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Putting Strategic Partnership to the Test Cooperation Between NATO and the EU in Operation Althea SWP Research Paper Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Frank Kupferschmidt Putting Strategic Partnership to the Test Cooperation Between NATO and the EU in Operation Althea RP 3 April 2006 Berlin All rights reserved. © Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2006 SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Ludwigkirchplatz 3−4 10719 Berlin Germany Phone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 www.swp-berlin.org [email protected] ISSN 1863-1053 Translation by Will Firth (English version of SWP-Studie 7/06) Table of Contents 5 Problems and Conclusions 7 The Political Preconditions for Althea 7 Structures and Instruments for Cooperation in Crisis Management 8 The Joint Approach of the EU and NATO for the Western Balkans 9 The Situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina 10 American and European Interests 12 Practical NATO-EU Cooperation in Operation Althea 12 Decision-Making and Management at Political Level 12 The Protracted Political Decision-Making Process 13 The Turkish-Greek Problem 15 The Problem of Task-Sharing Between the EU and NATO 15 The Tasks of EUFOR 16 The Tasks of NATO Headquarters in Sarajevo 17 Cooperation at Military Level 17 The Military Command Structure 18 EUFOR Personnel 19 Planning by NATO Headquarters Europe 19 Recourse to NATO Resources 20 Intelligence 20 Reserves 22 A Provisional Appraisal of EU-NATO Cooperation in Althea 22 What has been Achieved 22 Problems and their Causes 24 Possible Solutions 26 The State of the “Strategic Partnership” and its Prospects 29 List of Abbreviations Problems and Conclusions Putting Strategic Partnership to the Test: Cooperation Between NATO and the EU in Operation Althea Operation Althea, which has been the most compre- hensive and demanding military operation led by the European Union (EU) so far, was launched in Bosnia- Herzegovina on 2 December 2004. Although formally an EU operation, it represents the high point of NATO- EU cooperation to date. On 16 December 2002 Javier Solana, the EU’s High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, declared that that day marked the beginning of “the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU”, which would “bring the two organisations closer to- gether”. His statement was a reference to the first sig- nificant result to come from the intensive discussions between the EU and NATO since the NATO foreign ministers’ meeting in 1996 in Berlin: the two orga- nisations had agreed on goals, principles and proce- dures to make their partnership in crisis management take effect. This study analyses the cooperation between NATO and the EU in Operation Althea and asks the following main questions: How are the agreed structures and instruments for cooperation used in Althea? What are the root causes of the problems which have arisen there, and how can they be solved? And finally, does this cooperation between NATO and the EU live up to the claim of a “strategic partnership”? The reference period of the study is the preparatory phase of Althea and the first year of the operation. The analysis takes the arrangements of the EU and NATO for joint action in the Balkans, specifically in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as its point of departure. It then examines the motivations for the replacement of the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) by the EU Force (EUFOR) and goes on to look at the principles and in- struments, with which the NATO-EU partnership is to be put into practice. Subsequently the study examines political and mili- tary cooperation in the Bosnia operation with regard to the decision-making process, task-sharing, the command structures and the manner in which NATO resources are used. The problems which arise are iden- tified and their causes discussed. The final section as- sesses the state of the partnership on the basis of the SWP-Berlin Cooperation Between NATO and the EU in Operation Althea April 2006 5 Problems and Conclusions agreed principles and discusses how the problems in EU command structure which fundamentally mir- the partnership could be solved. rors that of NATO must be created for operations In assessing cooperation between NATO and the EU under the “Berlin Plus” rules. in the scope of Operation Althea, the study comes to Additional arrangements must be made to set a the following conclusions: clear framework for cooperation in various areas. Relations between NATO and the EU only partly live The amount of time required to prepare an opera- up to the agreed principles of “strategic partnership”. tion under “Berlin Plus” must be reduced. There are also doubts as to whether all the states in- Progress has been made in recent years in crisis- volved really want the partnership to be successful. management cooperation between NATO and the EU. The greatest deficits are to be found in cooperation The following measures would help further consoli- between the political committees of NATO and the EU. date this development: Since all decisions require consensus in both organi- Intensifying strategic dialogue between the two sations, and the number of members has increased, it organisations. is here that problems are most likely to occur. NATO and the EU meeting at an early stage when Different ideas and divergent interests at political crises are looming to discuss the situation, common and military-policy level delayed decisions in the prep- goals and possible measures. aratory phase of Operation Althea. The USA’s lack of All members should manifest the will to resolve trust in European capabilities initially led to SFOR’s problems in a cooperative manner. replacement being postponed. Later, national reser- Consistently putting into effect the agreed increase vations hindered clear agreements on task-sharing in European capabilities in order to achieve the between NATO and the EU and the exact shape of the desired balanced partnership between NATO/USA command structures. and the EU. The following measures could improve cooperation between NATO and the EU: Setting up joint NATO-EU preparatory committees – these could help prevent obstacles and blockades or at least allow the danger of their emergence to be recognised at an early stage, which would help lessen the negative consequences. Considering whether Turkey should be given asso- ciate status in the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), independent of EU accession nego- tiations . Improving the rules for cooperation between NATO and the EU. At military level the agreements between NATO and the EU have been utilised effectively and profession- ally. But there is still need for improvement in this area. Althea showed up the limitations of the “Berlin Plus” agreements: the complexity of the arrangements and the amount of time required for their implemen- tation in an operation mean that their application will probably be limited to NATO-successor operations. Further-reaching options will only be realistic if deci- sion-making processes can be effectively streamlined. In the military sphere the following improvements should be considered: The preconditions must be created for making decisions at an earlier stage. Command structures of the EU and NATO must be made mutually compatible, in other words an SWP-Berlin Cooperation Between NATO and the EU in Operation Althea April 2006 6 Structures and Instruments for Cooperation in Crisis Management The Political Preconditions for Althea Four factors shaped the EU’s intention to assume Independent operational management by the EU is command of SFOR’s successor operation: Firstly, the made possible by the permanent arrangements with reaching of permanent agreements between NATO NATO, the “Berlin Plus Agreement” of 17 March 2003,3 and the EU, which put the Europeans in the position which guarantees the EU access to NATO planning to undertake an operation of this magnitude for the capacities. Furthermore, in particular cases the EU first time; secondly, Europe’s particular interest in a also has access to collective NATO resources and capa- country that has prospects of joining the EU, which bilities—including the NATO command structure and was expressed in the joint approach agreed between communications. These agreements regulate numer- NATO and the EU for the Balkans, for instance; thirdly, ous mechanisms, including those for NATO-EU consul- the situation in the country itself, which was starting tations in crisis situations and many other functions; to show positive signs; and fourthly, developments they also define the tasks of NATO’s Deputy Supreme towards a concurring US-European interest in a Euro- Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) in his role as pean successor operation. operation commander of an EU-led crisis-management operation and lay down consultation mechanisms between NATO and the EU for EU operations involving Structures and Instruments for Cooperation recourse to NATO resources. in Crisis Management These agreements are of great significance for the EU in the light of its former decision to do without a The NATO-EU partnership, which guarantees the Euro- command structure of its own comparable to NATO’s peans access to the necessary instruments for large- so as to avoid “unnecessary duplication”. In larger scale crisis-management operations under their own operations the EU is consequently dependent on the command, was sealed with two documents. In Decem- NATO command structure or the headquarters (HQ) ber 2002 all the NATO states—including those which provided by individual nations. are not members of the EU—issued a declaration Whether it is NATO or the EU which intervenes in welcoming the European security and defence policy the event of crisis is determined in consultations both and its purpose of enabling EU-led crisis-management within the individual organisations and between operations.1 This includes military operations, “where them. Since this is essentially a decision about NATO as a whole is not engaged”,2 meaning whether an operation takes place with the involve- essentially if the USA is not involved.
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