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2–3/2018 Kr 48,- TIDSAM 1098-02 NORWEGIAN DEFENCE And ECURITY ndUSTRIES ssOCIATION 9 770806 615906 02 S I A RETURUKEReturuke 39 v 12 STYRETS ÅRSBERETNING 2017 GiraffeFlexible protection for mobile forces1X Saab Technologies Norway AS saab.no CONTENTS CONTENTS: MINE CLEARANCE Editor-in-Chief: 2 The future is unmanned M.Sc. Bjørn Domaas Josefsen NSM 6 US Navy selects Naval Strike Missile NORDIC DEFENCE CO- OPERATION; NOT NECESSARILY DOOMED TO FAILURE NORDEFCO 8 NDIS (Nordic Defence Industry Seminar) 2018 Nordic collaboration within the defence sector has for many years been riddled with good intentions, but often with meagre results to show for all the efforts. FSi The Nordic countries are often regarded as a common unit, with 11 Norwegian Defence and Security almost similar languages (except Finland), a great deal of cultural Industries Association (FSi) similarity, and a long-standing tradition for co-operation on a number of different arenas. And yet, there are significant differences between the countries, not 17 ÅRSRAPPORT 2017 least from a security political and military point of view. Two of the Nordic countries are members of NATO, while two are BULLETIN BOARD FOR DEFENCE, alliance-free. Finland has an extended land border to Russia, while INDUSTRY AND TRADE Norway has a short land border as well as a long demarcation line at sea. Neither Sweden nor Denmark have land borders to Russia. 59 Gripen Plant in Brazil Sweden and Finland have huge forest regions, where Norway has 61 Command post shelters for Kongsberg fjords, mountains and deep valleys; Denmark mainly consists of a flat 63 Training Systems for the Swedish Army culture landscape spread across some mainland and a few large islands. 66 £2.9bn gap to maintain Nuclear Enterprise One further and significant difference is that of climatic challenges; where Norway, Sweden and Finland are highly dependent on keeping 67 Carl-Gustaf Ammunition for Norway the Defence functional and operational in freezing snow and Arctic conditions, this is not so much an issue for Denmark. GRIPEN Furthermore, the defence industries are quite different in the 68 Gripen masterminds Nordic countries. Norway, Denmark and Finland each has a small and niche- oriented defence industry. Sweden, on the other hand, has a major defence industry delivering complete systems within several areas, F-35 and which to a great extent sets the premises for Sweden’s choices of 72 Three new F-35 aircraft to Norway defence materiel. Critics may claim that the successes in Nordic defence co-operation over the years are outnumbered by the fiascos. Cases in point include the Standard Nordic Helicopter project and the artillery system Archer. The selection by Norway and Denmark of the F-35 over the rival Gripen is another dark chapter from a Nordic defence co-operation perspective, at Coverphoto: Minesweeper KNM Otra. KNM Otra is the second mine- least with Swedish eyes. sweeper of the Alta-class minesweepers. Populists say that the reason for the failure of Nordic collaboration is Photo: Frederick A. Bakken/FMS that the countries lack the will and determination to co-operate. But the four countries’ defences are also faced with quite different prerequisites, parameters, challenges and prioritizations, all of which combine to create difficulties for co-operation on joint and common solutions. It must also be said that the basic premise for many of the bigger collaborative projects over the years, has been for the ‘other’ Nordic countries to buy weapons systems developed and made by the mighty Swedish defence industry. Any Nordic collaboration on new fighter aircraft would as a given be based on Norway and Denmark, and Finland as well, buying the Swedish Gripen fighter planes. The reverse was just unthinkable – that when Norway and Denmark opted for the F-35, then Sweden and Finland could do the same, and enjoy Nordic collaboration on the operation and maintenance of these aircraft. Still, there are areas where the Nordic collaboration has produced satisfactory results. This goes for many cases of purchases of materiel, and not least is it true for exercises and training. Cross Border Training (CBT) means that the Nordic countries can conduct exercises in each other’s air spaces, without applying for permission in each case. Work is also directed towards a closer Nordic co-operation with regard to participation in international operations. So even if there have been some memorable failures, sometimes based on poorly founded project parameters, the Nordic co-operation has had its share of successes as well. And with all the Nordic countries currently ramping up their defence spending, chances are there will be other successes to explore for Nordic defence co-operation. MILITÆRTEKNIKK 2–3/2018 1 MINE CLEARANCE Minevessel KNM Måløy outside Bødø in Northern Norway. Though no final conclusion yet is made, the future Norwegian Navy´s mine clearing capacity is probably unmanned. In the sky above the vessel are four Bell 412 helicopters. Photo: FMS/Torbjørn Kjosvold MINE CLEARANCE AT SEA; THE FUTURE IS UNMANNED Mine counter-measures at sea are a vitally important capacity Both the Oksøy class and the Alta class were for the Norwegian Navy. As of today, the main elements in this developed with a design service life span of 25 years. This means that the Navy is now capability is made up of manned vessels, while mine clearing entering a phase where the maritime mine operations of the future will in all likelihood be done using clearing capa bility neds to be evaluated, unmanned vessels. and the Ministry of defence has to this end launched the Project P6359; Future ea mines will be a serious threat to blocked by sea mines. This situation forms Maritime Mine Counter-measure capa bility. Norway in any crisis situation. The the background for the high priority given The goal of the project is to procure what SNorwegian coastline is huge, and a to mine counter-measures in the defence of will be the mine counter-measure capa- critical issue in any crisis will be the ability Norway. bility of Norway for the future, from 2022 to transport military forces and materiel In the period of 1990 to 1995, the onwards. along the coast. Further to this, the defence Norwegian Navy had a total of nine mine of Norway relies on open sea lanes to and clearing vessels built, comprising 4 mine Mine clearing today from Norway, in order to receive allied hunters of the Oksøy Class and 5 mine- When the presence of sea mines is forces to assist when the situation merits sweepers of the Alta class. As per today, suspected in an area, there are mainly two this. This makes keeping these transport several of these ships have been phased alternative forms of mine clearing to call lines at sea safe absolutely critical for the out, and the current Norwegian maritime upon: Mine hunting or mine sweeping. country’s safety. Both the north to south mine clearing capacity amounts to 2 Mine hunting entails searching coast line and the sea routes to our allied Oksøy Class mine hunters and 2 Alta class for mines on the seabed using sonar partners, however, can be relatively “easily” minesweepers, in addition to mine divers. ( acoustics). When a possible mine has 2 MILITÆRTEKNIKK 2–3/2018 MINE CLEARANCE rendered harmless with a better view of how far Hugin single-use weapon launched has progressed in the charting ODIN AND HUGIN from the Odin, and controlled operation. FFI – the Defence Research Establishment remotely by an operator When the sub mersible – and the Kongsberg Group are co-operating located at a safe distance on has finished charting the sea- on the development of Odin, and unmanned board the mother ship. Where bed, it will return carrying surface vessel, and Hugin, an unmanned sub- we are unable to hunt mines high-resolution sonar images using sonar, one or more and live video of mine-like mersible craft. Odin vessels will be deployed objects. The mines are then he concept sketch is effective range of the operation to perform unmanned mine rendered harmless with a T picturing Odin taking is greater, and the crew on sweeps, to detonate the mines. single-use weapon launched the submersible Hugin into board the mother ship gets a While Hugin operates from the Odin, and controlled the mine-endangered area, to better view of how far Hugin under water, the Odin on the remotely by an operator located launch the Hugin there. has progressed in the charting surface keeps radio contact at a safe distance on board the While Hugin operates operation. with the mother ship where the mother ship. under water, the Odin on the When the sub mersible crew is, while simultaneously Where we are unable surface keeps radio contact has finished charting the keeping track and control of to hunt mines using sonar, with the mother ship where the seabed, it will return carrying Hugin. In this manner, the one or more Odin vessels crew is, while simultaneously high-resolution sonar images effective range of the operation will be deployed to perform keeping track and control of and live video of mine-like is greater, and the crew on unmanned mine sweeps, to Hugin. In this manner, the objects. The mines are then board the mother ship gets a detonate the mines. Minevessel KNM Måløy outside Bødø in Northern Norway. Though no final conclusion yet is made, the future Norwegian Navy´s mine clearing capacity is probably unmanned. In the sky above the vessel are four Bell 412 helicopters. Photo: FMS/Torbjørn Kjosvold Hugin. Photo: FMS Odin Photo: FFI been located, an unmanned suspected mine-infested area SEA MINES: submersible vessel or a diver is dragging a load that simulates About a million sea mines are inflicting radius.