What Is Jakarta's Popular Politics a Case
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What is Jakarta’s Popular Politics a Case of? Olle Törnquist (02.07.2016) Introduction Anyone following Indonesian news from 2012 and a few years ahead must have been overwhelmed by the hype around Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo’s successful campaign for the position as governor of Jakarta and then renewed governance of the region, followed by his engagement in the presidential race. There were almost daily reports about so called blusukans – unannounced and unpretentious visits in the field – to demonstrate that here was a man of the people who listened to the people. And this was followed up then by immediate measures on (some of) the complaints and ideas from the grassroots. The general message of Jokowi and his partner for the position as Vice Mayor, Basuki Tjahaja ‘Ahok’ Purnama, was that they would reform the chaotic city, and that this would be possible in spite of powerful vested interests, frequently operating in tandem with fixers and gangsters (Wilson 2015), by cooperating with both non-corrupt business and ordinary people, including the urban poor. The major priorities were to improve public governance and fight corruption as well as the regular flooding of the city; to upgrade the miserable public transportation system; and to increase minimum wages while also swiftly implementing and improving on the recently legislated national health scheme. Significantly: when infrastructural improvements and beautification required that the poor had to abandon their residences and stalls, there would be negotiations with them and their organisations; and decent alternatives would be provided. Much of this was fresh and inspiring, but it was not unique. Rather, it was an exciting case of a broader trend; a case which therefore also allows for discussions of wider problems and options.1 Electable country boys 1 I shall draw primarily on the results from the democracy studies and assessments that I have been involved in since the mid-1990s in cooperation with concerned Indonesian scholars and knowledgeable and reflective activists, reported on in, primarily, Budiman and Törnquist (2001), Priyono et al (2007), Samadhi and Warouw (2009), Törnquist et al. ( 2010-11), Törnquist (2013), Savirani et al. (2015) and, for this chapter most importantly, Djani et al. (2016). In these works there are also further references. I am also drawing on wider comparative analyses of similar progressive policies in the Global South, reported on in the anthologies by Harriss et al. (2004), Törnquist et al. (2009), Stokke and Törnquist (2013), and Törnquist and Harriss (2016). 1 Jokowi as well as Ahok were country boys from rather modest circumstances, in sharp contrast to the metropolitan political elite. Ahok, a former ethnic Chinese businessman turned reformist regent of Belitung, the mining island off Sumatra’s east coast, had been elected to the House of Representatives (DPR) in Jakarta, from where he also supported the campaign for the national public health scheme and tried but failed to run as an independent candidate in the governor elections. His blunt managerial style attracted sceptics of the inefficient administration and served like a bad cop to the good cop-cum-media darling Jokowi with the unique ability to combine pragmatic business skills with charm and populist charisma, in-spite of poor rhetorical capacity. Most interestingly, however, Jokowi’s attraction was not just fashioned but also based on his outstanding reputation as the mayor since 2005 of the Central Java town of Solo. During his leadership, Solo had changed from chaos and conflicts to relative prosperity and social cooperation. This royal but run down country and business town became an ‘innovation site’ that combined cultural events and novel governance, and attracted donors and activists as well as media and reformers. Jokowi received numerous awards, became internationally famous and was re-elected in 2010 with more than 90 percent of the votes. Comment [OT1]: MT asked for comments on the new style of mayoral leadership in Indonesia. I try to do some of Yet, neither Ahok nor Jokowi were brought to Jakarta on the basis of strong popular that a bit later on when discussing post- clientelism. movements. The less glamorous truth is that party bosses and oligarchs in both Sukarno’s daughter Megawati’s Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) and Suharto’s previous son in law and former general Prabowo’s Great Indonesia Movement party (Gerindra) needed him to put up a fight against the incumbent Governor of Jakarta, Fauzi ‘Foky’ Bowo. As Foky was supported by most of the other parties plus major businessmen and the ethnic Batawi groups of fixers-cum-gangsters, Megawati and Prabowo had to join hands and pick particularly appealing candidates. Ahok, then, did not just have a good track record but also an ethnic Chinese background that was attractive to Prabowo, who as an aspiring candidate for the presidency had to show that he had changed since 1998 when instigating anti-Chinese riots to confuse the opposition against Suharto. And the main message to Megawati by Jokowi’s intellectual friends was that he was an unusually clean PDI-P associate that had proved to be the country’s prime vote-getter. Yet, there was more than credibility and electability to Jokowi. His popularity had a solid base in the remarkable achievements in Solo. So in order to understand the case of Jokowi in Jakarta, it is fundamental to understand what these previous developments were about, how 2 they related to other cases and to the problems of carrying them along to the big city and the national level. Comment [OT2]: I know that some of you suggest that the Solo story can be reduced, but I’m not convinced. Rather, I Civil society going politics think it’s was a matter of breaking up the previous long section called Solo, and to thus make it more clear why it is so The case of Solo was a breakthrough in Indonesia for civil society and movement activists important to account for the previous successes and problems in order to understand the case of Jokowi in Jakarta. who had so far failed to make a difference within organised politics after Suharto, in-spite of Also, a lot of what was under the title of having undermined his regime. The weakness of the progressive groups in the country had, of the previous section on Solo was actually about the wider background and course, deep roots in the repression in the mid-1960s against the then largest reform-oriented international cases, which you also indicated should get some more attention. popular movement in the world, followed by thirty years of authoritarian rule. But the drawback of the pro-democrats rested also with the internationally supported elite-pacts in the aftermath of Suharto’s debacle. These pacts held back alternative mass organising and electoral participation of new parties.2 Moreover, the dissidents themselves were unable to come together and to challenge this. Numerous attempts were made, but the early focus on separate specific issues (such as human rights and gender equality, land reform and the workers’ plights, anti-corruption and environmental concerns) persisted. The same applied to the emphasis on the victims rather than what they had in common with broader sections of the population. In structural terms the fragmentation of the progressive groups reflected the scattered interests among ordinary people in the context of uneven economic development as well as the lack of unifying ideological perspectives. But the divisiveness of the democracy movement was also because it made more sense to middle class based leaders in particular to focus on special groups, campaigns and lobbying in addition to special agreements with mainstream politicians in order to gain funding and reach short term results, than to try to alter the elitist character of the new democracy before being able to stand a decent chance to, for example, run in election with an alternative party. (Prasetyo et al. 2003, A.E. Priyono et al. 2007, Samadhi et al. 2009, Nur et al. 2009; Törnquist et al. 2009; Törnquist 2013) So by the early 2000, the many different groups that tried to link up with people with grievances were simply in great need of both alternative rallying points and of getting into organised politics – and in Solo there seemed to be an opening for both. New local politicians in need of extra parliamentary support Moreover, Solo was the prime Indonesian case for Indonesia’s new populist politics. This may be characterised in terms of what James Manor (2013) has, in increasingly similar Indian 2 For recent overviews and references, Savirani and Törnquist (2015) and Törnquist (2016). 3 contexts, named post-clientelism. His notion refers to the number of measures which many politicians must now add to clientelism to win elections, given that the old personalised linkages between patrons and clients have been undermined by economic and social change. The common supplementary measures include, of course, strong-men practices and personality oriented politics, but also populist ideas and means of mobilisation, sometimes combined with understandings with civil society leaders and unions to gain sympathies among workers and the educated middle classes too. In Indonesia, various brands of post-clientelist pattern became particularly apparent in the context of decentralisation and (after 2004) the new direct local elections of political executives in districts, cities and provinces. The direct elections meant that machine politics became even more crucial and that political activists turned professional in conducting intensive manoeuvring and applying various campaign techniques including through media. Moreover, personalities and popularity were fundamental; and surveys about the ‘public opinion’ rather than the development of strategic reforms were in the forefront. One of the pioneering cases was the initial phase of post-conflict democratisation in Aceh after the tsunami and the peace negotiations.