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The Decline of European Sea Power Europe's Navies in a Time of Austerity and Brinkmanship

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The Decline of European Sea Power Europe's Navies in a Time of Austerity and Brinkmanship Diplomarbeit zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades eines Magisters der Philosophie an der Karl-Franzens Universität Graz vorgelegt von Jeremy STÖHS am Institut für Geschichte Begutachter: Ao.Univ.-Prof. i.R. Mag. Dr. phil. Siegfried Beer Graz, 2015 Acknowledgments First and foremost, I want to express my profound gratitude to my parents. This thesis is the result of their unconditional support throughout my life. I owe all of my achievements to them. I also want to thank Professor Siegfried Beer for encouraging me to pursue excellence in my studies and for providing me with so many opportunities to study, discuss, and write about what interests me most. Finally, I want to thank Diana for all her love. 1 Table of Content List of Acronyms and Abbreviations ......................................................................................... 3 List of Figures: ........................................................................................................................... 5 PART ONE ............................................................................................................................... 7 1) Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 7 2) Principles of Sea Power ................................................................................................... 14 3) The ‘Pivot’ Towards Asia – and the Consequences for Europe ...................................... 23 PART TWO ............................................................................................................................ 30 4) Case Studies: Analyzing Europe’s Navies ....................................................................... 30 5) The UNITED KINGDOM: Keep Calm and Get Those Carriers Operational ................. 33 6) FRANCE: Stretched but Willing – Europe’s Most Capable Naval Force ....................... 50 7) ITALY: The Marina Militare – Between Global Interest and Regional Necessities. ..... 65 8) SPAIN: Creating a Well-Balanced Fleet – and Maintaining It ........................................ 81 8) TURKEY and GREECE: Allies and Yet Not Friends – Diverging Naval Powers ......... 96 8.1) Turkey ......................................................................................................................... 100 8.2) Greece ......................................................................................................................... 105 9) GERMANY: Reluctance and Reductions – Not Stepping Up to the Plate .................... 111 10) DENMARK and the NETHERLANDS: Commercial Might and Military Inaptitude 127 10.1) Denmark .................................................................................................................... 131 10.2) The Netherlands ........................................................................................................ 140 11) FINLAND, SWEDEN, NORWAY: Scandinavian Navies Sticking to their Guns ..... 147 11.1) Finland ...................................................................................................................... 150 11.2) Sweden ...................................................................................................................... 153 11.3) Norway ...................................................................................................................... 159 PART THREE ...................................................................................................................... 166 12) Analysis and Observations – Quo Vadis Europe? ....................................................... 166 13) Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 174 2 Appendices ............................................................................................................................. 183 Selected Bibliography ............................................................................................................ 189 List of Illustrations ................................................................................................................. 207 List of Acronyms and Abbreviations A2/AD: anti-access/area-denial AAW: anti-air warfare ABM: anti-ballistic missile APAR: active phased-array radar, also AESA: active electronically scanned array APR: Asian-Pacific Region ASN: anti-ship missile AsuW: anti-surface warfare ASW: anti-submarine warfare CATOBAR: catapult-arrested take-off barrier-assisted recovery CIWS: close-in weapon system CODOG: combined diesel or gas COIN: counterinsurgency CT: counterterrorism CTF: combined task force DoD: United States Department of Defense EEZ: exclusive economic zone EMI/EMC: Electromagnetic interference / electromagnetic compatibility EMPAR: European Multifunction Phased Array Radar ERAM: Extended Range Active Missile (RIM-174 Standard SM-6) ESSM: Evolved Sea-Sparrow Missile EU: European Union FREMM: Frégate européenne multi-mission GDP: gross domestic product GIN: Greenland-Iceland-Norway (gap) HADR: human assistance and disaster relief 3 ISIS: Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (also IS: Islamic State) LCF: Luchtverdedigings en Commando Fregat, Dutch air defense frigate LCS: littoral combat ship LHA: landing helicopter assault (amphibious assault ship) LHD: landing helicopter dock LPD: landing platform dock LSD: landing ship dock MCM: mine countermeasure MM: Marina Militare MN: Marine Nationale MoD: Ministry of Defense (general) MW: mine warfare NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization NLG: Netherlands Guilder OPV: offshore patrol vessel OSCE: Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe PAAMS: principle anti-air missile system RAM: radar absorbing material, RDN: Royal Danish Navy RIMPAC: Rim of the Pacific (exercise) RN: Royal Navy RNLN: Royal Netherlands Navy RNoN: Royal Norwegian Navy SAM: surface to air missile SAR: search and rescue SDR: Strategic Defense Review (U.K.) SDSR: Strategic Defense and Security Review (U.K.) SIGINT: signal intelligence SLBM: submarine launched ballistic missile SLOC: sea-lines of communication SMART-L: Signaal Multibeam Acquisition Radar for Tracking, L-Band SNMG: Standing Naval Maritime Group 4 SSBN: ship submersible ballistic missile nuclear (nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines) SSK: ship submersible conventional (diesel-electric powered submarine) SSM: surface to surface missile SSN: ship submersible nuclear (nuclear powered attack submarine) STANAVFORLANT: Standing Naval Force Atlantic STANAVFORMED: Standing Naval Force Mediterranean STOVL: short take-off or vertical landing TEU: Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit (standard container) UK: United Kingdom UN: United Nations UNIFIL: United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon UNISON: United Nations Operation in Somalia US: United States USN: United States Navy VLS: vertical launch system VSTOL: vertical and/or short take-off and landing List of Figures: Figure 1: United Kingdom – Defense Spending ...................................................................... 33 Figure 2: United Kingdom – Number of Major Vessels .......................................................... 34 Figure 3: France – Defense Spending ...................................................................................... 50 Figure 4: France – Number of Major Vessels .......................................................................... 51 Figure 5: Italy – Defense Spending .......................................................................................... 65 Figure 6: Italy – Number of Major Vessels. ............................................................................. 65 Figure 7: Spain – Defense Spending ........................................................................................ 81 Figure 8: Spain – Number of Major Vessels. ........................................................................... 81 Figure 9: Turkey – Defense Spending ...................................................................................... 96 Figure 10: Turkey – Number of Major Vessels. ...................................................................... 97 Figure 11: Greece – Defense Spending .................................................................................... 97 Figure 12: Greece – Number of Major Vessels. ....................................................................... 98 Figure 13: Germany – Defense Spending .............................................................................. 111 5 Figure 14: Germany – Number of Major Vessels. ................................................................. 112 Figure 15: The Netherlands – Defense Spending ................................................................... 127 Figure 16: The Netherlands – Number of Major Vessels. ..................................................... 127 Figure 17: Denmark – Defense Spending .............................................................................. 128 Figure 18: Denmark – Number of Major Vessels. ................................................................. 128 Figure 19: Finland – Defense Spending ................................................................................. 147 Figure 20: Sweden – Defense Spending ................................................................................ 147
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