this technology.541 Even after the seismic shift in world politics that occurred at the end of the Cold War, the aforementioned defensive strategic mindset remained prevalent among Norway’s political and military leaders. From the perspective of Norway’s defense planners, the country would

538 See Watkins, “Strategy 1984,” 69-85. 539 Moreau, “Presentation,” 29. 540 Chant, Ships, 166. 541 Prézelin, Combat Fleets, 401-410. For a more detailed description of the program see the article in Naval Forces: “MICOS – The New Mine Countermeasure Systems for the Royal Norwegian Navy,” Naval Forces Special Issue: Norwegian Naval Forces Today and Tomorrow (1995): 38-42. 160 have to become more self-reliant when it came to national defense, as Admiral Torolf Rein, Chief of Defense of Norway, elaborated in the mid 1990s.

From being situated at a pivotal point of opposed superpower interests, in the eyes of our allies, Norway is in the process of being reduced to an ally of marginal interest, located at the outskirts of the current events. […] With this background I, therefore, do not see any development that entails a fundamental change in the assessment of the challenges our defense forces could be faced with.542

The threat of invasion and the necessary provisions to “prevent an enemy from quickly gaining a foothold on Norwegian soil”543 continued to dictate the shape of the Royal Norwegian Navy. Although the defense budget had been reduced considerably by the mid-1990s, the size of the fleet remained largely intact. More importantly, however, as Admiral Rein stressed at the time, was the quality of the fighting force. “For the Navy [this meant that] the maintenance of a high quality submarine [and surface] force [was] essential for [Norway’s] ability to counter an amphibious assault and to prevent enemy naval domination of [her] territorial waters.”544 Consequently, weapon systems were continuously upgraded and naval personnel kept at a high level of readiness.545 In regard to its territory, a brief look at a map of Norway will allow us to easily identify the country’s inherent strategic vulnerabilities. While the southern tip is 1750 km from the northern shores, most of its territory only expands a few hundred kilometers inland from the coast. The Norwegian hinterland is largely dominated by rough mountainous terrain, thus forcing the population to live close to the sea. Moreover, the few land lines of communication, running from north to south would be under jeopardy in the case of war. This means that the “coastal Sea Lines of Communication are of the utmost importance […] and protecting [them] is therefore one of the major missions of the RNoN.”546 In order to protect the SLOCs a new class of frigates was to be delivered to the Navy between 2004 and 2010. After the Oslo (F-300) had run aground and sunk in 1994, only four ships of the Oslo-class were in service in 2000 and all were reaching the end of their service

542 Torolf Rein, “The Quality of Our Forces Remains a Primary Condition,” Naval Forces Special Issue: Norwegian Naval Forces Today and Tomorrow (1995): 4. 543 Ibid. 544 Ibid. 545 During the Cold War Norwegian forces were at a constant alert readiness of less than 30 min. See Kjell Amund Prytz interviewed by Naval Forces, “The Way Ahead,” Naval Forces Special Issue: Norwegian Naval Forces Today and Tomorrow (1995): 18. 546 Rein, “Quality,” 4. 161 life. Their successors were planned to be far larger (4,900 tons compared to 1,670 tons) and also far more capable in all areas of warfare. Initially, proposals from three different manufacturers were considered, but in the end, Spain’s Empresa Nacional Bazán (now Navantia) was awarded with the $1.6 billion contract to build five ships.547 Right from the start it was clear that this project would be immensely expensive for a country such as Norway, whose entire yearly defense budget amounted to approximately $5.5 billion.548 In comparison, the most expensive procurement project in the history of the U.S. Navy has been the latest order of ten Virginia-class submarines worth $17.5 billion, while the proposed defense budget for FY2014 was set at over $600 billion.549 While many foreign frigates were either too expensive or did not provide the desired capabilities, the Navy Material Command Norway decided “not to procure an off-the-shelf design from abroad”,550 but instead to buy a ship that satisfied the Navy’s needs. The result of this effort is the five Fridtjof Nansen-class frigates which entered service with only a year’s delay. In comparison to other European frigates, e.g. the Dutch Zeven Provinciën, the German F-124, or the FREMM-class, the Norwegian vessels are somewhat smaller and less heavily armed. However, their sophisticated sensors and combat systems nonetheless make them very capable warships. The Nansen’s design is similar to that of the Spanish Àlvaro de Bazán, which is not surprising considering the fact that both types were designed and built by Navantia. While the Spanish frigate, as we have heard, is the smallest vessel to carry the American SPY-1D radar, the Norwegian frigate, being even smaller, also uses the Lockheed Martin Aegis system. However, it has to rely on a scaled-down version of the radar – the SPY-1F. It could conceivably be used to fire the Standard SM-2 missile, yet only the Evolved Sea Sparrow missile is currently deployed in a single, eight-cells Mk 41 VLS. Furthermore, the ship relies on the Italian Oto Melara 76mm 62 cal gun to engage air, surface and land targets. (Note that many foreign frigates already have larger 127mm guns.) Its hull-mounted sonar is provided by Thales and the new NH-90 helicopter can be deployed for ASW operations in addition to the ship’s Stingray torpedoes. Further space has been reserved for two quad SSM launchers,

547 Baker III, Combat Fleets, 503. 548 See SIPRI Fact Sheet. http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/research/armaments/milex/research/armaments/milex/milex_dat abase. 549 See “General Dynamics Awarded $18 Billion by U.S. Navy for 10 Virginia-Class Submarines,” General Dynamics, April 28, 2014. http://www.generaldynamics.com/news/press-releases/detail.cfm?customel_dataPageID_1811=19222. 550 Eivind Hauger-Johanessen, “The Navy Materiel Command Norway: Facing A Historic Challenge,” Military Technology, Vol. 21, 12 (1997): 37. 162 firing the Kongsberg’s stealthy Naval Strike Missile. Despite having undergone successful testing at last year’s RIMPAC exercise,551 the missile is not yet installed on any of the ships. What is more, no CIWS system has been fitted either. Notwithstanding these shortcomings, the Fridtjof Nansen-class has enabled the Royal Norwegian Navy to become a significantly more effective naval force. Such improvements, however, come with a substantial price tag. At the end of the day, the entire project will have cost more than $2 billion, putting the Navy under substantial financial pressure. Already in 2013, rumors surfaced that the third ship of the class, the Otto Sverdrup, was no longer operational because it was being stripped for spare parts in order to keep the rest of the class in front-line service.552 Arguably, the stagnant defense spending over the last years has not been helpful in the Navy’s effort to maintain a capable naval fighting force. On a more positive note, after a long-pending decision, all six Skjold air-cushion attack missile craft were ordered. Initially planned as a class of 24 to replace the ageing fleet of small surface combatants, the highly complex stealth craft underwent “comprehensive testing with focus Illustration 28: Specifically, designed for operations among the on speed, sea-keeping, vast littorals of the Norwegian fjords, the new air-cushion attack [electromagnetic compatibility], craft, however, can also be deployed in blue-water operations. signature and functionality, as well as the operational reliability tests – mainly in northern Norway [where the sea-conditions are particularly demanding].”553 These tests were necessary as the design of the Skjold probed unknown ground in ship-design and it took ten years for the second unit of the class to be commissioned. Already at first sight, it becomes obvious that these warships differ in most aspects from what we have seen in naval shipbuilding thus far. The largest parts of this catamaran are made of carbon fiber to increase its stealth features. The propulsion system is based on the experience gained with the Navy’s air cushion minesweepers and is designed around four gas

551 RIMPAC is hosted by the United States annualy and represents the largest naval exercises in the world. 552 “Frigate Berthed for its spare parts,” NEWS in ENGLISH.no, 30 Sept. 2013. http://www.newsinenglish.no/2013/09/30/frigate-berthed-for-spare-parts/. 553 Guy Toremans, “Significant Ships: Skjold Class FACs: Norway’s Fighting Cats: Stealth Reigns Supreme,” in Seaforth World Naval Review 2015, ed. Conrad Waters (South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2014): 126-127. 163 turbines driving two water-jets (similar to those in the Swedish Visby-class). In order to maintain speeds of over 40 knots (75 km/h) two lift fans in the bow blow air into the pocket between and under the catamaran’s hull. The front and back of the ship are sealed by rubber flaps, thus enabling the ship to ride on a cushion of air (also known as surface effect). Speeds of up to 60 knots (>110 km/h) have been reached, making it the fastest naval vessel in the world.554 At the same time these ships pack a powerful punch. A single 76mm/62 cal gun is installed on the ship’s deck, while two retractable quad launchers for the Naval Strike Missile are located aft of the bridge. Portable Mistral SAM launchers can also be installed for point air defense. Although these ships are quite small, they are among the most innovative warships designed to date. They can rightfully be considered an essential element of Norway’s fleet of surface combatants555 and are “capable of contributing substantially to a wide range of operations in both the littoral and in blue water”, as Toremans points out. “Although designed to patrol Norway’s littoral waters,” he continues, “the units have already proved to be amongst the most flexible [naval] assets.” A lengthy deployment as part of the U.S. Navy in 2002 and 2003 proved that long-distance out-of-area operations were not only possible, but that “[the ship’s] top speed of 60 knots could prove quite useful to the EU or NATO counter-piracy operations.”556 As Norway slowly moved away from its somewhat parochial concept of territorial defense towards a more multinational-oriented defense policy, so did the Royal Norwegian Navy. Consecutive defense white papers in the mid-2000s stated that, apart from securing Norwegian sovereignty, the contribution to multinational crisis management, which included multilateral peace operations, was to be strengthened.557 “Our security cannot be maintained through a one-sided focus on the conventional defence of Norwegian territory.”558 A further publication in 2008 emphasized the latter point by postulating that “Norway’s most important contribution to the strengthening of international, and therefore Norwegian security, is active and constructive participation in the UN and NATO.”559 As a result of these decisions, Norway’s shore defense artillery was disbanded560 and its naval forces engaged more actively

554 Toremans, “Skjold,” 129. 555 Note that these ships have been included in the graph. Norway therefore has a total of 11 capable surface combatants. 556 Toremans, “Skjold,” 139. 557 Norwegian Ministry of Defence. Norwegian Defence 2006 (2006): 3-4. 558 Norwegian Ministry of Defense, Norwegian Defence 2004 (2004): 7. 559 Norwegian Ministry of Defense, Norwegian Defence 2008 (2008): 5. 560 See Ezio Bonsignore et al. “Norway,” Military Technology: The World Defense Almanac 2004, Issue 1 (2004): 149. 164 in a number of multinational operations, such as the E.U. anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and the joint exercises with its Scandinavian and Baltic neighbors, while its sister services have since been deployed to Afghanistan, Mali, South Sudan and the Middle East. In the long term, the focus of Norway’s concern, however, will remain directed towards the High North and the Arctic. Fittingly, in 2010, the Armed Forces’ Joint Headquarters was moved to Bod , inside the Arctic Circle and will lead all military operations from there.561 This move was spurred by growing security concerns in the region. Conflicting commercial interests, largely over fishing rights and the exploitation of natural resources on and under the seabed, have led to disputes between the different parties in the region while the possibility of increased instability and even hostility persist. In the future, the fundamental question regarding the freedom of the seas will become more pressing, in particular in the light of a possible sea route via the northern passage and the recent behavior of Russia’s resurgent Northern Fleet. “I worry about the question of the freedom of the seas”, the Chief of Naval Staff, Vice Admiral Kjell Amund Prytz stated as early as 1995. “During the Cold War, [the] threat of piracy was negligible”, he continued. “[L]awlessness at sea increases everywhere [and the] Coast Guard has fired more shots in anger during the last six months than during the entire duration of our neutrality guard operations in World War One.” 562 In the long term, the Royal Norwegian Navy is likely to be confronted with increasing challenges across the intensity spectrum. So far, it has been able to adapt to the diverse security environment of the post- Cold War era. As long as the country’s leadership does not succumb to sea blindness, as is the case with numerous other European nations, the Norwegian Navy will remain a relatively small, yet credible naval force in the region.563

561 See Homepage of Norwegian Armed Forces: “Norwegian Joint Headquarters.” http://mil.no/organisation/about/norwegianjointheadquarters/Pages/default.aspx. Gerard O’Dwyer, “Norway Maintains Littoral Focus on High North,” Defence News, 10 January (2011): 12. 562 Prytz, “Way Ahead,”19. 563 Sloggett, “Norway Leads,” 23. 165

PART THREE

12) Analysis and Observations – Quo Vadis Europe?

After having outlined the mainstay of European naval capabilities, it is time to place the development of European sea power within the larger picture. Purely by numbers, Europe, as a whole, could be considered at least as powerful as the United States. The continent is more populous than the U.S. and has a higher gross domestic product, thus making it the greatest combined economic power in the world. In terms of per capita GDP, Europe’s wealth becomes even more tangible: Thirteen of the twenty richest countries in the world are European. Furthermore, two of the five permanent U.N. Security Council members are from Europe (France and Britain) – both of which have nuclear forces – and together with Germany and Italy represent half of the former G8 members. All European armies combined have more military personnel than the U.S. Armed Forces and even its accreted naval forces, at first glance, would seem more than sufficient in size to protect its interest at sea: Europe can deploy a powerful nuclear aircraft carrier with an air-wing of highly capable aircraft, two smaller carriers operating the venerable Harrier jump-jet, 15 amphibious warships able to project aerial and naval assets over great distances and onto distant shores, eight strategic ballistic missile submarines, a mix of 12 nuclear attack submarines and 50 diesel-electric boats – some of which are the quietest submarines in the world – , over a hundred mine countermeasure vessels compared to the United States’ 13, highly sophisticated missile attack craft, stealthy corvettes and an escort fleet of more than 130 destroyers and frigates. How can one speak of brinkmanship and decline in light of such impressive numbers? Over thirty years ago, then Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, famously asked: “Who do I call if I want to call Europe?”564 And in fact, Europe’s strategic weakness lies in its heterogeneity. Its power seems to be diffused and divided. The great amalgamate of strikingly different states (take Finland and Turkey for example) with distinct cultural, religious and social backgrounds naturally affect Europe’s foreign policy. Although cooperation, in particular between the NATO members during the Cold War, had fostered close ties between the individual armed forces, recent events have shown how little agreement can be found between the political and military leadership of each country regarding military intervention

564 The precise wording of the quote is not known. However, in an interview with Der Spiegel Kissinger acknowledges having asked such a question. Henry Kissinger interview by Spiegel, “SPIEGEL Interview with Henry Kissinger: ‘Europeans Hide Behind the Unpopularity of President Bush’ Spiegel Online International, February 18, 2008. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,535964,00.html. 166 and a common security and defense policy. As was noted, throughout the last decade U.S. or NATO-led campaigns often consisted of an ad hoc coalition of more or less willing European states, while other members watched from the sidelines. This disunity has led some defense analysts to even question the deterrent nature of NATO’s Article 5 mutual-defense agreement.565 Despite being a mighty force on paper, European sea power has been in steep decline since the end of the Cold War. As my case studies revealed, the large majority of naval fleets have been significantly reduced in size and many have ceded important capabilities as a result of the post-Cold War peace-dividend and years of continued austerity measures. Notwithstanding technological advancement in shipbuilding, far fewer warships are available to deal with the current abundance of maritime tasks. The British Fleet, for example, has been reduced by nearly 60 percent while the French Marine Nationale has to rely on a fleet half the size of that in 1990. Italy’s forces will be stretched thin by the nation’s interests in the greater Mediterranean theater and the increasing burden of mass migration and Spain is barely able to maintain its multi-purpose fleet due to one of the lowest defense budgets in all of Europe. Greece continues to be caught in the quagmire of the financial crisis and it is therefore questionable if the country will be able to sustain its comparatively high defense expenditure in the future. As a result, the Hellenic Navy is unlikely to retain its current capabilities. Turkey, on the other hand, has been able to establish itself as a major naval power in the Black Sea and the Aegean Sea and, maybe more importantly, over the past twenty-five years has developed the ability to design and manufacture its own warships. On Europe’s northern flank, the Netherlands, one of the richest countries in the world, has cut its surface fleet by more than half, while its next-door neighbor Germany shows few signs of stepping up to the plate. As the world’s fourth largest economy and Europe’s industrial powerhouse, the Germans operate some of the most capable frigates in the world. However, compared to other medium-sized powers such as the U.K. or France, it has remained unwilling to align itself with the general trend towards operating a well-balanced multi-purpose fleet.

565 Etienne de Durand, “NATO in an Era of Global Competition, Defending Borders,“ min: 52:00. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VLZSQjBpHNk. 167

On a somewhat more positive note, the Scandinavian navies have shown some encouraging signs of effectively adapting to the post-Cold War environment. They have not only modernized their armed forces but strengthened cooperation and interoperability in the High North as well as the Baltic Region. However, with growing Russian military posturing in the region and the forceful annexation of Crimea, Sweden and Finland as well as the Poland and the Baltic states, remain largely oriented towards territorial defense. The latter countries have not been included in this study as they operate comparatively small naval forces. While Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia have modest defense budgets and only a handful of small warships, Poland, despite efforts to expand its capabilities in the waters of the Baltic Sea, will also have difficulties in securing funding for new surface combatants

and submarines. Its Illustration 29: Although the French/Italian Horizon project ultimately delivered four highly capable air-defense destroyers, they replace a much borders with Russia’s ally larger fleet of AAW vessels. This fact has limited both navies’ ability to put more than a single task-force to sea at any given point in time. Belorussia and the Russian exclave Kaliningrad are reason enough for the land component of the defense strategy taking precedence over naval matters. As Waters notes, “[t]he overall future of the Polish Navy continuous to look relatively bleak, […] given the increasing obsolescence of the two FFG-7 type [O.H. Perry-class] frigates and four Sokól class submarines that form the core of the fleet and the priority given to financing army and air force.”566 Notwithstanding the possibility of further Russian aggression in the theater, the aforementioned countries are unlikely to significantly increase their defense expenditure but will rather want to rely on strengthening cooperation with better-equipped partners.567 This, in turn, will put additional stress on those European navies, which, such as in the case of Norway, are already having difficulties in maintaining their current pace of operations.

566 Waters, “Europe 2015,” 93. 567 Gerard O’Dwyer, “Nordic Support for Baltic Littoral Defenses,” Defense News, 9 Jan. (2012): 11. More recently in Iain Ballantyne, “NATO Boss Make Vow TO PROTECT BALTIC,” Warships, Jan. (2015): 2. 168

In many instances the navies no longer have sufficient means to conduct their current tasks in a period of relative peace. In the case of major conflict, little or no surge capabilities are extant and no large-scale military operation can be maintained without the indispensible assets of the United States. As has been noted, it is important for the European citizens to realize the profound nature of the defense cuts over the past two decades. The austere financial environment after the Cold War has forced many navies to continuously adapt to new and more numerous challenges with less and less money, or as Parry puts it, “[t]he peace dividend was spent a long time ago and, in some cases, many times over.”568 The end of the Cold War also heralded a period of strategic naval reorientation. The principle of sea-control in the waters of the North Atlantic and Mediterranean against the Soviets was replaced by the understanding that a modern navy also needed to be able to conduct expeditionary warfare. The numerous stability operations and humanitarian interventions during the 1990s called for naval forces to assume an expeditionary, out-of-area role. Large investments were made to build amphibious assault ships and landing platform docks. Both the U.K. and France had already maintained such forces at the end of the Cold War and continued to expand these capabilities. By the year 2000, the Netherlands, Spain and Italy, among others, had followed suit and today even small fleets, such as the Royal Danish Navy, operate large warships for expeditionary warfare. However, these very expensive capital ships account for a significant part of each navy’s budget and also need very large crews to operate. At the same time, the shortage of manpower has become at least as pressing of an issue as the limited number of warships, as most European armed forces have shifted from mandatory service to a volunteer force. For that reason they almost all states in Europe are finding it increasingly difficult to attract young citizens to join the military. At the same time the predictions of the future are not encouraging. Not only are naval forces called upon to conduct the entirety of military operations, from drug interdiction to deploying special forces into hostile areas far from home. Naval sea power is also very likely to become an even more important factor in an increasingly competitive world – one in which the access to the ocean’s vital resources of fish, oil, gas, and raw materials is likely to become even more heavily contested. Conflict between regional powers in Asia, in particular regarding numerous islands in the South and East China Sea and the promise of large exclusive economic zones in the region, are harbingers of these growing tensions at sea. In this strategic environment, cooperation will be of the essence in order to avoid conflict and to encourage peaceful economic and political exchange.

568 Parry, Highway, 329. 169

Both the European Union and NATO represent the foundations on which European sea power is based. With the United States shifting its attention towards the Asian-Pacific Region, the North Atlantic Alliance, Is likely to remain the defining element in Europe’s security architecture. As Parry argues, “NATO will remain critical in maintaining equilibrium in the Western hemisphere, just as suitable arrangements for the USA and its allies to provide assurance and to support their friends (and interests) will be critical in the Eastern hemisphere.”569 However, some prudent decisions will have to be made over the next years.

For European navies in particular, ground needs to be made up. The slow drawdown from the Cold War and a succession of wars of choice by US and other leading democracies diverted attention away from the sea. This strategic myopia was compounded by the ways in which developed world governments introduced largely incoherent defense reductions, with little regard for strategic coherence and the balance of forces.570

One of the most promising developments over the last two decades has been the ability of many European states to successfully join forces in building state-of-the-art ships and weapon systems. Although some areas of high-end defense technology could not be sustained, British, French, Italian, and Danish warships and their sensors, radars, missiles, artillery and electronic countermeasures can rightfully be considered among the best in the world. “NATO helps to reduce defense duplication and prevents the renationalization of defense. Without NATO, the individual Alliance members would be forced to spend considerably more money on defense than they currently do.”571 A number of these cooperative efforts have been addressed. In this day and age, it is exorbitantly expensive to build a warship from scratch and quite frankly no European country’s defense industry is able to provide all the necessary parts for such an undertaking. Therefore, joint ventures such as the Franco/Italian Horizon and FREMM projects, the trilateral cooperation between Spain, Germany and the Netherlands for a new air defense frigate, the multi-national NH-90 helicopter program and the construction of the Rotterdam/Galicia-class LPDs are high-profile examples of the successful and necessary measures European governments have made so far. In terms of interoperability, the European navies have made great strides in being able to conduct a wide range of maritime missions with naval detachments from other countries. NATO’s Standing Maritime Groups are continuously at sea, constituting an immediate

569 Parry, Highway, 103. 570 Ibid., 329. 571 Larrabee , Austerity, 106. 170 reaction force and a conventional deterrent. European warships, operating as part of multinational naval operations, such as Operation Enduring Freedom or Operation Atalanta, provide an excellent basis for trust-building and interoperability among European and foreign navies. Such increased interoperability also allows each navy to specialize in specific capabilities to a greater degree. Chris Pegenkopf explains that

[w]ith enhanced coordination of the alliance’s operational capabilities, member states [conceivably] could completely cede certain mission areas in which they struggle to maintain a competency because of a scarcity of resources. This would allow them to reallocate funding to focus on becoming a world-class capability leader in their assigned mission areas. As a result, the overall NATO force would be more integrated and effective, as it would be a confluence of capabilities leaders rather than a collection of independent militaries that are jacks of all trades but masters of none.572

Although a trend towards more specialized navies is noticeable in some areas of operation, both political as well as operational considerations have been a limiting factor in such a process. Frankly, a highly specialized navy would find it more difficult to adapt to a rapidly developing security environment and might be caught off guard, having invested large sums of money in the wrong areas. At the same time the country’s leadership would realize that it is utterly dependent on other states to conduct many principal missions its own navy cannot perform. Italy, for example, would have found it very difficult to operate near the shore of Libya in 2011 had it not commanded a well-balanced fleet able to defend its aircraft carrier from air, surface and subsurface threats. Were Italy to decide to assign its submarine protection duties to, say, the French Navy in order have sufficient funds to operate two aircraft carriers instead of one, it would have to hope that France is also willing to take military action in a future conflict. In times of ad hoc coalitions and alliances such a plan is inherently risky. As has been pointed out, many naval scholars, therefore, disagree with Pagenkopf and rather argue that operating a general purpose fleet – and be it small – is still the best choice for most European navies. A well-balanced multi-purpose navy can adapt to changes in the strategic environment more easily and thus reduce the risk of having backed the wrong horse while being left to its own devices by its supposed allies. In the Asian-Pacific Region a number of states are actively engaged in building such naval forces. India, China, South Korea, Japan and Australia are all strengthening their blue-water capabilities and are in the process of creating more powerful multi-purpose navies, despite experiences major difficulties along the

572 Chris Pagenkopf, “Cooperation is the Key to NATO’s Future,” Naval Institute Proceedings, September (2014): np. http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2014-09/cooperation-key-natos-future. 171 way.573 In particular, the construction of aircraft carriers, amphibious assault ships, large surface combatants and long-range submarines are the most obvious signs of this trend. The graphs in the Appendices provide a valuable comparison between the rise of naval power in the Asia-Pacific and the apparent decline of European sea power.574 In contrast, only four countries in Europe can claim to operate a modern, general purpose naval force. Although some states, such as Norway and Denmark, are shifting from littoral to blue-water operations, and others, like Turkey, are seeking to operate more powerful fleets, their navies are limited by both smaller budgets and more limited strategic interests than their Asian counterparts. It is, therefore, pivotal for the European navies to retain as many capabilities as possible, and be they marginal. Even if short-term fiscal restrictions are limiting factors in putting such capabilities into full effect, in times of crisis they could be reestablished (although this process would possibly take considerably longer than imagined). From a platform-centric point of view, provisions have to be made so that surface combatants, submarines and aircraft can be incrementally upgraded over time. Luckily, modern European warships have considerable room to grow. Many frigates and destroyers, such as the Norwegian Nansen, the French La Fayette, and British Daring-class are relatively lightly armed when compared to their Asian and American equivalents. However, they have room for additional weapons systems and their sensor suits can be updated if necessary. The ability to quickly shift priorities at sea is already visible in operations in the North Atlantic where European

anti-submarine warfare Illustration 30: The overall reduction in numbers has also affected the capabilities are being put force of support and replenishment vessels – a key necessity in any form of naval operation today. Note the size of the replenishment vessel in the to the test by Russian middle in comparison to the LPD and frigate.

573 A brief illustration of the malaise India’s naval sector finds itself in can be found in: Dave Sloggett, “India’s Navy Falter,” Warships, July (2014): 12-13. 574 It is worth noting that the respective Asian navies already operated relatively large fleets in 1990. However, many of the vessels at the time were obsolete while today a large part of these fleets is comprised of modern warships. 172 naval operations. Formally a forte of the northern European states, in particular the United Kingdom, twenty-five years after the end of the Cold War naval strategy and tactics for sea- control have to be relearned. At the same time constabulary duties on the southern flank as well as ongoing crisis throughout North Africa and the Middle East have put considerable strain on the European navies operating in this theater. What is more, Europe remains largely dependent on American key capabilities. This includes the U.S. Navy’s auxiliary forces. Without these support vessels, large naval operations are not sustainable. Unfortunately, current trends indicate that the so-called teeth- to-tail ratio of combat ships to supply and replenishment vessels is becoming increasingly critical. The same is the case in regard to Europe’s sea-lift capabilities. While European powers were able to field, deploy, and sustain division-sized units in the war against Iraq in 1991, such an operation has become impossible today.575 In addition, even the two most powerful amphibious forces in Europe, the French and the British, are “unlikely to be deployed in a high-threat environment without considerable U.S. force protection.”576 In essence, despite the strengthening its amphibious forces, Europe’s military lacks the ability to get significant forces to the scene of action and it does not have the necessary sustainable high-end capabilities to sufficiently protect them from harm once they get there. In particular in the areas of air defense, close-air support, airborne-early warning, aerial-refueling, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and long-range precision strikes577 Europe is far from claiming military parity with the U.S. Armed Forces. That the U.S. military might, and especially its naval power, stems from a sustained defense expenditure of nearly four percent of the national GDP, more than twice that of the average European state,578 seems to be more of a welcome convenience to the Europeans rather than a goal worth aspiring to. In the long-term, the United States is likely to become increasingly frustrated by its allies’ tendency to free ride on the backs of U.S. taxpayers. With the United States’ focus of attention already shifting towards China and the greater Asian- Pacific Region, Europe will have to carry a larger share of the security burden in the Western Hemisphere as well as being more self-responsible for protecting its interests in other regions

575 Larrabee, Austerity, 7. 576 Ibid. 86. 577 As a matter of fact, nearly every single air-campaign since the end of the Cold War has shown that Europe’s arsenal of precision ammunition was quickly depleted. Karen DeYoung and Greg Jaffe, “NATO runs short on some munition in Libya,” The Washington Post, April 15, 2011. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nato-runs-short-on-some-munitions-in- libya/2011/04/15/AF3O7ElD_story.html. 578 In 2013 the U.S. spent a total of $735 million on the NATO defense budget compared to a total of $288 million of all other allies. See Pagenkopf, “Cooperation,” np. 173 of the world. That it will have to do so with much smaller and often less capable naval forces than twenty-five years ago seems to have been overlooked by Europe’s leadership.

13) Conclusion

It seems fair to say that by any reasonable estimate sea power will be one of the defining elements in the future of world affairs. In principle, the twenty-first century will be governed by various powers at sea, interacting with each other in both peaceful cooperation as well as bloody conflict, just like the centuries before. While I have gone to great lengths to provide substantial evidence for the ability to influence decisions on land by means of economic and military power at sea, an important question has so far only been alluded to – namely which actors will be able to utilize the maritime realm to a greater extent than the others and thereby accrue wealth and power. Or in other words: Whose sea power will it be? For now three basic trends are likely to remain extant in the foreseeable future. Firstly, the United States will be able to maintain its global naval dominance by a considerable margin for at least another thirty years. The U.S. Navy’s ability to maintain sea-control will however be challenged by the emergence of increasingly sophisticated anti-access/area-denial networks in close proximity to the shores of Russia, China, and to a lesser degree Iran and North Korea. Moreover, the emergence of large blue-water navies in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific will force the United States to rethink its current maritime strategy. Ultimately, however, the U.S. Navy (and the Marine Corps) is likely to remain the only naval force able to project significant power in any region of the world and sustain a military confrontation over a longer period of time. The second trend also coincides with arguably one of the most profound geopolitical developments in modern history, the consequences of which will not be understood for some time. Already in the mid-1980s maritime trade between the U.S. and Asia had eclipsed that of trans-Atlantic trade. However, it has been the incredible ascent of previously poor countries such as India, South Korea, Indonesia, Vietnam and (most importantly) China which, for the first time in more than five hundred years, has caused the geopolitical focus of attention – in particular that of the United States – to shift away from Europe and the Atlantic towards the Asian-Pacific Region (APR). In many counties in the APR the maritime domain has taken a prominent position. This is exemplified by Chinese naval scholars studying the writings of the most renowned naval strategists, Alfred T. Mahan and Julian Corbett, while many navies in

174 the region are trying to emulate U.S. maritime capabilities. Apparently, the leaders in Peking, Seoul and New Delhi have understood the strategic gains to be made by entertaining a large commercial fleet as well as a strong navy to protect the country’s political and economic interests at home and abroad. These efforts have been highly profitable for the aforementioned states, strengthening the domestic shipbuilding industry as well as the commercial market. However, the possibility of conflict looms large as the current naval arms race among the conflicting actors in the region is joined by the United States and its military in a contest over who will have the most to say in this part of the world. The third trend allows us to infer which role Europe will play in this maritime century. Over the course of the preceding chapters I have described the development of Europe’s navies since the end of the Cold War in much detail. Every lager navy has been discussed at length, paying particular attention to how each individual naval service has dealt with the paradigmatic changes to the security environment that have come to pass. During the later years of the Cold War, most European states were NATO members and thus part of the overarching maritime strategy against the Soviet Union. Therefore, each navy had specific tasks to fulfill, such as mining critical choke points through which the Soviet forces had to pass in the case of war, defending the European flanks from Soviet incursion, or protecting the strategic lines of communication between the United States and Europe on which the essential reinforcement for the besieged European allies would be transported. The enemy’s naval forces, in particular his submarines, had to be destroyed in order to maintain command of the sea. This principle of sea-control formed the basic strategic tenet of Europe’s naval forces. The Americans, for their part, would use combined aircraft carrier battle groups and all available attack submarines to put full forward pressure on the Soviet flanks in the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean (as well as in the Pacific). With the breakup of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War these plans were shelved as the emergence of new forms of conflict necessitated novel approaches to maritime warfare. Amphibious warfare capabilities were expanded in order to conduct military interventions, stability operations and peace-keeping missions in distant regions of the world. Soon, many European navies operated expeditionary forces, such as amphibious assault ships and other large multi-purpose surface combatants capable of projecting power from sea onto land. However, for strategic reasons, some states like Greece or Finland remained focused on territorial defense in the brown-waters closer to shore. Yet, of even greater relevance to European sea power was the fact that large sums of money which would have formerly been allocated to national defense could now be invested

175 elsewhere. As part of the so-called ‘peace dividend’ the large standing armies in Europe underwent drastic reductions. While ships were becoming more expensive to build, military budgets were reduced incrementally, making it difficult for most European navies to modernize their fleets. This process has continued for nearly twenty-five years and has been exacerbated by the global economic crisis which took hold of Europe after 2008. As a matter of fact, only days before submitting this thesis, the Stockholm Institute for Peace Research released the figures for the global defense expenditures in 2014. Despite the Islamic State waging war across Iraq and Syria; unabated conflict in North Africa – causing an influx of refugees trying to make their way to Europe; Russia forcefully annexing Crimea, continuing its hybrid warfare in support of the rebel forces in Eastern Ukraine and flexing its growing military muscle along the European periphery; and, lastly, the Americans shifting their focus of attention towards the Asian-Pacific Region, it is unlikely that we will see any significant increases in European defense spending any time soon. As the data reveals, many countries have, quite frankly, continued to make cuts to their defense budgets.579 Although the same can be said for the United States (the budget was reduced from 3.8 to 3.5 percent in 2014), it has again rushed to Europe’s assistance, re-deploying heavy mechanized forces and combat aircraft as a response to Russia’s actions. To be fair, many NATO members have also been actively engaged in confidence building measures across the Alliance’s eastern border. Furthermore, the three Baltic States, Poland and possibly Germany will be under pressure to increase their defense spending in the short term. Ultimately, such provisions will however have little effect on the overall decline of European sea power. This is partly due to the fact that in this theater of operation robust military forces for air and land warfare are considered the quintessential linchpin in deterring Russia from further coercive measures against the West.

[Therefore,] NATO’s pivot to Russia will shift attention away from the maritime domain back to the continent. Armies and air forces will receive, once again, much more attention than navies. While Putin’s aggression increased the importance of NATO for its member states, maritime security’s relevance for member states and, therefore, for the Alliance will [likely] decrease. In consequence, theaters like the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean will become of much less concern for NATO.580

579 “Baltische Länder erhöhen Militärausgaben,” news.ORF.at, 13. April, 2015. http://orf.at/stories/2273071/2273070/. 580 Felix Seidler, “NATO’s PIVOT TO RUSSIA: COLD WAR 2.0 AT SEA?” CIMSEC, April 25, 2014. http://cimsec.org/natos-pivot-russia-cold-war-2-0-sea/10723 176

As was pointed out, the defense budgets of the other NATO members meanwhile have either remained stagnant or have been reduced even further. The armed forces of France, Greece, Italy, and the Netherlands all have had to find ways of doing more with less money. Of the 28 NATO member states only four (apart from the United States) spend more than 2 percent of their GDP on defense. This figure has been stated on numerous occasions throughout this thesis as if it were some sort of panacea to all of Europe’s defense ailments and in fact there is a consensus that such a benchmark would constitute the best compromise in terms of feasibility and national security within the Alliance. In consecutive NATO summits the European members have pledged to “move towards the 2% guideline”,581 by increasing their defense budgets within a decade: “These decisions will further strengthen the Transatlantic Bond, enhance the security of all Allies and ensure a more fair and balanced sharing of costs and responsibilities,” the official statement after the most recent NATO summit in Wales underscored.582 Unfortunately these promises seem to remain merely lip service as governments throughout Europe and, maybe more importantly, the countries’ citizens are unwilling and unable to make such financial concessions. Although the security and prosperity of all European states relies heavily on maritime security and the unimpeded flow of commerce on the ocean’s ‘great highways’, the average person on the street will be difficult to convince that more money has to be allocated to the naval forces in order to protect Europe’s interests and prosperity. Therefore, it lies in the responsibility of the Illustration 31: Joint maneuvers, such as the current political and military leadership in RIMPAC exercise held by the US Navy every year, provide valuable opportunity to build trust among Europe not to continue down the current road states which otherwise have conflicting interests at sea. Such efforts will be particularly important of brinkmanship. At the end of the day, the in the Asian-Pacific Region.

581 NATO, Wales Summit Declaration, 5 September, 2014: np. http://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm. 582 Ibid., np. 177 real issue is neither Russia’s rearmament nor the state of the transatlantic relationship, but in fact money.583 After more than two decades of almost continuous cuts to national defense, many European armed forces no longer have the capability to effectively deal with the growing number of security challenges that confront them. In numerous strategic defense papers discussed in this thesis, Europe’s naval forces are not only called upon to fulfill their primary military function – to attack, to defend, or to deter – but far more often are used for diplomatic and policing duties. At any given point in time, the navies are conducting humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts, be it after the earthquake in Haiti or by saving passengers from a sinking cruise ship in the Mediterranean. British, Spanish and German destroyers and frigates, designed to protect an entire battle group from the onslaught of enemy anti-ship missiles, regularly conduct anti- piracy operations against small motorboats and modern-day freebooters armed with AK-47 rifles off the Gulf of Aden. Meanwhile, smaller, less sophisticated and less expensive ships, which would be better designed for such tasks, are spread thin over the vast oceans, conducting constabulary duties such as drug interdictions and fishery protection in their countries’ territorial waters and exclusive economic zones. That this can be quite a challenging undertaking in an area of over 11,000,000 km² with only a handful of ships, such as in the case of France, needs no further explanation. I have also made a point to stress the ramifications the reduction of naval capabilities will likely have on Europe as a political entity as well as for its population. Over the past five hundred years most major powers in the world have understood the utility of sea power, both in economic as well as military terms. Colin S. Gray even goes so far as to argue that, “[g]reat sea powers or maritime coalitions have either won or, occasionally, drawn every major war in modern history.”584 Ultimately, however, it was the successful marriage of commercial and military might (on which Mahan based his understanding of sea power) that put successive European powers ahead of the rest of the world, enabling them to accumulate vast territorial gains and in return secure wealth and political influence. After the end of the Second World War the United States succeeded the British as the preeminent sea power and has remained the “claviger and steward”585 of international trade regime while Europe’s economies continue to free ride on the maritime security that the United States Navy has upheld for nearly seventy years. In the future it is likely that this practice will no longer suffice. As we

583 The current problem of financing NATO operations in the Baltic States and Poland is discussed in detail in De Durand, “NATO,” min: 14:00. 584 Gray, Leverage, Prologue. 585 Bobbitt, Consent, 537. 178 speak, the oceans are becoming an increasingly contested area of interests: “[S]tates will seek to extend their jurisdiction, control and regulation over offshore areas up to the limits of their exclusive economic zones (EEZs)”. They will try to “exploit the resources that lie on and below the seabed and in the water column”,586 Parry warns. China’s current effort to build artificial islands and archipelagos in the South China Sea provides evidence for this proposition.587 Located considerably further from Chinese mainland than from Vietnam or the Philippines, the Spratley Islands are one of the many areas in the PRC’s vicinity in which the aforementioned maritime contest is taking shape. Being one of the most profitable fishing grounds in the world, it is not surprising that numerous states want to claim sovereignty over the small sandy islets in these waters, thereby expanding their EEZ. While the United States has to carefully weigh its interest and response to these developments in the Asia-Pacific, Europe will largely be incapable of having any direct influence on the events unfolding in the region. Although “[t]he debate about a European role in an East Asian major war is largely hypothetical, it teaches us three lessons,” Seidler points out.588 Firstly, Europe’s political and military power has become severely weakened. Considering the current trend towards further defense reductions, Europe’s ability to secure its interests abroad will likely be limited even further. Secondly, the principal cause for this development is the inability of the political leadership in many European countries to make prudent decisions in times of fiscal austerity, the population’s aversion towards military intervention, and their unwillingness to make sacrifices in both blood and money for the greater good of their respective country. Lastly, Europe is becoming increasingly irrelevant in geopolitical and strategic terms outside of its own sphere of influence and even within it will be challenged to a greater extent than before. 589 Growing instability on Europe’s southern flank has been discussed at length in this thesis. More funding will be needed to deal with the security challenges the influx of illegal immigrants from Africa and the Middle East is causing. At the same time, on Europe’s eastern border we are witnessing the reemergence of Russia as an important player in international politics – a player skillfully applying hard power to expand his sphere of influence by resorting to a strategy of hybrid warfare and fait accompli. Meanwhile, on Europe’s northern flank the steady melting of the polar caps will likely make commercial shipping between

586 Parry, Highway, 215. 587 Sui-Lee Wee, “China explains why it’s building islands in the South China Sea,” Business Insider UK, April 9, 2015. http://uk.businessinsider.com/china-explains-why-its-building-islands-in-the-south-china-sea-2015-4?r=US. 588 Seidler, “Europe’s Role,” np. 589 Ibid. 179

Europe and Asia via the North West Passage possible in the future. This circumstance would reduce the distance between China’s production sites and the European market by 10,000 km.590 According to various predictions, vessels travelling on these routes will, however, still need the assistance of icebreakers for many decades to come. Currently, “Russia maintains a decided advantage in Arctic operations in its ownership of […] seven nuclear-powered civilian vessels and nineteen diesel-powered variants, with six more planned in the near future.”591 The Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom are all largely dependent on seaborne trade and would profit immensely from the emergence of this new trade route. However, it would also place an additional burden on their naval forces, in particular if Russia was to use its geographical and military advantage as political leverage. To the reader it might seem as if I have drawn an overly drastic picture in the hope of making a case for an increase in defense spending and the strengthening of the military forces. This has not been my intention. Quite frankly, all observations have been based on factual assertions of previous developments and current political and maritime trends. Many European states still maintain robust naval forces – considered to be among the best in the world – exhibit industrial prowess as well as technological ingenuity and also maintain large commercial fleets. Europe as a whole would have all the ingredients to make it a truly great sea power were it not for the apparent differences and incongruities among its member states. Sadly, notwithstanding the common defense agreements within NATO and the growing military cooperation as part of the European Union, the continent remains a conglomerate of highly diverse states, all of which have their individual foreign and domestic interests to satisfy. Nowhere does this instance become more apparent than when the lives of young men and women, as well as substantial amounts of money are at stake. During the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, basically every single European state (save the neutral ones) provided military assistance to the U.S.-led campaign against Saddam Hussein. Only a few years later, in the Balkan Wars, it took the European powers much longer to agree on a common course of action. As a result of this inaptitude the United States had to take the lead in the military campaign against the regime of Slobodan Milosevic. After the terrorist attacks of 9/11 the world again briefly gathered behind the United States. However, as the hope of classical military victory turned out to be ephemeral in quagmires of Afghanistan and Iraq, Europe’s commitments in many instances became somewhat half- hearted. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 provided a turning point for the Western community.

590 Parry, Highway, 146. 591 Ibid., 146-147. 180

While Britain joined the ‘Coalition of the Willing’, Germany and France ruled out any military engagement on their part and Spain withdrew from Iraq in 2005 after having been hit by massive terrorist attacks on its capital. More recently Germany again abstained from committing military forces to the NATO air-campaign against Libya’s long-time ruler Muammar Gaddafi, despite the U.N. Security Council having passed a resolution that legitimized the use of force in order to protect the Libyan population from repercussions. This time Britain, France and Italy took the lead with even neutral Sweden participating in the enforcement of the no-fly zone over Libya. The apparent rifts within Europe and in particular its NATO members are not likely to disappear any time soon, as the current effort to degrade and destroy ISIS in Syria and Iraq exemplifies. While American and French combat planes are flying strike missions from aircraft carriers stationed in the Persian Gulf, most other European countries have shown little interest in stepping up to the plate in military terms. Meanwhile, the Italian Navy is heavily engaged in humanitarian assistance operations in the Mediterranean. Yet to date, no comprehensive approach in dealing with this human catastrophe has been put forward by the European Union. Again, contradicting political views among the various states are a major limiting factor in an effort to use military forces to full effect. So is this divided Europe going to be relegated to the fringes of a world centered on the Asian-Pacific Region as I postulated at the outset of this thesis? Perhaps the somewhat encouraging answer is: not necessarily. The developments we have witnessed over the past years are not irreversible. However, “[c]ountries need to be prepared for the long haul and the long view, in anticipation of risks and opportunities.”592 This means that sufficient investments have to be made to provide the respective populace with security and access to the amenities of the global market. In the 21st century, sea power in the form of commercial trade and naval forces will continue to represent the most effective tool in achieving both. Much has been said in regard to burden sharing and strengthening cooperation among the European partners. The progress that has been made in this area is laudable and should be vigorously pursued. However, to date, even the most powerful European militaries first look to Washington instead of Brussels for a response when conflict arises somewhere in the world. As long as this is the case there will be little incentive for the European states to make any cuts to, let us say, their welfare system, in order to strengthen their defense sector. Unfortunately, given the drastic reductions of Europe’s naval forces since the end of the Cold War, even the aforementioned efforts by many states to streamline their force structure and

592 Parry, Highway, 33. 181 effectively engage with friends and allies to somewhat alleviate the burden that is placed upon each individual navy have only slowed the process of overall naval decline. Unless the propensity apparent among Europe’s leadership to reduce the size, readiness and capabilities of the naval forces is revoked and a comprehensive budget increase is put into place, European naval power will continue to diminish. The 21st century will in all likelihood be one of American sea power, challenged by the rise of Asian sea power. On the basis of the past, current and future global trends analyzed in this thesis, it is questionable if it will also be a century of European sea power.

182

Appendices

Figure 24 United States: Defense Spending in % of GDP 6

5

4

3 Military Spending

% ofGDP % 2

1

0

1990-2014, Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database

Figure 24

Figure 25 United States.: Number of Major Vessels Sources: The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, Miilitary Technology Almanac, World Naval Review

250

200

150

100

Number ofVessels Number 50

0 1990 2000 2014 Aircraft Carriers 15 11 10 Large Surface Combatants 205 104 98 Submarines 126 73 74 Assault/Amphibious 50 37 29

Figure 25

183

Figure 26 Japan: Defense Spending in % of GDP 1,2

1

0,8

0,6 Military Spending

% ofGDP % 0,4

0,2

0

1990-2014, Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database

Figure 26

Figure 27 Japan: Number of Major Vessels Sources: The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, Military Technology Almanac, World Naval Review 70

60 50 40 30 20

Number ofVessels Number 10 0 1990 2000 2014 Aircraft Carriers 0 0 2 Large Surface Combatants 60 49 48 Submarines 16 17 16 Assault/Amphibious 6 5 4

Figure 27

184

Figure 28 South Korea: Defense Spending in % of GDP 4,5 4 3,5

3 2,5 2 Military Spending % ofGDP % 1,5 1 0,5 0

1990-2014, Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database

Figure 28

Figure 29 South Korea: Number of Major Vessels Sources: The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, Military Technology Almanac, World Naval Review 30

25 20 15 10

Number ofVessels Number 5 0 1990 2000 2014 Aircraft Carriers 0 0 0 Large Surface Combatants 15 15 24 Submarines 0 7 12 Assault/Amphibious 6 10 5

Figure 29

185

Figure 30 China: Defense Spending in % of GDP 3

2,5

2

1,5 Military Spending

% ofGDP % 1

0,5

0

1990-2014, Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database

Figure 30

Figure 31 China : Number of Major Vessels Sources: The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, Military Technology Almanac, World Naval Review 100

90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 Number ofVessels Number 10 0 1990 2000 2014 Aircraft Carriers 0 0 1 Large Surface Combatants 41 50 24 Submarines 93 91 47 Assault/Amphibious 19 10 14

Figure 31: Note that many vessels, in particular a large number of submarines, had already been obsolete by 1990 and have since been put out of service.

186

Figure 32 India: Defense Spending in % of GDP 3,5 3

2,5

2 Military Spending

1,5 % ofGDP % 1 0,5 0

1990-2014, Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database

Figure 32

Figure 33 India: Number of Major Vessels Sources: The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, Mililtary Technology Almanac, World Naval Review 18

16

14 12 10 8 6

4 Number ofVessels Number 2 0 1990 2000 2014 Aircraft Carriers 2 1 2 Large Surface Combatants 15 16 16 Submarines 16 14 14 Assault/Amphibious 2 3 6

Figure 33

187

Figure 34 Russia: Defense Spending in % of GDP 6

5

4

3 Military Spending

% ofGDP % 2

1

0

1990-2014, Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database

Figure 34

Figure 35 Russia: Number of Major Vessels Sources: The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, Mililtary Technology Almanac, World Naval Review 80

70

60 50 40 30

20 Number ofVessels Number 10 0 2000 2014 Aircraft Carriers 2 1 Large Surface Combatants 51 34 Submarines 69 55 Assault/Amphibious 32 22

Figure 35: Note that these are highly tentative figures. The actual readiness of Russian warships is rather difficult to assess.

188

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List of Illustrations

All accessed on the 24.04.2015

Illustration 1: Arguably the most renowned naval strategist: Alfred Thayer Mahan, in: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/c/c7/Alfred-Thayer- Mahan.jpg/640px-Alfred-Thayer-Mahan.jpg ...... 15

Illustration 2: Map of Chinese Lines of Defense, Military Power of China 2009, in: http://www.defense.gov/pubs/ ...... 26

Illustration 3: Map of main trade routes to China, Military Power of China 2009, in: http://www.defense.gov/pubs/ ...... 27

Illustration 4: Picture of an American Carrier Battle Group under way in the Pacific, in: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User:Marcd30319/Marcd30319_original_Carrier_Strike_Group_ Three_rev_2#/media/File:US_Navy_090320-N-9928E- 304_The_aircraft_carrier_USS_John_C._Stennis_%28CVN_74%29_and_ships_of_the_John _C._Stennis_Carrier_Strike_Group_are_underway_in_formation_with_naval_vessels_from_t he_Republic_of_Korea.jpg ...... 29

Illustration 5: Danish warships being dissasembled, in: http://i.imgur.com/fIXBeGb.jpg ...... 31

Illustration 6: British destroyers are conducting operations on both ends of the intensity spectrum, in: http://i.imgur.com/vqMT0e2.jpg...... 35 207

Illustration 7: The HMS Sheffield burns after being hit by Argentinean anti-ship missiles, in: http://belgranoinquiry.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/HMSSheffieldBurning1.jpg ...... 38

Illustration 8: An artist’s impression of the cancelled Nimrod MRA.4 maritime patrol aircraft, in: http://www.airforceworld.com/others/gfx/nimrod/nimrod_mra4_1.jpg...... 40

Illustration 9: HMS Queen Elizabeth under construction, in: http://www.hornby.com/wp/wp- content/uploads/2014/07/HMS-Queen-Elizabeth_Photo-Credit-Lee-Howard-Photography.jpg ...... 43

Illustration 10: The Singapore version of the French La Fayette stealth frigate, in: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_Singapore_Navy#/media/File:Singapore_Navy_gui ded-missile_frigate_RSS_Steadfast.jpg ...... 55

Illustration 11: General Dempsey and Pierre de Villiers on French aircraft carrier, in: http://l2.yimg.com/bt/api/res/1.2/iXWYwkStEhpvDet5Vh1wSw-- /YXBwaWQ9eW5ld3M7Zmk9ZmlsbDtoPTM3NztpbD1wbGFuZTtweG9mZj01MDtweW9m Zj0wO3E9NzU7dz02NzA- /http://media.zenfs.com/en_us/News/afp.com/6e74d87cb9a8c5e195af8b109c9338c7a59a4274 .jpg ...... 58

Illustration 12: French are troops are being stretched thin in numerous operations, such as the one in Mali, in: https://metrouk2.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/ay102016400epa03549933- fren.jpg ...... 60

Illustration 13: A picture of the French Mistral-class LHD also built for Russia, in: http://www.lopinion.fr/sites/nb.com/files/2014/03/vladivostok_4.3.14_bp_0.jpg ...... 63

Illustration 14: Italian Maestrale frigate with Albatros SAM system, in: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/0e/ITS-Maestrale-F570.jpg...... 70

Illustration 15: HADR in the Mediterranean, in: http://www.unhcr.org/thumb1/532c494c6.jpg ...... 79

Illustration 16: European aircraft carriers at the end of the Cold War, in: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/66/551-R11-Foch-esDragon- Hammer92b.jpg ...... 86

Illustration 17: A cut-away drawing of the Juan Carlos-class LHD, in: http://www.navy.gov.au/sites/default/files/SHIP_LHD_Canberra_Class_Concept_Cutaway.jp g ...... 90

Illustration 18: Turkish Milgem-class frigate being launched: http://www.trdefence.com/wp- content/uploads/2010/04/milgem1-1.png ...... 103

Illustration 19: Hellenic guided-missile attack craft, in: http://www.defencegreece.com/wp- content/uploads/2012/06/EKI_0059_Medium.jpg ...... 107

Illustration 20: Cut-away drawing of the German Type-214 AIP submarine, in: http://media.defenceindustrydaily.com/images/SHIP_SSK_U-214_Cutaway_lg.jpg ...... 118 208

Illustration 21: German F-124 air defense frigate, in: http://defense-update.com/wp- content/uploads/2013/03/Sachsen_f124.jpg ...... 120

Illustration 22: Dutch Frigate turns hard while a Danish container ship passes by, in: https://rogueadventurer.files.wordpress.com/2012/08/hnlms-evertsen.jpg ...... 130

Illustration 23: Illustration of the highly flexbile Danish StanFlex system, in: http://www.navalhistory.dk/images/Skibene/FLYV_projektet/FLYVEFISKEN-klassen-er- modu.jpg...... 133

Illustration 24: Artists Impression of the future backbone of the Dutch Fleet, in: http://www.defensie.nl/binaries/content/gallery/defensie/content- afbeeldingen/onderwerpen/materieel/schepen/joint-logistic-support-ship-jss/joint-logistic- support-ship-jss.jpg ...... 143

Illustration 25: Visby-class corvette, in: http://www.mapps.l- 3com.com/photo_gallery/pg_VisbyClassCorvette.jpg ...... 153

Illustration 26: Swedish coastal Artillery, in: http://coldwarsites.net/country/sweden/arholma- nord-arholma-battery/...... 155

Illustration 27: Ship being hit by Königsberg Naval Strike Missile, in: http://i.ytimg.com/vi/xJuoqu62K-4/maxresdefault.jpg ...... 159

Illustration 28: The Skjold air-cushion warship operating amon Norwegian Fjords, in: http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Skjold-Class- Corvette.jpg ...... 163

Illustration 29: All four Horizon-class air-defense destroyers, in: http://www.deagel.com/library1/medium/2009/m02009050700006.jpg ...... 168

Illustration 30: T Fleet Replenishment at high sea, in: https://s-media-cache- ak0.pinimg.com/736x/27/37/28/273728d26362a60827424c8843038908.jpg...... 172

Illustration 31: Chinese and Japanase commanders having a discussion during RIMPAC, in: http://i.imgur.com/nCJevap.jpg ...... 177

In the case of illustrations without common license, reproduction has been made without the approval of the owner.

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