Nuclear Proliferation International and Regional Challenges for Pakistan and Iran

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NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL CHALLENGES FOR PAKISTAN AND IRAN

A DOCTORAL DISSERTATION By M. UMAIR RAFIQUE

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE UNIVERSITY OF KARACHI KARACHI – PAKISTAN

2014

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL CHALLENGES FOR PAKISTAN AND IRAN

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF KARACHI IN FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

POLITICAL SCIENCE

M. UMAIR RAFIQUE

UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF

PROF. DR. TANWEER KHALID

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE UNIVERSITY OF KARACHI KARACHI – PAKISTAN

2014

CERTIFICATE

Certified that Mr. Muhammad Umair Rafique S/O Rafique Ahmed has written this thesis titled, “Nuclear Proliferation: International and Regional Challenges for Pakistan and

Iran” from Department of Political Science, University of Karachi towards the fulfillment of the requirement of Ph.D. degree. To the best of my knowledge the dissertation is based on original research.

Prof. Dr. Tanweer Khalid Research Supervisor Department of Political Science University of Karachi

DEDICATED TO MY PARENTS

MIAN RAFIQUE AHMED & TANWEER KAUSAR

Thank you for your appreciation and love without your support I wouldn't have been able to acquire this milestone

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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TABLE OF CONTENT………………………………………………………... i-x LIST OF TABLES……………………………………………………………... Xi ACNOWLEDGMENT………………………………………………………… Xii ABSTRACT………………………………………………………………...... xiii-xiv INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………… 1-8 CHPTER: 1 1. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: A STRATEGY FOR POWER………. 9-10

1.1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS: POTENTIAL AND IMPACT……………. 10-12 1.2. EVOLUTION OF NUCLEARIZATION……………………………. 12-13 1.3. HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION………………………………… 13-15 1.4. VERTICAL PROLIFERATION…………………………………….. 15-16 1.5. THEORIZING OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION……………….. 16 1.5.1. LIBERAL THEORY ON NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 16 1.5.2. STRUCTURAL REALIST APPROACHES TO NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION………………………………….. 17 1.5.3. RADICAL FEMINIST APPROACHES TO NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION………………………………… 17-18 1.5.4. CRITICAL SECURITY APPROACHES AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION………………………………… 18 1.5.5. POSTMODERNISM AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION……………………………………………… 18-19 1.5.6. CRITICAL CONSTRUCTIVISTS AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION………………………………………………… 19 1.6. MOTIVATIONS OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION…………...... 19-20 1.6.1. NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS………………. 20-21 1.6.2. STRATEGIC MOTIVATIONS……………………….. 21-22 1.6.3. POWER, STATUS AND PRESTIGE………………… 22-23

1.6.4. TECHNICAL IMPERATIVES……………………….. 23-24 1.6.5. REGIONAL POLITICS……………………………….. 24-25 1.7. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE………………………………………….. 25-26 1.8. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY…………………………………………………………….. 26-29 CHAPTER: 2 2. NON PROLIFERATION: GLOBAL EFFORTS FOR A NUCLEAR FREE WORLD…………………………………………………………….. 34 2.1. EARLY EFFORTS FOR NON-PROLIFERATION………………... 35-36 2.2. ATOM FOR PEACE PROGRAM…………………………………… 36-37 2.3. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA)……… 37-39 2.4. GENERAL AND COMPREHENSIVE DISARMAMENT………… 40

2.5. NEW EFFORTS FOR ARMS REDUCTION……………………….. 40-41 2.5.1. PTBT (PARTIAL TEST BAN TREATY)……………………. 41 2.5.2. NPT (NON-NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION TREATY) 41-44 2.5.3. EXPORT CONTROL GROUPS: NSG AND MTCR………... 44-45 2.5.4. REGIONAL NONPROLIFERATION TREATIES OR NUCLEAR FREE ZONES………………………………………… 45-46 2.5.5. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS…...... 46-47 2.5.6. COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY(CTBT)………… 47-49

2.6. CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES BETWEEN SUPER 49 POWERS……………………………………………………………….

2.6.1. SALT I (STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS)…….. 49-50

2.6.1.1. THE INTERIM AGREEMENT………………. 50 2.6.1.2. ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY…...... 51 2.6.2. SALT II…………………………………………………………. 51-52 2.6.3. INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY (INF TREATY)……………………………………………………... 52 - 5 3 2.6.4. START I (STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY) 53-54

2.6.5. START II (STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY) 55 2.6.6. SORT (STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE REDUCTION TREATY) 55-56 2.6.7. NEW START………………………………………………… 56-57 2.6.8. COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM (CTR)……………………………………………………………...... 57-58 2.6.9. INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY CENTER (ISTC) FOR RUSSIAN SCIENTISTS………………… 58-59 2.6.10. FISSILE MATERIAL PRODUCTION CUTOFF TREATY (FMCT)……………………………………………………………… 59-60

2.7. NUCLEAR TERRORISM……………………………………………. 60-64 CHAPTER: 3

3. PAKISTAN AND ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM: FROM THE PAST TO THE PRESENT……………………………………………………...... 70

3.1. STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF PAKISTAN…………………….. 70-71

3.2. PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM: THE BEGINNING……… 72

3.2.1. PHASE I: 1954-1970…………………………………………… 72-74 3.2.1.1. 1968 NPT DECISION…………………………………. 74

3.2.2. PHASE II: 1971-1998…………………………………………... 74 3.2.2.1. THE 1971'S INCIDENT OF EAST PAKISTAN (BANGLADESH)…………………………………………… 74-76 3.2.2.2. Z.A. BHUTTO’S INITIATIVE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM……………………………………. 76-77

3.2.2.3. FINANCIAL SUPPORT FROM GULF STATES…… 77-78

3.2.2.4. INDIAN NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS OF 1974 AND PAKISTAN’S RESPONSE…………………………………. 78-79

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3.2.2.5. Z.A. BHUTTO AND PAKISTAN’S QUEST FOR NUCLEAR WEAPON……………………………………… 79-80 3.2.2.6. PROJECT 706 OR 726……………………………… 80-81 3.2.2.7. DR. ABDUL QADEER KHAN’S INVOLVEMENT IN PAKISTAN’S WEAPONRY PROGRAM…………….. 81-82 3.2.2.8. FORMATION OF KAHUTA RESEARCH LABORATORIES………………………………………….. 83 3.2.2.9. MILITARY’S ROLE ON WEAPONRY PROGRAM IN BHUTTO’S ERA………………………………………... 83-84 3.2.2.10. GENERAL ZIA UL HAQ’S TAKE OVER AND MILITARY’S INVOLVEMENT IN PROGRAM……...... 84-85 3.2.2.11. ZIA’S INITIAL DIFFICULTIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE………………………...... 85-86 3.2.2.12. PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM SHIFT IN U.S POLICY………………………………………………… 86-88 3.2.2.13. PAKISTAN’S SECURITY MEASURES TO INTERCEPT FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND

ATTACKS………………………………………………...... 88-89 3.2.2.14. PAKISTAN’S CONDUCTING OF SECRET NUCLEAR COLD TESTS………………………………. 89-90 3.2.2.15. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN ZIA ERA………… 90-93

3.2.2.16. THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY (CTBT) AND PAKISTAN…………………………………. 93 3.2.2.17. NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT IN MIAN NAWAZ SHARIF’S ERA……………………………………………... 93 3.2.2.18. INDIAN NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS…………………. 94

3.2.2.19. PAKISTAN’S DECISION TO TEST NUCLEAR WEAPON……………………………………………………. 94-98 3.2.2.20. INTERNATIONAL REACTION ON NUCLEAR TEST…………………………………………………………. 98-99

3.2.2.21. PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES………………………………………………….. 99-100 3.2.3. PHASE III 1999 TO PRESENT………………………………. 100 3.2.3.1. CREATION OF NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITY (NCA)……………………………………….. 100-101 3.2.3.2. EMPLOYMENT CONTROL COMMITTEE (ECC) 101-102 3.2.3.3. DEVELOPMENT CONTROL COMMITTEE (DCC) 102 3.2.3.4. STRATEGIC PLAN DIVISION (SPD)………………. 102-103

3.2.3.5. THE SERVICES' STRATEGIC FORCES COMMAND (SSFC)……………………………………...... 103 3.2.3.6. POST-TEST NUCLEAR DOCTRINE………………. 103-105

3.2.3.7. CURRENT LEVEL OF FISSILE MATERIAL AND NUCLEAR WARHEADS…………………………………... 105-106 3.2.3.8. CHINA’S COOPERATION IN PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM……………………………………. 106-108 CHAPTER: 4 4. DYNAMICS OF IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM…………………… 119 4.1. THE SHAH, IMPERIAL POWERS AND USA…………………….. 120-122 4.2. SHAHS' VISION FOR IRAN………………………………………… 122 4.3. THE BEGINNING OF THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM…………...... 123 4.3.1. AKBAR ETEMAD THE ARCHITECT OF IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM…………………………………………… 123-124 4.3.2. THE ECONOMY FACTOR AND THE NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY……………………………………………………. 124-125 4.3.3. 1968 NPT DECISION AND IRAN……………………………. 125-126 4.3.4. THE CREATION OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY ORGANIZATION OF IRAN (AEOI)…………………………….. 126-127 4.3.5. FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN THE DECADE OF 70s… 127-128 4.3.6. THE AMERICAN IRANIAN COLLABORATION FOR THE TRANSFORMATION OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY… 128-131

4.3.7. THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION: THE END OF SHAH'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM…………………………………………… 131-132 4.4. RESTARTING AND RECONSTRUCTING THE PROGRAM: INITIAL DIFFICULTIES……………………………………………. 132-133 4.5. THE REBIRTH OF NUCLEAR PROGRAM………………………. 133-134 4.5.1. IRAN-CHINA CO-OPERATION IN NUCLEAR PROGRAM…………………………………………………………. 135 4.5.2. SOVIET ASSISTANCE IN IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM…………………………………………………………. 135-138 4.6. THE NEW ERA OF DEVELOPMENT……………………………... 138 4.6.1. THE IRAN’S NUCLEAR CRISES: AN ERA OF TWIST AND TURNS………………………………………………………... 138-140 4.6.2. THE BIRTH OF THE EU-3 AND TEHRAN AGREEMENT 140-143 4.6.3. THE PARIS AGREEMENT AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS…………………………………………………. 143-144 4.6.4. ROAD TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL…………………….. 144

4.7. ENTERING INTO NEW ERA: AHMADINEJAD COMING INTO POWER AND END OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT……………… 144-147 4.7.1. THE BIRTH OF THE P5+1 AND ROAD TO SECURITY COUNCIL…………………………………………………………... 147-148 4.7.2. THE CARROT AND STICK PACKAGE BY P5+1……… 149 4.7.3. UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1696………… 149-150 4.7.4. UN SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN: RESOLUTION 1737 150-151 4.7.5. SECOND SET OF SANCTIONS: RESOLUTION 1747 151-152 4.7.6. FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS AND MORE SANCTIONS 152-154 4.7.7. THE NEW AMERICAN PRESIDENT WITH A NEW STRATEGY………………………………………………………… 154-155 4.7.8. THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS…………………………. 155-156 4.7.9. THE TEHRAN DECLARATION………………………….. 156 4.7.10. ANOTHER SANCTION: RESOLUTION 1929…………... 156-157 4.7.11. AFTERMATH OF RESOLUTION 1929………………….. 157-158

4.7.12. THE CYBER ATTACK ON IRAN………………………… 158 4.7.13. FURTHER TALKS AND OIL EMBARGO ON TEHRAN 159 4.8. THE ERA OF PROPOSALS AND NEGOTIATIONS………….. 159-162 4.9. NEW ADMINISTRATION WITH MORE MODERATE STANCE ON NUCLEAR TALKS…………………………………………….. 162-164 4.9.1. THE BREAKTHROUGH BETWEEN P5+1 AND IRAN 164-166

4.9.1.1. VERIFICATION MECHANISM…………………… 166 4.10. RESPONSE ON IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL FROM REGIONAL AND WORLD POWERS…………………………… 167-172 CHAPTER: 5 5. REGIONAL IMPLICATION OF PAKISTAN AND IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM………………………………………………… 182 5.1. IRANIAN NUCLEAR IMPLICATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST REGION……………………………………………………...... 183 5.1.1. GCC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR 183-184 PROGRAM………………………………………………………. 5.1.2. NUCLEAR RENAISSANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST….. 184-185 5.1.3. REGIONAL ARMS RACE FOR DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE PACTS………………………………………………. 185 5.1.3.1. ARAB MILITARY PURCHASES…………………. 185-188 5.1.3.2. PENINSULA SHIELD FORCE……………………. 189 5.1.4. U.S PRESENCE IN THE REGION AND ARAB PERCEPTION…………………………………………………… 190-191 5.1.4.1. MILITARY COOPERATION WITH WEST……... 191-192 5.1.5. ISRAELI POLICIES ON IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM………………………………………………………. 192-193 5.1.5.1. POLICY PRIORITIES AGAINST IRAN…………. 193-194

5.1.5.2. MILITARY DOCTRINE AND PREPARATION AGAINST IRANIAN OFFENSE ………………………. 194-196 5.2. PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR IMPLICATIONS IN SOUTH ASIA... 196

5.2.1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS DETERRENT………………... 196

5.2.1.1. THE 1986-87 BRASSTACKS CRISES…………….. 196-197

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5.2.1.2. POST 1998 SITUATION……………………………. 197

5.2.1.3. THE 1999 KARGIL CRISIS………………………... 197-198 5.2.1.4. 2001-2002 CRISIS…………………………………… 198-199

5.2.1.5. THE 2008 MUMBAI INCIDENT…………………... 199-200

5.2.1.6. MISSILE RACE BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN……………………………………………….. 200-202 5.2.2. A NEW ARMS RACE………………………………………. 202

5.2.2.1. INDIAN BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM AND PAKISTAN'S ACQUISITION OF CRUISE MISSILE CAPABILITIES…………………… 202-204 5.2.2.2. INDIAN COLD STARTS DOCTRINE AND PAKISTAN'S TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS…... 204-206 CHARTER: 6

6. CONCERNS AND REALITIES ON NUCLEAR PAKISTAN AND IRAN……………………………………………………………………... 215 6.1. ISSUES RELATED TO IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM…… 215

6.1.1. NUCLEAR IRAN: CONCERNS OF GULF STATES…… 215-216

6.1.2. THE ROOTS OF THE TENSION BETWEEN IRAN AND GULF STATES……………………………………………. 216-218 6.1.2.1. SHIITE FACTOR AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM……………………………………………….. 218-220 6.1.2.2. ISRAEL'S PERSPECTIVES AND INTERESTS REGARDING NUCLEAR IRAN……………………….. 220-222 6.1.3. THE IRAN PROBLEM: ASSUMPTIONS AND REALITIES……………………………………………………… 222-224 6.1.4. AMERICAN AND ISRAELI ALLEGATIONS AGAINST IRAN DURING 90s……………………………………………… 226-227 6.1.5. BEGINNING OF THE NEW MILLENNIUM WITH NEW ALLEGATIONS…………………………………………………… 227-229 6.1.6. REVEALING OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES: THE NEW FRONT AGAINST IRAN…………………………………………. 229-231 6.1.7. IRAN'S CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES………… 231-232

6.1.8. A NEW SERIES OF ALLEGATIONS AND REALITIES… 232-234

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6.1.9. SHIFT IN IRANIAN POLICY AFTER 2005……………..... 234-235

6.1.10. AHMADINEJAD AND "WIPING ISRAEL OFF THE MAP"…………………………………………………………….... 235

6.1.11. IRAN'S DECISION TO RESTART ITS ENRICHMENT PROGRAM AND ITS AFTER EFFECTS……………………… 236-239 6.2. CONCERNS OVER SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S ARSENAL.. 240-243 6.2.1. MEASURES TAKEN BY PAKISTAN TO SECURE ITS NUCLEAR ARSENAL…………………………………………... 243 6.2.1.1. SCREENING PROGRAMS FOR INDIVIDUALS… 243-244 6.2.1.2. PHYSICAL SECURITY AND SURVEILLANCE… 244-245 6.2.1.3. SECURITY OF NON MILITARY NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS………………………………………… 246-248 6.2.1.4. NUCLEAR EXPORT CONTROL PROGRAM…… 248-249

6.2.1.5. SECURITY MESSURES FOR DOMESTIC 249-251 STABILITY………………………………………………..

6.2.1.6. SECURITY MEASURES FOR DOMESTIC INSTABILITY……………………………………………… 251-253 6.2.1.7. NUCLEAR SAFETY AGAINST EXTERNAL THREATS OR NON STATE ACTORS………………….. 253-255 6.2.1.8. MOBILE LAUNCH SECURITY……………..……... 255

6.2.1.9. NUCLEAR LAUNCH AUTHORITY…………..…… 255-256 6.2.1.10. PARTICIPATION IN NUCLEAR SAFETY PROGRAMS……………………………………………….. 256-258 CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………….. 269-281

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS…………………………………… 284-289

APPANDIX NO: 01………….……………………………………………… 290-294

APPANDIX NO: 02………….……………………………………………… 295-298

APPANDIX NO: 03………………………………………………………… 299

APPANDIX NO: 04………………………………………………………… 300

APPANDIX NO: 05………………………………………………………… 301

APPANDIX NO: 06………………………………………………………… 302

BIBLOGRAPHY…………………………………………………………….. 303-317

LIST OF TABLES

SR TABLES PAGE NO NO 01 NUCLEAR-CAPABLE PAKISTANI AIRCRAFTS 99 02 PAKISTAN’S MISSILE CAPABILITIES 100 03 GROWTH OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ARSENAL, 1998— 108 2012 04 PAKISTAN’S FISSILE MATERIAL RELATED FACILITIES 109 05 PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR WEAPON STORAGE AND 110 DEVELOPMENT SITES

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

It is my pleasure to express my most sincere and profound gratitude to my research director Professor Dr. Tanweer Khalid, Dean Social Sciences and Management, Ziauddin University and ex-Chairperson of Department of Political Science, University of Karachi, for her untiring, consistent and valuable guidance in completion of this dissertation. She was very kind and showed immense patience for meticulous checking of the contents of chapters and pointing out errors. I am indebted for her guidance and supervision.

I would also like to acknowledge my debt to all those who have helped me in my research work. I particularly obliged to my colleague and research fellow Rani Erum for her constant assistance and suggestions on research work when I needed them most. I am thankful to Lubna Abdul Wahab for her support and cooperation throughout this research. I am also gratified to Syeda Hareem Fatima for rechecking the different aspects of dissertation.

I wish to express my heartfelt gratitude to Professor Dr. Azra Anjum and Professor Dr. S. Azhar Ali, Department of Political Science, University of Karachi for their guidance during M.S. course work with their valuable suggestions. I would also like to extend my thanks to Madam Nazneen, in charge Seminar library of the Department of Political Science, and Mr. Majid Modi, in charge of research facility center, University of Karachi for their valuable cooperation.

I would also like to express my love to my grandmother for her love and prays throughout this research work. Last but not the least, I offer my special thanks to my entire family for standing by me all the way through and for being a tremendous source of moral support.

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ABSTRACT

This is an analytical study designed to help international scholars and policy makers to identify a preferred political choice among possible alternatives. It is characterized with a systematic approach based on assumptions made on explicit objectives and criteria with a clearly defined course of action, compared in the light of their causes and consequences.

It is a well known fact that from the beginning of Twenty First century the global community is confronting with abundant security challenges and beside the threat of terrorism the concerns of nuclear terrorism through militants control on Pakistan's nuclear assets and state sponsored nuclear terrorism on behalf of Iranian clerics is one of the most burning phenomena in today's security issues. Keeping these concerns in mind, this research study has raised numerous questions for international analysts’ regarding global concerns on ideology and security infrastructure of Pakistan and Iran's nuclear program. The purpose of this research is to analyze the implications of Pakistan and Iran's nuclear programs. Both states are located in the most important strategic positions of their region and both have begun their nuclear programs in mid 50's under the aspiration of "Atom for Peace" program and today they are the focus of the international community for this very reason.

The research begins with a detailed analysis of the basic reasons and approaches promoting proliferation of nuclear arms. It also discusses the effects of nuclear proliferation on international security. After describing the different prospects of nuclear proliferation the research focuses on global efforts for promotion of peaceful purposes of nuclearization and prevention of weapons of mass destruction. International treaties on nuclear proliferation as well as the bilateral efforts by Washington and Moscow for disarmament are also kept in view.

The research then discusses the motives which became focal points in the initiation of Pakistan's nuclear weapon program. The role of different individuals and administrations throughout the development of country's nuclear program is also discussed in detail. It then describes the post-test scenario and efforts for the development of security structure and command and control system for its nuclear assets. The role and importance of these

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weapons as deterrence against India and how these weapons played their part during the crises with India is also studied in detail. This research work also describes the global anxiety on the security structure of Pakistan's civil and military nuclear facilities. With detailed study of these concerns and security measures taken by Pakistan the study evaluate the perception that Pakistani nuclear arsenals are threat for international security or it is only a myth and only reason behind this thought is domestic instability.

On the issue of Iranian nuclear program this research work is based on the detailed study of its evolution with reasons and incentives behind policy shifts by Iranian regimes. The first part is based on the prerevolutionary era and discusses the Iranian Western cooperation in the field of nuclear development. The second part is a detailed study on the post-revolutionary era and discusses the new Iranian-Western relations throughout the twentieth century. It then examines the post 2002 scenario when Iranian nuclear program became an international phenomenon as it was believed that Tehran is running a clandestine nuclear weapon program. Also, the effects of Iranian nuclear program on Tel Aviv and Arab Peninsula states and their policies towards Iran have been studied in detail. Furthermore, the international sanctions on Iran and its responding policies are also discussed briefly. It further provides the analysis on the dialogues among Iran and w powers with their implications. The dissertation has identified the more basic reasons behind the international and regional apprehension on Iranian nuclear program and also made the suggestion which could bring prospect of peaceful relations among Iran and concerning international community.

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INTRODCUTION

0.1. BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

The purpose of this research is to evaluate and investigate the dynamics of Pakistan and Iran's nuclear programs with their impact on international and regional politics. The issue of nuclear proliferation represents one of the more noticeable illustrations of globalization of world politics. The introduction of nuclear arsenals and their unmatched competence for wreaking obliteration across territorial boundaries has changed the world. Although only five states are acknowledged by the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear arsenals as possessing nuclear weapons, several others have the capability of building nuclear devices. In these countries Israel, India, Pakistan and South Korea are nuclear weaponry states with Iran viewed as a prospective client state.

The spread of nuclear arsenals to other countries represents a growing danger because the larger the number of countries that have these weapons the greater the likelihood that they will be used. Some of these new nuclear powers either actual or potential are authoritarian regimes that have serious conflicts with their neighbors.1 In less developed world for example in South Asia, Pakistan and India have territorial conflicts because of which both states have acquired nuclear arms. In the Middle East there is a conflict between Arabs and Israel. It is usually believed that Israel has already obtained nuclear weapons and has them ready for use or could have them ready in a very short time. 2

There are some motivations for nuclear proliferation in which study of the motivational aspect of nuclear armaments acquisition consequently focused on the strategic, political and prestige rationales which has guided these countries to seek nuclear arsenals. Efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation have embraced a wide range of unilateral, bilateral regional and global measures that are usually referred to collectively as the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. Advocates of the regime argue that it is the evolution of these measures which include arms control and disarmament treaties like the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), export controls, international monitoring procedures, nuclear suppliers, trading agreements and other standard setting arrangements that has constrained the

proliferation of nuclear arms since the 1960s. Critics on the other hand contend that nuclear non-proliferation regime is discriminate because it continues to allow five states to possess nuclear weaponry while all other parties must forego the acquisition of such a capability by signing the NPT.

Attempts to prevent nuclear proliferation in the future will therefore depend on the capacity of the nuclear nonproliferation regime to deal with the range of demands for nuclear armaments that could emerge and on the ability of five Nuclear weapon states (NWS) to deliver on their collective statement of nuclear intent.

In South Asia, Pakistan and India are arch rivals. Since the nuclear test by India in 1974 and then by Pakistan in May 1998 the focus on this region has been almost exclusively of the nuclear dimension and confrontation between the two states.

Many observers are concerned that other states or terrorist organizations could obtain material or expertise related to nuclear weapons from Pakistan. 3 It is also said that from the beginning of 1970s Islamabad used secret network to expand its nuclear armaments program. The point here is that the overall security situation in Pakistan is unstable with a large number of terrorist groups operating within the Northern territory of the country with armed insurrection. In this scenario international community has great concerns about nuclear security.

In the Middle East, Iran is the world’s second biggest oil producing nation which is also the gateway to the region. Since 2002 Iran’s nuclear program has raised serious concerns among the international community. America and its allies from the West and Middle East are adamant that Iran is trying to develop nuclear arsenals. But Iran denies this claim and after the intelligence bungles in Iraq such claims need to be re-examined with care.4 The Iranians reminded the world that their soldiers were victims of Saddam Hussein’s poison-gas attacks during the Iran- Iraq war and that they never retaliated in kind. 5 When asked why a country overflowing with oil and gas should want nuclear energy, Iran answered that its oil revenues will one day diminish and that in the meantime nuclear energy at home would result in more stocks of petrol for export. 6 It is a well-known fact that America and other western countries were glad to assist the Shah to develop a

nuclear program prior to the revolution. Why then what U.S deemed to profess as economic sense earlier is considered by it as absurd now?

The research aims to investigate the reasons behind Pakistan and Iran's nuclear development with their current nuclear status and also the main reason behind international concerns on these states nuclear programs and assets. How far can they be contained further from peaceful to non-peaceful purposes? What treatment could be meted out by nuclear powers specially the U.S? It needs to be ascertained how far Iran is intended to become a nuclear power and how can it be considered together with Pakistan for likely actions or reactions. Pakistan and Iran have their own significance in international and regional politics. Pakistan is playing an important role in the war on terror but it is itself becoming a victim to terrorism. The Western powers claim that as Pakistan is frontline Islamic state extremists can easily reach its nuclear assets and use them against the West and other regional powers. There are other concerns too on Pakistan’s nuclear program regarding its proliferation to other countries.

As for the Iranian nuclear program Israel and U.S describe it as a threat to the political stability of the Middle East. A nuclear Iran will have tremendous impact on the regions peace and stability. For U.S alone Iran’s nuclear arsenals might place it in a better bargaining position thus pushing U.S interests away. As we know recent developments in the Middle East have changed the balance of the regional power structure in favor of Iran, consequently increasing its regional role and its bargaining power in the region's affairs.7 Iran is a major supplier of oil and natural gas to China and before sanctions it was a big oil exporter to India, Japan and European states. Although Iran is facing embargo on its oil exports but still now Iran plays an important part in fluctuation of oil prices and in future its oil reserves would increase its importance in world politics so it is clearly manifest that global powers need a stable Iran

0.2. OBJECTIVES OF RESEARCH

The basic objectives of the research are:

I. To understand the motives behind the proliferation of nuclear arsenals. II. To assess global efforts and their effects for non-proliferation of nuclear arsenals.

III. To elaborate the reasons behind the acquisition of nuclear armaments by Pakistan. IV. To observe the implications of Pakistan's nuclear deterrence on defense policies of Pakistan and India. V. To scrutinize the security structure of Pakistan's nuclear program in view of international concerns for their safety. VI. To identify the policies and ideological aspects behind the evolution of Iranian nuclear program. VII. To analyze the motives behind the regional and international concerns on Iranian nuclear program. VIII. To understand the regional and international dynamics of Iranian nuclear program. IX. To find out the ways to resolve the conflict between Tehran and the world community on the issue of its nuclear program.

0.6. HYPOTHESIS

1. Pakistan’s nuclear program and assets are necessary for its security and balance of power in the region. 2. Nuclear Iran will have significant effects on the politics of the Middle East.

0.4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The research is based on phenomenology paradigm, which is the part of qualitative research. Inductive method will be used to understand the international and regional challenges of the nuclear programs of the respective states.

The effort will be based on in depth evaluation of reasons, decisions and commitments made by political leaders of both countries to initiate and modify their nuclear programs; this will also need historical framework to evaluate data of the role of different administrations within Pakistan and Iran and their options and preferences. An analytical explanation will also be given.

For this purpose extensive literature survey from various sources will be conducted which are as follows:

I. Published material on the subject including Books, journalistic writings, and political opinions in broadcasts, expressions and briefs. II. Journals, periodicals, Newspapers. III. Reports and published Surveys IV. Government documents, executive orders, national security strategies and other official publications. V. Web information and data.

0.5. STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY

The study will be based on six chapters with an introduction of the meaning, dynamics and impact of the nuclear proliferation in the context of third world countries specifically Pakistan and Iran and a conclusion with suggestions for resolving the present concerns on respective states nuclear programs.

Chapter 1: Nuclear proliferation: A Strategy for Power

Chapter one reviews the concept of nuclear proliferation with potential impact of nuclear arsenals. It provides a comprehensive theoretical analysis of vertical and horizontal proliferation and the diversity of approaches towards proliferation. The reasons and motives which encourage states to acquire such weaponry based on nuclear technology will be considered for analysis.

Chapter 2: Non Proliferation: Global efforts for a nuclear free world

Consideration of the global efforts against the proliferation of nuclear arsenals will be kept in view in this chapter because the international community has adopted multiple approaches to contain such destructive weapons. Furthermore the efforts by non-nuclear states for a nuclear weapons free world will also be a part of the study. Multilateral

efforts by USA and USSR to decrease the numbers of their nuclear stockpiles leading towards effective arms limitation will also be evaluated.

Chapter 3: Pakistan and its Nuclear Program: From the Past to the Present

This chapter is to illustrate the evolution of Pakistan's nuclear program. It discusses the main factors which compelled Islamabad to shift its focus from civil to a military program. It will also evaluate different policies adopted by the civil and military administrations in this regard. Also the impact of regional and global politics on the focus of the program will be considered pointing out the difficulties, turns and twists which shaped the path towards nuclearization. Reasons leading to Pakistan's atomic explosion in 1998 will be a part of this chapter. The post test developments like creation of nuclear command and control structure with advance nuclear delivery systems and an emerging civil nuclear program will also be addressed.

Chapter 4: Dynamics of Iranian Nuclear Program

This chapter is based on evolution of Iran's nuclear program from its beginning to the present. It will discuss the major incentives which embarked the nuclear program of Iran. The chapter will be based on two eras of Iranian nuclear program, the pre-revolutionary era and post-revolutionary era. In pre-revolutionary era, it will discuss the role and policies of Shah in the commencement and development of nuclear program. This era further provides the details of those unknown individuals who played an important part in policy setting and advancement of nuclear program. The post-revolutionary era will describe the different shifts on nuclear policy by the new regime. It also provides the detailed study of international controversy on Iranian nuclear program as well as the number of negotiations between Tehran and different Western powers. It will also discuss the different international sanctions with their impact on Iranian economy.

Chapter 5: Regional implication of Pakistan and Iran's nuclear program

Chapter five will comprise of the effects of Pakistan and Iran's nuclear program on their respective regions. Because both of the states had different kind of nuclear scenarios

therefore their nuclear implications are different from each other. As for Pakistan the chapter will specifically discuss the impact of nuclear arms on Pakistan's security policy. It is a well-known fact that Pakistan's nuclear program is India specific therefore the study will also focus the effect of Pakistan's nuclearization on India and both states measures and counter measures against each other. On the other hand Iranian nuclear program has much larger repercussion on entire Middle East region. Therefore, the Chapter will emphasize the reaction and measures taken by Israel and Arab states against Iranian nuclear program.

Chapter 6: Concerns and Realities on Nuclear Pakistan and Iran

This chapter will discuss the international and regional concerns on Pakistan and Iran's nuclear program. Today both states are facing immense pressure on different aspects of their nuclear program. As for Pakistan, the domestic instability and extremism is constantly highlighting the security issues of its nuclear assets. Therefore this chapter will discuss these issues as well as the counter measures taken by Pakistani authorities to address the rising security concerns. On the other hand Iran is developing its nuclear technology and most of the Western estates believe that Tehran has a covert nuclear weapon program. Therefore, the chapter will focus the issue of alleged clandestine weapon program and it will also try to determine the most basic reasons behind these allegations on Iran.

The study is designed to help create an understanding of the concept of nuclear proliferation and its impact through Pakistan and Iran on the politics of South Asia and Middle East. It then emphasizes the probable scenarios of both states nuclear policies on near future.

1 Seitz, John L. and Hite, Kristen A., 4th ed. (2012) Global Issues An Introduction, West

Sussex U.K: Blackwell Publishing Ltd ,P. 226 2 Ibid, p. 226 3 Kerr, Paul K. and Nikitin, Mary Beth, (2010) Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues, Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, http://www.google.com.pk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&v ed=0CCkQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.dtic.mil%2Fcgibin%2FGetTRDoc%3FA D%3DADA535412&ei=JAC7UpyuE8i80QWdzYCoDQ&usg=AFQjCNF01gKEG53yjql sjwB4X6E8Hvv4Gg&bvm=bv.58187178,d.d2k 4 The Economist, (July 19, 2007) Bombs away: A suitable case for pre-emption?, http://www.economist.com/node/9466890 (Accessed on April 20th 2011) 5 Ibid 6 Ibid 7 Barzegar, Kayhan, (July 2009) “Iran, the Middle East, and International Security”, Ortadogu Etütleri, Volume 1, No 1, p. 27, http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/publication/19589/iran_the_middle_east_and_internat ional_security.html?breadcrumb=%2Fpublication%2F19695%2Fbeyond_zero_enrichme nt

Chapter: 1

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: A STRATEGY FOR POWER

Proliferation of nuclear arsenals crosses the boundaries of the continents of the world. It is the issue of the 21st century which represents the more marked illustrations of globalization of third world politics. Its uniqueness lies on its lethality, and amazing devastation. A major element of the nuclear proliferation process is the acquisition of key technologies to produce fissile materials to construct either fission (nuclear) or fusion (thermo-nuclear) weapons because the probable destruction of WMDs (Weapons of Mass Destruction) has mesmerized the whole world. 1 The first successful detonation of the nuclear device by USA at Alamogordo on 16th July 1945 opened the door of great secret of ‘Atomic energy’ which if used positively can be a blessing for humanity or else it could unleash a calamity. Nuclear proliferation was the product of east west rivalry during the cold war which undoubtedly, increased in significance on the global agenda. After the first ever attack of atomic bombs on Japan by the US, the other powers of that era acquired that capability in a rapid succession. Thus by 1964, the Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) had become permanent members of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) who had the special responsibility to maintain international peace. Since then, the spread of nuclear technology for civil and military purposes has meant that several states beyond the five which have registered nuclear weapons capability now have the capacity to produce nuclear armaments at relatively short notice. Apart from its devastation, nuclear capability can also provide peace to the world. Cold war period proves that it was nuclear arsenals which held the USSR and USA not to enter into actual war. The threat of destruction created the Pax Atomica (atomic Peace or atom for peace) between the two super powers. Nuclear capability is understood strategy of gaining power and security, the more you gain the more the state becomes secure.

Basically, Proliferation is the term used in biology, which means to ‘grow rapidly’. According to Concise Oxford dictionary it means multiplication of elementary parts or its reproduction itself.2 In the world of globalization it is used differently which is meant the spread of weapon capabilities from a few too many states in a chain reaction, so that an increasing number of states gain the ability to launch an attack on other states with devastating (Nuclear) weapons. 3 World War II caused the death of 50 million people but it also gave the devastating gift of two new inventions. The first was the Atomic bomb, which showed capability of complete elimination of life if it is exploded. The second was the V-2 rocket, the initial form of today’s intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBMs) which can send nuclear warheads across the world in half an hour. 4 Nuclear attack on Hiroshima and Nagasaki by USA led to the beginning of a race which had no end. One by one other states of the world developed the ability of annihilating humanity. This menace of nuclear proliferation horrified the early nuclear club members and these powers used all measures to hold further proliferation of nuclear capability to other states but they did not succeed. With these new inventions war has become more horrible, but instead of turning away from it in terror, states exercise this option more ruthlessly, proving that their very existence can be at stake. The stakes have continued to rise as new countries have acquired nuclear arms: The United States in 1945, the Soviet Union in 1949, England in 1952, France in 1960, China in 1964, Israel sometime in the 1960s, India in 1974, Pakistan in 1998 and North Korea in 2006.5 The question of controlling proliferation has further led to vertical and horizontal proliferation. Vertical proliferation describes the growth in numbers of certain weapons and related advancement in weapons technologies whereas the Horizontal proliferation refers to an expansion in the number of actors who possess such weapons. 6

1.1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS: POTENTIAL AND IMPACT

The devastating explosive energy of nuclear arsenals is created from the processes of nuclear fission and nuclear fusion. The weapon that relies only on fission process is called an ‘atomic bomb’ and the weapon that relies on both fission and fusion processes is known as ‘thermonuclear bomb’ which is more powerful. Nuclear fusion is the splitting of the nucleus of an atom into two or more parts. The fission of multiple heavy

nuclei creates a chain reaction that releases massive explosive energy. A nuclear weapon requires an adequate quantity (critical mass) of fissionable material (plutonium or highly enriched uranium) to create a self-sustaining chain reaction. Obtaining this material requires either the irradiation of uranium in a reactor and separation of small amounts of plutonium produced (reprocessing) or extracting rare uranium-235 isotopes from larger amounts of natural uranium in a centrifuge (enrichment). 7

Nuclear fusion, the opposite of fission, releases energy through the joining of light nuclei into heavier ones. Fusion is easiest using the hydrogen isotopes deuterium and tritium, although hydrogen nuclei will only fuse together under extremely high temperatures. In a thermonuclear bomb, the super- hot conditions for fusion are generated by a fission-based trigger device.8 In a fusion weapon, the explosive yield per nucleon is about three times that of fission, and there is theoretically no upper limit to the amount of fusion material that could be used. The largest device tested in the atmosphere was of Soviet design and produced an explosive yield of 60 megatons, or the equivalent of 60 million tons of TNT (thermonuclear tritium).9

A nuclear explosion is characterized by a rapid brief release of nuclear radiation, a rapid developing fireball that emits intense heat and light, and a powerful blast wave that travels out from the point of burst. 10 The fireball rises quickly and cools, forming a spreading mushroom-shaped cloud atop a column of smoke or dust. 11 The fission products of the weapon immediately produce radioactive neutrons and gamma rays, which are penetrative and damaging to humans.12 Thus, nuclear bombs cause devastation in three ways. Immediate devastation is wreaked by a blast effect of awesome explosive force, which is combined with thermal radiation that can create a fire storm travelling at several hundred miles per hour with temperatures rising to 1000C. 13 Nuclear explosions have electromagnetic effects that disrupt communications and in modern society would immediately cause chaos, thwarting rescue efforts and making military defenses ineffective. Nuclear explosions introduce radioactive isotopes into the environment, where they enter the food chain and cause cancer, sterility, and birth defects. Wind and water, which do not respect national boundaries, would carry poisonous radiation to neighboring countries.14

The fireball of a 1-megaton nuclear explosion would grow to two miles across and set off massive secondary fires. Anyone caught in the open within 9 miles of ground zero would receive third degree burns and would probably be killed; closer to the explosion, people would be charred and killed instantly.15 From Greenwich Village up to the central park, the heat would be great enough to melt metal and glass. 16

The thermo-nuclear weapons that the USA and Soviet Union began deploying in the 1950s are far more powerful than the weapons that killed hundreds of thousands in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Hiroshima bomb had energy of 12.5 Kilotons, the equivalent of 12,500 tons of chemical explosive TNT, while a typical strategic thermonuclear bomb has an explosive force of 1-megaton, the equivalent of 1,000,000 tons of TNT, or 80 Hiroshima bombs. To put it on another way; a 2-megaton bombs dropped in World War II.17A 1983 study for World Health Organization (WHO) concluded that 1.1 billion people would be killed outright in a nuclear war involving the US, the Soviet Union, Europe, China and Japan. Another 1.1 billion would suffer serious injury and radiation sickness for which medical help would be unavailable due to a breakdown of society.18All of the globe would certainly be affected by a complete nuclear war using nuclear arms; how severely is uncertain.

1.2. EVOLUTION OF NUCLEARIZATION

The possibility of inventing atomic bomb originated in 1930, when nuclear physics scientists including Leo Szilard (1898-1964), Edward Teller (1908-2003) and Eugene Wigner (1902-95) migrated to America and decided to persuade the American government to develop the bomb. 19 They took the assistance of Elbert Einstein, who did not even think that the nuclear chain reaction could be used to make a bomb, but he signed the letter of Szilard addressing president of USA Franklin D, Roosevelt (1882- 1945) and gave his approval to join this job which in the beginning, had peaceful intentions. Thus, the first nuclear weapon was invented by American and British scientists who, through a joint program known as the Manhattan Project had been achieving this goal before Nazi Germany. 20 This program was started when Germany was only thinking about developing the aircrafts and V-2 rockets. U.S initiated to the nuclear capability, though it defeated Germany without it. But on the orders of president of the

USA, Harry Truman (1884-1972), In August 1945, Hiroshima and Nagasaki of Japan became first and only victims of nuclear bombs, 340,000 Japanese lost their life as an initial effect and Japanese emperor announced immediate surrender on allied power terms. The whole world was horrified by the destruction of this gigantic invention. Even the inventor of this terminator himself considered it an immoral act. Leo Szilard called the use of the bomb on Japan “one of the greatest blunders of history”21. After the atomic explosion by USA on Japanese cities, Joseph Stalin of USSR immediately called his nuclear scientists including the father of the Soviet atomic bomb, Igor Varilyevich Kurchatov (1903-60) and put the single demand to develop the Soviet bomb as soon as possible.

"A single demand to you, comrades: Provide us with atomic weapons in the shortest possible time. You know that Hiroshima has shaken the whole world. The equilibrium has been destroyed. Provide the bomb—it will remove a great danger from us."22

The successful Soviet testing of nuclear device in September 1949 began the cold war arms race which has received more than one participant and as a result the world now has nine nuclear powers and many more in waiting.

1.3. HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION

Horizontal proliferation refers to nuclear weapons states transferring nuclear weapons, technology or materials to nuclear or non-nuclear entities.23 In last 50 years nine countries obtain nuclear arsenals (the America, Russia, England, China, France, India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea). The disintegration of the USSR generated four new nuclear nations (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine). Afterward, three of these states join the international disarmament treaties and transferred their nuclear arms to Russia. Another four states (Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, and Iraq) made efforts to create nuclear arsenals of their own, but subsequently gave up the programs due to their own reasons. Iran is considered to be a threshold state, i.e. those on the edge of obtaining nuclear armaments. It is possible that many more countries may join the nuclear club in the subsequent 10 to 20 years (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Syria, Libya, Egypt and

Saudi Arabia).24 Indonesia and Malaysia have also been showing interest in obtaining nuclear technology, while Argentina, Brazil, Iraq, and many other nations may continue their nuclear programs. According to the NPT those states that developed their nuclear arsenals after 1968 are recognized as defacto nuclear weapon state. Though they contain nuclear arsenals, but NPT did not accept them as nuclear powers only United States, Russia, France, Britain, and China has the official statues of NWSs. Therefore countries such as Pakistan and India and, according to all reasonable suspicions, Israel, and potentially others are NWSs by fact, though not by law.

So, the end of the cold war did not end the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The expectations of its declining proved fruitless. The attraction of the balance of terror of US and USSR in first nuclear age eliminates the possibilities of its end. The post-Cold War era is sometimes seen as the ‘second nuclear age’ being characterized by heightened anxiety about nuclear proliferation. This has happened for at least four reasons:

 Established nuclear powers continued to use nuclear strategies.  The incentives for states to acquire nuclear weapon have increased.  Proliferation is easier, as nuclear arms and nuclear technology are more readily available.  Fear has heightened that nuclear arsenals may get into the wrong hands.25

From the outset of nuclear age, USA has shown its double standards. All the talks and defense treaties of disarmament were not more than a ‘gentleman’s agreement such as START III 1999 (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) or SORT 2002 (Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty). Established nuclear powers themselves are not keen to exercise the attempts of disarmament in place of that they develop a new generation of weapons.

Second, Non-nuclear states in some cases had been pressurized to acquire nuclear arsenals. Such as in 1998, both Pakistan and India, responding to increasingly bitter rivalry over Kashmir and other issues joined the nuclear club by tested nuclear devices and lost the support of USA and Russia. Regional tensions in the Middle East also encouraged Israel to acquire nuclear arsenals and improvise Iran to enter in the quest.

Third, acquisition or development of nuclear arsenals is much easier after the cold war. During the ‘first nuclear age’ production of nuclear weapon was not as sophisticated as after the demise of USSR, although early members of nuclear club put all the measures to contain the horizontal proliferation of nuclear armaments, as a result of this, only small number of states had achieved the technological threshold of nuclear weapons. Today 428 nuclear powers and research reactors are in operation in forty four countries throughout the world.26 However, such technologies had been much diffusible by 1990s that were acquired by Pakistan, India and later North Korea.

Finally, anxieties about the nature of state intensified the concern about nuclear proliferation. The obstacles to horizontal proliferation have diminished the chances of nuclear arsenals getting in to the hands of states or other actors that may use them have significantly increased. This especially employs in the case of so called ‘rogue’ states US foreign policy, in the post-cold war era has particularly focused on preventing such states (Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria and North Korea) from acquiring nuclear armaments. The leaks in nuclear export controls have weakened the anti-proliferation regime.27

1.4. VERTICAL PROLIFERATION

Vertical proliferation refers to nuclear weapons states researching and developing new types of nuclear weapons, technology, materials and means of warhead delivery.28 The cold war between USA and USSR raised the bar of advancement in nuclear field. Both the powers accelerated their speed from nuclear to thermo-nuclear arms race, for the sake of deterrence. Mutual fear and hostility between these powers led them to increase the number and types of nuclear arsenals and their delivery systems. By 1970, the nuclear weapons possessed by each side numbered in the tens of thousands- over 26,000 war heads in United States alone and over 11,000 in Soviet Union.29

There were hydrogen bombs on aircraft ready to dropped on enemy targets; there were guided missiles in underground silos aimed at enemy cities, factories and military installations; there were missiles on nuclear submarines and thousands of “tactical’ nuclear weapons able to be launched in the form of artillery shells in Europe. Later both countries added MIRVs (Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicles) to their

missiles, multiplying the number of warheads that a missile could deliver after it was launched and each introduced another leg of its nuclear armory in the form of missiles and warheads mounted on mobile launchers, in constant motion on the ground. Any one of the systems had the potential to kill hundreds of millions of people, depopulating the enemies, countries and poisoning the atmosphere of the earth. By 1986, the number of war heads possessed by both sides exceeded 60,000.30

Both super powers assumed that large number of nuclear arsenals were the guaranteed of their security and supremacy, it would also assure the second strike capability for both but the magnitude of destruction would not left, any country for any chance to strike back, thus the first strike could be very lethal. This thinking in the end became the economic burden on the economies of USA and USSR, which at last became one of the major causes of demise of Soviet Union.

1.5. THEORIZING OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

Various theoretical positions and the direction of research describe the diversity in approaches towards the proliferation of nuclear armaments.

1.5.1. Liberal theory on nuclear proliferation

Liberal theorists concerned with the civil-military relations place considerable emphasis on civilian control of nuclear armaments. Although protected and deployed by the military, this is only possible in democratic societies with clearly specified rules of engagement approved by the executives and legislature. Nuclear arms can only be used on the authority of the government accountable to the electorate. Liberals consider that authoritarian regimes are less stable and reliable and, without similar accountability mechanisms, present a greater risk of willful or accidental nuclear weapon usage. While assumptions of rationality for democratic leaders are made this is not assumed where authoritarian rules are concerned with the potential proliferation of nuclear weapons by non-state actors such as Khan Networks, which included the proliferation of technological knowhow to North Korea, Syria and Libya. Liberal theorists are eager to engage in this debate.31

1.5.2. Structural Realist Approaches to Nuclear Proliferation

Structural realist accepts nuclear proliferation as an inevitable consequence of an anarchic international system. However, rather than posit that every state should seek to acquire nuclear weapon to guarantee survival, Kenneth Waltz has argued that nuclear weapon have spread rather than proliferation because they have increased upwards as NWS have increased their own nuclear arsenals. When nuclear arms have spread to other states this has only happened slowly, which is reassuring in an international system where surprises are unsettling. It is advantageous for nuclear arsenals to spread gradually rather than not at all, or too quickly, because possession of nuclear arms constrains action and produces responsible international actors, conscious of the dangers of using the weapons. The security environment improves by responsible nuclear weapon states as the defense and deterrent capabilities reduce the likelihood of war. 32

For realists, Security is more readily attained if states possess nuclear weapon. Such a development is rational because no rational actor would risk destruction by attacking a NWS. These weapon possessing states do not initiate conflict with one another or if they do so it is likely to only be once. Power in this perspective is observable and very firmly assumed to be the property only of states. It should be noted this may pose a problem, if we need to analyze the behavior of those non-state actors or organizations that may have access to nuclear weapon.33

1.5.3. Radical Feminist Approaches to Nuclear Proliferation

Radical feminists approach is that nuclear arsenals are an extension of masculinist discourse. The primary status given to nuclear arms diverts security attention and material resources to weapons of mass destruction while simultaneously downgrading or not recognizing other security considerations, in particular the individual and human security. When interstate security dominates agendas, interstate security issues become marginalized. Nuclear arms are presented as an exclusively masculinist discourse of power projection and survival in traditional security studies and so radical feminist theorize and campaign against nuclear armaments. Radical feminists were particularly active in 1970s and 1980s in anti- nuclear protests, including the protests at US nuclear

missiles deployed at Green ham Command in the United Kingdom. Radical feminists are apprehended with resistance to the presiding discourse and the reifying of security to exclude consideration of the domestic sphere, institutional and political discrimination and the disadvantaging/abuse of women.

1.5.4. Critical Security Approaches and Nuclear Proliferation

Critical security theory approach considers it from the critical stand point for whom are they for, and what function they serve. Rather than being taken for granted as an outcome of the anarchic international system, they rely on the construction of threats. Critical security considers this construction and analyzes the inside and outside groups of NWS and NNWS and the tensions that are constructed between the two emphasizing hegemony and the underpinning of hegemony by military force, in particular nuclear armaments. The United State’ hegemonic status in the globe rests on its possession of nuclear weapons alongside vast and technologically superior military force. Scholars will seek to shine light on the NWS’s privileged position within the international system and the impact that nuclear arms spending has on individuals deconstructing realist arguments, to empower people to resist, nuclear weapon acquisition.

1.5.5. Postmodernism and Nuclear Proliferation

Postmodernists are eager to deconstruct and challenge traditional security studies positions on nuclear arsenals. Through analyzing texts and languages, they are able to demonstrate how threats are constructed and the case made for nuclear weaponry. Rather than seeing nuclear arms' proliferation specially as a security issue, postmodernists are anxious to discover how institutions and populations are conditioned in preparation for the acquisition of nuclear arsenals or preventing other states from acquiring them. Their projection includes consideration of how discourse is utilized, to legitimate some NWS and not others. The narrative of protection and security, the appeal to survival or power maximization are all subject to discursive analysis. They might also be interested in the US-Indian nuclear cooperation agreement signed in 2005, in which the US provides India with materials and assistance on its civilian nuclear program in return for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors having access to India’s civilian nuclear

power stations. A discursive analysis would shed light on justifications for this policy, which would appear to reward states which proliferate. 34

The acquisition of nuclear armaments is not simply a security issue but also entails tremendous prestige and a seat at the international top table. They may be interested in deconstructing by analysis of speech acts and texts that present Iran is becoming technologically proficient, desiring independent energy supplies, and facing security threats from Israel and the USA.

1.5.6. Critical Constructivists and Nuclear Proliferation

Critical constructivist approaches to nuclear proliferation is adopting a critical perspective towards neo-realist orthodoxy. Rather than accepting policy on nuclear proliferation, critical constructivists will seek to unpack the organizational, institutional and bureaucratic interests involved. Scott Sagan suggests that military organizations are inflexible, parochial and institutionalize organizational behavior in a way that makes deterrence failure and accidental warfare a possibility. He also contends that the character of states seeking to acquire nuclear weapons has the potential to lead to the use of nuclear weapons, as authoritarian governments lack the checks and balances to constrain action. 35

A less pessimistic view is adopted by Alder, Price and Tannenwald, who suggest that epistemic communities, norms of responsible and appropriate behavior and taboos against the use of nuclear weapons makes proliferation less threatening. 36 Social constructivists are concerned with the role that identity and culture plays in constructing an environment in which nonproliferation is the norm, and why most states choose not to become nuclear weapon states, or even abandon nuclear weapons altogether. 37

Thus, social constructivists are concerned with the role that identity and culture plays in constructing an environment in which non-proliferation is the medium that nuclear weapon states are ready to abandon their weapons altogether.

1.6. MOTIVATIONS OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

Possession of nuclear weaponry motivate itself countries towards proliferation. The fascination of being the member of an exclusive nuclear club, improvises the states to

acquire the nuclear capability. In 1945, USA emerged as the first atomic power and propagated that the development of nuclear arms was under the fear of German nuclear threat which was not proven correct because Germany was defeated before US atomic explosion on Japan. Thus, the attraction of nuclear armaments since then has motivated eight countries completely and many more are following. Analysis of the motivational aspect of nuclear weapons acquisition focused on the strategic, political and prestige rationales has led states to seek nuclear weapons. 38 Security concerns are the biggest motivational force behind nuclear acquisition. Technological imperatives and regional politics are the other improvising factors of nuclear arm race. Thus state’s seeks to ‘go nuclear’ because of the following reasons:

 National Security concerns  Strategic motivations  Political and prestige benefits  Technological imperatives  Regional politics

1.6.1. National Security Concerns

The concept of “security” must include protection against all major threats to human survival and well-being, not just military threats. 39 Until now, “security” -usually addressed as “national security”- has meant the main tenancy of strong military defense against enemy invasion and attack. 40 This exposition of the concept of security shows that it stands high above all motivating factors of state to go nuclear. The decision of state regarding acquisition of nuclear capability is a dynamic function of its national security. According to Arnold Wolfers the term ‘Security’ encompasses a wide range of goals, that highly divergent policies can be interpreted as policy of security. 41 ‘Wolfers’ description of the concept of security though explained during the intense cold war era still looks valid.Walter Lippmanns defined security in following words:

"A nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values, if it wishes to avoid war and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war."42

This exposition of security clearly suggests that national security of the state is guiding it towards every capability which secures its boundaries such as nuclear armaments. The strategic consequences of nuclear proliferation have been debated since the first nuclear weapons were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 43 Indeed, only six weeks after the nuclear bombing of Japan, Jacob Vinier argued that it might be desirable for numerous countries to have nuclear weapons. 44 Subsequent scholars made similar arguments in the 1960s and 1970s. Most notably, such scholars as F.H. Hinsley, Richard Rosecrance, and French theorist Pierre Gallois argued extensively that nuclear proliferation could increase international peace and stability. 45 This debate was the base of the phenomenon of pax- atomica or atom bomb for peace.

History of nuclear proliferation expounded that behind the invention of atomic weapon and its proliferation, there was an issue of national security of Nuclear weapon states. USA created nuclear weapon since it was worried about deterring an expected Nazi Nuclear bomb, the USSR created its nuclear arsenal to counter USA. France and England developed their nuclear arsenals to have autonomous forces against the USSR. China acquired them to deter both USSR and USA, India sought to deter China and Pakistan sought to deter India, North Korea would undoubtedly justify its nuclear weapons.46 Israel developed a nuclear arsenal to gain greater degrees of liberty in relation to the Unites States and Soviet Union.

Thus, a nuclear arsenal seems to be the biggest safeguard for national security of a state. The transformation in the world politics after the 2nd world war changed the perimeters of the War, peace and security hence nuclearization plays a major role in it.

1.6.2. Strategic Motivations

Strategic motivation focused on the role that nuclear arms played in the context of the Second World War and it’s immediate after math when initially they were seen as war- fighting or war winning weapon. Later attention shifted to the role that nuclear weapon

played in deterrence; leading to the assumption that one of the principal motivation for acquisition was the deterrence of other nuclear weapon-capable states. The intervention of nuclear weaponry represented a sharp discontinuity in the evolution of military technology. The nations that possess them were in a completely different military category from the nations that did not.

During the cold war USA and Soviet Union built up the capacity to destroy the world many times over. By 2002, the joint USA and Russian nuclear capacity accounted for 98 per cent of all the nuclear warheads that had been built. Both sides quickly developed massive first strike capability, but also acquired second strike capabilities that would enable them to withstand an enemy’s attack and still destroy major strategic targets and population centers.47

There is a strategic logic to nuclear assistance, one worth understanding for those who seek to limit the spread of nuclear arsenals. These arms are neither potent causes of war, nor irrelevant to world politics. They cause their owners to become more influential, more successful in the wars which they choose to fight, and to have less intense conflicts, when these occur.48

1.6.3. Power, Status and Prestige

The political benefits that nuclear armaments conferred on those states with the wherewithal to manufacture them were also deemed significant. Nuclear weapons were seen as the most modern from of weaponry and their curators, by dint of their technological prowess, were automatically spared a seat at the ‘top table of world proceedings’. Nuclear arsenals are seen as a symbol of status and authority. Because of the widespread conviction rooted in realism that military might confer political stature, it is understandable why the non-nuclear power regard the non-proliferation treaty as hypocrisy, which provides a seal of approval to the U.S, Russia, China, Britain and France for possessing nuclear weapon while denying it to all others. The underlying belief that it is acceptable to develop a nuclear capacity for deterrence, political influence, and prestige was expressed in Brajesh Mishra, India’s national secretary advisor to the Indian Prime minister, when he justified India’s nuclear ambitions by asserting that:

"In the 21st century a new security order is likely to arise in the Asia Pacific region, one in which India should be granted as much respect and deterrence by the United States and others, as is China today."49

Non- nuclear nations have vigorous motives to create arsenals equivalent to those of the prevailing nuclear club. Former French president Charles De Gaule, declared that without an independent nuclear capability France could not “command its own destiny”.50 Similarly, in 1960, Britain’s labor party leader Aneurin Bevan stated that without nuclear arsenals Britain would be “naked into the council chambers of the world” and in 1993 North Korea refused to allow monitoring of its five nuclear sites, and later in 2002 admitted that it had secretly continued to operate a nuclear-weapon development program, deposit pledges in exchange for technological assistance it would not. 51

1.6.4. Technical Imperatives

Nuclear arms acquisition was also a form of technological determinism, that once a country had obtained the essential infrastructure it would mechanically create nuclear arsenals. Supporting this assumption was the view, that these states would also tread the same acquisition path as the five nuclear weapon states. Thus it could be predicted that any new nuclear state would pursue a dedicated military nuclear program, conduct an overt nuclear test, produce a stockpile of weapons, and finally, acquire an effective means for delivering the weapons to their target. While this explanation of the acquisition process and the motivations for embarking on a nuclear weapon program is still relevant, overtime, our understanding of the dynamics of nuclear proliferation have been more complex.52

The material required to develop nuclear weapons is extensively accessible. This is partly because of the extensive use of nuclear technology for generating electricity. The technical proficiency compulsory for weapons development has extended with the globalization of sophisticated systematic training.

During the 1950s and 1960s, India acquired a great deal of know-how, mainly due to its participation in international programs intended to encourage the nonviolent uses of

nuclear technology. On May 18, 1974, it conducted a successful test that the Indian government described as a “peaceful nuclear explosion”. 53 During the 1980s, India added to its nuclear capability with research on thermonuclear weapons (Hydrogen bombs), an effort that concluded in five tests of nuclear arsenals in 1998. Pakistan responds a few weeks later by practicing five nuclear tests of its own, there by becoming the first Islamic nation to have nuclear armaments.

1.6.5. Regional Politics

Regional politics is often cited as a reason of nuclear weapons proliferation. Many states equate nuclear capability after the atomic tests of USSR in1949, because it broke the balance of power in Europe and Asia. Soviet nuclear arms led to regional insecurity among the great powers of Europe. Therefore, first Britain and then France jumped into the nuclear arms race in Europe and China in Asia.

Britain and France needed to acquire nuclear capability to contain the communist supremacy in the region, As Alfred Goldberg asserted, “Britain should cease to play leading role in international affairs was, unthinkable, not only among the country’s political leaders but among her people as well for the nation had long been instinct with a sense of power and failure to accept the challenge of atomic energy would have been interpreted as a retreat from greatness and an abandonment of power.”54 Like Great Britain, France also believed that nuclear capability plays a dominant role in regional as well as in international affairs as former French president De Gaulle stated, “With the atomic armament, our defense and foreign policy will be able to be independent, on which we insist above all.”55 Therefore, France and Britain are usually referred to as the two leading cases of nuclear proliferation for the reason of prestige and regional dominance.

China’s entry into nuclear club in 1979 becomes significant in view of the contemporary geo-politics, especially the Sino-Soviet schism and ideological differences with the US. Though China officially denied that it wanted to achieve a ‘Super-status’.56 China’s possession of nuclear armaments was motivated by its ambition to attain the status of the

great power of Asia. India’s acquisition of nuclear capability was also for the sake of becoming the great power in South Asia subcontinent. Similarly, Pakistan’s desire for nuclear capability, was mainly motivated by its wish to emerge as the leader’ of Muslim world as well as acquire equal status with India in the region. Such motives also played a major role in desire of development of nuclear arsenals in the Middle East by Israel and Iran. Thus, nuclear weapons are not a replacement for the customary bases of regional power but rather a complement to them.

1.7. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Nuclear deterrence had diverse and contradictory impact on superpowers during the cold war especially in the Cuban missile crisis and it proved that nuclear conflict would be an extraordinary disaster for both sides. Patrick Morgan distinguishes between general and immediate deterrence.57 General deterrence depends on prevailing power balance to prevent an enemy from considering military confront because of its probable contrary consequences. It is a first line of defense against attack whereas, immediate deterrence is a temporary strategy with the motivation to distress an impending assault or challenge of explicit adherence. Leaders of the world use this strategy only after the failure of general deterrence. General and immediate deterrence suppose that contestants are most likely to exercise to force or intimidating military deployments judge that military equilibrium is constructive for them.

Mutual deterrence was another term used in world politics during the cold war, which can prompt mutual caution. It requires a second strike capability that enables a country to withstand an enemy’s first strike and still retain the ability to retaliate with a devastating counter attack.58Awareness of second strike capability by the opponent is as important as having it. American policy makers applied this strategy from 1962 to 1991 for peace enforcement. They bargained leverage by giving the impression that America actually uses nuclear arms. Policy makers of the world used the term MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction) to describe the superpowers vital military deadlock. It is the primary principle of mutual deterrence. Assured destruction is the assumed military potential and physiological expectation of extensive catastrophe by both rivals in a nuclear swap. MAD

produces peace or at least stability which is supposed to be a precondition for successful deterrence. Apart of MAD, NUTs (Nuclear Utilization Theory) is another approach also discussed by policy makers. This approach believes that nuclear arsenals cannot play a deterrent role unless they are used in a war. Advocators of NUTs argue that limited nuclear war could make nuclear threat more credible and guide the world towards the ultimate peace but the proponents of MAD on the other hand still believe that deterrence remained the only reason for nuclear arsenals. According to them initial limited nuclear war will surely turn into unrestrained nuclear exchange.

By the 1980s nuclear debate took a new turn when USA introduced a new thinking in nuclear rage with SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative) in 1983. It was the so called star war plan conceived by the Reagan Administration to deploy an antiballistic missile system using laser that would destroy enemy’s nuclear missile before they could enter the

Earth’s atmosphere.59

Apart from all these advanced measures taken by global power, intentions of deterrence to defend nuclear weapon states have botched many a times and appear hypothetically complicated. First states are hesitant to rely on it because of its dangerous nature. Moreover, states should make security guidelines that focus on conventional forces. The military value of nuclear arsenals is apprehensive enough that it makes little sense to rely on these weapons for safety and security. 60 Third, quick measures should be taken to diminish the outsized stocks of weapons of USA and Russia. Thus serious actions are needed to be taken by the world powers for securing the world from the calamity of nuclear weapons.

1.8. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Proliferation of nuclear weapons has long been an issue for international security and has gathered very high place on the global security agenda at the end of cold war. In the most general sense, there is wide gratitude of the swift pace of technology transformation and of the prismatic impact of certain technology as expounding feature of 20th century. Vertical and horizontal proliferation poses a serious security issue. Missile technology

make it more threatening because with ICBM (Inter Continental Ballistic Missile) delivering system countries can attack their adversaries from inside the boundaries of their own state, and if there advanced technologies proliferate to non state actors such as terrorist than no one will safe even inside their houses The cold war confrontation saw many things but above everything else it depicted a political-ideological organized rivalry between the two blocs led respectively by the USA and USSR.

The two terms peace and security have predominantly been used in the context of external aggression, implying that avoiding war between nations is tantamount to sustaining peace and that the ability to avoid or stand up to external aggression implies defense of the nation or security. 61 This thinking illustrate that militarization and war menace as supposed to be an act of defense and security preservation rather than as intent of probable aggression, even though the two are certainly equivalent. The common explanation for the acquirement of nuclear armaments is the procedure of deterrence between nuclear powers in which underlying the idea of WMDs which means that both nuclear weapons states have a potential of massive destruction. It means no country would initiate war. Thus, nuclear arms pose hazard to global peace and security.

Nuclear proliferation has its positive and negative effects on international security. This issue is larger than its nominal role in international affairs. The accumulation of weapons, in particular nuclear arsenals constitute a threat to the survival of the mankind. It has therefore, become imperative that states abandon the dangerous goal of unilateral security through armament and embrace the objective of common security disarmament. 62 Many scholars and policy makers believe that, international anarchy is the main motivating force behind international behavior of proliferation of nuclear weapons. States are persuaded by, which can be guaranteed only through sovereign means or alliances with other states. Therefore, nations facing threats either need nuclear capability or persuasive assurance from other states to protect their security. Kenneth Waltz, believe that the nuclear deterrence relationship between USA and USSR during the cold war can be duplicated elsewhere.63This point of view confers the positive effect of nuclear proliferation on international security and therefore, should not be thought as threat. Thus, these perceptions misguided the efforts to halt proliferation. This positive and

negative thinking on the issue of proliferation increase the jeopardy of nuclear conflict. The total stock of nuclear weapons is another danger to the international security. There are 5000 nuclear warheads on a status known as a ‘hair trigger alert’ round the world. Washington is ready to launch nuclear weapons within second as part of a launch on warning strategy. In the event of an alert, it takes three minutes to activate an Inter- Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and virtually no time to send a Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) on its way. 64 The possibility of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) used by terrorists or ‘WMD terrorism’ may still be very low, but its probability is growing with the advancement of technology which make it easier day by day. Its prospects is particularly alarming because it would be difficult to hamper and hard to identify the sustainer. WMD terrorism could be serious security challenge in future. Therefore, the measures of non-proliferation regimes are vital to international peace and security.

The international politics in this power motivated system obviously works to the benefit of the powerful where; power praise power and power propagate more power. No international treaty has ever appeared to operate against great power interest. As long as there is no global definition of what comprises international security, there can be no equivalent order performing as a sponsor of global peace. Therefore, it will be very difficult to sustain stability and nuclear security under these situations. Future challenges require strong policies from all countries and complete implementation from them.

Hence, nuclear capability was the biggest gift of WWII; it was not only disturbing the balance of power but also introduced the new kind of arms race among the world powers. The world was first time aware the catastrophic destruction of the advancement of technology. Every country desired to join the exclusive nuclear club especially those who already suffer from different kind of regional and international conflicts such as USSR, China, India, and Pakistan. Soviet Union needed this technology because of sustaining its position as a super power, same situation confronting by China to guarding its socialist status in international arena, whereas, Pakistan and India needed this devastating capability for their regional supremacy. Atomic creation of USA entered the world in a new phase of calamity. Proliferation of nuclear weapons carried two different schools of

thought since its beginning; one believes that it creates the atomic peace (nuclear deterrence) among the rivalries whereas the other one believes that this is a dangerous weapon and world should be free from this destructive arsenal because from their perspective in the presence of this technology in many hands the Armageddon is not far away. Although, nuclear technology have some positive uses such as energy generation, food processing, agriculture fertilizers and medicine applications etc. Nuclear technology utilizes significantly in a power sector and some countries uses this positive use as an argument for their greed of acquiring this technology such as North Korea and Iran. 21st century has emerged with advanced efforts for nuclear proliferation by nuclear powers because of the security threat and the fear of nuclear terrorism by non-state actors, which is still a myth but the possibilities should not be taken for granted.

1 http://www.cssforum.com.pk/central-superior-services-examination/topics-notes/int- relations/13330-globalization-world-politics-revision-guide-3ebaylis-smith.html 2 Oxford Concise Dictionary (1983) Oup, London, p. 921 3 Kegley JR, Wittkopf (9thed 2004) World Politics Trend and Transformation, , USA:

Thomson Wordsworth, p. 470 4 Ibid 5 Margulies, Philip (2010) Nuclear Non Proliferation, New Delhi: Viva book private limited, p. 3 6 Smith, Michael E. (2010) International Security: politics, policy, prospects, New York:

Palgrave Macmillan ltd, p. 125 7 Diehl, Sarah J. & Moltz, James Clay (2002) Nuclear Weapons and Nonproliferation: A

Reference Handbook, Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO Publishers, p. 3 8 McNaught, L.W. (1984) Nuclear Weapons and Their Effects, , London: Potomac Books

Inc, p. 7 9 Ibid, pp. 19-20 10 http://www.contemporarysecuritypolicy.org/assets/CSP-32-2-Enemark.pdf 11 Op cit, p. 25 12 Ibid, p. 25 13 Heywood, Andrew (2011) Global Politics, New York: Palgrave Foundations, p. 264 14 Margulies, Philip, p. 13 15 Ibid 16 Schell, Jonathan (1982) The fate of the earth, New York: Knopf, p. 48 17 Sagan. Carl, “The Nuclear Winter”, Dec 1983, p. 1,283, www.cooperativ individualism.org/sagan_nuclear.html. (Retrieved January 4, 2007) 18 Ibid, p. 1 19 Ibid, p. 2 20 Ayson, Robert & Ball, Desmond, eds. (2007) Strategy and Security in the Asia-

Pacific, Australia, Allen & Unwin, p. 90 21 Rhodes, Richard (1986) The making of the atomic bomb, New York, Simon &

Schuster, p. 744

22 Holloway, David (1981) “Entering the nuclear arm race: The Soviet decision to build the atomic bomb, 139-45”Social Studies of Science II, p. 159 23 Kegley JR, Wittkopf, p.470 24 http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_2911 25 Heywood. Andrew (2011), p. 269 26 DefenceMoniter, 1(2000), p. 5 27 Krepon, Micheal (2000) Weakening the anti-proliferation regime, International herald tribune (October 20):8. 28 Smith, Michael E ,p.125 29 Bundy, McGeorge (1988) Danger and Survival, New York: Vintage books, p.319 30 NRDC: “Nuclear Data- Table of USSR/Russia Nuclear war heads, 1949-2002” Available online: URL: http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab 10 asp. Accessed

November 17, 2007 31 Savigny, Heather, Marsden Lee (2011) Doing political Science and International

Relations: Theories in Action, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 181 32 Sagan, S. & Waltz K. (1995) The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate. New York:

W.W Norton. 33 Savigny, Marsden, p. 183 34 Ibid, p. 189 35 Sagan, S. and Waltz K. (2003) The Spread Nuclear Weapons: A debate, New York:

NY:W. W. Norton, p. 56 36 Alder, E (1992) The emergence of cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control’, International Organization, 46 (winter), pp101-145. Price, R and Tannenwald, N. (1996) Norms and Deterrence: The Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboos’. Tennenwald, N. (1999) The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use’,

International Organization, 53 (3), 433-68. 37 Cambell, et al (2004) Op cit: Savigny. Heather, Marsden. Lee(2011) Doing political Science and International Relations: Theories in Action, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 191

38 Baylis, John & Smith, Steve (2nd ed 2001) The globalization of the world politics: An introduction to international relations, New York, Oxford university press, P.423 39 Ibid 40 Kegley, Wittkopf, pp.490-491 41 Wolfers, Arnold (1962) Discords and Collaboration: Essay on international politics,

John Hopkins press, Baltimore MD, p.150 42 Lippmann. Walter (1943) U.S Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic, Little, Boston,

Brown &Co, p.51 43 http://www.firstprinciplesjournal.com/articles.aspx?article=35&theme=amsec 44 Op cit, p. 701 45 Hinsley, F.H (1963) Power and the Pursuit of Peace, Cambridge University press, Cambridge.Rosecrance . Richard. N (1963) Action and Reaction in World Politics, Little Brown, Boston, Gallois (1961) The Balance of Terror: Strategy for the Nuclear Age, Miffins, Boston. As Cited: Busch. Nathan E (2005) No End in Sight: The Continuing

Menace of Nuclear proliferation, New Delhi, Manas publications, p.3 46http://www.oldsite.transnational.org/SAJT/forum/meet/2004/Krieger_nuclear_disarm.ht ml 47 Baylis& Smith, p.423 48http://www.matthewkroenig.com/Editors_A_Strategic_Approach_to_Nuclear_Prolifera tion.pdf 49 Kegley, Wittkopf, p. 471 50 Ibid, p. 471 51 Ibid, p. 471 52 Balyis& Smith, p. 423 53 Kegley, Wittkopf, p. 470 54 Goldberg, Alfred (1964) The Atomic Origins of the British Nuclear Deterrent”,

International Affairs, Vol. 40. No.2, July, p. 427 55 Kohl, Wilfrid L. (1971) French Nuclear Diplomacy, Princeton, Princeton University press, pp. 335-336

56 Epistein, William, (1976) The Last Chance: Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control,

New York, The Free Press, p.50 57 Morgan, Patrick M. (1977) Deterrence: A conceptual analysis, USA, Sage publications,

P. 4 58 Kegley, Wittkopf, p. 503 59 Ibid, p. 506 60 http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/153_wilson.pdf 61 M.V. Ramana, Do Nuclear weapons Provide Security, Seminar No.468, August.1998 62 Zaehary S. Davis, (June 1995) Solving the Proliferation Puzzle: The role of theory in non-proliferation analysis, Director Series on Proliferation, P. 46 63 See, Facing Nuclear Danger: The report of Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, The Japan Institute of International Affairs 2000. 64 Singh.Jasit,(1998) Nuclear India, Knowledge World, New Delhi, P. 124

Chapter: 2

NON PROLIFERATION: GLOBAL EFFORTS FOR A NUCLEAR FREE WORLD

After the devastating effect of two nuclear exposures in Japan International community was horrified and new arms race began amongst the leading powers of the world. In the early stage America tried to contain this technology for itself but when USSR created its own nuclear bomb an ideological war started between these countries known as the cold- war. After two decades of constant nuclear proliferation, scholars and thinkers started to believe that if war began then it would be end of the civilization and humanity will return to its initial dark ages. This concept was very alarming for nuclear states and also to the United Nations Organizations (UNO). Thus, efforts were made from both sides by establishing organizations and agreements. The talks and conferences were bilateral and multilateral and with the help of these efforts the danger of nuclear war was reduced.

Basically, non-proliferation is the prevention of an increase in the number of nuclear arsenals that are produced or the prevention of something increasing or spreading (especially the prevention of an increase in the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons).1 The efforts of non-proliferation started after the World War I with restricting chemical and biological weapons such as poison gas, it was prohibited by Geneva protocol in 1925, which was the first and last effort for WMDs or arms control between the1st and 2nd world war. After the Second World War a new era began of WMDs which are nuclear arms and can destroy the world in very short time. So the effort to contain the spread of nuclear weapons began in late 40s soon after the use of atomic bomb in Japan.

2.1. EARLY EFFORTS FOR NON-PROLIFERATION

In 1946 on Truman's order, a series of reports were presented to scientists and managers who had helped to build the atomic bomb. These reports became the basis for a proposal delivered to the UNAEC (United Nation Atomic Energy Commission) by America’s first UN representative, Bernard Baruch on 14 June 1946. 2 It is also known as Baruch Plan and this was based on Acheson-Lilienthal report which argued likely approach for international control of nuclear weapons to evade a possible nuclear conflict. It was implicit that atomic energy be put into the hands of an International Atomic Development Authority (IADA) under the United Nations. This organization would have total dominance on the materials needed to create bomb with two main objectives. Firstly it would use nuclear technology for energy or electricity and other peaceful uses to the world. Secondly it would implement tight control over the technology and the materials that were needed both for power generation and weapons production. It would organize inspections to see if countries were to develop nuclear armaments. Countries suspected of trying to assemble weapons would be subject to severe retribution probably including military action under UN auspices. To make this threat persuasive Baruch suggested that measures taken by the IADA will not be subjected to a veto by members of the UN Security Council.

On the face of it, the proposal looked very promising but Soviet Union rejected the Baruch Plan as Soviet representatives viewed it as an effort to retain an American supremacy on nuclear weapons technology. This objection had some truth, since according to the Baruch plan, the USA would yield its weapons to IADA only after it had organize inspections and control over nuclear activities in the Soviet Union. From the Soviet point of view the US and Soviets were like two strangers in a room. One had a gun in his hand and the other one just might have a gun in his pocket. The man with gun in his hand the United States was promising to put down his gun but only after the other man USSR proved that he was not armed.3 In its place they suggested a ban on the use and assembling of nuclear arsenals and the demolition of stockpiles. They were not, however, willing to except any system of effective inspection. This proposal in turn was refused by the Americans on the ground that in this way they would be giving up their

nuclear program without any guaranty that the USSR would not create its own bomb.4 Similar impasse arose in disarmament negotiations during the early 1950s. The Soviet atomic test in 1949 was pursued by the first American thermonuclear test in 1952 and a thermonuclear Soviet test in 1953. Against this context of swift technological growth, a ‘parallel monologue’ took place in the early 1950s on a range of long distance multi-stage disarmament plans.5 Both Powers intended to take a stand on issues that affected their specific security concerns, and gave recommendations for cuts in those areas where their adversaries had the edge. As a result no progress was made. Some reports and proposals were made by US for preventing the accidental use of nuclear arsenals from both sides. In early 1952, Truman formed a panel of consultants to examine the threats posed by the arms race lead by J. Robert Oppenheimer (1904-76) who had also led the team that built the first atomic bomb. The primary Concern of this penal was the mounting numbers of bombs owned by the two superpowers. The panel gave two main recommendations:

 The USA should publicize the strength of the Soviet arsenals to avoid mistakes and the Soviets should know what the United States had  The panel advised that the Americans and Soviet’s must find a way to get a reduction in the size of (nuclear) stock piles such that neither side need fear a sudden knockout from the other.6

In 1955 US president Eisenhower put forward an ‘Open Skies’ agreement which would break down seclusion and doubt between the eastern and western blocks by allowing aerial inspections to make sure violent actions were not being prepared. Nevertheless the Soviets swiftly rejected the notion and it lay dormant till March, 1992. The event was followed by talks in Geneva on a nuclear test ban, suggestions for an atomic free zone and disengagement plans designed to abate the force in critical areas like central Europe.

2.2. ATOM FOR PEACE PROGRAM

Eisenhower also presented a new international initiative in 1954. This proposal was known as the “Atom for Peace Program” wherein, both nuclear powers would provide a certain amount of fissile material to a UN agency and ultimately IAEA (International

Atomic Energy Agency) which was established in 1957. This agency would stock and preserve the materials from being stolen. It was expected that as time went on, both super powers could provide more and more fissile materials to the program. That would encourage both powers to decrease their stockpiles of nuclear weapons. This would be the foundation for later serious arms negotiations between both sides. As it avoided terms that the Soviets had objected to earlier like: detailed on-site inspections putting arsenals in the hands of an international agency or strict punishment for noncompliance. It also produced strong support among non-nuclear weapon states.

Atom for peace ultimately went into taken but unfortunately it didn’t do what expected. The Soviets at the beginning had objected that Eisenhower’s plan would obtain the knowledge and materials that non-nuclear countries required to create bombs and in retrospect, the Soviets were right. But at the time, Washington was more concerned about vertical proliferation then horizontal proliferation, and the outline of this proposal reflected this distress. The USA did show anxiety over the spread of nuclear arsenals to other nations: As originally intended to the IAEA, the program contained strong precautions that would obstruct participants in the program from using the materials produced in power generation from being switched to the use of bombs. These safeguards were countered by number of nations. In its keenness to get an agreement, U.S dropped the safeguards, hoping that in some way they could be included later. This ambiguous approach resulted the proliferation of nuclear technology to more countries. Thus, USA failed to lead the arms reduction and a cause of its increase. At the same time US policy was the immediate cause of horizontal proliferation. It stationed its nuclear arsenals in Europe and renewed its policy of transferring nuclear technology to its allies for challenging the Warsaw pact’s military supremacy over NATO.

2.3. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA)

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established as an independent body related with the United Nations (UN) through an international treaty ba sed on the fear and concern of the collective consciousness over the spread of nuclear energy. The earliest attempt to institute “the Agency”, as the IAEA was known and later aptly

nicknamed, was the genesis of United States President Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” address in front of the General Assembly on December 8, 1953. 7 It was an attempt to establish an international agency that would take control of fissile material for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to seek to confirm that nuclear energy would not serve any military purpose. This initial suggestion was refused by the Soviet Union, as the idea that there would be international tutelage of fissile material was not viable to the interests of the nations; however, the notion of using a type of global and autonomous clearing house for nuclear transaction was an appealing compromise to the deadlocked nuclear superpowers. On October 23, 1956, the ideas from the address helped shape the IAEA Statute leading to its approval on July 29, 1957. 8 It declared, three main pillars of the IAEA’s function: “nuclear verification and security, safety, and technology transfer”. 9

It encourages and assists research, development and practical application of atomic energy for peaceful uses throughout the world; established and administers safeguards designed to guarantee that it is not used to further any military purpose; apply safeguards to pertinent proceedings at the request of Member States; apply, under the NPT and other international treaties, obligatory thorough safeguards in Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) Parties to such treaties. 10 In carrying out its functions, the Agency practices its proceedings in accordance with the intentions and principles of the UN Charter to promote peace and international cooperation, and in conformity with policies of the United Nations for furthering the inception of worldwide disarmament through safeguards.11 The IAEA is a self-governing intercontinental organization that reports yearly to the UN General Assembly. When essential, the IAEA will report to the Security Council in case of associates' non-cooperation of safeguard and safety obligations. In 2009, Yukia Amano was appointed as the Director General of the IAEA. The IAEA Secretariat is headquartered in Vienna, Austria. Regional offices are located in Geneva, Switzerland; New York, United States; Tokyo, Japan; and Toronto, Canada. Scientific research laboratories are established in Vienna and Seibersdorf, Austria; Trieste, Italy; and Monaco.12

In the early days the role of the IAEA was limited and merchants of nuclear materials and technologies took liability for observing those they supplied. The agency at last rose in

the wake of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, an issue that led the two superpowers to the edge of nuclear war. With U.S./Soviet arms diminution now on the agenda, the search was on to find a way to work together in the areas of nuclear weaponry and atomic energy. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) necessitated non-nuclear-armed states to accept IAEA safeguards. The 1986 Chernobyl (USSR) mishap, graphically bring out the significance of "nuclear safety" initiatives. The IAEA played a principal role in examining and dealing with radioactive pollution, a function it played once more during the accident at the Fukushima (Japan) nuclear power plant.

Under Safeguards Agreements, IAEA inspectors regularly visit nuclear facilities to verify records maintained by State authorities on the whereabouts of nuclear material under their control, to check IAEA-installed instruments and surveillance equipment, and to confirm physical inventories of nuclear material. 13 These and other safeguard procedures provide autonomous, worldwide verification that administrations are abiding by their obligations to the nonviolent utilize of nuclear technology. A prerequisite for the implementation of safeguards is an agreement among the State and Agency. There are four types of inspections: Ad Hoc (to verify a state's initial nuclear report), Routine (the most common inspections which are preformed routinely), Special (supplementary inspections executed in unusual circumstances), and finally, Safeguard Visits (inspections to declared facilities to confirm the safeguards design information). 14

The Additional Protocol is more comprehensive, and volitional, form of safeguarding which permits for extended inspections with the most sophisticated procedure. As a lawful manuscript, the Additional Protocol aims to provide guarantees to all declared and undeclared facilities. IAEA has 154 member states; Signature and endorsement of the NPT are not necessities for membership in the IAEA. The standard fund for fiscal 2011 was set at approximately 39 billion yen ($476.8 million). Japan's assistances stood at around 4.8 billion yen or 12 percent. Around 2,300 people employed at the IAEA Secretariat as of April 2011.

2.4. GENERAL AND COMPREHENSIVE DISARMAMENT

USSR also put some efforts to achieve the goal of disarmament during the late 1950s and early 1960s. In September 1959 Nikita Khrushchev introduced a plan for absolute disarmament at general assembly of United Nations. This plan was known as “General and Comprehensive disarmament” (GCD). This was persuaded by the Mc Cloy-Zorin talks in 1961 which ended in ‘Agreed Principles’ in 1962 and an abstract for GCD which was subsequently discussed by the armament talks. It ended without any progress.

2.5. NEW EFFORTS FOR ARMS REDUCTION

By the late 50s Efforts for total disarmament were entirely failed and a new thought emerge within the defense community towards more flexibility. This new theory was known as ‘Arms Control Theory’. It asked for arms management or reduction in armament and insisted that with the help of arms control international stability could be achieved. Internationally at the platform of United Nations General assembly Irish foreign minister ‘Frank Aiken’ presented a proposal in 1959. It was suggested that now nuclear weapons spreading should be restricted. Admitting that it was “hardly realistic” to believe in settlement on the elimination of nuclear arsenals any time soon. He argued

"What we can do is to reduce the risks which the spread of these weapons involves for this generation, and not to hand on to our children a problem even more difficult to solve than that with which we are now confronted."15

Aiken’s proposal was finally adopted into the NPT (Nuclear nonproliferation treaty) in 1968.

The Cuban missile crisis created more momentum for the arms control project in October 1962. Some thinkers believed that could start a nuclear war and three continents could be destroyed. After extreme tension and American threat of using nuclear arsenal, Soviet Union withdrew its nuclear missiles from Cuba. Both superpowers recognized that they had a common urgency for better crisis management. This crisis also highlighted the

dangers or misunderstanding during a political crisis. To stop any other miss understanding in future both powers signed a ‘hot line’ agreement in June 1963 to provide a stable and immediate medium of communication between leaders of both sides.

2.5.1. Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT )

At the end of 50s and starting of 60s both super powers were regulating hundreds of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, causing harm to the climate. The radioactive material continues to be dangerous for thousands of years after the initial explosion. It also damages the health of all living beings and has been related to escalate cancer rates. In keeping with the less enterprising agenda of the new arms control school, the first really convincing arms agreement of the cold war signed. America, Britain and USSR were agreed on a Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) signed in August 1963 at Moscow and entered into force on October 1963. This treaty prohibited nuclear tests in the Earth’s atmosphere, in space and underwater, but allowed tests to continue underground. There was an escape clause in this treaty. Signatories, who might feel threatened by upcoming technological advancement or cheating, can resume testing after three months’ notice. France and China did not sign the treaty because they believed that the treaty benefited only the advanced nuclear states.

2.5.2. Non-Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

Perhaps, NPT (Non-nuclear Proliferation Treaty) was the first major effort done against the spread of nuclear arsenals in the world, was signed at the conference of eighteen nation committee on disarmament in 1968. The 11 articles of this treaty addressed its primary objectives whereas the rest of the articles just provide loopholes, which helped non-nuclear states to creep slowly towards the ability to produce nuclear armaments. The primary objectives of the treaty were to prohibit the proliferation of nuclear weapons and its technology, to assist the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to non-nuclear states and also to achieve general and total nuclear disarmament.

The first three articles discussed the primary aim of slowing down the spread of nuclear armaments. Article I undertaking the nuclear states not to help non-nuclear weapons

states obtain nuclear technology to make nuclear arsenals. Article II undertaking other states not to seek such support and to manufacture “or otherwise” the weapons. Article III undertaking the non-nuclear weapons states to consent to a system of defense to guarantee that fissionable material was not switched from peaceful uses to the building of weapons. The same article impart its signatories a loophole which is: “The safeguards required by this article shell be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article VI of this treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities….”16

Article VI comprise of large motives for the non- nuclear weapons states that sign the treaty. Its first paragraph secure their “inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Article I and II of this treaty”.17 Whereas the second paragraph accommodates the other parties, especially the nuclear weapon states, to assist the NPT signatories with the growth of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Article V undertaking the signers to share any possible advantages of the peaceful application of nuclear detonation. Article VI six stated that nuclear states are obliged to proceed with negotiations to stop the arms race and eventually reach the general and comprehensive disarmament.

The remaining five Articles are technical that made signatories free to sign, regional treaties to limit nuclear arsenals, explaining the rules for modifying, signing, and endorsing the NPT, and the provisions for withdrawing from it, and programming a review conference to be held 25 years after it went slowly in 1970.

France, despite being one of the nuclear states under the terms of the NPT, did not sign the treaty until 1992; China signed in 1992; South Africa, which pursued nuclear weapons allegedly with the help of Israel, did not sign it until 1991; Brazil did not sign until 1998; and Cuba signed in 1995 but did not ratify until 2002. India, Pakistan, and Israel have refused to sign the NPT. Some NPT signatories, such as Libya, Iraq, North Korea, and Iran have violated its provisions.18

The biggest fatigue of the treaty, beside from the fact that some major states did not sign it, under these circumstances states are reaching very close to produce nuclear weapons, as well as it provide the shelter for countries to manipulate the rules to become nuclear state and then to withdraw from the treaty and complete the process. The review conference which would be held after 25 years was held in 1995. Most of the countries have consensus of the vitality and effectiveness of NPT for non-proliferation but still need more measures to achieve the obligations under Article VI of the treaty. Although the complete disarmament are not achieved but considerable reduction in nuclear weapons by USA and Russia had been accrued but still the road of disarmament is out of reach. Thomas Graham Jr., special ambassador for nuclear disarmament issues in Clinton’s administration argues on NPT:

"For more than thirty years, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has been a bulwark against [the spread of nuclear weapons]. Because of the NPT, the international community has thus far been largely successful in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. The predictions made during the Kennedy administration that as many as twenty-five to thirty nations would have nuclear weapons integrated into their arsenals by the end of the 1970s did not came true, thanks to the NPT. The International Atomic Energy Agency reports that, while many nations now pose the technological capabilities to produce nuclear weapons, only a handful have crossed the threshold."19

On May 11, 1995 more than 170 countries followed the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference (NPTREC) in New York. Three verdicts and one resolution emanated from NPTREC. First, the NPT was prolonged for an unspecified period and without any conditions. Second, Principles and goals for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament were worked out to lead the parties to the treaty in the next stage of its execution. Third, an improved appraisal procedure was established for upcoming review conferences. Finally, a resolution approved for the establishment of nuclear free zone in the Middle East.

In April 2000 review conference convened in New York. It was recognized that non- nuclear states needs surety from nuclear states that they would not use nuclear weapons against them. The conference approved a set of 13 “practical steps” towards nuclear disarmament but no major breakthrough perceived. The 2005 review conference ended with no agreement on any substantive feature of the NPT.

2.5.3. Export Control Groups: NSG and MTCR

In early 70s a group of representatives from 15 nuclear vendor states held a series of conferences in Vienna, because article iii.2 of the NPT pledges, not to export special apparatus and substances essential for the production of nuclear arsenals to nonnuclear weapon states except under special IAEA safeguards. Professor Cloud Zangger of Switzerland chaired these meetings. The objectives of these meetings were to decide that which items should be restricted and also to inaugurate a policy under which their trade would be permissible. This group was the first export control group which is still working and known as ‘The Zangger Committee’. It maintains and updates a list of apparatus and materials that may be exported only under IAEA safeguards. 20 The list is also known as the “trigger list” because an item on the list activates the stipulation for safeguards.

After Indian nuclear tests in 1974, it was crystal clear that only the NPT is not good enough to slow down the proliferation of nuclear arms. So in late 70s not only nuclear weapon states but also the states with advanced nuclear power generation techno logy, formed an organization known as Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) and also set standards to regulate sales of technology and elements which can be used for nuclear armaments. Currently there are 45 members of NSG. The Zangger Committee and NSG have common intentions but their approaches and memberships are different. On 27th March 2012 prime minister of Pakistan Yusaf Raza Gilani said that Pakistan is capable to supply nuclear technology to other countries and we wants to be a member of NSG.

For the launching of nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles plays primary role. So to control the miss use of missile technology another export control organization, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was formed in 1987 and it has 34 member states.

Like nuclear technology, missile technology has a peaceful use. It can play a part in space exploration and the launch of satellites. The MTCR allows member countries to transfer the missile technology only for nonmilitary satellites, aircrafts, and small short-range tactical missiles (which can use only for defensive purposes). Both NSG and MTCR played a vital role for nonproliferation of nuclear arms beside of NPT.

2.5.4. Regional Nonproliferation Treaties or Nuclear Free Zones

One of such approaches of non-proliferation has been the regional approach such as the establishment of nuclear weapon free zones. These Nuclear Free Zones (NFZ) aim to ban the manufacture, stationing and transportation or locating of nuclear weapons in the particular regions. It also insists to the nuclear weapons states that such zones should not be threatened or assaulted by nuclear weapon states (NWS). Nuclear free zone not only restricts proliferation but also sustain active nuclear disarmament with the demolishing of nuclear weapons and fissile stocks and rolling back existing nuclear programs. The idea of establishing nuclear free zone came in 50s and in 1956 Soviet proposal submitted to the disarmament commission on its concerns about central Europe. But first real proposal on nuclear free zone came from Polish minister of foreign affairs, Adam Repalcki on central Europe in 1956. This plane aim at elimination of nuclear arsenals, nuclear delivery vehicles, reduction of military forces and conventional armaments. 21 This plan covered the territories of Poland, Czechoslovakia and border area of both Germanys. It was admissible to smaller and neutral states of Europe, but America, U-K and France rejected this plan. On the other hand Soviet Union, agree to sustain this proposal.

Some other proposals from Europe came forward such as Soviet Bulgarian proposal of 1958 for Nordic nuclear weapons free zone and Soviet proposal for Mediterranean nuclear free zone in 1963. Finland’s president Kekkonen suggested the creation of a nuclear weapons free zone to cover Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. But due to the difference opinions and cold war politics, the effort could not attain its goal.22 Like Europe many countries from other continents also try to secure their regions from nuclear arms race and insisted to establish nuclear free zones. In 1956, a proposal was put forward to denuclearize Africa. In early 50s it was demanded to make the Baltic as a

nuclear free zone. In Middle East Egypt and Iran put forward the proposal in 1974. From south Asia, Pakistan made a proposal in 1974. Apart from these proposals, several agreements were signed declaring specific regions as nuclear free zones and these are: The Antarctic treaty (1959), The treaty of Tlatelolco (1967) for Latin America and Caribbean region, The Raurotonga treaty (1985) established a (NFZ) in the south pacific, The treaty of Bangkok (1995) created (NFZ) in Southeast Asia, and the treaty of Pelindaba (1996) for Africa.

2.5.5. Chemical and Biological Weapons

Although chemical and biological weapons are not nuclear weapons, but they both are deadly and can destroy lives in very limited span of time, also known as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). There devastating weapons was initially utilized by Spartan Greeks, which used sulfur fumes against opponent soldiers in 400 B.C. In modern history British soldiers deliberately distributed smallpox-infected blankets as 'gifts' to Native American Indian tribes in 1763. In World War I both sides of the conflict used poisonous gases and cause significant number of causalities. These weapons have caused nearly 100,000 causalities in World War I and 1.3 million fatalities worldwide. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 ruled out the exercise of chemical and biological weapons in combat. It did not ban their development, production or stockpiling and also the states that signed the protocol reserved the right to retaliate if attacked with any of these kinds of weapons. In World War II these non-conventional weapons were used and there were reports that most of these weapons were used in Asia by Japan. In cold war era, an increasing number of countries developed chemical and biological warfare research programs.

An initiative was made to control chemical and biological weapons and as a result of international efforts Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) was open to sign in 1972 and it was entered into compel in 1975. It prohibit ate the development, production and stockpiling of biological and toxic weapons. It also requires the destruction of such weapons. The BWC permits only defensive biological warfare research (e.g., vaccines, protective equipment), and allows production and stockpiling of BW agents only in amounts plausible for protective or peaceful purposes. 23 The convention has 163 states

parties and 13 signatories. There are 19 states which did not sign the conventio n; review conferences are held in every five years to monitor implementation of the convention.

In 1992 Chemical Weapon Convention (CWC) was ratified and entered into force in April 29, 1997. As of January 27, 2010, 188 nations had ratified the treaty. Two states (Israel, Myanmar) have signed but not approved the Convention. Five nations (Angola, Egypt, North Korea, Somalia, and Syria) have not signed the CWC. The CWC proscribes the manufacturing, accumulating and use of Chemical Weapons (CW). It also requires state parties to destroy all stocks of CWs within ten years of its entry into force by 2007 with possible extension of up to five years (2012). To ensure that no member country violating its clause, the CWC sets a strict system of inspections carried out by The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). This organization also makes sure the safe destruction of CWs.

2.5.6. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

The negotiations for Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) began in Conference on Disarmament, or CD, which was also known as “the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community.”24 It is affiliated with and funded by the United Nations, yet is autonomous from the U.N. 25 On November 19, 1993; the United Nations General Assembly collectively approved a resolution calling for arbitration of a CTBT. The CD’s 1994 conference opened in Geneva on January 25, with negotiation on CTBT its top precedence.

The CD reached a draft treaty in August 1996. The CTBT was accepted by the United Nations General Assembly, and was opened for signature in New York on 24 September 1996. It has achieved powerful worldwide support. The CTBT is a cornerstone of the international regime on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and a necessary base for the quest of nuclear disarmament. The treaty prohibiting member countries from carrying out of any nuclear weapon test detonation in any environment. It also constrains the development and qualitative progression of nuclear weapons and ends the expansion of sophisticated new types of these weapons. As of January 2012, 182 countries have signed

and 156 have ratified the treaty. 26 The treaty will enforce 180 days after 44 specified states (that participated in the negotiations and, at the same time, possessed nuclear power reactors) have ratified it,27 of the 44, as of August 2011, India, North Korea, and Pakistan had not signed the treaty and China, Egypt, Indonesia, Israel, Iran and the U.S had signed but not ratified it. Ten years after entry into force, a Conference of the States Parties will be held to review the operation and effectiveness of the Treaty.28 Further review conferences may be held at following intervals of 10 years or less.

The treaty establishes a verification regime. It permits States Party to use National Technical Means (NTM) of verification, and stipulates verification responsibilities of the Technical Secretariat. It establishes an International Monitoring System (IMS) for on-site inspections. The IMS have 321 stations around the globe to observe for signals that may specify a nuclear explosion. As of August 2011, of the 337 facilities, 29 are planned, 23 are under construction, 21 are undergoing testing, and 264 have been certified, that is, they are completed and meet the technical requirements of the Preparatory Commission.29

Article II of the CTBT establishes the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO).30 However, that organization will not come into existence until and unless the treaty enters into force. As an interim measure, on November 29, 1996, states that had signed the treaty adopted a resolution establishing the Preparatory Commission (Prep Com) for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) “for the purpose of carrying out the necessary preparations for the effective implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and for preparing for the first session of the Conference of the States Parties to that Treaty.”31 The Preparatory Com-mission’s key assignments are ascertaining an international verification system to observe compliance with the comprehensive ban on explosive nuclear testing and promoting Treaty signature and ratification. The Prep Com held 36 meetings from November 1996 through June 2011; as of August 2011, the next is scheduled for October 2011. Nine meetings of working groups and advisory groups were held in or are scheduled for 2011. The Prep Com also holds training sessions, workshops, etc.32

Many experts believed that the agreement will avert states from creating sophisticated nuclear arms or upgrading existing ones, and therefore obstruct a nuclear armaments pursuit, reduce nuclear arsenals proliferation and fortify the NPT. Many states parties to the NPT perceive the CTBT as a step in the direction of nuclear disarmament, which they consider is necessary under the NPT in trade for their agreement to give up nuclear armaments.

2.6. CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES BETWEEN SUPER POWERS

In 1963, first treaty signed between these nuclear powers known as “Hotline agreement” to recoiling from the strained nuclear standoffs of the early 60s, this agreement inaugurate close communication links between the leaders of both countries. The hotline agreement was the first of a series of treaties which were designed to prevent nuclear war among both powers and also to reduce nuclear arsenals. To decrease the chances of nuclear war and produce the confidence building measures between US and USSR several other agreements were signed including the 1973s “Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement” (a rather vague but welcome statement of good intentions) and 1987s agreement to establish “Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers”.

2.6.1. SALT I (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks)

The SALT talks were the first consultation between the two superpowers, which made an attempt to limit strategic nuclear arsenals with the affirmed objective of reducing the level of armaments to curb the nuclear arms race in the Cold War. To limiting nuclear offensive and defensive weapons, after three years of negotiations the U.S and USSR signed their first appropriate treaty in May 26, 1972. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, known as SALT I, based on two agreements, “The Interim Agreement” and the “Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty” (ABMT); the two treaties vary in their time period and inclusiveness. The ABM Treaty shall be of unlimited duration, but each Party has the right to withdraw on six months’ notice if it chooses that its utmost interests are endangered by unusual events associated to the subject matter of this Treaty. 33 The Interim Agreement was signed for five-year period, and covered only specific key

features of strategic weaponry. Intensive study had gone into discovering ways of authenticating likely agreements without necessitating access to the terrain of the other side. Together the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement specified that conformity will be assured by their own satellites and remote sensing equipment also known as National Technical Means (NTM) of verification. In addition, the agreements integrated provisions which were imperative steps to fortify guarantee against violations: both parties agree not to impede with NTM verification. In addition, both countries agreed not to use intentional cover up measures to interfere verification. The treaty turn into the root of all subsequent arms control agreements among U.S and USSR. Both states acknowledged that without concurred restrictions, nuclear arm race threatened global stability and imposed considerable economic costs on both countries.

2.6.1.1. The Interim Agreement

The interim agreement talks about offensive arms and freeze the total number of missile launchers for Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and Submarine Lunch Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) for five year duration. Both parties agreed that they would not construct new ICBM launchers after June 1972; at the time US had 1,054 ICBM launchers and the Soviet Union had 1,618 ICBM launchers. 34 They also agreed to freeze their number of SLBM launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines, although they could add SLBM launchers if they retired old ICBM launchers. 35 In 1977 both sides agreed to continue to follow the obligations of treaty. Unlikely, this agreement permitted both powers to arm their ballistic missiles with Multiple Independently Targetable Re- Entry Vehicles (MIRVs). A MIRV missile allows an individual missile to carry a number of warheads intended for separate targets. When it nears the enemy, sends out several smaller missiles each armed with a nuclear warhead. One ballistic missile thereby achieves the result of several missiles hitting to various targets. The MIRV technology equipped both parties to dodge the intentional effects of the interim agreement.

2.6.1.2. Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty

An Anti-Ballistic Missile is a defensive missile designed to shoot down incoming ballistic missile before it reaches its target.36 Both powers started to deploy ABMs in late 60s, Soviet Union deploy its ABM system in 1966 around Moscow and in 1967 Washington announced to deploy ABM around its territory both sides feel threatened from possible Chinese ICBM. After the SALT agreement, The ABM Treaty limited each side to two anti-ballistic missile sites with 100 interceptors each. In 1974 a protocol signed and both sides agreed to deploy an ABM system to one site. The Soviet Union installed its site around Moscow and it’s still functioning today. The US stationed its ABM system around ICBM silo launchers situated in close to Grand Forks air force base, North Dakota. Due to the systems expenditure and partial effectiveness, it was disbanded by Pentagon in 1975.37 For several years the ABM treaty was recognized as one of the milestone in arms limitations. It was professed as requiring two rivals to agree not to install a potentially useful weapon, intentionally to uphold the equilibrium of power and as such, was also taken as confirmation of the Soviet adherence to the MAD doctrine. On December 13, 2001 US president George W. Bush proclaim that the US would withdraw from the ABM treaty, he said “I have concluded the ABM treaty hinders our government’s ability to develop ways to protect our people from future terrorist or rogue- state missile attacks.”38 USA unilaterally departed from ABM treaty on June 2002. The Russian government didn’t regard US withdrawal from the treaty as a hostile act, and the Russian response was muted. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin called the withdrawal from the treaty “annoying” but said the United States was within its rights. 39

2.6.2. SALT II

SALT II negotiations began soon after the signing of SALT I. The main purpose of SALT II was to substitute the Interim Agreement with long-term comprehensive Treaty giving wide restrictions on strategically offensive arms systems. The Interim Agreement was planned to end in 1977. “Early discussion between the sides focused on the weapon systems to be included, factors involved in providing for equality in numbers of strategic nuclear deliverance vehicles, taking into account the important differences between the

forces of the two sides, bans on new systems, qualitative limits, and a Soviet proposal to include U.S forward-based systems."40 Both Parties had different stance on many of these matters. However, the talks were more complex than expected, which reflect the growing tensions in U.S.-Soviet relations, and U.S domestic political problems. After several years of negotiations the SALT II treaty, signed by Jimmy Carter and Leonid Brezhnev in June 1979. The treaty limited the number of strategic nuclear long-range delivery vehicles to 2,400, to be reduced to 2,250 by 1982. It also addressed the ambiguities of MIRV missiles, limiting MIRV launchers to a total of 1,320 and stipulating the number of warheads on each type of launcher – 10 on ICBMs and 14 on SLBMs. The treaty would not have restricted the total number of warheads that could be transported on these delivery vehicles, which was a heightening concern with the deployment of large numbers of multiple warhead missiles; still they agreed on provisions that were designed to limit missile advancement programs, in an effort to control qualitative improvements in their strategic forces.41

Six months after signing the treaty, Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. In responding of Soviet aggression In January 1980 US President James Carter asked the senate to delay the ratification of SALT II. Although SALT II remained un-ratified, both the US and USSR accepted the limits of the treaty. In 1986 Regan administration abrogated from SALT II after censuring the Soviets disregarding the pact.

With the possible exception of 1972 ABM treaty, none of these SALT agreements seriously curbed the enlargement of the both powers nuclear arsenals, much less reduction then. But it’s also true that because of these treaties chances of using nuclear arms from both sides became much shorter than before.

2.6.3. Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty)

The consultations for Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty (INF) initiated in late 1980 and resumed till November 1983, when the USSR leave the negotiations upon installation of the initial American INF systems in Europe. The talks recommenced in January 1985. At the negotiations, the Reagan Administration called for a “double zero”

option, which would abolish all short- as well as long-range INF systems, a position at the time viewed by most observers to be ill-favored to the Soviets.42 However, significant development transpired throughout the Gorbachev administration. In October 1986, at the Reykjavik summit, Gorbachev assent to include diminution of Soviet INF systems in Asian continent. In June 1987, the Soviets suggested a total ban on short- and long-range INF systems, which was similar to the U.S. proposal for a double zero. 43 Gorbachev also agreed to the American recommendations for an intrusive authentication system.

The treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear forces (INF) signed in December 1987 by USA and USSR under Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev administration. The INF treaty was seen as a historical and momentous breakthrough in arms control because it settled on comprehensive verifications and abolished whole class of weapons. The US and USSR agreed to obliterate all intermediate-range and short-range nuclear armed ballistic missiles and also the ground launched cruise missiles, which have range between 300 to 3,400 miles.44 The launchers associated with the controlled missiles were also to be destroyed.45 The Soviets agreed to eliminate nearly 1,750 missiles and the U.S agreed to obliterate 846 missiles. On the U.S side, the Pershing II ballistic and the Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM) systems were destroyed and they both were single warhead systems.46 On the other side the Soviet destroyed SS-20 ballistic missiles system, this system carries three warheads. The USSR also destroyed a variety of old nuclear missiles as well as a short-range SS-23 system, which was assembled and installed in the beginning of 80s. Both states had removed all their armaments by May 1991. Its main effects were felt in Western Europe. This agreement proved that nuclear arms reduction is possible. The INF Treaty is the most successful treaty in the history of nuclear disarmament and both parties showed their will to reduce nuclear threat with eliminating their reliable nuclear arsenals.

2.6.4. START I (STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY)

The settlements for Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) began in 1982. But because of American deployment of intermediate range missiles in Europe, these talks on INF and START stopped in between 1983 to 1985, and begin again later in the Regan

government. The talks were included in the Bush senior administration. Both powers signed the START treaty in July 1991. After demise of Soviet Union in December 1991, about 70% of the nuclear arsenals were deployed in Russia and the other 30% were stationed in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. In May 1992 America, Russia and these three republics signed a protocol that made these new states members to the agreement. Simultaneously, these three states agreed to abolish all of their nuclear arms through the seven years diminution period summarized in START. They also concur to sign the NPT. US senate ratified the START on October 1992, and Russia also ratify this treaty in November of following year, but Russian Duma affirmed that it would not switch the mechanisms of conformation for the agreement until all three of the other nations fuse to the NPT as NNWS. Kazakhstan ratified the treaty in June 1992 and joined the NPT as NNWS on February 14, 1994. Belarus accepted START and the NPT on February 4, 1993 and adopt NPT as NNWS on July 22, 1993. In November 1993 Ukrainian parliament gave approval to START, but the approval was conditional with security guaranty by other Nuclear Weapon States (NWS). After both American and Russian assurance Ukraine removed the nuclear arms on its soil and signed the NPT on November 1994.

After signing START-I treaty both parties can station up to 6,000 warheads on 1,600 strategic delivery vehicles (of which 4,900 would be ballistic missile warheads, with a ceiling of 1,100 ICBM warheads). To verify compliance both sides gather most of the information with their National Technical Means (NTM) confirmation system. Both sides also used data exchange, notifications, and on-site inspections to gather information47 and ensures that other party is not violating the treaty. Both parties reduced their forces by the date of December 5, 2001. The treaty was concluded in Dec 2009. According to the provisos of the agreement, START could be extend without any amendment for further five years but Obama administration decided to negotiate a new agreement to substitute START. So in April 2010 both parties signed treaty named New START.

2.6.5. START II (STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY)

The second START agreement signed by US President George H, H Bush and Russian President Boris Yaltsin in January 1993. START II, called for two stages of deduction. The first phase included an ample reduction of warheads and asks for the total deactivation of nuclear warhead delivery systems proscribed by the treaty by the end of 2004. The second phase proposed a further reduction of warheads and the demolition of deactivated missiles and delivery systems by December 31, 2007. Both sides agreed to limit the number of warheads in between 3,000 to 3,500 and also banned the use of MIRVs on ICBMs. The treaty also has limited both sides to 1,750 nuclear weapons for SLBMs. The United States delayed ratification of the START II because of senates’ dispute on the future of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.48 U.S approved and ratified the treaty in Jan 1996. The Russian Duma has concerns on three issues: the treaty’s costs and strategic effects; the need to resolve a new debate over the ABM treaty before agreeing to START II limits; and growing hostility towards NATO expansion.49 Some of these issues were settled during 1997. In Jan 1999 US announced its plan to hold talks for modifications in the 1972 ABM treaty. In similar year NATO forces began their air strikes in Yugoslavia. These events were very annoying for Russian Duma, but Duma approved START II in April 2000 with the condition that if US withdrew from the ABM treaty, Russia would withdraw from the START II. After 9/11 America changed its policy and withdraws from the ABM treaty in June 2002. In response of American withdraw Russia announced that it had withdrawn from START II. The treaty never entered into force.

2.6.6. SORT (STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE REDUCTION TREATY)

Strategic offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT), signed in 2002 by US President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin. The agreement is also known as the ‘Moscow Treaty’. According to the treaty, America and Russia will reduce their strategic nuclear warheads between 1,700 to 2,200 warheads by Dec 31, 2012. The US senate ratified the treaty on March 2003 and Russian Duma approved this agreement on May 2003. The treaty was enforced in June 2003. The treaty did not call for the distraction or

limitation of any warheads and delivery vehicles. The treaty’s limiting the number of nuclear armaments but both sides are free to begin manufacturing their nuclear arsenals immediately afterward. The treaty calls only for diminution of weapons which are deployed; it does not count NWs that are stockpiled. In 2003, Russian army general Andrey Nikolayev, which was also the chairman of the state Dumas committee on defense, said that the SORT allowed the deployment of warheads to its missile systems.

"We could not do this before, now we have legal clearance for it” He further stated “If the USA develops an [antiballistic system] which substantially affects our security, Russia will undoubtedly take commensurate steps, even including withdrawal from the SORT treaty. The ratification law makes provision for this."50

2.6.7. New START

In 2006 America and Russia started talks on arms control looking for new options because START was expiring in 2009. Neither side were wanted to START in its original form, Russia wanted to replace START with new treaty and on the other side Washington originally did not want to negotiate a new agreement, but in 2008, the Bush government decided to conclude a new Treaty. 51 Both parties decided that they wanted to substitute START before it expired, but recognized that this task would have to be left to talks among Russia and the new American government.52 Washington and Moscow began negotiations on a new treaty in late 2008. START ended on December 5, 2009. During the negotiating both administrations signified that they are looking forward to conclude a new agreement before the end of the year. Nevertheless, both parties were failed to achieve the final agreement till the end of 2009. Reports indicate that the formal talks will resume in mid-to-late January 2010, although consultations have continued in the interim.53

American and Russian Presidents Barrack Obama and Medvedev signed the New START in Prague on April 8, 2010. The New START comprises three basic restrictions

on American and Russian strategic forces. First, it restricts both sides to no more than 800 deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers and deployed and non- deployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments. 54 Second, with that total, it confines both side to 700 installed ICBM, SLBM and heavy bombers prepared to carry nuclear weapons. Third, the treaty limits each side to 1,550 deployed warheads included the actual number of warheads carried by deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and one warhead for each deployed heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments. 55

The New START includes observing and confirmation regime which resembles the old START regimes. The treaty has details of limited items; both sides rely on their NTM to gather data and information about the numbers and positions of their strategic forces. New START allowed both sides to conduct up to eighteen short notice, onsite inspections each year, during the first year of treaty’s implementation both parties used full quote of inspection.56 The parties will also exchange data about position and the amount of warheads installed on each deliverance system. Whenever they move forces between declared facilities, they will inform each other.

2.6.8. Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR)

The USSR dissolved in 1991, many nuclear powers and international thinkers were worried that new social and economic circumstances would affect control over Russian WMDs. In the following year two US senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar presented a bill in the US Congress of $400 million to aid the former Soviet Republics (including Russia) for the “transportation, storage, safeguarding, and destruction of nuclear weapons [and with] the prevention of weapons proliferation.”57 This bill gradually emerged into the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR). In beginning the program was difficult to negotiate, because the Russian government was disinclined to confess that there was any problem with their security of nuclear arsenals. The CTR assisted Russia to improve the security of its nuclear armaments throughout transportation. It also helped in transportation of nuclear arsenals from Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to Russia. The program provided Russia ‘armored blankets’ and ‘super containers’ to protect warheads during shipment, equipment to improve security for nuclear weapons railcars, and guard

railcars.58 This assistance may not have been fully adequate to the task, however. According to Russian nonproliferation journal “Ysderny control” in 1997, Russian military units had only 17 percent of the cargo trucks they needed for transportation of nuclear weapons.59 These special transportation securities secured a massive numbers of nuclear warheads in 90s. The transportation program is no longer great as it was in past. But it has its significant mark in the pages of history.

As time went on, the CTR devoted a greater portion of its efforts to improving security at Russian storage facilities, helping Russia design computer tracking systems for warheads, providing software for evaluating potential weaknesses at storage sites, and supplying fences and sensors.60 To stem proliferation and discourse the risk of nuclear terrorism many analysts and representatives in Obama government, believed that the US should expand its threat reduction assistance to other countries.

2.6.9. International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) for Russian Scientists

After disintegration of USSR, many nuclear powers and experts feared that the large numbers of Russian nuclear scientists have been left idle, with no other use for their abilities. These scientists might sell their knowledge to other rough states or groups seeking nuclear arms. To prevent this growing danger, the US, EU, Japan, and Russia founded the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in Moscow and Keiv in 1993. Many former part of Soviet state and other countries have donated their financial support. This center also facilitate scientists who have served on biological and chemical weapons, but it focus on nuclear scientists.

It is expected that 30,000 to 70,000 senior scientists and engineers are working under ISTC.61 Still, majority of the scientists spend approximately fifty days in a year on ISTC projects beside of this program the majority of the scientist also constantly work at their basic positions. Some analysts have noted that, because the science centers do not have enough money to support full pay for a significant number of scientists, they may not

achieve their objective of keeping these scientists away from nations or groups seeking weapons of mass destruction.62

According to a 2003 article in Arms Control Today, “The downsizing of WMD production plants and related infrastructure will continue to displace thousands of scientists and workers skilled in the details of weapon design, manufacture, and maintenance”.63 To address this problem, the State department is adopting new approach and instead of giving short term grants, the centers will focus on ventures that will lead to the long-term redirection of scientists out of weapons work. 64

2.6.10. Fissile Material Production Cutoff Treaty (FMCT)

The U.S first suggested that the global community should prohibit the creation of fissile substance (enriched uranium and plutonium) which can be utilized in nuclear armaments. In 1993 at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva talks have been mainly hindered on fissile material production ban, or FMCT. In 1995, the CD agreed to the “Shannon Mandate,” which called for a “non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” 65

The Bush Administration reviewed the American policy on the FMCT in 2004 and declared that such a ban is helpful but argued that the ban is fundamentally unconformable. In May 2006 Bush Administration put forward a draft treaty which includes no verification measures. The Obama Administration supports the negotiation of an FMCT with verification measures on the basis of the Shannon mandate. 66 President Obama said in an April 2009 speech that “to cut off the building blocks needed for a bomb, the United States will seek a new treaty that verifiably ends the production of fissile materials intended for use in state nuclear weapons; If we are serious about stopping the spread of these weapons, then we should put an end to the dedicated production of weapons-grade materials that create them.”67

One key issue is whether or not such a treaty would seek to include current stocks of fissile material.68 The USA has aggressively objected to such an approach, but it is

propped by a number of non-nuclear weapon states. Intrusive authentication could create an impact on American Nuclear facilities which are not presently being under the UN observation. Also there is a question that what will be the role of the IAEA in FMCT.

2.7. NUCLEAR TERRORISM

The prospect of a terrorist group armed with a nuclear weapon has often been cited as a genuine and supreme threat for the international community from since the past several years.69 Therefore it was indicated by major powers that the forthcoming nuclear posture review will make the goal of countering nuclear terrorism “equal to the traditional mission of deterring a strike by major powers or emerging nuclear adversaries”.70 Although the probability of a nuclear terrorist assault may be moderately low, the outcomes of such an assault would obviously be immense. Despite this consensus, a number of important questions remain open to debate: "How real is the risk that a terrorist group could acquire or construct a functional nuclear device, and how might it attempt to do so? Which group poses the greatest threat in this regard, how has that threat changed over time, and is it currently growing or abating? What existing and prospective measures will prove most effective in preventing terrorists from obtaining a nuclear weapon, stopping them from delivering and detonating a weapon if prevention fails, and responding both at home and abroad in the event that an attack succeeds?"71

Many observers and analysts conjectured that there is possibility that a group could purchase fissile material on the black market or steal it from a military or civilian facility and then use that material to fabricate an improvised nuclear device. 72 In recent years, counselors have increasingly come to view this scenario as the most probable way for radicals seeking nuclear arms, for two major motives. Firstly, huge stockpiles of fissile material can be found all over the world in military and civilian facilities, some of which are insufficiently monitored and guarded. 73 In nuclear power plants harbor, spent fuel pools contain five times as much radioactive material as the reactor core, and they are housed in simple ridged steel buildings even more vulnerable than the reactor containment buildings. Secondly, once an adequate amount of this material has been procured, building a crude nuclear device is not a simple job, certainly within the area of

opportunity, extremists could exploit radioactive materials would be used for creating a "dirty bomb" or so-called Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) by loading a conventional bomb with radioactive materials. If terrorists succeeded to build this kind of device than the results would be extremely disastrous and a big number of lives will face catastrophe for a very long time.

In 1996, the UN Secretary-General (UNSG) Boutros Boutros-Ghali prepared a report pursuant to UN General Assembly Resolution 50/53, in which he reviewed existing international legal instruments relating to international terrorism and concluded that there was a need to elaborate international treaties or other kinds of instruments in areas not covered by existing treaties, among the measures proposed by the UNSG was preventing the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by terrorists. 74

The Legal board of the UN General Assembly considered the draft conference, which was proposed by Russia. On 17th December, 1996 UN General Assembly Resolution 51/210 set up an Ad Hoc Committee to elaborate the draft convention. 75 The Russian Federation noted in draft convention that the 1980s Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) had a number of certain gaps regarding countering acts of nuclear terrorism, eminently at the stage of stopping the terrorist act and eliminating its consequences. 76 The Russia also claimed that CPPNM alone was not able to exclude the danger of nuclear terrorism in all its manifestations, and therefore, the draft convention was aimed at combating new and dangerous manifestations of terrorism, inducing the adoption of effectual preventive measures in that sphere, and establishing a credible international legal mechanism for solidarity at all stages of combating nuclear terrorism.77 The adoption of the convention was delayed for many years because of numerous concerns. Most of these worries correlated to Article IV. Many NNWS, particularly the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), opposed any idiom that could legalize the exercise of nuclear arms by armed forces of nuclear weapon States (NWS). These concerns were addressed by the adoption of an amendment added to Article IV stipulating that the convention cannot be interpreted as addressing the "legality of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by States."78

After the clarification of article IV with some other amendments in draft treaty, the Ad Hoc Committee reached an agreement to present the document for signature in its 35th meeting. The General Assembly unanimously approved the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism on 13 April 2005 during the 91st plenary meeting of the General Assembly by resolution A/RES/59/290.79 The treaty opened for sign on 14 September 2005 and came into force on 7 July 2007. Till now 77 countries had signed the treaty and only 15 of them ratified it.

The convention defines the act of nuclear terrorism as the use or threat to use nuclear material, nuclear fuel, radioactive products or waste, or any other radioactive substances with toxic, explosive, or other dangerous properties. 80 The definition includes the use or threat to use any nuclear installations, nuclear explosive, or radiation devices in order to kill or injure persons, damage property, or the environment, or to compel persons, States, or international organizations to do or to refrain from doing any act. 81 The unauthorized receipt through fraud, theft, or forcible seizure of any nuclear material, radioactive substances, nuclear installations, or nuclear explosive devices belonging to a State Party, or demands by the threat or use of force or by other forms of intimidation for the transfer of such material would also be regarded as acts of nuclear terrorism. 82

For further prohibition of the nuclear terrorism, on 15 July 2006, during the G8 Summit in St. Petersburg, American and Russian head of the states together announce the establishment of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). The Initiative took legal guidance from the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1540 and 1373.83

The GICNT's initial summit took place in October 2006 at Rabat, Morocco envoys from 13 states Australia, China, Canada, Germany, France, Kazakhstan, Italy, Turkey, Japan, Morocco, the United Kingdom, the U.S and Russia mutually accepted the Statement of Principles that sketched out obligations of the GICNT.

The Statement of Principles pledges to improve each nation’s ability to: secure radioactive and nuclear material, prevent illicit trafficking by improving detection of such material, respond to a terrorist attack, prevent safe haven to potential nuclear terrorists and financial resources, and ensure liability for acts of nuclear terrorism. 84 Member nations share a familiar ambition to develop national capabilities to combat nuclear terrorism by sharing best practices through multinational exercises and expert level meetings.85

If a State desires to become a partner in the GICNT it must send a written letter of endorsement of the Statement of Principles to the GICNT Co-Chairs (United States or Russian Federation).86 The State is admitted as a partner upon a Co-Chairs' agreement. Only International Governmental Organizations (IGOs) have observers’ status for the GICNT. In this aptitude they can offer suggestion and expertise to the GICNT about events and the improvement of best practices. Currently, the IAEA, European Union (EU), INTERPOL, and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) are authorized onlookers of the GICNT. As of January 2011, 82 countries have agreed to the statement of principles and are Global Initiative Partner nations. 87

From past 68 years countless efforts were made for preventing and restraining of nuclear weapons proliferation, both individually and collectively. Unfortunately the dream of using nuclear technology for better human life style is not entirely fulfilled, although efforts were made to terminate the danger of nuclear war. Today the developed nuclear states transferring nuclear technology and the question arises that how anyone can know the intentions of a state which is acquiring nuclear technology in the name of energy purposes. Especially in conflict, it is impossible that a state in pursuit for better deterrence would not try to develop a nuclear bomb in the name of peaceful nuclear program. In this era of globalization and global economy many nuclear powers use unconventional tactics to prevent nuclear proliferation with economic incentives and sanctions. These types of efforts have gained some success, but they are not entirely successful. America and European powers punished Iran, Pakistan, North Korea and India with economic sanctions but in all of these cases China, Russia and some of other European countries continued their economic support to those proliferating countries,

because they have their own interests in these regions. There is another theory that proliferation can be slow down if nuclear powers guarantee non-nuclear states that they are under their nuclear umbrella and they will protect them from any nuclear aggression. But in this scenario the question arises among these protected states inner and outer sovereignty, nuclear states can make their political and economic influence on these small nations in the name of nuclear protection and also there is no such surety that in the time of nuclear crises these big powers really protect those non-nuclear states instead of their own cities or state. With the help of confidence building measures and lowering the number of nuclear arsenals we can retain nuclear proliferation.

1 Oxford Dictionary 2007 2 Sokolski, Henry D. (2001) Best of Intentions: America’s Campaign Against Strategic

Weapons Proliferation. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, pp. 13-21 3Margulies, Philip (2010) Nuclear Non Proliferation, New Delhi: Viva book private limited, p. 25 4Daylis, John, Wirtz, James, Cohen, Eliot & Gray, Colin S. (2006) Strategy in the Contemporary World: An introduction to strategic studies, New York: Oxford University press, p. 189 5 http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/TR/2001/NPS-IJWA-01-005.pdf 6 Margulies, p. 26 7 http://ocmun.weebly.com/uploads/4/3/4/7/4347574/ocmun.iaea.final.pdf 8 Ibid 9 IAEA, About IAEA, http://www.iaea.org/About/index.html. 10 http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/international-atomic-energy-agency/ 11 Ibid 12 Ibid 13 Ibid 14 Ibid 15Quated in fighting proliferation chapter 1 “what does the history of the non-nuclear proliferation tell us about its future?” Henry Sokolski, http://fos.org/irp/threat/fp/b19ch1.htm. 16 Margulies, p. 28 17 Ibid, p. 28 18 Sokolski, pp. 39-56 19 Thomas Graham, Jr. (2004) Common Sense on Weapons of Mass Destruction, Seattle

& London: University of Washington Press, pp. 51-52 20 Margulies, p. 30 21 Pande, Amba (2002) Regional Security in Southeast Asia & the South Pacific:

Prospects of Nuclear Free Zone, Delhi, Authors Press, p. 6

22Pande.Savita, “Tlatelolco treaty: How Successful?” Strategic Analysis, vol.22, no1,

April 1998, p. 38 23 http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33865.pdf 24 http://congressionalresearch.com/RL34394/document.php 25 Medalia, Jonathan (August 3, 2011) Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Background and Current Developments, Congressional Research Service, p. 14, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33548.pdf 26 Mackby, Jenifer (January 23, 2012), Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, Center for Strategic International Studies, http://csis.org/publication/comprehensive-nuclear-test- ban-treaty-0

27 http://csis.org/publication/comprehensive-nuclear-test-ban-treaty-0 28 http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/comprehensive-nuclear-test-ban-treaty-ctbt/ 29 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Preparatory Commission provides updated information on these facilities at http://www.ctbto.org/map/#ims. 30http://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/legal/June_2013_Commentary_on_Nation al_Implementation_Measures_for_OSI_Inspections_Under_the_CTBT-_English.pdf 31 “Resolution Establishing the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization,” Adopted by the States Signatories, November 19, 1996: “Annex—Text on the Establishment of a Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization,” paragraph 1, http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/ctbt/text/ctbt4.htm. 32 Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty Organization, “Calendar of Events 2010” http://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/conferenceservices/workshops/2010/2010_C alendar_May31.pdf. 33 http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/salt1/intro.htm 34 http://www.slideshare.net/FreeLeaks/rl33865 35 Dijk, Ruud Van, (2008) "Encyclopedia of the Cold War", U.K: Rutledge Taylor and

Frances Group, p. 850 36 http://www.thefreedictionary.com/antiballistic+missile

37 http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33865.pdf 38 Margulies, p.59 39BBC News, Thursday, 13 Dec 2001, 18:17 GMT. “America Withdraws from ABM

Treaty.” 40 Alikuzai, Hamid Wahed, (2013) "A Concise History of Afghanistan in 25 Volumes:

Volume 14", USA: Trafford Publishing p. 857 41 http://www.slideshare.net/FreeLeaks/rl33865 42 Ibid 43 Ibid 44 Ibid 45 Ibid 46 http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33865.pdf 47 Ibid 48 Ibid 49Baylis. John, Writz. James, Cohn Eliot, Gray Colins. (2006) Strategy in The Contemporary World: An introduction to St Studies, New York, O xford University Press,

P.195 50Nuclear files.org. Project of the Nuclear Age, Peace Foundation, Timeline of the

Nuclear Age, 2003, http://www.nuclear files.org/menu/Timeline/2000/2003.htm. 51 http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33865.pdf 52 Ibid 53Woolf, Amy F, and Nikitin, Mary Beth, and Kerr Paul K, (February 2, 2010) Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements, Congressional

Research Service, p. 17.http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33865.pdf 54 Warren, Aiden, (2013) "The Obama Administration's Nuclear Weapon Strategy: The

Promises of Prague", U.K: Rutledge Taylor and Frances Group, p. 54 55 Ibid, p. 54 56 http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33865.pdf 57 Bush, Nathan E. (2005) No End in Sight: The Continuing Menace of Nuclear

Proliferation, Lexington, Ky, University Press of Kentucky, p. 124

58 Margulies, p. 49 59 Busch, p. 124 60 Ibid, p. 124 61 http://www.slideshare.net/FreeLeaks/rl33865 62 Woolf, pp. 24-25 63Luongo, Kenneth N. &Hoehn, William E. (June 2003) “Reforms and Expansion of Cooperative Threat Reduction”, Arms Control Today, http://www.armscontrol .org/act/2003_06/luongohoehn_june03.asp. 64 Ibid 65 Woolf, p. 32 66 Woolf, Amy F. and Kerr, Paul K. and Nikitin, Mary Beth D. (July 15, 2013) "Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements", p. 34, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33865.pdf (Accessed on 18 November 2013) 67 Op Cit, p. 33 68 http://www.slideshare.net/FreeLeaks/rl33865 69 http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2010/04/understanding-the-threat-of-nuclear- terrorism/ 70 Thom Shanker and Eric Scmitt, “U.S. to Make Stopping Nuclear Terror Key Aim,” New York Times, December 19, 2009. 71 Evan B. Montgomery, “Understanding the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism”, Centre for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, April 2, 2010, http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2010/04/understanding-the-threat-of-nuclear- terrorism/ 72 http://www.nuclearthreatinitiative.org/e_research/official_docs/inventory/pdfs/ctbto.pdf 73 Ibid 74 Nuclear Threat Initiative Website, (2011), International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/international- convention-suppression-acts-nuclear-terrorism/ 75 Ibid 76 Ibid

77 Ibid 78 Ibid 79 Ibid 80 Ibid 81 Ibid 82 Ibid 83 Nikitin, Mary Beth, (March 7, 2012) "Securing Nuclear Materials: The 2012 Summit and Issues for Congress", p. 24, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41169.pdf (Accessed on 14 October 2013) 84 Ibid, p. 25 85 http://www.slideshare.net/FreeLeaks/rl33865 86 Nuclear Threat Initiative Website, (2011), Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/global-initiative-combat-nuclear- terrorism-gicnt/ 87 Woolf, p. 37

Chapter: 3

PAKISTAN AND ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM: FROM THE PAST TO

THE PRESENT

Pakistan was established as a Muslim state after the dissolution of the British India on 14th August 1947. Pakistan is located between 23 degrees 30 to 37 degrees North Latitude and 61 degrees east to 77 degrees East Longitude. 1 China lies in the north of Pakistan while Afghanistan and Iran are in the West of it India is situated in the east and Arabian Sea is to the south. It was the most populous Muslim state in the world. The secession of Bangladesh in 1971 decreased it to a second place after Indonesia. Pakistan is a seventh country in the world to become a nuclear weapon state. In responding to Indian nuclear tests at Pokhran, Pakistan successfully carries out five nuclear tests on May 28, 1998 in Chaghi, Baluchistan. Although Pakistan is a nuclear state but only two percent of its electricity is produced by nuclear power. It is basically an agricultural state and ranked 145 as a low human development country by HDI (Human Development Index) in 2011. According to the HDI, 60.3% of Pakistan's population lives on under $2 a day.2 According to Pakistan Planning Commission 37.5% of Pakistani population is living under the poverty line. All these figures show that economically Pakistan is a weak country and one of the facts is that Pakistan from its independence has always relied on foreign aid for military and civil purposes. The question arises that in these extreme unstable conditions how and why Pakistan has acquired nuclear weapons. The answer to this and many other questions is the purpose of this chapter.

3.1. STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF PAKISTAN

Pakistan’s geo-strategic significance can be best implicit in the international and regional perspective. In geological terms, it is delimited by four states: Afghanistan, Iran, India and China, each of which is a foremost player in global politics. Therefore, Pakistan is essential for these nations and this substance amplifies its international figure. Pakistan is link among South West Asia and South Asia; Afghanistan and Iran are wealthy in power

resources while India and China are deficient of, so they require way in to these countries and Pakistan can grant them course to Iran and Afghanistan, IPI gas pipeline and ‘Afghan-Pak Transit Trade Agreement’ (APTTA) are proof of geo-strategic significance of Pakistan. Afghanistan which is now the center of world’s attention is generally regarded as the breeding ground of international terrorism, militancy, opium production and the whole world, including the US realizes the fact that no peace is possible in Afghanistan without the active support and cooperation of Pakistan.3

Pakistan geo-strategic location has sometimes caused trouble for Pakistan as during the cold war, USA used it in the proxy war against the Soviet Union; now in the global War on Terror (WOT) Pakistan paid a lot because of its historic ties with Afghanistan. The regional interests of US are to contain China, nuclear ambitions of Iran, terrorism in Afghanistan, and to gain benefit of trade market of India. While Islamabad is playing a major task in fight against terrorism and by using Pakistan’s strategic position U.S can get its goals. For US, Pakistan is geo-strategically important because it is the sole super power, and to prevent the rise of any rival, China or any European power, the United States wishes to dominate in the Middle East and Central Asia, because they are rich in oil and gas resources.4 Saudi Arabia had both the geo-political and geo-strategic interests in region and it saw Pakistan as a strategic balance of Iran. Both America and Saudi Arabia view Pakistan as a catalyst for any kind of military strike on Iran.

Pakistan is close to Central Asian Republics (CARs) which are full of oil and gas reserves, but they are landlocked states needing a passage for export of their valuable assets. Pakistan can provide them a transportation route for trade with other states, so its geo-strategic location is very important in the eyes of Afghanistan and CARs. Pakistan’s location is also vital for China because through Pakistan it can find a way to hot waters. China is economic power and its economy is swiftly rising, so to preserve its growth it needs access to other states, hence Gwadar harbor is extremely imperative for China providing safe transit to the western region. China is also increasing its cooperation with Pakistan in Saindak project.

3.2. PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM: THE BEGINNING

Although, Pakistan came into existence in late 1940s, its nuclear program began seven years after its emergence. It could have been even later then that if the inspiration had not come from the American ‘Atom for Peace’ proposal, which the then American president Dwight Eisenhower put forward in the United Nations General Assembly in late 1953.5 In its early days Pakistan was unstable both politically and economically. Almost 8.2 million people were migrated from India to Pakistan and it was very difficult task to provide them food and shelter and to settle them in different regions of Pakistan. Secondly there were no scientific institutions and study centers in this part of the subcontinent as all big universities were established in India. Moreover, the administrative set-up of the Indian council of scientific and industrial research established in 1942, and its 14 national research laboratories, remained in India upon the partition of the subcontinent.6 Most importantly the Pakistani politicians didn’t show any kind of enthusiasm to start nuclear program but in India Jawaharlal Nehru was very keen to attain nuclear technology.

3.2.1. PHASE I: 1954-1970

In October 1954, Pakistan’s industry minister announced a plan to set up a national atomic research unit as part of a new body for scientific and industrial research in Pakistan.7 A twelve person atomic energy committee was formed for the initiation of a nuclear program which started in March 1956 after the establishment of Atomic Energy Council (AEC) based on two parts: a central body and Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC). Dr. Nazir Ahmad was the first chairman of PAEC. In its initial years PAEC failed to gain attention from government and it was financially a very week institute that’s why Dr. Nazir Ahmed in his address to Pakistan Institute of International Affairs (PIIA) on June 1958, complained that the procurement of nuclear reactors was unnecessarily delayed for ‘non-technical’ (financial and administrative) reasons. 8 In 1960 Dr. Ishrat Usmani took charge of PAEC. He was a physicist and educated in Imperial College of science and technology, London and Dr. Abdul Salam (Nobel Laureate) selected him. Under his supervision PAEC emerged as a powerful functional institute.

Therefore, in the 1960’s government’s attitude toward nuclear program also gained attention and momentum. The administration thereafter adopted an atomic energy law, which made the PAEC an autonomous statutory body. The first matter undertaken was the search for Uranium. The process took about 3 years from 1960 to 1963. Uranium mines were founded in the Dera Ghazi Khan district and mining of uranium began the same year.

As a result of this new dynamics, the PAEC – at the beginning of 1965 established eight medical and agricultural centers and trained some 350 nuclear scientists and engineers.9 The Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (PINSTECH) was thus created in 1963 at Nilore near Islamabad which had two facilities: a research reactor known as Pakistan Atomic Research Reactor (PARR) and a reprocessing plant. This 5 MW research reactor was provided by US under the ‘Atom for Peace’ program. It became operational in 1965 under IAEA safeguards. The PARR was upgraded to 10 MW by Nuclear Engineering Division in 1990. An accord was signed in 1965 between Pakistan and Canada for the construction of 137 MW power plant in Karachi also known as Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP). To make this plant operational, Canada provided natural uranium and heavy water along with technical and training assistance. The construction of the plant started in 1966 and was completed in 1971 also under IAEA safeguards system. In total, the Pakistani government spent PRs. 324 million in between 1960-68 for the development of nuclear technology in addition to the PRs. 400 million allocated for the construction of the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP). 10 The Center of Nuclear Studies (CNS) was founded in 1969 to prepare nuclear engineers and scientists within Pakistan who were earlier trained in USA, Western Europe and at the IAEA under ‘Atom for Peace’ program. Till then there was no indication that Pakistan will switch its nuclear program from peaceful purposes to military purpose. According to Ashok Kapur, General Ayub is reported to have said, ‘We will buy the bomb of the self if India goes Nuclear’.11 This statement shows that leadership of Pakistan believed that India will not use its nuclear technology for military purposes and if he did then Pakistan will buy a weapon from international market, truly a non-serious approach for the country’s nuclear program. Only Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (foreign minister in Ayub Khans

cabinet) showed some concerns on the Indian nuclear program and insisted to start nuclear weaponry program along with civil nuclear technology. After the Indo-Pak war of 1965 Washington imposed an arm embargo on Pakistan. This was a wakeup call for the policy makers in Pakistan and it showed that Islamabad can’t rely on its so called defense allay. Z.A Bhutto realized it and stated that; ‘it would be dangerous to plan for less and our plan should therefore, include the nuclear deterrent’. 12

3.2.1.1. 1968 NPT decision

Although Islamabad played a productive role throughout the NPT negotiations (1965-68) and was conclusive about the final draft, it refused to accept the treaty in 1968 because of Indian decision of not signing the treaty. After the year of 1968 Pakistan modified its nuclear guidelines and adopted the policy of ‘nuclear option’, which meant that it would keep the choice to acquire nuclear weapons if situation asked for it. Aga Shahi, the Pakistan’s representative in the UN later recalled, Pakistan’s choice not to sign the NPT in 1968 was obvious because ‘it did not require much foresight to visualize that India would acquire nuclear arsenals within the next few years’.13 Before 1968 Pakistan never showed any interest in the making of nuke weapon. It clearly shows that ‘India factor’ played most assertive role in Pakistan’s nuclear policy.

In 1970, Pakistan signed an agreement with French firm for importing a reprocessing plant but, Paris went back due to American pressure. After Pakistan’s decision not to sign NPT, the US administration became against Pakistan’s acquiring any facility which could be used for producing fissile material.

3.2.2. PHASE II: 1971-1998 3.2.2.1. The 1971s Incident of East Pakistan (Bangladesh)

In the 70s Pakistan fully shifted its nuclear program from civil to military purposes because of three events. First and foremost was outbreak of a civil conflict in East Pakistan in 1971 and New Delhi’s participation in it. In the result of this war Pakistan was dismembered and East Pakistan became a newly Independent state known as

Bangladesh. India played a vital role in the beginning of civil war and disintegration of East Pakistan with its propaganda and military invasion. According to Z.A. Bhutto:

"In barely a quarter century between 1947 and 1971, India has gone to war three times against Pakistan. Throughout this period, India has spurned all possible methods of peaceful settlement of its disputes with Pakistan. The last war was the result of India’s armed intervention in order to bring about the disintegration of Pakistan."14

This war raised many questions and concerns for the policy makers of Pakistan. First of all, this conflict showed that India’s conventional military potential was far better than Pakistan’s and it cost half of its terrain. Secondly, Pakistan not only lost its eastern wing (which was geographically separated from the western section by 1,000 miles of hostile Indian Territory), but also lost a priceless strategic advantage that it had relative to India before 1971.15

Before 1971 New Delhi had to prepare for a two front combat against Pakistan. After the separation of East Pakistan, It gained a strategic advantage and in upcoming conflict with Pakistan, India would not have to battle on two-fronts with the Pakistan. Due to speeches of various Indian politicians and leaders, it was widely believed in Pakistan that Indian leadership never acknowledged the partition of sub-continent and the war reinstate the historic fear that New Delhi planned to obliterate Pakistan in order to establish Akhand Bharat (undivided India).

The second event which helped Pakistan to shift its nuclear policy was its failure to gain help from its trusted ally the USA. During the 1971 war Pakistani leadership heavily depended on US as a Security ally, but practically US refused to assist Pakistan. Also like 1965, Pakistan tried to get help through SEATO (Southeast Asian Treaty Organization) and CENTO (Central Treaty Organization), but Pakistan failed to acquire any kind of help from these organizations under the idea that both of them were aimed at containing

the USSR and not India. As a result Pakistan adopted a new security policy and withdrew from SEATO in 1972.

The lessons of 1971 had defined Pakistan’s military and strategic thinking for decades to come. These were, firstly, that India could not be trusted and was bent on Pakistan’s destruction; secondly, that when coming to the crunch, despite whatever “security guarantees” they may offer, the United States (and other allies) could not be relied upon to provide meaningful military support to protect the nation; and finally, as a result of these two lessons and since it was now painfully evident that Pakistan could not match India with conventional military force, nuclear weapons were the only way of leveling the playing field and ensuring the survival of the nation. 16

3.2.2.2. Z.A. Bhutto’s Initiative on Nuclear Weapons Program

Four days after the defeat of East Pakistan, President Yahiya Khan resigned and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto assumed power as Pakistan’s first civilian marshals law administrator. He was undoubtedly the political father of the Pakistani bomb. He had also long been an advocate of a nuclear weapons program. During the 60s, He was the only minister in Ayub Khan’s cabinet who had keen interest in such a program. In 1965 he’d expressed his famous quotation: “If India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own, we have no other Choice.”17

On taking office Bhutto didn’t waste any time. He took office of the Division of Nuclear Energy Affairs. A separate ministry of science, technology and production was created to expedite scientific development in the country. 18 Moreover, an inter-ministerial committee was set up to deal with the nuclear matters. Most importantly the activities of PAEC became more secret because the PAEC chairman became answerable only to the president. Bhutto also ensured that bureaucratic intervention would not hamper the activities of the PAEC.19

On 20 January 1972, just a month after becoming president, he called a meeting of scientists at Multan, the residence of Nawab Sadiq Qureshi, former governor of the Punjab. Over seventy prominent scientists were present at the meeting. Hence, Bhutto

announced the appointment of Munir Ahmed Khan as the new Chairman of PAEC, who was then in charge of the nuclear power and reactor division of the IAEA at Vienna. He replaced I.H Usmani who evidently disagreed with Pakistan’s Nuclear weapon program. Bhutto is believed to have told his audience: ‘I had always wanted Pakistan to take nuclear road but no one listened to me.’ Turning towards some scientists present there, he queried, ‘Can you do it?’ they are reported to have replied, ‘Yes we can, give the resource and the facilities.’ Bhutto’s answer was; ‘I shall find you the resources and the facilities.’20 Bhutto asked how long it would take to assemble the bomb. The scientists said that they will do it in five years. Bhutto replied that he wanted it in three years and again promised to spare nothing to support the scientists in their assignment. After this meeting many scientists came back to Pakistan and joined PAEC to serve their country and it completely focused its energies on the weaponry program. On the other hand Z.A. Bhutto worked hard to fulfill his promise regarding funds and resources to PAEC for the program.

3.2.2.3. Financial Support from Gulf States

Pakistan was a poor country and a nuclear arsenal program would cost billions of dollars. From where was it to come? To solve this problem Bhutto set off on a world tour of twenty countries, focusing mainly on the Middle East. These countries were rich and had cash from profits following the 1973 oil crises and wanted to counter a likely Israeli nuclear weapon. The defeat of 1973’s Arab-Israeli war traumatized the pride of Arabs and Muslims. They wished for advance weapons and technology to match their enemy. Arabs were worried that if one of them went for nuclear program, then there would risk being attacked by Israel (as happened to Iraq in 1981). In this scenario Pakistan played a crucial role, as a Muslim state and far away from the range of Israel, a Pakistani program was seen a more secure to provide an “Islamic Bomb” for the Muslims of conflict regions of the World. According to Bhutto “We know that Israel and South Africa have full nuclear capability -- a Christian, Jewish and Hindu civilization have this capability ... the Islamic civilization is without it, but the situation (is) about to change”. 21 For the eyes of the world Pakistan’s nuclear program was to counter a similar Indian program. Libya and all gulf countries were ready to invest in Pakistani nuclear program. Pakistan had a very

stable civil nuclear program and had more experience internationally recognized scientists then other Muslim states, which was also another reason for those Arab countries to support Pakistan in its weapon program. Libya and Saudi Arabia were known as sole financer to the Pakistani program and according to Time Magazine both these countries approximately paid 450 million US$ to Pakistan for its nuclear project. Pakistan and Libya signed a 10-year nuclear collaboration contract in 1974. Saudi Arabia was highly supportive of Pakistan’s program. According to Shahid Amin (former Pakistani ambassador to Saudi Arabia) when it came to Pakistan’s nuclear capacity, the Saudis regard Pakistan as a trust worthy friend who will come to Saudi Arabia’s assistance whenever the occasion arises. 22

3.2.2.4. Indian Nuclear Explosions of 1974 and Pakistan’s Response

On May 18th 1974 New Delhi tested its earliest nuclear device, code named ‘Buddha Smile’ at Pokhran declaring that it was a nonviolent nuclear detonation. Pakistan and the western countries did not agree with this clam. Pakistan’s initial reaction to the Indian test came from a foreign office spokesperson, who observed that the Indian blast ‘cannot but be viewed with the degree of concern matching its magnitude by the whole world and more specifically, by India’s immediate neighbors’. 23 The prime minister of Pakistan Z.A. Bhutto also stated that: ‘Pakistan would not accept under any circumstances Ind ia’s hegemony over the subcontinent’. 24 Although, Indian premier Indira Gandhi wrote a memo to Z.A Bhutto and guaranteed him that the explosions had no, political, military or foreign policy connotations but in Pakistan nobody was ready to believe these. In 1971 India had played its part to dismember Pakistan and obviously it was impossible that Pakistan should believe on any kind of Indian guarantees in these circumstances. As a result, a vast majority of Pakistanis started to force the administration to develop a nuclear weapon rapidly to equal Indian nuclear capabilities. Pakistan’s foreign minister Agha Shahi underlined the spill-over effect of the Indian test at the Geneva disarmament conference in June 1974. He is reported to have said: ‘The road has been thrown open for the emergence of a seventh and eighth nuclear power.’ 25

On diplomatic grounds, government of Pakistan sent letters to the leaders of the permanent members of the United Nations explaining Islamabad’s observations and security dilemma. Its ambassadorial missions overseas were instructed to converse Pakistan’s opinion to the government of host nations. The Pakistan foreign ministry also briefed Islamabad based diplomats of a numerous countries about the situation and concerns which appeared from Indian nuclear tests. In 1974, Pakistan also presented a proposal to the UN General Assembly to create a NWFZ in South Asia. The UN General Assembly approved Pakistani proposal on November 21, 1974 by a vote of 82-2, with India and Bhutan voting against the proposal but Pakistan failed to get any kind of assurance from nuclear powers. As a member of CENTO, Islamabad passionately urged fellow members to understand its security predicament and to provide credible guarantees against India’s nuclear threat, other members of CENTO turned down Islamabad’s request for security guarantees. 26 Like 1965 and 1971 the same excuse was given that the union was mainly aimed to fight against expansion of communism. Islamabad also demanded from US to lift the arms embargo which was forced throughout the 1965 India- Pakistan conflict. Bhutto intimidated to go nuclear if a balance of power between Pakistan and India was not reinstated. He warned that: ‘If we cannot get all the equipment’s and weapons, which are deterrents – conventional deterrents – then we say, we will forget spending money on conventional armament and take the big jump forward and concentrate all our energies on acquiring nuclear capability’. 27 In February 1975, Washington lifted its arms embargo and once again arms supply was resumed, but it did not fulfill Pakistan’s weapon requirements. In Islamabad’s view Washington was not responding to Pakistan’s security needs, but only acting to serve its own end which was to prevent Pakistan from developing its nuclear capability. 28 This new scenario resulted in intensified efforts of policy makers in Islamabad and stimulating new opinion within the country on the importance of nuclear deterrence.

3.2.2.5. Z.A. Bhutto and Pakistan’s Quest for Nuclear Weapon

Bhutto took initiatives on weaponry program in 1972 at Multan but Indian nuclear explosions and international reaction to those explosions provided him a solid ground to go ahead with the country’s nuclear arsenal capability and gave the official go-ahead at a

Defense Committee meeting with the words. ‘Nobody will be able to stop us from pursuing this course of action now’29

After Indian nuclear tests, Canadians stopped supplying fuel and auxiliaries for Karachi based nuclear power plant KANUPP and it was crystal clear that Pakistan was punished for Indian deeds. On this un-expected decision of Canadian authorities, Bhutto’s key goal was to attain self-reliance in the nuclear technology and decrease its reliance on other countries regarding nuclear equipments and technology. Initially Islamabad adopted the plutonium recycling course for the production of nuclear arsenal.

To obtain plutonium based reprocessing plant, Pakistan was already negotiating with France from October 1973. After three years of consultation, Bhutto signed an agreement with France in 1976 for the setting up a nuclear reprocessing plant in Pakistan. The IAEA’s board of governors approved the agreement containing international safety specifications concerning the IAEA. Pakistan accepted all the conditions which were included to ensure that none of the equipment would be used to manufacture nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive device, or for any other military purpose. 30 Although the USA had raised no objection to the deal when it was presented for approval in the IAEA’s board of governors, it was not happy with Pakistan attaining this nuclear facility. As American intelligence agencies began reporting that Islamabad could redirect the plant to obtain nuclear arms capability, Camp David started pressurizing Paris to cancel the deal. Unable to withdraw without a valid excuse, the French government proposed certain modifications to the earlier agreement, which would have meant that Pakistan could not produce weapon grade plutonium from the re-processing plant. Pakistan rejected this proposal; as a result France backed out of the transaction and cancelled the deal in 1978.

3.2.2.6. Project 706 or 726

Just after Indian Nuclear test, Islamabad adopted the uranium-enrichment process to obtain nuclear arsenals. It shows Pakistan’s desperate and urgency in Pakistani leadership for a reliable deterrence. Beginning as project 706 in late 1976 (also called project 726) it

soon superseded the plutonium-reprocessing method. Project-706 refers specifically to the period from 1974–1983 when it was under the control of former prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and later on under the military administration of Major-General Zahid Ali Akbar Khan of the Pakistan Army Corps of Engineers.31 The research was led by Dr. A.Q Khan of Khan Research Laborites (KRL) and Munir Ahmad of PAEC. According to Time magazine Pakistan's Project-706 was identical to the American Manhattan Project. The Project was admirably disbanded from its service when Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) carried out the first cold test of a miniature nuclear device on 11 March 1983.32 The major purpose of Project-706 was to develop the Kahuta site as well as the nuclear weapon by utilizing centrifugal technology.

3.2.2.7. Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan’s Involvement in Pakistan’s Weaponry Program

Dr. A. Q. Khan is a pioneer Pakistani Scientist and well known for his contribution in the development of Pakistan’s Weaponry program and in Pakistan he is known as “the father of the Pakistani atomic bomb”. He obtained his doctorate in physical metallurgy from Belgium in 1971. In May 1972 he started his job in Netherlands at Physical Dynamics Research Laboratory (FDO), which is also known as Almelo Plant. FDO was a subcontractor to Ultra Centrifuge Nederland (UCN). 33 In turn, UCN was the Dutch wing of URENCO—an international consortium founded in 1971 that consisted of the UK, Germany, and the Netherlands which was at the forefront of Europe’s attempts to develop the latest, most advanced centrifuge technology for nuclear fuel. 34 URENCO hired A.Q. Khan because it was shifting to a new German-designed centrifuge model that required the translation of reams of documents. 35 A.Q. Khan was fluent in English, Dutch and German, and his metallurgical expertise was useful in analyzing what types of metal could stand up to the stress of spinning at high speeds and coping with corrosive gas. 36

A.Q. Khan was not present in Multan meeting of January 1972’s and till 1974 he didn’t show any interest to get involved in his country’s nuclear program and did not contact any Pakistani authorities in Netherlands or Pakistan. Indian nuclear explosions of May 1974 led A.Q. Khan to volunteer himself. In his article in a newspaper, Dr Khan said:

“I would like to make it clear that it was an Indian nuclear explosion in May 1974 that prompted our nuclear program, motivating me to return to Pakistan to help create a credible nuclear deterrent and save my country from Indian nuclear blackmail.”37

On 17th September 1974, he handed over a letter to Pakistani embassy in Belgium for the country’s Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto and offered his services for the Pakistani nuclear weaponry program. Because of his work in FDO, A.Q. Khan was well familiar with the procedure of enriching uranium using the gas centrifuge method. In his letter he suggested that Pakistan must take the enrichment path then the plutonium one to develop fissile material for a bomb and he had the proficiency to accomplish it and wanted to contribute by his services. Khan’s entreaty caught the attention first of Bhutto’s military secretary who then handed it to the prime minister himself; “He seemed to be talking sense”, Bhutto wrote in the margin of the letter and passed it on to Munir Khan telling him to arrange a meeting.38 At the end of 1974 A.Q. Khan traveled to Pakistan to attend a chain of furtive meetings with authorities, used the code-name “Karim” and stayed at the house of a family member in Karachi. There, Dr. A.Q Khan met with Z.A Bhutto, Munir Khan, and Bhutto's Science Adviser, Dr. Mubashir Hassan. During the meeting, Abdul Qadeer Khan advocated the development of the atomic bomb via highly-enriched uranium. Munir Khan insisted that with the French extraction plant in the offing, Pakistan should stick with its original plan. 39 Bhutto agreed with both of them and he decided to initiate the uranium program as a parallel nuclear program with Plutonium processing route. The authorities told Mr. Khan that he should stay in the Netherlands to gain as much expertise as he could. He came back to Pakistan in December 1975 and in the spring of 1976; he joined the nuclear project, and became part of the enrichment division at PAEC, initially working under a Pakistani Scientist, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood as his director of research and development. On April 19, 1976, A.Q. Khan wrote a letter to Munir Khan, the head of the entire nuclear program, stating that he was not gratified and that he wanted to work separately.

3.2.2.8. Formation of Kahuta Research Laboratories

Bhutto realized the danger that the scientists were divided between uranium and plutonium paths. A.Q. Khan had his significant importance because at that time he was the only person in the entire Pakistani program, which had actually seen a working centrifuge. Therefore, Bhutto called him for a meeting, which was held at the prime minister’s secretariat and directed the division of the centrifuge project from PAEC to A.Q. Khan. By July 1976, Engineering Research Laboratories (ERL) was established as an independent organization under Khan’s supervision. The ERL was under direct control of Prime Minister Bhutto and A.Q. Khan reported directly to him. 40 A three member Board was to be eventually established to oversee the organization consisting of A.G.N. Kazi (to provide funding), Ghulam Ishaq Khan (to liaise with the military), and Aga Shahi (to deal with foreign relations). 41

By September 1976, A.Q. Khan selected one hundred acre site of Kahuta for the setup of "Kahuta Research Laboratories" near Islamabad to establish a uranium enrichment plant known as “project 706”. As the site was selected, Prime Minister Bhutto assigned this project to Pakistan Army units of Engineers to direct construction of the facility. The Engineer-in-Chief directed Brigadier Zahid Ali Akbar of Corps of Engineers to work with Qadeer Khan in the Project.42 Even though it was in an earthquake zone, the most of its part was constructed underground, which would secure the most sensitive work against any kind of attack. In 1981 General Zia renamed Kahuta Research Laboratories to Khan Research Laboratories in the honor and services of Dr. A.Q. Khan.

3.2.2.9. Military’s Role on Weaponry Program in Bhutto’s Era

All through the Bhutto period, policies on the nuclear agenda did not engage the leadership of armed forces. Bhutto kept the military away as a means to maintain civilian control of national security, particularly with regards to the nuclear program, and domestic politics.43 The armed forces as an organization, nonetheless, provide all the help that the PAEC wanted. Later, when the construction of Engineering Research Laboratories commenced, the military provided manpower and equipment from its

technical branches such as Corps of Engineers, Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (EME), and Signals and Aviation, the Military Operational Directorate and logistical branches of General Headquarters played supporting roles in helping select sites for future tests.44 The military was well aware of the nature of the classified project even though it was not privy to the technical details, blueprints, or objectives of the program. 45

3.2.2.10. General Zia ul Haq’s take over and military’s involvement in program,

On July 5th 1977, General Zia ul Haq took over the government, through a military coup and became the Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA). Military take-over in 1977 marked the first transition from civilian-dominated control of the nuclear program to a military-dominated one.46 In fact, the nuclear weapons program from then on went into the hands of the military.

Like Bhutto, Zia-ul–Haq took private charge of the program. Zia, however, retained the same core senior civil servants in the coordination committee and also brought the military and scientific communities together, further shrouding the program. 47 Former Military Secretary of Z.A Bhutto, Major General Imtiaz Ali was also removed from all nuclear transactions. Zia-ul-Haq obtained all updates from two scientists, Munir Ahmad Khan and A.Q. Khan. He also retained the two most important persons, Defense Secretary Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Foreign Secretary Agha Shahi, in the inter-ministerial committee.48 General Zia-ul-Haq made all verdicts and issued personal orders after consulting with his panel of Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Agha Shahi and General Arif, who make sure the permanence of the nuclear agenda.

Zia assigned Lt. General Khalid Mahmood Arif as his Chief of Staff, an office that turn into the central point of all coordinating actions, and all nuclear substances were shifted to his office from the Prime Minister’s office, which was intimately linked with his Military Secretary.49 There was a Supervisory board which made all nuclear policy decisions under Zia. General Arif clarified the importance of a nuclear supervisory board under the chairman Mr. Ghulam Ishaq Khan and members Mr. Munir Ahmad Khan

(Chairman PAEC), Dr. Ishfaq Ahmad (later chairman PAEC 1991- 2001), Dr. AQ Khan (Director KRL), Mr. H.U.Beg (Finance Secretary), and Mr. Bhatti (Finance Advisor). 50

3.2.2.11. Zia’s Initial Difficulties under international pressure

After takeover, General Zia did not slow down nuclear program. The White House become aware of Pakistan’s modest efforts on the enrichment of uranium. Therefore, its ambassador in Pakistan came to see General Zia in August 1977 and told him: ‘General Zia, you will do a great service if you halt the nuclear program’. Tongue in cheek, Zia replied, ‘I do not even know if such a program exists. I will certainly have a look.’ 51 On nuclear strategy issues, Zia intentionally misguided the Washington and covered confidential information from the outside world. Unlike Bhutto, Zia adopted the policy of ambiguity and declared that Pakistan’s nuclear program was entirely peaceful. This policy of nuclear ambiguity was adopted after witnessing the success of Israel's nuclear program and on multiple occasions Zia's broke his promises concerning the nature of his country's nuclear project.52

In 1976 American Congress approved the Symington Amendment barring US military and economic aid to any country that possessed nuclear technology not under IAEA safeguards. Although, General Zia deliberately lied to US regarding Pakistan’s nuclear program, in 1979 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) analysts became convinced on the existence of Pakistan’s weaponry program and the law was enforced on Pakistan in April 1979. Aid was cut off and US-Pakistan relations began to decline precipitously with rows over human rights as well as the nuclear issue. 53

USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 made Pakistan a most important country and for the war against communist regime in the eyes of USA. In this new situation Pakistan’s co-operation was needed to support the Afghan mujahedeen to push Soviet Union out of the Central-Asian region. As it was need of the hour, President Ronald Reagan approved that Pakistan had not embarked on a nuclear weapons program.

Nevertheless, the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Vernon Walter meted Zia on his furtive tour of Islamabad in October 1981. Confronted with the

evidences, General Zia acknowledged that the information "could be true," but then denied everything, leading Walters to conclude that: "either Zia "did not know the facts" or was the "most superb and patriotic liar I have ever met..."54

3.2.2.12. Pakistan’s Nuclear Program Shift in US Policy

The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan modified the strategic landscape of Central and South Asia. The event transformed Washington's strategic preferences in the Pak-Afghan region. After December 1979 the whole strategic calculus over US-Pakistan relation was transformed and American concerns over Pakistani nuclear program were replaced by a new strategic imperative to prevent further Soviet westward expansion. 55 According to a former CIA officer, “We went from anger and almost a break in relations to almost best of friends again.”56 Initially, Carter administration offered 400 million dollars in economic and military aid to gain the whole hearted collaboration of Pakistan to dislodging Soviet forces from Afghanistan. But Zia discarded the offer saying it was ‘peanuts’. He took full advantage of the situation and he knew that he could negotiate for an enhanced package from the incoming Reagan government. In 1981, the Reagan administration subsequently announced a 3.2 billion US$ aid package and to facilitate this aid, Washington suspended the application of uranium-enrichment sanction provisions of the Glenn-Symington Amendment. General Arif claimed in his book that: Zia obtained an assurance from the United States that there would be no interference in Pakistan’s nuclear program.57 In return Zia had made a secret deal with President Reagan that he would not humiliate Reagan by following any nuclear activity. "The U.S. had given four nuclear restraint requirements to Pakistan: not to conduct hot tests; not to enrich low enriched to high enriched uranium; not to machine existing stocks into core; and not to transfer any know-how or material to any entity or state."58

During the 1980s, the nuclear program gradually developed though Zia-ul-Haq insisted on its nonviolent nature. But in 1984 American intelligence agencies once again reported from the White House Islamabad’s skeptical nuclear activities and its furtive pursuit for nuclear arsenals. These reports provoked President Reagan to note down a memo to Zia. In his letter Reagan warned Zia not to purify Uranium beyond 5 percent or there would

be consequences. Zia gave a written guarantee that Pakistan would not create weapons- grade plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) above a 5% level.

In 1985, Solarz Amendment was passed by the American congress. According to this law, the economic and military aid should be cutoff to any country found to be trying to export sensitive material from the U.S for a nuclear weapons program. In 1987 a Pakistani born Canadian Arshad Ayub tried to export especially hardened steel to Pakistan from Philadelphia. Although he was sentenced and the authorities deemed that the steel was intended to support Pakistan’s nuclear weapon program, the Reagan administration overlooked the affair and did not invoke the Solarz Amendment. 59

The Pressler Amendment was another American law which was passed by parliament in 1985 specifically to prevent Pakistan from obtaining nuclear weapons technology. According to this legislation, US aid and government to government military sales to Pakistan would be cut off unless the President certified at the beginning of each fiscal year that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive device and that the proposed US assistance program will significantly reduce the risk that Pakistan will possess a nuclear explosive device.60 At that time Pakistan was fighting a proxy war on behalf of the Americans therefore in order to facilitate financial and arm aid to Pakistan, both Reagan and Bush administrations certified Pakistan from 1985 to 1989 that Pakistan did not acquire any nuclear weapon and in 1987 Washington announced 4.02 billion $ as a second six year package for Pakistan for its contribution in the fight against Soviet Russia. In 1989 US achieved its goal and Soviet Union was defeated in Afghanistan. After the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan President Bush decline to endorse that Pakistan did not attain a nuclear device in 1990.

As a matter of fact, Pakistan had already achieved its goal and possessed a nuclear device. The Afghan war and Zia’s policy of ambiguity had played an important role in Pakistan’s nuclear program. Before the Afghan crises, the US and western countries were more inclined on Pakistan to abandon its weapons program. The Soviet interference in Central Asia transferred international concerns over Pakistan’s nuclear program to USSR’s expansionism in Asia. The cold war conflict between both super powers in

Afghanistan became a blessing as it enabled Islamabad to move forward its pursuit for nuclear competence. Another fact which cannot be bypassed is West’s economic and military assistance which played a significant role in Pakistan’s weaponry program.

As a head of state, General Zia played his cards very skillfully and exploited the situation to advance Pakistan’s nuclear aspirations. According to Richard Barlow (American intelligence analyst and a former senior member of the counter-proliferation desk at Central Intelligence Agency),

“It was basically a question of more effectively using our leverage of economic and military aid. We drew lines in the nuclear sand and when Zia crossed them, we just drew another line. The ‘powers that be’ felt that if we pushed it and cut off aid or even part of it, that Zia wouldn’t help us and wouldn’t funnel aid to the Afghanistan. I didn’t agree with that. The Pakistanis didn’t want the Russians on their border any more than we did. They weren’t doing it for us. They had their own reasons. People were not willing to call his bluff. He had us wrapped around his finger and Zia played us brilliantly.”61

3.2.2.13. Pakistan’s Security Measures to intercept Foreign Intelligence and Attacks

Zia feared penetration of Western secret agents into the nuclear program so he aimed at scientific institutes and intelligence agencies to keep looking for an “insider threat,” which could have been sabotaged from within or facilitate by an attack from the outside. He directed the army to take on the protection of Kahuta centrifuge plant and the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP) installations. 62 On 26 June 1979, the French Legate to Pakistan, Le Gourrierce and his First Secretary, Jean Forlot who were on a surveillance mission to Kahuta Research Laboratories nuclear complex, were intercepted and their cameras and other sensitive equipment were confiscated.

In 1981 Israel launched an operation against Iraqi nuclear program known as “Operation Opera” Israeli planes assaulted and demolished power plant in Iraq. Soon after this

successful Israeli preventive strike, suspicion grew in Pakistan that Indian Air Force had similar plans for Pakistan. General Zia used the diplomatic channel and a high-level Pakistani mission was sent to Vienna where both countries had signed an agreement promising not to attack or assist a foreign power to attack each other’s facilities. 63

Brigadier Imtiaz (former director-general of Intelligence Bureau) claimed in an interview with News International that he had conducted the military operation "Rising Sun" in 1979 that effectively thwarted a CIA conspiracy to target Pakistani nuclear scientists and engineers who were closely associated with Pakistan's nuclear program.64 The operation accomplished with the detain and a life imprisonment of a Pakistani CIA agent, ‘Rafiq Safi Munshi’, who himself was employed as a nuclear engineer at KANUPP, attempted to wire classified atomic documents to the American consulate in Karachi.65 The operation finished with the arrest of twelve Pakistani scientists and engineers. These persons were planning to incapacitate Pakistan’s nuclear sites at the command of the CIA.

3.2.2.14. Pakistan’s Conducting of Secret Nuclear Cold Tests

When General Zia-ul-Haq brings down the administration of Z.A Bhutto in 1977, the nuclear program was in its emerging stages. However, PAEC sustained assembling the infrastructure for achievement of the nuclear fuel cycle. Although Zia had concurred on nuclear restraint with President Reagan, there was no system to evaluate its implementation. Zia disallowed nuclear detonation test (hot tests), but, he allowed scientists to carry out cold tests and research and improvement on bomb designs and delivery systems.66

It was confirmed when the PAEC performed the cold-fission test of a fission device, codename Kirana-I on 11 March 1983 at the Weapon-Testing Laboratories-I, under the supervision of weapon-testing laboratory's director Dr. Ishfaq Ahmad. This trial was performed in tunnels bored in the Kirana Hills close to Sargodha, dwelling of the Pakistan Air Force’s central air base and the Central Ammunition Depot (CAD). 67 A

subsequent cold test is performed soon afterwards and is observed by Vice Chief of Army Staff, General KM Arif, Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Munir Ahmad Khan.

By March 1984, Kahuta Research Laboratories (KRL) had independently carried out its own cold tests of its own nuclear device design near Kahuta. 68 From 1983 to 1990, the Wah Group of PAEC accomplished over 24 cold tests of nuclear devices with the assistance of mobile diagnostic apparatus. These tests were carried out in 24 tunnels measuring 100-150 feet (30-50 m) in length which were bored inside the Kirana Hills.69 Subsequently, because of excessive intelligence and satellite surveillance on the Kirana Hills site, it was deserted and the cold test facility was moved to the Kala-Chitta Range. In February 1984 A.Q. Khan first made the statement that Pakistan had attained nuclear weapons ability.

3.2.2.15. Other Developments in Zia era

In 1986-87, the Indian military performed a series of drills, codenamed ‘Brass-tacks’. These were the biggest military exercises in Indian history and carried out in the Rajasthan desert along the Pakistani border. The exercises were performed to test the Indian strategy of ‘offensive-defense’ to be employed against Pakistan and were based on the Indian Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General K. Sunderji’s newly devised concepts of mechanization, mobility, and air support. 70 Pakistan had to react and Dr. A.Q. Khan gave an interview to a well-known Indian journalist Kuldip Nayyar, on 28 January 1987. In Interview A.Q. Khan said:

“What the CIA has been saying about our possession the bomb is correct and so is the speculation of some foreign newspapers. They told us that Pakistan could never produce the bomb and they doubted my capabilities, but they now know we have done it. … Nobody can undo Pakistan or take us for granted. We are here to stay and let it be clear that we shell use the bomb if our existence is threatened.”71

According to Mushahid Husain (former editor of The Muslim newspaper), who accompanied Nayyar during the interview. “The message given by Dr. A.Q. Khan is

directed against all those detractors of Pakistan’s Islamic Bomb; To the Indians, it is a hands–off Pakistan message at a time when New Delhi has been caring out massive warlike exercises all along our eastern border’. 72 In Islamabad’s view, this realistic claim of Pakistan’s nuclear capability played impressive role for the ending of the Bra ss-tack crises.

From 1985 to 1987 Pakistan achieved more nuclear goals and many new plants became functional. In 1985 PAEC established a 50 MW heavy water plutonium production reactor, known as Khushab-I, at Khushab. KRL started producing weapons-grade highly enriched uranium in 1986. Also in the same year Pakistan and China signed a historic civilian nuclear cooperation agreement. This contract was signed by Foreign Ministers of the both states in the attendance of PAEC chairman and his Chinese counterparts in Beijing. In 1987 PAEC conducted hot tests at the New Labs reprocessing plant and began its work on the heavy water production plant at Khushab and also on the Heavy Mechanical Complex-3project acquiring a tritium purification and production plant from West Germany. A second Atomic Research Reactor, known as PARR-II, was established in 1989 and it was a Pool-type, light-water, 27-30 KVA training reactor. The PARR-II reactor was assembled and provided by PAEC under the IAEA safeguards as IAEA had financed this venture.

President Zia’s was killed in a plane crashed on August 17, 1988 along with the U.S representative to Pakistan, Arnold Raphael, and Defense Attaché as well as numerous other military persons. Soon after of Zia-ul-Haqs death Ghulam Ishaq Khan became becomes the acting president. This was the second major change in the system after the inauguration of Pakistani nuclear weapons program. After Zia’s death, a new power formation came up and technically a troika of three was to manage the whole nuclear program the president, prime minister and army chief. Since the beginning of the military takeover Ghulam Ishaq Khan had played an institutional role in the nuclear program and after became President, Ishaq Khan and COAS General Aslam Beg lead ed the nuclear program and the Prime Minister who elected, became the third pillar of decision-making. In his memoirs, General Musharraf wrote:

“After Zia's death in 1988, Ghulam Ishaq Khan took the presidential office. Since he was a civilian, he brought the army chief into the loop. From then on the chief of army staff started managing our nuclear development on behalf of the president.”73

However, after Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistan lost its strategic importance for Washington and th infamous Pakistan-specific ‘Pressler Amendment’ was invoked. All aid from the U.S was cut off and all economic and military assistance to Pakistan was stopped in 1990. Washington had initiated to push Islamabad to roll back its nuclear program and to open its nuclear sites to UN examination. Islamabad rejected American proposal of providing thirty eight F-16s in replacement for approving to US non-proliferation goals in region. In December 1993 Pakistani Parliamentarians discarded US offer and approved to continue the existing nuclear strategy line. Pakistan’s military who took all decisions on nuclear policies, rejected any tradeoff between combat aircrafts and nuclear deterrence. During a visit to Washington, the Pakistan Army Chief bluntly stated that F-16s were no substitute for nuclear deterrence capability and that Pakistan would not roll back its nuclear program. 74 As a chairman of Pakistan’s Nuclear Command Authority (PNCA) President Ghulam Ishaq Khan continued to provide the necessary funds to both the PAEC and the KRL.

In November 1988 Benazir Bhutto, the daughter of Z.A Bhutto became Prime Minister of the state. The nuclear arms complex remained under the hands of the armed forces and from then on never came under the control of the civilian administration. Benazir Bhutto was in fact ignorant of the status of the nuclear program, and when Pakistan passed the landmark of manufacturing fissile cores for nuclear arms she knew it from the U.S representative to Pakistan.

It was claimed that, ‘before being allowed to take power, Benazir Bhutto had to give assurances that she would not interfere with nuclear policy, Afghan policy, or the internal policies of armed forces.’75 Benazir was not trusted by President Ghulam Ishaq and military establishment because they both believed that she was not in the favor of the country’s nuclear program. It has been confirmed that she never visited the PAEC or

KRLs weapon assembling facilities. During her second tenure Pakistan froze its work on the enrichment of uranium from 1994 to 1997. General Aslam Beg denies that the action was taken due to any pressure from outside and in an interview he stated:

"Our nuclear program achieved the desired level of progress in early 1989, when the Pakistan Nuclear Command Authority (PNCA) took the unilateral decision to restrain the program. The objectives of the program had been served, i.e., a low level non-weaponized deterrence against India had been achieved, and there was no justification in stockpiling the fissionable material. In so doing, the program was nether frozen nor capped, or rolled back. Only the level of enrichment was brought down to below 5 percent."76

3.2.2.16. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and Pakistan

The CTBT was approved by the United Nations General Assembly on 10 September 1996. However, Pakistan declined to ratify the CTBT and mentioned that it did not defy the treaty; it will join the treaty as soon as India agreed to join it first. In Pakistan’s view, without India’s signature on the CTBT, its own signing of the treaty would be suicidal in view of India’s superiority in conventional weapons capabilities. 77 Pakistan has linked since its position on CTBT with India and whenever India signs the treaty, Pakistan will show no hesitation to sign.

3.2.2.17. Nuclear Development in Mian Nawaz Sharif’s era

Mian Nawaz Sharif is a public right-wing conservative figure. He had been groomed by General Zia and was to known to follow in his footsteps. His ‘Pakistan Muslim League’ (PML) emerged as an opposition party to Benazir’s ‘Pakistan People’s Party’ (PPP). He continued with Zia’s approach of nuclear ambiguity. After being elected as Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif announced that: "The peaceful atomic program of which it would be accelerated to accommodate growing nuclear energy needs and to make up for rising oil prices and of course, (Pakistan) will to construct new nuclear power plants.”78

3.2.2.18. Indian Nuclear Explosions

The re-election of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to power in India in 1998 was a turning point to carry out India's first nuclear tests in 24 years. 79 In the afternoon of Monday, 11 May 1998 Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee shocked the world by declaring at a hurriedly arranged press meeting that India had conducted three underground atomic tests at Pokhran, 150 kilometers from the Pakistani border. According to a press release, the three tests were carried out with a 15-Kiloton fission device, a 2-Kiloton low-yield device, and a 45-Kiloton thermonuclear device. All three devices located separately in under-ground shafts, 200 meters deep, detonated at the same time.

Seismic stations in different regions registered a mild earthquake, measuring 4.7 on the Richter scale, which did not correspond on the claimed size of the blast. International observers claimed that Indian tests were not more than Hiroshima size (14 KT) yield, and also the stated thermo-nuclear blast was most probably a boosted fission blast. According to a Pakistani Scientist Dr. Samar Mubarakmand “Shakti-1 was a successful test, but if it was a thermonuclear device as claimed, then it failed to produce certain results that were to be expected of a thermonuclear device.”80 Two days later, on May 13, India conducted two more additional underground tests and Indian scientists claimed that the total yield of their five tests were 58-kilotons. But a report titled ‘Monitoring Nuclear Tests’, prepared by nineteen researchers drawn from seven established US scientific institutions, came up with the conclusion that the combined yield of the series of Indian nuclear tests was around 9-16 kilotons only.81

3.2.2.19. Pakistan’s Decision to Test Nuclear Weapon

Indian nuclear explosions shaped unsustainable circumstances for Prime Minister Mohammad Nawaz Sharif. He was under intense pressure from international powers not to give a tit for tat respond to New Delhi. The American President Bill Clinton asked Nawaz Sharif "not to react to an irresponsible act in kind" and stipulated that a show of restrained would produce economic, political and security benefits. Islamabad appeared

to be after explicit U.S. security promise something that was implausible to be offered. Pakistan failed to gain any security guarantees from Americans and other member of Security Council. According to Pakistan’s minister of foreign affairs, Siddique Khan Kanju:

"Despite our calls for resolute action against the tests conducted by India, the response of the international community was weak. There was no meeting of the P-5 foreign ministers; there was no Security Council resolution; there were no G-8 sanctions on funding from international financial institutions."82

The pressure was mounting on Nawaz Sharif from within Pakistan to detonate a nuclear device. It was made more intense when Indian leadership issued provocative statements on the issue of Kashmir. During his visit to Indian held Kashmir, India’s minister for parliamentary affairs Madan Lal Korana stated, ‘Pakistan should nominate a time and place, where it wanted to fight a fourth round’. Also Islamabad felt an urgent need to display a sense of a balance-of-power with New Delhi. The Pakistani armed forces, the true core of power in Pakistan and the definite authority over its nuclear arms, also put pressure on the government to conduct nuclear tests. Sharif thus faced intolerable pressure to approve its own nuclear experiments.

According to an adviser, Sharif appeared to favor "a balanced and moderate response" and ordered a report on the cost the country would have to bear if a Pakistani nuclear test brought international sanctions.83 A meeting of the Defense Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) was set up on the dawn of 15 May 1998 at the Prime Minister’s Secretariat in Islamabad to chat about the situation arising out of the Indian nuclear explosions.84 The DCC was the only competent authority to decide on this matter, especially since the National Command Authority (NCA), Pakistan’s nuclear command and control authority for its strategic forces, did not exist at that time. 85 The meeting was chaired by the Prime Minister of Pakistan and attended by the Minister of Defense, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gohar Ayub Khan, the Minister of Finance & Economic Affairs, Sartaj Aziz, the Foreign Secretary, Shamshad Ahmed Khan and the three Chiefs of Staff of the Army, Air

Force and Navy, namely General Jehangir Karamat, Air Chief Marshal Pervaiz Mehdi Qureshi and Admiral Fasih Bokhari respectively. 86

There were two points on the DCC’s agenda: Firstly, whether or not Pakistan should carry out nuclear tests as a counter to Indian nuclear tests? Secondly, if Pakistan does go ahead with the tests then which of the two organizations, PAEC or KRL, should carry out the tests?87

Since Dr. Ishfaq Ahmed, head of the PAEC was on a trip to the North America. Dr. Samar Mubarakmand gave a procedural appraisal on behalf of the PAEC on Indian nuclear tests and Pakistan’s preparedness to give an equivalent reply to India. Dr. Samar said that the PAEC is totally ready to conduct the nuclear tests inside 10 days. Dr. A.Q. Khan was also present at time and he mentioned that KRL can also conduct nuclear tests within 10 days if the instructions are given by the DCC.

Therefore it was clear that PAEC and KRL were equally prepared for the assignment. Nevertheless, PAEC had two additional benefits which KRL didn’t. Firstly, it was PAEC which had developed Pakistan’s nuclear test site at Chaghi, Baluchistan. Secondly, PAEC had greater experience in conducting cold tests than KRL88. The DCC meeting ended without any decision on the two agenda points.

The debates carry out for a several hours and include the economic, diplomatic, military, strategic and national security concerns. Finance Minister Sartaj Aziz was the only person who opposed the tests on financial grounds due to the economic recession, the low foreign exchange reserves of the country and the effect of inevitable economic sanctions which would be imposed on Pakistan if it carried out the tests. 89 Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif neither opposed nor proposed the tests. The remainder spoke in favor of conducting the tests.90

The head of the PAEC, Dr. Ishfaq Ahmed came back to Pakistan on 16 May 1998. On 17 May he met with Nawaz Sharif at Prime Minister House. Dr. Ishfaq Ahmed guaranteed the Prime Minister that the PAEC was prepared to test when approved to do so, but

wilted to take a stance on whether the order should be given. At the end of the meeting he was told to get ready for the tests but remain ready for the final decision.

The mountains of Ras Koh rang in Baluchistan had been chosen after an extensive study of several sites in the late 1970s. Like Nevada in USA, Kazakhstan in USSR, Lop Nor in China, and Rajasthan Desert in India, Chaghi (Ras Koh) was also located on barren land, away from all habitation. The tunnel for nuclear test was 1 kilometer long, 4 meters wide, 3.5 meters high and 230 meters below the mountain range. The tunnel at the far end was shaped like a fish hook to prevent radio activity leakages. The site was dug by army engineers unit in 1991 and was finally put to use in 1998.

It took another 30 seconds in computer transition for the detonations of nuclear devisees. All five devices were detonated at same time. A radiation-hardened television camera with special lenses recorded the outer surface of the mountain. 91 As the firing cycle continued during its phases, all eyes were stick on the mountain 10 kilometers away. There was deafening silence inside and outside of the surveillance post.

Thirty seconds after pushing the button a big jolt was felt in and out of observation room and the mountain peak began to change color as the temperature of the rock rose to 3000 degree Celsius. The dirt of thousands of years was removed from mountain’s surface. Its black granite rock turned white as de-oxidization from the radioactive nuclear forces operating from within, a huge cloud of beige dust then enveloped the mountain. 92

Seismic signals of the atomic blasts were recorded by twenty five seismic stations of the GERESS array, operated by the federal institute for geosciences and natural resources, Hanover, Germany, as a part of the international monitoring systems, established for the monitoring of the CTBT. It took 1 minute 25.7 seconds for the shock waves to travel from Chaghi to the monitoring station in the Bavarian forest of Germany. 93

Soon after the tests, in his television speech to the nation Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif announced that Pakistan had carried out five nuclear tests he also stated that: "Today, we have settled a score and have carried out five successful nuclear tests".94 The Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs later describes it as "Pakistan’s finest hour".95

Pakistan tested its sixth nuclear weapon two days after first explosions. The test was conducted in the Kharan desert, south to the Ras Koh Hills. This was a miniaturized apparatus giving a yield which was 60% of the first tests. 96 The device was placed in an L-shaped underground shaft that was 120 feet deep. The total yield of the tests was given out as 60 KT, but US scientists, who had earlier carried out a study of the Indian tests, concluded that the total yield of the Pakistani tests was only 16 KT. 97

3.2.2.20. International Reaction on Nuclear test

Although, Pakistan was not the initiator of the blasts and its security had been jeopardized by Indian aggression. The US president Bill Clinton was disappointed on Pakistan’s nuclear decision and economic sanctions under the Glenn Amendment were forced by USA on Pakistan. On June 6, 1998, a resolution (1172) was adopted by the UN Security Council. Its operative paragraph called upon India and Pakistan to stop their nuclear weapons development program; to refrain from weaponization or deployment of nuclear weapons; to cease development of ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons; and to halt further production of fissile material for nuclear weapon. 98 As expected, western countries and media criticized Pakistan’s nuclear tests and sanctions were forced on the imports and export of goods. All non-humanitarian aid and defense contracts were suspended. Many European states halted all development projects in Pakistan. South Asian countries showed their concerns on the arm race and regional security.

Although, the statements from Arab states were based on anxieties and disappointments but in reality they celebrated this occasion and it was believed that Pakistani bomb is an Islamic bomb and it will be used as deterrence to Israeli aggression in the region. Arab states especially Saudi Arabia and Libya were the financers of Pakistani nuclear program since the beginning. In May 1998 when Pakistan was deciding whether to respo nd to India’s nuclear tests, the Saudis promised 50,000 barrels per day of free oil to help the Pakistanis cope with the economic sanctions that might be triggered by a counter test.99 The Saudi oil commitment was a key to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s decision to

proceed with testing; it cushioned the subsequent U.S and EU sanctions on Pakistan considerably.100

3.2.2.21. Pakistan’s Nuclear Delivery Vehicles

Pakistan possesses two types of nuclear delivery systems in its inventory—high- performance aircraft and missiles. For the delivery of nuclear arms Islamabad can utilize F-16s which he purchased from the U.S. Some experts also believed that Pakistan has upgraded the F-16s earlier sold to them. Mirage III and V aircraft could also be used, although would have limited range. A-5’s may have been modified to carry a nuclear payload.101

During the 1983-1990 period, the PAECs Wah Group went on to design and develop a bomb petite enough to be put under the wings of a jet fighter such as the F-16. It worked alongside the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) to evolve and perfect delivery techniques of the nuclear bomb using combat aircraft including ‘conventional freefall’, ‘loft bombing’, ‘toss bombing and ‘low-level lay down’ attack techniques; Today, the PAF has perfected all four techniques of nuclear weapons delivery using F-16, Mirage-V and A-5 combat aircraft.102

Table 3.1 Nuclear-Capable Pakistani Aircrafts Type Range Supplier Inventory F-16 A/B 925 km US 35 Mirage 5 PA 1,300 km France 50 A-5 600 km China 46

In the 1980s, Pakistan moved attentively to acquire ballistic missile capabilities. Like the nuclear program, Pakistan’s missile program went into full speed following India’s first Prithvi ballistic missile test in 1988. Missiles are likely continued to be the core of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons delivery systems. It is presumed that Pakistan’s missile program is being expanded with the dynamic collaboration of the North Korea and China: having diverse types of short and medium range ballistic missile as well as two

types of cruise missile systems. Ballistic missiles can carry conventional and non- conventional ammos and are made of both solid and liquid propellant.

Table 3.2 Pakistan’s Missile Capabilities Name Designation Type Propellant Range/km Payload/kg In Service __ Hataf-1 BRBM Solid 50-80 500 1992 __ Hataf- A/1B BRBM Solid 50-100 500 1995 Abdali Hataf-2 BRBM Solid 180 250-450 2012 Ghaznavi Hataf-3 SRBM Solid 350-400 500-700 2004 Shaheen I Hataf-4 IRBM Solid 700-750 700-1000 2003 Ghauri I Hataf-5 IRBM Liquid 1300 700-1000 2003 Ghauri II Hataf-5 IRBM Liquid 1800 700-1000 2003 Shaheen II Hataf-6 IRBM Solid 2000-2500 700-1000 2010 Babur Hataf-7 SLCM Solid 500-700 500 2012 Raad Hataf-8 ALCM Solid 350 350 2013 Nasr Hataf-9 SRBM Solid 60 __ 2014

BRBM = Battlefield Range Ballistic Missile; SRBM = Short Range Ballistic Missile; IRBM = Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile; SLCM = Submarine Launch Cruise Missile; ALCM = Air Launch Cruise Missile. Sources: Official Pakistani data (various sources); Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), SIPRI Yearbook 2011: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2011); International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2012 (IISS: London, 2012); Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems, ; and ‘Pakistan’s nuclear forces, 2011’, Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, July/Aug. 2011.

3.2.3. PHASE III 1999 TO PRESENT 3.2.3.1. Creation of National Command Authority (NCA)

Pakistan did not form effective command and control structure in the pre-test era was done by other nuclear weapons state. After Pakistan’s nuclear tests, the Sharif government accorded the responsibility of developing a nuclear command and control structure to the chief of army staff General Pervez Musharraf. A draft plan was submitted by Musharraf in April 1999 proposing the creation of a new body named ‘Strategic Plan Division’ (SPD). The new body would act as the coordinating body of all nuclear

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activities and would exercise operational, financial and security control over all strategic organizations.103 The proposal was accepted and the SPD became operational.

After snatching power in October 1999 through a military overthrow, General Musharraf established a National Security Council (NSC) which includes thirteen key civilian and services persons. The NSC is an advisory body on national security and strategic matters and deals with nuclear issues. The NSC announced a consolidation of a National Command Authority (NCA) in February 2000, delegated all employment and deployment control over all strategic forces and strategic organizations to this apex-nuclear decision making body.104 Also, NSC put the program under full military management and set up the answerability of laboratories. In November 2000 all strategic institutions participating in the nuclear and missile programs the KRL, PAEC, National Engineering and Scientific Commission (NESCOM) and the Pakistan Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO) were put under the control of the NCA. 105 SUPARCO, formed in 1981, played important role in the development of ballistic missiles technology.

The NCA is composed of the Employment Control Committee (ECC), Development Control Committee (DCC), Services Strategic Forces Commands (SSFC) and SPD serves as its secretariat destined to take all key verdicts concerning nuclear and space strategy. It gather twice or thrice a year. Initially, NCA was chaired by President and Prime Minster served as its vice-chairman. But February 2008 elections brought civilian administration back to rule and the 18th Amendment transferred authority to the premier and he become the head of the NCA. The legal framework of the NCA was formalized through the NCA Act of March 2010 (retroactively in force since December 2007) and the turning into law of the 18th Amendment in April 2010.106

3.2.3.2. Employment Control Committee (ECC)

The ECC is chaired by the head of the government and includes the cabinet ministers o f foreign affairs, defense and the interior; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC); the military service chiefs; the director-general of the Strategic Plans Division (a senior army officer), who acts as secretary; and technical advisers.107

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Including all persons the committee has eleven members. In case of requirement, professional experts may be invited. The ECC play its part as the policy maker organ. It works as a political-military committee. The ECC is responsible for directing policy- making during peace time and deployment of strategic forces during war time, making recommendations on the evolution of nuclear doctrine, establishing the hierarchy of command and the policy for authorizing the use of nuclear weapons, and establishing the guidelines for an effective command and control system to safeguard against accidental or unauthorized use.108

3.2.3.3. Development Control Committee (DCC)

The DCC supervises the nuclear weapon complex and its related functions. Main function of this committee is the preparation up-gradation of nuclear means in order to maintain deterrent capability in a prepared and robust form. Another significant purpose of this committee is to decide the volume of Pakistani deterrence. It is also responsible for the credibility and readiness of the nuclear arsenals. It has the same military and technical members as the ECC but lacks the cabinet ministers that represent the other parts of government.109 The DCC is chaired by the head of the government and includes the CJCSC (as its deputy chairman), the military service chiefs, the director-general of the Strategic Plans Division and representatives of the weapon research, development and production organizations.110 The committee has huge importance in the command structure of Pakistan's nuclear program.

3.2.3.4. Strategic Plan Division (SPD)

It is the most vital organ of the NCA which performs multiple tasks of great significance. It covers all aspects of expansion and management of Pakistan's nuclear capability. The SPD is situated in the Joint Services Headquarters under the CJCSC and is directed by a superior army official. Nearly seventy officers from three armed forces are incorporated in SPD. This division acts as the secretariat for the NCA and has responsibility for planning and coordination and, in particular, for establishing the lower tiers of the

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command-and-control system and its physical infrastructure. 111 The SPD has four main directorates:

 Operation and Planning Directorate: carries out operational planning.  The C4I2SR (Computerized, Command, Control, Communication, Information, Intelligence and Surveillance) Directorate: responsible for developing and maintaining strategic command and communication links.  The Strategic Weapons Development Directorate: carries out liaison with the strategic organizations, scrutinizes their budgetary demands, and carries out audits of funds.  The Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs Directorate: provides policy recommendations on all arms control and disarmament issues and participates in relevant bilateral and multilateral non-proliferation discussions.112

3.2.3.5. The Services' Strategic Forces Command (SSFC)

The Services Strategic Force is combination of all three services, which all have their respective strategic force commands. The key task of these commands is to implement technical, training, and supervisory control on the strategic delivery systems. The operational control, however, rests with the NCA.113 The army strategic force command possesses ballistic and cruise missiles, while the air force strategic command has the aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons.114 The naval strategic force command was the last to be established, and it possesses the nuclear capable cruise missiles for its submarine and warships.

3.2.3.6. Post-Test Nuclear Doctrine

In May 1999 Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, proclaimed a principle of ‘minimum credible deterrence’; this was part of a redesign of Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine. 115 The policy of minimum credible deterrence translates into four objectives:

(a) deterrence of all forms of external aggression; (b) building an effective combination of conventional and strategic forces; (c) avoiding a pre-emptive strike through protection

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and the threat of nuclear retaliation; and (d) stabilizing strategic deterrence in South Asia.116

Pakistan claims that it will not use or intimidate to utilize nuclear arms against non- nuclear countries. It would only utilize nuclear arms in reply to conventional assault by New Delhi as a final option. In 1999 General (and later President) Musharraf said nuclear arsenals would only be used if its ‘national integrity was threatened’ and in 2001 Lieutenant General Khalid Kidwai said ‘only if the very existence of Pakistan as a state is threatened’ then nuclear use would be a ‘last resort’. 117 Kidwai described those circumstances in late 2001 as follows;

1. The spatial threshold: The infiltration of Indian forces on a large scale would draw a nuclear reaction. The threshold could be low (50–100 kilometers) in Kashmir and in Punjab.

2. The military threshold: The obliteration of a great part of land or armed forces could lead to a nuclear retaliation if Pakistan feels that it was losing its defense and feared imminent defeat.

3. The economic threshold: Economic strangulation could also become a factor to a nuclear response; this refers primarily to a blockade of Karachi, but could also concern the stopping of the Indus River’s water flow or the capture of essential arteries for example the Indus River and the Karakoram Highway.

4. The political threshold: A destabilization of the country fomented by India could also be a nuclear threshold if Pakistan believed that the integrity of the country was at stake.118

Pakistani policy makers claim that these doorsills are of an indicative nature only, and should not be appraised in separation from each other. Further, they deny the theory that Pakistan is planning for a preemptive nuclear strike.

After 1998s nuclear examination Islamabad applied a long-term enhancement plan for its nuclear program. Officials' stated that Pakistan will not engage in any kind of regional

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arm race and it have already established the volume of weapons which is compulsory for a minimum deterrent. In 2005 Pakistani President Musharraf claimed that Pakistan had accomplished the threshold of minimum deterrence; however, Pakistan insists that the required force levels can change over time, in light of the evolution of the threat.119

Pakistan’s worries have been compounded by increasing U.S–India strategic corporation, which comprises nuclear collaboration. In 2006 the NCA stated that ‘in view of the fact that the [India–USA] agreement would enable India to produce significant quantities of fissile material and nuclear weapons from unsafeguarded nuclear reactors, the NCA expressed firm resolve that our credible minimum deterrence requirements will be met’.120 In the meantime, Islamabad will possibly resort to concealment and mobility (in a similar way to China) to make sure the survival of its force.

3.2.3.7. Current level of Fissile Material and Nuclear Warheads

Pakistan and India are the only nations which are producing HEU in South Asian region. Islamabad started its HEU production during the 1980s. As of 2011 it was believed to have produced 2–3.5 tons of HEU.121 It may be generating 110–170 kg per year, adequate for 9–14 weapons. Additionally, Islamabad has commenced developing an imperative plutonium production capacity. There are two reactors in service at Khushab site and couple more are being construct. New reprocessing facilities are also being constructed at Nilore (the current one having a capacity of 20–40 tons of heavy metals per year) and probably at Chashma (with a projected capacity of 50–100 tons of heavy metals per year) plant of French origin.122 Till 2011 Pakistan had 120–150 kilograms of plutonium stockpiles. It is difficult to approximate the production levels of reactors at Khushab: the two reactors in service do not function constantly and could be different from each other. Khushab-1 can produce 5.7–11.5 kg of plutonium per year depending on its duration of operation, enough for 1–3 warheads.123 In recent years, Islamabad has enlarged its weapon capacity and most likely has approximately 100 to 120 weapons. Estimates lingers doubtful: they are based on accessible information and conjectures vis-à-vis the number of launchers, the quantity of fissile material produced and transformed into

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weapon cores, and the amount of material Pakistan uses in each weapon. The potential production of warheads today is 7–14 per year.124

Pakistan has numerous serviceable designs. Two models were developed by PAEC for Pakistan Air Force aircraft, with reported yields of 2–10 kt and 10–20 kt.125 The 1998 nuclear explosions allowed Islamabad to improve its designs. Some analysts believed that Islamabad has acquired a pair of recent and complex designs to create smaller, lighter and more powerful warheads. Whether or not Islamabad already has a verified plutonium- based implosion design, it is probable that it will carry on relying on HEU weapons for a long time.126

3.2.3.8. China’s Cooperation in Pakistan’s Nuclear Program

Pakistan was one of the earliest countries to recognize the People’s Republic of China, becoming only the third state, and the first Muslim country to recognize the Communist state in 1950. Chinese‐Pakistani nuclear cooperation began in 1972 with Z.A Bhutto’s trip to China. He described gaining Chinese support as “my greatest achievement and contribution to the survival of our people and our nation” and the culmination of eleven years of work.127

China helped Pakistan in the development of missiles technology. Pakistani IRBM missile series (Shaheen I&II) were based on Chinese M9 missiles. The Khushab Reactor, which produces plutonium, and the Chasma Plutonium reprocessing facility, which extracts plutonium from spent fuel, were assembled with Chinese support. It is also believed that Khan transferred its centrifuge technology to the Chinese for their bomb drawings.

The two American journalists R. Jeffrey Smith and Joby Warrick claimed that Pakistan obtain weapons-grade uranium from China in 1982, which was good enough for two atomic bombs. In 1986, the scientists from KRL and military engineers of Army Engineering Core built a HEU enrichment plant in Hanzhong province of PRC, and provided technical assistance to China in weapon-grade centrifuge technology for

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Chinese nuclear weapons.128 From 1980s to present, Beijing has agreement with Islamabad to use for civil and military purposes.

Cooperation between the two countries gradually enlarged in the years following, with substantial transfers occurring in the decade of 1986‐1996. Despite international scrutiny, in 1991, China agreed to build the Chashma 325‐MW nuclear power reactor for Pakistan.129 To gain the international approval, Islamabad was inquired to sign an IAEA safeguards agreement for the reactor at Chashma. In 2005, China expanded its collaboration with Pakistan, and vowed to construct more nuclear plants. Construction of its twin, CHASNUPP-II, started in December 2005; It is reported to cost PR. 51.46 billion (US$ 860 million, with $350 million of this financed by China).130 The enriched fuel takes place in Pakistan Nuclear Power Fuel Complex (PNPFC) facility, which is also under IAEA safeguards.

Pakistan and China signed another agreement on May 2011. Under which two 650 MW reactors Chashma III and Chashma IV will be based at the Chashma nuclear complex in Punjab province, where China is assembling two other reactors from an previous mutual agreement. After the agreement, Chinese ministry of foreign affairs stated that the recent development project at Chashma is fraction of a 2003 deal among Islamabad and Beijing. These under construction nuclear plants will function under the IAEA safeguards.

The journey of Pakistani nuclear program is very different and unique. Although, Pakistan acquired nuclear capability in eleven years since 1972 during this period we can see the consistency in nuclear policy and political will of all governments and head of the states. It is a fact that Indian atomic explosions were the main reason behind Pakistani pursue for nuclear weapon technology. Indian role in the dismembering of East Pakistan was the reason behind the awakening of Pakistan’s nuclear weapon program. Without the fear of Indian aggression it was not possible that Pakistan could ever obtain nuclear bomb. After achieving the nuclear capability it adopted a proper nuclear command system and secured its nuclear arsenals as well as after 1998 focused to develop its civil nuclear program and signed multiple agreements with China for civil nuclear technology and power plants. Currently, Pakistan is in the middle of energy crises and all these

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projects have become significantly important for the industry and economy of this country.

Table 3.3: GROWTH OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ARSENAL, 1998—2012

Year 1998 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 2012 Estimated 2 8 14 20 26 32 38 44 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 No. of Weapons

Source: Adapted and updated from Robert S. Norris and Hans Kristiansen, “Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories, 1945–2010,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August

2010, Vol. 66, No. 4, pp. 77–83.

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TABLE 3.4: PAKISTAN’S FISSILE MATERIAL RELATED FACILITIES

Location Facility Type Material Dera Ghazi Khan Uranium mine, ore concentration plant, conversion Uranium plant Kahuta Enrichment (Khan Research Laboratories HEU Gadwal (Wah) Enrichment (secondary plant) HEU Chaklala Enrichment (pilot plant) HEU Sihala Enrichment (pilot plant) HEU Golra Enrichment (pilot plant) HEU Khushab–I Heavy-water reactor 40–50MWt Plutonium Khushab–II Heavy-water reactor 40–50MWt Plutonium Khushab–III Heavy-water reactor 40–50MWt (under Plutonium construction) Khushab–IV Heavy-water reactor 40–50MWt (under Plutonium construction) Chashma Reprocessing facility (under construction) Plutonium (Khushab) Rawalpindi Reprocessing facility–I (New Laboratories) Plutonium Rawalpindi Reprocessing facility–II (New Laboratories) Plutonium Khushab–I and II Tritium production Tritium Chashma Reactor fuel-fabrication plant (Kundian) Multan Heavy-water production facility Khushab Heavy-water production facility

Source: Adapted and updated from Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise of Proliferation Networks, International Institute of Strategic Studies, London, 2007.

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TABLE 3.6: PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR WEAPON STORAGE AND DEVELOPMENT SITES Facility Province Weapons Function name/location Fatejhang National Punjab SSM Missile development and potential warhead storage capability Defense Complex Masroor Weapons Sindh Various Potential storage of bombs for Mirage Vs at Masroor Air Base, Depot and/or warheads for SSMs Sargodha Weapons Punjab Various Potential storage site for bombs for F-16s at nearby Sargodha Air Base, Depot and warheads for SSMs Shanka Dara Punjab SSM Missile development and potential Missile Complex warhead storage capability Near Quetta Air Balochistan Bombs Potential storage site with Base underground facilities in high- security weapons storage area Wah Ordnance Punjab Various Possible warhead production, Facility disassembly and dismantlement facility Unknown air force ? Bombs Central air force storage facility facility with bombs for F-16s at F-16s at Sargodha Air Base, and Mirage Vs at Kamra Air Base Unknown army ? SSM/GLCM Central army storage facility with facility warheads for SSMs and Babur cruise missiles

Source: Robert S. Norris and Hans Kristensen, “Worldwide Deployments of Nuclear Weapons, 2009,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/ December 2009

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1 http://www.educationsz.com/importance-of-location-of-pakistan/ (Accessed on 18 May

2013) 2 Poverty in Pakistan, online available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poverty_in_Pakistan, Accessed on 03-10-2012 3 http://www.scribd.com/doc/119911041/geo-strategic-significance-of-pakistan

(Accessed on 25 November 2013) 4 http://cssexam2013.blogspot.com/2012/09/geo-strategic-importance-of-south-asian.html

(Accessed on 09 March 2013) 5 Chamka, Bhumitra (2009) Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons, New York, Rutledge, p. 10 6 Ibid, p. 11 7Siddiqui, Salimuzzaman (1957) The Pakistan council of scientific and industrial research: A review of its activities, Pakistan Quarterly, vol. VII, no. 4, Winter, pp. 42-45 8 Asian Recrds, 7-13 June 1958, vol. IV, no. 24, New Delhi, p. 2095 9Mosaver, Zeba (1991) Nuclear Weapons Proliferation in the Indian Subcontinent,

London, Macmillan Publishers, p. 100 10 Chamka, Bhumitra, p. 12 11Matinuddin, Kamal (2002) The Nuclearization of South Asia, Karachi, Oxford

University Press, p. 81 12 Kapur, Ashok (1987) Pakistan’s Nuclear Development, London, Croom Helm, p. 54 13 Agha Shahi, ‘Signing CTBT’, The News, 21 July 1998. 14Statement Of The Prime Minister of Pakistan Regarding The Indian Nuclear Explosion’, Made on 19 May 1974 and printed in Pakistan Horizone, vol. XXVII, No. 2,

Second Quarter 1974, p. 133 15 Chakma, Bhumitra, p. 13 16 Corera, Gordon (2006) Shopping for Bomb: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity and The Rise and Fall of the A. Q. Khan Network, London, C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, p. 9 17 Ibid, p. 9 18 Chamka, Bhumitra, p. 19

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19 Ibid, p. 20 20 Baber, Fahutullah (4 April 1999) A Historic Meeting Recalled (art.), frontier Post 21 Rehman, Shahid ur (1999) "Dr. A.Q. Khan: Nothing Succeeds Like Success," Long

Road To Chagai, (Islamabad: Print Wise Publication), p.47 22 Amin, Shahid (2000) Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, Delhi, Oxford University Press, pp.

133-135 23 The Pakistan Times, 19 May 1974 24 The Pakistan Times, 20 May 1974 25 Matinuddin, Kamal, p. 84 26 Kureshi, Enver (September 1979) ‘Pakistan’s Islamic Bomb’, Pakistan Economist, Vol.

19, no.39,29, p. 6 27 Dawn, 20 September 1974 28 Mahdi, Niloufer (1999) Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, 1971—1981: The Search for

Security, Rawalpindi, Feroz sons Publishers, p. 161 29 Cheema, Z.I., Summer (1992) Strategic Studies, Vol. xiv, No. 4, p. 7 30 Matinuddin, Kamal, p. 89 31 Wikipeidia The Free Encyclopedia, Online Available from Internet, http//en.wikipeidia.org/wiki/Project-706, Accessed on (12 November 2012) 32 Ibid 33 Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan (January 2002), http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Pakistan/AQKhan.html 34 Corera, Gordon, p. 6 35 Ibid, p. 6 36 Ibid, p. 7 37 Khan, Dr. A.Q. (May 17th 2011) “I Saved My Country from Nuclear Blackmail”, The Express Tribune, On-line Available from Internet, http://tribune.com.pk/story/170253/i- saved-my-country-from-nuclear-blackmail/, Accessed on 13 November 2012 38 Rehman, Shahid ur (1999) The Long Road to Chagai, Islamabad, Self-Published, p. 47 39 Corera, Gordon, p. 14 40 Project 706, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project-706

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41 Op Cit, pp. 17-18 42 http://medlibrary.org/medwiki/Abdul_Qadeer_Khan (Accessed on 10 August 2013) 43 Khan, Feroz Hassan (2012) Pakistan: Political Transitions and Nuclear Management, p. 11, On line available http://www.npolicy.org/article_file/Pakistan-

Political_Transitions_and_Nuclear_Management.pdf, (Accessed, 15 November 2012) 44 Ibid p. 12 45 Ibid, p. 12-13 46 Ibid, p. 16 47 Ibid, p. 16 48 Ibid, p. 16 49 Ibid, p. 17 50 Arif, General K. M (2010) Estranged Neighbors: India-Pakistan 1947- 2010, Islamabad, Dost Publications, p. 283 51 Subrahmanyam, K. (26 May 1998) Times of India, quoting General K.M. Arif, former

Chief of Staff to General Muhammad Ziaul Haq 52 Wikileaks (Apr 27, 2012) "Reagan admin swallowed Gen Zia’s lies on nuclear weapons", declassified information archive, 1981, Retrieved on 17 November 2012. 53 Corera, Gordon, p. 30 54 Wikileaks (Apr 27, 2012) "Reagan admin swallowed Gen Zia’s lies on nuclear weapons" 55 Chamka, Bhumitra, p. 26 56 Corera, Gordon, p. 31 57 Arif.K.M (1995) Working With Zia, Karachi, Oxford University Press, p. 346 58 The New Document Spotlight Reagan-era Tension Over Pakistani Nuclear Program, The National Security Archive, The George Washington University, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb377/, accessed, 15 November 2012

59 Chamka, Bhumitra, p. 26 60 Ibid, p. 27 61 Corera, Gordon, p. 38 62 http://npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1156&rid=6 (Accessed on 16 October 2013)

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63 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project-706 (Accessed on 18 May 2013) 64 Ibid 65 Ibid 66 http://npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1156&rid=6 67 http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Pakistan/PakDevelop.html 68 Sublette, Carey, (January 2002), "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program Development", http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Pakistan/PakDevelop.html (Accessed on 18 February

2013) 69 Shabbir, Usman, "Remembering Unsung Heroes: Munir Ahmad Khan" http://www.defencejournal.com/2004-5/print/p-cvs.asp (Accessed on 12 March 2012) 70 Hegarty, Devin T. (1998) The Consequences of Nuclear weapons: Lessons from south

Asia, Cambridge, The MIT Press, pp. 96-97 71 The Tribune, 1 March 1987, reprinted In ‘Strategic digest (New Delhi), vol. xvii, no. 5,

May 1987, pp. 7-8 72 Husain, Mushahid (3 March 1987) “Bomb Controversy”, The Muslim 73 Khan, Feroz Hassan, p. 19 74 Husain, Mushahid (3 April 1994) “Army and the Nuclear Issue”, The News 75 Abbas, Hassan (2004) Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, The Army, and

America’s War on Terror, New York, M.E Sharpe, p. 136 76 Matinuddin, Kamal, p. 98 77 Ibid 78 Wikipedia, Nawaz Sharif, Retrieved on 29-11-2011, On line Available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nawaz_Sharif 79 Sublette, Carey, (September 2001) "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program 1998: The Year of Testing", http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Pakistan/PakTests.html (Accessed on

18 January 2011) 80 Ibid 81 Raj Chengappa, India Today, 12 October 1998 82 Siddique Khan Kanjo’s statement at the first committee of the 53rd session of the UN

General Assembly, 20 October 1998, p. 4

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83 Sublette, Carey (2001) "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program: The Beginning", http://defence.pk/threads/the-comprehensive-story-of-pakistan-nuclear-program.2314/

(Accessed on February 6, 2011) 84 Ibid 85 Sublette, Carey (2 January 2002) Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program, (Retrieved on 23-11-12), On Line Available at http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Pakistan/PakOrigin.html 86 Azam, Rai Muhammad Saleem, Retrieved on 23 November 2012, When Mountains Move: The Story of Chaghi, Defense Notes , On Line Available at http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/june/chagai.htm 87 Sublette, Carey, "Nuclear Test History of Pakistan" http://forum.chatdd.com/threads/23960-nuclear-test-history-of-Pakistan#axzz2qxZjakoc

(Accessed on 09 March 2010) 88 Azam, Rai Muhammad Saleem, 89 Verma, Anand K. (2001) "Reassessing Pakistan: Role of Two Nation Theory", New

Delhi: Lancer Publishers, p. 256 90 Op. Cit, Azam, Rai Muhammad Saleem 91 Bhushan B., and Katyal G., (2002) "Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Warfare" New

Delhi: A.P.H Publishers, p. 213 92 http://www.pakistanpaedia.com/landmarks/RasKoh/Youm-e-Takbeer.htm (Accessed on 02 October 2009) 93 Matinuddin, Kamal, p. 137 94 Sublette, Carey, "Nuclear Test History of Pakistan" 95 Bhushan B., and Katyal G., p. 14 96 Azam, Rai Muhammad Saleem, 97 Raj Chengappa, 98 Matinuddin, Kamal, p. 145 99 Riedel, Bruce, (January 28, 2008) "Saudi Arabia: Nervously Watching Pakistan", http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2008/01/28-saudi-arabia-riedel (Accessed on 28 February 2010)

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100 Ibid 101 CRS Report RL30623, Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic Missile Proliferation in India and Pakistan: Issues for Congress, by K. Alan Kronstadt 102 Azam, Rai Muhammad Saleem 103 Musharraf, Pervaiz, (2006) In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, New York, Simon and

Schuster Publishers, pp. 288-289 104http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/nonproliferationpapers/brunotertrais501030

5e17790.pdf 105 Ibid 106 Tertrais, Bruno (July 2012) "Pakistan’s Nuclear and WMD Programs: Status, Evolution and Risks" http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/nonproliferationpapers/brunotertrais5010305e

17790.pdf. (Accessed on 18 May 2013) 107 Mian, Zia and Ramana, M. V., (July 12, 2008) "MAD: Ten Years of the Bomb and the Obstacles to Peace in South Asia", http://www.japanfocus.org/-Zia-Mian/2817#sthash.Vo6pk4B3.dpuf (Accessed on 18 August 2010)

108 Kuusisto, Maria & Bremmer, Ian, (May 2008), "Pakistan’s Nuclear Command and Control: Perception Matters", London, Published by South Asian Strategic Stability

Institute (SASSI), p. 10 109 http://zcomm.org/znetarticle/mad-ten-years-of-the-bomb-and-the-obstacles-to-peace- in-south-asia-by-zia-mian/ (Accessed on 18 May 2013) 110 Mian, Zia and Ramana, M. V, 111 Sareen, T.R., (2004 Vol. 3) "Socio Economics and Political Development in South

Asia", New Delhi: Isha Books, p. 223 112 Malik Qasim Mustafa, (2010) Are Pakistan’s nuclear weapons safe?, p. 7, http://www.issi.org.pk/publication-files/1299650081_87535106.pdf, (Retrieved on 12

September 2013)

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113 Luongo, Kenneth N. and Salik, Naeem, (December 2007) "Building Confidence in Pakistan’s Nuclear Security", http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_12/Luongo

(Accessed on 20 May 2010) 114 Ibid 115http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/nonproliferationpapers/brunotertrais501030

5e17790.pdf (Accessed on 15 Nov 2013) 116 Durrani, M. A., July 2004, ‘Pakistan’s strategic thinking and the role of nuclear weapons’, Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional Paper 37, Sandia National Laboratories, SAND 2004 3375P,

3375p.pdf>, p. 23. 117 Tertrais, Bruno, pp. 2-3 118 Cotta-Ramusino. Martellini, Koch, A. Foss. C., ‘Pakistan strengthens nuclear security’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 9 Oct. 2002. 119 http://muhammad-tahir.blogspot.com/2009_12_01_archive.html 120 President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, "Pakistan satisﬁed with nuclear deterrence capability: expresses ﬁrm resolve to meet future challenges", Press release, 12

Apr. 2006, 121 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), SIPRI Yearbook 2011: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2011) and the International Panel on Fissile Materials IPFM), Global Fissile Material

Report 2011 (IPFM: Princeton, NJ, 2011), p. 11 122http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/nonproliferationpapers/brunotertrais501030

5e17790.pdf 123 Joshi, Shahshank, (August1, 2012) "Pakistan’s nuclear weapons (and A.Q. Khan’s perpetual motion machine" http://shashankjoshi.wordpress.com/2012/08/01/pakistans- nuclear-weapons/ (Accessed on November 2012) 124 Albright, D. and Brannan, P., ‘Pakistan doubling rate of making nuclear weapons: time for Pakistan to reverse course’, Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), 16 May 2011, .

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125 ‘Nuclear bombs (Pakistan), offensive weapons’, Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems, 24 Aug. 2011, http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-Strategic-Weapon-

Systems/Nuclear-Bombs-Pakistan.html 126http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/nonproliferationpapers/brunotertrais501030

5e17790.pdf (Accessed on 18 May 2013) 127 Corera, Gordon, p. 13 128 "Nuclear power in Pakistan" http://en.academic.ru/dic.nsf/enwiki/3216887 (Accessed on 12 January 2013) 129 http://www.academia.edu/3780149/yoyo (Accessed on 18 December 2013) 130 Ibid

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Chapter: 4

DYNAMICS OF IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM

Historically known as Persia, Iran is home to many great civilizations and empires of the ancient world, which was frequently invaded. Unlike other Middle East states Iran managed to stay autonomous during much of its history. It is the eighteenth largest country in the world, with an area of 1,648,195 km2 (636,372 sq mi) south of the Caspian Sea and north of the Persian Gulf; its area roughly equals the United Kingdom, France, Spain, and Germany combined, or more than the US state of Alaska.1 Iran lies between latitudes 24° and 40° N, and longitudes 44° and 64° E. It shares borders with Iraq, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Armenia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. 2 Recognized as Persia until 1935, Iran turn into an Islamic republic in 1979 after the ruling realm was bring down and Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was enforced into exile. Conservative clerical forces founded a theocratic system of government with definitive political authority vested in an erudite spiritual scholar referred to as the Supreme Leader who, according to the constitution, is answerable only to the Assembly of Experts - a popularly elected 86-member body of clerics.

Nowadays, Iran has a population of about 75 million. Principle racial groups are Persian 51%, Azeri 24%, Gilaki and Mazandarani 8%, Kurd 7% and Arab 3%. 3 It is a Muslim state and the official religion is Shi’a Islam, with 89% Shi'a and 10% Sunni Muslims. The remaining 1% belongs to Jewish, Bahai and Zoroastrian faiths. The Bahai and Zoroastrian faiths originated in Iran. 4 Persian (Farsi) is the national language. Azeri is the next most widely vocal language. Other minority languages are Kurdish, Arabic, Luri and Baluchi.

The most part of it have semi-arid climate and it also is one of the richest country in natural resources. Especially, it has almost 10% of the globe's proven oil capital. With nearly 16% of the world's gas reserves, Iran has the second largest reserves in the world;

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However, poor economic planning, sanctions by Western countries, low literacy and a long and bloody war with Iraq have kept Iran poor, with a GDP of about $7,000 and unemployment of about 16%.5

In current scenario of world politics especially in the Middle East, Iran possesses a very important position and its nuclear program plays an important role in the political dynamics of the region. Its nuclear program was frequently under criticism from the western and regional powers especially from the beginning of the millennium. In this chapter with analyzing the reasons behind the embankment of the Iranian nuclear program, the history and current status of Iran's nuclear development will be in view focusing different thoughts behind the country's nuclear ambitions. Furthermore, the unilateral and multilateral sanctions and different types of embargos by world powers against Iran will also be discussed.

4.1. THE SHAH: IMPERIAL POWER AND USA

Shah of Iran had acquired power at the height of World War II in conditions that reflected the unsteadiness of both his position and that of his state. Only 24 hours earlier, the impending Anglo-Soviet occupation of Tehran had finally convinced Reza Shah to abdicate and flee to South Africa, having persuaded his callow 21-year old son to stay and take his place as they stood outside the palace gates. 6 Reza Pahlavi knew that he owed his very position to the great powers: they had pressured his father into abdicating and then only begrudgingly allowed him to claim the throne. The new Shah internalized two truths at his political birth: the need for his regime to be militarily strong and the ability of the great powers, particularly Britain and Russia, to manipulate his country at the height levels; in fact, to do what they wanted in Iran. And just in case he did not, the British sent him a message (via the Egyptians) to 'read, mark, learn and inwardly digest what had happened to his father'. 7

After the end of World War II, the new "big three" USA, USSR and UK decided that all allied troops must be withdrawn from Tehran and the rest in stages from the remainder of the country. The last American soldier left Iran on January 1, 1946. The British troops departed at the end of February 1946. But soviet actions suggested a different intention.

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Soviets were not ready to withdraw their army from Iranian soil and USSR mobilized the communist groups within the different provinces of Iran to fight for their independence and became a Soviet satellite states in the Middle East. This situation convinced Washington that it needed to step up the pressure on Moscow. Truman alerted American military forces to be ready to deploy into Iran, including three combat divisions in Austria awaiting their return to the United States. 8 This was a very serious threat for the Soviets and they know very well that they could not fight another war so Moscow removed its soldiers from Iran in May 1946. As a consequence, this event brought Shah near to the White House and American influence stood high among Iranians in the years after the war. The US bounded with the shah's regime by training his army and posting technicians to Tehran to assist the country's development.

Throughout the first half of 20th century Iranians were annoyed by the unfair distribution of oil money under the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) arrangement and by the company's virtual state-within-a state status in their motherland. The 1919 Anglo-Persian Agreement had guaranteed Britain access and drilling rights to Iran's oilfields. The Iranian Majlis (parliament) named Mohammad Mossadeq as prime minister on 28 April 1951. Known nationalist, Mossadeq had taken a keen interest in the question of Iranian oil and moved to seize control of Iran's oil production. On the other hand the Shah was naturally desperate to keep the western powers happy, which of course meant satisfying there oil thirst, and when Mossadeq took initiative to nationalize Iran's oil reserves – at a time controlled by the British conflict was unavoidable. He repeatedly offered large amounts of compensation in return for his proposed nationalization, but he would not compromise on the fundamental point of Iranian oil. While better for national self- esteem, the move was politically naïve; Iran was simply too feeble to pursue such an assertive strategy. In January 1953, hardliner Eisenhower replaced Truman and became President of the USA and Britain was able to play on American anti-communist fears; Mossadeq became yet another Iranian victim of Great Power machinations and on 19 August was overthrown in the British-inspired and CIA implemented coup "Operation Ajax". After the operation, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi favored American and British oil interests and his rule became increasingly autocratic.9 Before Mossadeq's ascendancy,

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America's role had been restricted mostly to keeping the Soviet troops sidelined from Iran. The event (which, in effect, imposed a regime change on the country) has lodged in Iran's political rhetoric, historical canon and collective memory ever since – reducing centuries of foreign meddling to a single image that defined the birth of the modern Iranian political consciousness. 10

4.2. SHAHS' VISION FOR IRAN

The coup strengthened the Shah and enabled him to consolidate his reign and entrench a royal dictatorship. After assuming full powers Shah adopted a policy to modernize Iran for the restoration of Persian glory. He began the journey to autocratic modernization, believing that an educated population with more urbanization and technological advancement were the keys to Iran's future, which he also believed lay in close ties with the west. Western goods and technology began to flow into the country. The display of progress was what counted and the very latest in progress was nuclear technology. Washington now began to supply more military equipment to Iran as well as increased its number of advisors in Iranian civilian and military programs.

Reza Pahlavi toke personal interests in nuclear energy and according to him, there were two things, both of which would become crucial to his nuclear program: Iran's lack of security and its technological backwardness. Also the Shah was frantic to ally Iran with the west and always disliked identification of Iran as a developing country. Nuclear power was the perfect conduit for industrial and economic progress and any economic improvement to a country would logically raise its prestige. The Shah was desperate to overhaul Iran's scientific establishment therefore, he alone had made the decision to launch a nuclear program with almost no government consultation; nuclear power had come to Iran not from political consensus or debate, but from one man's will.

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4.3. THE BEGINNING OF THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM

By 1957, four years after the coup, Iran was judged stable enough to be trusted with nuclear technology and under the auspices of Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) a nuclear training center was moved from Baghdad to Tehran. Washington and Tehran signed a civil nuclear collaboration agreement as part of the U.S Atoms for Peace program. The agreement, which provided for technical assistance and the lease of several kilograms of enriched uranium, also called for collaboration on research for peaceful uses of nuclear energy.11 The agreement required Iran to commit not to pursue nuclear weapons program. It also set the groundwork for the deliverance of a 5 MW light-water research reactor. Two years after the agreement was made public, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi ordered the establishment of an institute at Tehran University known as "Tehran Nuclear Research Center" (TNRC) and negotiated with the White House to supply a five- megawatt reactor.12 Over the next decade Washington supplied nuclear fuel and apparatus that Tehran used to begin its research. After setting the path for nuclear technology Iran's limited scientific establishment simply couldn't build on what it had received; the country now had some basic nuclear equipment but no real scientific base capable of operating it and the 5 MW light water Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) sat idle in Tehran University for almost a decade. Initially all nuclear issues fell under the ambit of Iran's Plan Organization, which had no expertise for nuclear technology. The Shah was angry about the lack of progress on the reactor and his dreams of a technologically advanced Iran had ostensibly been thwarted before they had begun. He met with the head of the Plan Organization, Safi Asfia, to get things moving, which was simply not possible without anyone competent to operate the reactor.

4.3.1. Akbar Etemad The Architect of Iranian Nuclear Program

It was 1965 when a young nuclear physicist, Akbar Etemad returned to Iran after studying in Geneva and Paris with sufficient qualifications but no job. Soon after his comeback he recognized the problems regarding the country’s nuclear policy and he knew very well that with his education and experience he could develop and operate the TRR. So one morning, in one of those twists of serendipity that litter history, he went to

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the Plan organization's office in Tehran to meet Safi Asfia. Asfia was a professor of engineering in Tehran University and had sufficient technical knowledge to understand the proficiency of Etemad. 'God has sent you through the window to us', he told Etemad with obvious and desperate relief. 13

Two days after his meeting with Asfia, he was told to start work at Tehran University and soon after his joining all funds needed to complete the reactor was released. The staff in research facility was based on a few nuclear physics professors without the necessary know-how to build, run or maintain reactors. Some of the construction work on the reactor had been done, but because of the lack of infrastructure and qualified persons it was not even installed. It took two years to complete the nuclear reactor and also to train people to function sophisticated procedures of the reactor. The reactor was ready for use in November 1967 and at the beginning of the next year, the 5 MW Atomic research reactors were officially opened.

In the end of 1969 Iranian Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveida duly summoned Etemad to discuss the improvement of scientific research in the country. Etemad recommended the establishment of an autonomous, national organization devoted solely to scientific research, which according to him should be run and staffed by relevant experts not bureaucrats. The proposal was approved and Iran's Institute for Planning and Research in Science and Education was established under the chairmanship of Akbar Etemad.

4.3.2. The Economy Factor and The Nuclear Technology

Iran's primary justification of its nuclear program from the beginning has always been presented as an economic argument. Because of 'Atom for Peace' program nuclear energy became known as the alternative power source to petroleum. This source of energy free non-petroleum producing countries from vulnerability to international oil price fluctuations; as for Iran where petroleum is the primary source of its income, nuclear energy can be lifesaving. The Shah had strong view in this economic dilemma, and was at pains to repeat his belief to anyone who would listen that petroleum and natural gas were so valuable that it was 'scandalous' to burn them as fuel. 14

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The use of oil as a domestic energy consumption seriously affected Iran's foreign exchange earnings. Even at this stage, studies indicated that if Iran continued to export oil at the same rate it would become a net-importer of crude oil and associated by-products within 50 years.15 At the beginning of 1960s, the Shah declared nuclear energy as a replacement to oil and stated:

"The oil we call the noble product will be depleted one day. It is a shame to burn the noble product for the production of energy to run factories and lighthouses. About 70,000 products can be derived from oil. We plan to get as soon as possible, 23,000 MW from nuclear power stations. Added to the electricity generated by our dams this will give us one of the highest per capita supplies in the world."16

Another emerging problem in 70s was the new oilfields, discovered in Libya and new French-built refineries in the Sahara, affecting both price and costumer. With water resources insufficient to support hydroelectric power, and other potential energy sources such as fusion and solar technologies too far off to be feasible, for 1970s Iran, nuclear energy remained the only realistic-long term energy alternative for the preservation of oil reserves.17

4.3.3. 1968 NPT Decision and Iran

On 20 June 1968, the Shah called his foreign minister Adeshir Zahedi and instructed him to sign the treaty as soon as it became possible. It was Shah's personal decision and no discussion or debate took place. NPT was opened for signature on July 1, 1968 and Iran was one of those states who signed it on very first day. The Shah was delighted that they had signed the agreement the very day it opened for signature. He told Zahedi; 'it showed the west that Iran was 'honorable'. 18 Etemad was unhappy with Shah's decision to sign NPT. According to him, "without any clear understanding of the limitations it imposed on national sovereignty".19 Iran ratified the treaty in February, 1970, and in 1973 signed the comprehensive safeguards agreement, which made its program subject to international control and inspections to detect and thereby deter any diversion of nuclear material for

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non-peaceful means.20 Iran signed its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA six years after signing the NPT.

4.3.4. The Creation of The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI)

In early 1974 Etemad was called by Reza Ghotbi (head of Iran's national Radio Television and also cousin to Queen Farah) who told him that Shah wanted to set up a sovereign body devoted to nuclear energy. In the next few months Etemad prepared a report in which he outlined the various possible approaches and their respective political implications. He also set out a condition: that the organization would be independent from government, for which it needed sufficient resources; and the Iranian treasury had resources.21 During 1973s Arab-Israel conflict all OPEC members stabilized their incomes by rising world oil prices and at the end of this crisis Iran's oil revenues hit $20 billion. In this scenario Shah's ambitions became much higher and Etemad knew very well that his demand wouldn't face any problems. After he submitted his report a meeting was convened in March 1974 at the royal palace in Tehran attended by three persons Etemad, Hoveida and the Shah himself. The Shah read the report a few times, asked Etemad a question or two, and then handed it to Hoveida; 'this is how things will work', he told him; the meeting lasted for under two hours. 22

Soon after Shah's permission the proposal was approved by parliament and the creation of AEOI attracted many suitably qualified Iranians which were working in USA and Europe. By the end of 1974 the AEOI had a nucleus of nearly 100 qualified scientists. The AEOI had an almost limitless budget and this brought total authorization to Etemad to pay his recruits what he liked. As the head of the organization he possessed all decision making powers and he also had responsibility to hire the staff. The AEOI did not have to present reports to regime on the amount of money spent. Instead, a single report on all expenditure went to the treasury at the end of the year – the only financial report ever produced.23

There were two organs responsible for the AEOI. First of them was the High Council of Atomic Energy Policy. The Prime Minister and some ministers with relevant expertise

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were the members of this council. The council united only two or three times during its entire existing period. The second organ was the Committee of Nuclear Energy, it was responsible for the governmental supervision of the organization as a whole and it had four members three of them were ministers and the fourth member was the head of AEOI. It was convened only once and never again. Because of Shah, the parliamentarians could not interfere in AEOIs maters and the Shah declared publically that the AEOI would function under his direct supervision. The western countries especially advanced nuclear states knew very well the Shah's bold plans regarding nuclear technology. The Shah wanted up to 20 nuclear reactors meaning that billions were there to be made; the French foreign ministry even created the post of nuclear Attaché at their embassy in Tehran. Many companies contacted the chairman of AEOI Akbar Etemad with requests for meetings. The other AEOI officials were also pursued by different embassy officials with endless invitations to visit foreign nuclear installations. Iranian nuclear officials meet with the USSR, China, Brazil, Japan and many other representatives for the possible co-operation in the transfer of nuclear technology.

4.3.5. Further Developments In The Decade of 70s

After establishment of AEOI, the organization's directors first decided what types of nuclear reactors were to be used and Etemad chose light water reactors which were considered more reliable. The next thing was to decide who would build them. After some negotiations West Germany and France were chosen for the construction of nuclear plants because both of the states had excellent nuclear industries and had fairly neutral political choices. A costal location was then chosen for the country's first power plant, 17 km southeast of the city of Bushehr. It would provide power to the city of Shiraz. The West German companies Siemens, Kraftwerk Union AG and AEG Telefunken jointly started construction in the end of 1974. By the end of 1975 Iran signed another deal with Kraftwerk worth US$4-6 billion to construct a pressurized water reactor power plant with two 1,196 MW reactors at Bushehr. The constructions of the plants began the same year. The first reactor was listed to be finished by 1980 and the second one by 1981.

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The AEOI engineers selected Darkhovin as the next nuclear construction site. It is situated 40 km north of the city of Ahvaz and close to the Karoon River. It was expected that France will construct a nuclear reactor at this site but like other countries French administration was so desperate to finalize the contract that they intently bypassed the AEOI and tried to contact directly the Shah. This kind of development was unacceptable for Etemad and he threatened the French Minister of Finance Poniatowski; if he tried to bypass him again, all nuclear co-operations with France would be cancelled. 24 The contract was delayed and after a month's negotiation the agreement was signed. The French construction company surveyed the area and began site preparation when the revolutionary government came power and cancelled the contract.

4.3.6. The American Iranian Collaboration For The Transformation of Nuclear Technology

White House was also interested in Iranian civil nuclear program. In June 1974, Washington and Tehran signed a deal for the supply of two energy reactors with enriched fuel. Both countries endorsed another agreement in January 1975. According to the agreement Iran would purchase eight nuclear reactors worth of $6.4 billion. Since the beginning of 'Atom for Peace' program western countries feared nuclear weapons proliferation and 1974s Indian test raised further concerns on the develop ing world's nuclear program and all of them came under scrutiny. Like other nuclear developing countries Iran also faced consequences of one countries action. Suddenly the Americans became anxious about Iran's nuclear program. According to western experts, by the end of 1980s Iran's 201,000 MW reactors were to become operational and produce enough plutonium to build hundreds of nuclear arms in a year. The program was entirely based on plutonium based nuclear reactors and it had no uranium enrichment program therefore plutonium bomb was the only option for Iran. Furthermore, just about 4 kg of reprocessed plutonium is required to make a bomb, and to produce 12 kg of plutonium only a relatively small reprocessing facility would be needed. Suspicion was compounded because Iran's electrical consumption in the mid-1970s was only 14,000 MW, which meant that projected nuclear power production far exceeded any realistic demand. 25

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Throughout Shah's era Iran did not show any intention to possess plutonium reprocessing plan and without a reprocessing technology Iran's reactors were not a proliferation threat. But CIA analysts believed that, if Shah were still on the throne in the 1980s, and Iran had a vibrant nuclear power industry and all the facilities necessary to make nuclear weapons, and if other countries had proceeded with nuclear weapons development, the agency had no doubt that Iran would 'follow suit'. 26

In the mid-70s, Iranian relations with American had strained and talks on multibillion dollar nuclear co-operation between the two nations stalled. When, the Americans demanded a 'right of prior consent' clause that stated that the AEOI had to run all nuclear activities with Washington’s consent, and seek approval for whatever it wished to do with the spent fuel produced in any reactor Washington would shift Iran. The AEOI was not ready to except this amendment to the 1950s bilateral agreement signed by both countries. But in summer of 1978 Washington declared Iran as a 'most favored nation' and in response Iran agreed for the American demand of ' right of prior consent'. Further, the Carter administration imposed more restrictive nuclear export policy. The nonproliferation act of 1978 created a set of new conditions for countries seeking US nuclear technology, which the AEOI viewed as overly onerous and only made things between the two countries more tense.27

The Shah was always interested to extend its military programs to become a regional power and many observers and historians believed that this path directly went towards a nuclear arsenal program. Nuclear arsenals always known as symbols of power which bring self-respect and can bring an added prestige that is highly desirable, especially for the Shah. But officially, Iran denied the theory that, Iran has ambitions for nuclear weapons. Prime Minister Hoveida himself unambiguously articulated the first limb: 'The atomic bomb does not interest us,' he told the New York Times in 1976; 'we want to master nuclear technology.' 28 By signing NPT the Shah already clarified his intentions to the west that he was not pursuing nuclear bomb. Soon after the Indian nuclear explosio ns the French news weakly asked the Shah if Iran may also seek a bomb. His response was unequivocal: 'without any doubt, and sooner than one would think'. The Iranian Embassy in Paris instantly denied the statement. But only one month later, when the Shah was

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again asked about nuclear weapons, he replied that 'Pakistan and India talking about nuclear strength' might force Iran to reconsider its options. 29

During the decade of 70s after Indian tests embarked a nuclear race and many countries showed interests in the development of nuclear arsenal and the impact was also clearly shown in the interviews of the Shah. In an interview with the New York Times he stated that, ' I am not really thinking of nuclear arms, but if small states begin building them then Iran might have to reconsider its policy'. 30 The head of AEOI, Dr. Akbar Etemad was also confused on Shah's indecisive vision for nuclear weapons program. The Shah described the scenario of the region, which clearly indicate that Iran was clearly became a mini superpower. Iran was a biggest arm importer from U.S in 1976 and the quality of arms was also high. By the late 1970s, Iran's military capabilities were becoming comparable to some western countries, analyst projected that the Iranian air force would have more fighter planes than any NATO country except the USA. Iran also had the most power full and rapidly growing naval fleet and in the beginning of 80s Iran could be declared the dominant military power in the Persian Gulf, on land, on sea and in the air. In these circumstances, Iran had no immediate need for nuclear capability. Undoub tedly, Iran was strong enough to defend its interests in the region and also its neighbors respected it. The Shah also feared that, any move towards a bomb would destroy relations with Americans and other western powers, which he had built at the cost of domestic politics. The Shah was determined not to risk the relationship through the acquisition of a bomb he felt had a little immediate use anyway. 31 At the end of conversation Shah clarified that, if anyone else in the region got nuclear arms and Iran's security was threatened, he would reconsider his nuclear policy, so till the end of Shah's regime Iran's nuclear program purely functioned for energy purposes. By the end of Shah's era Iran had acquired the foundations of civil nuclear program, which centered on the two reactors at Bushehr. Both of the plants were likely to come online in the beginning of 80s, which would decrease Iran's dependence on oil for domestic power purpose. The AEOI had royal mandate to do almost whatever it takes for the promotion of the nuclear power plants. The organization had grown to almost 5,000 staff with multiple research sites across Tehran. It sent many Iranian scientists and engineers abroad for training, with over

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1,000 being sent to Europe, America and Asia for research and education purposes. All nuclear installations were 'turnkey' projects controlled and staffed significantly, or in some cases almost entirely, by foreign contractors. 32 So, the possibility to acquire nuclear weapon for Iran was at least a decade away.

4.3.7. The Islamic Revolution: The End of Shah's Nuclear Program

After 1953s unpopular decision to end the popular government of Mossadeq, the Shah installed safeguards against a repetition of political danger to his throne. He jailed, agonized and executed his opponents. His internal intelligence security agency SAWAK, become a byword for repression. The people with different ideologies became combined against him and at the end of 70s Shah lost his throne. Throughout his regime, the Shah was also criticized domestically on his reliance with the West and it was also one of the reasons, which ended his autocracy. The last year of his regime was also problematic for the nuclear program and AEOI. The new Prime Minister Jamshed Amouzegar raised concerns about the program’s cost and alleged that the program had not fully assessed or ‘the growing cost and risks’ involved in the ‘substantial’ Iranian commitment to nuclear power. In addition the architect of nuclear program and AEOI, Akbar Etemad was also dismissed due to the charges of mismanagement and corruption. The new head of AEOI Dr. Ahmed Sotudehnia was not enthusiastic as Etemad was. He declared that ‘there will be some place for atomic energy, but whatever it will be 23,000 MW I cannot say. 33

The revolt changed everything. It transformed the country from an autocratic, Pro- Western kingdom to an isolationist, Islamic and populist republic under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s clerical rule. 34 The immediate effect on the program was that nobody knew what to do with it; certainly, nobody knew where it stood in relation to the new regime’s principles, and the official position on the program during its first year was confused and contradictory.35 Fereydun Sahabi was appointed as the head of AEOI under the Khomeini administration. Soon after his appointment Shahbi met with senior AEOI staff and announced that the program as a whole was under serious review because it was reliant on help from abroad which would bind us economically and industrially to those countries.36 Later, he also stated that the AEOI had created a consumer market in Iran for

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the industrial products of other countries, and that, critically, in future no foreign manpower would be utilized by the AEOI.37 As a result, Iran’s co-operation with Kraftwerk on the two Bushehr nuclear reactors came to an end and in July 1979, Kraftwerk formally terminated its contract to build the Bushehr power plan. At this stage the first reactor was around 80 percent complete, the second reactor 45-70 percent complete, while 90 percent of the parts had been shipped. Both, Iran and Kraftwerk demanded compensation from each other and, in early 80s both began litigation in Geneva. The French farm, Eurodif had also taken Iran to the International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Court in Paris and the court ordered a freeze on all Iranian assets in the company and ruled that repayment of Iran's $1 billion loan to Eurodif be suspended.38 Furthermore, Iran cancelled construction of the two projected Framatome power plants at Darkhovin in April 1979. At the beginning of the 80s, Iran's nuclear program becomes mired in legal wrangling and its major development took place in courts. Nonetheless, in the space of just over a year, a program that had absorbed increasing revenue and enjoyed increasing prominence in the latter stage of Pahlavi rule was, on a practical level, dead.39

4.4. RESTARTING AND RECONSTRUCTING THE PROGRAM: INITIAL DIFFICULTIES

Severe electricity shortages after the revolution made finding a reliable power source a priority for regime. Iran's population was rapidly growing and Tehran needed a solid solution for energy crises. Nuclear energy was the only way to solve it but regimes previous anti-nuclear stance had been so adamant that the government couldn't contradict it too aggressively without a loss of face. However, by June 1982 Tehran and Kraftwerk achieved a preliminary agreement and Kraftwerk agreed to complete Bushier reactor. Due to the Iran-Iraq war, Kraftwerk declared that it would only finish the plant when the conflict finished. During the war, Iraq attacked Bushehr seven times in between March 24, 1984 and July 19, 1988. Throughout the war Iran requested several times Kraftwerk, to resume the construction of plant but Kraftwerk refused to do so, in fact construction never resumed and West German co-operation ended.

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Due to a hostage crisis, relations between America and Iran became worse and in September 1981, White House announced a tightening of export controls, naming Iran as one of 63 countries to which the transfer of nuclear materials would be scrutinized more thoroughly.40 In 1984, U.S state department recommended an international ban on the sale of nuclear substances to Iran and stated:

"The United States will not consent to the transfer of U.S.-origin nuclear equipment, material or technology to Iran, either directly or through third countries, where such consent is legally required. In addition, we have asked other nuclear suppliers not to engage in nuclear cooperation with Iran, especially while the Iran-Iraq war continues."41

The government of Iran found itself almost totally isolated in the international community after the hostage crises. But it was determined to restart the program, and in 1984 allocation was made in the national budget for nuclear power. There was only a one way to resume the nuclear program and that was self-sufficiency. On November 6, 1985, Kayban International invited Iranian nuclear scientists living abroad to attend a conference from 14-19 March 1989, offering to pay all expenses incurred. 42 Furthermore, On October 29, 1986, AEOI sponsored an international seminar on civilian nuclear energy programs and during the seminar Iranian authorities requested the gathered scientists to return home and serve their country. But till the end of war Iran failed to initiate nuclear program. Also, Iran was unsuccessful to gain any support from its initial nuclear suppliers for further collaboration.

4.5. THE REBIRTH OF NUCLEAR PROGRAM

At the end of the war, Iran was desperate for a nuclear partner for the reconstruction of its nuclear program. It failed to convince western nuclear suppliers to work on its incomplete power plants. All Iranian efforts to convince western suppliers were halted by Washington and the indigenous rout was simply not viable. In this situation, Iran looked towards Africa, South America, Asia and the Eastern bloc. Over the next few years Iran

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explored co-operation with various modernizing countries including Argentina, Pakistan, India and China.

At the end of 80s, Ali Akbar Rafsanjani (speaker of the parliament) became president of Iran, the same year Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Khomeini died and another cleric Ali Khamenei became second supreme leader of the nation. The new administration under president Rafsanjani was a big advocate of nuclear energy. Since his days as Speaker of the parliament, Rafsanjani had always supported nuclear research. Iran's continuing shortfall of power and quick expansion of the country's inhabitants were the causes for Iran to push ahead with the nuclear program immediately. On October 9, 1990, Rafsanjani chaired an AEOI extraordinary meeting at which he reactivated the Shah's custom and appointed the AEOI chief, Reza Amrollahi, as one of Iran's Vice President in order to emphasize the program's importance to Iran's future. 43 The instant outcome of all this was the program's normalization as it became an official part of Iran's restructuring and rebuilding. In the mid-90s, AEOI determined that by 2005 up to twenty percent of Iran's energy would be produced by nuclear electric power and ten power plants would be built over the next decade. In February 1990, laboratory for the teaching of nuclear technology was established under the name of an Islamic scientist 'Jabir bin al-Hayyan' and in early 1992 the AEOI inaugurated the country's first Master’s Degree course in nuclear engineering. The regime now admired the importance of nuclear technology and in an inauguration of a research laboratory in Tehran, Rafsanjani stated: 'A nuclear program was something without which no country could find its real standing in the world.'44

Initially, AEOI planned to build cooperation with Argentina because it had a large program of its own but once again US pressure forced Buenos Aires to cancel any proposed nuclear assistance. In the following years Tehran signed agreements with developing countries like Mexico and Indonesia. But in reality these states could offer little; Washington had thwarted almost all significant nuclear cooperation. China and Russia are the only options left for Tehran. Both nations were global powers; with seats on the UN Security Council both had differences with US on ideological basis.

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4.5.1. Iran-China Co-Operation In Nuclear Program

Primarily, China was the first choice and many western writers believed that China had been involved in Iran's civil nuclear program since 1985; it had trained Iranian nuclear technicians under a secret nuclear co-operation agreement. On January 21, 1990, Iran's minister of defense, Ali Akbar Torkan, and China's Deputy Director of the Commission on Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense had signed a ten-year agreement to construct a 27 MW plutonium-production plant at the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center.45 Both countries also initiated negotiations for the construction of Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Isfahan and two 300 MW power plants, which would be built at Esteghlal, adjacent to Bushehr. In May of 1995, the Esteghlal contract was signed and Iran made a down payment of $800 to $900 million to Beijing for the construction of the plants. In the same year China also agreed to build UCF at the Isfahan nuclear technology center. But despite being permissible under the NPT, Washington considered it unacceptable for the Chinese to sell nuclear technology to the 'militant' Iranian government.46 Several meetings took place between the American secretary of state Warren Christopher and Chinese foreign minister Qian Qichen and on October 30 1997, in a confidential letter to US secretary of state, Qian Qichen vowed that China would complete existing areas of co-operation but it wouldn't provide any new assistance to Iran.

4.5.2. Soviet Assistance In Iranian Nuclear Program

Tehran was keen to complete its most advanced nuclear facility at Bushehr and it was at top of the AEOI agenda throughout the years. At the 1990 35th IAEA general session in Vienna, Amrollahi told the gathered diplomats that Iran would complete Bushehr through any means possible, even if it meant purchasing and re-ordering the project's withheld spare parts.47 Throughout the negotiations with Kraftwerk, Iran also worked on alternative ways to complete the plant and USSR was one of those alternative countries which can complete the Bushehr plants. Russia had been Iran's primary foreign policy problem for over a century but the 1953 coup had transferred Iranian suspicions away from the historic Anglo-Russian axis towards Washington, and after the revolution

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Tehran had looked on Moscow for leverage against USA.48 In June 1989 Rafsanjani made an official visit to Moscow to negotiate collaboration in the fields of nuclear energy, fisheries, transportation, and heavy industries. As expected Western block showed its anxiety on talks between both countries, specifically on nuclear collaboration. At 1990s IAEA conference in Vienna, Amrollahi explained that the tentative discussions Iran had begun with the USSR on Bushehr, which had inevitably begun to attract international concern, were simply the logical consequence of West Germany's unacceptable attitude since the revolution. 49

Eventually, in March 1990, Iran signed a protocol with former Soviet Union, according to which, Russia would complete the Bushehr reactor and construct two additional reactors in exchange for natural gas. But this protocol did not produce immediate results and for next two years both states tried to finalize a preliminary agreement. Two reasons, delayed this project first was the 'financial problems' and second and the most important was US opposition to the project. Both countries took five years to sign a formal deal in January 1995, Iran signed $800 million contract with Russia. Under its terms, Russia would complete the Bushehr power plant and also build a nuclear plant with one VVER-1000 water-cooled reactor over four years, with the possibility of another generating unit of the same capacity in the future. Moscow also undertook to provide a 30-50 MW thermal light-water research reactor, as well as 2,000 tons of natural uranium, and training for about 15 Iranian nuclear scientists per year. 50 After this agreement, Moscow became a primary nuclear partner of Tehran. The deal was criticized by Washington because by article 6 of the contract Russia promised to supply plutonium production reactor, a gas centrifuge plant and most importantly a nuclear weapons test shaft, which caused alarm. After American pressure, on May 1995, Russian President Boris Yeltsin assured Bill Clinton that Russia would not go forward with the centrifuge plant and, furthermore, subsequently admitted that, while the agreement had contained components of civilian and military nuclear energy, Russia had now excluded the military component from the contract. Russia also cancelled the construction of a light water reactor.

The construction of Bushehr power plant was restarted after 16 years of hiatus but there was a big diversity in Russian and German technology and Russian engineers faced

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difficulties in adjusting their technology to the German infrastructure. It was expected that the power plant will be completed in four years. However after more than a decade later, it was completed but it took two more years for the test run. In September 2011 the plant officially started to add electricity to the national grid but it was shutdown in 2012 because of technical problems. On 9 January 2013, it was reported that the plant was back online, connected to the national grid, and working at full capacity producing 1,000 megawatts, about 2.5 per cent of Iran's electricity.

In July 1998, President Clinton had signed an executive order barring US aid to seven Russian firms accused of selling weapons technology to Iran, and the following month the US House of Representatives cut US funding for the IAEA by the exact amount that the Agency was assisting Iran with the construction of Bushehr. 51 The American decision was criticized by Iran and claimed that the move defied all logic in light of Washington's continued support of Tel Aviv. On the other hand, the American action sparked opposition from the IAEA, which claimed the move would not influence its policy; that all its member states were satisfied with the peaceful nuclear co-operation with Iran; and that it would continue to support all peaceful use of nuclear energy in the world. 52

On August 27, 1998, after sixteen years as head of AEOI, Amrollahi was replaced with Iran's former oil minister, Gholamreza Aghazadeh. The new head of AEOI had run the oil industry under complex circumstance throughout the war, and developed a status for being able to get things done rapidly. He announced that once Bushehr was completed Iran would buy more reactors from Russia. In January 1999 the US imposed sanctions on three more Russian companies supposedly aiding Iran's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs; in reply Moscow announced that it would increase the number of staff working on Bushehr to 1,000. The political duel between Washington and Moscow continued to intensify and on 11 May 2000, in response to the Iran Non-Proliferation Act of the Congress, which imposed yet more sanctions on Russian companies suspected of supplying Iran with nuclear technology, new Russian President Vladimir Putin pointedly changed a 1992 presidential decree (On Controlling the Export of Nuclear Materials, Equipment and Technologies from the Russian Federation) to allow for a much broader export of Russian nuclear technology and materials. 53 A Russian minister stated that, US

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efforts to prevent collaboration with Iran should be observed as a desire to deprive Russian factories of orders. For probably the first time since the revolution, Iran had an official nuclear ally. Especially since China had ruled itself out of any more nuclear cooperation, broader nuclear co-operation with Russia was the goal for Tehran.

4.6. THE NEW ERA OF DEVELOPMENT

After joining AEOI, Aghazadeh visited France to talk with nuclear firms about the possible transfer of nuclear technology to Iran. The French showed interest but they needed a green light from the government, which was clearly not possible. There was no other country to turn to; as a result Aghazadeh called AEOI scientists and ordered them to start enriching uranium to make its own nuclear fuel. Iran appeared to have tried to become self-sufficient in making nuclear fuel but the unilateral sanctions of USA prevented it from doing so openly. Therefore, Iran carried out a number of actions that were covered and not reported to IAEA. In the end of 1998, AEOI began to assemble and test the P-1 centrifuges (acquired from Pakistan) at a pilot enrichment facility at the Kalaye Electric workshop. Between 1999 and 2002, the AEOI conducted covered tests on new assembled centrifuges in clear violation of Iran's IAEA safeguard obligation (which states that the IAEA must be informed within 90 days of fissile material being introduced into nuclear facility). In the beginning, the AEOI covertly began construction of a uranium enrichment facility in Natanz and also a heavy water production plant at Arak. As policy changed, at the highest political levels, to privilege the indigenousness production of the fuel cycle, this period marked the beginning of the program that has caused so much international concern today.

4.6.1. The Iran’s Nuclear Crises: An Era of Twist and Turns

On August 14, 2002, with the suspected help of Israel, an Iranian opposition group, The Mujahedeen-e-Khalq (MEK) revealed the constructing plants of Natanz and Arak. The construction of these facilities was not against the NPT, as Article IV of the NPT sets out the inalienable right of all state parties to develop research and produce nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.54 Although, Tehran did not report constructing new nuclear

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facilities, it did not violate any law or regulation. In 1992, after the US invasion of Iraq, the IAEA board of governors approved a plan to demand the submissions by states of preliminary designs of nuclear facilities as soon as decision is taken to construct them, according to this plan the IAEA requires "designs to be submitted 180 days before fissile material is loaded on the site."55 While Iran had not introduced fissile material into the facilities under construction, it did not have to report these facilities.

At UN September conference, Aghazadeh told Elbaradei (Head of IAEA) that Iran is constructing such facilities and agreed to an IAEA inspection of the two sites later in the year. On February 22, 2003 the IAEA inspected the sites. After this visit, inspectors carried out several more inspections in Iran ahead of a report that was to be issued in June of 2003. In a May 2003 letter Iran officially informed the Agency of its uranium- enrichment program, which was described as including two new facilities located at Natanz, namely a pilot fuel enrichment plant nearing completion of construction, and a large commercial scale fuel enrichment plant also under construction; its intention to construct its 40 MW heavy water research reactor at Arak (IR-40); and its plan to being construction of a fuel manufacturing plant at Isfahan. 56 In short, Iran openly admitted that it was pursuing the indigenous nuclear fuel cycle. The IAEA report of June 6, 2003 concluded that "Iran has failed to meet its obligations under its safeguards agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material, the subsequent processing and use of the material and the declaration of facilities where the material was stored and processed."57 The report did not declare that Iran had a weapons program but the US officials sounded as if the report confirmed their allegation that Iran was actually developing nuclear armaments. The Americans argued hard for Iran to be in disobedience with its safeguards agreement and reported to the Security Council; but, the IAEA, Non-Aligned Movement and most of the EU countries wanted more time to find out exactly what was going on in Iran. Both Washington and Tel Aviv hoped that the next report of IAEA will give agency enough ammunition to submit the issue to the UN Security Council.

On August 26, 2003 IAEA issued its second report, stating that IAEA inspectors were permitted to take environmental samples at the Kalaye Electric Company Workshop and the results of the analysis of these samples are not yet available; but it was noted by

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inspectors that there had been considerable modifications of the premises since their first visit in March 2003.58 Immediately, the US and Israeli experts claimed that Tehran was hiding something and this could be a nuclear weapons program. Before IAEA's next report, news leaked that its inspectors had found traces of highly enriched uranium at Kalaye. The news had been greeted with considerable satisfaction in Washington. The IAEA published its next report, which, in forensic detail, outlined everything that had been discovered since the crises began: that Iran's centrifuges were the Pakistani P-1 model; that plans for a centrifuge enrichment program began in 1985 and drawings for these had been in their possession since 1988; that the UF6 was secretly imported from China in 1991; that traces of HEU had been found on equipment at Kalaye Electric, which was not reported to the Agency. Soon after the report, Israel threatened a military strike on Iran and pressurized the American's and Europeans to impose sanctions on Iran.

The Non-Aligned Movement became mobilized on behalf of Iran led by South Africa's IAEA Ambassador and the group complained about the NPT's Article-IV and argued that if it were established through Iran's case that an NPT signatory could not exercise its Article IV rights, how could the other non-nuclear states be sure they wouldn't suffer the same fate if the West deemed it appropriate? On IAEA's September board meeting the situation was very difficult, Iran had the support of Russia, China and Non-aligned Movement; on the other side American's were alone because the Europeans were remaining, more or less, in the middle. A resolution was passed on a time-limited suspension of all further uranium-enrichment activities, including the introduction of nuclear material into Natanz.

4.6.2. The Birth of The Eu-3 And Tehran Agreement

On October 20, 2003 the British, French and German political directors duly arrived in Tehran to meet with Iranian authorities. The trip was the first step towards what became the Tehran agreement and was when the so called EU-3, France, Germany, Britain, the three countries that would now take the lead in negotiations—was born.59 The delegation pressurized Iran to sign the IAEA's Additional protocol, stop nuclear enrichment and provide full disclosure of its nuclear program. In return, the EU-3 offered to provide

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nuclear technology. During the talks, Iranian claim that nuclear weapons have no place in Iran's defense doctrine and that its nuclear program and activities have been solely in the nonviolent domain.60 The meeting ended with an accord which became known as Tehran agreement and according to this: Iran has decided to sign the NPT's Additional Protocol and also committed to voluntarily suspend its uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities as defined by the IAEA. Furthermore, the government of Iran decided to engage in full co-operation with the IAEA to address and resolve through full transparency all requirements and outstanding issues of the agency and clarify and correct any possible failure and deficiencies with IAEA. 61 In return, the Europeans explicitly agreed to recognize Iran's nuclear privileges and to confer ways it could provide satisfactory assurance about its nuclear power program (after which Iran would gain easier access to nuclear technology) and committed that Iranian non-compliance will not be reported to the Security Council. On October 23, 2003, Iran handed over the documents of its past atomic energy activities to IAEA and it signed the additional protocol of the NPT.

Critically, the regime believed that Tehran agreement was merely the first step in building trust between the two sides. To Iran suspension may only have been temporary to allow for broader nuclear negotiations to progress, but for the Europeans, who had got what they wanted, there was no hurry to reach another agreement and they naively hoped that Tehran would just forget about enrichment. 62 In fact, the Europeans could offer nothing of real note to Iran as long as USA maintained its unilateral sanctions on Iran. Even when trade did not directly fall within the domain of US sanctions, European interests in US markets meant that no firm would risk upsetting Washington. Structurally, negotiations were most likely doomed because USA and Iran's continuing refusal to speak meant there was no one who could offer Iran any genuine incentives to make it dramatically alert its nuclear policy. 63 The first stage of nuclear talks highlighted the EU- 3's restrictions as a diplomatic force in itself.

The Americans were unhappy with Tehran agreement and they believed that the simple European delegation to Tehran had been cheated and their desire for confrontation increased. In February 2004, IAEA published another survey report which stated that Iran had failed to mention in October 2003 that it had received P-2 centrifuge drawings from

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foreign source in 1994, a kind of centrifuge which was more advance than the P-1 centrifuge that Iran already possessed. US Ambassador to the IAEA Ken Brill's immediate response was that the report proved Iran's October 2003 declaration to the IAEA was neither correct nor complete, that Iran's nuclear efforts were clearly geared to the development of nuclear weapons, and again called for Iran's Security Counc il Referral.64 But there was still no appetite among the Europeans and Non-Aligned Movement Board members to pursue this course of action and they simply showed their concerns regarding Iran's miss behave at February's board meeting.

As much as the Europeans were concerned, the diplomatic game to make sure Iran uphold suspension remained unchanged. In February 2004, British foreign officer Jhon Sawers, visited the IAEA to meet Iranian representatives. During the discussion, he was asked to take the floor and delineate the European position on the Iranian suspension. He assumed that suspension should remain until the entire outstanding matters were resolved which, being familiar with the Agency's methodology, meant three to four years. The Iranians were not happy with situation and it looked like that they were desperate to withdraw from the agreement. But in the following month at a meeting in Brussels, the Europeans were able to get the Iranians to officially agree to widen the definition of suspension to suspension of the assembly and testing of centrifuges and suspension of the domestic manufacture of centrifuge components in return for a vague promise of European support in exchange for Iran's continuing good behavior. 65

Matters intensified when, in June 2004 IAEA declared that Iran had failed to report the fact that it had imported some equipment for advanced P-2 centrifuges in late 90s. Elbaradei also criticized the regime and said that Iran's cooperation had been less than satisfactory. It was the second un-satisfactory report and for Americans the report provided yet another chance to drag Iran in the Security Council. But on the other hand the Europeans had not considered it necessary to table a resolution at the IAEA board because recently Iran had agreed to widen the definition of suspension. On June 18, 2004, a resolution was placed at IAEA's board meeting, which was drafted by EU-3. It called on Iran to take all necessary steps on an urgent basis to help resolve all outstanding questions, particularly with regard to the nature and scope of Iran's P-2 centrifuge

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program.66 The Iranians were unhappy with this resolution and in August 2004 Iran declared that it had resumed building nuclear centrifuges and, according to diplomats, it had also restarted work at a uranium conversion facility near the central city of Isfahan. In principle, constructing centrifuges and converting uranium did not violate the Iran-EU 3 agreement. The EU-3 was not happy with Iran's action, as expected Americans argued that Iran was backing out of its commitment and the case should be referred to Security Council.

4.6.3. The Paris Agreement and Further Developments

The pressure was mounted on Tehran and Iranians knew very well that to prevent UN sanctions they needed EU-3 on their side. Unable to resist political pressure, Iranians were become ready for talks and in November 2004 both parties met at Quai d'Orsay in Paris. After intense negotiations an agreement was signed among the E-3 and Iran on November 15, 2004. The Agreement was based on a new proposal offered by the EU-3 on behalf of the European Union recognizing Iran's right under the NPT. According to the accord, Tehran reaffirmed that it would not seek nuclear weapons, committed to full co-operation and transparency in its dealing with the IAEA and approved to extend the postponement of all enrichment linked and reprocessing activities. The suspension was only to last while negotiations on a long term agreement were underway. In exchange for this temporary suspension, the EU-3/EU agreed to provide firm guaranties on nuclear, technological and economic cooperation and firm commitments on security issues. 67 The agreement further stated that, once suspension has been confirmed, the dialogues with the EU on a Trade and Cooperation Agreement will continue. The EU-3/EU also assured that they will support Iranians for the membership of World Trade Organization (WTO).

The Paris agreement, just as Tehran agreement, was meant as a precursor to negotiations on a mutually acceptable long term agreement, and also side stepped the core of the dispute: Iran's asserted right to enrich. 68 The promise regarding Iran's membership in WTO was also an allusion because it was a fact that the US had continuously prevented Iran from joining the WTO. A day after the EU-Iran agreement the US State Department gave its guarded approval and stated that:

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"Iran's promise to freeze all activity related to nuclear enrichment is useful but the suspension has to be verified."69

4.6.4. Road To The Security Council

After the Paris accord negotiations between EU-3 and Iran continued and in March 2005 the Iranians put forward an informal proposal that would allow them to resume uranium enrichment. The proposal was based on four phased approach which, in its second, key, phase, called for the assembly, installation and testing of 3,000 centrifuges in Natanz; in return, they would offer a permanent onsite inspector presence and a written promise that it would never seek to withdraw from the NPT. 70 But the Europeans remained determined to prevent any continuation of Iranian enrichment program and formally promised to think about this proposal. Iranian realized that Europeans are not willing for further development and in May 2005, the Iranian Parliament approved a bill pressuring the government to pursue peaceful use of nuclear energy, including uranium enrichment. The public opinion in Iran seemed to be shifting against any capitulation and the program became an issue of country's pride. Therefore, Iranian foreign minister Kamal Kharrazi stated that: "Iran is frustrated and wants to see results from the negotiations over the future of its nuclear program," also stated: "We have insisted that we are looking for something tangible to convince our public opinion". 71 The statement was alarming but West did not realize it and failed to provide any assurance or agreement which could normalize the situation.

4.7. ENTERING INTO NEW ERA: AHMADINEJAD COMING INTO POWER AND END OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT

In June 2005 Mahmud Ahmadinejad defeated Hashemi Rafsanjani in Presidential election. The new President of Iran made his name as a populist and conservative Mayer of Tehran and he appeared to be one of those who saw the Paris agreement as capitulation. The Iranians were upset at the lack of progress after almost two years of suspension and they were in no mood to carry on along what they considered to be an increasingly fruitless path. Negotiations broke down in the end of July 2005 with

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Tehran's disappointment at the Europeans refusal to reply to some new Iranian proposals which were good confidence building measures against the resumption of its nuclear program. At last Iran decided to halt its all agreements and restart its nuclear activities. On August 1, 2005, Iran wrote a letter to IAEA, in which Iran announced its decision and criticized the EU 3/EU and said that the Europeans had not kept their part of bargain and they seemed to be using delaying tactics to turn Iran's voluntary and temporary halt in all uranium enrichment activities into a permanent freeze. The letter stated:

"It is now self-evident that negotiations are not proceeding as called for in the Paris Agreement, due to E3/EU policy to protect the negotiations without the slightest attempt to move forward in fulfilling their commitments under the Tehran or Paris Agreements. The suspension has been in place for nearly 20 months, with all its economic and social ramifications effecting thousands of families. The E3/EU has failed to remove any of its multifaceted restrictions on Iran's access to advanced and nuclear technology. In a twist of logic, it has attempted to prolong the suspension, thereby trying to effectively widen its restrictions instead of fulfilling its commitments of October 2003 and November 2004 to remove it. In light of above, Iran has decided to resume the uranium conversion activities at the UCF in Isfahan on 1 August 2005."72

However, Iran ensured that it will continue to maintain its voluntary suspension of all enrichment related activities and asked the IAEA to remove the seals from the Isfahan plant to restart its uranium conversion activities. In response, the EU-3 threatened Iran with sending the case to the Security Council. In reply of this threat, the Iranian nuclear negotiator Hassan Rowhani stated: "There is no judicial or political logic to send the issue to the Security Council, this would mean that the Europeans have given in to US pressure and they must assume the consequences."73 On August 5, 2005, the EU-3 presented a framework to Iran for a long term agreement. Like in the past, the incentive offered a package of trade and technology and in return Iran has to discard all nuclear fuel work. This framework also tried to curb Iran's undeniable rights under the NPT. It demanded from Iran a number of measures which violated the spirit of NPT, such as

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asking Tehran to close down the construction of its heavy water research reactor at Arak. The Iranians described the proposal as an insult for which the EU-3 should apologize. On August 10, 2005, in an emergency meeting IAEA urged Tehran to reinstate complete suspension of all enrichment related activities and insisted to allow the IAEA to restore the seals that have been detached from the Isfahan facility. In response Iran claimed that it was in full conformity with the NPT and was exercising its inalienable right. Iran's representative Cyrus Naseri further stated:

"The leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has issued the fatwa that the production, stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons are forbidden under Islam and that the Islamic republic of Iran shell never acquires these weapons. President Mahmud Ahmadinejad, who took office just recently, in his inaugural address, reiterated that his government is against weapons of mass destruction and will only pursue nuclear activities in the peaceful domain."74

In IAEA's September report, the Agency criticized Iran's recent nuclear policy. Iran protested with the statement that the UN Agency has been influenced by a political propaganda movement against Iranian nuclear program. On 24 September 2005, in IAEA's board meeting E-3 drafted a resolution of Iranian non-compliance and demanded that Iran should reinstate full and sustained suspension of all enrichment related activity, reconsider the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water, ratify and implement in full the additional protocol of NPT. 75 Responding to this resolution, on 29 September, the Iranian Parliament passed a draft law that suspended the Additional protocol until Iran's right to use atomic energy for peaceful proposes was recognized.

The Russians were concerned and in October 2005 they put forward a proposal to solve the enrichment impasse. According to this proposal, Iran would not enrich uranium on its soil; instead, it would be allowed a large financial stake in a Russian-based enrichment facility from which it would import enriched fuel.76 Western powers accepted this proposal and encouraged the Russians for further development. The negotiations were started at a time when the Iranian Majlis approved a bill requiring the government to

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block international inspections of its atomic facilities if the UN nuclear monitoring agency refers Iran to the Security Council for possible sanction. 77 The negotiations between Moscow and Tehran were extended into February 2006 and the talks halted when IAEA referred Iran to the Security Council.

4.7.1. The Birth Of The P5+1 and Road To Security Council

On January 10, 2006 Iranian officials remove the IAEA seals on the centrifuges at Natanz and announced that it would continue research and development activities at the plant and the production of nuclear fuel remains suspended. The decision did not violate Iran's Safeguard Agreement, but it was contradictory with the IAEA's demand to reinstate suspension of all enrichment and reprocessing-related activities. This was a move that the US and Israel were waiting for and on the very next day White House stepped up the diplomatic pressure on Europeans to refer Iran to Security Council for violating its nuclear treaty obligations. Meanwhile, Israeli lobbies and allies in US Congress pressurized the government to consider the military action as an option against the regime. Israel also threatened the EU states that if they did not refer Iranian matter to the Security Council then it will take preemptive measures against the regime. The pressure exerted by Israel and its allies was so intense that IAEA was asked to submit an early report on Iran to speed up the process.

During the same month a collation of six countries was formed to avert Iran from obtaining the nuclear weapons program. This collation of six countries is famously known as P5+1 (the five Security Council powers Germany). On January 31, 2006, a brief report was presented by IAEA in which it claimed that Iran possessed some documents related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon components. Iran explained that the accusations were groundless and it would present further clarification later. The US and Israel, however, did not wait for the full report of February 27, 2006 to make their move. On 4th February the IAEA board passed a resolution against Iran and the case was referred to the Security Council. The resolution was passed by 27 votes to 3. Cuba, Syria and Venezuela voted against the resolution. Although, China and Russia voted for the referral but both were able to soften the agreement by stipulating that the Security

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Council will not adopt the issue until March. This gave Iran more time to comply with UN nuclear inspectors and avoid the threat of sanctions. In response, Tehran immediately stated it would restart uranium enrichment and halt application of the Additional Protocol, which disallowed IAEA for surprise inspection of non-declared sites.

On March 6, 2006 news was reported that Iran had agreed to delay industrial-scale enrichment for up to two years in exchange for small scale enrichment. But US ruled out any compromise saying that no enrichment in Iran is permissible. The US representative in UN Boltan was quoted: "even small so-called research enrichment programs could give Iran the possibility of mastering the technical deficiencies that it's currently encountering in its program and translate them into large scale enrichment later."78 China's vice minister of foreign affairs rejected the idea of sanctions and offered a thinly veiled criticism of the war in Iraq when he said, 'The Chinese side feels there has already been enough turmoil in the Middle East and we don’t need any more turmoil.' 79 In the end of March, the Security Council passed a resolution in which it called upon Iran to suspend all its enrichment related and reprocessing activities comprising research and development. The Security Council also ordered the IAEA director general to report process of Iranian compliance within 30 days to the IAEA board of governors as well the Security Council.

In April, Tehran announced that it started enriching uranium to the 3.5 percent level (a range needed to make fuel for reactor). The Western powers were not happy with this kind of response. On April 28, 2006 Director General of IAEA issued his report on the process of Iranian compliance with the steps required by the IAEA, as the Security Council had asked on March 29.80 As expected the report was based on the Iranian non- compliance with the Agency. Following his IAEA report, Elbaradei tried to slow down the drive to enforce UN sanctions against Iran and stated: "We haven't seen a clear and present danger. We haven't seen an imminent threat."81 Recognizing the political nature of the dispute, He also tried to convince Americans to talk directly to Iran.

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4.7.2. The Carrot and Stick Package By P5+1

In the beginning of June a new strategy was adopted by Washington. The Bush administration was willing to talk to Iran if it would stop enrichment related activities. Iran's Foreign Minister, Manouchehr Mottaki replied that Iran was ready to accept the US offer but rejected the condition to suspend enrichment. Iran also made it clear that its enrichment right was guaranteed under the NPT and would not be given up. The proposal was clearly unacceptable for Iran; therefore no further development happened in behalf of this offer. In the same month P5+1 announced a carrot and stick package to Iran. Once again, the package asked Iran to commit to addressing all the outstanding concerns of the IAEA; suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities to be verified by the IAEA, as requested by the IAEA Board of Governance and the UN Security Council, and commit to continue this during these negotiations; and resume implementation of the Additional Protocol.82 In exchange, Iran was offered many of the same incentives offered in the past. But what was offered either lacked sufficient specification or was simply undeliverable. Responding to this offer, Iran's supreme leader Khamenei stated: "We do not negotiate with anybody on enriching and exploiting nuclear technology, but if they recognize our nuclear rights, we are ready to negotiate about controls, supervisions and international guarantees."83 Because of past harsh experiences, Iranian consider these new promises as a tactics to halt its natural right to develop nuclear program and said that it is ready to hold talks over mutual concerns, but will not give up its right to develop nuclear energy under the NPT.

4.7.3. U.N Security Council Resolution 1696

On 31 July 2006 a resolution was conceded in Security Council. Acting under Article 40 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nation in order to make mandatory the suspension required by the IAEA, the resolution demanded that Iran suspend a ll enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the IAEA.84 The resolution also asked for a report by the end of August from head of the IAEA whether Tehran has established full and sustain postponement of all activities pointed out in resolution. The Resolution 1696 was adopted by the voting of 14

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to 1. Only Qatar voted against the resolution. In reply of this resolution the Iranian Ambassador for UN, Javad Zarif, stated: "Iran's peaceful nuclear program posed no threat to international peace and security and dealing with the issue in the Council was, therefore, unwarranted and void of any legal basis or practical utility."85 Furthermore, the Iranian officials and the members of Majlis condemned the resolution and show willingness for talks but not at the price of their nuclear program.

On August 31, 2006 IAEA published its report on Iran's compliance with UN Resolution 1696. The Agency admitted that Tehran has granted access to its nuclear material and facility. Yet, the report went on to say, "Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities; nor has Iran acted in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol."86 Immediately, the US demanded that UN must impose sanctions on Iran and start to convince other Security Council states to speed up the process. China, France and Russia resisted the US call for immediate sanctions. All of these countries insisted to resolve this issue through dialogue.

4.7.4. U.N Sanctions Against Iran: Resolution 1737

In early November numerous reports appeared concerning a draft resolution circulated by the EU-3 for imposing UN sanctions against Iran. 87 Russia and China were uncomfortable with initial draft and both tried to soften the sanctions against Iran but after extreme pressure and some give and take negotiations both of the countries accepted the draft against Iran. On December 23, 2006 the Security Council approved Resolution 1737. This resolution mandated all UN member states 'to prevent the supply, sale or transfer of all items, materials, equipments, goods and technology which could contribute to Iran's enrichment related, reprocessing or heavy-water related activities or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. 88 Unless Iran suspended all enrichment activities within 60 days, further sanctions would be considered.' 89 The resolution exempted the Bushehr project in order to secure Russian support. It also founded a sanction committee to examine Iran's compliance and trade with other countries and report to the Security Council within 90 days on the implication of the Resolution, with its observation and recommendation.

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Iran did not show any stronger reaction as Americans were expected. Although, Iranian Parliament passed a bill to revise the level of cooperation with IAEA, but Iran did not reduce its cooperation with the organization. In fact, the sanctions made reverse effect and Iran pace up its nuclear program in following years. The sixty days limit of Resolution 1737 came to an end on February 22, 2007, and IAEA issued its report. As expected, the report indicated that Iran was not acting in accordance with the mandates of the resolution. After this report the sanctions were officially be imposed on Iran and further sanctions were on the way to the Security Council.

4.7.5. Second Set of Sanctions: Resolution 1747

On March 24, 2007 the second set of UN sanction was approved undisputedly. It reaffirmed previous resolution and number of new penalties added against Tehran. It demanded from all states to exercise vigilance and restrain regarding the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals who are engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery system. 90 It was also decided that Iran will not provide, sale or transfer any arms or associated materials. Furthermore, the resolution asked all states and international financial institutions not to enter into new commitments for grant, financial assistance, and concessional loans, to the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, except for humanitarian and developmental purposes. 91 Once again, the resolution asked the IAEA to prepare a report within 60 days as to whether Iran had met the terms of Resolution 1737 and 1747. Responding to these new UN measures the government official stated that the new sanctions will not affect our work on nuclear technology. Iran’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Manouchehr Mottaki, said that the Security Council was “being abused to take an unlawful, unnecessary and unjustifiable action against the peaceful nuclear program of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which presents no threat to international peace and security and falls, therefore, outside the Council’s Charter-based mandate”.92 He further stated that "all those schemes of the co- sponsors of the resolution are for narrow national considerations and aimed at depriving the Iranian people of their inalienable rights, rather than emanating from any so-called

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proliferation concerns”.93 He also invited the concerned parties for talks which should be based on justice and truth.

4.7.6. Further Developments and More Sanctions

In April President Mahmud Ahmadinejad declared that Iran is now capable of enriching nuclear fuel "on an industrial scale" and it has 3,000 centrifuges for the purification of uranium. But three days after Iran's claim, the head of the IAEA Mohammad Elbaradei rejected Ahmadinejad's claim with his statement that 'Iran is only operating several hundred centrifuges at its uranium enrichment plant at Natanz, despite its claims to have activated 3,000.'94 During the year of 2007, Russia stopped its work on Bushehr power plant, U.S and E.U officials claimed that Moscow refused to provide nuclear fuel to the Bushehr reactor until Tehran complies with the U.N Security Council's demand for the stalling of its enrichment activities.95 But Russian Federal Nuclear Power Agency Rosatom, denied the West's argument and confirmed that the number of Russian workers has in fact decreased ever since Iranian payment delays. But in the middle of the year the financial problems were solved by the regime and the construction on Bushehr resumed. On December, 18 2007, Russia delivered its first fuel consignment for the Bushehr nuclear reactor. Russian officials stated that the fuel will be under the control of the IAEA and that Tehran has given its pledge that the fuel will only be used for the power plant.

On the other side the Western powers were not happy with further development in Iranian program and the Bush Administration announced unilateral sanctions against three of Iran's largest state-owned banks to pressurize the regime and when Iran did not show any interest to halt its nuclear program, America and its allies introduced another draft in the Security Council to pass the third round of sanctions against Iran. On March 3 2008, Security Council conceded 'Resolution 1803' by a vote of 14-0.

Resolution 1803 called on states to “exercise vigilance” when providing export credits, guarantees and insurance to Iranian entities; It also called on states to voluntarily limit their interaction with Iranian banks operating in their territories.96 The resolution specifically urged states to cut ties with Bank Melli and Bank Saderat, which the

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Washington accused of providing financial services for Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs, in addition to facilitating money transfers to terrorist organizations; the Resolution also subjected 13 individuals and 12 companies to travel restrictions and asset freezes.97 Furthermore, it approved examination of air and sea cargo transported to or from Iran if “reasonable grounds” suggested the ship was carrying illegal supplies. Iran’s Ambassador to the IAEA called the resolution “irresponsible,” and described the agency’s information on its nuclear program as “forged and fabricated.”98 He also affirmed that Iran’s nuclear program had been and would remain completely nonviolent and in no way posed any threat to global peace and security; it, therefore, did not fall within the Council’s purview.99

In July a new round of negotiations were started to end the nuclear standoff. The P5+1 offered the new incentives package, proposed a six week "freeze-for-freeze," where Iran would suspend enrichment and the sanctions would be lifted.100 Iran had rejected to freeze its nuclear program and put forward its own offer which was based on political, economic, and security cooperation. But the Iranian proposition did not address steps that Tehran would take in view to its nuclear program. It was not acceptable for P5+1, therefore no further development achieved by both sides. After unsuccessful negotiations the Bush administration imposes financial sanctions on Iranian officials and businesses involved with the nuclear program.

On September 27, 2008 the Security Council collectively approved 'Resolution 1835'. The resolution obligated no new sanctions and merely restated the four previous resolutions. Resolution 1835 was issued in response to a September 2008 IAEA report that Iran was resisting the agency’s investigation into its nuclear program; the report also said that Tehran was making progress in developing and operating centrifuges for uranium enrichment.101 Therefore, Resolution 1835 called on Iran to comply “fully and without delay with its obligations” under previous resolutions. 102 It was the weakest Resolution against Iran and like previous resolutions it failed to make any impact on Iranians. The reason behind this weak incentive was the Russians because during the September conference, the Russian announced that it will not take part in a conference to talk about new economic sanctions against Tehran. The Russian Foreign Ministry said in

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a statement that "We do not see any fire that requires us to toss everything aside and meet to discuss Iran's nuclear program in the middle of a packed week at the United Nations General Assembly."103 In December of the 2008, the deputy chairman of AEOI announced the country’s plans to construct five new nuclear reactors in the next five years.

4.7.7. The New American President With A New Strategy

In 2008, Barack Obama became the 43rd President of the USA. President Barack Obama, who sought to abandon the previous U.S policy requiring Iran to fulfill UN Security Council, demands to suspend nuclear fuel cycle activities prior to negotiations, the P5+1 sought to renew their negotiations with Iran. 104 In February 2009, diplomats from the P5 and Germany gathered to discuss Iran's nuclear program. This was the first summit since President Obama's induction. The diplomats welcomed the willingness of the U.S administration, as expressed by President Obama, to engage in talks with Tehran. In April 2009 The Obama administration officially announces that it will join P5+1 negotiation with Iran as a full participant. Iranian President Ahmadinejad responded in a speech that he would welcome "honest" talks with Washington.

On 18 June 2009 United Kingdom declared that it has frozen $1.64 billion of Iranian assets. The total assets frozen in the U.K. under the EU and UN sanctions against Tehran were around 976,110,000 pounds," all these measures were taken to maintain pressure on Iran for negotiations. In addition, the P5+1 set a deadline for Iran to join the talks or otherwise be ready for further sanctions. In response on August 10 2009 an Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Hassan Qashqavi stated that Tehran will not recognize a September deadline for agreeing to join talks about its nuclear program.

"We are not against negotiations but we will not allow world powers to pressure us with deadlines."105

Just before the Septembers General Assembly meeting Iran informed the IAEA that it had been constructing a pilot fuel enrichment plant at 'Fordow' near the holy Shiite city of Qom. In its letter to the IAEA, Iran added that the plant would enrich uranium to 5

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percent - enough for nuclear fuel, but not weapons grade fissile material. Tehran claimed that this facility was being built as a backup to Natanz in response to continuing military threats against the facility from the Zionist regime and Bush Administration. According to the Iran's Ambassador to the IAEA, Ali Asghar Soltanieh:

"This new site at Fordow has a political message: we are saying to the world that even the threat of military attack will not stop enrichment – we have a contingency plan. Enrichment in Iran will not be stopped or suspended at any price. It has not been done by sanctions or resolutions it won't be done by force. If Natanz is attacked, this side will continue enrichment."106

The Fordow was widely suspected to be for military use therefore, President Obama demanded that Iran open it for inspection within two weeks.

4.7.8. The Geneva Negotiations

At the beginning of October Iran and P5+1 meet in Geneva for negotiations offering Iran the same 'freeze for freeze' offers it had in 2008, but Iran was not ready to except it. The parties also discussed a proposal for Iran to ship most of its low enriched uranium from Natanz to a third country for further enrichment and fabrication of fuel for the reactor in Tehran that produces medical isotopes. 107 Initially, Iran accepted the proposal and agreed to ship around 75 percent of its LEU to Russia by the end of the year. For further dialogues both sides agreed to meet again within a month.

On October 21 2009, the talks between P5+1 and Iran concluded in Vienna. IAEA Director General circulated a draft agreement that reportedly envisaged the consignment of Iran's LEU to Russia for advance enrichment and then to France to make fuel for Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). But two days after the IAEA proposal, deputy speaker of Iran's Parliament Mr. Bahonar, rejected the IAEA draft plan, deeming that the terms of the deal are "not acceptable." On October 29, 2009 Iran declared that it will not accept a plan because Iran had a right to enrich uranium indigenously and it could never be sure of a guaranteed fuel supply. Instead, Iran proposed that when the fuel was delivered to Iran

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it will hand over the LEU, but this time P5+1 rejected the proposal. Therefore, Iran commenced to increase the enrichment level of some of its LEU to 20% in February 2010, apparently for TRR fuel. In April 2013, during a press conference the Iranian President Ahmadinejad unveiled a new third generation centrifuge with a reported ability to enrich up to six times faster than the old P-1 centrifuges. Ali Akbar Salehi, who had replace Aghazadeh as head of the AEOI in July 2009, stated that it could a year before a cascade of the new centrifuges was available for testing. 108

4.7.9. The Tehran Declaration

Brazil and Turkey presented a diplomatic proposal in the spring of 2010 to broker the TRR fuel exchange with Iran. Following trilateral consultation in Tehran, on 17 May 2010 Iran, Turkey and Brazil sign a combined agreement (Known as Tehran Declaration), whereby Iran concurred to send 1,200 kg of its LEU to Turkey in return for 120 kg of 20 percent enriched fuel for the TRR within a year. The declaration allows Iran to uphold possession over the LEU in Turkey, and in the occasion the provisions of the declaration are not met within a year the material will promptly be returned to Iran. 109 In the declaration Iran also agreed to notify the IAEA in writing of its deal within seven days of the declaration, which had to be accepted by the Vienna Group (America, Russia, France and the IAEA) and upon positive response, a written agreement will be made followed by proper arrangements and commitment by the Vienna Group to deliver the fuel to Iran for its TRR.110 But P5+1rejected the deal because according to them, Iran promised to export 1,200 kg of LEU when its total stockpile was around 2,300 kg, so what was on offer was less than half and with the current enrichment rate it would only take Iran about a year to replace what it had agreed to ship, which was not accep table for the P5+1.

4.7.10. Another Sanction: Resolution 1929

Only one day after the Tehran Declaration, U.S, after consultation with Russia, China and other major powers, presented a draft U.N Security Council Resolution that make tighter sanctions against Iran. Brazil, a non-permanent member of the Security Council at the

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time, noted that it would "not engage on any draft resolution and there was still room for negotiations".111 On June 9, 2010 UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1929, passed by a vote of 12 in favor to 2 against (Brazil, Turkey), with 1 abstention (Lebanon) which were the fourth round of sanctions forced on Iran. The new resolution demanded from UN member states to put off the transfer of any kind of military weapons to Iran comprising missile associated technology. It also prohibited Iran from acquiring commercial interest in uranium mining or producing nuclear materials in other countries; it enhanced previous travel sanctions by requiring states to prevent designated individuals from entering their territories, and called on states to inspect ships bound to or from Iran if they suspected banned cargo is aboard.112 Finally, it advocated member states to ban new branches of all Iranian banks in their country and prevent financial institutions operating in their territories from doing business in Iran.113 President Ahmadinejad responded by saying the sanctions were a "used handkerchief that should be thrown in the dustbin" and that the sanctions were "not capable of hurting Iranians". 114

4.7.11. Aftermath of Resolution 1929

In reply to the new sanctions forced against it, Iran has deferred nuclear talks with P5+1 until late August. It also declared that if its ships are searched it will be ready to retaliate. In addition, the AEOI announced that it successfully completed its search for 10 additional sites for uranium enrichment plants and construction of the first of the 10 enrichment facilities should reportedly begin in early 2011. 115 The tensions mounted when one day after Iranian withdrawal from further talks, President Obama imposed advance unilateral sanctions against Tehran, which aimed to cut-off Iran's imports of refined petroleum goods such as gasoline and jet fuel as well as restrain Iran's access to the global banking system.116 But in September 2010, Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad offered that Iran will stop uranium purification to high levels, if world powers send Tehran nuclear fuel for its research reactor. President Ahmadinejad affirmed his country's readiness to set a date for the resumption of talks with six world powers to discuss Iran's nuclear program.117 He also insisted that Iran had no initial interest in enriching uranium from around 3.5 percent to 20 percent, contending that the refusal to

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provide nuclear fuel for producing medical isotopes has forced Iran to pursue higher levels of enrichment.118

4.7.12. The Cyber Attack on Iran

In late 2009, Iranian technician in Natanz noticed that centrifuges had started to spin out of control and destroy themselves. Although, this problem was not new, since Russia had become Iran's primary nuclear partner this problem became a permanent trouble. But in 2009, the level of breakage was highly unusual and in only one month staff decommissioned and replaced about 1,000 centrifuges. Even stranger event was the examination of all the internal monitoring systems, which showed the centrifuges spinning normally. But, after an investigation it became clear that the footage had been doctored. On November 23 2010, the head of AEOI confirmed that someone had managed to put a computer malware virus into the computer system at Natanz. The virus, called Stuxnet, was highly sophisticated and worked by increasing the speed of uranium centrifuges to breaking point for short bursts while it simultaneously fooled the safety monitoring systems.119 The program secretly recorded normal operations at the plant then played those reading back to plant operators, so that everything appeared normal while the centrifuges were actually destroying themselves. 120 Iranian officials first acknowledged it in September 2010 and stated that over 30,000 computers have been infected by the malicious Stuxnet computer virus.

The complexity of the virus indicated that USA had designed and released the rapidly mutating computer worm. Also, only Americans have the cyber expertise and the nuclear apparatus essential to test the virus. Although, American and Israeli officials remained quiet on Stuxnet but in December 2010, at a conference on Iran, Obama's chief WMD strategist, Gary Samore, dodged a Stuxnet question, but declared himself pleased that the Iranians were having trouble, and, with a broad smile, added that the USA and its allies were doing everything they could to complicate things further. 121

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4.7.13. Further Talks and Oil Embargo on Tehran

In December 2010, the negotiations between both parties again resumed but failed to yield substantive progress. Both parties again met in January 2011 at Istanbul but again talks were inclusive. Iran refused to consider any proposal without the lifting of economic sanctions. During July 2011, Russia presented another proposal to both parties. But both of the parties did not support the idea and Russian plan was ruled out. Meanwhile, Tehran rapidly developed its nuclear facilities, fuel production and enrichment program. This provoked another sanction; in January 2012 EU announced to embargo Iran's oil from July 2012 and also to freeze the assets of its central bank. Soon after the proclamation, Tehran ceased its oil sale to Brittan and France. Iranian foreign ministry spokesperson Ramin Mehmanparast stated that the embargo would not considerably affect Iranian oil revenues. He further said that "any country that deprives itself from Iran's energy market will soon see that it has been replaced by others."122 Despite the oil embargo, the EU also tightened its restrictions on trade with Iran, prohibiting the import, financing, insurance, and brokering of Iranian natural gas, and banning the supply of vessels to transport or store Iranian oil; The EU also banned the provision of ship-building, flagging, and classification services to Iran's ships, as well as the sale of graphite, aluminum, and steel.123

4.8. THE ERA OF PROPOSALS AND NEGOTIATIONS

After ceaseless Western demands, in March 2012, Iran announced that it would allow IAEA inspectors to visit Parchin, but several rounds of subsequent IAEA-Iran talks throughout 2012 did not produce an agreement on a "structured approach" that would include a visit to the site.124 In April 2012, Iran and the P5+1 gathered in Istanbul to restart negotiation. Two more rounds of negotiations were held May 23-24 in Baghdad, and June 18-19 in Moscow. The negotiators decided in Istanbul to adopt a step-by-step process with mutual actions, in order to build momentum towards a long-term solution.125

During Baghdad talks, the P5+1 proposed that Iran stop uranium enrichment up to 20% U-235, ship out all of the 20% enriched uranium already produced, and close the Fordow

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Fuel Enrichment Plant.126 In return, the P5+1 showed willingness to discuss the provision of medical isotopes, cooperation in nuclear safety, international assistance in nuclear safety and construction of a light-water reactor and the supply of parts for Iran's civil aviation. For its part, Iran indicated a willingness to halt the 20% enrichment if the move was met with lifting of some of the current sanctions, such as those imposed against its oil industry and central bank. 127 The P5+1 position, however, was that an end to 20% uranium enrichment and greater transparency must precede the lifting of any sanctions currently in place, rather than happening simultaneously. 128 Iran has insisted that its "inalienable right" to enrich uranium be recognized by the P5+1. On the other hand Iran also presented a five point plan which was based on its nuclear rights and included non- nuclear matters, such as sanctions relief in return for Tehran's collaboration with the IAEA; collaboration in nuclear energy and safety; a possible cap on 20% enrichment; and regional security but both sides were yet again unable to agree on substantive actions.

During the Moscow talks in June 2012, the parties did not modify their stances and without deal, the high-level consultations were suspended. But, both parties settled for the expert-level consultation, which happened in Istanbul on July 3, to discuss the procedural features of each proposal. On July 3, 2012, a meeting was held in Istanbul among lower-level officials. At the meeting, "the specialists explored understandings on a number of technical issues. While negotiators described the meeting as a constructive but no agreement was attained and niceties of the negotiations were withheld.

Since the June talks, Iran’s nuclear strategy has sustained to make progress. The international community, concerned over the advancement, has increased pressure on the regime by passing further sanctions. On February 6, 2013, a new round of U.S sanctions went into effect which states that any state that buys Iranian oil, have to put the purchase money into a local bank account. Tehran cannot repatriate the money and can utilize it only to purchase products within that state and if local bank allows the payments to go to an Iranian bank or transfers them to another country, it could face US sanctions. According to some reports, oil exports from Iran have already dropped by a million barrels a day. In the same month President Ahmadinejad unveiled Iran's first domestically

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produced 20 per cent enriched nuclear fuel for TRR and also stated that 3,000 more centrifuges had been added to the uranium enrichment efforts.

After an eight-month hiatus, P5+1 and Iran continued their talks on February 26, 2013 at Almaty, Kazakhstan. This time six world powers modified their offer to advance negotiations. Most importantly they dropped the demand that Iran deactivate its enrichment plant at Fordo instead insisting that Iran suspend enrichment work there and agree to take a series of steps that would make it hard to resume producing nuclear fuel quickly.129 P5+1 decided to provide modest sanctions relief, primarily by permitting Turkey and other countries that have traditionally imported Iranian oil and gas to pay in gold in exchange for Tehran’s suspension of 20-percent enrichment operations at its underground Fordo facility, shipping its 20-percent stockpile out of the country; and ramping up inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 130 The six powers also agreed that Iran could keep a diminutive quantity of 20 percent enriched uranium for use in TRR to make medical isotopes. But talks end with no specific agreement over a proposal that would sharply restrain Iran’s stockpile of the twenty percent enriched uranium, in return for a modest lifting of some sanctions. Iran argued that as a signatory to the NPT and a member of the IAEA, it is entitled to develop and acquire nuclear technology for nonviolent meanings. But the regime also encouraged the new proposal and a high-ranking Iranian official stated that the February 2013 negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 in the Kazakh city of Almaty proved that the six leading world powers have taken a more practical approach to Tehran’s nuclear case.

A second round of dialogues among Iran and the P5+1 initiated on April 5, 2013, again at Almaty, Kazakhstan. Till now the details regarding this round of negotiations were not made public. In a press meeting, the European Union's head of foreign policy Catherine Ashton said Iran and six world powers failed to achieve an agreement throughout the talks and the two sides "remain far apart on substance" and did not make enough headway to qualify the meeting as a success. However, she added, “Indeed, we have talked in a much greater detail than ever before, and our efforts will continue in that direction.”131 In the other hand Iran repeatedly said; it only wants nuclear reactors for

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electricity and medical applications and demanded that world powers acknowledge the country's right to enrich uranium and ease U.N. and Western sanctions. 132

Only two days after the Almaty talks at the Iran's National Day of Nuclear Technology, which marks the centenary of the first time Iran enriched uranium in 2006, on April 9, 2013 Tehran declared two key nuclear-related projects which expand the country's ability to extract and process uranium. 133 Although, Iran already has uranium mines and the aptitude to turn the raw ore into a substance known as yellowcake, which is the first step in the enrichment chain. The new facilities the country's largest uranium mine and processing facility give Tehran more self-sufficiency over the raw materials. 134

4.9. NEW ADMINISTRATION WITH MORE MODERATE STANCE ON NUCLEAR TALKS

After joining his office in June 2013 the Iran's former chief negotiator on nuclear talks and new President Hassan Rouhani shifted Tehran's foreign policy and gave the message of moderation, when he held a 15-minute phone call with President Barack Obama in September. It was the first highest-level communication between the states since the Islamic revolution in 1979. Throughout his election campaign he promises to bring a fresh start to Iran's foreign policy and the nuclear standoff. Another reason which brings Rouhani in power is Iran's crippling economy, which is under extraordinary pressure from global sanctions. Due to unilateral and multilateral sanctions, Iran's oil exports are down 60% compared to last year. Banking sanctions have severely limited Iran's ability to move the profits from the oil it sells, and sanctions on shipping and insurance are squeezing Iran's trade with the world. 135 Because of these sanctions the country's economy is decreasing, with Iranian officials estimating GDP to reach -6% this year. Lack of growth has been coupled with annual inflation of over 40%, giving Iran its worst stagflation in 25 years.136 The new president knew that to restore the financial system he has to resolve the nuclear confrontation, and first and foremost, have sanctions lifted. His policies on nuclear talks have so far facilitated to prevent the conditions getting any worse. The Iranian Rial, has become stable against the dollar since these elections, unlike

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the previous year when it lost two-thirds of its value. Tehran's stock market shares have gone up 25% in his first 100 days.137

Soon after taking office the new Iranian president gave speech in the UN General Assembly annual conference and again showed its attentions to resolve the nuclear issue with West when he stated that "Iran is ready to engage in talks on its nuclear program "with full transparency." Also, in his interview with the Washington Post, when he was asked about the time frame for resolving the nuclear issue, President Rouhani said:

"If we are on the issue of the nuclear file, we need resolution in a reasonable time. Then the road will be paved for further activities. The only way forward is for a timeline to be inserted into the negotiations that's short–and wrap it up. That is a decision of my government, that short is necessary to settle the nuclear file. The shorter it is the more beneficial it is to everyone. If its 3 months that would be Iran’s choice, if it’s 6 months that’s still good. It’s a question of months not years."138

The first round of negotiation among Rouhani administration and E3+3 was held in Geneva during 15 to 16 October 2013. Soon after the negotiations, the parties issued a combined proclamation describing the conference as "substantive and forward looking." The statement also says that Iran presented a new proposal that the P5+1 carefully considered as an "important contribution" to the talks.139 The proposal is understood to contain a broad framework for a comprehensive agreement and an interim confidence building measure to be instituted over the next 3-6 months, but no details were given as the parties agreed to keep the negotiations confidential. 140 The two sides also settled to gather again in Geneva Nov. 7-8, and said that technical experts on both the nuclear and sanctions matters would be meeting before that.

The Second round of talks were held from November 7th to 10th, with the expectation that a deal is close, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry flies to Geneva to join the talks, as do the foreign ministers from the other P5+1 countries. 141 The parties unsuccessful to achieve an agreement on a first-phase deal, but declare that negotiations will continue in

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two weeks on the same venue at Geneva. At the end of negotiations U.S Secretary Kerry said that:

"We came to Geneva to narrow differences, and I can tell you without any exaggeration we not only narrowed differences and clarified those that remain, but we made significant progress. There’s no question in my mind that we are closer now, as we leave Geneva, than we were when we came, and that with good work and good faith over the course of the next weeks, we can in fact secure our goal."142

At a joint press conference at the conclusion of talks, European Union foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif declared that significant progress had been made and they would meet again in Geneva on Nov. 20-21, this time at the political director level.

4.9.1. The breakthrough Between P5+1 and Iran

The third round of talks begun on November 20th 2013 and after three days of intense negotiations between new Iranian Administration and P5+1, both parties reached in an interim agreement on the morning of November 24th 2013. This was a historic breakthrough which was achieved after a decade long negotiations. The news came out when Iranian Chief Negotiator Jawad Zarif tweeted that: "We have reached an agreement".

The foreign ministers of P5+1 and Iran as well as European Chief Negotiator Baroness Catherine Ashton welcomed the agreement. The accord is seen as a significant first step towards an inclusive solution to end the controversy over Iran’s nuclear energy program. Both sides committed to a sequence of steps which will last for six months, while a more conclusive deal is negotiated.143 In Joint Plan of Action Iran and the E3+3 aimed to wrap up the final agreement in no more than one year (Complete Joint Plan of Action is given in appendices). Here are the key points of what the two sides agreed:

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What Iran will do

 All uranium enrichment above 5% is to be halted  "Neutralize" its stockpile of near-20%-enriched uranium, either by diluting it to less than 5% or converting it to a form which cannot be further enriched

 Not install any more centrifuges (the machines used to enrich uranium) and large numbers of the existing banks of centrifuges are to be left inoperable  Leave half to three-quarters of centrifuges installed in Natanz and Fordo enrichment facilities inoperable  Not build any more enrichment facilities

 Iran's stockpile of 3.5% enriched uranium is to remain the same between now and the end of the six-month period  Iran halt its work on the construction of heavy-water reactor at Arak, which Western experts fear could be used - once it is commissioned - for its plutonium, giving Iran a second route towards a nuclear bomb.

 Provide daily access to Natanz and Fordo sites to IAEA inspectors and access to other facilities, mines and mills  Provide "long-sought" information on the Arak reactor and other data. 144

What the P5+1 will do

 Provide "limited, temporary, targeted, and reversible [sanctions] relief"  Not impose further nuclear-related sanctions if Iran meets its commitments

 Suspend certain sanctions on trade in gold and precious metals, Iran's automotive sector, and its petrochemical exports, it will provide about $1.5bn of revenue to Iran.

 License safety-related repairs and inspections inside Iran for certain Iranian airlines

 Some $4.2bn from Iranian oil sales will be allowed to be transferred to Iran

 Some $400m of Iranian funds can be transferred to educational institutions in third countries to pay the fees of Iranian students studying there.145

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The P5+1 and Iran also discussed the general parameters of a comprehensive solution that would constrain Iran's nuclear program over the long term, provide verifiable assurances to the international community that Iran’s nuclear activities will be exclusively peaceful, and ensure that any attempt by Iran to pursue a nuclear weapon would be promptly detected.146

For the E3+3 (England, France, Germany, United State, Russia, China) Iran's commitment to neutralize its stockpile of near-20% enriched uranium, halting its constructing work at Arak and stop installing any further centrifuges to its nuclear facilities has been seen as a big win.

The most important factor for Iran in this agreement is that P5+1 recognized its right of uranium enrichment. According to the agreement Iran can enriching uranium up to 5% for its nuclear reactors. Which is sufficient to produce electricity, but not enough to reach the level required to make a nuclear bomb.

For the Iranians, the deal provides some relief from the hardships associated with the sanctions -- estimates run in excess of $10 billion and some suggest the impact might be multiples of that (Europeans, Russians and the Chinese all also have been hoping for anything that might promise a restoration of economic ties with the oil-rich nation.).147

4.9.1.1. Verification Mechanism

According to the agreement IAEA will execute verification steps with its current inspection role in Iran. In addition, the P5+1 and Iran have committed to establishing a Joint Commission to work with the IAEA to monitor implementation and address issues that may arise; The Joint Commission will also work with the IAEA to facilitate resolution of past and present concerns with respect to Iran's nuclear program, including the possible military dimension of Iran's nuclear program and Iran's activities at Parchin.148

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4.9.2. RESPONSE FROM REGIONAL AND WORLD POWERS  The United States

President Barack Obama welcomed the deal and said, “Today, the United States, together with our close allies and partners, took an important first step toward a comprehensive solution that addresses our concerns with the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear program.”149 He further stated that

"As we go forward, the resolve of the United States will remain firm, as will our commitments to our friends and allies –- particularly Israel and our Gulf partners, who have good reason to be skeptical about Iran’s intentions. Ultimately, only diplomacy can bring about a durable solution to the challenge posed by Iran’s nuclear program…I have a profound responsibility to try to resolve our differences peacefully, rather than rush towards conflict. Today, we have a real opportunity to achieve a comprehensive, peaceful settlement, and I believe we must test it."150

 Russia

The Russian President Vladimir Putin welcomed the agreement and stated that:

"The deal was balanced and will be a positive factor in Middle East relations. The outcome of the Geneva talks is a victory for all and shows once again that collective efforts in a spirit of mutual respect can produce answers to today’s international challenges and threats. I stress that although this is a breakthrough, it is just the first step on a long and difficult path. Together with our partners, we are ready to continue the patient search for a mutually acceptable and broader comprehensive solution that would guarantee Iran’s inalienable right to develop peaceful nuclear energy under IAEA supervision and the security of all countries in the Middle East, including Israel."151

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 Iran

The outcome of Geneva negotiations has been widely cheered in Iran. According to public opinion in Tehran, "Iranian diplomats have killed two birds with one stone; they worked hard for Iran's rights to be respected by the international community and set the stage for sanctions to be relieved."152 To many people, the main effect of this agreement will be economic in nature.

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani addressed on the day after the deal praised the diplomatic developments as a victory for Iran and announced that the outcome means world powers have recognized Iran's nuclear rights, including the right to enrich uranium and echoed a phrase often repeated in Tehran: "Iran has never sought to attain nuclear weapons, He added that Iran is eager to start talks immediately on a comprehensive nuclear agreement."153

In his letter to President Rohani, Ayatollah Khamenei said that:

"The prayers of the Iranian nation had helped ensure the success of the negotiations, and said that the initial Geneva nuclear deal would provide the basis for further steps toward a lasting deal."154

Iranian Foreign Minister and chief negotiator Mohammad Javad Zarif called the deal an opportunity to avert an unnecessary crisis and stated that “This is only a first step. We need to start moving in the direction of restoring confidence, a direction which we have managed to move against in the past.”155 On another occasion he said that "the agreement was an opportunity for the removal of any doubts about the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program and he hopes the nuclear agreement will lead to "concrete steps" to improve relations between Iran and Western powers.156

 Israel

The Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu showed strong reaction against the interim agreement and stated that:

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"What was achieved in Geneva is not an historic agreement; it is an historic mistake. Today the world has become a much more dangerous place. The permanent agreement with Iran must lead to one result: The dismantling of Iran’s military nuclear capability."157

The Israeli minister of trade and industry Naftali Bennett gave more harsh statement then prime minister and said. "If in five years a nuclear suitcase explodes in New York or Madrid, It will be because of the agreement that was signed this morning."158

 China

The Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi called the deal an initial step and stated: "The execution of this agreement is only the start of solving Iran's nuclear issues. In the future, there will be new issues and challenges," he said. "China will insist upon a political channel and continue to work with all sides toward the final resolution of Iran's nuclear issues."159

China’s foreign ministry released a statement saying:

"The agreement will help maintain the international non-proliferation system, and the peace and stability in the Middle East. It will help various parties carry out normal activities with Iran, and help the Iranian people live a better life... [Foreign Minister] Wang Yi noted that the fact of the negotiations proved that a proper solution could certainly be found no matter how tough an issue is, as long as all parties adhere to dialogue, keep patience, and demonstrate goodwill."160

 European Union

After the end of negotiations the EU High Representative Catherine Ashton with Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif issued a joint statement in which she stated that:

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"The adoption of the joint plan of action was possible thanks to a sense of mutual respect and a determination to find a way forward which is beneficial for all of us…the implementation of this first step creates the time and environment needed for a comprehensive solution, which remains the shared goal and on which talks will begin soon. The work on the implementation of this first step will begin shortly. We look forward to swift implementation, which we will jointly monitor, in close coordination with the IAEA. Today’s agreement is a significant step towards developing our relationship in a more constructive way."161

 Reaction from GCC States

The GCC states have divided on the perception of the nuclear deal with Iran. The initial statements from Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and the UAE have come out in favor of this accord, although all those realms still have grave worries in private. Only Oman seemed pleased because it played unseen part as an icebreaker between the U.S and Iran.

The initial statement from Saudi Arabian came through from its cabinet which stated that, “The government of the kingdom sees that if there was goodwill, this agreement could represent a preliminary step towards a comprehensive solution to the Iranian nuclear program.”162

But as the regional Arab heavyweight and historic rivalry with Iran for power and influence Saudi Arabia sees anything that lets the pressure off Iran as a setback. 163 The statement from Abdullah al-Askar, chairman of Saudi Arabia’s appointed Shoura Council, is clear example of it. As he said:

"I am afraid Iran will give up something to get something else from the big powers in terms of regional politics — and I’m worrying about giving Iran more space or a freer hand in the region…The government of Iran, month after month, has proven that it has an ugly agenda in the region, and in this regard no one in the region will sleep and assume things are going smoothly."164

170

Overall reaction on this temporary agreement between Iran and E3+3 is quite positive but the most important fact that the majority of the states from the region were unsatisfied and not happy at all. There isn't any question about Israeli stance because it openly condemned the deal. Although the official statements from Arab peninsula states were mild welcoming but in reality unofficial statements were quite harsh and made devastating effect on U.S intentions to resolve the nuclear issue of Iran. As soon as accord signed the small states of the region immediately contacted with their security provider (America and other European states) to re ensure their present and future security ties but the regional heavy weights (Israel and Saudi Arabia) cleared their policy to their soul ally U.S that Iran should be treated on their provided guidelines or otherwise they feel free for new security and economic ties with other countries which respect their national interests.

The Shah of Iran initiated the nuclear program as a symbol of modernity and greatness. There are three things which affected the birth of the Iranian nuclear program and its character and purpose during its formative years. The most significant of these were Washington's support and the Shah's anxiety for nuclear energy. He had personally driven the project from the beginning, with his subordinates, demanding more and more progress all the time.165 The third important factor was Etemad's expertise and role. During the Shah's regime it was expected that in mid 80s Iran will fulfill its overall energy needs from nuclear technology. But Islamic revolution changed everything and anti-Western statements and policies of new management ended all civil nuclear deals between the country and the nuclear suppliers. The hostage crisis determined the faith of Iranian nuclear cooperation with Washington influenced nuclear suppliers. In fact, Iranian co-operation with most other nuclear countries was impossible, especially since China had ruled itself out of any more nuclear co-operation. With the help of Russian assistance, Tehran barely completed its first nuclear power plant in thirty years.

Since the days of the Shah the nuclear program has been a source of Iranian nation's pride. The sanctions did not reverse Iran's nuclear fuel cycle program or even halt it. But

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it only made the Iranian more determined for further development. Ahmadinejad, true to his populist instincts, used sanctions to unite people for the nuclear cause, which included frequent chanting in favor of Iran's nuclear rights, at which the president announced that Iran's nuclear program was like a train without brakes.

Recently, Iranian oil trade have been decreased by half as a outcome of the global anxiety on the country, and limitations on economic transactions and transportation have shaped many difficulties for its leaders. But Tehran does not show any intention to stop its nuclear enrichment or fuel cycle program, not even on temporary basis. From almost ten years the regime was engaged in constant diplomatic talks with different Western and international groups, such as EU-3 and P5+1, but because of mistrust of the E-3 the Iranian authorities were not willing to trust them again. The Almaty discussions at Kazakhstan, failed to produce any breakthrough which were fraction of almost half-a- dozen rounds of negotiations, between the concerned parties, in less than two years. Although, Tehran provided full access to IAEA for surprise inspection to all of its facilities and so far the UN watchdog failed to find any violation of NPT but American and Israeli authorities are frequently claiming an Iranian clandestine nuclear program. The recent interim agreement between Iran and E3+3 (United State, Russia, China, England, France, Germany) has seen as a biggest breakthrough after the ten years of talk between both parties but it is also a fact that the both most important regional actors (Israel & Saudi Arabia) are unsatisfied with this deal and both parties plays significant role in U.S policies for the Middle East. Therefore it is now important for U.S to remove the concerns of these regional allies on this temporary agreement and convince these states that this accord and any further talks for comprehensive agreement are in favor of their own security and stability in region.

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1 "Iran-Location, size, and extent", 7 February 2011, Nationsencyclopedia.com, Retrieved on 14 February 2013. 2 http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0107640.html?pageno=1#ixzz2Kh5nUzyH (Accessed on 14 April 2013) 3 Ibid 4 History of Modern Iran, Retrieved on 14 February 2013, http://www.mideastweb.org/iranhistory.htm 5 Ibid 6 Patrikarakos, David, (2012) Nuclear Iran: The Birth of An Atomic State, London, I.B.

Tauris & Co Ltd, pp. 6-7 7 Milani, Abbas, (2011) The Shah, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 87 8 Pattanayak, Dr. Satyanarayan, (2011) Iran's Relation With Pakistan: A Strategic

Analysis, New Delhi: VIJ Books Pvt Ltd, p. 10 9 Iran is an example how interventionism kicks back, http://myfutureamerica.org/?p=1788 (Accessed on 11 May 2011) 10 Katouzian, Homa, (1999) "Mussaddiq and the Struggle for Power in Iran", London:

I.B. Tauris, p. 34 11 Ibid 12 http://www.cfr.org/publication/16811/ (Accessed on 15 October 2013) 13 Patrikarakos, David, p. 16 14 Pahlavi, Muhammad Reza, (1961) "Mission for My Country", London: Hutchinson, p.

288 15 New York Times, 17 May 1962 16 Ibid, pp. 85-86 17 Patrikarakos, David, p. 26 18 Ibid, p. 54 19 http://www. Berlinonline.de/berliner-zeitung/politik/538747.html. (Accessed on 18

May 2013) 20 'Additional Safeguards Agreement in Iran', in IAEA, http://www.iaea.org, p. 1 21 Patrikarakos, David, pp. 20-21

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22 Ibid, p. 21 23 Ibid, p. 22 24 Ibid, p. 40 25 Ibid, p. 73 26 Prospects for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 23 August 1974, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb268/index.htm 27 Patrikarakos, David, Op. cit, 79 28 New York Times, 7 October 1976 29 Chubin, Shahram, (1993) Iran's Security Policy: Intentions, Capabilities and Impact,

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, p. 101 30 New York Times, 23 September 1975 31 Patrikarakos, David, p. 67 32 Ibid, p. 80 33 Quester, The Shah, p. 97 34 Patrikarakos, David, p. 92 35 Ibid, p. 93 36 Poneman, Daniel, (1982) Nuclear Power in the Developing World, London, George

Allen & Unwin Publishers, p. 96 37 ‘Scale-down for Iranian Nuclear Program’, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 28

May 1979 38 'Nuclear Stake Frozen', 31 December 1979, Facts on File News Digest, p. 976 E2. In

Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexis-nexis.com (accessed on 13 March 13, 2013) 39 Patrikarakos, David, p. 100 40 The Washington Post, 9 September 1982 41 New York Times, April 26, 1984 42 Nuclear News, October 1985, p. 41 43 Middle East Defense News, 29 April 1991 44 Cordesman, Anthony H., Al-Rodhan, Khalid R., (2006) Iran's Weapons of Mass

Destruction: The Real and Potential Threat, CSIS, p. 116

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45 http://www.nuclearthreatinitiative.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/1825_1860.html

(Accessed on 15 June 2013) 46 Dallas Morning News, 28 September 1995 47 Voice of The Islamic Republic of Iran, 17 September 1991 48 Ansari, Ali M., (2006) Confrunting Iran: The Failure of American Foreign Policy and

The Routs of Mistrust, London, Hurst and Co, p. 70 49 IRNA, 23 September 1990 50 Patrikarakos, David, p. 140 51 Iran News, 'US Again Uses the Same Failed Policy', 30 July 1998 52 IRNA, 5 August 1993 53 The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 11 May 2000, p. 20 54 http://thesirenvoice.blogspot.com/2008/05/closer-look-at-national-intelligence.html

(Accessed on 18 May 2013) 55 The Independent, 27 Feb 1992, London 56 Patrikarakos, David, p. 179 57 IAEA, http://www.iaea.org/Publitions/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-40.pdf.

(Accessed on 20 March 2013) 58 Fayazmanesh, Sasan, (2008) The United States and Iran: Sanctions, Wars and The

Policy of Dual Containment, New York, Routledge, p. 143 59 Patrikarakos, David, p. 196 60 http://www.iraninternationalmagazine.com/issue_26/text/do%20not%20disturb.htm

(Accessed on 02 November 2013) 61 Schmidt, Oliver, (September 2008) "Understanding & Analyzing Iran’s Nuclear Intentions–Testing Scott Sagan’s Argument of 'Why do States build Nuclear Weapons' ”, http://archive.atlantic- community.org/app/webroot/files/articlepdf/Oliver%20Schmidt%20Analyzing%20Iran%

20Nuclear%20Intentions%20.pdf (Accessed on 12 June 2012) 62 Patrikarakos, David, p. 200 63 Ibid, p. 202

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64 'US Again Accused Iran of Hiding Nuclear Program', 26 February 2004, Middle East

Online 65 Patrikarakos, David, Op. cit, p. 204 66 http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1155624/posts (Accessed on 24 July 2013) 67 Fayazmanesh, Sasan, p.159 68 Patrikarakos, David, p. 209 69 Op cit, Fayazmanesh, Sasan, p. 159 70http://www.conflictprevention.net/library/documents/middle_east/y_out_of_the_nuclear

_impasse_cpp_web.doc (Accessed on 18 May 2013) 71 The Washington Post, 5 May 2005 72 Fayazmanesh, Sasan, pp. 168-169 73 Ibid, p. 169 74 Mehr News Agency, Iran's Statement at IAEA Emergency Meeting, 10 August 2008, Available at, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/ iran/nuke/mehr080905.html (Accessed on

23 March 2013) 75 http://www.marxist.com/iran-nuclear-threat-crisis260106.htm (Accessed on 18 May

2013) 76http://www.conflictprevention.net/library/documents/middle_east/y_out_of_the_nuclear

_impasse_cpp_web.doc (Accessed on 28 April 2013) 77 http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/SR109.pdf (Accessed on 05 March 2013) 78 Fayazmanesh, Sasan, p. 189 79 The New York Times, 30 March 2006 80 "Implementation of The NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran", Available online at: http://www.iaea.org/publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-

27.pdf. 81 Reuters, 12 May 2006 82 On line available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/90569.pdf.

(Accessed on 09 September 2013) 83 The Independent, 28 June 2006

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84 Fayazmanesh, Sasan, p. 201 85 Ibid, p. 201 86 Ibid, p. 205 87 The New York Times, 3 November 2006 88 Op cit, p. 205 89 The Resolution is available online at: http://www.un.org/News/Press

/docs/2006/sc8928.doc.html. 90 Fayazmanesh, Sasan, p. 226 91 Ibid, p. 226 92 http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc8980.doc.htm (Accessed on 05-04-2013) 93 Ibid 94 http://www.ransac.org/Publications/News/Nuclear%20News/412200714006PM.html 95 http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Nuclear/1825_6349.html 96 Wright, Robin, (2010) "The Iran Primer: Power, Politics and U.S Policy", Wasington

D.C: United States Institute of Peace, p. 120 97 Jason, Starr, The U.N. Resolutions , On line Available at http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/un-resolutions (Accessed on 05-04-2013) 98 Ibid 99 Ibid 100 Ibid 101 Ibid 102 Ibid 103 "Iran Sanctions Scuttled when Russia Withdraws", Global Security Newswire, 23

September 2008 104 Davenport, Kelsey,(2013)"History of Official Proposals on the Iranian Nuclear Issue", http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Iran_Nuclear_Proposals (accessed on 06-04-2013) 105 "Iran Rejects September Deadline on Nuclear Talks," Global Security Newswire, 10

August 2009 106 Patrikarakos, David, p. 253

177

107 Erlanger, Steven and Landler, Mark, 1 October 2009, "Iran Agrees to More Nuclear

Talks With U.S. and Allies," The New York Times 108 Patrikarakos, David, Op. cit, p. 261 109 http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Nuclear/chronology.html 110 "Nuclear Fuel Declaration by Iran, Turkey and Brazil," BBC Monitoring, 17 May

2010. 111 Kessler, Glenn, and Lynch, Colum, 19 May 2010,"U.S. Partners Agree to Sanctions on Iran," The Washington Post 112 The UN Resolution, http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/un-resolutions 113 Ibid 114 "UN Votes for New Sanctions On Iran Over Nuclear Issue," BBC Monitoring Middle

East – Political, 9 June 2010. 115 Iran Nuclear Chronology (May 2011) http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/iran_nuclear.pdf?_=1316542527 116 http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Nuclear/chronology.html 117 Ibid 118 "Iran Out to Do a Nuclear Bargain," Sunday Telegraph (Australia), 26 September

2010. 119 Patrikarakos, David, p. 265 120 'Israeli Test on Worm called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay', New York Times, 15

January 2011 121 Financial Times, 10 December 2010 122 "Iran defiant as EU imposes oil embargo". Al Jazeera. 24 January 2012. 123 http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/iran/nuclear/ (accessed on 09-04-2013) 124 http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/iran/nuclear/ 125 Davenport, Kelsey (January 2014) "History of Official Proposals on the Iranian Nuclear Issue", http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Iran_Nuclear_Proposals

(Accessed on 10 January 2014) 126 http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/iran/nuclear/ (Accessed on 29 December 2012) 127 Ibid

178

128 Ibid 129 http://wwa.virtualjerusalem.com/news.php?Itemid=9335 130 Jim Lobe, "P5+1 Coalition Fraying on Eve of Second Almaty Talks with Iran", http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/04/p51-coalition-fraying-on-eve-of-second-almaty-talks- with-iran/ (accessed on 04-04-2013) 131 "P5+1 must recognize Iran’s nuclear rights: Mehmanparast" http://www.presstv.com/detail/2013/04/09/297335/p51-must-recognize-irans-nuclear- rights/ (Accessed on 28 May 2013) 132 http://world.time.com/2013/04/09/defiant-iran-inaugurates-2-nuclear-linked-projects/ 133 Ibid 134 "Iran Nuclear Program: Tehran Opens Largest Uranium Mine, Processing Facility Amid Nuclear Talks", http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/09/iran-nuclear- program_n_3044394.html?utm_hp_ref=world (Accessed on 12-04-2013) 135 Paivar, Amir, (12 November 2013) "Iran: Rouhani's first 100 days", http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-24908733 (Accessed on 27 December

2013) 136 Ibid 137 Ibid 138 Ignatius, David, (25 September 2013) Edited transcript: An interview with Hassan Rouhani, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2013/09/25/transcript- an-interview-with-hassan-rouhani/ (Accessed on 27 September 2013) 139 http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheet/Timeline-of-Nuclear-Diplomacy-With-Iran 140 Davenport, Kelsey, (January 2014) "Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy With Iran", http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheet/Timeline-of-Nuclear-Diplomacy-With-Iran 141 Op, cit 142 http://backchannel.al-monitor.com/index.php/date/2013/11/ 143 "Iran nuclear deal: Key points", http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-

25080217 (Accessed on 20 January 2014) 144 Ibid 145 Ibid

179

146 Cordesman, Anthony H., (Nov 2013), "The Best Deal with Iran That We Can Get", http://csis.org/publication/best-deal-iran (Retrieved on January 4, 2014) 147 Rothkopf, David, "Iran deal a risk worth taking", (Nov 24, 2013) http://edition.cnn.com/2013/11/24/opinion/rothkopf-iran-deal/ (Retrieved on January 04,

2014) 148 "Breaking down the Iran nuclear deal", http://edition.cnn.com/2013/11/23/world/meast/iran-nuclear-deal- details/index.html?iid=article_sidebar (Accessed on 15 December 2013) 149 "Statement By The President On First Step Agreement On Iran's Nuclear Program", http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/11/23/statement-president-first-step- agreement-irans-nuclear-program (Accessed on 2 January 2014) 150 Ibid 151 "Statement by Vladimir Putin following the conclusion of talks on the Iranian nuclear program on November 24, 2013", http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6324#sel= (Accessed on 31

December 2013) 152 "Iran nuclear deal: Mixed reaction around region", http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world- middle-east-25086240 (Accessed on 03 January 2014) 153 "Rouhani says nuclear deal with West allows Iran to enrich uranium", (24 Nov 2013) The Jerusalem Post, http://www.jpost.com/Iranian-Threat/News/Rouhani-says-nuclear- deal-with-West-allows-Iran-to-enrich-uranium-332808 (Accessed on 03 January 2014) 154 "Iran's president says world powers recognize Iranian nuclear rights", http://news.yahoo.com/irans-president-says-world-powers-recognize-iranian-nuclear-

083733079.html (Accessed on January 3, 2014) 155 http://tribune.com.pk/story/636642/irans-nuclear-imbroglio-landmark-deal-clinched- at-geneva/ 156 "Iran agrees to curb nuclear activity at Geneva talks", http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25074729 (Accessed on 30 November

2013)

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157"PM Netanyahu on the Geneva agreement", http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2013/Pages/PM-Netanyahu%27s-remarks-at-the-start- of-the-weekly-Cabinet-meeting-24-Nov-2013.aspx (Accessed on 1 January 2014) 158 Yan, Holly and Levs, Josh,(24 November 2013) "Iran nuclear deal: One agreement, wildly different reactions", http://edition.cnn.com/2013/11/24/world/iran-deal- reaction/index.html?hpt=hp_t1 (Retrieved on 1 January 2014) 159 Ibid 160 "Wang Yi: First Step toward the settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue”, Chinese Ministry of Foreign , http://beforeitsnews.com/iran/2013/11/policy-memo-a-good-iran- deal-spin-vs-reality-2437216.html 161 "Iran nuclear deal: historic breakthrough", http://www.eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2013/251113_irandeal_en.htm (Accessed on 1

January 2014) 162 "Saudi Arabia welcomes Iran nuclear agreement", Al Jazeera, November 25, 2013, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/11/saudi-arabia-welcomes-iran-nuclear- agreement-2013112513519366380.html 163 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25086240 (Accessed on February

2014) 164 "Nuke deal leaves Iranian capability, Arab fears intact", USA Today, November 25, 2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/11/24/iran-deal-middle-east- fears/3691673/ 165 Patrikarakos, David, p. 20

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Chapter: 5

REGIONAL IMPLICATION OF PAKISTAN AND IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM

Both Pakistan and Iran possess significant importance in the region because of their strategic position. Nuclear program and policies of both states also play a decisive role in regional politics. Although both countries are neighbors but their nuclear programs were undisruptive against each other and as a matter of fact both states sported each other on nuclear policies. Iranian nuclear program is known as an eminent threat for the Middle Eastern states. On the other hand Pakistani nuclear program is the reaction of Indian nuclear development and therefore it affects only the Indian administration and policy makers in South Asian region and it is harmless for other regional states. Therefore, effects of Pakistan and Iran's nuclear programs and there implications are discussed in this chapter.

As on Pakistani prospect the study discusses the role of nuclear arsenals in Pakistan's security policies towards India, as well as their use in Indo-Pakistan conflicts and its implications on Indian policy makers. Furthermore, New Delhi and Islamabad's quest of vertical proliferation for better and more reliable deterrence systems and their strategies and doctrines to counter each other are also discussed in this chapter.

Although Iran does not possess any nuclear weapons but its nuclear program is a big concern for regional states and politics. Since the 1979 revolution, Tehran constantly faces difficulties in development of its nuclear technology and it is still unclear that Iran is developing nuclear arsenal or the stories behind its nuclear weapons program are conspiracy theories. The study focuses on implications of Iran's nuclear program on Arab states and Israel and their adoption of counter measures against Iran.

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5.1. IRANIAN NUCLEAR IMPLICATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST REGION

Like Israel’s nuclear program in the 1960s, Iranian program has generated extensive fear among Arab countries in the Middle East. While Israel sparked only one unsuccessful proliferation effort by Egypt, Tehran appears to have provoked a sprint to obtain nuclear technology on the part of several Middle East nations.

The region of Middle East is known as one of the most important part in the world because of its black gold. The security scenario in the Persian Gulf made a huge impact on international oil prices. The relations between Iran and Arabian states of the region are not ideal. The unwelcome Iranian activities toward the Gulf States and its problematic movements in the region contributed to the fragility of relations between the Gulf States and Iran.1 The controversial case of Iranian nuclear development raised fears of Iran’s expansionist ambitions, furtiveness, and support of Shiite opposition in the Gulf countries led to tensions within the Gulf States and threatened the security of the region.2

5.1.1. GCC attitude toward the Iranian nuclear program

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) comprised of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. These kingdoms have a precise policy towards Iran’s nuclear program. When Tehran initiated its program in the 1960s, these countries had no concerns on its well-known civil nuclear program. As party states of the NPT, these Arabian Peninsula states acknowledged Tehran’s right to develop a civil nuclear program and they had no grounds to distrust its nonviolent exercise. Like the rest of the global society, these states changed their approach towards Iran's nuclear program in 2002/2003, when MEK alleged that Iran is running a clandestine nuclear program. Iran’s rising nuclear activities and the lack of transparency in its nuclear strategy produced profound anxiety between the neighboring countries. These states support the argument that Iran as a member of NPT is under binding international legal obligation not to engage in any covert activities or expand any form of military nuclear capability.3 The GCC’s power to pressurize Iran to abandon its nuclear ambition is limited; therefore the bloc’s policy has emphasized the important role of the international community in forcing

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Iran to abstain from illegal activities. 4 The GCC states supported IAEA's role on Iran's nuclear program and the involvement of the UN Security Council has been seen as a constructive progress toward the internationalization of the effort to stop Tehran from obtaining any kind of nuclear weapons capability.

The GCC countries favored political and financial procedures to force Iran to halt its nuclear activities. These Arab neighbors also publically expressed their condemnation with the employment of the military measures at currant stage. Nevertheless, if sanctions do not work, non-military pressure fails and Iran is successful in continuing the development of its nuclear agenda, the GCC states might reassess their objection to the military option.5 In any case, these states are in no position to prevent a third party from carrying out military action against Iranian nuclear facilities, and they could benefit from such action as a last resort to thwart Iran’s nuclear ambition. 6

5.1.2. Nuclear Renaissance in the Middle East

It is wildly believed that Iranian has embarked nuclear technology race in the region. Since 2006, at least ten countries in and around the Middle East have undertaken negotiations to invest in developing civilian nuclear power. 7 Egypt has announced to build four reactors and each of them will have the capacity of 1,000 MWs. Turkey also planned to build eleven nuclear reactors with the capacity of 10,000 MWs. According to a report these reactors will became fully operational in next decade. The Gulf States commissioned a joint study in late 2006 on developing nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.8 The GCC signed an agreement with IAEA in February 2007 for assistance on a nuclear development plan, and that same month Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Saudi Arabia and offered nuclear assistance.9 The Gulf States are among the few that have the essential financial means to build commercial nuclear reactors, which often come with a $4 billion dollar price tag, and the total of their considered projects amounts to over $1 trillion.10 Jordan and Algeria have also entered negotiations for nuclear technology: in January 2007 Algeria signed an agreement with Russia on nuclear development, and Jordan’s King Abdullah met with the prime minister of Canada in July 2007 to discuss the purchase of CANDU heavy water reactors. 11

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Another essential nuclear competitor in the Middle East, Syria, experienced a setback in 2007 when Israel shattered an anonymous Syrian facility alleged to be a plutonium reactor. The Syrian nuclear program was sighted as a way to intimidate Israel rather than Iran, because Syria shares pleasant relations with Iran due to Shiite leadership. To find the motivation behind this nuclear rebirth, both public proclamation on the part of Arab leaders and analysis by Western experts must be taken into account. 12 The public statements at conferences of Arab leaders imply that the move towards nuclear power in the Middle East could act as a hedge against Iran’s nuclear ambitions, warning that Iran’s nuclear activities could precipitate “a grave and destructive nuclear arms race in the region.”13 In January 2007, King Abdullah of Jordan gave an interview to Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz, in which he stated,

"The rules have changed on the nuclear subject throughout the whole region. After this summer everybody's going for nuclear programs."14

He also point out the war between Israel and Hezbollah as an indicator of Iran’s growing influence in the region. Geoffrey Kemp, a Middle East analyst at the Nixon Center, agrees that an Iranian attempt to become a regional hegemony will surely trigger a counter-reaction on the part of the other states in the region, and that this wave of nuclear development is a sign that such a reaction is taking place.15

5.1.3. REGIONAL ARMS RACE FOR DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE PACTS 5.1.3.1.Arab Military Purchases

The rumors regarding Iran's military based nuclear program began in early 90s. Therefore in reaction the neighboring states of Iran started to strengthen their conventional armed forces by buying arms from America and other European arm suppliers. During 1995— 2005, UAE obtained sixty F-16 aircraft from Washington. The nuclear program of Iran raised tensions in the Gulf States. The US influence in Middle East's defense markets is now evident. Because of the U.S military presence in the Persian Gulf region, almost every regional military, with the exception of “rogues” such as Syria and Iran, is one way

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or another influenced, trained, or supplied by the U.S.16 Most relevant to the Iranian issue, the U.S force nourishes ideas and strategy directly into the force development programs of the highest-spending Gulf States such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait through bilateral services commissions and the Gulf Security Dialogue, U.S has launched an initiative in 2006 to revive U.S-GCC security collaboration.17

During the 2009 International Defense Exhibition and Conference (IDEX), held February 22–26 in Dubai, GCC realms signed numerous arms contracts with U.S, British, and French corporations.18 Throughout the recent financial calamity and the reducing oil prices, Arabian Gulf countries did not decrease their military spending. Maj. Gen. Obaid al-Ketbi, chairman of the military committee organizing the 2009 IDEX, said:

"I don’t think the financial crisis will have any fundamental effect on the defense and security segment. This is priority number one for any nation."19

In recent years, while Iran has been challenging the global community with its uranium enrichment activities, Arab states’ military expenditure has augmented to unparalleled levels.20 Their military expenditures have enlarged gradually since 2003. Gulf nations particularly have increased their conventional weapons purchases. The Gulf States have purchased U.S weapons worth some $123 billion, the largest arms deal in peacetime history.21 Saudi Arabia has appeared as the major buyer, which has ordered $67.8 billion worth of conventional weapons. These include new F-15 jet fighters, 85 in number, in addition to another 70, which are to be upgraded.22 In addition, the first phase of Saudi Arabia’s deal with the U.S would be just the beginning, as the future would see the Saudi fleet being modernized and its missile and radar defense systems being upgraded.23

Likewise, the UAE has also signed an agreement to acquire $35.6 billion worth of military equipment. The deal includes Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system, which is a high-altitude missile defense system. Other GCC countries have also used their resources to reinforce their military potential including Kuwait and Oman, which according to Purkiss, are likely to spend $7.1 billion and $12.3 billion,

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respectively, by the end of the year 2014.24 These amounts would be use for the installation of new command-and-control-systems and upgrading of combat aircrafts.

In the maritime sphere, the GCC countries are focusing to secure their coastlines. Each Arab peninsula state is investing in muscular and adaptable Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) with helicopter decks. 25 Though the name suggests defensiveness, and thus appears well matched to the Gulf market, the OPV class of ships provides a lot of “bang for the buck” for these small and midsize nations, which seek to protect and patrol their large coastal sovereign zones, well-armed, fast, modular, and built cost-effectively to meet commercial standards, OPVs of all sizes are being purchased by the Gulf States.26 The Baynunah-class corvettes formed by Abu Dhabi Ship Building are an example of the powerful sea crafts that are now being designed by local states to perform regional missions, with six Baynunah-class vessels launched in 2013; the UAE is operating the most competent combat ships in the Gulf.27

In September 2008, the UAE agreed to purchase a U.S. missile defense system for $7 billion, including the Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system.28 According to Defense News:

"The proposed sale of the weapons will strengthen the effectiveness and interoperability of a potential coalition partner, reduce the dependence on U.S forces in the region, and enhance any coalition operations the U.S may undertake."29

In 2008, UAE signed an agreement with Washington for Patriot-3 missiles. According to the clauses in the contract:

"The agreement...includes technology, training, and supply of the medium range missile system, which is part of a multi-tiered defensive shield the UAE Armed Forces, is building to protect the nation from perceived threats in the region."30

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The United Arab Emirates spend more than $12 billion in missile defense systems in the past four years.31 In December 2011, the Pentagon proclaimed an agreement with UAE; according to the accord U.S supply Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system to Emirates with two sophisticated missile defense launchers, worth nearly $2 billion. Riyadh also has purchased a noteworthy arsenal of Patriot systems, the latest being $1.7 billion in upgrades last year.32

Kuwait has already established a Patriot-2 missile defense system and is seeking to obtain the much more sophisticated Patriot-3, while Qatar is in negotiations with U.S officials to purchase the older Patriot-2 system.33 These defense systems are competent to counter any kind of air assault. In July 2012, the Pentagon announced the newest addition to Persian Gulf missile defense systems, informing Congress of a plan to sell Kuwait $4.2 billion in weaponry, including 60 Patriot Advanced Capability missiles, 20 launching platforms and 4 radars; this will be in addition to Kuwait’s arsenal of 350 Patriot missiles bought between 2007 and 2010.34

Another important state of the Middle East, Iraq is facing serious domestic security issues on behalf of Iranian interference. Tehran’s desire to dominate a susceptible Iraq after the departure of U.S troops is clear, and Iran is already a factor of volatility in Iraq.35 Both two states share long borders, and the Shiites of Iraq has strong background relations with Iran due to same religious believe. It is widely believed that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) supports and funds Shiite militants, leading to more violence in Iraq.36 In fact, if Iran attains an atomic weapon, Iraq would become dominated by the Iranian regime. Therefore, Baghdad is also acquiring modern military equipment. In July 2008, the Pentagon signed a $10.7 billion arms deal with Baghdad that included M1-A1 tanks.37 Two months later, the Wall Street Journal reported that the Iraqi government was seeking to buy thirty-six F-16 advanced fighter jets from the U.S, with total planned inventory likely to reach ninety-six F-16C/D Block 50/52 aircraft by the end of 2020.38 Recent security improvement and quality arm purchasing from US, bolstered the Iraqi self-confidence and officials believed that the Baghdad can counter any potential intimidation from the Iran.

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5.1.3.2. Peninsula Shield Force (PSF)

After 1990s Kuwait crises, the Arab Peninsula states developed their military capabilities and capacity to protect their existence and in order to do that, the GCC shaped its own security and defense coalition that is called Peninsula Shield Force (PSF). Although this idea was visualized in the early 1980s, it was only recognized after the evident ineffectiveness of the force during Operation Desert Storm, in which external assistance was essential.39 Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait showed that Gulf States lacked the capability to mount an effective deterrence, even though they could afford to buy the best equipment and supplies for their armed forces.40

The purpose of the PSF is similar to NATO. It necessitates its members to support the other member in the case of conflict. The armed forces of all state parties regularly carry out combine exercises. In the beginning, the GCC countries perceive Iraq and Iran as significant threats. Nowadays, Iran has emerged as the biggest rival for these states, both ideologically and militarily and ranks high on the GCC list of threats.41

In December 2000, the GCC States adopted a joint defense concord meant to enhancing the joint defense capability, this was an agreement aimed at increasing the Peninsula Shield Force from 5,000 to 22,400 soldiers.42 In January 2008, the Peninsula Shield developed a rapid response force consisting of 9,000 troops to be situated in Saudi Arabia.43 The PSF played its part in 2011 when rebellion by Shiites in Bahrain was quelled by the deployment of PSF troops. On 12 July 2011, GCC Secretary General, Abdul Latif al Zayani explicitly condemned Iran’s interfering in Bahrain’s domestic affairs though Tehran has denied such accusations. An Iranian newspaper claimed that, Bahrain’s foreign minister announced that GCC troops would remain deployed in Bahrain until Iran no longer remains a threat to Gulf countries where as Iranian foreign ministry, through a statement has objected to GCC’s troops deployment to Bahrain.44 Therefore it has become obvious that because of the improbable future of the Gulf region and the Middle East in general, the Peninsula Shield Force will be the first line of defense against any threat before calling on support from the various Gulf allies.45

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5.1.4. US PRESENCE IN THE REGION AND ARAB PERCEPTION

During the decades-long history before the outbreak of the 1991 Gulf War, the US military presence in the region was mostly in the form of aircraft-carriers buoyant in the offshore areas, and such aircraft carriers were interlinked with the sixth fleet in the Mediterranean Sea with a view to prevent the former Soviet Union from interfering in regional affairs. Before the outbreak of the 9/11 attacks, the US armed forces had primarily concentrated in Saudi Arabia and as many as 334 thousand troops were stationed in the country during the Iraq War in 1991. After 9/11, George W Bush considerably adjusted the base structure in the Gulf and an extensive military presence was shifted from Saudi Arabia to the new host countries of Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar. Since President Obama entered the White House, the US military bases in the GCC states have shifted in their immediate task from overthrowing Saddam Hussein’s regime and safeguarding the post-war reconstruction in Iraq to confronting Iran and combating Taliban militants on the Afghan-Pakistan border.46 With its task transformed, the US military bases in the Gulf region have exhibited five new attributes, i.e. the bases are expanding geographically, diminishing in size, increasingly approaching the potential enemies, becoming stronger in maneuverability and being gradually interlinked. 47

After the Iraq War, the Fifth Fleet, which was stationed in the Persian Gulf, had one aircraft-carrier fleet, including one aircraft-carrier, six warships, one attack submarine, three amphibious ships and four anti-mine ships.48 The Capital city Manama of Bahrain is the headquarters and the home port of the American Fifth Fleet with as large as a 60-acre military base hosting more than 1500 soldiers.

Gulf States are anxious of Iran’s exertions of leading the Gulf and the region; consequently they consider American existence in the region as a matching power as they do not appear to be confident enough to preserve their own interests. That is why they have shaped long term financial and military alliance with the United States. Despite their reservations regarding US policy of encouraging democratic sentiments in the Arab states, in view of Iran’s increasing naval power in the region GCC countries are most likely compelled to seek US support in balancing Iranian positions.49 Iran blames

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Washington for shaping Iran phobia between Arab peninsula states to keep the region unsteady so that Gulf States depend on the United States and let its armed forces to stay in the Middle East. It is in Americans interest that Arab countries continue to purchase arms from them and also depend on its security guaranties so that its marine units stays there and US/West’s oil supplies keep protected.

5.1.4.1. Military Cooperation with West

While Arab states particularly Persian Gulf countries spend huge amounts of money to strengthen their conventional arm forces. It is also a fact that they always looking for strong Western support to gain guarantees on their security issues. The lack of military experience, modest population totals (the population of the Gulf states is 35 million while that of Iran is 70 million), and restricted geography of most Arab countries near Iran denote that Gulf states will continue to seek additional regional security guarantors.50 Although U.S has been seen as the key security provider to Arab states in Middle East, still many Gulf States are expanding their security dealings with European powers as well. The diversification of security associations had been an important factor in GCC security beliefs before the mid-1990s, with major arms purchases from European countries and even several limited procurement by Kuwait and the UAE from Russia and China.51 However, from the mid1990s, the GCC states began focusing much more on the United States, partly because of better terms and partly because of better access to American technologies.52

On January 15, 2008, French president Nicolas Sarkozy and Emirati officials signed an accord to establish a permanent military base in Abu Dhabi, near the strategic Strait of Hormuz in front of the Iranian coast.53 The military base is become operational in 2009. Another French unit is also operating in Djibouti (UAE) which is also one of the essential areas of the Gulf region. These agreements with France are seen as the response to Tehran's behavior toward its neighbor. Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesman Muhammad Ali Hosseini, denouncing the establishment of the French military base located only a few miles from Iranian waters, said: "We are opposed to the military presence of

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foreigners in the region because we believe their presence would not only [fail to] help the regional security but would be the cause of instability in the region."54

In February, 2008, armed divisions of France, Qatar, and UAE, conducted a large-scale military exercise in the Persian Gulf. Furthermore, Qatar approved to open a French financed services school in Doha in 2011 in order to prepare officers from Qatar and other regional countries. By opening a new era of military relationships with France, Qatar is demonstrating its interest in diversifying its military partnerships with Western powers to uphold its position in the region and to protect its interests.55

Because of the fear of Iranian nuclear program the GCC avow Turkey as their first strategic collaborator outside the region. On September 2, 2008, GCC states and Ankara signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) intended to strengthen their military and political relationship.56 According to the foreign minister of Qatar, Hamad bin Jassem al-Thani, “The signing of the memo is a step on the way to strategic relations, and it is vital for both the GCC countries and Turkey.”57 Besides bilateral associations with France and Turkey, the GCC countries also succeeded to gain support from NATO. In 2004 Istanbul Cooperation Initiative declared that NATO would promote dialogue and practical cooperation with countries of the region to enhance security.58 So far, Kuwait, the UAE, Qatar, and Bahrain have agreed to join the initiatives, and Saudi Arabia and Oman are expected to follow. 59 Kuwait becomes the first country to join the defense accord with NATO and in November 2008 its navy conducted a military exercise along with NATO forces.

5.1.5. ISRAELI POLICIES ON IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM

Since Iranian revolution relations between Israel and Iran have become more complex by every passing day. Soon after the revolution Tehran disengaged all political and commercial lashes with Israel, and its administration does not recognize the legitimacy of Israel as a state and refers to its government as the Zionist entity. From then till know both administrations regularly give harsh statements against each other. Iranian leadership believes that Israel is the main reason behind regional instability and therefore

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named it as small Satan. Because of Iranian alliance with Hezbollah and Hamas and its emerging nuclear program, Tel Aviv sees Iranian regime as a threat for its very existence and therefore Iran has been placed in a very important position in Israel's foreign policy.

5.1.5.1. Policy Priorities against Iran

From day one Tel Aviv is trying to prod the U.S and other Western powers to progress from dialogue towards sanctions, to military action because of Iranian refusal to discard its uranium enrichment program. Israel also played its part to persuade China and Russia in order to end their disagreement on tougher U.N sanctions on Iran. It primarily prevented Moscow from selling sophisticated S-300 anti-aircraft missiles to Tehran. Because of the perceived Iranian threat, Israeli officials are wary of the possible establishment of a Palestinian state that would be prepared to takeover by Iranian- supported Hamas – thereby creating what Prime Minister Netanyahu calls “Hamastan,” an Iranian proxy, on Israel’s borders.60

Tel Aviv already indicated its willingness to prevent Tehran’s nuclear objectives by military means if negotiations not succeeded. On September 6, 2007, the Israeli Air Force accomplished an air attack on a nuclear facility in northeastern Syria. Then, on June 20, 2008, the New York Times reported that the Israeli Air Force had conducted a major exercise about 900 miles west of Israel over Mediterranean sea, comparable to the distance planes would have to fly to strike Iran’s uranium enrichment plant at Natanz.61 In June 2009, Israel deployed its submarine in the Red Sea which was competent of launching a nuclear missile and several missile class warships. Some observers saw this move as a training for a probable assault on Iran’s nuclear sites.

The Israeli Air Force has increased its overseas training and has held joint aerial drills with the United States that simulated a war against an “enemy state. 62 In October 2009, Israel and the U.S carried one of their usual combined biennial military drills, called Juniper Cobra. This time, it was a large exercise, involving 17 U.S naval ships, one of which was armed with the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System, 1,400 U.S European Command (EUCOM) servicemen and an equal number of IDF forces, and it tested the

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U.S and Israeli air-defense systems and their interoperability. 63 Juniper Cobra was measured as another indication to discourage Iran on its nuclear policies.

In 2010 Israel signed an accord with Washington for the possession of F-35 stealth fighter aircrafts. It is another example of the Israelis’ building capabilities with an eye toward Iran, particularly since stealth capability would be critical if Iran attains the S-300 advanced air defense system from Russia. 64 Indeed, assessments of Israel’s ability to strike Iran suggest that Israel already has sufficient capabilities to launch a unilateral attack, including its F-16 and F-15 aircraft and global positioning system and laser- guided munitions in sufficient numbers to penetrate Iranian defenses and reach nuclear targets, even if it lacks the capabilities for a sustained attack.65

Analysts appear to agree that an Israeli attack on Iran would be a complicated task and carry jeopardy of asymmetric reprisal against both Israel and the U.S, its closest ally, by Iranian-allied non-state actors.66 Besides, Iranian nuclear facilities are separated and manifold air strikes would be required, perhaps diminishing the chances of success. Many experts believe that a successful strike would set back Iran’s nuclear program for only a few years.

5.1.5.2. Military Doctrine and Preparation against Iranian Offense

While demonstrating its capability to attack Iran, Israel also reinforced its defenses against any kind of Iranian assault. In contrast to its offensive-based doctrine of the past, Israel has invested heavily in missile defense programs. 67 Iranian missiles are a particular concern for Israel, leading Israel to shift from its two-tier system of missile defense (based on the Arrow II and Patriot systems) to a four tier system based on the Arrow II, Arrow III, Patriot, and David’s Sling systems to better hedge against the failure of any one system.68

Just before the end of the second Bush administration, Washington delivered the X-band radar system, controlled by U.S forces, to an air base in Israel’s Negev (southern) region, along with supporting U.S equipment and staff.69 While the U.S European Command has positioned troops and Patriot air defense systems to Israel in the past for combined

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exercises and Iraq war contingencies, the X-band deployment comprises a permanent U.S presence on Israeli soil.70 This sophisticated, long-range early warning radar can perceive targets from thousands of miles away, making it a particularly vital system for potential eventualities involving Iran.71 The Pentagon linked the X-band radar into the U.S Joint Tactical Ground Station (JTAGS); the U.S government had denied earlier Israeli requests for JTAGS because of security classification objections by the U.S Air Force, therefore this deployment is viewed as a major progression for Israeli early warning systems.72 Joint U.S-Israeli military exercises and stepped up high-level military exchanges have further signaled U.S interest in intensifying the security relationship with Israel to bolster its defenses in response to Iranian nuclear threat. 73

Despite Tehran's claim that its nuclear program is meant for nonviolent functions, its past trend has cast numerous suspicions as to the authenticity of its declared ambitions. As a result, Tehran has made other regional States focus on defending themselves from the imminent hazard caused by his approach towards region. The acquisition of enormous consignments of armaments and aircrafts by Saudi Arabia, Oman, UAE, and Qatar is just one sign of the growing anxiety in the region.74 Meanwhile, the utmost dilemma that the Arab Peninsula States are now facing is how to sustain good relations with Tehran while at the same time steering dialogue to convince it to keep its nuclear objectives only for energy generation purposes. 75 Many regional states recognize that the risk of confrontation would prompt a real calamity in the region.

Traditionally, GCC realms have been tight-lipped about their military spending, but since they now fear Iran’s increasing strength, these regimes have given away more transparency in order to send a warning message to Tehran to stay within its borders.76 During the 2007 IDEX fair, UAE president Sheik Khalifa bin Zayed al-Nahyan said:

"We believe there is a need for power to protect peace, and strong people with the capability to respond are the real protectors of peace. That is why we are keen to maintain the efficiency of our armed forces."77

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As for Israel, Iranian nuclear program produces multiple threats and to limit Tehran's emerging hegemony Tel Aviv is continuously upgrading its military offence and defense systems. Although Israel has the most advanced conventional weaponry in the region but Iranian backed groups, Hezbollah and Hamas, have always gained success to counter Israeli defense systems and show their presence. Israel knows very well that if Iran gains any success in advancement of nuclear technology then these groups would be the main beneficiary of that technology which is un acceptable for Tel Aviv and therefore Israel shows no restrain on the issue of Iranian nuclear program and in every international or regional platform it highlights Iranian threat and because of strong lobbying in America and Europe it has acquired considerable success to impose sanctions on Iran.

5.2. PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR IMPLICATIONS IN SOUTH ASIA

As Pakistan and India develop their military and nuclear capabilities at increasingly rapid rates, it is not too surprising that scholars, analysts, and the media alike have drawn on the convenient term “arms race” to characterize this phenomenon.78 But Pakistan-India dynamics is much more complicated. The two neighbors are certainly entangled in a long-standing competition, but they are not too closely matched opponents running side- by-side on a racetrack until one collapses from exhaustion, as happened in the Cold War.79

The India-Pakistan “race” is burdened with reservations and asymmetries. Both adversaries are matched neither in size, aptitude, nor perceptions of the nature and scope of the rivalry. Nor is it clear whether the “race” is a sprint, a marathon, or a steeplechase; the finish line is evident to no one.80

5.2.1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS DETERRENT 5.2.1.1. The 1986-87 Brasstacks Crises

Since the attainment of nuclear means in mid-eighties, Islamabad has utilized its limited deterrent aptitude primarily to frighten New Delhi from initiate a conventional war against it. In 1986 Indian military exercise Brasstacks was the first occasion whe n Pakistan apparently corresponded its readiness to counter with nuclear arsenals. The

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messages were conveyed firstly by Dr. A.Q Khan and secondly during cricket diplomacy Zia ul Haq also verbally expressed Pakistan's capability to Indian prime minister on his visit to India. Brasstacks was a large-scale, live-fire exercise that amassed almost 250,000 Indian troops—including mobile RAPID divisions—and simulated combined arms operations in the most likely theater for an India-Pakistan conventional war.81 Nuclear arsenals did play a part in preventing New Delhi from initiating a full scale mêlée against Pakistan, and also involved USA and other international powers to interfere and resolve the crisis. This occasion brought a new aspect in India-Pakistan strategic equation. For Pakistan, nuclear weapons became the central part of its military strategy, an effective tool to deter India, and also to overcome increasing conventional asymmetry vis-à-vis India.82

5.2.1.2. Post 1998 Situation

The 1998 nuclear tests guided to official addition of nuclear weapons in defense policies of both countries. India, with a conventional benefit, favored to preserve a high moral position and affirmed a No First Use (NFU) doctrine. Pakistan, being a comparatively weaker party in the Pakistan-India dyad, did not subscribe to an NFU policy, and continues to view nuclear arms as an indemnity against Indian conventional attack by threatening it with a nuclear response to inflict unacceptable damage – a variant of Cold War's strategy of massive retaliation. 83

5.2.1.3. The 1999 Kargil Crisis

Pakistan’s nuclear posture has had a diverse deterrent effect on Indian civil and military leadership. Unlike the catalytic posture, it directly deterred large scale Indian military action against Pakistan in the 1999 Kargil War, the 2001– 02 Operation Parakram crises, and the 2008 Mumbai attacks.84 Although Washington played its part to deescalate crises but facts advocates that Islamabad’s threat of premature use of nuclear armaments on Indian military has had a momentous inhibitory effect on Indian leadership. In fact it has twice prevented New Delhi from empowering major conventional combat suggests the powerful deterrent outcome of Pakistan's nuclear posture.85 During the Kargil war

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Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad made an explicit statement that: "Pakistan would not hesitate to use any weapon in its arsenal to defend its territorial integrity."86

According to Indian chief of Army Staff at the time, Gen. Ved Malik:"Pakistan’s nuclear posture led India to rule out full scale conventional war."87

Observers believed that BJP was firm about not increasing the military operations outside the Kargil sector or attacking Pakistani forces, staging posts, and lines of communications across the Line of Control (LoC), despite the fact that this defied military logic entailed the acceptance of heavier casualties.88 This restraint was in marked contrast to India’s response in the 1965 and 1971 conflicts, when nuclear weapons had not entered the equation and it had not displayed any inhibitions in invading Pakistan.89 During Kargil conflict Pakistan's nuclear deterrence inhibited New Delhi from retaliating across the Line of Control or the international border.

5.2.1.4. 2001-2002 Crisis

Following the assault on the Indian parliament on December 13, 2001, the BJP commenced Operation Parakram. It called for the largest mobilization of Indian forces since 1971— almost 800,000 troops—with several infantry and mountain divisions deployed across the LoC and all three strike corps deployed in the Thar Desert in Rajasthan for the first time in Indian history, prepared to thrust into Pakistan’s vulnerable plains and desert sectors.90 As result, Pakistan also mobilized its corps-level forces and reserves.

In June 2002, Indian leadership prepared a decisive conventional assault on Pakistan and the Indian strike corps were prepared to execute deep penetrating operations to engage and destroy Pakistan’s two strike corps and seize Sindh Province through Thar region.91 Pakistan then made explicit nuclear threats, with Lt. Gen. Javed Ashraf Qazi, former director-general of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), warning, “If Pakistan is being destroyed through conventional means, we will destroy them by using the nuclear option.”92 Furthermore, President Musharraf also stated that he had conveyed to Prime Minister Vajpayee that “if Indian troops moved a single step across the international

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border or the Line of Control, they should not expect a conventional war from Pakistan.”93 Through this course of crisis, Pakistan tested three types of ballistic missiles in rapid succession. According to International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), three probable political messages underscored the Pakistani missile test: first, they were intended to placate domestic critics; second, they were intended to increase pressure on India to refrain from launching military strike; and, third, they were intended to indicate that Pakistan was capable of using short and intermediate-range ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads and was prepared to do so, if required. 94 Pakistani leadership believed that these missile testing determined the course of the crises and contributed to its de- escalation.

The Indian forces remained deployed at tremendous cost to equipment and morale, awaiting Delhi’s approval until October, when Operation Parakram was formally called off and the strike corps returned to their cantonments. 95 Indian military and strategic analysts describe Parakram as a costly and ill-conceived mobilization that “ended as an ignominious retreat after having failed to secure even its minimum objectives.”96 Ganguly and Hagerty conclude that “the fear of Pakistan’s resort to a possible nuclear threat was paramount in the minds of Indian decision-makers, thereby inhibiting a resort to all-out war.”97

5.2.1.5. The 2008 Mumbai Incident

After Mumbai incident in November 2008 the relation between both countries again become tense. From the outset, India’s Congress government, and even General Malik, accepted that its military options against Pakistan were limited, because of Pakistan's competitive and up-to-date nuclear delivery systems, any meaningful strikes risked uncontrollable escalation, possibly up to the nuclear level. 98 Former Army Chief of Staff Roy Chowdhury accepted that “Pakistan’s nuclear weapons deterred India from attacking that country after the Mumbai strikes . . . and it was due to Pakistan’s possession of nuclear weapons that India stopped short of a military retaliation following the attack on Parliament in 2001.”99

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Since the adoption of an asymmetric escalation Islamabad has been able to achieve deterrence against New Delhi. The three militarized crises discussed above reveal that Pakistan’s nuclear posture means that major conventional war is no longer a viable option for India.100 The American intermediation played a very little part to stop New Delhi from Nuclear escalation. The more compelling explanation is that Pakistani atomic deterrence inhibited Indian leadership from performing militarily retaliatory options that might have otherwise been on the list of choices for fear of triggering nuclear response from Pakistan.101

5.2.1.6. Missile Race between India and Pakistan

Following the May 1998 nuclear tests, Pakistan and India continued to upgrade their missile capabilities and develop further advanced variant missiles for gaining more credible deterrence. Over the following years, both tested medium-range systems (Agni variants for India, Ghauri and Shaheen variants for Pakistan) in mobile configurations; the data indicate periods of co-development of such capabilities. 102 After testing advanced Ghauri-II and Shaheen-I in April 1999 Pakistani officials stated that the test flights of Ghauri-II and Shaheen-I would ensure that Pakistan's minimum deterrent capability' was technically credible and would maintain 'strategic balance in South Asia.'103 After these tests, Islamabad halted missile tests and called on New Delhi to join in a 'strategic restraint regime' in order to limit the development of missile and nuclear weapons technology and deployment. 104

Pakistan observed the self-imposed suspension on missile testing for the next three years and did not react to India's test of the Agni-2 in January 2001or the Dhanush in September 2001 with any missile test of its own. When terrorists' attacks on the Indian parliament in December 2001 occurred, India alleged that the attacks were carried out by terrorist organization based in Pakistan and started mobilizing its troops along the Punjab border. During this course of catastrophe Pakistan tested three types of ballistic missiles Ghauri-1, Ghaznavi, and Abdali in quick succession. During 2004 Pakistan presented a proposal to India for nuclear and missile restraint. According to Pakistan's High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, Dr. Maleeha Lodhi, the proposal included: a

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moratorium on nuclear testing, non-deployment of nuclear capable ballistic missiles, maintaining nuclear arms on a de-alerted status, and moratorium on acquisition and deployment of Anti-Ballistic Missile system (ABM).105

In 2005, Islamabad New Delhi signed an accord necessitating both rivals to provide earlier notification of ballistic missile tests. The era between 2002 and 2006 marked a flurry of missile test-flights in a "tit-for-tat" pattern between both powers. 106 Since 2007, Pakistan's testing of the Ghauri and Shaheen missiles has decelerated and the majority of new advancement has come out in cruise missiles system. Potential causes for this include India's investment in a ballistic missile defense system, the Ghauri and Shaheen missiles acquiring sufficient range and payload to target strategic locations in India, international pressure against intermediate and long-range ballistic missile tests, and a shift in focus toward developing a tactical nuclear capability. 107

Since 1998, both states have conducted nearly the same number of nuclear missile tests (60 and 55, respectively), Pakistan has primarily tested ballistic missiles, 42 in total, but after its initial test of the Babur in August 2005 it began to conduct cruise missile tests in greater number, now totaling thirteen. 108 On the other hand, India has tested ballistic and cruise missiles in almost equivalent percentage, with 32 and 28, respectively. It is tempting to assess that the high number of cruise missile tests suggests a more important role for cruise missiles in Indian deterrence, but this is unlikely given that all of these tests are of just one cruise missile system, the BrahMos. 109

Although both countries have tested approximately the same number of total missiles, the breakdown of this total between cruise and ballistic missiles is quite different, with India testing cruise missiles roughly twice as many times as Pakistan—28 and fifteen cruise missile tests, respectively.110 This can be understood by the prior beginning of Indian cruise missile program. New Delhi tested its first cruise missile during 2001, while Pakistan carried out its first test in 2005. Unlike India’s other missile systems, which have been developed by the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) for use by India’s military services, the BrahMos is a joint venture between DRDO and Russia’s Federal State Unitary Enterprise, NPO Mashinostroyenia. 111 The BrahMos is

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also developed for the export. On the other hand Pakistan’s development of the Babur and Ra’ad cruise missiles appears to have been motivated by Indian defense acquisition, though not specifically by its development of BrahMos. 112

Since 2006, the series of missiles being trialed by New Delhi and Islamabad have in progress to deviate. The divergence in missile development and testing thus can be seen as a consequence of shift in the national security direction of both countries to close professed reliability flaws in deterrence. Both states carry on to test missiles that will become part of their arsenals and meet the objectives of their evolving nuclear postures.113

5.2.2. A NEW ARMS RACE 5.2.2.1. Indian Ballistic Missile Defense System and Pakistan's Acquisition of Cruise Missile Capabilities

In July 1997 India signed an agreement with Russia to acquire Russian made S-300v air defense and anti-ballistic missile system. The system was highly capable of targeting incoming enemy aircraft and ballistic missiles. After nuclear tests of 1998 and Pakistan's emerging ballistic missile capabilities, India started its own Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system in 1999. Indian missile defense system is a double-tiered system consisting of two interceptor missiles, namely the Prithvi Air Defense (PAD) missile for high altitude interception, and the Advanced Air Defense (AAD) Missile for lower altitude interception.114 This system is functioning from late 2007. Furthermore, India is also collaborating with Israel in Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) technologies, especially in the joint development of radars for interceptor missiles and claims to have carried out a successful test of against an incoming ballistic missile.115 Recently NATO has offered BMD technologies to India, which is poised to deploy an operational BMD system by 2014.116 India has acquired Patriot PAC-3, the Israeli Arrow-2, and the Russian S-300V BMD systems, 15 with the latter reportedly installed in limited numbers around Delhi.

The Indian's were happy that they can counter the Pakistani nuclear delivery systems and also regain superiority over Pakistan. Pakistan's own security came on stake after Indian

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deployment of its defense system. It became crystal clear that in the case of military conflict Indian defense system could bring disaster for Pakistan. It clearly affected Islamabad's policy of minimum nuclear deterrence and triggered a new arms race in the region. In this extreme scenario, Pakistan had no other choice then to initiate countering measures against Indian defense system to ensure its own security and restore the balance of power in the region.

Pakistan initiated its cruise missile program after massive Indian investment in a ballistic missile defense system. Initially, there are two types of systems, which can counter the ballistic missile defense, cruise missiles and Multiple-Independent Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs). To offset Indian defense system Pakistani think-tanks decided to initiate a cruise missile program and the task was given to the National Engineering and Scientific Commission (NESCOM) and the Air Weapons Complex (AWC). It is also believed that Pakistani scientists and engineers are making swift evolution in the development of MIRVs. It is expected that Pakistan may use this technology for its Shaheen series of missiles, which would make difficulties for Indian Defense system to shoot them down. A MIRV missile permit a single missile to contain a number of warheads directed at separate targets. When it reaches to its target, sends out several smaller missiles each armed with a nuclear warhead. One ballistic missile thereby achieves the result of several missiles hitting various targets and becomes difficult for any kind of missile defense system to target all missiles. On the other hand, cruise missiles are nearly untraceable and highly survivable, even against the modern missile defenses. The first few weeks of the 2003 Iraq War demonstrated that sophisticated missile defenses could shoot down ballistic missiles with relative ease, but faced a significantly more difficult task in preventing a cruise missile strike. 117 However, these shortcomings are superseded by the remarkable advantages cruise missiles have over ballistic missiles in defeating existing missile defenses.

Pakistan successfully tested its first cruise missile in August 2005. The Hatif-VII/Babar is a subsonic missile, which can carry both conventional and non-conventional weapons. It can be launched by Pakistani advanced aircrafts like F-16 and JF-17 Thunder and also from Pakistan's Agosta submarines. The mating with the Agosta is a key to Islamabad's

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quest for a second-strike capability. 118 India recently acquired a nuclear submarine from Russia and is on the way of modernizing its navy; the presence of Indian nuclear submarines has strategic implications for Pakistan. Babur has heightened Pakistan’s strategic standoff capability at sea. In July 2007, Pakistan retested Baber with further modifications. According to the Pakistani military, the missile has "near stealth" capabilities. Since the last test, Pakistani engineers have extended the range of the missile from 500 to 700 km, increasing its ability to reach targets in India, including the capital, New Delhi, with ground-launched or air-launched versions of the system.119 Following Pakistan’s Babur test, Mansoor Ahmed, a defense analyst in Islamabad, noted:

"This is signaling to India that if you are modernizing your weaponry, then we are also not lagging behind. Pakistan is sensitive and responsive to evolving threats. Basically, these missile tests are meant to ensure Pakistan’s minimum deterrence."120

On August 25, 2007, Pakistan successfully tested its second cruise missile, the Hatif-VIII, or Ra'ad, which is a nuclear-capable Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM). According to the Pakistan military, the Hatif-VIII provides the Air Force with a "strategic standoff capability."121 The missile has a range of 350 kilometers. The Pakistan military further stated that like Baber the Ra'ad also has a "low detection probability due to stealth design and materials used in its manufacturing."122 Some analysts believe that this specific cruise missile is expected to be installed on F-16A jet or domestically upgraded fleet of F-16C warplanes. The Ra'ad was natively developed by National Defense Complex (NDC).

5.2.2.2. Indian Cold Start Doctrine and Pakistan's Tactical Nuclear Weapons

The lessons of the Kargil conflict and India's ineffective strategy against Pakistan in the 2002 and 2008 crises led to the genesis of the Cold Start Doctrine (CSD). The new Indian war doctrine was publicized by Indian army chief in April 2004. The objective is to develop the ability to launch a conventional strike in the shortest possible time to attain

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limited objectives without upsetting Pakistan's nuclear threshold.123 By keeping war objectives limited, Indian military planners hope to contradict Islamabad the justification to react predominantly against Indian metropolitan areas. The CSD envisages reorganizing strike corps into at least eight smaller division-sized Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs) that combine mechanized infantry, artillery, and armor on the pattern of Soviet Union's operational maneuver groups.124 These IBG's would mobilize rapidly to make way into the Pakistani terrain 50-80 KMs deep in a short time period of 72-96 hours, like the German blitzkrieg against the French in 1940.125

It indicates Indian strategic philosophy on limited war under the nuclear umbrella while the notion itself has been put to test in various exercises, close to the border with Pakistan. The CSD is designed for the destruction of key components of Pakistan‘s war- waging mechanism by initiating combine air-land offensives utilizing conventional forces. According to the theory, all of these objectives can only be achieved if deep sledgehammer blows are launched jointly by the Indian Army and Air Force during the next war with Pakistan.126 During 2004 to 2011, the Indian armed forces have carried out eleven different military drills to test the idea of the CSD. These military movements were detained close to the Pakistani border in which Indian troops and apparatus were tested in a Nuclear, Chemical, Biological (NCB) environment. One such major exercise ―Vijay Bhava engaged more than 50,000 troops, only 70 km from the Pakistani border. Over 1000 artillery pieces, 250 tanks including the T-90 and T-72, participated along with fighters and ground attack aircraft from the Indian Air Force. 127 CSD appears to have been designed to explore and exploit gaps and options for limited conventional war below Pakistan‘s nuclear threshold; Therefore, a perceived gap in Pakistan‘s deterrence posture was felt in the wake of India‘s interest in limited conventional war on its own terms, reflected through the CSD. 128

In this situation, Pakistan decided to launch Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) program. It was widely believed that battleground use of nuclear artillery is highly destabilizing, with potentially strategic consequences. It can be argued that in Pakistan‘s case, TNWs would nuance deterrence stability by denying India the incentive to pursue limited war by exploiting any weak spots in the country‘s defense.129 In April 2011 Pakistan tested the

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60 km range NASR, a tube-launched tactical ballistic missile on the heels of an earlier test of the 180 km range Abdali ballistic missile.130 After these tests official reports indicating that Pakistan had attained an operational level capability. According to the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) press release:

"The missile has been developed to add deterrence value to Pakistan‘s Strategic Weapons Development program at shorter ranges; NASR, with a range of 60 km, carries nuclear warheads of appropriate yield with high accuracy, shoot and scoot attributes, this quick response system addresses the need to deter evolving threats; The test was a very important milestone in consolidating Pakistan‘s strategic deterrence capability at all levels of the threat spectrum; He said in that hierarchy of military operations, the NASR Weapon System now provides Pakistan with short range missile capability in addition to the already available medium and long range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles in its inventory."131

Pakistani nuclear weapons played their role to reshape Indian offense and Defense policy against Pakistan especially after 1998 nuclear tests. As mentioned above, because of Pakistan's credible nuclear deterrence Indian administration geared up for gaining modern and reliable BMD systems and also introduced the Cold Start doctrine to counter the Pakistani nuclear deterrence. Therefore as countering measure and to obtain assured nuclear deterrence Pakistan developed the Cruise missile technology to counter Indian defense system and Tactical nuclear weapons to offset Indian Cold Start doctrine.

Ultimately, we can see that both parties spend tremendous amount in vertical proliferation. Indians argue that their advancement in defense and missile technology has two reasons. Firstly, to deter China and Pakistan and secondly to gain higher rank in the world community as one of the world’s emerging powers. On the other hand Islamabad's nuclear and missile policies were shaped in response of Indian policies for regio nal hegemony. Almost all states justify their nuclear developments or existing holdings due to varying security concerns, but in reality, there are very few that rely on nuclear deterrence for their survival, and Pakistan is one of these countries.132

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1 www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA555928 (Accessed on 19 March 2013) 2 Ibid 3 Stracke, Nicole, Nuclear Non-Proliferation from a Gulf Perspective

http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/global/05354.pdf (Accessed on 15 May 2013) 4 Stracke, Nicole, "Nuclear Non-Proliferation from: A Gulf Perspective", FES Briefing Paper 3, April 2008, http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/global/05354.pdf (Accessed on 15

April 2013) 5 Op cit 6 Stracke, Nicole, “Nuclear Arms Race in the Gulf”, Khaleej Times, 2 February 2007 7 Longa, Joseph, Then and Now: Arab Reactions to the Israeli and Iranian Nuclear Programs, http://csis.org/images/stories/poni/110921_Longa.pdf, (Accessed on 16 May

2013) 8 Cirincione, Joseph and Leventer, Uri, “The Middle East’s Nuclear Surge,” The International Herald

Tribune, August 13, 2007. 9 http://csis.org/images/stories/poni/100128_NSI_2009_Collection_of_Papers.pdf 10 William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, “With Eye on Iran, Rivals Also Want Nuclear Power,” The New York Times , April 15, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/15

/world/middleeast/15sunnis.html (accessed on March 16, 2010) 11 J. Broad, William, and E. Sanger, David, “With Eye on Iran, Rivals Also Want Nuclear Power,” The New York Times, April 15, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/15/world/middleeast/15sunnis.html (Accessed on 16

May 2013). 12 http://csis.org/images/stories/poni/100128_NSI_2009_Collection_of_Papers.pdf 13 Crail, Peter and Lasky-Fink, Jessica, “Middle Eastern States Seeking Nuclear Power,” Arms Control

Today, May 2008. 14 http://chpponline.blogspot.com/2007_01_01_archive.html 15 Op. cite, J. Broad and E. Sanger, “With Eye on Iran, Rivals Also Want Nuclear

Power,”

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16 http://www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/Arab_Reactions_to_a_Nuclear-Armed_Iran.pdf 17 Ibid 18 Ibid 19 Habbouch, Mahmoud, “Gulf Defense Spending Likely to Defy Downturn”, The National, February 12, 2009, http://www.thenational.ae/article/20090212/NATIONAL/786392446/1010 20 http://www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/Arab_Reactions_to_a_Nuclear-Armed_Iran.pdf 21 Drummond, James and Khalaf, Roula, “Gulf States in $123bn US Arms Spree,” Financial Times, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ffd73210-c4ef- 11df-9134-

00144feab49a.html#axzz1b8iuSvLT. 22 www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA555928 23 Purkiss, Alan, “Gulf States Order $123 Billion of U.S. Weaponry to Counter Iran, FT Says,” Bloomberg, September 20, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-

21/gulf-states-order-123billion-of-u-s-weaponry-to-counter-iran-ft-says.html. 24 Al Kaabi, Yousef H. and Al Kaabi, Khaled M., December 2011, "The Iranian Century: The Tension Between Iran and The Gulf States", http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a555928.pdf (Accessed on 18 May 2013) 25 http://www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/Arab_Reactions_to_a_Nuclear-Armed_Iran.pdf 26 Khaitous, Tariq, (2009) "Arab Reactions to a Nuclear-Armed Iran", Washington

Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, p. 3 27 http://www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/Arab_Reactions_to_a_Nuclear-Armed_Iran.pdf 28 Ibid, P. 3 29 Agence France-Presse, “Pentagon Proposes Sale of THAAD to UAE,” Defense News,

September 13, 2008, http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3722961 30 Reuters, “UAE Buys U.S. Missiles in $3.3 Billion Deal: Report,” December 21, 2008, http://armoredd.com/home/uae-buys-us-missiles-in-33-bn-deal-report/2008/12/20 31 http://www.inlandnewstoday.com/story.php?s=25258 32 Ibid 33 http://www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/Arab_Reactions_to_a_Nuclear-Armed_Iran.pdf

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34 Shanker, Thom, "U.S. and Gulf Allies Pursue a Missile Shield Against Iranian Attack", August 8, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/09/world/middleeast/us-and-gulf- allies-pursue-a-missile-shield-against-iranian-attack.html?_r=0 35 http://www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/Arab_Reactions_to_a_Nuclear-Armed_Iran.pdf 36 Ibid 37 Ibid 38 Elliott, D. J., “Iraq Announces Plan to Expand the Air Force”, Long War Journal, November 6, 2008, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/11/plans_for_iraqi_air.php, (Accessed on

19 May 2013) 39 www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA555928 40Shaheen, Kareem, 16 March 2011, “Defensive Shield for the Gulf Since 1982,” The National, http://www.thenational.ae/news/uae-news/defensive-shield-for-the-gulf-since-

1982, (Accessed on 03 June 2013) 41 www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA555928 42 Vassiliou, M. S., (2009), "The A to Z of the Petroleum Industry", Scarecrow Press,

New York, p. 228 43 www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA555928 44 Hanif, Muhammad, Gulf Tension and US Missile Shield for GCC Countries, http://ipripak.org/pa/gtum.pdf, (Accessed on 09 June 2013) 45 www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA555928 46 Sun, Degang, (2010) The US Military Bases in the Gulf Cooperation Council States: Dynamics of Readjustment, Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia) Vol.

4, No. 4, p. 47 47 Ibid, p. 47 48 Zhao, G. (2006). “The US military presence in the Middle East and its strategic

Motive”, West Asia and Africa, No. 1, p. 33 49 http://www.ipripak.org/comment/gtum.pdf 50 http://www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/Arab_Reactions_to_a_Nuclear-Armed_Iran.pdf 51 Ibid

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52 Knights, Michael (2006), "Troubled Waters: Future U.S. Security Assistance in the

Persian Gulf", Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, pp. 134–135, 53 http://www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/Arab_Reactions_to_a_Nuclear-Armed_Iran.pdf 54 Kaye, Dalia Dassa and Wehrey, Frederic M., “A Nuclear Iran: The Reactions of

Neighbors,” Survival 49, no. 2 (Summer 2007), p. 111 55 http://www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/Arab_Reactions_to_a_Nuclear-Armed_Iran.pdf 56 Al-Hakeem, Mariam, “GCC Names Turkey First Strategic Partner outside the Gulf,”

Gulf News, September 3, 2008, http://www.gulfnews.com/news/gulf/gcc/10242265.html 57 Ibid 58 http://www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/Arab_Reactions_to_a_Nuclear-Armed_Iran.pdf 59 Ibid 60 Addis Casey L. and others,( 2010) Iran: Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy, Congressional Research Service, 13 January, p. 45, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R40849.pdf (Accessed on 18 May 2013) 61 Gordon, Michael R. and Schmitt, Eric, (2008) “U.S. Says Exercise by Israel Seemed

Directed at Iran,” New York Times, 20 June. 62 Katz, Yaakov,(2010) “Israel, US Hold Joint Maneuvers to Simulate Attack Against

Enemy State,” Jerusalem Post, 11 June, p. 3. 63 Addis Casey L. and others, p. 42 64 http://www.slideshare.net/mmangusta/iran-israel-dangerous-rivalry 65 Long, Austin and Raas, Whitney, (Spring 2007) “Osirak Redux? Assessing Israeli Capabilities to Destroy Iranian Nuclear Facilities,” International Security, Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 7–33 66 http://www.parstimes.com/history/crs_regional_2010.pdf 67 http://www.slideshare.net/mmangusta/iran-israel-dangerous-rivalry 68 Frenkel, Sheera, (2010) “Israel Says Tests on Iron Dome Missile Shield Have Been a Success,” London Times, 8 January, See Also Kam, Efraim, ed., (July 2008) "Israel and a Nuclear Iran: Implications for Arms Control, Deterrence, and Defense", Institute for

National Security Studies (INSS), Memorandum No. 94, 69 Op cit

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70 Ibid 71 http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND_MG1143.pdf 72 Ibid 73 Levinson, Charles, (2010) “US, Israel Build Military Cooperation,” Wall Street Journal, 14 August. Also See. Prusher, Ilene R. (2009) “To Defend Against Iran Missiles,

US and Israel Conduct Joint Exercises,” Christian Science Monitor, 29 October. 74 www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA555928 75 Ibid 76 http://www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/Arab_Reactions_to_a_Nuclear-Armed_Iran.pdf 77 Fattah, Hassan M., “Arab States, Wary of Iran, Add to Their Arsenals but Still Lean on the U.S.,” New York Times, February 23, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/23/world/middleeast/23gulf.html 78 http://strategicstudyindia.blogspot.com/2013/06/understanding-arms-race-in-south- asia.html 79 Ibid 80 Dalton, Toby and Tandler, Jaclyn, "Understanding the Arms Race In South Asia", The Carnegie Paper, Nuclear Policy September 2012, Washington, D.C., Carnegie

Endowment for International Peace Publications Department, p. 18 81 Chari, P.R., Cheema, Pervaiz Iqbal, and Cohen, Stephen (2007) "Four Crises and a Peace Process :American

Engagement in South Asia", Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, p. 44 82 Sultan, Adil, "Pakistan’s Emerging Nuclear Posture: Impact of Drivers and Technology on Nuclear Doctrine", p. 155 83 http://www.issi.org.pk/publication-files/1340000409_86108059.pdf 84 Narang, Vipin, "Posturing for Peace? Pakistan's Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability", International Security, Volume 34, Number 3, Winter 2009/10, The MIT

Press, p. 60 85 http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Narang.pdf 86 “Pakistan May Use Any Weapon,” The News, Islamabad, May 31, 1999.

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87 Kapur, S. Paul, “Ten Years of Instability in a Nuclear South Asia,” International

Security, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Fall 2008), p. 79 88 http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Narang.pdf 89 Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process, p. 139. 90 Sood, V.K. and Sawhney, Pravin, (2003)"Operation Parakram: An Unfinished War", Delhi: Sage Publishers, pp. 77–78 91 http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Narang.pdf 92 Pak Will Not Hesitate to Use Nuke against India,” Press Trust of India, May 22, 2002 93 Khan, Zarar, “Pakistan Was Ready to Wage Nuclear War against India, President

Says,” Associated Press, December 30, 2002. 94 IISS, The Military Balance: 2002—2003, n. 18, p. 126 95 http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Narang.pdf 96 Swami, Praveen, “Beating the Retreat,” Frontline, Vol. 19, No. 22 (October 26, 2002), http://frontlineonnet.com/º1922/stories/20021108007101200.htm. 97 Ganguly, Sumit and Hagerty, Devin T., "Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of

Nuclear Weapons (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005), p. 180 98 http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Narang.pdf 99 “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Deterred India,” Hindu, March 10, 2009. 100 http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Narang.pdf 101 Ibid 102 http://www.scribd.com/doc/109707647/Understanding-the-Arms-Race-in-South-Asia 103 Farooq, Umer 'Pakistan's Ghauri Test for "national security", Jan's Defense Weekly, vol. 31, no. 16, 21 April 1999, p. 3 104 US Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, January 2011, p. 30; http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/prolif00.pdf. (accessed on March 8, 2013) 105 http://nti.org/e_research/profiles/Pakistan/Missile/3068_4693.html 106 http://world-defece-review.blogspot.com/2012/01/all-about-pakistan-missile- program.html

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107 Michael Krepon, "Pakistan's Nuclear Requirements," Arms Control Wonk, krepon.armscontrolwonk.com, (accessed February 28, 2013). 108 Dalton, Toby and Tandler, Jaclyn, "Understanding the Arms Race In South Asia", The Carnegie Paper, Nuclear Policy September 2012, Washington, D.C., Carnegie

Endowment for International Peace Publications Department, p. 7 109 Ibid, p. 7 110 http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/09/13/understanding-arms-race-in-south-asia/dtj0 111 Dalton, Toby and Tandler, Jaclyn, P. 11 112 Ibid, P. 12 113 http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/09/13/understanding-arms-race-in-south-asia/dtj0 114 Indian Ballistic Missile Defense Programme, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_Ballistic_Missile_Defence_Programme 115 Arjun, Y. Malikk, Interceptor Missile Hits the Bulls Eye, The Hindu, July 26, 2010. Available at: http://www.thehindu.com/news/article535042.ece. (Accessed on September 15, 2011) 116 NATO offers Missile Defense Cooperation to India, The Times of India, September 4, 2011. Available at: http://―articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-09- 04/india/30112637_1_ballistic-missile-defence-defence-systemmissile-threats. Accessed on September 15, 2011 117 Mason, Shane A., Pakistan’s Babur and Ra’ad Cruise Missiles: Strategic Implications for India, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, http://www.ipcs.org/article/pakistan/pakistans-babur-and-raad-cruise-missiles-strategic- implications-for-india-3681.html (accessed on March 4, 2013) 118 Hali, S.M., "Second Strike Capability," Nation, August 16, 2006, http://www.nation.com.pk/daily/august-2006/16/columns5.php. (accessed on, March 11,

2013) 119 Loudon, Bruce, "New Delhi Suspicious of Test," The Australian, July 27, 2007, http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,22139886-2703,00.html; (accessed on December 12, 2012)

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120 Masood, Salman, “Pakistan Says It Tested Nuclear-Capable Missile,” New York Times, June 5, 2012, www.nytimes.com/2012/06/06/world/asia/pakistan-says-it- testednuclear-capable-missile.html. 121 "Pakistan Military Test-Fires Nuclear Capable Cruise Missile," International Herald Tribune, August 25, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/08/25/asia/AS-GEN-

Pakistan-Missile-Test.php (accessed on October 23, 2012) 122 http://www.wmdinsights.com/I19/I19_SA2_MissileDev.htm 123 http://www.issi.org.pk/publication-files/1340000409_86108059.pdf 124 Patel, Y.I., “Dig Vijay to Divya Astra: A Paradigm Shift in the Indian Army's Doctrine,” Bharat Rakshak Monitor, Vol. 6, No. 6 (May–July 2004), http://www.bharat- rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE6-6/patel.html. 125 Op cit 126http://www.orfonline.com/cms/export/orfonline/modules/analysis/attachments/A355_1

199862929995.pdf 127 Khattak, Masood-ur-Rahman, “An Assessment of the Indian Military Exercises”, Weekly Pulse, May 20, 2011. Available at: http://www.weeklypulse.org/details.aspx?contentID=634&storylist=10, (accessed on

March 09, 2013) 128 Ahmed, Mansoor, Security Doctrines, Technologies and Escalation Ladders: A Pakistani Perspective, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-

Library/Publications/Detail/?lng=en&id=142881 (accessed on, March 4, 2013) 129 Ibid 130 Mansoor Ahmed, (2006) “Why Pakistan Needs Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Weekly Pulse” , May 06, Available at: http://www.weeklypulse.org/details.aspx?contentID=563&storylist=9,

(Accessed on September 15, 2011) 131 ISPR Press Release, April 19, 2011. Available at: http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-ress_release&id=1721 (accessed on March

11, 2013) 132 Sultan, Adil, P. 163

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Chapter: 6

CONCERNS AND REALITIES ON NUCLEAR PAKISTAN AND IRAN

Both Pakistan and Iran are Muslim states and acquire important strategic position in the region. Although Pakistan has already obtained both civil and military nuclear technology and a large number of well trained and internationally experienced personals are running its nuclear program but from the beginning of this century it has faced enormous criticism and mounting concerns by the global community on the security of its nuclear armaments and its (secret proliferation of centrifuge technology to Libya, North Korea and Iran). After the initiation of war against terrorism and increasing number of ethnic extremists in Pakistan's tribal areas, the west showed its fears regarding the security of Pakistan's nuclear facilities as a result of which many conspiracy theories began and a restrain between Pakistan and Western powers was clearly visible.

The Iranian case on the other hand is significant and phenomenal as discussed in previous chapters. Iran completed its first nuclear power plant in 2007 which took six years to become fully functional. Currently Iran is a focus of world attention, facing enormous pressure on its nuclear program after information of its nuclear activities at Natanz and Arak. Western powers especially America and Israel have continued to pressurize Iran with all types of measures including sanctions and threats of military strikes but Iran has stood firm on its decision to continue the program at any cost and has become a symbol of pride and resistance.

6.1. ISSUES RELATED TO IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM 6.1.1. Nuclear Iran: Concerns of Gulf States

The Gulf States are anxious about Iran’s nuclear program because leaders of other states alleged that Iran is using its civil nuclear program as a cover to develop nuclear

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weapons.1 It is widely believed that its nuclear program is the most fundamental component of Iran’s policy to achieve regional supremacy and this is an issue of major concern to the Arab peninsula states. Even without nuclear competence Iran is a regional power in the Middle East because of its geographic and demographic size. 2 Therefore, Iran can undermine the regional stability if it possesses nuclear arms.

6.1.2. The Roots of the Tension between Iran and Gulf States

Arabs and Persians have belonged to the same Islamic civilization and they share common characteristics of religion, culture, trade, and emigrants. However, eras of strain between Arabs and Persians interrupted their history.

In 1501, a new era of Persian history was established by the Safavid Empire; they reunified Iran as an independent state and established Twelver Shiism as the official religion of their empire, primarily to distinguish Iran from the Sunni Ottomans.3 While most Persians were Sunnis, the Safavids commenced a bloody movement, escalating all the way to Iraq, to change the inhabitants. Iraq turned into the frontier of the Ottomans throughout the clash among the Safavid and the Ottoman Empire. Under the Safavid Empire, the gap between Sunni Islam and Shia Islam widened.4 Under the influence of Safavid Shahs, Shia scholars developed new practices in order to shield the state from the surrounding Sunni Empire, including pilgrimages to the Shrines of Imams. 5 In addition to these activities, cursing the first three Sunni Caliphs fueled Sunni-Shia tensions even more.6

During Reza Shah's monarchy, Iran's territorial claim, including its authority over Bahrain, caused immense fear and anxiety in Arab Peninsula states. Furthermore, Iranian forces took control of the three islands into Gulf (Abu Mousa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs) from the United Arab Emirates (UAE).7 Till now those islands are still under the Iranian jurisdiction and this issue has had a strong effect on the relations among Tehran and its Arab neighbors. After the Revolution Khomeini further developed Shia governing theories and attempted to extend the rebellion across the borders by tagging all the regimes in the region as un-Islamic calling for their termination.8 Driven by Ayatollah's

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Ideology, Iran was involved in a coup plot in Bahrain and political protests in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.9 The clerics still desires to enforce their preeminence in region and did not accept the UAE's right over occupied islands.

Iran’s newly destabilizing influence forced the neighboring Sunni states to draw nearer to Iraq’s Ba’athist ideology in order to unite against a common threat knowing that Iran is imagining itself as a superpower in the region. 10 The threat of an Iranian invasion was most dangerous for Iraq because Shia comprises 60 percent of the population and Iraq hosts the holiest Shia shrines known as Karbala and Najaf.11 Saddam understands the threat of the Khomeini's philosophy and to protect the unity of Iraq, he commenced war against Islamic Republic of Iran. Furthermore, the Arab peninsula states were concerned due to the Iraq-Iran conflict. Shortly after the beginning of conflict, the Gulf realms mutually shaped the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) for joint defense. During Iran-Iraq war the GCC declared that it would remain neutral. But Iran considered the GCC’s position as a trick to assist Iraq through the combat. While, the GCC blamed Iran as the major source behind the uprisings across the Arab kingdoms. The fear among the GCC states was confirmed in December 1981, when a secrete group was discovered to be operating in Bahrain with a motive to topple the government through acts of terrorism and sabotage.12 Some of the plotters were found to have links with clerics from Iran.13 In a similar pattern, Saudi Arabia’s shitte minority's disturbances during the annual Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca was also seen as Iranian plot to destabilize the Saudi rule and quoted as another example of Iran’s encouragement of sectarian violence in the region. In December 1983, the attack on Kuwait further aggravated suspicions within the GCC. The perpetrators of these malicious acts of terrorism were found to belong to Ad-Dawah, a movement comprised of Iraqi Shia and the headquarters of this group was based in Tehran.14 After 2003's American invasion in Iraq, Ad Dawah party appears as one of the major parties in the newly formed Iraqi government.

From the 80s to the present, Bahrain and Kuwait having a significant Shiite population frequently show apprehensions that Tehran is fomenting turmoil among Shiites, highlighting fears about their internal stability.15 Recently, Morocco, Egypt, and Yemen also expressed the similar apprehensions. Iran also utilizes deputies that at times are a

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destabilizing force, as is the case with Hezbollah in Lebanon. 16 Others view Iran’s regional aspirations in a broader sense; Saudi Arabia criticizes Iran’s interference in what it perceives as “Arab cause,” like the Israeli-Palestinian issue, and reportedly confronts Iran’s proxies in Lebanese politics with material support of Sunni political parties and candidates.17 Furthermore, the association among the GCC states and the U.S has an enormous impact on the stress between the regional countries and Iran. Consequently, Iran regarded its neighbors, like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia as puppets who allowed the “Great Satan” to manipulate them.18 Certainly, there is a power struggle in the region between Sunni-ruled Arab states, led by Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and Iran and its allies and proxies, namely Syria, Hamas, and Hezbollah. 19 Recently, relations between Iran and Bahrain are became more stressed as a result of 2011 rebellion by Shiites in Bahrain which was sponsored by Tehran and successfully quelled after the deployment of PSF troops. Therefore if Iran succeeds to obtain a nuclear weapon then the balance of power would be shifted in favor of Iran and a nuclear Iran will obviously be unacceptable to the Arab states.

6.1.3. Shiite factor and nuclear weapons program

Iran's suspected non-peaceful nuclear program is not only of concern to Israel, but also to Arab countries in the region, especially those who fear that a progress towards a Shiite dominance is under way. On November 27th 2010 Wiki Leaks exposed that Saudi Arabia and Jordan had asked Washington to halt the Iranian nuclear program, by force if necessary. Like Israel’s nuclear program Iran’s program has caused widespread anxiety among Arab countries in the Middle East, but whereas Israel sparked only one failed proliferation attempt by Egypt, Iran appears to have prompted a rush to acquire nuclear technology by several Middle East countries.20

"The question arises that why Iranian neighbor do sees its nuclear program as a greater hazard than Israeli nuclear program? As the central nexus of world oil production and transshipment, the region is a key hub for the international economy."21 The Gulf countries rely on the security of their oil reserves for income; therefore they strongly need stability to secure their interests. In this scenario, there are three principal concerns by the

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Arab states in which Iran’s nuclear program signifies the menace of a regional power imbalance that would prompt its neighbors to hurry to hedge their nuclear bets. 22

First, there is the possibility that America or Israel may take preventive military action against Tehran's advancing nuclear capability. Tel Aviv in particular has a past of such actions, having destroyed nuclear facilities in Iraq in 1981 and Syria in 2007 with targeted airstrikes.23 Recently, Tal Aviv carried out military drills which appear to replicate a scenario in which they would assault the Iranian nuclear facilities. In the event of a major conflict among Iran and Israel or the United States, the rest of the Middle East especially Arab states have no wish to become wedged in the crossfire, militarily or politically.24 Armed conflict could also threaten to destabilize other states, or worse, disrupt the valuable oil market and cause economic turmoil throughout the region.25

Secondly, Arab states fear that nuclear Iran could become more aggressive and dominant player in the region. Despite the number of conflicts in the region over the past two decades, there has existed a relatively stable balance of power with no one country dominating the Middle East.26 Therefore GCC fears that, as Iran gains more prestige and authority from its ability to stand up to the pressure of the U.S and the rest of the powers it would begin to assert greater pressure on the affairs of Arab nations and the region’s economic interests.27 This could have a destabilizing effect on the political stability of moderate regimes in the region. 28 More so, Tehran would also come to a strong position of dictating its own stipulations on diverse international and regional issue.

Thirdly, Arabs fear that a nuclear armed Iran would deepen the already fragile Shiite- Sunni equation in the region and would also swing the balance of power in favor of Iran resulting in a possible arms race.29 It could also support the Shiite inhabitants in Sunni ruled countries to resort to hostile ways for government change, thus destabilizing domestic situations in an already brittle region. Some of the reports published in western media suggest that Saudis have been taken on board by the Israelis in case they decide to strike Iranian nuclear installations and therefore, Saudis have already given a green signal to Israel for using its airspace to strike Iran.30 There appears to be a tacit unanimity of views amongst the Europeans, the Arabs and the Americans that Iran must be prohibited

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from becoming a nuclear state, and if diplomacy fails, other options like sanctions or even a military strike should be used to prevent the country from achieving nuclear weapon capability.31

Because of these reasons, Iran’s nuclear program is professed as a grave menace to regional stability and the balance of power in the Middle East. Therefore, regional Arab states are playing there part to stop the further progress of Iranian nuclear program. They also fear that Iran with a nuclear weapon could erode their influence in region. Thus, a counterbalancing push for nuclear expansion in the region is viewed as a way to keep Iran’s nuclear activities in check.32

6.1.4. Israel's Perspectives and Interests Regarding Nuclear Iran

From 1948 to until the fall of Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1979, Israel had fine dealings with Iran. Israel provided the Shah with weapons and trained his secret police, the infamous SAVAK, and Iran provided Israel with oil, even during the Arab oil embargo after the October 1973 War.33 After the revolution in the 1980’s, Tel Aviv started to consider Iran a hazard as Tehran provided ideological motivation and military support for creating the Lebanese Hezbollah, which later attacked Americans and Israelis in the region and abroad. This threat perception raised as Israel progressively confronted Iranian-supported Palestinian Jihadist groups (Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad).

Authorities in Tel Aviv strongly believe that a nuclear armed Iran could cause a direct intimidation to its existence, provide a nuclear shield for Tehran sponsored proxy groups, and possibly supply them nuclear arms. In November 2009, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu laid out his views regarding Iran’s nuclear potential by saying:

"Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons threatens our security, peace in the Middle East, and global stability. With nuclear weapons, its powers of destruction, already considerable, would grow immensely. The moderates in the Middle East would be weakened and extremists strengthened. Other countries in the region would join the race for nuclear weapons. An Iranian regime that

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pledges to wipe Israel off the map would work day and night to undermine any attempt to advance peace between Israel and its neighbors – whether it is peace with the Palestinians, with Syria, and with anyone else. In contrast, if Iran’s nuclear ambitions are thwarted, peace would be given a dramatic boost. Hezbollah and Hamas would be considerably weakened and moderate forces within the region would quickly become ascendant. That is why the fate of Iran’s nuclear program is a true turning point in history. It would significantly influence our ability to achieve a stable and secure peace in the Middle East."34

Israeli security elites have various vital concerns with respect to Tehran’s acquirement of nuclear capabilities. In particular, Israeli leaders worry that nuclear weapons may provide a cover that would embolden Iran and its allies, lead to greater regional alignment with Iran, further erode U.S influence, and trigger broader regional proliferation that would further limit Israel’s freedom of action. 35

The first concern, that an Iranian bomb would grant cover for Iran and its regional associates to act more violently toward Israel, is frequently expressed through the example of Hezbollah.36 At present, Israeli analysts believe that Hezbollah confines its actions against Tel Aviv because of worries of Israeli reprisal in Beirut. But Tel Aviv strongly believed that, if Iran had a nuclear capability, Israel may not be able to act as freely against Lebanon and thus would be less able to limit Hezbollah's actions.37

A second Israeli concern relates to extensive perception that nuclear weapons under the possession of Iran would only strengthen the apparent ongoing decline in American influence in the Middle East region. Tel Aviv believes that Iran’s pursuit of nuclear capability is one of the major international problems of the day, and its outcome will shape U.S. status in the world. According to an Israeli appraisal, a bomb with Iranian tag would radically enhance regional extremism and could lead to the downfall of Arab governments (this view was expressed before the Arab revolts of 2011), increasing the risks for both Israel and the United States.38 Of course, concerns regarding eroding U.S. influence were already widespread even without Iran’s development of a nuclear bomb

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capability, with such regional perceptions increasing after the 2003 Iraq war and more recently in the wake of Arab revolts.39

A final Israeli concern relates to the risk that a nuclear Iran would cause further proliferation in the region.40 Almost every Israeli strategic appraisal on the subject consists of this prospect, largely dismissing research on proliferation trends that question such suppositions.41 Israel views a multi polar nuclear Middle East as particularly threatening to regional stability and Israeli security given the perceived absence of Cold War deterrence conditions and the complexity of a regional environment with multiple nuclear powers.42

6.1.5. The Iran Problem: assumptions and realities

It all started soon after the 1979s Islamic resolution; when the Shah of Iran was exiled because of his pro-western status and poor domestic policies, particularly his role in the dismantlement of the government of Mossadeq in 1953. The new Iranian administration was not willing to make friends and the hostage crises almost isolated Iran from the developed world. These crises outlined Iran's relationship with the America and other western powers. The world's second biggest oil exporting country clearly challenged American interests in the region and as a conservative Islamic state it also became a threat for the America’s ally Israel. Therefore, Americans fully supported the Iraqi dictator Sadam Husain to invade Iran and the Regan administration removed Iraq from the list of so-called terrorist nations, and lifted trade sanctions against the country. During the Iran-Iraq war American administration provided financial support, counter- insurgency training, operational intelligence in the combat zone and conventional arms to change the regime in Iran.

As mentioned in earlier chapter the new Iranian anti-western administration initially close down the constructions of its nuclear facilities and practically halted its nuclear program because they viewed the program as a western influence on the country, based on western technology bought from western countries and built by western contractors. But the regime changed its stance on nuclear technology only a year later, when the country

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faced one of the worst energy crises of its history and there were no other alternatives to deal with the situation. Because of Tehran's anti-western stance this time the Western contractors were not willing to work in Iran especially during the Gulf war. Iraqi forces used Chemical Weapons (CW) against Iran and 20 percent of the total casualties were caused by CWs. The use of CWs was a clear violation of Geneva protocol 1925. But international community did not show any attention to seriousness of Iraq’s use of CW and no action was taken. This kind of attitude indorsed the security concerns of Iranian think tanks. Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwa against nuclear weapons, declaring them 'un-Islamic'. Throughout the 80s Iran voted consistently for disarmament measures and at the end of the decade Iran had voted for over 20 disarmament initiatives. But because of massive number of causalities Iran's military commander, Gen. Mohsin Rezai first declared that, Iran needed nuclear warheads to win this war and it was his statement which forced Iranian establishment to accept the UN Security Council Resolution 598 that called for an instant truce. It was the first statement from an Iranian official to obtain nuclear weapons. In 1988, in a speech to the Revolutionary Guard Corps, Ali Akbar Rafsanjani (then-speaker of the Iranian parliament and commander in chief of Iran's armed forces) declared:

"With regard to chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons training, it was made very clear during the war that these weapons are very decisive. It was also made clear that the moral teachings of the world are not very effective when war reaches a serious stage and the world does not respect its own resolutions and closes its eyes to the violations and all the aggressions which are committed in the battle field. We should fully equip ourselves both in the offensive and defensive use of chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons. From now on you should make use of the opportunity and perform this task."43

The Iranian authorities knew the Importance of nuclear technology and at the end of Gulf war the authorities again pursued the nuclear suppliers to resume its nuclear program but this time Americans interfered and sabotaged all kinds of Iranian deals with European suppliers. As an alternative for European technology, Tehran developed its

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relations with China and Russia to resume its nuclear program but after the American pressure China withdrew its collaboration but Russia stayed firm and resisted the American pressure while continuing its work on Bushehr and other nuclear reactors.

On May 2, 1984 the neoconservative Kenneth L. Adelman, the Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency at the time, gave an address in Chicago in which he mentioned a British defense journal's report stating that Iran is only 2 years away from obtaining nuclear arsenal. The journal that he referred to was Jan's Defense Weekly of April 1984, which had published some fabricated news about Iran building a nuclear weapon with some "very enriched uranium" from Pakistan, based on some West German Intelligence.44 In that particular time Iran was fighting against Iraq and did not possess enough recourse to resume its nuclear energy program. During the Iran-Iraq war America and Israel started their massive campaign against Iran's sins, particularly the offense of developing WMDs. But there was no solid avoidance to prove their theory. In November 1991, when India offered the construction of a research reactor to Tehran, senior Israeli officials claimed that the Indian reactor would soon enable Iran to produce a significant amount of plutonium and it would put Iran close to producing a nuclear weapon within a few years. However, since there had been no sale of a research reactor to Iran by India, the story was replaced by other more sensational stories. For example, The Jerusalem Report of March 26, 1992 which stated that "three missiles with nuclear warheads missing from the former Soviet republic of Kazakhstan were spirited away, at a price, to Tehran."45 But this report was also a false alarm because the missing nuclear weapons were found in custody of Russia. In the same year an Iranian opposition group known as MEK (it is widely believed that the group was backed by Israel) again claimed that Kazakhstan has sold several nuclear warheads to Iran. But again the report was denied by Russia, Kazakhstan and Iran. After visiting Iran in February 1992, IAEA also confirmed that the report of Iran obtaining nuclear weapons was a fabrication. In the following year IAEA inspectors revisited Iranian nuclear sites for an evidence of clandestine nuclear weapons program and reconfirmed that they did not discover any proof that Iran is in possession of nuclear weaponry.

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6.1.5.1. Early Reports

Many reporters which were involved in news concerning Iran's suspected WMD program were closely associated with the neoconservatives and Israeli circles. For example, Kenneth R. Timmerman, a member of the Board of Advisors of the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA) and, as of 1995, the "Executive Director of the Foundation of Democracy in Iran," reported news among Iran's nuclear collaboration with Syria and Libya for the nuclear weapons, which was published on August 2, 1992 in The Jerusalem Post. In his other reports he claimed that soon Iran would obtain assistance from Central Asian countries for nuclear weapon technology. So far all of his reports proved complete fabrications and none of his claims were proven.

Amir Taheri, a member of the neoconservative publicity agency Benador Associates, also reported similar kind of reports in the 90s. He reported on December 31, 1991, in Al- Awsat (London), that Iran has received nuclear weapons technology from Brazil and India.46 In one of his other report he claimed that an Iranian scientist had stated: "We want to have the technical expertise and the industrial base necessary to produce nuclear weapons if and when that becomes necessary." This report was published in Money clips on January 27, 1992. As time passed it became clear that all of these news reports were untrue and the only purpose of this kind of news was to pressurize the world community to take legal action against the Iranian regime.

Since the early 1990s a number of pro-Israeli newspapers and magazines have also been quite active in propagating false news about Iran's alleged nuclear weapons program. One such magazine is US News & World Report, which is owned by Mortimer Zuckerman, the former chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organization.47 From early 90s the magazine continually publishes fabricated news on nuclear Iran. On February 12, 1990 it reported that "Pakistani engineers are helping to build a plutonium reactor in Iran". Another report published in October 1993 stated: "Intelligence sources have confirmed that Tehran did indeed buy weapons-grade uranium from Kazakh scientists who worked on the Soviet Union's nuclear program." 48 These were the few examples of magazine's reports on Iran and all such reports were proved as

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pure fabrications. The magazine is still producing sensational reports regarding Iran's nuclear arsenals but failed to prove the credibility of its predictions.

6.1.6. American and Israeli Allegations against Iran During 90s

In March 1992, the director of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Robert Gates stated that, Iran could have a nuclear bomb by the year 2000 if the West does not prevent it. 49 A year later, the new CIA director, R. James Woolsey made the same statement. Even after the IAEA's conformation report in which it stated that they found no indication of weapon program in Iran. Mr. Woolsey stayed firm on his prediction that Tehran is eight to ten years away from nuclear weapons.

On January 5, 1995 The New York Times published a report, according to which American and Israeli officials claimed that Iran could produce nuclear weapon in less than five years. Israeli officials described this new assessment as the most serious threat for their country and further added: "When we look at the future and ask ourselves what is the biggest problem we will face in the next decade … Iran's nuclear bomb is at the top of the list."50 Another senior Israeli official said that if the program is not halted, they will consider using force against Iran's nuclear sites. A tactic they already used against Iraq in 1981.

In July 30, 1996, director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, John Holum made a statement in which he claimed that, "Iran is 10 to 15 years away from acquiring nuclear weapon." But in very next year he reduced nuclear Iran's estimated years from 10-15 to eight years.51

Throughout the 1990s both the IAEA and Iranian officials rejected the existence of any nuclear weapon program. But both U.S and Israel constantly accused Iran for nuclear weapons program. In fact, Israel begins to threaten Iran with military attacks and on May 22, 1995 The Independent reported that "Israel is considering attacking Iranian nuclear facilities to prevent Iran acquiring a bomb, according to Israeli press reports. The aim would be to repeat Israel's success in 1981 in bombing Iraq's Osirak reactor."52 These reports were never denied by any Israeli official. At the end of the millennium there was

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no bomb in sight, therefore all estimates were pushed forward into the next century. In late 90s new series of thrilling fake stories were started again by Israel and its allied lobbies for example, on April 10, 1998 The Jerusalem Post stated: "Iran paid $25 million for what appears to have been two tactical atomic weapons smuggled out of the former Soviet Union in a highly classified operation aided by technicians from Argentina, according to Iranian government documents marked top secret and obtained by The Jerusalem Post."53 The newspaper also claimed that the source of these documents is an exiled Iranian scientist and these documents were first studied by the US government and now these documents were under investigation of the Israeli intelligence. But when reporters asked about this story, State Department spokesman James Rubin said: "There was no evidence to substantiate such claims." Some of the US senators also made serious accusations against Iran. For example two American house members Representatives Jim Saxton and Bill McCollum even alleged that Iran has acquired nuclear weapon as well as established a ballistic missile control system to launch them. This claim was also published in The Jerusalem Post on April 16, 1998.

Throughout 90s, IAEA inspectors visited Iran number of times but did not find any bombs or activity regarding acquisition of nuclear arsenals. Therefore, the IAEA declined to issue a fake report accusing Iran and, instead, reported that Iran's nuclear activity appears to be peaceful. This type of response was unacceptable for both Israel and America. Thus, in August 1998 the US Congress voted to cut US voluntary contributions to the IAEA by the amount the agency spends on nuclear energy projects in Iran. 54 The bill was passed 405 to 13, also asked the Secretary of State to review the IAEA's activities annually and report to congress.

6.1.7. Beginning of the New Millennium with New Allegations

The 21st century started with sensational news of Iran's nuclear weapons. On January 17, 2000 two New York Times reporters Judith Miller and James Risen reported: "The CIA assessed that Tehran may now be able to produce a nuclear weapon and Iran acquired the technology by the international black market, primarily from the former Soviet Union. The agency has notified policy makers that it is not assured that Iran really has atomic

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weapon now but agency can't rule out the likelihood that Tehran has acquired them." Furthermore, the report also stated that: "by 2010, with the help of Russian technology and assistance, Iran might test a missile that could reach the United States."55 There was no doubt that this story was a fabrication. The task at hand was to scare the public and achieve the desire results, a tactic that proved quiet useful in the second invasion of Iraq.56

Throughout the coming year Israel continued to produce more exclusive propaganda against Iran officially and also with the help of its print media. The Israeli defense minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer told Turkish officials that Iran could produce nuclear weapons by 2005 and its missiles could also reach any point in the Middle East region.57 But at the end of the year Israel found an Iranian statement to back their claim that Iran is a biggest threat for its security. On December 14, 2001 in a prayer meeting on Quds Day, former Iranian President Rafsanjani stated:

"Colonialists have supplied vast quantities of weapons of mass destruction and unconventional weapons to Israel. They have permitted it to have them and they have shut their eyes to what is going on. They have nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and long-range missiles and suchlike…If one day, the Islamic world is also equipped with weapons like those that Israel possess now, then the imperialists' strategy will reach a standstill because the use of even one nuclear bomb inside Israel will destroy everything. However, it will only harm the Islamic world. It is not irrational to contemplate such an eventuality. Of course, you can see that the Americans have kept their eyes peeled and they are carefully looking for even the slightest hint that technological advances are being made by an independent Islamic country. If an independent Islamic country is thinking about acquiring other kinds of weapons, then they do their utmost to prevent it from acquiring them. Well, that is something that almost the entire world is discussing right now."58

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It was a golden opportunity for Israel to use these remarks against Iran and they did. On December 26, 2001 Israeli foreign minister Shimon Peres recorded its protest to the international community against Iran in which he mentioned that Iran is willing to destroy Israel with a "nuclear weapon". On his letter to the foreign ministers of the countries serving UN Security Council, the EU and UN Secretary General he stated: "Rafsanjani's bone-chilling statements contradict Iran's claim that it is acquiring nuclear power for peaceful purpose only."59 Furthermore, in a television interview he said:

"I want to tell you that this statement of Rafsanjani, that they will produce a nuclear bomb to destroy Israel, is tantamount to a statement by Hitler, and we must not treat this issue lightly or allow to deflect attention from this, and we will do everything possible so that the entire world will know about this."60

However, if we re-read the Rafsanjani speech we could easily find that he never stated any word such as Iranian nuclear weapon and the context of his speech was different. But like the past Israel used the opportunity to develop a perception through pro-Israeli media and lobbies that Iran is working on a WMD program.

6.1.8. Revealing of Nuclear Facilities: The New Front against Iran

On August 14, 2002, in an emergency press conference a so called Iranian opposition group MEK claimed that Iran is constructing two nuclear facilities not reported to the IAEA, at Arak and Natanz. The group also showed some satellite pictures to the audience and within a few minutes this revelation became a most sensational story ever made on Iranian nuclear program. As pointed out in chapter 4, constructing these facilities did not infringe the NPT agreement, since the IAEA requires designs to be submitted 180 days before fissile material is loaded on to the site. The other important point was that the IAEA already knew about the existence of such facilities six months prior to MEKs revelation.

A state department report in 1992 identified the MEK as responsible for the killing of six Americans in Iran during the 1970s.61 Consequently, MEK was designated as terrorist organization by the Americans in 1997. Interestingly, the head of MEK, Alireza

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Jaferzadeh held his press conference at Willard Inter-Continental Hotel, in Washington DC. Many independent observers raised questions on American involvement in this new Iranian revelation. The question arises as how a US-designated terrorist organization accessed the sophisticated satellite systems and pin pointed the exact positions of Iranian’s nuclear facilities. To date there is no official response to this question. Independent observers however believe that America and Israel had played a role to create the scenario. An American congressman Gray Ackerman stated in 2001 that:

"He did not give a shit if they [MEK] are undemocratic or a terrorist organization based in Iraq; what was important was that they helped to destroy both Iran and Iraq."62

In January 2004, MEK held a rally at the Washington Convention Center in the guise of raising funds for the victims of earthquake in the Iranian city of Balm. Richard Perle, a well-known neoconservative American political advisor, consultant, and Israeli lobbyist attended the rally and delivered a paid speech. He was also the assistant Secretary of Defense in the Reagan administration and had worked on the Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee from 1987 to 2004.63 After being questioned by reporter about attending a MEK event, he replied that he was unaware of any involvement by the terrorist group, which was clearly unbelievable. There are so many other reports which indicate connections between MEK and American-Israeli lobbies and to gain maximum attention from the world MEK was the perfect choice. Once MEK broadcasted the news, the US and Israeli administrations tried hard to convince the UN that Iran is hiding something, therefore Iran must be reported to Security Council for the violation of NPT and sanctions must be imposed against it.

The Security Council forced Iran to sign the additional protocol of NPT, which allows IAEA to make sudden inspections across Iranian territory. During 2003 IAEA inspectors carried several inspections of Iranian nuclear sites and a report was issued in June 2003. The report showed concerns on Iran's safeguard obligations and demanded that Iran should conclude NPTs additional protocol. Although the report did not say that Iran had a weapon program, yet US officials sounded as if the report confirmed their allegation that

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Iran was actually developing a nuclear weapon. In reference to the question "Do you have any reaction to the IAEA's report on Iran's nuclear efforts," Ari Fleischer, the White House Press Secretary, stated: "Well, the President welcomes the international community's report about Iranian attempts to develop nuclear weaponry."64 The US representative in IAEA, Kenneth Bill was unsatisfied with the report and called it deeply troubling and also gave a very interesting statement. According to him: "The US expects the Agency's accumulation of further information will point to only one conclusion—that Iran is aggressively pursuing a nuclear weapons program."65 Meanwhile, the US authorities also pressurized Russia to stop the construction of Iran’s Bushehr power plant.

In 2003 when IAEA revealed that its inspectors had found traces of highly enriched uranium at Kalaye. The Israeli and Western media reported Tel Aviv's intentions for a preemptive strike on Iran's six nuclear sites. Planting ominous news was part of the Israeli strategy of waging a psychological war against Iran and putting pressure on the Americans and Europeans to impose UN sanctions on Iran.66 In September 2003, warning and threats became more intensified, as Tel Aviv hinted at a likely military action to prevent what it calls a frightening scenario—nuclear arms in the hands of Islamic Republic of Iran. The Israeli claims and threats became so severe that Iran had to warn Israel not to commit the error of wagging a military attack, because it would face a slap it will never forget.67

6.1.9. Iran's Confidence Building Measures

In October 2003, after successive talks with EU-3, in which Europeans admitted Iran's right to development of its civil nuclear program, Iran signed NPT's additional protocol and voluntarily suspended all enrichment and reprocessing activities as defined by the IAEA.68 The EU-3 promised to Iran to provide access to advanced nuclear technology after the end of international concerns on the nuclear program. Therefore in the same month Iran also handed over its record of past atomic activities but Israeli representatives continually issued threatening statements against Tehran. For example Israeli Defense Minister, Shaul Mofaz stated that:

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"Iran would reach a point of no return in its nuclear program within a year unless there were concerted efforts to stop it."69

Through November 2003 Americans worked hard in UN Security Council to declare that Iran is not acting under the NPT. Therefore sanctions must be imposed. Knowing the intentions of US and Israel, there was resistance on the part of other members of the board of Governance. Therefore, the Russian atomic energy minister, Alexander Rumyantsev stated:

"Sanctions are unacceptable as nothing has been discovered. Iran has shown everything it has (in the nuclear field). It is hard to imagine Iran still has something to disclose."70

6.1.10. A New Series of Allegations and Realities

Through 90s American and Israeli newspaper claimed that Iran has received nuclear warheads from Russia stored in the Lavizan military camp in Tehran. Yet the story of Lavizan was kept alive by the US-Israeli alliance and the IAEA was delegated to inspect the site. In September 2004 IAEA inspectors visited the site and took environmental samples of the site because the site had been razed in 2003 and turned into a park. The results of environmental samples revealed no signs of nuclear activities. The report rejected US claim that Tehran could have used the site to run secret uranium enrichment program and that dismantlement of the Lavizan site is a part of nuclear cover-up.

In September 2004, a senior US official claimed that they got satellite photos of a n alleged nuclear industrial location in Iran which demonstrate its intentions to develop WMDs. He also accused that IAEA had asked to inspect the site but Tehran refused the request. The claimed site was a military complex known as Parchin, situated southeast of Tehran. The Iranian authorities denied the American claim of nuclear facility and also argued that IAEA had not requested such a visit and Iran would cooperate if such a request was made. Thus, in January 2005 inspectors of the agency visited Parchin and took environmental samples from the site. The results showed that there was no nuclear material present and once again the American claim proved to be a fabrication.

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In December 2004, the head of IAEA Elbaradei admitted that they have received access to every facility they asked for but his statement was not accepted and US administration was so upset with his refusal to send Iran’s care to the Security Council that it tried to remove him from office. He was accused of having an Islamic bias and claimed that they intercepted dozens of Elbaradei's phone calls made to Iranian diplomats. The US Secretary of State Colin Powell also stated that:

"Elbaradei should step aside after his term expires in spring of 2005 and not run for a third term."71

However Elbaradei refused to act on behalf of its opposition saying:

"We cannot work on the basis of beliefs; we have to work on the facts. As long as we have cooperation, and we do not see a smoking gun, the international community should bear with us. … If people have information and on this basis are coming to the conclusion that this is a weapon program, then I would very much like them to share it."72

It is an open fact that Americans were acting under the influence of Israeli lobbies. In 2005, the European leaders tried to persuade President Bush that Iran should be offered some economic incentives and should be allowed to buy spare parts for its airplane fleet.73 Ultimately, American administration showed some intentions to drop its objections against Iran on the membership of WTO and also agreed to consider, on a case-by-case basis, the licensing of spare parts for Iranian civil aircrafts, in particular from the EU. But for Americans the key was Israel, and only after its approval Bush administration could shift its policy practically therefore, in April 2005 President Bush tried to convince Sharon, who was visiting Bush at his Texas ranch, that he should support the European diplomatic efforts to ensure Iran does not develop nuclear weapons.74 Sharon showed President Bush satellite photographs of Iranian nuclear sites and stated that Tehran was forthcoming a point of no return. He also criticized the EU saying that European negotiating with Iran were softening their position and may be

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willing to allow it to hold on to technology to enrich uranium. 75 The very next day US Secretary of State's Condoleezza Rice said:

"The United States is giving European efforts to rein in Iran's nuclear program a few more months before considering tougher measures."76

There are other countless examples which indicate that Israeli lobbies and representatives in Washington were the major players in the development of US policies for the Middle East.

6.1.11. Shift in Iranian Policy after 2005

In March 2005, the Israeli foreign minister Silvan Shalom stated:

"Iran will have the technological know-how within six to nine months to build a nuclear bomb."

It was one of the many predictions which were made by both Israeli and American administrations throughout 2005. Tehran was frustrated because for almost 20 months, no enrichment and reprocessing activity was held and still EU-3 failed to provide any type of economic incentive to Iran for its decision of a nuclear freeze. The regime was facing heavy criticism domestically on its nuclear stance. Therefore in August 2005, after Ahmadinejad took office as a President of Iran, the regime decided to resume its uranium conversion activity and still maintain its voluntary suspension of all enrichment related activities. Obviously this decision was made to pressurize the EU-3 to remind its commitments. In response the EU-3 applied the policy of "Carrots and Sticks". First they threatened Iran with sending the case to Security Council and then called for a long term package of trade and technology incentives. The demands in this new package were clearly restricting Iran's inalienable right to develop a civil nuclear program under the NPT's article IV. The framework required Iran to stop construction of its Heavy Water Research Reactor at Arak.

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The European package was rejected by Tehran. Subsequently, the IAEA board of governors issued a resolution on August 11, 2005 in which it expressed serious concerns and demanded that Iran should postpone its nuclear related activities. In the same month a major US intelligence agency claimed that Iran is ten years away from producing a nuclear weapon. On the other hand Israel alleged that they expect Iran will be capable of producing nuclear weapon within three years. 77 By now these wild, random predictions had been made after to be taken seriously by the rest of the world.

6.1.12. Ahmadinejad and "wiping Israel off the map"

On October 26, 2005 president Ahmadinejad delivered a keynote address at the "World without Zionism" conference at Tehran. At one point on Palestine issue he stated:

"Our dear Imam [Ayatollah Khomeini] stated that this Quds [Jerusalem] occupying regime must disappear from the page of time. This is a very wise statement. The Palestine problem is not one with which we could compromise partially."78

On very next day the headline in The Jerusalem Post was "Iranian President: Wipe Israel off the map". The facts were manipulated by Israeli media and officials in such a way that it would help to push for UN sanctions. Israel's Vice Premier, Shimon Peres called for Israel to work to get Iran kicked out of the UN saying Ahmadinejad's comments represented a crime against humanity.79 There were countless US and Israeli statements which demanded that Iran be expelled from the UN calling for Sanctions from the Security Council.80 US House of Representatives passed a resolution against Ahmadinejad's statement. Six month after his speech, a scholar, Professor Juan Cole declared that the statement had been mistranslated and there is no Persian idiom to wipe something off the map.81 A few other Farsi experts also wrote about the mistranslation and the fact that it suited the political campaign against Iran. But these researches failed to gain any media or official attention.

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6.1.13. The Laptop Mystery

The New York Times reported in November 2005 that according to an official:

"U.S received documents from a walk in source who approached U.S intelligence earlier this month with more then, 1,000 pages purported to be Iranian drawing and technical documents, including a nuclear warhead design and modifications to enable Iranian ballistic missiles to deliver an atomic strike."82

All these documents were in a laptop and to this day, the source of the laptop remains a mystery. IAEA officials suspected the legitimacy of the laptop story saying:

"If you have a clandestine program, you don’t put it on laptops which can walk away. Moreover, the data is all in English which may be reasonable for some of the technical matters, but at some point you'd have thought there would be at least some notes in Farsi. So there is some doubt over the provenance of the computer."83

6.1.14. Iran's Decision to Restart its Enrichment Program and its After Effects

After two years of suspension, Iran resumed its work on its enrichment program. In these two years Iran failed to gain any benefit from the West as promised by the EU-3. As expected, Washington and its allies showed immediate action against Iran's decision. Specifically, White House stepped up diplomatic pressure by saying that Iran had made a serious miscalculation by clearing the way to resume enrichment, and that inte nsive diplomacy with European allies and others was starting over what to do next. 84 Therefore, in February 2006 IAEA referred Iran to the Security Council. Although, Elbaradei had stated that a deal on Iran's suspected nuclear program could be only a few days away, making UN Security Council’s action unneeded. Iran was ready to delay industrial scale enrichment for two years in exchange for small scale enrichment. But the White House

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was not ready to show any tolerance and opposed any kind of enrichment on Iranian soil. Hence the chances of a compromise were over.

After Iran's referral to Security Council, Israeli leaders started to compare Iran with Nazi Germany and Ahmadinejad to Hitler on a daily basis. Israeli defense minister Shaul Mozaf said that:

"Ahmadinejad was the world's most dangerous leader since Adolf Hitler and that Israel was now under an existential threat from Iran."85

Almost all Israeli leadership had produced same kind of statements; the reason behind this new shift in Israeli policy was the campaign to portray Iran as a threat to Israel the world peace. Because under these allegations UN charter's chapter 7, which has the title "Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression"86 could be imposed against Iran providing the legal base for invading the country under the United Nation umbrella.

US also believed that only a fall of the Islamic republic will lead to an end of its nuclear program. To promote democracy in Iran Washington started to devote more funds to anti mullah groups and in February 2006 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice asked congress to provide $75 million in emergency funding to step up pressure on the Iranian government, including expanding radio and television broadcasts into Iran and promoting internal opposition to the rule of religious leaders. 87

Furthermore, to maintain pressure on the international community for sanctions, Israeli authorities issued threats of a unilateral military strike against Iran. In 2006 Israeli Deputy Defense Minister Ephraim Sneh had indicated that Israel might be forced to launch a military strike against Iran's disputed nuclear program further stating that: "He considers this option as a last resort. But even the last resort is sometimes the only resort."88

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At last both Washington and Israel succeeded due to their propaganda and pressure politics and sanctions were forced on Iran by the Security Council and Resolution 1737, 1747, 1803 and 1929 were passed in December 2006 to date.

By 2010, Iran started to raise the enrichment level of some of its LEU to 20% apparently to produce fuel for TRR and isotopes for medicinal purposes. Although Iran has a right under NPT that it can enrich uranium up to 20 percent but international community specifically Israel once again started propaganda enrichment is for military purposes. AEOI's head Ali Akbar Salehi proposed that Iran would keep its enrichment activities below 5 percent in return for the West providing fuel rods for the Tehran reactor but the offer was refused by P5+1.89 Furthermore, to address international concerns Iran signed an agreement with Turkey and Brazil known as Tehran Declaration in which it agreed to send 1,200 kg of its LEU to Turkey in return for 120 kg of 20 percent enriched fuel for the TRR within a year (For Detail See Ch. 4). IAEA and P5+1 rejected the deal because of Iran had promised to export 1,200 kg of LEU when its total stockpile was around 2,300 kg. Again the powers did not show any flexibility and insisted to halt enrichment program.

Interestingly, the deal was based on a proposal first drafted by the Obama administration with Brazilian and Turkish officials under the impression that they had the approval of Washington to bargain with Iran. 90 Disappointingly, the White House trampled on their success by refusing the plan and the UNSC passed further sanctions against Iran. Once again, Tehran was not interested in enriching uranium up to 20 percent; it sought only to have assurances that fuel would be guaranteed for the Tehran reactor and its rights under the NPT would be respected.91 The West itself pushed Iran to attain 20 percent enrichment so that it could make fuel rods for the Tehran reactor. 92

On September 21, 2011, in his interview with The New York Times’ President Mahmud Ahmadinejad yet again restated Iran’s readiness to stop producing 20 percent enrichment in response of supply of the material by world powers. He said:

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"If they give us the 20% enriched uranium this very week, we will cease the domestic enrichment of uranium of up to 20 percent this very week."93

The President Obama showed intentions for table talk with Tehran but because of the non-tolerable stance and backdoor diplomatic pressure on US administration by Tel Aviv, the negotiations among Iran and world powers failed to produce any significant breakthrough throughout the first decade of twenty first century. Tehran claiming that its nuclear program did not violate any provision of NPT and as a matter of fact the UN Watch dog IAEA still failing to find any clandestine nuclear activity in Iran. But on the other hand P5+1 did not agreed with Iranian stance and therefore recently as a result of an interim deal between Iran and P5+1, Tehran again halted its nuclear program as a confidence building measure to address the concerns of regional and world community.

After the study of Iranian nuclear issue it became apparent that presently Tehran does not possess any clandestine nuclear program or facility. Most importantly IAEA failed to find suspicious activity or material in facilities which were pin pointed by the world's two biggest spy agencies. Different administrations of both Tel Aviv and Washington simultaneously fabricated negative propaganda against Iran. Both of these states pressurized Security Council directly or indirectly to approve sanctions. The well-known western media showed its biasness in its reporting regarding Iran. Facts were manipulated and conspiracy theories were regularly produced by Israeli and US media. Because of immense propaganda the international community was misguided by these states. The study also shows that the American policies regarding the Middle East region were heavily influenced by Israel. Interestingly, Arab monarchs are supporting American and Israeli policies against Iran on sectarian basis notably to secure their monarchies. Although Iran halted its nuclear program after EU-3s assurance that soon it will gain the financial benefits from EU powers but because of unfaithfulness of these powers Iran reconsidered its nuclear policy and restarted its program. The West should have to respect Iran's right to develop nuclear technology for nonviolent purposes. On the other side Iran will have to reconsider its relations and foreign policy with the international community specifically with its neighboring states to complete its peaceful nuclear program.

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6.2. CONCERNS OVER SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETSE

After the incident of 9/11, Western powers, especially think tanks and the print media, begun to raise questions regarding the protection of Pakistan’s nuclear assets. On September 18, 2001, the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) raised concerns that “increased instability in Pakistan could make Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and stocks of nuclear explosive material dangerously vulnerable to theft by militant groups.”94 The report also emphasized the likelihood of an armed assault on Pakistan’s nuclear installations by radical groups linked to Al-Qaida or the Taliban, and the function of armed forces personnel compassionate to the Islamic fundamentalists. In October 2001, a subsequent report of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) identified the following security threat scenarios relevant to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons:95

 Outside threat: an individual or armed group from outside the facility can access to nuclear weapons  Inside threat: a person from within the setup can gain control of nuclear weapon and sell  Inside/outside threat: insiders and outsiders conspire mutually acquire weapons or weapon components  Leakage of sensitive information: an internal source can provide key information about Pakistan’s nuclear armaments to outsiders  Loss of Central Control of Storage Facilities: in the incident of a civil war in country, clear lines of communication and control over weapon, weapons components, and information may be busted or lost completely. 96

On November 11, 2007 the Washington Post and New York Times published an intelligence report, which affirmed that the U.S had had prepared eventuality plans to prevent Pakistan’s nuclear weapons fall down into the wrong hands. On that particular day, similar type of statement was given by then U.S. Ambassador John Bolton to the U.N. The very next day in response to these statements Pakistan’s Foreign Office

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spokesman, Mohammad Sadiq, stated that Pakistan had sufficient retaliatory capability to protect its nuclear weapons; he also affirmed that there was no risk of the weapons being taken by any group, and if another country tried to intervene, Pakistan was ready to defend its nuclear arsenal.97

In January 2008, the chief of the IAEA, Mohammad Elbaradei expressed the fear that:

"Nuclear weapons could fall into the hands of extremist groups in Pakistan or Afghanistan."98

However, Pakistan’s Foreign Office rejected Elbaradei’s statement, saying that, as head of the IAEA, he should be more careful about his statements, which ought to remain within the parameters of his mandate. 99

On September 22, 2008, U.S Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCF), Admiral Michael Mullen described his concerns regarding Pakistan's nuclear assets. He said,

“To the best of my ability to understand it—and that is with some ability—the weapons there are secure. And, that even in the change of government, the controls of those weapons haven’t changed. Certainly at a worst-case scenario with respect to Pakistan, I worry a great deal about those weapons falling into the hands of terrorists and either being proliferated or potentially used.”100

Likewise, On March 31, 2009, General David H. Petraeus, Commander, U.S. Central Command, testified that:

"Pakistani State’s failure would provide transnational terrorist groups and other extremist organizations an opportunity to acquire nuclear weapons and a safe haven from which to plan and launch attacks."101

The terrorist attacks on Rawalpindi General Head Quarter (GHQ), the Aeronautical Complex in Kamra, and other correlated events have once again sparked doubts between

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global community that Pakistan’s nuclear assets would became the future target. However, on October 11, 2009, the U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, during her address in London stated that:

"Extremists were increasingly threatening the authority of the State, but we see no evidence that they are going to take over the State. We have confidence in the Pakistani government and military’s control over nuclear weapons."102

Afterward, during her three-day visit to Islamabad in late October 2009, Hillary once again uttered a high level of confidence in safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenals. Still, she urged Pakistan to face up to the potential threat of nuclear-armed terrorists and encouraged the country to join nuclear non-proliferation talks.103

The specific concerns often rised by the U.S authorities as well as expressed in the Western media, which cause suspicions over Pakistan’s nuclear safety and security, can be summed up as following:

 Theft of a nuclear arms or material by radical group.  Susceptibility of nuclear armaments during the conflict, movement, and deployment.  The domestic instability could weaken the government’s control over its nuclear weapons whereby Islamic fundamentalists could gain control over them. Particularly, fears that Pakistan could suffer a further military overthrow and that a radical leadership would seize nuclear arms.  Experts from the nuclear facilities could steal imperative information or assist other states or rough groups on nuclear technology.  An insider can collaborate with an outsider to disrupt nuclear installations.  Some analysts raise concerns on accidental or unauthorized launch of nuclear weapons.104 A Congressional Research Service (CRS) report of February 2005 says that there are two basic nuclear risks in South Asia: first, that terrorist will acquire nuclear material or nuclear weapons, and second, that nuclear war will erupt through miscalculation, through preemption, or through sudden escalation. 105

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To eradicate these fears, Pakistani Foreign Office and security representatives have given numerous special briefings on Pakistan's nuclear safety to Western ambassadors and correspondents. Although Pakistani officials have refused all of mentioned concerns but the measures taken by Islamabad to address these concerns must be highlighted.

6.2.14. Measures Taken By Pakistan To Secure Its Nuclear Arsenal

The nuclear safety and security background in Pakistan is now thirteen years old and it is frequently developing. Ever since the 1998 nuclear explosions, Islamabad has taken special actions to protect the state’s nuclear belongings. The primary measure in this regard was the formation of the National Command Authority (NCA) in 1999 to administrate and preserve nuclear assets and associated infrastructures. The NCA has a three-tiered structure with two committees, the Employment Control Committee (ECC) and the Development Control Committee (DCC), constituting one tier; the Strategic Plan Division (SPD), the permanent secretariat of the NCA, second tier; and the three services Strategic Force Command, the final tier (NCA and all of its organs have been discussed in chapter 3).106

The SPD plays a significant role as managing entity and supervises nuclear assets by work together with all strategic organizations. It has also devised a standard operating system to regulate the pattern of strategic organizations. It has established a system which requires approval, reporting and monitoring of travel for all scientific personnel, especially those that possess sensitive information or expertise. 107 On May 28, 2009, the Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs at the SPD, Air Commodore Khalid Banuri, claimed that Pakistan has a large force of nearly 10,000 people deployed to keep a tight vigil on the country’s nuclear arsenal.108 Under the SPD Pakistani authorities have taken a number of steps in last twelve years to secure its nuclear assets compatible to the standard international procedures for nuclear security.

6.2.14.1. Screening Programs for Individuals

To make sure individuals’ dependability based on generally established security standards, Pakistan has instituted Personnel and Human Reliability Programs for all

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officials and scientists working on key assignments. The program is governed by SPD along with three intelligence organizations (ISI, MI, and the IB). The procedures were established in the early 2000s; it took two years to do so, and the reform had to overcome resistance.109 Two different programs exist: a Human Reliability Program (HRP) for civilians and a Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) for military. 110 The PRP and HRP makes sure that all people accountable for handling or guarding nuclear materials or weapons are reliable, trustworthy, psychologically stable and moderate.111 Under these programs any person assigned to a sensitive project now go through a security approval by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the Military Intelligence, the Intelligence Bureau, and the SPD.

The program has been applied to some 2,000-4,000 persons. This includes about 2,000 scientists or engineers working in particularly sensitive areas or having critical knowledge; they continue to be monitored after retirement.112 There are approximately ten thousand personnel having access to vital information and SPD plans to expand programs to all these employees. After primary screening, there are periodic clearance rechecks every two years or when an individual is relocated from one location of the program to another.113 In addition, random verifications can be performed when necessary. This procedure comprises complete background check of an individual, including lifestyle, family, friends, political associations, educational career, and inclinations. Furthermore, the 2007s National Command Authority Ordinance, grants SPD power to investigate distrustful conduct, and can send for up to 25 years of sentence any serving and retired personnel, including military personnel, notwithstanding any other laws.114

6.2.14.2. Physical Security and Surveillance

As much as physical safety measures of Pakistan's nuclear assets are concerned, the nuclear installations are spread physically. There are various systems of protection over these nuclear facilities. This includes highly trained Special Forces at the inner perimeter, air defense systems, no fly zones, fencing of structures, monitoring by state of the art

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equipment, close-circuit cameras, sensors, and check posts at second and third level, and counterintelligence teams to identify any threat to nuclear installations.115

In 2001, President Musharraf ordered re-locate of nuclear weapons to at least six new secret locations, and rationalized the military oversight of nuclear forces. It is widely believed that Pakistan has approximately 100 nuclear weapons which are kept detach from their delivery means, with the core detached from their detonators. According to former head of SPD General Khalid Kidwai, the weapon can be accumulated rapidly when the requirement occurs. Additionally to their detached position, Pakistan's nuclear warheads are now operational with Permissive Action Links (PALs), also verified by General Kidwai in 2006. PALs require a code to be entered before a weapon can be detonated.116 According to Brigadier (retired) Naeem Salik, Pakistan has developed its own PAL systems which obviously ensure that even if an unauthorized person gets hold of a weapon, he cannot activate it unless he also has access to the electronic codes. 117

There are three levels of nuclear protection. The first level (inner ring) is directed by the SPD, which supervises some 9,000 workforce devoted to this task, the SPD’s directorate in charge of nuclear security is led by a two-star general and is endowed with its own counter-intelligence team.118 It has a unit in all four laboratories managed by the NCA, each leaded by a high ranked military officer. The next stage is physical (fencing, sensors, etc.). The third level (outer ring) is observation and screening of apprehensive events around the facility, with ISI association. The SPD has a procedure of responsive material control and accounting. It is based on usual and surprise examinations. It has reportedly adopted inventory systems to track individual components of warheads.119 Theft- and tamper-proof containers and vehicles are used for storage and transport, SPD has also set up a Special Response Force, presumably to deal with nuclear incidents.120

According to Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), a nuclear security review was conducted in 2011. Washington has assisted Islamabad to solidify such procedures with the sharing of expertise and perhaps equipment.

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6.2.14.3. Security of Non Military Nuclear Installations

Pakistan's civilian nuclear sites protection is administrated by the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA), established in 2001. The PNRA regulates all aspects of civilian nuclear energy which include licenses for imports and exports, to create necessary legislations and regulations, and to ensure the physical protection of nuclear installation and nuclear material.121 PNRA has 200 expert members Director General SPD (DGSPD) is also an associate of the PNRA. The military and other intelligence agencies play their part to implicate its policies and laws. In 2002, the PNRA streamlined nuclear disaster management by announcing a host of new measures for protecting “the plant and society from hazards that could be man-made or natural.”122 A five-year Nuclear Security Action Plan (NSAP), designed to improve security of nuclear substances and radioactive sources of all nuclear related facilities was implemented by the PNRA in 2006. A security review of existing and under construction nuclear sites was carried out in 2011. Under the NSAP, the PNRA has established safety and security training centers, the National Security Emergency Coordination Centre (NSECC), launched campaigns to locate and secure orphan sources and provision of detection equipment at strategic points to help prevent illicit nuclear smuggling. 123 All identified sources are said to have been cataloged, orphan sources have been recovered, and two protected storage sites have been set up.124 To improve nuclear safety, Islamabad is also collaborating with IAEA. Furthermore, Islamabad endorsed the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM) in 2000. According to 2008 expert review judgment the control of the Pakistani civilian complex was satisfying.

As pointed out earlier, Pakistani nuclear weapons are in de-mated status with warhead and fissile cores stored separately; and, besides other physical security measures, the technical design features supplement safety against unauthorized or accidental launch.125 On November 27, 2007 DGSPD stated that “Pakistani nuclear controls include some functional equal to the two-man command and Permissive Action Links (PALs) that the United States and some other nuclear-weapons states rely on to protect against loss of control, inadvertent weapons use, accidents, and other mishaps".126 As mentioned, Pakistan adopted a two-man rule to validate the codes that call for the release of the

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weapons; it may in fact be a three-man procedure in some cases; such verification processes are standard in advanced nuclear-weapon States.127

Some observers believed that on three man rule, the three men are the missile launch team commander, a representative from the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) with the missile team, and the head technician from the strategic organizations.128 Pakistan also employed some permutation of technical procedures to make sure ritual measures are being in practice. The fundamental part of debate on Pakistan’s nuclear arsenals includes PALs. Luongo and Salik, citing a 2004 television interview with former Pakistani nuclear scientist Samar Mubarakmand, state that every Pakistani warhead is now fitted with a “code-lock device,” which requires a proper code to enable the weapon.129

Former SPD officials, Air Commodore Khalid Banuri and Adil Sultan sum up the control structure in less fail-safe terms:

"To preclude any possibility of inadvertent or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, Pakistan has developed physical safety mechanisms and firewalls both in the weapon systems themselves and in the chain of command; no single individual can operate a weapons system, nor can one individual issue the command for nuclear weapons use."130

Pakistan’s recent work on nuclear safety has been silently supported by the US Government. Therefore, US officials have stressed that the programs have enhanced security, as in May 2009 Admiral Mullen commented that “the United States, have invested fairly significantly over the last three years, to work with Pakistan, to improve that security; and we’re satisfied, very satisfied with that progress.”131 Mullen’s comments echo earlier statements by former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, who said,

"We have spent considerable time with the Pakistani military, talking with them and working with them on the security of their nuclear weapons. I think most observers would say that they are fairly secure. They have pretty sophisticated mechanisms to guard the security of those."132

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According to the New York Times, the Washington has transferred around $100 million worth of training, equipment and other aid to Pakistan for this purpose.133 PALs did not emerge as part of any assistance; because of American legal limits and also for Islamabad's sensitivity that US technological support may endanger Pakistan’s liberty of action through an intense crisis. As said by Feroz Khan,

"In 2001, US Secretary of State Colin Powell offered nuclear security assistance to Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf. The SPD carefully examined the offer and accepted training but declined technology transfers, which they perceived as intrusive or likely to compromise program secrecy…. There has been no further acceptance of any assistance [beyond training], especially permissive action links (PALs)…."134

6.2.14.4. Nuclear Export Control Program

The actions of Dr. A.Q Khan from the late 1980s through 90s which resulted in the transfer of sensitive technologies to Iran and Libya, along with other activities, was due to flaws in the previous oversight system.135 Prior to A.Q. Khan’s black market scandal, Pakistan's nuclear export control structure was governed by 'statuary regulatory orders and ordinances' issued by the Pakistan Commerce Division in 1999. After eruption of A.Q Khan Scandal in 2003–2004 Pakistan redeveloped the exports control laws. In 2004, Pakistan consolidated most of the previous regulations in a single legislation: the “export control on goods, technologies, material, and equipment associated to biological and nuclear arms and their delivery means act was adopted in September 2004.”136

The Export Control Act was established to fortify controls on the export, re export, transshipment and transit of goods and technologies, material and equipment related to nuclear and biological weapons and missiles capable of delivering such weapons.137 The Act upholds a control catalog which is consistent with the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and the Australia Group, working to prevent proliferation of biological agents. The Controlled items list was issued in 2005 and a revised control list was published in 2011. Exporters are required to maintain

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detailed inventories and records and to notify the relevant authority if they are aware or suspect that goods or technology are intended to be used in connection with weapons.138 Lawbreaker face strong consequences, which include detention of up to fourteen years, a fine of up to five million rupees, and the seizure of all assets and property. 139

The Export Control Act played its part in the formation of a Strategic Export Control Division (SECDIV) in 2006. The foreign minister is the head of this division, but it is multidisciplinary organization and comprises personnel from the Customs department; the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Commerce, and Defense; the Central Board of Revenue; the PAEC; the PNRA; and the SPD. 140 The SECDIV was formed in 2006, to devise and enforce policies for the execution of export controls in accordance with the Export Control Act 2004 and also to act as a licensing body.141

6.2.14.5. Security Initiatives of Radiological Sources

Assessing Pakistan's nuclear program, some observers have expressed anxiety over the susceptibility of radioactive materials to radical abduction. The experts believe that fundamentalists with such matter could then produce a Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD), or dirty bomb. Although this warning should not be overlooked, Islamabad does not necessarily cause any special jeopardy over and above other states. The huge number of radiological sources worldwide is the most important challenge for any administration trying to protect them all against an indomitable enemy. In 2004, over 370 radiological sources were lost in the U.S and E-U on an annual basis. Thousands have been lost from countries in the former Soviet Union.142 According to a 1998 Bhabha Atomic Research Centre study, there were nearly 10,000 radioactive sources in India. In India, some of these radioactive sources have been stolen and in at least 13 cases the material was never recovered.143

The PNRA is conscious of the intimidation posed by radioactive material, therefore it employs regulatory and trade controls over radioactive sources through certification and observing from the moment they entered in Pakistani territory till they are disposed, including regular physical examinations. Recently, the PNRA has conducted frequent,

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nationwide inspections of nuclear and radiation amenities, identifying weaknesses and advocating countermeasures.144 The PNRA has also initiated an orphan-source program through a people awareness and education crusade. The PNRA constantly upgrade security procedures according to commendations and direction given by IAEA. They are also committed to protecting investment in the nuclear industry by specifying stringent design and operational safety targets to help eliminate the probability of major economic loss due to an accident, incident, or malicious act.145

The total number of radiological sources in Pakistan isn't clear, but 65 percent of the sources are claimed to be stored and 34 percent of sources are in use; of the amount in use, 49 percent is under the PAEC, of which 26 percent is for medical use and 74 percent for nonmedical use, and 51 percent is non-PAEC, of which 12percent is for medical use and 88 percent is for nonmedical use.146 It is claimed that the amount of category one, two, and three radioactive materials is restricted, and once its useful life is over, it is returned to the nuclear regulatory authorities; For example, in sanatoriums once a source has ended its effective life, the licensee release the source to the PNRA, which in turn hands it over to the PAEC, which is the only government agency equipped to dispose of such materials. 147

Currently PNRA has been working on securities of precise tracking of all radioactive materials in the state. Although, it is very complex for Pakistan to protect all of its boundaries against illegal trafficking, particularly since there is over 2,000 miles of borders with a small number of authorized crossing points. Yet, Islamabad has taken precautions to control the hazard of radiological terrorism. As a result, the 2004 Export Control Act comprises limitations and punishments for transshipments. It has endorsed the Container Security Initiative in March 2006 as a result of which the Port Qasim authority in Karachi are using remote targeting with real-time remote imaging of a container examination process, while incorporating a live video transmission/feed, to monitor the inspection process. 148 Non-intrusive inspection and radiation detection technology is used to screen high-risk containers before they are vessel to American harbors.

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In addition, Pakistani officials are involved in negotiations to become a member of the Megaports Initiative. This Initiative works with foreign customs, port authorities, port operators, and other relevant entities in partner countries to systematically enhance detection capabilities for special nuclear and other radioactive materials in containerized cargo transiting the global maritime shipping network. 149 Pakistan also participates in the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database, which allows countries to share information on incidents involving theft, loss, or pilferage of radiological materials.150 Islamabad is also working on export and border control programs with the U.S. Energy Department. Therefore Washington is assisting Pakistan with supplying metal detectors for border crossing points and mobile labs to identify any distrustful substance which is intercepted.151 Pakistani officials also note that if someone illegally transports radiological sources into Pakistan he would find it uneasy to trade such material because there are very few end users and they are well-known to officials, thus it is easier to recognize any new source that appears in the market.

6.2.14.6. Security Measures for Domestic Instability

According to some Western reports the most extreme form of risk of Pakistan's nuclear program would be the occupation of the state by radical Islamists. The fear of the Islamist regime has affected the Western policies towards Pakistan. Apparently, these concerns draw analogies from conservative ideas of a small segment of Pakistani society and the presence of Taliban sympathizers in remote parts of the tribal areas in North West Frontier Province of Pakistan particularly North and South Waziristan. 152 The authority of these fundamentalists is limited to distant areas where the literacy rate is low and civic infrastructure is less urbanized. 153

Most of Pakistani society consists of moderates who refuse extremism. Michael Krepon of the Stimson Center, Washington, says,

"Pakistan has not been a revolutionary state to date, and the mullahs have not made deep inroads in the political life of the country."154

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Religious parties are politically oriented and they have no rhetorical desire to conquest nuclear facilities or to brandish nuclear weapon as an Islamic bomb.155 Furthermore, these parties have only 5-8% of electoral support. However, in the October 2002 elections, they were able to gain 11.10% of total votes, the year when Islamist parties did best, were unique because of the degree of anti-US sentiment as well as procedural rulings that favored religious parties over mainstream parties.156 According to Frederic Grare, visiting scholar at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace says:

"No objective observer believes that Pakistan’s Islamic parties have a chance to seize power through elections in the foreseeable future."157

In other term, this is not revolutionary Iran.

The second fear is that coup d'état within the Pakistani armed forces would result in empowerment of Islamist officers over the moderate Army leadership. The fearsome philosophy that alleged fundamentalists in the armed forces would overthrow and snatch control of nuclear weapons is merely an over-stretch. There has never been a coup within the arm forces or lower-level military officer against top leadership. It is an organized institution, which follows the norms of a set discipline. There is a well-established system for recruitment, psychological tests, screening, promotion and appointments; thus the speculation that military would fall prey to radical ideology may not be vindicated.158 If there is a takeover; it should understandably be for bringing down the government and gaining power and not for confiscating nuclear arsenals for any external power. Besides, an institutional mechanism exists to manage all strategic assets irrelevant of who is in power.159 It appears unlikely that a fundamentalist could have ascend to a position of influence after fourteen years of moderate army chiefs, mainly given Pakistan’s robust inner intelligence equipment.

In terms of inner intimidation to the weapon, ideally the PRP should screen out extremist individuals from gaining access into the strategic forces themselves. The confidentiality of Pakistan’s nuclear storage sites, even within the Pakistani armed forces, means it is improbable that any kind of radical would even be aware of a nuclear site in his

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vicinity.160 Furthermore, a localized splinter group trying to capture a nuclear related facility would have to be great enough to overwhelm the SPD safety division personnel guarding the site.

The third scenario presented by Western media is a sudden state collapse. Evidently the rumors of Pakistan’s demise have been greatly inflated. Pakistan has been facing profound challenges, but state failure is unusual in recent international system. In Adam Smith’s phrase, there is a “great deal of ruin in a nation,” and while Pakistan has suffered much, it seems likely to endure.161Anatol Lieven, writing from Karachi, observes:

"Karachi demonstrates as well as anywhere else the fact that while Pakistan is a troubled state, it is as yet very far from being a failed one. Only in its northwestern fringe has state power collapsed—and state power there wasn’t always very real anyway. Calling Pakistan a failed state is a bit like saying that Russia has failed as a state because it has lost control of parts of the northern Caucasus. Anyone who, like me, has lived and worked in truly failed states will know the difference immediately. Cities in failed states do not have Karachi’s great industries, road and sewage networks that have improved radically in recent years, a clean, well-functioning modern airport, or a highly effective—if rather ruthless—municipal administration."162

6.2.14.7. Nuclear Safety against External Threats or Non State Actors

Another category of risk mentioned by Western analysts is loss of control of nuclear arms to a radical group or a military rogue unit. To deal with this scenario initially Pakistan took preventive measures which comprise reliability programs, and physical security and surveillance. Secondly, as cited above the warheads are stocked in a disassembled and de-mated form. The triggers and warheads are stored separately therefore this measure even further defends against an external threat, which would have to knock over two buildings to get a complete bomb.163

Furthermore, Pakistan’s most significant defensive measure against outside intimidations is secrecy. If opponents—be they foreign regimes or Non State Actors (NSA) are

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oblivious of the locality of nuclear materials, they cannot intimidate those assets. Historically, information regarding the location of Pakistan’s warheads and delivery vehicles has been very tightly controlled by Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division, and is not shared with regular military officers or intelligence officials in the vicinity of such sites.164 Some suggest that even the director of the ISI does not know where the weapons are.165

There is a slight chance that the strongest physical security actions could be detectable for outsiders and may ironically make the facilities less protected. According to Rolf Mowatt-Larsen, ex-head of the U.S Department of Energy’s intelligence and counterintelligence efforts:

"Another precaution taken by the Pakistani military is to maintain strict secrecy over the location of storage sites and to transport and deploy weapons clandestinely rather than in convoys that have a stronger, highly visible security profile. These security precautions produce few visible signs of movements, thereby lowering the risks associated with possible theft of or attack on weapons at their most vulnerable point, in transit."166

An assault against a nuclear base would need to confound SPD and ISI observation and then break the physical or military barriers that would exclude access to a nuclear weapon.167 After this facing Insider complicity they would have to defeat the reliability programs. Military involvement from inside or outside the facility would need a breakdown in the tradition of devotion inherent to the Pakistan armed forces.168 Besides, if Pakistan has ten storage facilities, it most likely has thousands of personnel available to defend each site.

Intention is also debatable: radical Islamists are generally proud of Pakistan’s nuclear capability and have so far shown little interest in attacking the country’s nuclear infrastructure.169 Two assaults by Baluch radicals on suspected PAEC site at Dera Ghazi Khan in 2003 and 2006 have drawn more international attention then terrorists attacks on

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other conventional military installations. In both assaults attackers failed to breach perimeter security of so called nuclear facility. The penetration in the outside perimeter of a base hosting nuclear weapons does not signify that the interlopers are able to get someplace near to a nuclear arsenal.

Even if a non-State actor or a rogue military unit was able to take control of a nuclear warhead, it would still need to transport it – including perhaps taking it out of the country – while continuing to defeat the Army’s defenses. 170 Coding is seen as the final fence of security. It is prepared throughout the developing procedure, and the launch officer would be given the code a few moments before the launch. It has been surmised that the codes are generated by the Military Intelligence (MI).171 According to DGSPD the Codes used are 12-digit alphanumerical. All of these preparations are functioned by “a firmly controlled ID system”. Therefore the chances of theft or use of nuclear arsenals by any militant or rouge unit are totally overstated and the writers and thinkers which fear that Pakistani weapons could drop in the hands of extremists are living in ideates heaven.

6.2.14.8. Mobile Launch Security

There has been some concern about the security of mobile nuclear units, when they are away from the static and reinforced security provided at a fixed storage site. 172 This concern appears to be overstated. Any mobile launcher is expected to be escorted by an outsized protection squad. Still, seizing a mobile launcher necessitates a good deal of fortune, while attacking a permanent facility could be designed. American academic Jordan Seng concluded, “Just as it is hard to hit what cannot be seen, it is hard to steal what cannot be found.”173

6.2.14.9. Nuclear Launch Authority

The NCA empowers every step of the procedure leading to nuclear use. Devolution measures have been implemented to make sure uninterrupted control of the weapon in case of leadership's debilitation (or decapitation in time of conflict). The Prime minister can delegate his NCA powers to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (and not to the head of the Army, the most powerful military officer in the country).174

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Deputy chairs of the ECC and DCC have the authority to replace the Prime minister if he is unavailable or debilitated.175 It is notable that control of nuclear weapons has survived sudden change in leadership (1988), a military coup (1999), and a major legitimate change (2010).176 Instability in Pakistan has not been dramatically higher than in other nuclear capable States: example China with the Cultural Revolution of 1966-1976; the Soviet Union with the 1991 attempted coup and breakdown of the country, and the 1993 crisis; or France with the 1958 regime change and the 1961 attempted coup. 177 Hence there is no reason to deem that, for instance, the command and control structure will not endure another army takeover.

6.2.14.10. Participation in Nuclear Safety Programs

Pakistan is an active member of international non proliferation regime and known as a responsible nuclear state. Pakistan is a State party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM), the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the IAEA code of Conduct on Safety of Radioactive Sources, and the U.N Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540.178 Pakistan was one of the very first countries which submitted a report to the U.N to complete its commitments under UNSCR 1540, which requires enact legislation to prevent the proliferation of nonconventional weapons and their means of delivery, and recognized the continuing importance of the IAEA and its nuclear material security guidelines and activities. 179 Till now Pakistan has submitted four reports to the United Nations commission, managing the implementation of Resolution 1540. Almost all civilian nuclear facilities are under the purview of the IAEA, through PNRA. Islamabad is an active participant in the of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), especially on issues related to nuclear forensics and efforts to upgrade the international community’s ability to identify nuclear and other radioactive resources in order to prevent nuclear trafficking. 180 In March 2006, It has also joined the United States backed Container Security Initiative (CSI) for the training and assistance in nuclear security.

In 2012 Seoul nuclear security summit Pakistan promised to open a nuclear security training center and signed the Joint Statement on Nuclear Security Training and Support

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Centers.181 The center is intended to serve as a regional and international hub for training in nuclear security; in the joint statement, Pakistan joined with 22 other countries in forming what will amount to an international network on that issue. 182 After the Fukushima accident, Pakistan organized an international seminar on nuclear safety. In addition it developed a radiation emergency response mechanism and a Nuclear Security Emergency Coordination Center. 183 It is also preparing to advance physical safeguard of civil nuclear power plants.

After analyzing security concerns on Pakistan's nuclear program it has become clear that the country is passing through a distressed period and facing a lot of challenges including an unstable neighbor Afghanistan which has the past of political unsteadiness; and rebel activities. Despite a notable inventory of actions for its nuclear protection, Pakistan’s efforts to provide information about all these developments domestically and internationally have not been sufficient. 184 This has added to the continuous skepticism about Islamabad’s aptitude to secure its nuclear facilities. These characteristic features make the safety of the Pakistani nuclear program and its infrastructure a global anxiety, which is unlikely to reduce soon. As a result, all acts of terrorism in the country, especially those directed at military targets, are going to raise concerns and invite scrutiny and skepticism of official assurances of control. 185

Islamabad has taken its accountability for nuclear security seriously. The propaganda by the West, especially from media, against the safety of Pakistan's nuclear program is groundless. Islamabad is collaborating with the Washington on personnel screening and training on nuclear security. It is also taking part in global forums committed to averting nuclear terrorism and developing nuclear safety. It has made strides domestically to improve the legal and regulatory system for preventing proliferation of sensitive materials and technologies.186 Authorities in Pakistan recognize that its weapon program is intensely intertwined and security of its nuclear infrastructure is a top precedence. Domestically or internationally, it cannot afford a loss of control. 187 The existing command and control structure emerges to be premeditated to confront most conceivable circumstances with regards to domestic unsteadiness. While the international system should continue efforts to stabilize Pakistan in part so that scenarios that currently seem

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implausible do not become more likely analysts looking at Pakistani nuclear risk should not assume state failure.188 In light of the inherent limitations on any screening program, Pakistan employs procedural safeguards to ensure that even vetted personnel do not access the most sensitive nuclear items, most importantly warheads, without following strict protocols.189

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1 Al Kaabi, Yousef H. and Al Kaabi, Khaled M., (December 2011) The Iranian Century: The Tension Between Iran And The Gulf States, P. 3, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi- bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA555928 (Accessed on 29 November 2013) 2 Ibid, p. 3 3 Ibid, p. 10 4 Ibid p. 10 5 Ibid, PP.10-11 6 Satrapi, Marjane, 2010 “Iranian History”, http://libguides.unco.edu/content.php?pid=108562&sid=1042079.(Accessed on 05 June

2013) 7 Al Kaabi, Yousef H. and Al Kaabi, Khaled M., p. 12 8 Ibid, p. 14 9 Ibid, p. 15 10 Ibid, p. 14 11 Ibid, p. 15 12 Ibid, pp. 15-16 13 Ibid, p. 16 14 Op Cit, p. 16 15 Iran: Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R40849.pdf. (Accessed on March 25, 2014) 16 Ibid 17 Ibid 18 “Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988)”, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/iran- iraq.htm. 19 Op, cit. 20 http://csis.org/images/stories/poni/100128_NSI_2009_Collection_of_Papers.pdf 21 Longa, Joseph, Then and Now: Arab Reactions to the Israeli and Iranian

Nuclear Programs, https://csis.org/images/stories/poni/110921_Longa.pdf 22 Ibid

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23 Ibid 24 Ibid 25 Beehner, Lionel (20 April 2006),“Arab Views of a Nuclear Iran,” Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, http://www.cfr.org/publication/10491/arab_views_of_a_nuclear_iran.html, (Accessed on

29 May 2013). 26 Longa, Joseph, "Then and Now: Arab Reactions to the Israeli and Iranian Nuclear Programs", p. 40 http://csis.org/images/stories/poni/110921_Longa.pdf (Accessed on 27

June 2013) 27 Ibid 28 Ibid 29 Zaman, Shams-uz, "Implications of a nuclear-armed Iran on the Middle East and

Pakistan," http://www.issi.org.pk/publication-files/1340000677_18060791.pdf 30 Tomlinson, Hugh, (2010) “Saudi Arabia gives Israel clear skies to attack Iranian nuclear sites”, The Times, 12 June, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article7148555.ece, (Accessed on 21 Apr 2011) 31 Zaman, Shams-uz, p. 178 32 Op cit 33 Parsi, Trita (2007) "Treacherous Alliance: the Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the

United States", New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 78 34 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 15 November 2009, http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2009/Pages/PM_Netanyahu_addresses_Saban_Forum

_15-Nov-2009.aspx (Retrieved on 12 June 2013) 35 Kaye. Dalia Dassa and Nader. Alireza, Roshan. Parisa, (2011) "Israel and Iran: A

Dangerous Rivalry", Santa Monica, Rand corporation, p. 27 36 Ibid p. 27 37 Williams, Dan, “Israel plays war game assuming Iran has nuclear bomb,” Reuters, May

17, 2010. 38 Kaye. Dalia Dassa and others, p. 29

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39 Wehrey, Frederic and others, (2010) "The Iraq Effect: The Middle East After the Iraq

War", Santa Monica. California, RAND Corporation, p. 78 40 Kaye. Dalia Dassa and others, p. 29 41 Ibid, p. 30 42 Sadr, Ehsaneh I., (Summer 2005) “The Impact of Iran’s Nuclearization on Israel,”

Middle East Policy, Vol. XII, No. 2, pp. 58–72 43 'Hashemi-Rafsanjani Speaks on the Future of the Revolutionary Guards Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps', Tehran Domestic Service, 0935 GMT, 6 October 1988, translated in FBIS-NSE, 7 October 1988, p. 52 44 Fayazmanesh, Sasan, (2008) The United States and Iran: Sanctions, Wars and The

Policy of Dual Containment, Routledge, New York, p. 129 45 Ibid, p. 130 46 Iran Nuclear Chronology, http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/iran_nuclear.pdf?_=1316542527 (Accessed on 15-02-

2013) 47 Fayazmanesh, Op. cit, p. 132 48 Ibid, p. 132 49 The Washington Post, 17 November 1992 50 http://www.conservativehome.com/thetorydiary/2012/09/by-paul-goodmanfollow- paul-on-twitter-i-returned-from-israel-and-palestine-recently-but-in-one-sense-didnt- need-to-go-for.html (Accessed on 06 November 2013) 51 Fayazmanesh, Op. cit, p. 134 52 Ibid, p. 134 53 http://www.counterpunch.org/2007/03/17/the-us-israel-and-iran/ (Accessed on 16

March 2011) 54 Associated Press, 3 August 1998 55 http://www.iran-e-sabz.org/news/abomb.html (Accessed on 22 March 2013) 56 Fayazmanesh, Op. cit, p. 137 57 AP, 9 July 2001 58 Fayazmanesh, Op. cit., p. 138

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59 The Jerusalem Post, 26 December 2001 60 BBC Morning International Report, 12 January 2002 61 http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2012/sep/21/qanda-mek-us-terrorist-organisation 62 Village Voice, December 2001 63 http://www.stormfront.org/forum/t776693/ (Accessed on 16 March 2012) 64 Fayazmanesh, Sasan, pp. 141-142 65 AFP, 19 June 2003 66 Fayazmanesh, Op, cit, p. 144 67 AFP, 18 September 2003 68 http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/iaea_dept_of_safeguards.pdf 69 AFP, 17 November 2003 70 Ibid 71 The Washington Post, 12 December 2004 72 AFP, 29 January 2005 73 AP, 28 February 2005 74 AFP, 13 April 2005 75 The New York Times, 13 April 2005 76 AFP, 14 April 2005 77 AFP, 6 August 2005 78 http://www.counterpunch.org/2008/03/17/the-united-states-and-iran/ 79 The Jerusalem Post, 27 October 2005 80 For more details see Fayazmanesh, Sasan, pp. 174-175 81 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mahmoud_Ahmadinejad_and_Israel 82 Op cit, p. 177 83 Ibid, p. 221 84 The Guardian, 12 January 2006 85 AFP, 24 April 2006 86 http://quizlet.com/36853119/ia-chapter-7-flash-cards/ 87 The Washington Post, 16 February 2006

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88 http://www.warwithoutend.co.uk/wake-up-america-your-government-is-hijacked-by- zionism/2006/11/10/bush-ok-s-israel-attack-on-iran.php (Accessed on 16 June 2012) 89 http://www.armscontrol.org/2012_07-

8/The_Iranian_Nuclear_Dispute_Origins_and_Current_Options 90 Ibid 91 Ibid 92 Ibid 93 ISIS Iran Report, (September 22, 2011) "Ahmadinejad Reiterates Willingness to Halt 20 Percent Enrichment", http://www.isisnucleariran.org/reports/detail/ahmadinejad- reiterates-willingness-to-halt-20-percent-enrichment/ , (Accessed on 02 November 2013) 94 Mustafa, Malik Qasim, (2010) "Are Pakistan’s nuclear weapons safe?", p. 2, http://www.issi.org.pk/publication-files/1299650081_87535106.pdf, (Retrieved on 12

September 2013) 95 David Albright, Kevin O’Neill and Corey Hinderstein, “Securing Pakistan Nuclear Arsenal: Principles for Assistance”, ISIS, Issue Brief, October 4, 2001, http://www.isisonline.org/publications/terrorism/pakassist.html#notes 96 Mustafa, Malik Qasim, http://www.cssforum.com.pk/css-compulsory-subjects/current- affairs/33010-pakistani-nuclear-safe.html 97 “Fears Rise over Pakistan's N-weapons”, Daily Times, November 12, 2007 98Strategic Planning Directorate, (August 2, 2011), http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/pakistan/spd.htm (Accessed on January 2,

2014)

99 Mustafa, Malik Qasim, p. 4 100 Kerr, Paul K. and Nikitin, Mary Beth, (March 19, 2013) "Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues", p. 1, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34248.pdf (Accessed on 25 December 2013) 101 Ibid, p. 2 102 "No threat to Pakistan`s N-arsenal: US", (October 12, 2009), http://www.dawn.com/news/851158/no-threat-to-pakistan-s-n-arsenal-us (Accessed on 4

May 2013)

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103 Mustafa, Malik Qasim, p. 5 104 http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/PakistanNuclearAssets-

070607-ZafarAli-FINAL.pdf (Accessed on 16 March 2014) 105 Ali, Zafar, (JULY 2007) Pakistan’s Nuclear Assets and Threats of Terrorism: How

Grave is the Danger?, The Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC, p. 8 106 Mustafa, Malik Qasim, p. 7 107 Ibid, p. 7 108 Ibid, p. 8 109 According to Kidwai cited in “Pakistan: CJCS Mullen Meets with General Kidwai on Safeguarding Nuclear Assets”, US State Department diplomatic cable, 20 February 2008,

[Wikileaks]. 110 Khan, Feroz Hassan, “Nuclear Security in Pakistan: Separating Myth From Fiction”,

Arms Control Today, July-August 2009. 111 http://www.cssforum.com.pk/css-compulsory-subjects/current-affairs/33010- pakistani-nuclear-safe.html (Accessed on 26 July 2013) 112 Pennington, Matthew, “Pakistan: Nuclear Assets Safe, Outlines Nuclear Protocol”,

Associated Press, 26 January 2008 113 http://www.cssforum.com.pk/css-compulsory-subjects/current-affairs/33010- pakistani-nuclear-safe.html (Accessed on 16 August 2012) 114 Ibid 115 Mustafa, Malik Qasim, p. 9 116 http://www.carnivalglassbowl.com/posts/Bahawalpurindia+Abroad.html 117 Op cit 118 Tertrais, Bruno, (June 2012), Pakistan’s nuclear program: a net assessment, Fondation Pour La Recherche Stratégique, p. 18, http://www.frstrategie.org/barreFRS/publications/rd/2012/RD_201204.pdf, (Accessed on

16 September 2013) 119 Bokhan, Farhan & Lamont, James, “Obama says Pakistan nukes in safe hands”,

Financial Times, 30 April 2009. 120 http://defence.pk/threads/how-pakistan-secures-its-nuclear-weapons.13958/page-10

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121 Mustafa, Malik Qasim, p. 10 122 Ibid, p. 10 123 Ibid, p. 10 124 Ibid 125 http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/PakistanNuclearAssets-

070607-ZafarAli-FINAL.pdf (Accessed on 16 March 2014) 126 http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/CBRNIB13-Rabia-PakNukes.pdf 127 http://www.cssforum.com.pk/general/news-articles/69871-pakistan-nuclear-weapons- safe-report.html (Accessed on 18 April 2014) 128 Schram, Martin, (2003) "Avoiding Armedgeddon: Our Future, Our Choice", Basic

Books, New York, p.54 129 Luongo, Kenneth N. and Salik, Naeem, “Building Confidence in Pakistan’s Nuclear

Security,” Arms Control Today, December 2007. P. 46 130 Banuri, Khalid and Sultan, Adil, “Managing and Securing the Bomb,” DailyTimes, May13, 2008, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008\ 05\30\story_30-5-

2008_pg3_6. 131 Mullen, “Defense Department Briefing Transcript,” May 4, 2009. 132 Armitage, Richard, “A Conversation with Richard Armitage,” The Charlie Rose

Show, November 6, 2007. 133 Sanger, David and Broad, William, “US Secretly Aids Pakistan in Guarding Nuclear

Arms,” New York Times, November 18, 2007. 134 Schram, Martin, p. 59 135 http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_12/Luongo (Accessed on 21 May 2012) 136 Mustafa, Malik Qasim, p.9 137 Ibid, p. 10 138 Ibid, p. 10 139 Luongo, Kenneth N. and Salik, Naeem, 140 Ibid 141 http://www.cssforum.com.pk/css-compulsory-subjects/current-affairs/33010- pakistani-nuclear-safe.html (Accessed on 15 March 2014)

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142 Krepon, Michael and Haider, Ziad, eds., Reducing Nuclear Dangers in South Asia, report no. 50, Stimson Center, Washington DC, February 2004, p. 29. 143 Ibid, p.30. 144 Luongo, Kenneth N. and Salik, Naeem, p. 15 145 Ibid p. 16 146 Ibid, p. 16 147 Ibid, p. 16 148 http://www.mustafakibaroglu.com/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/Kibaroglu-MEJ-

Spring2006-IranNuclear.pdf (Accessed on 03 January 2014) 149 National Nuclear Security administration, http://www.nnsa.energy.gov/aboutus/ourprograms/nonproliferation/programoffices/intern ationalmaterialprotectionandcooperation/-5, (Accessed on 23 September 2013) 150 Op. cit, p. 16 151 Ibid, p. 17 152 Ali, Zafar, p. 14 153 Ibid 154 Ibid, p. 14 155 http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/PakistanNuclearAssets-

070607-ZafarAli-FINAL.pdf (Accessed on 16 March 2014) 156 http://www.scribd.com/doc/37599059/Pakistans-Nuclear-Security 157 Grare, Frederic, Pakistan: The Myth of an Islamist Peril, Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace, Policy Brief No 45, February 2006 158 http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/PakistanNuclearAssets-

070607-ZafarAli-FINAL.pdf (Accessed on 16 March 2014) 159 Ibid 160 ttp://www.scribd.com/doc/37599059/Pakistans-Nuclear-Security (Accessed on 26

June 2013) 161 Clary, Christopher, (September 2010) "Thinking about Pakistan’s Nuclear Security in Peacetime, Crisis and War", Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, p.

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30, http://www.idsa.in/system/files/OP_PakistansNuclearSecurity.pdf (Accessed on 12

September 2013) 162 Lieven, Anatol, “Pakistan’s Passing Grade,” The National Interest, 11 May 2009, http://nationalinterest.org/article/pakistans-passing-grade-3118 (Accessed on 25

September 2013) 163 Warrick, Joby, “Pakistan Nuclear Security Questioned,” Washington Post, (November 11, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/story/2007/11/10/ST2007111001833.ht ml (Accessed on 29 September 2013) 164 Clary, Christopher, p. 13, http://www.idsa.in/system/files/OP_PakistansNuclearSecurity.pdf 165 Peter R. Lavoy, "Islamabad's Nuclear Posture: Its Premises and Implementation," in Pakistan's Nuclear Future: Worries Beyond War, Henry D. Sokolski, ed., (Carlisle, PA:

Strategic Studies Institute, 2008) p. 152 166 Mowatt-Larssen, Rolf, “Nuclear Security in Pakistan: Reducing the Risks of Nuclear

Terrorism,” Arms Control Today (July-August 2009). 167http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/nonproliferationpapers/brunotertrais501030

5e17790.pdf (Accessed on 05 May 2013) 168 Ibid 169 Rosenberg, Matthew & Tohid, Owais, “Taliban Say They Won’t Hit Nuclear

Arsenal”, Wall Street Journal, 26 May 2011. 170 Tertrais, Bruno, p. 24 171 Gregory, Shaun, The Security of Nuclear Weapons in Pakistan, Brief n° 22, Pakistan

Security Research Unit, 18 November 2007, p. 3 172 Sanger, David E., “What to Do about Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal?” New York Times

Magazine, January 8, 2009 173 Seng, Jordan, “Less is More: Command and Control Advantages of Minor Nuclear

States,” Security Studies 6, no. 4, Summer 1997, p. 83 174 NCA Act of 2010, the Gazette of Pakistan, March 11, 2010, (Retrieved on 01 October

2013) http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1300934560_193.pdf

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175 Cheema, Zafar Iqbal, “Pakistan”, in Hans Born et al., Governing the Bomb: Civilian Control and Democratic Accountability of Nuclear Weapons, SIPRI/Oxford University

Press, 2010, p. 204 176http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/nonproliferationpapers/brunotertrais501030

5e17790.pdf (Accessed on 16 March 2014) 177 Tertrais, Bruno, P. 25 178 http://issi.org.pk/publication-files/1299650081_87535106.pdf 179 http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_03/Challenges-for-Pakistans-Nuclear-Security 180 Ibid 181 Salik, Naeem and Luongo, Kenneth N., (March 2012) "Challenges for Pakistan’s Nuclear Security", Arms Control Today, Vol 42, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_03/Challenges-for-Pakistans-Nuclear-Security 182 Ibid 183 Ibid 184 Ibid 185 Ibid 186 Ibid 187 Ibid 188 http://www.scribd.com/doc/37599059/Pakistans-Nuclear-Security (Accessed on 29

November 2013) 189 Clary, Christopher, p. 25, http://www.idsa.in/system/files/OP_PakistansNuclearSecurity.pdf (Accessed on 11

January 2014)

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CONCLUSION

Pakistan and Iran are important players in international politics in the 21st century. Iran is a major competitor of oil rich Middle East and Pakistan has a significant role in the war against terrorism. Nuclearization is another issue which has brought both the states in focus of the global community, although both have a different nuclear stance and face diverse nuclear challenges. Pakistan has already acquired nuclear weapons program whereas Iran's nuclear program is still ambiguous. Interestingly both states began their nuclear programs at the same time but domestic and regional politics reshaped their nuclear paths and both faced different twists and turns in their nuclear program.

Pakistan faces all kinds of regional, international and domestic challenges for its nuclear program. History evidently advocates that competition between New Delhi and Islamabad was asymmetric since independence therefore despite being a small country with a deep sense of uncertainty; Islamabad developed nuclear arsenals typically to prevent military hostility of New Delhi. Initially Pakistan started its nuclear program for peaceful purposes, but it was transformed into a nuclear weapons project due to various factors that ultimately forced Islamabad to move from an option policy towards nuclear weapons development.1 Factors are as under:

1. India diverted its civil nuclear program to a military one. 2. India became an uncontested nuclear power in South Asian region which decisively shifted the balance of power in its favor which was intolerable for Pakistan, as both states had territorial disputes to resolve. 3. Islamabad's coalition with Washington and also its association in CENTO and SEATO failed to guarantee any kind of protection against India. 4. Pakistan had lost half of its terrain in the 1971 Pak-India War, and it was necessary to take remedial measures to stop the repetition of a similar debacle. And, finally, the major powers efforts for non-proliferation showed different standards for different countries.

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These factors reinforced Pakistan's security perception vis-à-vis India, and encouraged Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto to launch the nuclear weapons program which was predominantly security driven, and based on the statements of leadership and senior government officials - mainly India centric.2 Therefore when India tested its nuclear device in 1974, Prime Minister Bhutto described it as a threat to Pakistan's security, and said;

"A more grave and serious event has not taken place in the history of Pakistan. The explosion has introduced a qualitative change in the situation between the two countries."3

Furthermore, Canada restricted its fuel supply for Pakistan's only nuclear power plant (KANUPP) due to Indian nuclear explosions. Pakistan paid the price of its neighbor's action. The dual standard by the West mobilized Islamabad to produce fuel domestically. Therefore Pakistan started to enrich uranium indigenously and as soon as Pakistani scientists gained success in production of fuel for power plant, it further motivated authorities to provide all the help and support to the technicians and scientists to promote nuclear development and also to recall its nuclear scientists from around the world for the sake of their homeland.

After 1974 the attainment of a atomic weapon became essential for Pakistan's political survival. Initially, U.S government pressurized Islamabad to drop its weapons program and played its part to end the Pak-France deal for the development of plutonium reprocessing plant in Pakistan. The Soviet invasion in Afghanistan entirely changed American rigid posture towards Pakistan's nuclear program. Some writers claim that to gain Pakistan's support and fulfill its regional strategic interests U.S assured Pakistan that it will not interfere in Pakistan's nuclear weaponry program. 4 Through the decade of Afghan war nuclear program remained under constant but mild criticism by the U.S. Although this era played a positive role in the growth of nuclear program but in reality it was the phase that sowed the seeds of coming troubles for Pakistan. Inclusion of Afghans in the Pakistan's social fabric had proven disastrous for the internal stability of Pakistan.5 Soon after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, things became complicated for Pakistan as U.S congress cut off Pakistan's economic and military aid by the enforcement of Symington and Glenn amendments. It is a well known fact that during the Afghan war,

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Washington knew about Pakistan's weapons program and from 1985 to 1989 both Regan and Bush administrations certified that Pakistan has a peaceful nuclear program because of Pakistan's role in Afghanistan and as soon as war ended, American alliance with Pakistan also came to an end.

Pakistan carried out its first nuclear cold or sub-critical test in 1983 but didn't break the news regarding its successive nuclear achievement. However its nuclear capability played a role as a deterrent in 1987s Indian led Brasstacks crises when Indian army conducted one of its largest exercises along the Pakistani border to pressurize Islamabad on its policy regarding Kashmir. It was the first time when India was clearly communicated about the nuclear capability of Pakistan through A.Q Khan's interview to Indian journalist Kuldip Nayyar. It is widely believed that Islamabad's threat to utilize nuclear weapons against any Indian aggression played a decisive role to end the Brass-tack crises.

Once India overtly went nuclear in 1998 and Pakistan followed, it was almost certain that Pakistan would attempt to develop a nuclear deterrence stance that would protect the country from nuclear extortion and give assurance to the leadership to stand up against military compulsion.6 Pakistan’s policy makers were expected to improve the reliability and endurance of their limited nuclear stockpile and delivery systems by modifications between aircraft and ballistic missiles and by dispersion. Their goal was to give minimum credibility to nuclear deterrence. Nuclear weapons have enabled Pakistan to create the threat of retaliation, which is necessary for stable deterrence of premeditated attacks and from then to the present, Islamabad's nuclear posture has directly deterred large scale Indian military action against it on occasions like Kargil Crises, the 2001– 02 Operation Parakram, and 2008 Mumbai attacks.

At the beginning of the new millennium, it was felt that the pursuit of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence has reached its logical end with the declaration of its explicit posture. But once again India embarked further arm race in the region by initiating missile defense system as a counter for Pakistani ballistic missiles. Meanwhile, India also obtained advance BMD systems from Russia, Israel and NATO. Pakistan's own security came on stake and it became crystal clear that in case of any further conflict Indian defense system could bring calamity for Pakistan. Once again Pakistan had no other choice but to enhance its

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delivery systems against Indian defense to ensure its own security and restore the balance of power in the region. To counter Indian superiority and maintain deterrence, Pakistan had no other choice but to develop Cruise missiles as an answer for Indian BMD System. Therefore Pakistani cruise missiles Baber and Ra'ad are developed in response of Indian BMD system.

In 2004 India announced its new war doctrine known as the Cold Start Doctrine (CSD). The CSD doctrine is Pakistan-specific and it was solely designed to explore and exploit gaps and options for limited conventional war below Pakistan‘s nuclear threshold. As a result, a perceived gap in Pakistan‘s deterrence posture was felt. Like BMD system Indian CSD prompted Pakistan to develop Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) for maintaining deterrence in the region. Islamabad's integration of TNWs sufficiently reinforces its offensive-defensive capability against the adversary and stabilizes bilateral deterrence. In addition, the Indo-U.S. Nuclear Agreement of 2008 in Pakistan's perspective is the biggest destabilizing factor in the South Asian nuclear equation, which had accorded India a de facto legitimacy as a nuclear weapon state (NWS).7

The U.S-India nuclear energy agreement and the growing Indian military capabilities are strong issues enhancing Pakistan insecurity and impelling it to strengthen its resolve to sustain a qualitative and quantitative improvement in its nuclear program. According to one estimate, the deal is expected to increase India's capability to produce up to 240 nuclear weapons in a year.8

In such a constraining and challenging environment, it is believed that for Pakistan a robust nuclear capability had now become a much more critical element of its foreign and security policy.9 From the day of its nuclear tests till date Pakistan's policy is to maintain assured deterrence for its security. Thus, Pakistan views nuclear weapons as an infrangible guarantee of its independence and physical integrity.10 Furthermore, Pakistan has made clear that there were no global or regional interests involved in its nuclear program and it was strictly limited to national security, particularly for deterrence of Indian weapons. The fact was made clear in order to avoid and counter Western propaganda that Pakistan could export its nuclear weapons to other Islamic states because of their economic contribution to its nuclear program.

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After gaining nuclear deterrence the most crucial situation Pakistan had to face were the security issues on the domestic front. Almost immediately after the incident of 9/11 western media started to raise questions on the security of Pakistani nuclear assets but the security issue became highlighted after the emergence of evidence that A.Q Khan was involved in proliferation of nuclear technology. The scandal greatly tarnished the image of Pakistan and put the safety of nuclear assets of Pakistan under considerable doubt in view of international community. Pakistan took all necessary measures as it implemented nuclear export control act and started human reliability program to ensure that in future its scientists will not be involved in any kind of technology proliferation.

After 9/11 Pakistan again became an ally of United States on the war against terrorism in Afghanistan. It is a well-known fact that during and after Soviet-Afghan war Pakistani authorities and public supported Taliban, hence their spectrum of influence in Pakistan's remotest areas was extended greatly. Therefore when Pakistan took a U-turn on its policies regarding Taliban and started crackdown on suspicious right wing parties, it directly affected its system and security of its conventional and non-conventional military assets. The domestic crisis during the end of 2007 had focused attention on the protection and safety of the nuclear assets. The U.S authorities were convinced that Pakistan's nuclear materials and weapons were in danger of being taken over by terrorists or rogue elements within the Pakistan army. On this presumption, secret plans were reportedly made for the seizure or neutralization of Pakistan's nuclear capabilities. However, Pakistan has significantly developed its technical and procedural nuclear security operations.11 Especially, rouge operations are virtually closed by the personal screening procedures for Pakistan's strategic command which are as rigorous as those applied by the U.S and other advance nuclear states. Islamabad has also engaged with its global allies in an effort to further fortify its nuclear security and control procedures. The major changes over the past thirteen years include the creation of the National Command Authority (NCA), the establishment of the Strategic Plane Division (SPD), the development of a nuclear doctrine, the improvement of export controls, the integration of the command and control system, and the employment of permissive action links on nuclear weapons.12 Despite all international concerns, there have not been any cases so far of systemic breakdown. Indeed, the weapons and amenities have been secure during

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the crisis, which presented a measure of reassurance that the improvements on the security of civil and military installations are working.

Furthermore, Pakistan also takes part in international efforts for the safety of nuclear assets and actively participates in IAEA technical cooperation programs. It is a party to eleven out of the thirteen UN conventions and protocols on terrorism. It is a party to Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and member of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, Code of Conduct on Radiological Safety and other international treaties and regimes. It has been at the forefront during negotiations on UNSCR1540, and its export control law on sensitive material and technology is aligned with international standards and the non-proliferation regime.13 That’s why Pakistan's security preparations have been graded by the so called nuclear safety index as being better then India's.

These actions show that Pakistan is a responsible nuclear State and clearly indicates that Islamabad is not only serious about the safety of its nuclear assets but also supports the global objectives of non-proliferation. This is the reason why the Washington also admired Pakistan's security measures as on September 5th 2013 U.S State Department spokesperson Jen Psaki stated that:

"While there is room for improvement in the security of any country’s nuclear programs, Pakistan has a professional and dedicated security force that fully understands the importance of nuclear security."14

Although, such statements promote international trust on the security of the country's nuclear program, it is certain that Pakistan still needs domestic stability to ensure the international community that its civil or military based nuclear facilities are as secure as any other country's facilities are. In the India-Pakistan strategic backdrop, the emerging asymmetries unresolved disputes, and heightened state of distrust between them, is complicating the South Asian security environment. 15 In the absence of conflict- resolution mechanisms, the two countries are destined to craft divergent and deliberately manipulated polices to coerce each other in order to achieve their respective political

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goals. For both countries, the biggest impediment to the stabilization of their relations is mistrust, animosity and paranoia. Hence, it is essential that both countries make honest efforts to find a mechanism to resolve their disputes, end mistrust, and normalize their diplomatic, trade and commercial relations in order to reduce their over-reliance on nuclear deterrence for the sustenance of peace and stability. 16

As for Iran, its nuclear policies were shaped by the external threat environment, the internal domestic political process, and the state’s technical capabilities. It is one of the most important states of the Middle East region. Because of its vast population and oil reserves it has always played an influential role in regional politics and when nuclear technology became a symbol of modernization and power the Shah of Iran swiftly utilized its relations with West specifically with US for acquiring this symbol of excellence and power. As like other third world countries, nuclear program in Iran was initiated under the "Atom for Peace" program by USA in the late fifties. The Shah strongly believed that one day nuclear energy will become an alternate source of petroleum. The Shah's pronouncement that a barrel of Oil is too valuable to burn for fuel was true and Iran has always needed to sell its oil to survive; today the Islamic republic is just as adamant that it needs to free oil production for export in order to earn foreign exchange. According to latest statistics Iran needs at least an additional 2,000 MW of electricity every year because of the rising demand of its fast growing population. Therefore if it fails to gain benefit out of its nuclear program then without any doubt domestic needs will absorb the country's entire oil production. The Shah heavily invested to acquire twenty nuclear power plants for the production of 22000 MW of electricity. There was a time when Shah showed some interest for obtaining nuclear weapons but because of western pressure he denied his weapon related statements and signed the NPT to reassure his faithfulness with the USA. At the end of Shah's regime Iran was the mini power of the Middle East and in conventional means it was way ahead from other regional states. But from the day of revolution Iran created difficulties for itself and most importantly for its emerging civil nuclear program. Initially, Western regimes and nuclear supplier groups were willing to work with new Iranian administration. But Iranians were skeptical because of the American's role in 1953s coup against elected Prime Minister Mossadeq. So much hatred against it had developed that soon after revolution people

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showed their dissent against U.S and hostage crises became a focal point in the relations between Iran and the West. It is also true that from then on the overthrow of Mossadeq drives Iranian policies to this day. The new administration failed to recognize the significance of nuclear technology and implemented harsh policies against its own program on the grounds that it was a Trojan horse for foreign influence. Therefore the Western firms stopped their work on nuclear sites and terminated their contracts to build power plants in Iran.

Conflict with Iraq and energy crises within the state were the issues which changed the regime's stance on nuclear technology. But it was too late for the ruling clerics because Washington wasn't ready to see any kind of nuclear development in Iran and used its influence to halt Iranian nuclear program and as a result there was no Western cooperation left to continue work in Iran. After five years of negotiation Iran signed a deal with Russia in 1995 for the completion of Bushehr power plant. It was estimated that this plant would become functional in four years but because of differences in German and Russian technology, it became difficult for Russia to fit its technology in German infrastructure which was started in 1975. This power plant was barely completed in 2010. It took three more years to become fully functional and it is the only power plant in Iran which produces nuclear energy providing only 2.5 percent of Iran's electricity needs.

Meanwhile, Iran also started to develop its nuclear program domestically with the help of its own nuclear scientists. There was no other country to turn to; as a result Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) started to enrich uranium to make its own nuclear fuel. Iran appeared to have tried to become self-sufficient in making nuclear fuel but the unilateral sanctions of USA prevented it from doing so openly. Iran thus carried out a number of actions that were covered and not reported to IAEA. During late 90s AEOI began construction of a uranium enrichment facility in Natanz and also a heavy water production plant at Arak, which was revealed by Mujahedeen-e-Khalq (MEK) in 2001. The construction of these facilities was not against the NPT, as Article IV of the NPT sets out the inalienable right of all state parties to develop research and produce nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. 17 But Washington and Tel Aviv claimed that Iran was developing a clandestine nuclear weapons program. Since then Iran is facing constant

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pressure on its nuclear program. Throughout the beginning of nuclear crisis, the Iranian officials tried to co-operate with various negotiating parties such as the West, the Chinese, the Russians, East Europeans but were successful only with E-3. After the Tehran and Paris agreements with E-3 Iran halted its nuclear program for almost two years as a confidence building measure and in return these powers promised to recognize Iran's nuclear rights with financial assistance and firm assurances on security matters. But in reality E-3 failed to fulfill their promises. As a result Iranian administration realized that Europeans were not willing for further development. The public opinion in Iran also shifted against nuclear renunciation and the program became an issue of the country's pride. Furthermore, Iran provided IAEA full access to its nuclear sites and from 2003 to 2005 it had essentially committed itself to agency's additional protocol. When Iranian case was referred to the Security Council, its legislature decided to pull out from the additional protocol. It was another interesting fact that the reason the decision was made to transfer the Iranian nuclear file to the Security Council in 2005 was simply because Iran had operationalized its Isfahan site.18 In reality, from day one the Isfahan site was functioning under the regulation of the IAEA and the UN watchdog itself had declared that as far as the Isfahan site was concerned there had been no deviations at all.19 During 2003 to 2005 American and Israeli intelligence agencies constantly pinpointed some of Iranian sites with certain alleged “military dimensions”. To deal with these allegations Tehran actually provided IAEA full access to these sites as well and in the end the entire accusations proved as a misguided propaganda against Iran.

Because of a cold response from the World powers, in January 2006 Iran removed the IAEA seals on the centrifuges at Natanz and announced that it would resume research and development activities at the plant but the production of nuclear fuel remains suspended. The decision did not violate Iran's Safeguard Agreement with IAEA but this was a move that the US and Israel were waiting for and on the very next day White House stepped up the diplomatic pressure on Europeans to refer Iran to the Security Council for violating its treaty obligations. Israel also threatened the EU that if they did not refer Iranian matter to the Security Council then it will take preemptive measures against the regime.

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It is a fact that Iran's enrichment right was guaranteed under the NPT but Tel Aviv and Saudi Arabia are still pressurizing Washington and demanding that Iran should halt its enrichment program. Up till now the Security Council has passed four rounds of sanctions against Iran which were quiet devastating because Iran was only practicing its rights under the NPT and from the beginning of the crisis it has tried to convince these powers that its nuclear program has a peaceful agenda and it does not want to develop nuclear weapons.

The question arises as to why these powers did not believe in Iran's constant claim that its nuclear program has peaceful purposes. The reason behind this mistrust is Iran's historic role in regional politics. Soon after the revolution, the new administration failed to develop good relations with its neighboring states and its harsh policies against Arabs further isolated it. Iran promoted sectarianism in the region by providing funds and training to shia minorities in other states. The new regime in Tehran had its list of friends much shorter in its initial stages. Although Iran signed the NPT and it also collaborated with IAEA but its influential role in the region with aggressive foreign policy and support for Hezbollah and Hamas against Tel Aviv were the main reasons behind the difficulties to continue its nuclear program.

Iran has hardly completed its first nuclear power plant in 2010 and till now both Americans and Israelis have been unsuccessful in convincing the world that Iran has a clandestine nuclear program. It is impossible for Iran to develop a nuclear bomb secretly when UN watchdog and two of the world's most well-known spy agencies are monitoring Iran's nuclear or uranium sites. Furthermore after the Stuxnet virus attack 2010, it is not possible that Iran could build a atomic bomb without the knowledge of the international community. The facts show that Iranian nuclear program is as harmful as Japan and Germany's nuclear programs. Also the multilateral and bilateral sanctions have taken a toll on Iran's economy. Last year, Iran's economy decreased by more than 5 percent and Iran's oil exports are down from about 2.5 million barrels a day in 2011 to about 1 million barrels a day; these declining exports cost Iran about $5 billion a month and overall about $120 billion during the past several years. 20 The Iranian economy is standing on the brink

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of destruction and in these conditions it is uncertain that Iran would acquire the nuclear arsenal instead of restructuring its economy.

Many regional and international actors fear that Iran already has acquired missile technology and therefore the purpose behind nuclear program is to obtain a weapon. But the question arises that Iran is not the only non-nuclear state which possesses missile program, there are many other missile developing and nuclear program obtaining countries around the globe. So why is Iran seen so suspiciously? Although Tehran has a right to develop such technology for peaceful purposes but again because of its unwelcoming stance and intervening policy its missile program is also under strict criticism and seen negatively. Recently Iran utilized its missile program for launching satellites in space and so far this program has shown peaceful purposes. On the other hand the threatening attitude of U.S and Israel also gave Tehran an excuse to develop its missile program for defense purposes.

It is constantly claimed that if Iran obtained nuclear weapons then it would be harmful for regional stability and Tehran could become a significant player in regional politics. If we analyze the current standing of Iran then we can see that with or without nuclear weapons Iran is an influential state of the region and it can't be underestimated. Recently Washington and its allies failed to take any full scale military measures against Syria because they knew that Iran with the assistance of Hezbollah can play its part in the conflict and American assets would not be safe and could be targeted in any part of the region.

Also, there is no evidence that in case of acquiring nuclear weapons the clerics would launch a nuclear attack on Israel. Tehran is fully conscious with Tel Aviv's potential for retaliation which would destroy Iran as a functioning entity for an indefinite period and eliminate substantial parts of its national patrimony. The ruling clerics did not seek power in order to see Iran destroyed; they see themselves as stewards of a revolution that they believe will bring Shia Islam to its rightful place of world leadership.21 It is obvious that they are not ready to lose their vision in a nuclear holocaust. In the absence of military aggression against Iran the clerics have no theological or other motivation to initiate a

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war that could prompt Iran’s nuclear obliteration. 22 Therefore, if Iran succeeded in acquiring the bomb, it still would be deterred to using it to another nuclear-weapons state.

It is also a fact that Israel and USA have simultaneously fabricated negative propaganda against Iran's nuclear program since the mid-80s. These states also pressurized Security Council for sanctions against Iran. Most importantly, the western media has always been biased while reporting about Iran. The facts were falsified and conspiracy theories were regularly fabricated by Israeli and US media. Also, by characterizing sanctions as the only peaceful solution, the media implicitly legitimized the illegal use of force against Iran as a valid option, when in fact it would be a war crime and a violation of international law to attack Iran's perfectly legal and IAEA-monitored nuclear program.23 In addition sensible and genuine Iranian conciliation offers are intentionally overlooked or lied about. The insistence on limiting the range of choices in dealing with Iran to either sanctioning them or bombing them, is a deliberate ploy and characteristic of the whole range of US media coverage of the conflict with Iran. 24

The probability of a fully successful assault by Israel that obliterates all of Iran’s nuclear amenities is also stumpy. Nuclear related facilities in Iran are discrete and several of them are completely underground. This is in contrast to the state of the nuclear amenities in Iraq and Syria when Israel attacked them in 1981and 2007, respectively. 25 Any military assault would generate Iranian reprisal, not only against Tel Aviv but also against U.S armed forces in the region. Many experts also believed that if Israel and U.S keep threatening Tehran then it would be possible that Iran will like to obtain a nuclear weapon to secure its very existence. Therefore it is important that these powers reconsider their foreign policy for Iran and show some willingness for the development of better relation with it.

Unlike the GCC rulers fear, the people of these states are not afraid of Iran's nuclear program. Interestingly they consider U.S and Israel as their biggest enemies but because of sectarian violence Iran has made its case weak in the Arab states. It is also true that Washington has a remarkable influence on GCC countries and because of Iranian fear these states always look for American and Western security umbrella. It is also true that United States is the main beneficiary from the conflict in Middle East. Since 2003 the

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Gulf States have purchased U.S. weapons worth some $123 billion, the largest arms deal in peacetime history.26 From this huge amount about $50 billion to $60 billion was contemplated in missile defense alone to the GCC countries. According to an estimate some of the U.S arms suppliers might get 10 percent of their proceeds from Saudi Arabia alone within the next few years. These facts automatically raise questions on Washington's sincerity for a peaceful conflict resolution in the Middle East. Studies show that the American policies regarding Middle East region are heavily influenced by Israel. Interestingly, Arab monarchs are supporting American and Israeli policies against Iran on sectarian basis and notably in their own vested interest to secure their monarchies.

The recent interim agreement between P5+1 and Iran opened a path of diplomacy and reconstructed the relations between Iran and Western powers. But it is still a temporary agreement and Iran's regional adversaries, Israel and other GCC states specifically Saudi Arabia is not happy with this agreement. The deeper underlying problem is that many influential Israeli lobbies in U.S don't agree that Iran has a right to peaceful nuclear energy. They believe a peaceful program is inherently a pathway to a militant program, that there is no way to create a barrier between the two—and that if Iran wanted, it could maintain a robust civilian program for years and then, at some point, break free and become a nuclear military power. 27 Therefore, these lobbies are mobilized in US and other European countries and it is obvious that Tel Aviv will play its role to halt this or any further agreement between Iran and P5+1. It is now important for these powers to look forward to further positive developments in nuclear talks with Tehran and they have to admit Iranian right to develop its civil nuclear program and pull out unnecessary sanctions against it for better relations. Iran also has to fulfill its promises on nuclear program for further economic relief and most importantly to secure its economy. It also has to improve relations with its neighboring states otherwise it would face difficulties in the future. It can only gain a limited benefit from this deal and to survive in a global community it seriously needs a number of positive and confidence building measures with the West specifically with the U.S. In future Tehran should not interfere in other state's domestic issues and good relations with Riyadh and other states of the region is the only way which can bring regional stability and continuity of its nuclear program.

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1 http://www.issi.org.pk/publication-files/1340000409_86108059.pdf (Accessed on 16

March 2014) 2 Salik, Naeem, (2009) The Genesis of South Asian Deterrence: Pakistan’s Perspective,

Karachi: Oxford University Press, p.68 3 Z. A. Bhutto's statement in the National Assembly of Pakistan on June 7, 1974, The

Pakistan Times, Rawalpindi, June 8,1974, p.1 4 Jones, Rodeny W. (1981) Nuclear Proliferation: Islam, the bomb and South Asia, The

Washington Papers, no 82. Beverly Hills: Sage. 5 Mukhtar, Asia, (2013) "Threat Perception: Pakistan's Nuclear Program," Lahore: Peace

Publications, P. 179 6 Ibid 7 See the statement of Raja Zafarul Haq, leader of the House in Senate, concerning the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal and promotion of India in the international nuclear order;

Speakers Highlight Reservations, Double Standards,‟ The Express Tribune, June 28,2013 8 Hyder, Tariq Osman, (April-May, 2013) Strategic Restraint in South Asia, CISS

Insight, p. 11 9 Khan, Zulfqar (2013) South Asian Nuclear Equation: A Perspective, http://www.issi.org.pk/publication-files/1393572988_51445474.pdf. (Accessed on

February 2014) 10 http://www.cssforum.com.pk/css-compulsory-subjects/current-affairs/33010-pakistani- nuclear-safe.html (Accessed on 28 March 2014) 11 Luongo, Kenneth N. and Salik, Naeem, (2007) Building Confidence in Pakistan’s Nuclear Security, Arms control Today, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_12/Luongo

(Accessed on 25 November 2013) 12 Ibid 13 Ali, Zafar, (2007) Pakistan’s Nuclear Assets and Threats Of Terrorism: How Grave Is

The Danger?, Washington: The Henry L. Stimson Center, P. 17 14 US welcomes Pakistan's commitment on Nuclear safety, September 5th 2013 http://www.nation.com.pk/international/05-Sep-2013/us-welcomes-pakistans- commitment-on-nuclear-safety (Accessed on 24 December 2013)

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15 Khan, Zulfqar (October 2013) The Changing Dynamics of India-Pakistan Deterrence,

Pakistan Horizon, no. 4, vol. 66, p. 12 16 Ibid, p. 13 17 http://thesirenvoice.blogspot.com/2008/05/closer-look-at-national-intelligence.html

(Accessed on 15 March 2014) 18 http://theiranproject.com/blog/2013/09/26/an-interview-with-hassan-rouhani/

(Accessed on 18 March 2014) 19 Ibid 20 Riechmann, Deb, (15 November2013) US Officials: Nuke Deal Offers Iran Minor Relief, Associated Press, (Accessed on 17 November 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory/ambassador-power-iran-talks-time-20897956 21 Weiss, Leonard,(2009) "Israel's Future and Iran's Nuclear Program", Middle East

Policy, Vol. XVI, No.3, P. 83, http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22711/Weiss-3.pdf 22 Op cit 23 Safdari, Cyrus, (2008) Iran's nuclear program: A false dilemma, http://www.iranaffairs.com/iran_affairs/2008/06/iran-nytimes-false.html (Accessed on 18

October 2013) 24 Ibid 25 Weiss, Leonard, P. 83 26 Drummond, James and Khalaf, Roula, “Gulf States in $123bn US Arms Spree,”

Financial Times, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ffd73210-c4ef- 11df-9134

00144feab49a.html#axzz1b8iuSvLT (Accessed on 26 February 2014) 27 Zakaria Fareed, (2013) Statecraft and Stagecraft, Time Magazine, 14 October, P. 20

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

 AAD: Advanced Air Defense  ABMT: Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty  ABMS: Anti-Ballistic Missile System  AEC: Atomic Energy Council  AEOI: Atomic Energy Organization of Iran  AIOC: Anglo-Iranian Oil Company  ALCM: Air Launch Cruise Missile  APTTA: Afghan-Pak Transit Trade Agreement  AWC: Air Weapons Complex  BJP: Bharatiya Janata Party  BMD: Ballistic Missile Defense  BRBM: Battlefield Range Ballistic Missile  BWC: Biological Weapons Convention  CAD: Central Ammunition Depot  CANDU: Canada Deuterium Uranium  CARs: Central Asian Republics  CD: Conference on Disarmament  CENTO: Central Treaty Organization  CIA: Central Intelligence Agency  CJCSC: Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee  CMLA: Chief Martial Law Administrator  CNS: Center of Nuclear Studies  COAS: Chief of Army Staff  CPPNM: Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material  CRS: Congressional Research Service  CSD: Cold Start Doctrine  CSI: Container Security Initiative

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 CTBT: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty  CTBTO: Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization  CTR: Cooperative Threat Reduction Program  CW: Chemical Weapon  CWC: Chemical Weapon Convention  C4I2SR: Computerized, Command, Control, Communication, Information, Intelligence and Surveillance  DCC: Defense Committee of the Cabinet  DCC: Development Control Committee  DGSPD: Director General Strategic Plan Division  DRDO: Defense Research and Development Organization  ECC: Employment Control Committee  EME: Electrical and Mechanical Engineers  ERL: Engineering Research Laboratories  EU: European Union  EUCOM: European Command  FDO: Physical Dynamics Research Laboratory  FMCT: Fissile Material Production Cutoff Treaty  GCC: Gulf Cooperation Council  GCD: General and Comprehensive Disarmament  GHQ: Generals Head Quarter  GICNT: Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism  GLCM: Ground Launched Cruise Missiles  HDI: Human Development Index  HEU: Highly Enriched Uranium  HRP: Human Reliability Program  IADA: International Atomic Development Authority  IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency  IBGs: Integrated Battle Groups  ICBM: Inter Continental Ballistic Missile

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 IDEX: International Defense Exhibition and Conference  IGO: International Governmental Organizations  IISS: International Institute for Strategic Studies  IMS: International Monitoring System  IND: Improvised Nuclear Device  INF Treaty: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty  IRBM: Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile  IRGC: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps  ISI: Inter-Services Intelligence  ISIS: Institute for Science and International Security  ISPR: Inter-Services Public Relations  ISTC: International Science and Technology Center  JINSA: Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs  JTAGS: Joint Tactical Ground Station  KANUPP: Karachi Nuclear Power Plant  KRL: Kahuta Research Laboratories  KRL: Khan Research Laborites  LEU: Low Enriched Uranium  LoC: Line of Control  MAD: Mutual Assured Destruction  MEK: Mujahedeen-e-Khalq  MI: Military Intelligence  MIRVs: Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicles  MOU: Memorandum of Understanding  MTCR: Missile Technology Control Regime  NAM: Non-Aligned Movement  NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization  NCA: National Command Authority  NDC: National Defense Complex  NESCOM: National Engineering and Scientific Commission

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 NFU: No First Use  NFZ: Nuclear Free Zones  NNWS: Non-Nuclear Weapon State  NPP: Nuclear Power Plants  NPT: Non Proliferation Treaty  NPTREC: Non Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference  NSAP: Nuclear Security Action Plan  NSC: National Security Council  NSECC: National Security Emergency Coordination Centre  NSG: Nuclear Supplier Group  NTM: National Technical Means  NUTs: Nuclear Utilization Theory  NWS: Nuclear Weapons States  OPCW: Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons  OPEC: Organization of Petroleum Exploring Countries  OPVs: Offshore Patrol Vessels  PAEC: Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission  PAF: Pakistan Air Force  PALs: Permissive Action Links  PARR: Pakistan Atomic Research Reactor  PIIA: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs  PINSTECH: Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology  PML: Pakistan Muslim League  PNCA: Pakistan’s Nuclear Command Authority  PNPFC: Pakistan Nuclear Power Fuel Complex  PNRA: Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority  PPP: Pakistan People’s Party  PRP: Personnel Reliability Program  PSF: Peninsula Shield Force  PTBT: Partial Test Ban Treaty

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 P5: Permanent Five  RDD: Radiological Dispersal Device  SALT: Strategic Arms Limitation Talks  SDI: Strategic Defense Initiative  SEATO: Southeast Asian Treaty Organization  SECDIV: Strategic Export Control Division  SLBM: Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile  SLCM: Submarine Launch Cruise Missile;  SORT: Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty  SPD: Strategic Plan Division  SRBM: Short Range Ballistic Missile  SSFC: Services' Strategic Forces Command  START: Strategic Arms Reduction Talks  SUPARCO: Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission  THAAD: Theater High Altitude Air Defense  TNRC: Tehran Nuclear Research Center  TNWs: Tactical Nuclear Weapons  TRR: Tehran Research Reactor  UAE: United Arab Emirate  UCF: Uranium Conversion Facility  UCN: Ultra Centrifuge Nederland  UK: United Kingdom  UN: United Nations  UNAEC: United Nation Atomic Energy Commission  UNO: United Nations Organizations  UNSC: United Nation Security Council  UNSCR: United Nation Security Council Resolution  UNSG: United Nations Secretary-General  US: United States  USA: United States of America

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 USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  WHO: World Health Organization  WMD: Weapons of Mass Destruction  WOT: War on Terror  WTO: World Trade Organization  WWI: World War I  WWII: World War II

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APPENDIX: 01

THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATIONOF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

(NPT)

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Parties to the Treaty, Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples, Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war, In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons, Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities, Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points, Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States, Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament, Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective, Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end, Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

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Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources, Have agreed as follows: Article I Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices. Article II Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Article III 1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere. 2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article. 3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

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4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute o f the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations. Article IV 1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty. 2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world. Article V Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements. Article VI Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Article VII Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories. Article VIII 1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall

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circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment. 2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of a ll the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment. 3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realised. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty. Article IX 1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time. 2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments. 3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967. 4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession. 5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices. 6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

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Article X 1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. 2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.1 Article XI This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty. DONE in triplicate, at the cities of London, Moscow and Washington, the first day of July, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-eight.

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APPENDIX: 02

Geneva, 24 November 2013

INTERIM AGREEMENT BETWEEN IRAN &P5+1 JOINT PLAN OF ACTION

PREAMBLE The goal for these negotiations is to reach a mutually-agreed long-term comprehensive solution that would ensure Iran's nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful. Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek or develop any nuclear weapons. This comprehensive solution would build on these initial measures and result in a final step for a period to be agreed upon and the resolution of concerns. This comprehensive solution would enable Iran to fully enjoy its right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under the relevant articles of the NPT in conformity with its obligations therein. This comprehensive solution would involve a mutually defined enrichment program with practical limits and transparency measures to ensure the peaceful nature of the program. This comprehensive solution would constitute an integrated whole where nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. This comprehensive solution would involve a reciprocal, step-by-step process, and would produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions, as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran's nuclear program.

There would be additional steps in between the initial measures and the final step, including, among other things, addressing the UN Security Council resolutions, with a view toward bringing to a satisfactory conclusion the UN Security Council's consideration of this matter. The E3+3 and Iran will be responsible for conclusion and implementation of mutual near-term measures and the comprehensive solution in good faith. A Joint Commission of E3/EU+3 and Iran will be established to monitor the implementation of the near-term measures and address issues that may arise, with the IAEA responsible for verification of nuclear-related measures. The Joint Commission will work with the IAEA to facilitate resolution of past and present issues of concern.

ELEMENTS OF A FIRST STEP

The first step would be time-bound, with duration of 6 months, and renewable by mutual consent, during which all parties will work to maintain a constructive atmosphere for negotiations in good faith.

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IRAN WOULD UNDERTAKE THE FOLLOWING VOLUNTARY MEASURES:

 From the existing uranium enriched to 20%, retain half as working stock of 20% oxide for fabrication of fuel for the TRR. Dilute the remaining 20% UF6 to no more than 5%. No reconversion line.  Iran announces that it will not enrich uranium over 5% for the duration of the 6 months.  Iran announces that it will not make any further advances of its activities at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant1, Fordow2, or the Arak reactor3, designated by the IAEA as IR-40.  Beginning when the line for conversion of UF6 enriched up to 5% to UO2 is ready, Iran has decided to convert to oxide UF6 newly enriched up to 5% during the 6 m  Iran announces that it will not make any further advances of its activities at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant1, Fordow2, or the Arak reactor3, designated by the IAEA as IR-40.  Beginning when the line for conversion of UF6 enriched up to 5% to UO2 is ready, Iran has decided to convert to oxide UF6 newly enriched up to 5% during the 6 month period, as provided in the operational schedule of the conversion plant declared to the IAEA.  No new locations for the enrichment.  Iran will continue its safeguarded R&D practices, including its current enrichment R&D practices, which are not designed for accumulation of the enriched uranium.  No reprocessing or construction of a facility capable of reprocessing.  Enhanced monitoring: o Provision of specified information to the IAEA, including information on Iran's plans for nuclear facilities, a description of each building on each nuclear site, a description of the scale of operations for each location engaged

1 Namely, during the 6 months, Iran will not feed UF6 into the centrifuges installed but not enriching uranium. Not install additional centrifuges. Iran announces that during the first 6 months, it will replace existing centrifuges with centrifuges of the same type.

2 At Fordow, no further enrichment over 5% at 4 cascades now enriching uranium, and not increase enrichment capacity. Not feed UF6 into the other 12 cascades, which would remain in a non-operative state. No interconnections between cascades. Iran announces that during the first 6 months, it will replace existing centrifuges with centrifuges of the same type.

3 Iran announces on concerns related to the construction of the reactor at Arak that for 6 months it will not commission the reactor or transfer fuel or heavy water to the reactor site and will not test additional fuel or produce more fuel for the reactor or install remaining components.

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in specified nuclear activities, information on uranium mines and mills, and information on source material. This information would be provided within three months of the adoption of these measures. o Submission of an updated DIQ for the reactor at Arak, designated by the IAEA as the IR-40, to the IAEA. o Steps to agree with the IAEA on conclusion of the Safeguards Approach for the reactor at Arak, designated by the IAEA as the IR-40. o Daily IAEA inspector access when inspectors are not present for the purpose of Design Information Verification, Interim Inventory Verification, Physical Inventory Verification, and unannounced inspections, for the purpose of access to offline surveillance records, at Fordow and Natanz. o IAEA inspector managed access to: . centrifuge assembly workshops4; . centrifuge rotor production workshops and storage facilities; and, . uranium mines and mills. IN RETURN, THE E3/EU+3 WOULD UNDERTAKE THE FOLLOWING VOLUNTARY MEASURES:

 Pause efforts to further reduce Iran's crude oil sales, enabling Iran's current customers to purchase their current average amounts of crude oil. Enable the repatriation of an agreed amount of revenue held abroad. For such oil sales, suspend the EU and U.S. sanctions on associated insurance and transportation services.  Suspend U.S. and EU sanctions on: o Iran's petrochemical exports, as well as sanctions on associated services. 5 o Gold and precious metals, as well as sanctions on associated services.  Suspend U.S. sanctions on Iran's auto industry, as well as sanctions on associated services.  License the supply and installation in Iran of spare parts for safety of flight for Iranian civil aviation and associated services. License safety related inspections and repairs in Iran as well as associated services.6  No new nuclear-related UN Security Council sanctions.  No new EU nuclear-related sanctions.  The U.S. Administration, acting consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Congress, will refrain from imposing new nuclear-related sanctions.  Establish a financial channel to facilitate humanitarian trade for Iran's domestic needs using Iranian oil revenues held abroad. Humanitarian trade would be

4 Consistent with its plans, Iran's centrifuge production during the 6 months will be dedicated to replace damaged machines. 5 "Sanctions on associated services" means any service, such as insurance, transportation, or financial, subject to the underlying U.S. or EU sanctions applicable, insofar as each service is related to the underlying sanction and required to facilitate the desired transactions. These services could involve any non-designated Iranian entities. 6 Sanctions relief could involve any non-designated Iranian airlines as well as Iran Air.

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defined as transactions involving food and agricultural products, medicine, medical devices, and medical expenses incurred abroad. This channel would involve specified foreign banks and non-designated Iranian banks to be defined when establishing the channel. o This channel could also enable: . transactions required to pay Iran's UN obligations; and, . direct tuition payments to universities and colleges for Iranian students studying abroad, up to an agreed amount for the six month period.  Increase the EU authorisation thresholds for transactions for non-sanctioned trade to an agreed amount.

Elements of the final step of a comprehensive solution*

The final step of a comprehensive solution, which the parties aim to conclude negotiating and commence implementing no more than one year after the adoption of this document, would:

 Have a specified long-term duration to be agreed upon.  Reflect the rights and obligations of parties to the NPT and IAEA Safeguards Agreements.  Comprehensively lift UN Security Council, multilateral and national nuclear- related sanctions, including steps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance, and energy, on a schedule to be agreed upon.  Involve a mutually defined enrichment program with mutually agreed parameters consistent with practical needs, with agreed limits on scope and level of enrichment activities, capacity, where it is carried out, and stocks of enriched uranium, for a period to be agreed upon.  Fully resolve concerns related to the reactor at Arak, designated by the IAEA as the IR 40. No reprocessing or construction of a facility capable of reprocessing.  Fully implement the agreed transparency measures and enhanced monitoring. Ratify and implement the Additional Protocol, consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Majlis (Iranian parliament).  Include international civil nuclear cooperation, including among others, on acquiring modern light water power and research reactors and associated equipment, and the supply of modern nuclear fuel as well as agreed R&D practices.

Following successful implementation of the final step of the comprehensive solution for its full duration, the Iranian nuclear program will be treated in the same manner as that of any non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT.

* With respect to the final step and any steps in between, the standard principle that "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed" applies.

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APPENDIX: 03

SIGNIFICANT NUCLEAR SITES OF PAKISTAN

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APPENDIX: 04

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APPENDIX: 05

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APPENDIX: 06

IRAN’S NUCLEAR FACILITIES AND URANIUM MINES

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