With Thanks to Our Workshop Partners Report by the CEPA Task Group March 2021

“The first and most important rule to observe ... is to use our entire forces with the utmost energy. The second rule is to concentrate our power as much as possible against that section where the chief blows are to be delivered and to incur disadvantages elsewhere, so that our chances of success may increase at the decisive point. The third rule is never to waste time. Unless important advantages are to be gained from hesitation, it is necessary to set to work at once. By this speed, a hundred enemy measures are nipped in the bud, and public opinion is won most rapidly. Finally, the fourth rule is to follow up our successes with the utmost energy.”

Carl von Clausewitz The CEPA Military Mobility Project

Contents

List of Acronyms...... 2 Executive Summary...... 4 Foreword ...... 12 Strategic Context...... 13 Europe’s Military Mobility Challenge...... 14 The Principles of Military Mobility...... 18 Political-Military Framework in Europe...... 19 Military Mobility Project — Five Scenarios...... 22 Project Leadership Team ...... 25 Project Timetable...... 27 Main Findings and Recommendations...... 27 Conclusion...... 40 Endnotes...... 42 Appendices: Working Group’s Findings...... 44 Bibliography of Relevant Publications...... 65

All opinions are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.

Cover: Members of the Emergencies Ministry of the separatist Donetsk People’s Republic demine the area at the militants’ former positions on the contact line with the Ukrainian armed forces following troop withdrawals near the settlement of Petrivske (Petrovskoye) in Donetsk region, Ukraine November 19, 2019. REUTERS/Alexander Ermochenko.

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About the Authors

Heinrich Brauss

Heinrich Brauss is a former lieutenant general of the . From October 2013 to July 2018, he was NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defence Policy and Planning. He was previously deputy to the same department in NATO for several years and director of the Civil-Military Cell and EU Operations Centre in the EU Military Staff.

Ben Hodges

Lieutenant General (Retired) Ben Hodges holds the Pershing Chair in Strategic Studies at the Center for European Policy Analysis. Previously, he served as Commanding General, Army Europe (Wiesbaden, ) from 2014 to 2017, as Commander, NATO Allied Land Command (İzmir, ), and in a variety of other Joint and Army Staff positions.

Julian Lindley-French

Prof. Dr. Julian Lindley-French is a leading advisor, strategist, and author with eleven published books and many articles. He is a Distinguished Visiting Research Fellow at the National Defense University in Washington; Senior Fellow, at the Institute for Statecraft in London; Director of Europa Analytica in the Netherlands; a Fellow of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute; a Visiting Program Director at Wilton Park; and founder of The Alphen Group.

About CEPA

The Center for European Analysis (CEPA) is a non-partisan think-tank dedicated to strengthening the transatlantic relationship. Headquartered in Washington, D.C. and led by seasoned transatlanticists and young leaders from both sides of the Atlantic, CEPA brings an innovative approach to the policy arena. Our cutting-edge analysis and timely debates galvanize communities of influence while investing in the next generation of leaders to understand and address present and future challenges to transatlantic values and principles.

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List of Acronyms

A2/AD Anti-access/area denial AO Area of Operations AMCC Allied Movement Coordination Centre AOR Area of Responsibility CBMP Cross-Border Movement Permission CBRN Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear CEF Connecting Europe Facility CJTF Combined Joint Task Forces CSDP Common Security and Defense Policy DG-MOVE Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport EDA European Defense Agency eFP Enhanced Forward Presence FD Final destination EUMC Military Committee GMPT General Master Plan on Transport GRP Graduated Response Plan HNS Host Nation Support JSEC Joint Support and Enabling Command LOGFAS Logistics Functional Area Services MFF Multi-Annual Financial Framework MLC Military Load Classification MNDDP Multinational Detailed Deployment Plan MSR Main supply route NAC North Atlantic Council NMS NATO Military Strategy NRF NATO Response Force NPOC National Point of Contact NSIP NATO Security Investment Program NTC National territorial command PESCO Permanent Structured Cooperation PfP Partnership for Peace POD Port of disembarkation POE Port of embarkation RAM Rapid Air Movement RFF Recovery and Resilience Facility RSOM Reception, staging, and onward movement

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SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe SJLSG Standing Joint Logistic Support Group SOFA Status of Force Agreement TA Technical Arrangement TEN-T Trans-European Transport Network tFP Tailored Forward Presence TSI Technical Specification for Interoperability VJTF Very High Readiness Joint Task Force

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Executive Summary The Project’s Primary Message Europe’s security environment changed The Military Mobility Project fundamentally in 2014 as a consequence The Military Mobility Project, launched of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and by the Washington-based Center for its illegal annexation of Crimea. Since European Policy Analysis (CEPA), is then, NATO has placed renewed emphasis designed to promote the establishment of on deterrence and defense and made a the multiplicity of conditions (legal and significant effort to strengthen its posture. regulatory standards, infrastructure and In view of Russia’s now-entrenched military requirements, the management policy of constant confrontation, its use of risks to the security of transiting of hybrid warfare in both peacetime forces) needed to enable, facilitate, and and during crises, as well as its growing improve military mobility across Europe. military potential close to NATO’s The project focused on five different borders, the Alliance must consider the political-military scenarios each of simultaneous and parallel defense of which was examined by a multinational several regions all of which could be at working group in a series of military risk in a crisis with Russia. These regions mobility workshops that took place stretch from Northern Norway and the between September and October 2020. North Atlantic through the Baltic Sea and Their purpose was to generate a number Black Sea Regions to the Mediterranean. of substantial recommendations that, if Specifically, NATO must further enhance implemented, would advance military its responsiveness and agility as well as mobility across Europe. the readiness of its military forces and be able to deploy them rapidly to provide In an address to the Plenary Military timely reinforcement of allies in a crisis Mobility Workshop in October 2020, or a military conflict. Speed is of the Adm. Rob Bauer, the Netherlands’ chief essence. NATO also remains committed to of defense, identified the key challenges responding effectively to crises beyond the posed to his country as a transit nation Alliance’s borders. Given the risk that such for moving military forces: the need crises could escalate rapidly, the ability for improved infrastructure; clear to respond speedily over distance is also and agreed rules and regulations (for important. dangerous goods, customs, cross-border movement permissions); military mobility The EU seeks to become a geopolitical relevant command and control (C2); the actor and advance, in time, toward a so- establishment of a 24/7 network of national called European Defense Union. While the points of contact across NATO and the EU’s focus is on the conduct of effective European Union (EU), respectively; the civil-military crisis management beyond establishment of Territorial Command Europe, its ability to act effectively will authorities by transit and host nations also require the rapid movement of forces to facilitate smooth movements along across Europe prior to their deployment to multimodal movement corridors, properly crisis regions adjacent to the bloc’s borders supported by logistic hubs; and the and beyond. The security environment is fostering of digital support and protection. also marked by the return of geopolitical This report seeks to address these and great-power competition. One consequence related challenges that military mobility of China’s rapid rise to global power status faces in Europe in general.1 is the shift taking place in the U.S. strategic center of gravity toward the Indo-Pacific region. The United States’ European allies and partners will thus have to spend

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significantly more both on deterrence For Russia, the problem and defense in Europe and effective crisis management in North Africa and the remains that it cannot Middle East. compete in a direct contest Against this strategic background, both NATO and the EU have a clear common of national power responsibility to establish the conditions needed for the expeditious movement of for air, rail, road, and port facilities. military forces throughout Europe. The Fostering a whole-of-government military primary strategic purpose of military mobility culture through preestablished mobility is to move forces and resources relationships will be particularly important rapidly over distance and by so doing in transit and host nations. afford the political and military leadership of the Alliance options to enhance Main Recommendations deterrence and defense or engage in effective military crisis management Rules, Regulations, and beyond NATO’s borders. Effective Procedures cooperation between the EU and NATO Streamline Cross-Border Movement Permissions: over military mobility would further It is essential that all European nations strengthen transatlantic cohesion by establish a harmonized cross-border contributing to equitable burden sharing. movement approval process for all military movements across Europe and lift existing Principal Factors restrictions in national legislation. NATO There are three principal factors that has implemented a legal framework should drive all efforts to improve military through Technical Arrangements (TAs) mobility across and within Europe: high- with both allies and its partners that level engagement, effective military participate in the Partnership for Peace planning, and the adoption of a whole- (PfP) program. The European Defense of-government approach. Engagement is Agency (EDA) and 25 EU nations are also needed at the highest levels of NATO, the working on two TAs, one for the surface EU, and European capitals, and in both and the other for the air domain, which the political and military domains, to lay are expected to be completed by spring the foundational conditions for military 2021. Norway has joined the program, mobility. This is both an urgent military and it is important that other non-EU requirement and a political necessity. European allies join as well or at least Effective military planning for the establish compatible rules. deployment of forces across Europe both in • Standardize regulations for the transport a crisis and war must take better account of of dangerous goods: Legal basis for the national and EU legislation and regulations. transport of dangerous goods should There is also a vital need to exercise be established by the EU member and test coordination and to deconflict states and their national practices processes prior to any emergency to ensure harmonized as soon as possible to they function under duress and can thus promote friction-free movement. The meet planning timelines. Effective and combining of civilian rules with, where rapid military mobility also demands a necessary, the provisions of the NATO whole-of-government approach in all Standardization Agreement, AMovP6, enabling nations. This would necessarily is considered sufficient by the EU. involve (inter alia) ministries of defense, A harmonized legal basis would be interior, and transportation, as well as particularly important for both transit those private sector leaders responsible and host nations. The aim should be an

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Polish soldiers patrol the rail yard at Mockava, Lithuania during Exercise Brilliant Jump 20. Brilliant Jump is a deployment exercise designed to test the readiness of NATO’s spearhead unit, the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force. The VJTF deployed to Lithuania by land, air and sea to take part in the Lithuanian national exercise Iron Wolf II. To avoid the spread of COVID-19, the deploying forces avoided civilian populations on their way to Lithuania and practiced social distancing. Credit: NATO.

annual renewal/update of approval for EU member states. However, there is the transport of a range of dangerous concern about duplication of effort and goods along defined multimodal data ownership. Therefore, in order to movement corridors. simplify the customs process for all military movements in Europe, NATO • Standardize customs procedures: All and the EU should make a joint effort European governments should apply to develop identical 302 templates. simplified and streamlined customs procedures for military transportation • Accelerate response times for Cross-Border throughout Europe in peacetime and Movement Permissions: The EU aims to in a crisis. NATO allies and their PfP deliver diplomatic, border-crossing, partners use NATO Form 302 for and transit movement clearance in exemption from customs relating to peacetime for military forces within the movement of goods for use by a five working days. For NATO, this is deploying force. For its part, the EU too long given how important it is has developed, in full transparency for it to be able to respond rapidly and dialogue with NATO, EU Form in a crisis. NATO’s operational-level 302 which is to be used alongside planning timeline is three calendar NATO Form 302. Together, these days (72 hours). Therefore, the EU forms enable uniform treatment of, member states should adjust their and rapid customs declarations for, all respective response times to three days. cross-border military movements in all At the very least, the EU should create

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a mechanism to allow preapproval for reinforcement of allies located on defined rapid reaction force packages NATO’s periphery, transit and host within a maximum of three days. nations should also better provide for sufficient bridging capability. Projects Transportation Infrastructure designed to reinforce bridges should be central to the creation of dual-use • Undertake a comprehensive infrastructure civil-military infrastructure throughout assessment: The responsible the EU. headquarters/staff of both NATO and the EU should build on a • Standardize rail interfaces: The better use comprehensive infrastructure of civilian freight routes for military assessment and maintain shared transportation should be further comprehensive infrastructure databases explored within the framework of the relevant to their respective military European Commission’s work on rail transportation networks. Such an freight corridors. Over the short to approach will require close and detailed medium term, increased investment coordination with the nations. For in so-called transition technologies example, host nations should continue could be made to facilitate the transfer the Military Load Classification (MLC) of shipments from one railway gauge assessment and corresponding marking to another to avoid the need to unload of relevant bridges. and reload rolling stock.

• Make full use of the European Commission’s Command, Control, and Trans-European Transport Network policy: It is essential that European NATO allies, Coordination which are also members of the EU, • Standardize networks of National Points of in coordination with the responsible Contact: The EU has set up a network of NATO military headquarters, submit National Points of Contact (NPOCs) for project proposals for priority dual-use military mobility. They are the entry (civilian and military) infrastructure points for movement requests and projects that could be co-funded by in charge of processing them within the European Commission through their nations. NATO has established the military mobility envelope of the a network of single NPOCs at the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF). Such political level to enable the coordinated projects will be particularly important management of civil emergencies along the main supply routes and and strengthen the Alliance’s transportation corridors and covered resilience. NATO is also setting up a by the European Commission’s Trans- 24/7 movement control network at European Transport Network (TEN-T) the operational level between it and policy. Such projects will necessarily national civil and military entities take time and it is vital EU member within the Alliance that is vital for states urgently identify projects that force flow management for both could benefit from CEF funding. exercises and operations. The network of POCs in NATO should be completed • Build for heavier military equipment: as soon as possible with the requisite During the deployment of forces for terms of reference also finalized crisis response operations weight expeditiously. The EU POCs and those restrictions on roads will tend to favor of NATO should also be aligned and the use of rail or river/barge routes. harmonized as far as possible. This is because the combination of truck, trailer, and heavy tank could • Establish National Territorial Commands: in future exceed 120 tons. For rapid Where they do not yet exist, national

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territorial commands (NTCs) should is serious about significantly enhancing be established in all transit and its efforts to do more for its own host nations and charged with the security, as well as promote better provision of Host Nation Support transatlantic burden sharing. (HNS) for transiting or deploying forces. Specifically, the provision of • Extend NATO common funding: The the national military infrastructure Alliance should explore greater use of necessary for ensuring freedom of the NATO Security Investment Program maneuver through effective rear area (NSIP) to co-finance infrastructure security, military movement control, projects relevant to military mobility the rapid and unrestricted crossing that are not eligible for co-funding of waterways, including sufficient by the European Commission. NATO bridging capability, telecom links, and should also consider counting allies’ medical support should be provided. investments in such projects that are The NTCs should also act as enablers clearly dedicated to facilitating military for improved links between NATO mobility of NATO forces as part of a forces, national forces, and the civilian nation’s 2% (of GDP) benchmark for defense sector, with the NPOCs defense spending. integral, but distinct elements of the NTCs. Special Capabilities

• Make full use of NATO’s Joint Support and • Fully harness capability catalogues: Enabling Command: The Joint Support The allies, together with NATO’s and Enabling Command ( JSEC) has European partner nations, should been assigned as Supreme Allied make available and regularly update Commander Europe’s (SACEUR’s) Joint their respective capability catalogues. Rear Area Command. It is in charge Capability catalogues are designed to of battlespace management and force ensure that nations’ data relevant to flow management across Europe and military mobility is available to NATO responsible for the security of the rear to inform operational and movement area of SACEUR’s Area of Responsibility planning. Critical capabilities such as (AOR). To this end, it should also be wet-gap crossing, and counter-mobility vested with coordinating authority equipment must be available in nations’ for all national territorial commands military inventories. and act as the network hub for the • Enhance national military transportation respective NPOCs for military mobility capacities: NATO should assign in the transit nations. Capability Targets for the allies to significantly increase their respective Funding military transportation capacity (road, • Increase EU funding for military mobility: rail, air, sea) and to ensure timely The EU member states concerned and assured priority access to civilian should make optimal use of the transportation capacity. EU member Military Mobility Fund (€1.69 billion states should also contribute to this in current prices) to co-fund dual-use effort through increased collaboration infrastructure projects. They should via enhanced military mobility, also consider additional funding which is one of six focus areas for options, for example, by using parts of collaborative capability development EU Recovery and Resilience Facility recommended by the EDA. (RFF) funds for such projects. This • Establish logistic hubs: Distances from would send a clear signal that Europe ports of debarkation in Western Europe

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U.S. Marines stand on their Amphibious Assault Vehicles, waiting for the order to head to shore near Klaipeda, Lithuania during Exercise Baltic Operations 18. Credit: NATO.

to potential theaters of operations can through better communication be great. Germany and its Permanent between NATO, the EU, the member Structured Cooperation (PESCO) nations, and all civilian and military partners should, therefore, spare no stakeholders during the planning phase effort to implement the network of operations. Far closer civil-military of logistic hubs (for maintenance, relationships must also be forged recovery, storage of food, ammunition, to ease incompatibilities between and fuel, etc.) across Europe consistent military and civilian equipment that with the planned establishment of cyberattacks would seek to exploit. multimodal movement corridors. It is essential that the logistic hubs also be • Counter information warfare: Information fully usable by all allies contributing to warfare during a crisis, in combination NATO operations and exercises. with cyberattacks and subversive actions, could have significant Resilience destabilizing and paralyzing effects on Western societies as well as on allied • Foster a culture of cyber resilience: The forces. Therefore, fostering state and deployment of military forces is societal resilience against all forms of particularly vulnerable to a potential hybrid warfare, including malicious adversary seeking to delay and cyber activities and disinformation, destabilize NATO or EU responses is NATO’s first line of deterrence and to a crisis. Increased awareness of defense and a precondition for the EU’s the cyber threat posed to military ability to act successfully. Host nations’ mobility should be actively promoted civil and military authorities, together

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Map 1. CEPA Military Mobility Workshop Scenarios

Scenario 1 Norway to Estonia

Baltic North Sea Sea Scenario 2 Suwalki Corridor

Scenario 3 Focsani Gate

Atlantic Ocean

Black Scenario 4 Sea Western Balkans

Scenario 5 Mediterranean Sea Mediterranean

Source: CEPA Military Mobility Workshop 2021.

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with commanders of transiting nations to meet the requirements of and deployed forces, should closely tactical-level advance planning, in coordinate to develop a common particular with regard to force, space, approach to countering disinformation and time requirements adjusted to if they are to respond swiftly and regional/local conditions. effectively. Persistent NATO-EU cooperation Exercises on military mobility • Establish a systematic and comprehensive • Enhance the Structured Dialogue on Military program of EU-NATO civil-military Mobility: The Structured Dialogue on exercises: Military mobility in Europe Military Mobility between relevant relies on a complex system of national NATO and EU staffs has already and international civilian and military effectively contributed to improved stakeholders and actors. This system information sharing in key areas needs to be regularly tested, reviewed, such as transportation infrastructure, and improved, both in NATO and the transport of dangerous goods, the EU. Such a goal can only be customs, and cross-border movement achieved through a systematic and permissions. However, those involved comprehensive program of rigorous should meet more frequently and exercising. focus on identifying those areas and measures that must be tackled urgently • Use exercises to promote a shared civil- in order to make tangible progress. military understanding: A variety of To that end, a virtual joint secretariat frequent joint military mobility could be charged with monitoring exercises should be conducted to progress between the meetings and strengthen both NATO-EU and national coordinate technical staff cooperation civil-military cooperation. Such on particular strands of work between “events” would also help construct a the meetings to ensure issues are shared civil-military understanding followed up. of the challenges faced by military mobility and ensure staff are properly • Senior leadership engagement is essential: trained, with processes and procedures Key leaders’ engagement is vital. tested and adjusted; possible The NATO secretary general and the vulnerabilities, frictions, and associated presidents of the European Council risks identified and addressed; and and the European Commission must cohesion built among stakeholders. be regularly informed about progress achieved and the emerging issues that • Test and improve NATO and national can only be tackled at their level of planning: Movement of NATO forces responsibility. They should also be to reinforce national home defense encouraged to address issues vital to forces of allies located on the Alliance’s military mobility in their meetings and periphery requires close and effective provide guidance to their respective coordination between NATO and host civil and/or military staffs.

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scenario included cross-functional working Foreword Ben Hodges groups of 15-25 practitioners and experts from a wide range of organizations, agencies, industry, media, and nations. The Effective deterrence requires demonstrated results were presented during a virtual capability and the will to use that culminating event in October with the capability. It must be built on a strong workshop’s senior mentors and working foundation of speed: (1) speed of group leaders, and alongside presentations recognition of what a potential adversary by Adm. Rob Bauer, the Netherlands’ chief is considering, (2) speed of decision- of defense, and Lt. Gen. Scott Kindsvater, making to begin necessary movements and deputy chairman of the NATO Military preparations to prevent or respond to a Committee. crisis, and (3) speed of assembly to gather the elements of combat power in place to This project was also the first to gather a stop an adversary or, if deterrence fails, to comprehensive list — or “network” — of respond fully and forcefully. organizations, agencies, and industries that have a role and stake in improving Military mobility is essential to effective military mobility. This network will enable deterrence. It is about speed and the ability and enhance further work in the coming to move our forces as fast or faster than months and years. any potential adversary. It gives political leaders options to head off a crisis and the This report provides key findings, sharp ability to deter — something other than a analysis, and substantive, achievable liberation campaign. recommendations to reinforce and build upon existing efforts. Much progress has CEPA’s Military Mobility Project was a been made, and relevant headquarters, yearlong, comprehensive look at all facets nations, and responsible NATO, EU, of military mobility, including authorities, and national leaders now acknowledge capabilities, capacities, transportation the significance of military mobility infrastructure, cyber protection, air to our credibility. But we have yet to and missile defense, mission command, meet all requirements for effective interoperability, river crossings, weights deterrence. There is insufficient capacity of vehicles, EU regulations, and NATO and capability, authorities are still not decision-making. The project included complete, and determining clear chains of panels that were conducted virtually over command remains a problem. the spring, summer, and fall of 2020 as a consequence of Covid-19 pandemic-related NATO, the EU, and the member nations restrictions. Its center of gravity was have a common responsibility to make the Military Mobility Workshop, which effective military mobility a reality. We was also conducted virtually, in August, hope that the substantive recommendations September, and October. offered in this report will be considered and, in time, implemented so that we can The workshop was unique in several ways. move as fast or faster than our potential It was based upon five different scenarios adversaries. which touched nearly every corner of Europe within a NATO or EU context. Each

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a more effective, responsive and joined-up Strategic Context Union, capable of pursuing the EU’s shared Since 2014, the security environment in interests and priorities in promoting peace and around Europe has fundamentally and guaranteeing the security of its citizens changed. For NATO, new challenges and territory.”2 In November 2017, the and threats have emerged from two EU agreed to undertake an initiative to strategic directions. To the east, Russia’s improve and enhance military mobility. aggressive actions against Ukraine and its One of the practical steps proposed was the illegal annexation of Crimea profoundly better exploitation and fostering of civil- altered the conditions for maintaining military synergies and the greater use of security in Europe. To the south, an “arc existing policies and instruments to “enable of instability” and violence stretching EU Member States to act faster and more across the Middle East and North Africa effectively in the context of the Common (MENA) fueled terrorism and triggered Security and Defense Policy, national and mass migration, both of which affected multinational activities.”3 Moreover, work the stability of Europe. Consequently, is underway on the EU Strategic Compass. NATO must be able to respond to multiple Based on a joint threat analysis, this new challenges and threats from several regions EU security policy document, which is and directions at short notice. In order due in 2022, aims to specify how the to do so, the Alliance must ensure it has priorities set by the EU Global Strategy can the right forces in the right place at the be implemented and which capabilities the right time. While the two major sets of EU should provide with respect to crisis challenges are different, they are equally management, enabling and enhancing important for the security of NATO allies. partners, and protecting the Union and its Therefore, NATO has adopted a multi- citizens. faceted approach. First, the Alliance is significantly strengthening its deterrence and defense posture, particularly its ability NATO must be able to respond to rapidly reinforce allies on its periphery, if necessary. Second, the Alliance is to multiple challenges and projecting stability to its southern neighborhood, primarily by supporting threats from several regions partners therein to develop their own and directions at short notice defense capacities, but also by undertaking crisis response operations, if needed. In addition, the Alliance is bolstering its resilience against hybrid threats from There are, of course, wider strategic state and non-state actors, in particular considerations both in the transatlantic by strengthening its cyber defense and relationship and beyond, most notably countering disinformation. the evolution of the global security environment and growing great-power By way of its conclusions on how the EU competition. Of specific relevance to Global Strategy should be implemented, this project is the growing worldwide the European Union (EU), in November overstretch to which U.S. forces are 2016, determined the three strategic subject. U.S. armed forces are perhaps priorities to be pursued by it in the area as taut as at any time since the Korean of security and defense: responding to War in the early 1950s, or at least the external conflicts and crises, building Vietnam War in the late 1960s and early partners’ capacities, and protecting the 1970s. Given the nature and scope of bloc and its citizens. To that end, the EU the change, the security and defense of has adopted a range of measures to “build Europe will become progressively harder

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A US Army Bradley fighting vehicle crosses a Polish floating bridge at Zły Łęg lake during Exercise Allied Spirit. Part of DEFENDER-Europe 20 Plus, Allied Spirit brings together more than 6,000 Polish and US Army troops for combat and mobility drills. Credit: NATO to maintain credibly unless Europeans, the possible need for European forces to in concert with their North American hold the line in a series of crises precisely allies, quickly take practical steps to so that the United States could use its own ensure their ability to act as effective, fast forces to best effect. first responders during a crisis. Improved military mobility would represent one strand of effort, albeit a vitally important Europe’s Military one, in reinforcing defense and deterrence. Mobility Challenge Enhanced military mobility would also There is a sobering story about Europe’s demonstrate a European determination contemporary military mobility challenge. to ease the burdens and overstretch to A U.S. Army force of Bradley armored which U.S. forces are subject. In the worst infantry fighting vehicles was being case, U.S. forces could face simultaneous transported by train across Poland. Each of engineered crises in the Indo-Pacific, the the Bradleys was equipped with a so-called Middle East, North Africa, and the Euro- Commander’s Sight device that projected Atlantic. Given the changing correlation of from the top of the hull of each vehicle. forces there could come a point when the The route had been “recced” to ensure the United States might be unable to prevail necessary clearances. Every single bridge, in any of these conflicts unless properly tunnel, and overpass had been carefully supported and aided by its European allies, measured, except one …. particularly in and around the European theater. Therefore, the strategic ambition Drive across Western Europe during the implicit in the Military Mobility Project is Cold War and one could have seen signs

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on thousands of road bridges bearing the force across national borders in Europe, image of a tank and a number. The sign both during peacetime and the conduct of signified the weight and gauge any given routine activities and exercises, but also bridge could bear in the event of a major during crises. Consequently, allied forces exercise or an emergency. In what is take far longer to deploy and be retrieved today’s Western Germany, major exercises than they should if they are to afford designed to test military mobility were contemporary deterrence and defense, the almost routine with REFORGER I-IV, hard power credibility upon which both Lionheart, Able Archer, and Big Lift part of depend. a coterie of exercises the commanders of which all assumed that road, rail, air, sea, The challenge is being slowly addressed. and port facilities, much of it controlled In March 2018, Federica Mogherini, at by civilian government, would enable the time high representative of the EU their respective forces to move rapidly for foreign affairs and security policy and relatively securely. Those days are and vice-president of the European gone. For example, since the end of the Commission, together with then-European Cold War, much of the rail infrastructure commissioner for transport, Violeta Bulc, across Europe has been privatized, mainly presented the “Action Plan on Military to comply with EU competition and state Mobility.” This action plan outlines aid rules. The shift to a corporate culture concrete steps to better facilitate and with its focus on commercial cost and expedite the movement and crossing of profit has led to entire infrastructures borders by military personnel, materiel, being constructed with no heed for their and equipment both for routine activities potential military use in an emergency. in peacetime and during crisis and conflict, both within and beyond the EU. The In Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe action plan considers all transport modes the situation is even worse as such and in all strategic directions. Moreover, infrastructure never existed. During the Bulc stated: “[O]ur objective is to make Cold War, the Group of Soviet Forces, better use of our transport network, to Germany (GFSG) might have looked ensure that military needs are accounted impressive on paper. However, its for when planning infrastructure projects. commanders consistently fretted about the This means a more efficient use of public difficulty of secure supply and resupply money and a better-equipped transport given the poor condition of much of the network, ensuring quick and seamless infrastructure between Russia’s western mobility across the continent. This is a border and its forward-deployed forces. matter of collective security.”4 Indeed, such concerns partly explain the Soviet penchant for the offensive and the The action plan addresses specific areas doctrine of “proval blitzkriga,” which germane to this project: transport supported it for much of the Cold War. infrastructure; regulatory and procedural First, the force would need to live off the issues, such as transport of dangerous land of others if it was to maintain both goods, customs and value-added tax, and momentum and cohesion. Second, the cross-border movement permissions, security of its rear area deteriorated across including diplomatic clearances; and other much of Central Europe as Warsaw Pact cross-cutting topics such as countering nations became increasingly fractious. hybrid threats. The subsequent military requirements for military mobility within The challenge of military mobility is not and beyond the EU were developed by just one of physical weakness. There are the EU Military Staff in close cooperation a host of political and legal barriers that with the EU member states, as well prevent the rapid deployment of military as the European Commission and the

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European Defense Agency (EDA). Critically, co-funding for dual-use infrastructure the relevant NATO staffs were also projects through the CEF as part of the engaged and involved. The method of EU’s Multi-Annual Financial Framework the action plan was to use infrastructure (MFF) for 2021-2027. However, during the development to create synergies between long and difficult negotiations on the size civilian and military transportation and various elements of the new MFF and needs. Consequently, a “gap analysis” was concomitant contraction of the EU budget undertaken to establish a relationship by some 16% due to the departure of the of need between military infrastructure as a result of Brexit, the requirements and civilian requirements CEF’s military mobility envelope has been addressed by the European Commission’s reduced significantly to €1.69 billion (in Trans-European Transport Network current prices) for 2021-2027. (TEN-T) policy. The analysis identified a significant (93%) overlap between the Military mobility is also among the 47 infrastructure identified as relevant for EU Permanent Structured Cooperation military purposes and the geographic (PESCO) projects, part of the EU’s overall scope of the TEN-T. The overlap also helps effort to “develop defense capabilities and define the geographic coverage needed for improving the operational availability of 5 dual-use (civilian and military) projects forces.” The PESCO military mobility that could be eligible for co-funding by project is led by the Netherlands and the European Commission’s Connecting supported by 24 other EU member states, Europe Facility (CEF) with a view to which are project members. At its core is enhancing both civilian and military the concept of a “Military Schengen” — mobility. the free movement of military units and assets throughout Europe as a result of Work is ongoing to identify suitable dual- the removal of bureaucratic barriers and use projects with the funding of projects improvements to the infrastructure needed beginning possibly as early as 2021 (in to move through EU member states, via accordance with the October 19, 2020, rail, road, air, or sea. On the one hand, joint report by the European Commission the PESCO military project demonstrates and the High Representative of the the broad political support that enhancing European Union for Foreign Affairs and military mobility enjoys. On the other Security Policy to the hand, there is a multiplicity of EU entities and the European Council). Therefore, and national actors involved which poses EU member states have been invited to significant challenges for cohesion and identify and present their priority dual-use coordination. infrastructure projects, while the European Commission and the EDA are also It is critical that the capabilities, examining streamlining and simplifying infrastructure, and arrangements customs arrangements for military necessary to support the deployment and movements, as well as better aligning rules sustainment of NATO forces are in place concerning the transportation of dangerous in advance. The vital role of the Alliance military goods across borders. The EDA is as a force generator, but NATO’s ability has also been charged with supporting the to act is only credible if it can act. With establishment of common rules on cross- the important exception of Rapid Air border movements of military forces. Mobility, NATO looks to its members and the EU to create the necessary While the stated ambition is impressive, infrastructures and permissions that are political agreement on funding proved vital to enabling such action. To that end, more difficult. The European Commission NATO is engaged in similar planning to had originally proposed €6.5 billion of that of the EU as part of its Enablement

16 The CEPA Military Mobility Project

Map 2. Trans-European Transport Network

North Sea Baltic Sea

Atlantic Ocean

Black Sea

Mediterranean Sea

Scandinavian-Mediterranean Corridor Orient/East-Med Corridor

North Sea-Baltic Corridor Rhine-Alpine Corridor

Mediterranean Corridor Atlantic Corridor

Baltic-Adriatic Corridor Rhine-Danube Corridor

North Sea-Mediterranean Corridor Disputed areas

Source: European Commission Trans-European Transportation Network (TEN-T).

17 The CEPA Military Mobility Project

Plan for SACEUR’s Area of Responsibility. for military mobility because forces will Timely reinforcement of a threatened ally be at their most vulnerable during a war or allies to strengthen deterrence in a crisis when they move into position. and/or effective defense in a war rather than permanent forward positioning of Military mobility has always been seen as large forces has been, and remains, the a force and combat multiplier enabling paradigm for adapting NATO’s conventional commanders to choose the space in which force posture. Hence, enabling military to fight. From the English longbow men of th th mobility has become a priority area for the 13 to 15 centuries to the Wehrmacht enhanced NATO-EU cooperation within of World War Two the ability of a force the framework of the implementation of to move rapidly has historically enabled a the 2018 Joint Declaration signed by the force to defeat a more cumbersome enemy presidents of the European Council and many times its size. With the shift toward the European Commission and the NATO future war across air, sea, land, cyber, secretary general to promote cooperation space, information, and knowledge the very in areas that are crucial for the security concept and principles of “mobility” are of both the EU and NATO. The US-led changing. What is to be moved by whom, Exercise Defender 20 would have tested where, when, and how and against whom many of the Alliance’s assumptions about and what threat requires a new mindset military mobility, but in a sign of the of mobility. In such an environment the times it was curtailed due to the Covid-19 past “luxury” of commanders to amass pandemic. a force on one site over many days will evaporate as mobility accelerates for both the offense and defense. Moreover, The Principles of the movement of force and resource is Military Mobility increasingly vulnerable to new forms of coordinated attack from cyber and Two principles remain central to effective information “warriors” across a vast field and efficient military mobility: speed of of engagement. Consequently, a deploying assembly and speed of engagement. The force could be attacked anywhere along master principle of military mobility any route effectively halting military concerns the ability of combat forces mobility. Therefore, fostering state and and their weapons to move expeditiously societal resilience against all malicious toward their objective, and for combat cyber activities and disinformation is support and combat service support forces key to credible deterrence and thus to maintain the fighting efficiency of such constitutes NATO’s first line of defense. It a force once engaged. Future war will is also a precondition for the EU’s ability place a particular premium on the ability to successfully deploy forces for crisis of combat forces to move rapidly and management. securely. Over the past century, the pace and reach of military mobility has gone In sum, central to the success of military from the pace and range a regiment or unit mobility is the creation of secure military could walk to rapid air mobility. With the movement corridors through which increasing use of robotics and automation forces must pass to exploit their mass in the battlespace it is likely that future and to maintain speed of command and military mobility could take place at action. Carl von Clausewitz saw military hyper speed. Consequently, the speed of mobility as central to sound strategy. For command is accelerating as well as the him strategy involved the identification distance from which such a force can of the decisive space in which to fight be attacked by increasingly “intelligent” an enemy and the preservation of a systems, which poses a range of challenges commander’s ability to move forces as he

18 The CEPA Military Mobility Project

so wished. Indeed, for Clausewitz strategy reinforcing “follow-on forces,” such as involved choosing the space and time in additional mechanized forces held at a which to fight, while tactics concerned very high readiness as part of the NATO the successful conduct of the fight once Readiness Initiative. Improved military engaged. Military mobility was thus central mobility would render greater utility of to his principles of warfare. allied forces and thus broaden the range of options for the political leadership to ensure an appropriate, effective, and Political-Military proportionate response. Consequently, Framework in Europe the value of improved military mobility extends far beyond the movement of any Effective military mobility is also force package as it would further assure central to NATO’s mission spectrum, and ensure allied decision-making in the particularly at the high end of conflict. eyes of allies, partners, and, critically, This is because NATO remains solely adversaries. The ability to act is a critical responsible for collective defense planning factor in the maintenance of credible and operations as part of which, and as deterrence. a matter of principle, Article 5 collective defense operations enjoy absolute Improved military mobility would also give priority. However, enhanced military political leaders and military commanders mobility also enables allies to maintain greater flexibility through more phased their contributions to crisis response responsiveness and graduated readiness operations lower down the conflict in crises. For example, moving from air spectrum. Effective and credible military policing to air defense during a crisis mobility is thus also central to meeting requires that NATO air forces can be the requirements of European security and deployed without delay across Europe. defense established within the framework Therefore, the arrangements for NATO’s of the EU’s Common Security and Defense Rapid Air Movement (RAM) across national Policy (CSDP), particularly as it concerns borders in Europe must be such that the effective and timely deployment and border crossings can take place at very sustainment of civilian and military means short notice. Timely allied air movement is for crisis response in regions beyond the thus a condition for friction-free military EU’s borders. mobility that has already been established.

Rapid and effective military mobility thus Such movement also reinforces the need acts as a deterrence and defense enabler to move all allied forces rapidly in the and force multiplier in its own right. event of a military attack. However, while For example, improved military mobility air movement by its very nature depends would better enable the activation of the on specific infrastructures, the mobility relevant NATO Graduated Response Plans of land forces can only be credible if the (GRPs), specifically the movement of the infrastructures and systems that enable Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF, it are sufficiently robust, the network a brigade-sized joint force of some 5,000 endowed with sufficient redundancy, and, troops) and the remainder of the NATO above all, if the necessary infrastructures Response Force (NRF) in support of the and permissions are in place. Legality of national home defense forces and forward- movement is thus a critical enabler of deployed NATO forces to designated defense and deterrence. The legal basis areas. This is particularly important for for an Alliance response is under Article the Baltic states and other regions along 51 of the Charter of the United Nations the northern, eastern, and southeastern (U.N. Charter), the right to self-defense. borders of the Alliance. It would also Article 51 permits an immediate response enable the more rapid deployment of

19 The CEPA Military Mobility Project

A U.S. Coast Guard boat is parked in position to be loaded onto an Air Force C-17 Globemaster, as an Army UH-60 Black Hawk prepares to land during Exercise Patriot Sands, Naval Air Station Cecil Field, Florida, Feb. 22, 2019. Exercise Patriot Sands is a joint-service exercise coordinated by the Air Force Reserve, designed to integrate first responders from federal, state, local agencies and the military by providing quick response training in the event of a regional emergency or natural disaster. Credit: U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Larry E. Reid Jr. by both national home defense forces and information and digital spectra) prior to the legitimate alliances of which they form any cataclysmic decision to use nuclear a part. In the event of a surprise attack weapons. this would concern all of NATO’s various commands and forces in and around the Furthermore, sound security and defense Euro-Atlantic area, including forward- are increasingly reliant on a shifting deployed U.S. forces. Indeed, central to the balance between people protection, legal ethos of the Alliance is that an attack military power projection, and legal on one ally is an attack on all. In practice, authorization. This balance also demands Article 51 would buy time for a considered a new “contract” between critical civilian decision by the North Atlantic Council and military actors. As the Covid-19 (NAC) on the nature, scope, and extent crisis has shown, the need to move of any attack and thus for the Alliance to resources quickly and intelligently respond proportionately, including the across the European theater is vital to possible and eventual invocation of Article responsiveness across a broad spectrum of 5 of the Washington Treaty. Consequently, security. However, vital political nuance improved military mobility, both to in a complex crisis can be frustrated if theater and within it, would not only structures and systems on the ground make NAC decision-making more credible are simply unable to meet the demand it would also afford leaders more utility of response due to a lack of alignment and flexibility in the use of conventional between the political, the legal, and the force (which today extends across the physical.

20 The CEPA Military Mobility Project

In the event of a planned crisis response operation by NATO beyond its borders the Rapid and assured military legal basis for action would be constituted mobility is one of the essential by a series of sequential NAC decisions. Critically, for any such crisis response pillars upon which any credible operation member nations would in the end almost certainly also demand a overall strategic framework mandate from the U.N. Security Council. In for security, defense, the EU, any decision to act would be taken by the Political and Security Committee and deterrence in Europe (PSC), based on Article 38 of the Treaty of the European Union and under the would need to stand responsibility of the Council of the EU and the high representative. Additionally, a so-called joint action would also need to United States’ strategic center of gravity to be agreed that specifies the mandate and the Indo-Pacific region, the relative paucity details of such a mission in legal terms, i.e., of deployable European forces, and their consistent with the Treaty of the European limited collective ability to move forces Union and, of course, the U.N. Charter. and resources quickly to offset relative Consequently, for both NATO and EU/ weakness. Rapid and assured military CSDP crisis response operations most of mobility is thus one of the essential pillars the nations concerned would insist upon a upon which any credible overall strategic U.N. mandate. framework for security, defense, and deterrence in Europe would need to stand, Given the tensions therein if nations are the more so given the possible concurrency unwilling to act prior to U.N. authorization of crises in a major emergency. responsiveness and mobility could be halted. Given also that adversaries In the event of escalating political and such as China and Russia are becoming military tensions during which there are increasingly skilled at operating just below a number of indicators that suggest Russia the threshold of Article 5, the Alliance is preparing to launch a large-scale attack, must further confront a crisis of legitimate NATO would also need to be prepared action implicit therein. When would it to confront aggression in more than one be legitimate to act in the absence of a region. Consequently, the Alliance also has U.N. mandate? For example, if the U.N. to set priorities of scale and the readiness Security Council was stymied by a Chinese of the forces and resources required, as or Russian veto the ability of both NATO well as establish timelines for the rapid and the EU to act would be strengthened deployment and buildup of forces in more immeasurably if both institutions not only than one region. It would be assumed that had the credible ability to respond to crises NATO had some time to assess, decide, in a quick and timely manner, but also deploy, and employ forces to reinforce applied some “creativity” over the source deterrence or conduct collective defense of legitimacy for any such action. operations. Consequently, the critical need would be for leaders and commanders to Ultimately, the case for improved military know what could be moved where, at what mobility rests on several dangerous scale and speed, and, critically, how best to realities given the nature and scope of move forces and resources appropriately emerging and disruptive challenges and to ensure secure and credible “notice to threats faced by Europeans and their effect.” It would be difficult but doable. partners: the growing overstretch of U.S. However, if NATO was confronted with a forces and the concomitant shift of the short-notice crisis or attack by Russia, and

21 The CEPA Military Mobility Project

a fait accompli, possibly in the Baltic region, such as: What type and quantity of force the challenge for military mobility would and materiel would need to be transported be profoundly different and more difficult. to meet the threat? How would control, NATO’s immediate response initially would execution, and monitoring of military be to authorize the speedy deployment and civilian movements be secured? of sufficient forces to reinforce the Baltic Who would have the full picture of all states and Poland to deter Russia from multimodal capacities and their availability attempting a quick land grab and to deny in such a crisis? Could a robust chain of it the possibility of further incursions. Any command be established in the face of deep such contingency would thus require the cyberattacks, engineered social disorder, planning, generation, and deployment of a organized criminal and terrorist attacks, sizable and powerful force in far less than and, of course, direct military attack? thirty days. During a high-end emergency, for example Military Mobility in the Baltic states, allied forces would Project — Five need to cross the Suwałki Corridor and move further to the north. NATO would Scenarios also need to be prepared to move the VJTF It is against the backdrop of a challenging and/or even the entire NRF forward as far contemporary strategic context that the as Estonia if need be. However, if war were Military Mobility Project was established. to break out while deploying the force the The essential dilemma faced by NATO conditions for the movement of all allied is this: While the Alliance’s 30 member forces would change fundamentally and nations provide far more aggregated dramatically. Russia would have activated military power compared to Russia they its burgeoning anti-access/area denial (A2/ are disaggregated through geography, AD) capability in Kaliningrad and the St. command, and structure, as well as varying Petersburg area, as well as on the Crimean levels and types of strategic culture. peninsula, significantly hampering the Russia, on the other hand, can choose movement of NATO’s forces. Even as where, when, and if to apply locally they deployed, NATO forces would also overwhelming force anywhere on the be confronted with the full spectrum perimeter of both the EU and NATO. Given of Russia’s (hybrid) warfare capabilities, that potentially critical allied disadvantage, including cyberattacks, disinformation, effective and efficient military mobility is subversive actions, blockages, deep strikes a critical element of credible deterrence with intermediate-range missiles, etc. Such and defense, as well as regional emergency actions would also massively impact the management, as evinced by the response deployment of NATO’s air and maritime to the Covid-19 pandemic. While NATO forces, the composition and readiness of has made significant progress in adapting land forces to be deployed, and how and to a changing strategic environment, and when they would or could move. In other the EU has devoted a significant effort to words, NATO would be forced to adopt improving military mobility by means of maneuver operations in significant scale implementing the Action Plan for Military in depth at an early stage of any major Mobility, far more needs to be done given conflict across a space that would extend the evolving nature of the threat. from the rear area to the forward defense area all of which would be under various The Military Mobility Project was forms of an intense Russian attack. designed to identify key findings and recommendations that would, if In planning for such worst-case scenarios, implemented, advance the conditions a number of questions must be addressed, required to enable military mobility across

22 The CEPA Military Mobility Project

Europe. The project’s core assumption political or strategic issues, but to examine was that effective and efficient military what was required to deploy a force using mobility across road, rail, sea, and air complex multimodal modes of transport would far better support and enable a range (air, sea, road, and rail). The objective was of contingencies from a peer competitor to generate the concrete recommendations crisis in Europe to the consequences of for which this report is a vehicle, political, economic, and social collapse in to use the report thereafter to raise the Middle East and North Africa and the awareness across and amongst a swathe of threat posed by terrorism. policymakers of the critical importance of military mobility, and to generate a much- With this in mind, the project established needed sense of urgency. five scenarios. Three of the scenarios addressed high-end military dilemmas in Scenarios I (the Nordic-Baltic Route), II varying forms in response to a possible (the Suwałki Corridor), and III (the Focşani threat from Russia, all of which would Gate) tested the movement of forces for require the use of significant force, while reinforcement of eastern allies located on the other two scenarios considered the NATO’s northeastern and southeastern use and utility of military force across a flanks. They were based on the political- much broader spectrum of civil-military military framework set by NATO’s political interventions. The aim of the scenarios was leaders at various summits, such as the to test military mobility across differing 2016 Warsaw Summit where the heads of conditions, environments, and challenges state and government agreed to establish within the overall political and strategic two forms of multinational forward context established herein. presence: an Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) and a Tailored Forward Presence (tFP). The scenarios shared a range of The eFP was established to reinforce the characteristics and differences. They were Baltic states and Poland, all of which share all potential flashpoints, had strategic common borders with Russia and could implications for the security and defense be exposed to a potential direct military of Europe, and demanded a tailored attack by Russia. The eFP comprises several and intelligent application of force and multinational battlegroups ready to “fight resource over time, space, and mission tonight.” The tFP in Romania and Bulgaria intensity. They would also likely be subject committed allied forces to reinforce the to complex strategic coercion prior to full- defense of NATO members not directly scale military conflict across the hybrid exposed to a potential military attack by cyberwar spectrum of disinformation, Russian forces. The tFP saw the creation deception, destabilization, disruption, and of a Multinational Divisional HQ (South- implied or actual destruction. Equally, they East), as well as a Multinational Brigade HQ were also sufficiently different and distinct (South-East), plus roughly two battalions. enough to pose a range of institutional, It also acts as a framework for the regular national, and military mobility challenges. exercising of multinational allied forces in the region and includes an enhanced Each scenario was assigned to a working NATO air and naval presence in the Black group composed of multinational, cross- Sea Region. The difference between the functional, civilian, and military integrated two forms of “presence” is essentially teams of some 20 personnel. They all one of time. In the event of an attack on enjoyed representation from the EU, NATO’s southeast, Russia would either NATO, member nations, industry, media, need to launch a large-scale amphibious and academia, and included specific subject landing operation from Crimea or first matter experts in areas such as cyber, defeat Ukrainian forces before crossing transportation, and logistics. The aim of Moldova to invade Romania, all of which the working groups was not to “solve” any

23 The CEPA Military Mobility Project

would imply significant preparations, large Some 40 miles (60 kilometers) wide and forces, and significant time. Consequently, stretching along the Lithuanian-Polish NATO would likely have time to prepare border between Belarus and Kaliningrad, its collective defense of the region, albeit the Suwałki Corridor could become a subject to the constraints on military choke point for allied forces and cut across mobility environment being sufficiently NATO’s land supply axis to the Baltic states. permissive for NATO to reinforce national Defending the Baltic states and Poland defenses in the region that is notorious for has moved the AOR far to the east of poor communications and transportation where it was at the end of the Cold War. links. However, while the Alliance force And yet, only two roads and one railway posture in both the eFP and tFP reflects line through the Suwałki Corridor would headquarters and forces at different states enable NATO land forces to reinforce the of readiness, for the sake of methodological region across land. Scenario III tested rigor each scenario tested assumptions to reinforcing NATO’s southeastern region, the credible worst-case for each of them. in particular the movement of forces across the Carpathian Mountains and the Scenarios IV (Western Balkans) and V utility of the River Danube for military (Libya) specifically tested the planning transport to the so-called Focşani Gate — a assumptions of the EU with regard to terrain basin that is suitable for maneuver a possible crisis response beyond their operations and also offers a military force respective borders. However, while that would be able to penetrate the gate Scenario IV dealt with reinforcing the from the east to gain an avenue toward the EUFOR mission in Western Balkans. The essential challenge () to fend off possible was to get allied forces into the region in Serbian and Russian destabilization strength and in time. The infrastructure activities and restore stability across the that would enable such movement is by Western Balkans, Scenario V envisaged and large old with some of the POD under an autonomous EU peacekeeping mission Russian influence. without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. The assumption therein Scenario IV concerned an EU-led being that there would be no Berlin-Plus operation, supported by NATO assets missions beyond the existing one in and capabilities that had to be moved Bosnia-Herzegovina. Consequently, the across Europe to the Western Balkans scenario considered how best to deploy to restore stability and counter Russian a relatively small force package across a influence therein. The focus was on the large geographical area using unhardened movement and use of military forces in a existing arteries. complex strategic environment in which hybrid warfare and military competition Scenario I examined the movement of a were destabilizing an already unstable defined NATO force package from Norway the region. Finally, Scenario V tested the through Sweden and across the Baltic Sea manifold technical, logistical, and military to the Baltic states and Poland. Its focus challenges of moving a force across Europe was the political, legal, organizational, and the Mediterranean Sea into a region and infrastructural challenges that would beyond Europe’s borders which has long be faced moving a battlegroup from Oslo since been subject to instability, conflict, to Stockholm and on to Estonia. Scenario and civil war. For the purpose of the II examined the movement of military scenario, the international community forces from Germany though Poland to the decided on an U.N.-sanctioned ground Baltic states. The focus of the scenario was operation with an EU force at its core the so-called Suwałki Corridor through charged with keeping armed militias apart. which allied forces would need to pass.

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Military Mobility Project Team The multinational Project Leadership Team combined experience and knowledge and was structured thus:

Project Co-Leaders: Ben Hodges, Pershing Chair in Strategic Studies, Center for European Policy Analysis (United States) Lauren Speranza, Director, Transatlantic Defense and Security Program, Center for European Policy Analysis (United States)

Advisers: Julian Lindley-French (United Kingdom) (lead report author) Heinrich Brauss (Germany) (lead report author) Oliver Gnad (scenario design) (Germany) Miriam Ludwig (scenario design) (Germany)

CEPA: Christina Brown (United States) Candace Huntington (United States) Gabrielle Moran (United States) Carsten Schmiedl (Germany/Canada) Miruna Sirbu (Romania)

Working Group Leaders: Scenario I: John Agoglia (United States) Scenario II: Jacek Bartosiak (Poland) Scenario III: Phillip A. Petersen (United States) Scenario IV: Greg Melcher (United States) Scenario V: Hans Damen (Netherlands)

Industry Partners: General Dynamics European Land Systems Acrow Corporation of America DB Cargo Oshkosh Defense Raytheon Missiles & Defense Rheinmetall Defence

Participating Organizations:

• Army of the Czech Republic — J4 Logistics • Atlantic Council • Bell Textron • Boeing Defense, Space & Security • Booz Allen Hamilton • BRK Systems SRL, Craiova

25 The CEPA Military Mobility Project

• Deutor Cyber Security Solutions GmbH • Die Rheinpfalz GmbH & Co. KG • EURACTIV • European Commission — Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport (DG MOVE) • European Defense Agency (EDA) • European External Action Service (EEAS) — European Union Military Staff; Security and Defense Policy Division • European Parliament — European Parliamentary Research Service; Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) and Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) • Friends of Europe • George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies • German Federal Armed Forces — Mountain Engineer Battalion; Joint Support and Enabling Service Headquarters ( JSES) • Ignitis Group • International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS) • Lithuanian Railways — LG Freight Transport • Ministry of Defense of Latvia — Crisis Management Department • Ministry of Defense of the Netherlands — Task Force Logistics • Movement Coordination Centre Europe (MCCE) • Multinational Corps Northeast Headquarters (MNC-NE), Joint Engineering ( JENG) Division • National Defense University (NDU) • NATO Allied Joint Force Command Naples ( JFC Naples) • NATO Defense Planning and Policy Division (DPP) • NATO Energy Security Center of Excellence (ENSEC COE) • NATO Force Integration Unit (NFIU) Lithuania • NATO Force Integration Unit (NFIU) Poland • NATO International Military Staff, Logistics, Armaments & Resources Division (IMS L&R) • NATO International Military Staff, Defense Policy and Planning Division, Enablement & Resilience Section (ERS) • NATO Joint Force Command Brunssum ( JFC Brunssum), Movement and Transportation (M&T) • NATO Joint Support and Enabling Command ( JSEC) • NATO Standing Joint Logistics Support Group (SJLSG) • NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) — Strategic Enablement Directorate (STREN), Infrastructure & Engineering (IE); J4 Logistics • New Strategy Center • RAND Corporation • SEKO Logistics • Swedish Defense Research Agency • Europe — 21st Theater Sustainment Command, G4 Mobility Division • United States European Command — J4 (Logistics)

26 The CEPA Military Mobility Project

• May 5, 2020: “Shifting Towards ‘Crisis Project Timetable Mobility?’ Why Military Mobility The project timetable was severely Matters During Covid-19,” moderated impacted by the Covid-19 pandemic. It by retired Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, was originally envisaged that the bulk Pershing Chair in Strategic Studies, of the work would have taken place at a CEPA; speakers: Jacek Bartosiak, major Brussels conference in spring 2020. CEO and founder, Strategy & Future; However, the Covid-19 lockdown forced Tania Latici, policy analyst, European the postponement of the conference. In Parliamentary Research Services; Greg the end, it was decided to generate the Melcher, chief operations officer, New work through several virtual working Generation Warfare Centre; Gp. Capt. group sessions which took place between Elizabeth Purcell, J4 Strategic Plans, the end of August and October 2020, with NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied a culminating virtual plenary conference Powers Europe (SHAPE). on October 20. Over the course of the spring and summer, CEPA hosted a number • April 2, 2020: “Moving Mountains of virtual panels each month in order to Amid a Crisis? Increasing Military create awareness, build momentum toward Mobility Across Europe,” moderated by the virtual Military Mobility Workshop, retired Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, Pershing and further inform the effort. The Chair in Strategic Studies, CEPA; following panels were conducted: speakers: retired Lt. Gen. Heinrich Brauss, former assistant secretary • July 7, 2020: “How We Move: Five general for defense planning and Scenarios That Test Military Mobility policy at NATO; retired Brig. Gen. Hans Across Europe,” moderated by Damen, strategic adviser for Insparcom; retired Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, Pershing Tania Latici, policy analyst at the Chair in Strategic Studies, CEPA​ European Parliamentary Research ; speakers: Dr. Jacek Bartosiak, CEO Services; and Professor Dr. Julian and founder, Strategy&Future; Dr. Lindley-French, senior fellow at the Oliver Gnad, managing director, Institute for Statecraft. Bureau für Zeitgeschehen; Miriam Ludwig, program manager, Bureau für Zeitgeschehen; and Charles “Bill” Main Findings and Robinson, chief of Integrated Learning, Recommendations Joint Wargaming and Experimentation Division, Joint Staff, J7. Military mobility has many moving parts: sending nations, transit nations, host • June 2, 2020: “Cybersecurity and nations, NATO, the EU, and potentially Critical Infrastructure,” moderated by other international organizations outside retired Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, Pershing Europe, as well as a host of civilian Chair in Strategic Studies, CEPA​; and military actors within nations. speakers: retired Col. Tom Greenwood, Effective coordination built on a deep research staff member, Institute for understanding of the political, legal, and Defense Analyses (IDA); Edvinas Kerza, physical challenges is thus a vital first step corporate resilience service director at to improving mobility. The five scenarios Ignitis Group, former deputy minister mentioned above highlighted a number of defense of Lithuania; Col. Jaak of common challenges and requirements, Tarien, Estonian Air Force, director and the working groups identified a series of NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense of findings and recommendations without Centre of Excellence; and Sabina Wolf, which effective strategic and operational journalist, Bayerischer Rundfunk, ARD. planning will be near impossible. These findings are discussed in Appendices 1 to 5.

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An Italian air force member stands-by as a pallet of medical supplies from Milan, is off-loaded in Rome, May, 13, 2020. In response to the ongoing coronavirus disease 2019 outbreak, an 86th Airlift Wing C-130J Super Her- cules assisted the Italian government in transporting medical supplies between supply hubs in Milan and Rome, Italy. Credit: U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Kristof J. Rixmann

The working groups’ findings and experts from NATO and EU staffs have recommendations have been reviewed, provided additional input on several consolidated, and are grouped in this specific topics central to the mission of the section under the key functional areas project. that have been identified by the EU as central to enabling military mobility in Principal Considerations Europe. These functions are also guiding discussions over the Structured Dialogue There are several principal factors that on Military Mobility between the EU and should drive all efforts to improve the NATO at staff level: rules and regulations conditions for moving military forces to, pertaining to the transport of dangerous across, and within Europe. goods, customs, and cross-border The security environment movement permissions, as well as transport Engagement. is marked by the return of geopolitical infrastructure. A number of important great-power competition. As a consequence crosscutting issues are also discussed of China’s rapid rise to global power in this section: command, control, and status, the United States is shifting its coordination relevant to military mobility, strategic center of gravity to the Indo- funding, special capabilities, resilience, and Pacific region. The United States’ European exercises. The aforementioned joint report allies and partners will thus have to by the European Commission and the spend significantly more on deterrence high representative has also been analyzed and defense in Europe, as well as crisis and taken into account, and several senior management in North Africa and the

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Middle East. The November 2020 decision of military forces across Europe, it would by the British government to increase its also require such forces to cross multiple defense budget by 10% over four years national borders, pass across the territory could be a sign of an effort to address the of several nations in which different and coming challenge. Moreover, between differing national legislation applies, as 2016 and 2020 the European allies and well as use the available infrastructures Canada increased their accumulated of varying extent and quality. Military defense expenditures by some $130 billion. planning for the deployment of forces Against such a strategic background, there across Europe in peacetime, in a crisis, is a clear common responsibility for both and war must, therefore, take into account NATO and the EU to enable expeditious national and EU legislation and regulations. military mobility throughout Europe, Given the challenges, there is also a vital which is why it has become both a flagship need to exercise and test coordination and project for NATO-EU cooperation and standardization and deconflict processes central to transatlantic burden sharing. prior to any emergency to ensure they In short, establishing the foundational function under duress and can thus meet conditions required for military mobility planning timelines. and implementing them is both an urgent military requirement and a political necessity, and requires leadership Credible deterrence can only awareness and engagement at the highest levels in NATO, the EU, and European be achieved when conditions capitals, at both political and military levels. are set for successful

Planning. The five multinational civil and collective defense military project working groups have already greatly contributed to enhancing and raising awareness in capitals, EU Whole-of-government approach. Even during institutions, and across NATO’s civilian and a major crisis with Russia the relevant military staffs of the critical importance peacetime legal regulations would still of military mobility for both the Alliance apply, for which the EU and various and the Union. Moreover, the discussions levels of national civilian and military therein also addressed a number of issues authorities and actors are responsible and important for comprehensive and effective which differ from country to country. military planning for the deployment of Therefore, for the enabling of rapid and forces in a crisis, whether for enhancing effective military mobility a whole-of- deterrence and the collective defense government approach in all enabling of allies or crisis management beyond nations is required. This would necessarily Europe. Critically, the responsible military involve (inter alia) ministries of defense, headquarters and staffs of both NATO interior, and transport, as well as private and the EU have long been engaged in sector leaders responsible for air, rail, road, military advance planning, including and port facilities. Therefore, the fostering logistics planning, for deploying forces of a whole-of-government military and sustaining them in theater. Credible mobility culture through preestablished deterrence can only be achieved when relationships will be particularly conditions are set for successful collective important in transit and host nations. defense. Consequently, this report Such a network of effect will demand identifies the policies and actions needed established and robust relationships to add value to their work. In the event of between national government and local a crisis that requires the rapid movement authorities, those relevant industries

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responsible for the management of critical on two TAs within the framework of its infrastructures, as well as those military program on “Optimizing Cross-Border commands responsible for coordinating Movement Permission Procedures in and supporting the deployment of military Europe” for military forces (military forces and providing HNS and sustaining personnel, equipment, ammunition, fuel), forces in theater. Ultimately, the test of one for the surface and another for the effective military mobility will rest upon air domain. Twenty-five EU member timely decision-making in an emerging states have joined the program, which crisis that is at the “speed of relevance” is reportedly progressing well. The aim (in the words of former US Secretary is to lift existing restrictions in national of Defense James N. Mattis). While the legislation. The TAs will thus facilitate EU clearly has a major role to play in the cross-border movement of EU promoting such political coherence, it is member states’ forces and capabilities for NATO that is and must be the driving force operations, exercises, and daily activities concerning requirements. A whole-of- and are expected to be completed and government approach and effective NATO- agreed by spring 2021. Therefore, it is EU cooperation on countering hybrid essential that all EU member states commit threats will be particularly important to to establishing a harmonized movement successfully combat disinformation and approval process within Europe. Norway promote enhanced cyber resilience. has joined the program; it is important that other non-EU European allies join up as Rules, Regulations, and well or at least establish compatible rules. Procedures Standardize regulations for the transport During a crisis, if the Alliance moves of dangerous goods. Effective military to deploy forces to reinforce allies and mobility also requires harmonization of strengthen deterrence there would be no EU member states’ legislative frameworks time for extensive political consultations and diverging national approaches to and preparations of procedures for crossing authorizing the movement of dangerous borders and transiting countries ahead of goods. Several EU bodies (the EDA, the a planned movement. Therefore, it is of European Commission, and the European utmost importance that all necessary data, External Action Service) have been arrangements, and forms are identified in working, including within the scope of the advance, and developed, coordinated, and TAs for the surface and the air domains, standardized between the nations, on the to enable harmonization of respective one hand, and between the EU and NATO practices across EU member states. The on the other, as well as worked up through combining of civilian rules with, where frequent exercises and improvements. necessary, the provisions of the NATO Standardization Agreement, AMovP6, as the Streamline Cross-Border Movement Permissions. reference set of rules for the transport of Smooth military movement requires dangerous goods in the military domain, harmonized procedures for requesting is considered sufficient by the EU to allow and issuing border-crossing and transit for the speedy international transport of permission for all modes of transport. dangerous goods for military purposes (in NATO has implemented a legal framework accordance with the October 2020 joint through Technical Arrangements (TAs) report by the European Commission and with both allies and those European the high representative of the EU). The partners that participate in the Partnership legal basis for the transport of dangerous for Peace (PfP) program. These TAs goods should, therefore, be determined by are geared to NATO’s current advance the EU member states as soon as possible. planning. The EDA has also been working A harmonized legal basis is particularly

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THESSALONIKI, Greece - Eight UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters and more than 70 other pieces of equipment from the 10th Combat Aviation Brigade, Ft. Drum, N.Y., arrived at the Port of Thessaloniki Feb. 25. This is the first full aviation Regionally Allocated Force to support Operation Atlantic Resolve and U.S. Army Europe. Credit: Spc. Kelsey Little, U.S. Army Europe important for both transit nations and EU CSDP (through EU Form 302). While host nations. The aim should be to achieve NATO Form 302 is already digitalized, the annual renewal/update of approval for the EDA is working on a digitalized format transport of a range of dangerous goods of its Form 302, which is supposed to be along defined multimodal movement available in 2024. Although these forms corridors. are designed to ensure uniform treatment of all cross-border military movements Promote standardized customs procedures. by customs in all EU member states and All European governments should apply non-EU allied countries, there is a concern streamlined customs procedures for about duplication of effort and data military transport throughout Europe. ownership. Moreover, every custom officer Based on the PfP Status of Force Agreement in every European country must be aware (SOFA), allies and PfP partners use NATO of, trained, and thus able to correctly apply Form 302 for exemption from customs the pertinent procedure. Therefore, in related to the movement of goods for use order to simplify the customs process for by a deploying force. For its part, the EU all military movements in Europe, the EU has recently developed, in full transparency and NATO should make an effort to jointly and dialogue with NATO, EU Form 302 develop identical 302 templates, while which is to be used alongside the existing retaining their distinct legal basis. NATO Form 302. Together, these forms enable rapid customs declarations for Accelerate response times for CBMP. The various military cross-border movements, EU has committed itself to ensure the including within the framework of the timely delivery of cross-border movement

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permissions by its member states, anticipation of risks and possible frictions. including for requests for entry and Route heights and widths, specifically movement permission for military forces restrictions on the capacity of tunnels, and equipment for all modes (surface, bridges, roadways, harbors, and airstrips, air, and sea) for routine activities within must be known by the responsible no more than five working days; and to military commands in advance for the consider further reducing this period for transport of heavy vehicles. The results rapid reaction units/rapid reinforcement. of the “gap analysis” for identifying dual- Since a crisis on NATO’s periphery in use infrastructure projects should be Europe could virtually emerge overnight taken into account. Such an assessment and, in some circumstances, lead to a should take place in conjunction with a decision by NATO to move its high- similarly comprehensive assessment of readiness response forces expeditiously the capacity of the communications and for rapid reinforcement, a five- working- energy infrastructure. The responsible days period would be too long. NATO’s headquarters/staff of both NATO and operational-level planning timeline is three the EU should have established and calendar days (72 hours). The EU should, should maintain shared comprehensive therefore, adjust the response time to be infrastructure databases relevant to their granted by EU member states to three days, respective military transport networks. In including for movement exercises. At the this regard, host nations should continue very least, it should create a mechanism the Military Load Classification (MLC) to allow preapproval for defined rapid assessment and corresponding marking reaction force packages within no more of bridges in the mobility corridors than three days. in accordance with NATO guidelines (STANAG 2021). In addition to improving Transport Infrastructure existing infrastructure, additional infrastructure requirements to enable The transportation infrastructure in Europe heavier military traffic have to be taken is primarily designed for civilian transport. into account. To that end, roads, rail lines, tunnels, bridges, harbors, and airfields in every Make best use of the European Commission’s European NATO country need to comply Trans-European Transport Network policy. The with established international standards. European Commission has, meanwhile, However, if they are part of NATO’s established procedures to identify dual- movement corridors and network of main use (civilian and military) infrastructure supply routes (MSRs), such infrastructures projects as part of its TEN-T network must also be capable of carrying the weight that would be eligible for co-funding. EU of heavy armor and large mechanized member states have also been invited to formations. identify their priority dual-use projects, and the European Commission plans Undertake a comprehensive infrastructure to launch a call for proposals in the assessment. Such an assessment will be first semester of 2021. At the very least, critical prior to an emergency to avoid transit and host nations must upgrade the dangerous slowing of movement of their existing rail and road networks forces as these forces disembark at ports to NATO and EU standards. Besides the and re-embark on road and rail systems. need to improve existing infrastructure, A comprehensive survey is needed of additional infrastructure requirements to all possible routes to check the capacity enable heavier military traffic have to be of rail or road networks as well as addressed. Therefore, if not already done, potential choke points and vulnerabilities it is essential that European NATO allies, in a contested environment and in which are also members of the EU, in

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coordination with the responsible NATO Standardize rail interfaces. In Europe, “rail military headquarters submit those priority lift” is likely to be the primary mode of infrastructure projects located along the transportation and there is a pressing MSRs/transport corridors that are also need to standardize railways and their covered by the TEN-T policy. Such projects gauges and weight capacity across Europe. will necessarily take time, so it is vital Extensive work is being done by the that EU member states urgently identify European Commission on rail freight projects that could benefit from TEN-T corridors. These are civilian freight routes funding. that might also be relevant to military mobility. This should be further explored. Build for heavier military equipment. Given Moreover, existing standards should be the potential military threat posed by evaluated and the degree of interoperability Russia, it was agreed by heads of state and on European railways assessed — this is government at NATO’s Warsaw Summit in currently ensured by so-called Technical 2016 that allies should provide for “heavier, Specifications for Interoperability (TSIs). In more high-end forces and capabilities and theory, all EU member states must answer 6 more forces at higher readiness.” NATO’s to the TSIs based on requirements set by capability targets for allies have been the EU. However, railway lines in several adjusted accordingly. However, the likely European countries have different track greater weight of new military equipment gauges. This presents a real challenge for also needs to be factored into infrastructure the rapid movement of forces on NATO’s assessments. Future equipment could eastern flank in particular. In the short to well become heavier with more armor. In medium term, increased investment in Europe, so-called transition technologies could be 90% of highways, 75% of national roads, made to facilitate the transfer of shipments and 40% of bridges are able to carry from one gauge to another and to rapidly vehicles with the maximum MLC of 50 change bogies on railway wagons to avoid for a tracked vehicle. Critically, tracked the need to unload and reload rolling vehicles can only weigh up to 45.4 tons stock. on bridges, while a maximum weight of 52.6 tons is permitted for wheeled vehicles. During crisis response operations Command, Control, and weight restrictions will in some cases Coordination tend to favor the use of rail or river/ Enabling rapid movement of forces barge routes given that the combination requires the clear delineation of roles and of truck, trailer, and heavy tank could go responsibilities of national governments and well beyond 120 tons. On the other hand, military commands, the EU, and NATO, as for rapid reinforcement of allies located well as the effective, seamless coordination on NATO’s periphery, NATO’s ability to and cooperation of all the relevant civilian conduct multiple, simultaneous wide and military national and international wet-gap crossings would be critical to actors. In particular, there is a need for a mission success, especially in the Baltic comprehensive system of movement control states and Poland. Allies must, therefore, from peacetime to crisis. devote greater attention to providing for sufficient bridging capabilities and filling Standardize networks of National Points of corresponding gaps. Furthermore, bridge Contact. The EU has set up a network of reinforcement, where required, should be National Points of Contact (NPOCs) for central to identifying and co-funding dual- military mobility. They are the entry use infrastructure through the EU. points for the submission of a movement request and responsible for processing all

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establish and maintain a comprehensive National territorial commands operational picture. The national territorial should act as enablers for, commands should also be responsible for providing HNS for transiting or deploying and links between, allied forces, such as providing the national military infrastructure necessary for NATO forces, national forces, ensuring freedom of maneuver by means and the civilian defense sector of rear area security; military movement control; ensuring waterway crossings; damage repair; chemical, biological, incoming transit and host nation requests. radiological and nuclear (CBRN) defense; They are connected, for that purpose, with and explosive ordnance disposal. This all national civil and military stakeholders. would, for example, also encompass NATO has, in turn, established a network holding contingency bridging stocks and of single NPOCs at the political level for the provision of capabilities for emergency the coordinated management of civil bridging to improve, repair, or restore emergencies in peacetime or in periods essential infrastructure in urban or rural of crisis as part of the Alliance’s whole- areas and to ready selected national roads of-government approach as well as its for heavy military equipment as well efforts to strengthen its resilience. NATO as civilian traffic of all kinds. National is also setting up a 24/7 movement control territorial commands should also take network at the operational level between responsibility for national counter- the Alliance and national civil and military mobility needed in case of military entities for coordinated movement conflict (supporting establishing the legal planning and force flow management for framework, conducting national barrier multinational exercises and operations. planning in coordination with NATO Moreover, EU and NATO staffs are working planning). They should also help ensure together to facilitate future cooperation telecom links, host nation logistics, and synergies between these networks, medical support, and public relations. as well as on developing their respective Thus, national territorial commands should terms of reference. The work on the act as enablers for, and links between, networks of NPOCs for military mobility NATO forces, national forces, and the in NATO should be completed as soon civilian defense sector. as possible with the terms of reference finalized expeditiously. The EU POCs and Make full use of NATO’s Joint Support and those of NATO should also be aligned and Enabling Command. It is assumed herein harmonized as far as possible. that the SACEUR has approved a clear delineation of Areas of Responsibility Establish national territorial commands. Transit (AORs) between his subordinate joint and host nations should, if not already commands, in particular the two Joint done, (re)establish national territorial Force Commands ( JFC Brunssum and commands or territorial operational Naples), the Joint Support and Enabling centers as soon as possible. Their essential Command ( JSEC), and the Standing Joint mission should be twofold: to act as Logistic Support Group (SJLSG). Such central hubs for all matters related to a delineation of responsibilities and coordination and support of military assignment of related areas is an essential movement through their respective prerequisite for ensuring smooth and countries and passing them on seamlessly swift movement of forces through Europe to the neighboring country. To this effect, to final destination (FD). JSEC has been the respective NPOCs should be distinct, assigned as SACEUR’s Joint Rear Area integral elements of such commands and Command (i.e., the area where no Joint

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Operation Area has been assigned). It is projects relevant to military mobility. As responsible for battlespace management an example, the EU-agreed Recovery and designation of movement corridors and Resilience Facility (RRF) that amounts to force flow management, as well as for €672.5 billion could in theory be used for the security of the rear area (e.g., force transport infrastructure if the EU member protection; harbor protection; countering states chose to do so. It is, therefore, hybrid threats, including cyber defense; recommended that they consider spending traffic management; medical support). an appropriate part of the RRF on dual-use As a functional command, the SJLSG is transport infrastructure. This would be a in charge of strategic-level coordination clear signal that Europe is serious about of logistical support for deploying forces significantly enhancing its efforts to do across SACEUR’s AOR and their logistical more for its own security, improved NATO sustainment in theater and should also cohesion and credibility, and transatlantic provide a common operational picture to burden sharing. SACEUR. To ensure JSEC is used in full it should also be vested with coordinating Extend common funding. NATO allies should authority for all national territorial consider common funding to improve commands and act as the hub of the infrastructure and prepositioning of network of the (18) transit nations’ NPOCs mobility assets along movement corridors/ for military mobility. MSRs that are crucial to enabling the rapid movement and sustainment of allied forces to and in theater. The Alliance Funding should also explore using the NATO For the funding of deployment and Security Investment Program (NSIP) to employment of forces, as well as sustaining co-finance relevant projects that are not of forces in theater, the principle of “cost co-funded by the European Commission, lie where they fall” applies to both NATO in conjunction with the relevant allies, and the EU. Therefore, those nations that because such infrastructure projects in a crisis or in case of an attack would would benefit NATO as a whole. NATO be reinforced as part of NATO’s collective should also consider counting investments defense should invest in infrastructure that made by allies to improve infrastructure would also benefit NATO as a whole. that is clearly dedicated to facilitating military mobility of NATO forces as part Increase EU funds for military mobility. In the of a nation’s 2% (of GDP) benchmark for course of internal negotiations for the defense spending. MFF, the funding originally envisioned for the military mobility envelope of the Special Capabilities CEF 2021-2027 was reduced from €6.5 billion to €1.69 billion (in current prices). Fully harness capability catalogues. The Therefore, allies that are also members of allies, together with NATO’s European the EU should fully tap the CEF to co-fund partner nations, should make available infrastructure projects that are critical and regularly update their respective for military mobility. They should submit capability catalogues. Capability catalogues suitable proposals as soon as possible and are designed to ensure that nations’ data make the best use of committed funding. relevant to military mobility is available However, since military mobility is a key to NATO to inform operational and component enhancing the contribution movement planning. Catalogues comprise a of Europeans to both NATO’s deterrence listing of all relevant facilities that could be and defense posture and the EU’s ability to made available by a potential host nation act, the EU member states should look for in a crisis. These include HNS capabilities, additional options to fund infrastructure reception facilities, air/naval operating

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Joint river crossing exercise. Credit: U.S. Army Europe. base facilities, staging and marshalling with specialized navigation systems with facilities, as well as support areas, such inbuilt sensors that measure height and as supplies, medical, transportation, weight and automatically guide a vehicle telecommunications/IT, etc. National onto routes with the necessary clearances. cross-functional expertise thus provided A similar system could be established to NATO forms the basis of the Alliance’s that would ease military mobility by military transport network and enables its recommending alternative routes for the further development. The catalogues are heaviest vehicles. However, the deployment particularly important for effective route and employment of forces requires planning which relies upon the constant more than simply the effective use of fusing of automated updates and real- emerging technologies. Effective military time information on the status of routes. mobility will also demand additional Capability catalogues should also be used investment in critical capabilities such as to help fully survey routes and identify wet-gap crossing and counter-mobility potential weaknesses and choke points. equipment in the military inventories This would also help identify alternative of nations. National territorial military movement options, such as commercial and civil defense actors will also need solutions, or even the construction of new to be equipped, organized, and funded infrastructure. To that end, the catalogues to ensure the structural enhancement of could be further informed by commercial roads, rail, bridges, as well as the necessary systems developed by industry partners barrier infrastructure required for defense and information concerning civilian- operations. This will take time. owned infrastructures and equipment. For example, commercial trucks are equipped

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Enhance national military transport capacities. leading the PESCO Project Network of Before Russia’s aggression against Ukraine Logistic Hubs in Europe, which has 15 in 2014, and the consequent fundamental participating nations. The project aims to change of the security environment, establish a multinational network based NATO focused on military crisis response on existing national logistic capabilities beyond its borders. For its part, the EU and infrastructure to better prepare CSDP deployments also served crisis equipment for operations, commonly use management, mainly through a range depot space for spare parts or ammunition, of civilian, civil-military, and by and and harmonize transport and deployment large small military missions. When activities. The network is also intended deploying their contingents, European to facilitate rapid response and increase nations primarily used contracted sustainability for military operations. commercial transport, while at the same This is vital work and Germany and its time significantly reducing their military PESCO partners should spare no effort to transport capacity. Consequently, military implement the network of logistic hubs requirements competed with civilian across Europe consistent with the planned demand, complicating and extending multimodal movement corridors. It is the time needed for planning for and essential that the logistic hubs also be fully deployment of crisis response operations. usable by all allies contributing to NATO Rapid response and nondiscretionary operations and exercises. NATO operations critical to allied deterrence and defense require immediate Resilience access to sufficient transport capacity. Thus, new emphasis must be put on generating Military mobility could be severely affected military transport capacity that will be by the conduct of hybrid warfare by Russia permanently and immediately available. or terrorist groups. The deployment of Therefore, as part of its Defense Planning military forces is particularly vulnerable Process, NATO should assign capability to a potential adversary seeking to targets to the relevant allies devoted to destabilize, weaken, and delay NATO or increasing their military transport capacity EU responses to a crisis. Hybrid warfare (road, rail, air, sea) significantly and to could also slow down decision-making and ensuring timely and assured priority access undermine allies’ cohesion, with sustained to civilian transport capacity. Equally, EU cyberattacks on rear choke points possibly member states should also contribute to paralyzing disembarkation. Disinformation this effort through increased collaboration campaigns could be designed to sow on enhanced military mobility, which is doubt about NATO’s intentions among one of the six focus areas for collaborative citizens in vital host and transit nations, capability development by the EU member while subversive actions that fall below states as recommended by the EDA. the threshold of an open military attack could create confusion and fear. In the Establish logistic hubs. The distances from worst case, hybrid warfare could even ports of debarkation in Western Europe prevent allied forces from sustaining lines to potential theaters of operations along of communication and projecting military the northern and eastern periphery can be power. great. Consequently, logistic hubs should be established along planned multimodal Foster a culture of cyber resilience. Both movement corridors for maintenance, NATO and the EU have set up ambitious recovery, storage of food, ammunition, and programs to enhance cyber defense and fuel, etc. Such a network would ensure have deepened their cooperation in that supplies are in the right spot at the right area. However, robust cyber resilience is time in the right amount. Germany is also needed beyond the command chain

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given the wide swathe of contacts across as populations, on the threat posed by society generated by effective military Russia or terrorist groups. Such education mobility. To that end, cyber awareness, would necessarily include improved resources (human, technical, and financial), responsiveness, cyber hygiene, and the and capabilities (protection, response, promotion of a shared culture, including recovery) must lead to integrated cyber greater media literacy. There is also a defense plans, with robust and effective need to promote military and industrial systems of communications established standardization and interoperability across between national military and civilian both the physical and cyber domains to stakeholders. As cyber protection is enhance civilian resilience and improve often devolved to the civil sector, often civil defense. Host nations’ civil and the responsibility of railways or airport military authorities and commanders of owners, civilian equipment needs transiting and deployed forces should to be tested for cyber resilience in a closely coordinate to develop a common coordinated and standardized manner by approach to countering disinformation both government and industry. Indeed, to be better able to respond swiftly and even force protection may thus have to effectively in a coordinated manner. come from civilian service providers. Therefore, the use of highly encrypted Exercises secure civilian communication systems may better enable such cooperation with Establish a systematic and comprehensive program the commercial sector and enhance of EU-NATO civil-military exercises. Military security. Increased awareness of the mobility in Europe relies on a complex cyber threat posed to military mobility, system of national and international as well as the risks associated with the civilian and military stakeholders and use of non-EU/non-NATO ownership actors. This system needs to be regularly or control of critical communication tested, reviewed, and improved, both in technologies (e.g., 5G), should also NATO and the EU. NATO-EU coordination be actively promoted through better and cooperation can only be properly communication between stakeholders established by such a regimen. For example, during the planning phase, as well as far it is well-established that in peacetime given closer civil-military relationships forged to advance planning allied forces can be moved ease incompatibilities between military and to Bremerhaven, a port city on Germany’s civilian equipment that cyberattacks would North Sea coast, and projected into Poland seek to exploit. without undue delay. It is a tried and tested system. However, in an emergency such a Counter information warfare. Information “space” would become contested, possibly warfare during any crisis will be extensive. critically so. In combination with cyberattacks and subversive actions, information warfare Use exercises to promote a shared civil-military could have significant destabilizing and understanding. A variety of frequent joint paralyzing effects on Western societies military mobility exercises should be as well as on allied forces. Therefore, conducted to strengthen both NATO-EU resilience against all kinds of hybrid and national civil-military cooperation. warfare is NATO’s first line of deterrence Such “events” would also help construct and defense and a precondition for the a shared civil-military understanding of EU’s ability to act successfully and deploy the challenges faced by military mobility, to crisis regions. Defense against such and ensure staff are properly trained, attacks will require systematic “education” with processes and procedures tested of political and industry leaders, as well and adjusted; possible vulnerabilities,

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frictions, and associated risks identified has so far effectively contributed to and addressed; and cohesion built among information sharing in key areas such stakeholders. Particular attention should as transport infrastructure, transport of be paid to exercising hybrid scenarios and dangerous goods, customs, and cross- their impact on military mobility. The border movement permissions. It is exercising of cyber vulnerabilities and also designed to facilitate coherence multimodal transport and infrastructure and mutual reinforcement of efforts to interfaces would be critical to assess improve military mobility and achieve where “weak” connections could impede synergies wherever possible, while operations and should be central to avoiding unnecessary duplication. Due to a testing regime. Industry should be the Covid-19 crisis, the Structured Dialogue included in such exercises from the was suspended for several months and only outset as part of a development program resumed in October 2020. Its work should to enhance military mobility systems be expanded and enhanced. and structures across the relevant AOR. Moreover, previous military mobility Enhance frequency of staff meetings. The exercises could be revisited to identify relevant staffs should meet at least monthly lessons that have not as yet been and focus on identifying those areas and incorporated into action plans to better measures that must be tackled urgently in inform exercise campaign design. order to make tangible progress. Technical staff contacts should be pursued on Test and improve NATO and national planning. particular strands of work between the The movement of NATO forces to meetings of the Structured Dialogue to reinforce national home defense forces of ensure issues are followed up. A virtual allies located on the Alliance’s periphery joint secretariat should also be established requires close and effective coordination charged with monitoring progress between between NATO and host nations to meet the meetings and identifying actions to be the requirements of tactical-level advance taken, potential delays or blockages to be planning, in particular with regard to addressed, and key leaders to be engaged force, space, and time requirements as appropriate in the search for military adjusted to regional/local conditions. The mobility solutions. NATO and the EU need deployment of forces for reinforcement a common operating picture at the senior and their integration into national defense level. forces at the tactical level within a very short period of time and potentially Senior leadership engagement and buy-in is under enemy fire is a demanding military essential. NATO’s secretary general and the operation. Therefore, the integration of presidents of the European Council and the moving forces into local defense structures European Commission must be regularly must be systematically exercised to stress informed about progress achieved or test capabilities, structures, and plans down emerging issues that need to be tackled at to the tactical level. their level. They should also be encouraged to address military mobility in their meetings with a view to giving guidance Persistent NATO-EU to their respective civil and/or military Cooperation on Military staffs on how to advance cooperation and Mobility expedite the implementation of military mobility. Enhance the Structured Dialogue. The Structured Dialogue on Military Mobility between relevant NATO and EU staffs

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HNMLS De Witt and HNMLS Rotterdam conduct amphibious exercise in Cassis. LCVP in assault. DYMR20. Octo- ber 5th, 2020. Credit: Mediacentrum Defensie (MCD) - Maartje Roos

that Europeans now collectively consider Conclusion the military mobility challenge if Europe The future defense of Europe will not is to properly harness the resources and simply depend on a sufficiency of relevant capabilities that will be needed in the force, but the ability of such a force to post-Covid-19 economic environment move far more rapidly than today across to credibly and speedily project military Europe and around Europe’s extended power to its own eastern borders, with or borders. Both the force and its supporting without the United States. resources will need to be sufficiently maneuverable to meet all challenges, The November 2020 report of the NATO and of sufficient mass to meet several Reflection Group, “NATO 2030: Unified contingencies at once. The critical enablers for a New Era,” states: “The key to will be mission relevant military mobility NATO’s political and strategic credibility and the political and legal permissions, is that it keep pace with a dramatically as well as a sufficiently large and robust and fundamentally changing strategic network of road, air, rail, sea, and river environment. This is all the more transportation systems and infrastructures. important in the context of a paradigm shift in how Allies think about their The ultimate strategic challenge will be security. Doing so will require Allies to to develop European strategic mobility continue to adopt a genuinely strategic capabilities that are able to “reach in mind-set that goes beyond risk- and crisis- strength” to the very eastern frontiers management. NATO must preserve a of both the Alliance and the Union. geopolitical perspective and shared vision Therefore, it is particularly important for NATO’s strategy at the same time that

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it upgrades its ability to understand and overall strategic framework for security, manage the transboundary threats that deterrence, and defense in Europe must will shape its environment over the long necessarily stand. term. Only with this clarifying strategic framework will NATO be able to make The critical need is to counter Russia’s full use of the resources at its disposal for readiness advantage. That is why the shaping its external environment.”7 2019 NATO Military Strategy (NMS) calls for effective and credible deterrence and Since the end of the Cold War much defense across the totality of the Alliance’s of the road, rail, air, sea, and port AO. For SACEUR, such credibility demands infrastructure that enabled NATO forces to geographic interdependence is strategically move rapidly across Western Europe has and properly aligned with domain diminished, together with the facilities (land, air, maritime, cyberspace, space) that also enabled the safe transit and interdependence. The ability to move secure reception of U.S. and Canadian forces and resources rapidly would not forces. Therefore, effective deterrence only demonstrate a full-spectrum mix of and defense will not only require, but activities vital to the Alliance’s permanent increasingly depend upon, hardened and postures and temporary deployments, it expanded “inter-modal” military-friendly must also be central to NATO’s training, infrastructures, especially so given the exercise, and education programs that size of the Area of Operations (AO) to be drive adaptation. defended by the Alliance is far bigger than it was during the Cold War. The Covid-19 Military mobility also highlights the pandemic has also revealed the importance many vulnerabilities that exist to all- of the timely movement of resources important logistics. While these are across Europe during such an emergency known weaknesses, the priority for and must be seen as a core component most allies at present is addressing of improved people protection across the sustainability shortfalls in overall force conflict spectrum. preparedness. Military mobility is too often an afterthought. This is partly because In spite of recent progress, a true of the nature of logistics. While military constancy of purpose is needed to enhance mobility is a common endeavor, logistics military mobility. Deeds, not words, will be remain a national responsibility. Such the currency with which all such efforts tensions hinder not only any agreement on will be judged. For the EU, in particular, priorities, but also collective action in spite contributing to better European defense of there being broad agreement on the capacity that is fully compatible with and principles of military mobility. complementary to NATO will require enhanced national military capabilities and It is for these reasons that this report effective implementation of substantive is not about where or when to move initiatives such as military mobility. That forces and resources, but rather the goal is still a long way away. establishment of what might be termed the procedural wherewithal that needs Put simply, Europe is by no means close to be agreed and put in place in order to meeting the military mobility challenge to allow them to do so. That is why the this report addresses despite there being main focus of the report is on practical an implicit acknowledgment that rapid and considerations, including what worked assured military mobility (together with well in the past and why the method is Europe’s ability to act as an effective first to identify approaches that do not require responder) is central to credible defense significant investment in order to gain and deterrence. Indeed, military mobility early momentum, just collective will. is an essential pillar on which any credible The vision implicit in this project is of

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a Europe in which forces and resources Time is pressing. An already complex and can be moved around in an expeditious difficult security environment is going to and affordable manner to deter, defend, very likely deteriorate further, possibly and assist, and in which infrastructures, rapidly so. Progress will not be easy, it laws, and politics combine to afford never is. Military mobility, by its very Europeans enduring security and stability. nature, is the essence of progress. It is time This is because the ultimate reason for to act. It is time to move. enhanced military mobility is not to fight a war, but to prevent or stop one. In other The Military Mobility Project, words, NATO, the EU, and their respective CEPA, members and partners must demonstrate March 2021 an ability to move as fast, or faster, than any potential adversary if crises are to be managed effectively, deterrence is to remain credible, and defense maintained. The possible alternative? The conduct of liberation campaigns on Europe’s soil … again!

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Endnotes

1 For the purpose of clarity and readability, the team decided that as a matter of policy footnotes would only be used where direct quotations are employed supported by the bibliography at the end of the report. 2 “Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council on the Action Plan on Military Mobility,” European Commission, March 28, 2018, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=JOIN:2018:0005:FIN. 3 Ibid. 4 See: “Action Plan on military mobility: EU takes steps towards a Defence Union,” March 28, 2018, European Commission Mobility and Transport, https://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/infrastructure/news/2018-03-28-action- plan-military-mobility_en. 5 See: “Draft Council conclusions on progress in implementing the EU Global Strategy in the area of Security and Defence,” Council of the European Union, March 6, 2017, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST- 6715-2017-INIT/en/pdf.

6 See: “Warsaw Summit Communiqué,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, July 9, 2016, https://www.nato.int/cps/ en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm. 7 “NATO 2030: Unified for a New Era: Analysis and Recommendations of the Reflection Group Appointed by the NATO Secretary General,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, November 25, 2020, https://www.nato.int/nato_ static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/12/pdf/201201-Reflection-Group-Final-Report-Uni.pdf.

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Appendices: Working Scenario 1: Norway to Estonia Group’s Findings Appendix 1

Working Group Nordic-Baltic Route: Anticipating a Changing Geostrategic Environment (Scenario I) This scenario highlighted the time that will be needed for extensive political consultations and preparations of the legal process for crossing the Norwegian-Swedish border ahead of any planned military movement. This is because there are Baltic multiple levels of authority that need to grant Sea approval for any such movement. Dealing with Legal/Diplomatic Standards Importance of civil society: The scenario south of the city. Critically, road, rail, and highlighted the importance to military shipping capabilities for any movement mobility in the Nordic-Baltic region of in strength will need to be assessed early, civil society and its many organizations in with particular concern for EU regulations both Norway and Sweden. Appropriate for the transport of dangerous goods. Both relationships with these institutions will road and rail capacity is limited in Sweden, thus need to be built as they are often best which could cause a three-to-four-week equipped to enable such movements and delay in the transport of heavy equipment, best placed to offer insights to movement not least because of the relatively small planners on route networks and the number of railway flat cars of the capacities of necessary staging areas. appropriate size. Consideration should thus Particular focus will be needed on the be given to the use of wheeled rather than expeditious completion of Sweden’s Host tracked armored vehicles as this would Nation Support (HNS) request process also make alternative and multiple routes for the use of civilian infrastructure by available. Storage options in Sweden are military equipment. Thankfully, many also limited. of the necessary legal and political Continuous inventory: The scenario also requirements needed to move military highlighted the need for a rolling equipment across the region are already inventory to establish the state and scope in place through bilateral and HNS of the relevant equipment expedited agreements in Sweden and Norway. military mobility would need. Much of Managing Infrastructure Requirements the equipment will be civilian. It will and Standards need to be tested for cyber resilience in a coordinated manner by both Road and rail lacunae: Road and rail government and industry. Part of that transport will pose greater challenges testing regime will require exercising than shipping in this scenario as Oslo is cyber vulnerabilities and multimodal able to receive forces, although the Port of transport and infrastructure interfaces Stockholm is unlikely to be available thus to assess where weak connections could requiring the use of ports to the north and impede operations. Any such effort will,

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of course, cost money and it is important better communications between critical that appropriate funding is identified and mobility stakeholders during the planning coordinated between NATO, the European phase, as well as far closer civil-military Union (EU), and the host nations with relationships to ease incompatibilities incentives to industry and the host nation between military and civilian equipment. to commit to the capital funding outlays Particular attention must be paid to the needed to improve infrastructure vital to impact of 5G technologies and their use improved military mobility. A critical step which could allow adversaries to attack at will be to strengthen the resilience of civil great speed but remain undetected. infrastructure through improved civil- military communication, which will also Appendix 2 need to be built into the planning process. Determining Chains of Command and Working Group Suwałki Corridor: Communication NATO’s Achilles’ Heel (Scenario II) A common operational picture: For an effective Security of mobility was a central theme in chain of command and control to be this high-end scenario on NATO’s eastern established, the scenario underlined the flank. Procedures for the military’s use of need for a common operational picture infrastructure have not been updated since the that will be established and maintained Cold War. Such modernization will be critical by Norway and Sweden. Successful civil- during an emergency to avoid the dangerous military cooperation will, in turn, only slowing of military mobility as it transitions from be established if roles, responsibilities, disembarkation at port to multimode transport and command and control structures are systems. This scenario highlighted the vital need designed from the outset to bridge the to test coordination and deconfliction of processes civil-military spectrum and the structures under duress and beyond the usual planning and institutions therein. The scenario’s timelines. For example, it is well-established that findings placed particular importance on in peacetime, allied forces can be moved into the need to facilitate early use of host Bremerhaven and projected into Poland. But what nation infrastructure through increased about during an emergency? cooperation between industry, civilian authorities, and host nation militaries. Dealing with Legal/Diplomatic Standards Information warfare: Three necessary courses Rapid responsiveness: Key mobility of action were identified to address stakeholders, who are vital to military the information risks to the security of mobility in a high-end emergency such military mobility in the scenario. First, the as played out by this scenario, will need use of information warfare (infowar) during to be identified early in the planning any emergency will require the need to process. Close working relationships educate political and industry leaders, as will be particularly important in transit well as populations, on the threat posed by nations between national and local state actors, although the working group governments, relevant industries, those did not specify who would be responsible responsible for the management of for such a program. Second, the need critical infrastructure and organizations, to promote military and industrial and between sending and transit nations standardization and interoperability across through the reconciliation of border- both the physical and cyber domains to crossing procedures by both the European promote enhanced civilian resilience Union (EU) and NATO. Authorization and improved civil defense. And third, to procedures must also be resilient to the promote increased awareness of the cyber sudden changes any emergency tends to threat posed to military mobility through generate. For example, the importance to

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Scenario 2: Suwalki Corridor Determining Chains of Command and Communication Mobility coordination triad: The actual process of military mobility rests on a triad of “legs” or phases that provide the framework for future coordinating architectures. The national leg concerns the home base and Baltic port of embarkation (POE), and requires Sea national-level coordination. The strategic leg takes place between the POE and the port (or point) of disembarkation (POD) and requires effective transnational coordination. The operational leg takes place between the POD and the final destination (FD). During the strategic leg, SACEUR, through the Standing Joint Logistics Support Group (SJLSG) and the Allied Movement Coordination Centre (AMCC), plans, prioritizes, coordinates, and deconflicts. During the operational leg, rapid mobility of robust administrative the Joint Force Command ( JFC) plans and systems cannot be overstated. Potential executes reception, staging, and onward errors in cargo lists and the order of arrival movement (RSOM) in coordination with of shipping could lead to significant delays. the host nation and nations responsible The importance of effective and robust for national planning and provision of regulatory regimes will also be vital. In transportation and movement. peacetime, industry and civilian activities and regulations that compete with military Streamlined border crossings: It would be requirements can cause friction. As soon useful to create a streamlined process to as a crisis is formally declared as such better facilitate cross-border movement friction should be brought to an end and eliminate parallel procedures. There by the necessary political and statutory are existing memoranda of understanding instruments. The critical need will be to (MOUs) and transit agreements in place declare a crisis early which, in turn, will to help improve cross-border missions, require the indicators and decision-making but more needs to be done. Authority for capacity for such a judgment to be made. crossing borders should be standardized Thereafter, national coordination centers so that forces can move without having to would promote the seamless mobility overcome several and repeated legal and of forces and resources. There is already regulatory obstacles. Military mobility a process to formally recognize a crisis would also be greatly helped if the areas — the NATO crisis response system. As of responsibility of both NATO and the soon as the Supreme Allied Commander EU with regard to military mobility Europe (SACEUR) has been authorized procedures were harmonized, such as by the North Atlantic Council (NAC), establishing equal response time for Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers permissions to move. For example, the Europe (SHAPE) issues an activation order EU is trying to agree those military to all participating nations and commands, movements that could be eligible for initiating the deployment of NATO forces. annual approval, i.e., military movements that do not affect civilian activities and do not require repeated approval. This

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initiative could establish the basis for a in advance and then assigned to the most harmonized approach. Another could suitable method and route for onward include easing the discrepancies that exist transportation. In such circumstances, it is between the time it takes to obtain cross- probably more important to identify such border movement permission for military requirements prior to any movement than forces (military personnel, materiel, and suggest improvements to the infrastructure assets) through the EU (up to five working itself, although that is also needed. There is days) and NATO (up to three working days). a critical need for more detailed standing At the very least, the EU and NATO should defense plans, which have atrophied seek to harmonize their respective data markedly since the end of the Cold War. and provide annual, overarching approvals wherever possible. Defender 20: Although Exercise Defender 20 was in part cancelled due to Covid-19, Form 302: Another measure that might be it does provide sufficient data to form considered is the adoption of a common the basis for a renewed effort to quantify regulatory process by both NATO and the what is needed for military mobility in EU. For example, the EU is developing such a high-end scenario in areas such Form 302 which is also NATO-compatible. as the required quantity and capability of Form 302 implies the end goal of a railway wagons and trucks (both heavy and uniform approach by the two institutions light) so that critical gaps can be identified. for the transit of the same military Critical infrastructure, such as airports, rail items. The EU version is designed to facilities, ports, fuel storage areas, as well as accelerate cross-border movement via a hubs for theater logistic bases, are regularly movement identification number (MIN), surveyed to assess whether they meet which identifies the country of origin, NATO requirements in close coordination the destination, whether the shipment with respective host nations. This data includes EU or non-EU goods, and can already be accessed through several whether it is a NATO or EU activity or allied capability documents. However, the other. To facilitate harmonization further situation could be improved if NATO’s it would also be useful to establish a Logistics Functional Area Services (LOGFAS) direct link between NATO’s Joint Support was able to be continually updated with and Enabling Command ( JSEC) and the real-time data, including highlighting European Defense Agency (EDA). temporary restrictions.

Managing Infrastructure Requirements Alternative routes and dual use: Consideration and Standards must also be given to alternative routes to the Suwałki Corridor to avoid the main The Suwałki bottleneck: The scenario arteries, which are obvious targets, and considered the infrastructure requirements increase dispersal. This could include needed to move forces through the Suwałki disembarkation at Poland’s Szczecin/ Corridor through which there are only two Świnoujście sea/river ports or through the roads with limited tonnage capacity and use of the Kędzierzyn-Koźle connectivity one railway line. The corridor is a main hub, which used to be the second-largest EU thoroughfare for civilian traffic but in Europe. Specific military mobility lacks staging areas to house a significant gaps could also by assessed by comparing force package without interference with military requirements with the capabilities civilian traffic. It is also too narrow for the identified in the European Commission- deployment of long military convoys. To led work on the Trans-European Transport prevent a dangerous bottleneck the specific Network (TEN-T) as not all possible routes forces and materiel needed by each force have been fully assessed. Such an approach unit (e.g., heavy brigade/wheeled brigade, would promote more extensive dual civil- etc.) would need to be determined well

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military use, which will be vital to future to be worked up through exercises such as military mobility. By identifying dual-use Trident Juncture. infrastructure within the framework of TEN-T a case could be made for improved “Civilian” battle space management policy: funding from the EU. Hitherto, the EU The supply chain challenge highlights has only funded dual-use commercial the growing importance of civilian assets infrastructure. Interestingly, the EU has in almost all aspects of military mobility. reportedly identified the existence of Indeed, without recourse to such assets a 93% overlap of the geographic scope it is increasingly hard to speak of a battle of commercial and military transport space management policy as such. Civilian infrastructure requirements. traffic has a particularly important role in bringing forces to any given area. Renovating Soviet infrastructure: An Experience of past conflicts demonstrates examination should also be undertaken that in any crisis area civilian traffic to see if it would be possible to revitalize management will also be crucial. some Soviet-era transportation and storage infrastructure in Poland. Some of it has Civil preparedness: Effective military not been in use for more than 30 years. mobility will also rely on improved However, if renovated, such capabilities civil preparedness and resilience. could be used to facilitate future While there has been some progress deployments. Railway junctions, seaports, in the cybersecurity domain with EU and river ports between Greater Poland and regulations identifying critical sectors and Silesia could also be used as rear areas in infrastructure that need hardening, as well the Szczecin and Kędzierzyn-Koźle area. as new “incident response regulations,” far more needs to be done. In line with the Supply chain and flexible logistic nodes: A other four scenarios, the need to minimize critical assessment is also needed along bureaucracy and movement across areas of the entirety of the supply chain both authority was highlighted, including the for needed capabilities and the manifold use of an electronic Form 302 form when vulnerabilities from which they suffer, entering EU territory as such a form would particularly when forces rely upon civilian enable just one complete load and unload. fuel supplies. Fuel storage capacity, as well as the capabilities needed to move fuel, are MNDPP: It is vital that all states limited. One approach might be to create contributing to the Multinational Detailed flexible infrastructure with storage based Deployment Plan (MNDDP) fulfil their on need with locations rendered flexible National Deployment Plans, coordinate and thus enabling far easier movement. During de-conflict the process led by the SJLSG, the Cold War, when all essential supplies execute expeditiously the strategic RSOM were mobile, divisions were expected to be and make effective use of LOGFAS, with able to fight for seven days before resupply. the necessary support of trained personnel, What is really needed is the development reinforced by appropriate access for key of flexible logistical nodes for maintenance, mobility stakeholders assured by robust recovery, storage, food, etc. This would connectivity. ensure supplies are in the right spot at Determining Chains of Command, the right time and in the right amount. Control, and Communication The current centralized approach to storage makes supply and resupply highly Robust C3: Consideration of the robust vulnerable. In the absence of bespoke command, control, and communication flexible solutions, the use of hybrid civil- needs of military mobility was central to military solutions could also offer some the scenario. To improve all three elements way forward. However, they would need one finding was the need for a central

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hardened location. Particular emphasis structure could be reinforced further by was placed on maintaining and enhancing local information from the host nation, interoperability. The importance of the industry, and specialist providers, which Very High Readiness Joint Task Force have been integrated into a NATO or EU (VJTF) was paramount during the pre- knowledge net. crisis, crisis, and sustainment phases of an operation and for establishing effective Anticipating Risks to Security communications and an information Trust and confidence building: In keeping with exchange with civilian authorities to many of the recommendations herein trust support any deployment from port to the and confidence across the stakeholders can final destination. only be built through regular meetings, exercises, and experience of how to : Chains of command, control, and Test C3 overcome potential choke points when communication must be tested with the planning for exercises and operations aim of synchronized planning for all the through a shared culture. In anticipating mobility elements and phases based on a risks to security, the scenario considered a realistic analysis of the challenge. Critical wide range of potential choke points when information gaps must be addressed in the moving forces. These included threats to common operating/movement picture with multimodal transport exchanges (e.g., from a high-level plan generated that includes port to railway) where communication nets and incorporates the relevant capacities change, as well as choke points early in and movement windows. This high-level a movement that are often more difficult plan would need to be supported by a to predict. Some force components also low-level detailed plan that enjoys a live move at different speeds, or simply do not feed from convoy movements and tracks work together, creating opportunities for critical cargoes and which links into civil an adversary to impose cyber or kinetic and commercial movement information disruptions, often without attribution. systems. For example, there is at present Non-physical choke points must also no operating picture for a brigade moving be considered, such as the mindset of to reinforce. It would thus make sense to the deployed force if it begins to fear acquire the appropriate civilian system such disruptions, be they geographic or and work it up prior to a crisis rather than administrative, and even if these are simply develop and run a parallel and bespoke figments of a stressed imagination. military system. The worst case: This scenario stood apart : LOGFAS and a joint mobility command from the others because of the threat of Connectivity to NATO’s LOGFAS would an Article 5 contingency which demanded enable permanently updated data to a firm grip of a host of worst-case populate a common operating picture if consequences. Consideration was thus nations “fed” the LOGFAS system with given to the dispersal of forces during the latest data. The more sensors there movement closer to the Baltic states are, the more “visibility” there will be given the threat posed by a potential for commanders of all aspects of military flanking attack from either Kaliningrad mobility. Critically, a new joint JSEC-led or Belarus by powerful Russian forces. mobility command could better manage The primary lesson was that any credible the battle space if it had an overall view concept of secure military mobility in such of movement. If supplemented by a circumstances should plan and prepare standing joint logistic support group, to be deprived of critical resources, face a such a command structure would ensure series of coercively applied choke points, enhanced coherence between joint and resist concerted attempts to undermine fighting commands. Such a command NATO cohesion.

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Force protection: Effective force protection continuity from deterrence to defense to for forces on the move will demand deployment is to be realized within seven training and exercising in how to days under NATO planning. Defining the effectively implement both active and “rear area” early will better enable clear passive measures. An essential challenge contingency and operational planning built will be the need for sending nations to on equally clear lines of responsibility entrust the provision of security to national within clearly defined boundaries. The authorities, particularly concerning the use status of the rear area should also be of national infrastructure. For example, capable of being graduated upward, force protection cannot be guaranteed particularly as U.S. forces move forward. when moving into Lithuania, particularly during a gray zone crisis or in the face of Redundancy and flexibility: Any force a surprise attack, as units are no longer movement in such a scenario would permitted under law to protect themselves benefit from an appropriate level of with live munitions. Peacetime protection redundancy and flexibility built into is also now led by interior ministry forces the planning. Moving a force with only and national and local police and they will limited assets and capabilities along clearly need to be up to the task and resilient to identified and effectively fixed axes leaves infiltration and disruption. Cyber protection forces extremely vulnerable to disruption is also often devolved to the civilian sector, and possible destruction. Redundancy in many cases the responsibility of railway, built into mobility through the use of road, port, or airport owners. Some of several means and modes of transport these owners or shareholders are Russian. would thus markedly improve resilience. Enhanced force protection may thus have to Such an approach would be similar to be generated by government contractors or the British-led Operation Transportation transport police. prior to D-Day which successfully masked the landing operations. This basic rule of Materiel protection: Protecting the force secure military mobility also applies to while moving does not simply concern command-and-control structures, which personnel. Materiel also needs to be if more distributed are more resilient, protected. Munitions and containers of thus facilitating a greater capacity to adapt other essential, often dangerous, materiel and recover. The emergence of a host may also move separately from the force of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and and much of its protection will also be long-range reconnaissance drones has the responsibility of a host of nonmilitary accelerated and increased the need for authorities. Again, only the proper such in-built redundancy into planning, training and exercising of all mobility systems, and mobility itself. stakeholder personnel would help ensure structures can withstand the test of a crisis. Countering hybrid warfare: The scenario also Command jurisdiction will also need to be revealed the importance of countering clearly established. the effects of hybrid warfare all and any of which could slow decision-making Rear area protection: Critically, it will be and undermine cohesion even without vital to establish early a clear definition a kinetic exchange of fire. For example, of the “rear area” when moving from, say, sustained cyberattacks on rear choke points Germany to Poland, with those charged could paralyze disembarkation, while with its security trained for the task. This disinformation campaigns could create is because the “rear area” is not generally doubt about NATO’s intentions among a commander’s Area of Responsibility citizens and critical mobility stakeholders (AOR). A clear division of responsibilities in vital host and transit nations. Subversive must thus be established, particularly if actions that fall below the threshold of

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Article 5 could also create confusion Scenario 3: Focsani Gate and thus prevent U.S. and other allied forces from sustaining strategic lines of communication and projecting defensive Baltic power. Sea

Cyber resilience: Improved cyber resilience, which reaches far beyond the military command chain given the wide swathe of contacts across civil society on which effective military mobility would rely, is needed. To that end, cyber awareness, resources (human, tech, and financial), capabilities (protection, response, recovery) must promote the far deeper integration of cyber defense plans into national crisis management, with robust and effective systems of communication established between national and civilian mobility stakeholders.

Appendix 3 Dealing with Legal/Diplomatic Standards Working Group Focşani Gate: Key Civil emergency planning: In keeping with all Terrain in NATO’s Southeastern the scenarios, the need for standardized Region (Scenario III) border regulations and customs forms was highlighted together with a common Certainty of mobility is the twin of speedy European system of civil emergency mobility. These twin certainties were tested to the planning. The European Defense Agency limit in this scenario focused on southeastern (EDA) is currently working to harmonize Europe and the Black Sea Region. To enhance these procedures and it would be useful to the cross-border transit of military forces, NATO build on the EU Action Plan on military needs to intensify its efforts to standardize mobility by establishing a Europe-wide legal rules/requirements among members and non- framework for border crossing that extends member EU nations. A harmonizing body needs to troop, equipment, ammunition, and fuel to be established to gather data for coherent movements into Romania in particular. information sharing with NATO, EU, the private sector, and all stakeholders in effective military EU capabilities: Greater leverage needs to mobility, particularly in regions where access is be made of EU capabilities, and improved severely constrained due to outdated road and harmonization is needed between them. rail networks. In this scenario, an estimated 20 EU member states are currently running brigades would be required to defeat a Russian eight relatively low-level programs attack and would require 20 million liters designed to optimize cross-border of diesel fuel and more than 12,000 tons of movement procedures. These issues need ammunition to be moved to fight the initial battle. to be gripped at a more strategic and Critically, this scenario highlighted the need for political level, leading to both friction extensive combat support service (CSS) enablers, and gaps. For example, there are two such as transport maintenance and bridging sets of Technical Arrangements (TAs) for equipment. The overall assessment was that any surface and air domains, but the maritime movement in strength would take a very long time domain is missing. The EDA is also trying and because of that any and all military mobility to reduce the “move time” from seven to should be carefully planned in advance. five working days for task forces at high

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readiness with logistic planning established which could bring any force movement in advance, in conjunction with efforts to to a halt. A new railway crossing should resolve in advance any customs obstacles thus be constructed. In any case, the faced during the pre-crisis phase for the need for rail ferries on the lower Danube prepositioning of ammunition and other should be a mandatory part of any strategic logistic assets. The EDA has also established defense planning in Romania, not just a program to revise European customs law as a national requirement, but also an to create a legal basis for the harmonization Alliance requirement. An infrastructure of regulations across all 27 EU member fund should be developed to build barges states. capable of creating pontoon bridges across the Danube and transporting rail vehicles Managing Infrastructure Requirements when bridges have been destroyed. and Standards Choke points and vulnerabilities: A proper Supply and resupply: Ammunition stocks assessment of critical intermodal choke and petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) points and vulnerabilities is needed. Such would need to be moved to where they an effort would require a detailed, in-depth are needed, which could prove difficult series of onsite measurements and route given the poor and outdated transport analysis to assess the reliability of rail, networks across the region. There are also particularly in Bulgaria, not least because of insufficient pre-positioned stocks while the problems associated with electricity supply stocks that would be needed could not be and the type of voltage used by Bulgarian pre-positioned in all the required locations. rail. Sea lift would be facilitated by the 11 Ammunition and POL could be moved by ships dedicated to the movement of NATO sea but getting from port to the battlefront forces, assuming they were available. The by road and rail still requires moving Port of Thessaloniki would be the most hazardous materials through population capable port of entry due to its berthing centers via inadequate and insecure road capacity. However, Russian influence over and rail corridors. the ownership of the port suggests that Land movements: The scenario paid NATO should also look use Alexandroupolis particular attention to the problems Port in Thrace, although the United States associated with the movement of forces has already taken steps to mitigate the over land into the AOR. Particular attention threat posed by Russian influence over was paid to the need to find rail corridors critical infrastructure in the region. capable of transporting heavy equipment : Given the and the need to plan for alternative routes Innovative transportation solutions many constraints, innovative transportation if bridges were targeted, even if this meant solutions should be considered. For forces disembarking in Greece diverting via example, it might be possible to use large Poland. The example was highlighted of an trucks to move heavy equipment and Italian division using the Greek ports and bulk supplies (such as fuel) to bridges rail system to transit through Bulgaria and and tunnels where weight and gauge into Romania. The deployment of Italian restrictions apply. Thereafter, use smaller forces to Kosovo provided some useful trucks to move loads onward. The use of lessons about the likely problems. For multiple trucks fitted with cranes could example, a force moving by rail via Skopje also help ease challenges posed by bridge would need to detrain early because of weight limits and would require minimal gauge restrictions with tunnels and bridge personnel. Most likely, an emergency in clearances. There were also considerable the region would require a mix of air, concerns about the Ruse Bridge over the land, and sea lift solutions, subject to the Danube River. If it is destroyed, it would political approval to cross borders being act as a single catastrophic point of failure granted early in the pre-crisis phase.

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Secure routing into theater: Consideration Work with national planning: Any deployment was also given to finding the most secure and mobility plans to the Focşani Gate routes. For example, the Poland-Ukraine must also account for Romania’s existing (Lviv)-Romania route would probably strategic plans, including the National be the most secure prior to any fighting Defense Strategy (RoNDS) for 2020-2024, in Romania, while the Greece-Bulgaria- Romania’s Defense Strategic Assessment Romania route would probably be the (RoDSA) for 2020-2040, and the revised only land route available once a conflict final version of the General Master Plan on has broken out. Contracting out to the Transport (GMPT). The GMPT was revised civilian haulage sector could ensure and in December 2020 by an interinstitutional assure strategic lift across the 1,200 or working group that included civilian so miles from Poland to the Focșani Gate and military stakeholders and took into prior to a conflict, although there would consideration EDA and NATO military be significant associated costs such as hire mobility requirements. and insurance. Moving by rail across such a large distance is unlikely to be possible, Sources of infrastructure investment: The updated unless such movements are made well in GPMT also assumes access to the now very advance of an emergency. limited EU military mobility budget, as well as the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) transport Romania’s infrastructure: The scenario also priority project and the Three Seas Initiative highlighted the paucity and poor quality of (3SI) Investment Fund. As such, the GMPT much of the infrastructure in the region. might prove a useful test case for best Romania is in need of major improvements practice military mobility planning in the to its air, road, river, and rail infrastructure. region and might have lessons that could be Its road infrastructure is unsuitable at applied elsewhere in Europe. present for large deployments of forces due to narrow roads, weak bridges that Serbia, the Danube, and “smart TEN-T”: would be unable to support large and Romania could provide a critical pathway heavy vehicles, and narrow tunnels. for developing cooperation between the There are also several river crossings in European Union (EU) and Serbia with Romania where bridges cannot support the aim of boosting the importance of armor (the Focșani and Galați bridges the Danube for commercial activity and, being the exception). Romania does have as a consequence, fostering improved airfields which could be used by large military mobility. The region would also aircraft to transport a spearhead force, benefit if the Trans-European Transport such as the Very High Readiness Joint Network (TEN-T) and other corridors Task Force (VJTF). The Danube is a major were adapted for enabling the transport thoroughfare, but needs more ports of of oversized military assets. At the EU entry to be constructed and infrastructure level, there is only knowledge of such improved along the length of the river requirements (which are not met across from Germany to the Black Sea. If the all EU member states in spite of existing Danube is to be exploited as a corridor for legislation). Therefore, an audit should mobility, ferries on the river could provide be undertaken of all infrastructure to a logistical reserve capability and should be test for accommodation of oversized developed by both Romania and Bulgaria. military assets. In some circumstances, The Romanian rail system would be unable it might still be possible to move such to transport a huge tonnage of equipment assets using mitigation measures. The via rail, but could transport some military EU is also promoting the streamlining equipment at a relatively high speed. of procedures for building infrastructure across the Union. Transport and military communities in the region should seek

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to exploit these efforts by both sharing Exercising and training: The need for more knowledge and expertise and promoting a shared operational military training joint approach to developing the case for and exercises to safeguard command funding. and control was also identified, with calls for a systematic program of EU- Rail interfaces: There is a need to standardize NATO civil-military exercises that would railways and their gauges and weight help construct a shared civil-military capacity across the region. To that end, understanding of the challenges faced a working group should be established by military mobility, ensure staff are within the framework of enhancing better trained, and build cohesion among military mobility to evaluate existing stakeholders. railway standards and reassess the degree of interoperability on European railways Equipment movement: There is also a need to currently based on so-called Technical better coordinate the numerous mobility Specifications for Interoperability stakeholders involved in equipment and (TSIs). In theory, all EU member states ammunition movement. To that end must answer to the TSIs based on the NATO and the EU should jointly bring EDA and the European Commission’s together regional transport authorities. Directorate-General for Mobility and Increased coordination among NATO, the Transport (DG MOVE) requirements. EU, and the member states is thus vital. However, railway lines in several EU It must be further reinforced by a whole- countries have different gauge widths, of-government approach to mobility. while the gauge in Ukraine and Moldova Critically, there is no single coordinating is 1,520 mm and thus conforms to authority, although NATO is moving to Russian standards. This presents a real enable whole-of-government efforts across challenge for military mobility on NATO’s Europe and has a rolling database to assist eastern flank. In the short to medium in the process. However, as it is developed term, increased investment in so-called it should also be shared with the EU and transition technologies could also be made partner governments, not just allies. to facilitate the transfer of shipments from one gauge to another. Both the Anticipating Risks to Security Russians and the Swiss have developed the Big-picture approach: To ease threats to the technology to rapidly change bogies on security of transiting forces a holistic railway wagons to avoid the need to unload “big-picture” approach is needed to and reload rolling stock. The Swiss have a scenario planning that incorporates bespoke system to facilitate changing the critical infrastructure preparedness, bogies on flat-bed wagons from standard to offensive cyber operations, effects on narrow gauge. local populations, disruptions to lines of communication, and other actions which Determining Chains of Command, could create confusion and impact the Control, and Communication speed of movement and act as a barrier to Promote decision-making: Promoting political rapid political decision-making. decision-making at the “speed of crisis relevance” to initiate and enable military Civil unrest: Preparedness for civil unrest mobility was highlighted. And, while should also be an integral part of the the EU clearly has major role to play in planning remit, together with possible promoting more political coherence, NATO large-scale population movements, all of must be the driving force concerning which would further limit the already requirements. limited road and rail capacity in the region. While alternative civilian logistic capacity is attractive as a solution, it

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could also be vulnerable to Russian New Scenario 4: Western Balkans Generation Warfare. For example, Russia has successfully penetrated the political systems of Hungary and Serbia and trains carrying troops and equipment across those states could be interfered with. Forces disembarking in Greece could also have difficulty transiting through Bulgaria.

Lack of airborne fire support: Secure military mobility in the region needs the support of airborne fire support platforms such as attack helicopters and U.S. Army aviation, which are critical combat multipliers. An aviation brigade is capable of self-deploying for at least 48-72 hours, supporting elements and movement coming out of Germany and Poland, forward deploying and providing mobility and strike capability. Its Longbow radar can detect enemy at ranges of 16 kilometers and least because a firm knowledge of infrastructure distribute this targeting data to any Link along lines of ingress and egress is a key driver of 16-capable fire system. strategic and operational planning. Responsibility for movement during the phases of deployment Appendix 4 into and across the region would need to be better defined. Working Group Balkans — Europe’s Soft Underbelly (Scenario IV) Dealing with Legal/Diplomatic Standards Legality and legitimacy of movement in a pre- crisis situation is as important and complex Legal and legitimate mobility: The Western as speed of movement and the ability to move. Balkans raises a host of issues concerning In the specific circumstances of this scenario, a the legality and legitimacy of movement. number of allies could well insist on a new legal Take Kosovo as an example. It is not in mandate, most likely a U.N. Security Council NATO, so Article 5 collective defense mandate. However, NATO is unlikely to secure does not apply. NATO reinforcement such a mandate because of the veto power wielded could still take place as a non-Article 5 by Russia and China. This scenario highlighted Crisis Response Operation and for Bosnia- the complexity of military mobility in those parts Herzegovina (BiH) through reinforcement of Europe where nations are not members of of the existing EUFOR operation. either the EU or NATO and where there is strong However, in a pre-crisis situation NATO Russian influence. The importance of making would also need to demonstrate that any trade-offs between weight of force and mobility reinforcement of its forces in the region during the phases of movement again became would be covered by the United Nation’s apparent. The sheer complexity of military mandate authorizing KFOR (UNSCR mobility in such regions was also highlighted with 1244) and the operational plan (OPLAN) many moving parts; sending nations, transiting would need to reflect that. In the specific nations, host nations, NATO, EU, and other circumstances of this scenario a number international organizations, as well as a host of allies could well insist on a new legal of civilian and military actors within nations. mandate, most likely a U.N. Security Effective deployed coordination is thus vital, not Council mandate. However, NATO is

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unlikely to secure such a mandate because documents from the EU, which are not of the veto power wielded by Russia and publicly available. China. Speed of reinforcement: The roles played Form 302: In keeping with several of the by NATO’s Joint Support and Enabling other scenarios, the need for a standardized Command ( JSEC) and the Standing Form 302 to be used by both the European Logistics Joint Support Group (SJLSG) to Union (EU) and NATO was also proposed maximize the speed of reinforcement will as essential for the seamless transit of be critical. JSEC provides a network for equipment and materiel across borders all involved nations to use during a crisis in the region, even if a state is not a but needs clearance from Albania and member of either institution. In such cases, Kosovo before it can act. NATO’s SJLSG arrangements would need to be negotiated provides contingency planning for the prior to any such contingency. A critical NATO Response Force (NRF), including the need identified by the working group was Allied Movement Coordination Centre, and to promote awareness of such instruments acts to deconflict and coordinate actions amongst customs officers at borders across based on a commander’s required date the region. for a multinational joint plan. To ensure deconflicted strategic movement, SJLSG The need for bespoke diplomacy: Ideally, at could identify available infrastructure the national level a whole-of-government through the existing capability catalogue. approach should be fostered built on SJLSG also coordinates strategic movement shared best practice between EU member (multinational deployment plan) and states and NATO allies, with a specific advisers for strategic support and point of contact identified for each nation movement. or region tasked with coordinating all relevant civilian and military operators and JSEC, SJLSG, and host nations: Responsibility actors. However, in this scenario, several between JSEC, SJLSG, and national critical partner states were members of movement plans could be further aligned neither the EU nor NATO. Moreover, it by using the model provided by Supreme was envisaged that some nations would Headquarters Allied Powers Europe not have a seat at every, nor indeed any, (SHAPE) tabletop exercises (TTX) to ease table (Bosnia-Herzegovina/Serbia/Kosovo). pressure on host nations. JSEC is in close Given the tensions in the region, a bespoke contact with host nations and prepares and continuous diplomatic effort would the battlefield, as well as provides force be needed. This would not be dissimilar protection and damage control for the to that required to maintain access for rear area. It is also responsible for all areas NATO forces and resources in Afghanistan that are militarily necessary to support through Pakistan. the joint operational area or the “rear area” in the Western Balkans. The SJLSG Standardized doctrine: All EU and NATO is considered responsible from the “rear standards relevant to command and area” to the objective (Kosovo in the case control, mobility, and transportation of this scenario), while the host nation is should be reviewed and harmonized. responsible for delineating responsibility Such an effort should be based on between SJLSG and national movement. “NATO Standard Allied Joint Publication Detailed responsibilities were better (AJP) — 4.4 Allied Joint Movement and defined at SHAPE at a TTX in November Transportation Doctrine” on command 2020 at which the involved commanders and control, roles, and responsibilities, were present. and “NATO Standard AJP-3 Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations.” Three phases of deployment: Responsibility Any review should also include parallel for movement during the three phases

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of deployment into and across the region movements would need to take place either should be better defined. From home to the from a Bulgarian port through North ports of embarkation it, including border- Macedonia, or from Hungary to Kosovo. crossing procedures, is the responsibility If Serbia cooperated, offloading could take of the sending nation. In the strategic place in Belgrade and then proceed via rail phase of deployment (port of embarkation, and road to Kosovo. The use of the Danube POE, to port of disembarkation, POD) the as an alternative approach would only nations play a significant coordinating role, work via the Port of Pančevo near Belgrade. but the strategic military commander and the Allied Movement Co-ordination Center The EU plan for the Western Balkans: The EU (AMCC) or equivalent EU movement Economic and Investment Plan for the coordination center (the European Western Balkans does to an extent address Commission’s Directorate-General for rail, road, river, and IT improvements Mobility and Transport, DG MOVE) has across the region. And, while it does not the responsibility to coordinate, deconflict, mention military mobility, it could be and prioritize the movement of forces. In adapted to support dual-use projects of the operational phase of deployment in which there are several. These include theater (from POD to the final destination “Flagship Programs” which address, inter (FD), the Joint Force Commands ( JFC) for alia, road, rail, and river improvements, NATO and the force exporters for the EU improved connections to the coastal are responsible for deployment. Nations regions (including a rail link to the are responsible for executing the plans Port of Durrës, the one currently used afforded them by the operational-level and most likely to be used in any such headquarters, must provide transportation, scenario), as well as improvements to and conduct execution of movement of digital infrastructure. If funded, such forces in accordance with the plan. programs would need careful review, assessment, and ultimately appraisal by the Managing Infrastructure Requirements EU Military Committee (EUMC) to meet and Standards military mobility requirements, or at least include an assessment of the key trade-offs Use of the Danube: This scenario also that would need to be made. The SHAPE explored the potential of the Danube River capability catalogue team, in conjunction as a corridor for military mobility, but with both JSEC and SJLSG, could also help went more deeply into associated risks. address these issues. For example, the required draft for a barge carrying M1A2 Abrams tanks or Stryker Assess rail capacity: A comprehensive armored vehicles is 2.5 meters, which is assessment needs to be undertaken deeper than much of the river itself. This of the capacity of the Western Balkan constraint could be addressed by limiting rail network as an enabler of military the loads where draft is lower or ensuring mobility. Bridges, tunnels, and other the entire Danube is dredged to 2.5 meters. infrastructure are old across the Balkan Other constraints include different and rail network, much of it built by the differing regulations in NATO and EU Austro-Hungarian Empire, and as such countries, and between Schengen and non- suffer from significant limitations, most Schengen countries on the river, limited notably height-weight capacity of tunnels port capacity for the accommodation of and road overpasses, which would impact ro-ro (tank-carrying roll-on, roll-off) ships, the expeditious movement of military relatively poor connections to road and rail forces in a contingency operation. There infrastructure from river ports, and the is a particular problem when transporting sheer distance from the Danube to Kosovo, armored vehicles via rail or road in the especially if Serbia is not supportive of mountains. A comprehensive assessment an operation. In the case of the latter,

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of the capacity of the communications, be examined to test its suitability as an energy, and transportation infrastructure enabler of strategic mobility into the in the Western Balkans for mobility is also Western Balkans region. The most relevant needed. corridor for this scenario is the Eastern Mediterranean corridor, which extends An EU-NATO host nation database: The host north from Thessaloniki into Central nation is the key player in the region. Europe. The EU has already agreed on NATO has established a common EU- its strategy for the Western Balkans and NATO Host Nation Support (HNS) database the six initiatives designed to upgrade to reinforce NATO’s HNS information infrastructure therein. Consequently, there for the planning of deployments (SHAPE is some €1 billion set aside for connectivity J4 has a dedicated cell for this). The EU projects and technical assistance across does not have access to such a capability. Europe for which states in the Western Given that the EU’s goal is to maintain the Balkans can compete. network with the support of nations across the region, access to a database of regional Port options: The scenario also considered infrastructure information would be vital the viability of port options for enhanced for the planning process. mobility. The Port of Bar in Montenegro has significant limitations to unload and Improve route planning: Improved route stage large equipment. Therefore, industry planning could be achieved by employing highly favors use of the Port of Durrës. capability catalogues with automated Substantial military experience has also updates and status reports. Such capability been gained over the past 20 years in catalogues are also intended to act as the use of the land route from Durrës to geolocation repositories, which are critical Kosovo (although that particular road has to effective route planning and require the quite a few bridges and tunnels limiting fusing of automated updates and real-time military movement which should be information on route status. Commercial studied further). The Port of Durrës also technology could assist this process. For enjoys much larger berthing capacity example, commercial trucks are equipped than the Port of Bar for the unloading with specialized navigation systems with of multiple vessels simultaneously and inbuilt sensors that measure height and is also more modern. While the Port weight and automatically guide the vehicle of Thessaloniki has excellent capacity onto routes with the necessary clearances. with good links to road and rail options, A similar system could be established to its ownership is vulnerable to Russian ease military mobility when the load class influence. This could be an issue of the heaviest vehicle dictates the route. To depending on the nature of any given crisis that end, NATO and the EU should assess response operation. An alternative could be the possibility of synthesizing the many the Port of Alexandroupolis. disparate military and commercial tools available so that consistent and secure route Plan for a heavier future: Military mobility planning via rail/road/river is made possible. demands a constant trade-off to be made SHAPE’s capability catalogue could then between the weight of a force and mobility. be further expanded to include telecom/IT, Mobility challenges would be eased if the energy, and health information and fused weight of future main battle tanks (MBTs) with commercial systems developed by and armored vehicles could be reduced, industry partners and information about although the nature of the threat suggests civilian-owned infrastructure. the opposite is likely to occur with more armor required given the experience of TEN-T and military mobility: The European counterinsurgency operations over the Commission’s Trans-European Transport last three decades. Any such trade-offs Network (TEN-T) corridor system should

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may require more thinking about pre- (EUCOM) does not know about this positioning equipment at certain hub region and its infrastructure (if, of course, locations in Eastern Europe, or even for coordination and information sharing is European forces. The likely greater weight permitted). However, infrastructure wears of new military equipment should thus be out and what may have been possible factored into infrastructure assessments. 20 years ago may not be possible now if In Europe, 90% of highways, 75% of maintenance or improvements have not national roads, and 40% of bridges are been carried out. able to carry vehicles with the maximum military load classification (MLC) 50 for a Determining Chains of Command and tracked vehicle, but such vehicles can only Communication weigh up to 45.4 tons on bridges while a Better coordination of command and control: maximum weight of 52.6 tons is permitted Continued and deepened coordination for wheeled vehicles. and collaboration between EU and NATO command and control structures is vital. : Past experience should Bridging catalogue Use of the same or similar procedures and be tested against current planning as structures would help maintain a clear but infrastructure deteriorates. What was linked delineation of responsibilities in possible in the past may not be so in the the region. The NATO STANAG AJP-6 on future. A capability catalogue should thus Allied Joint Doctrine for Communications be created of all industry-standard bridging and Information System (CIS) (2017) could equipment. This catalogue should also be be a useful starting point for the practical designed to assess the current status of and pragmatic strengthening of a strategic bridges in each host nation, critically the partnership. While EU command and route from Durrës to three destinations control (C2) concepts are classified, there in Kosovo. Routes and their deficiencies are no major differences between the C2 would need to be fully surveyed so that structures or standards across either the commercial solutions, military options, Alliance or the Union. or even the construction of new bridges might be explored. Anticipating Risks to Security Existing projects should also be reviewed: For Counter Chinese influence: Potential risks example, a careful military review of the resulting from increased Chinese influence U.S. International Development Finance and investment in infrastructure and IT Corporation’s Export/Import Bank joint in the region need to be mitigated. For project with Serbia should be undertaken example, Chinese companies are actively to identify lessons. The main aim is the influencing Serbian TV networks, creating construction of a “peace highway” between security risks, and undermining civil Niš and Pristina via Merdare. From a liberties by using debt to leverage state military mobility perspective this route behavior. Russian activity in Serbia is also could provide a much more direct link increasing and has a long history. While from Belgrade via the E75 and an improved NATO and EU influence may be perceived E80. Bridges and tunnels on that route to be in decline, as recently as 2016 there should also be reviewed to test their current were 125 military-military interactions limitations for military equipment and the between NATO and Serbia versus only four resulting requirements fed into the plan. with Russia. Efforts by the United States in September 2020 to increase its investment Build on the KFOR experience: KFOR is a long- in the Western Balkans (specifically standing NATO deployment. Indeed, the targeting Serbia and Kosovo) should be Alliance has operated in the region for over built on. 20 years and there is likely to be little that NATO, the EU, or US European Command

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Assess all communications networks in region: Appendix 5 There is a critical need to assess all aspects of in-region communications. Any Working Group Libya — A such assessment must include available Potential EU Peacekeeping bandwidth for command and control of transiting forces, sustainment, and Mission (Scenario V) communications infrastructure security. An Robust military mobility is the sine qua non established policy would require managing of peacekeeping during complex contingencies spectrum allocation. NATO could manage in countries such as Libya. A potential EU such a spectrum through the appropriate peacekeeping mission to Libya and its associated STANAGs, but the local capabilities in the military mobility planning should be approached region are not part of NATO and rely on as though they are a just-short-of-war scenario. different standards and systems. Any such operation that is first and foremost an EU-led operation will demand tight political, : Most telecom Vulnerable cable infrastructure diplomatic, military, and civilian coordination cable infrastructure into and in-theater between European states and the EU with NATO date back to the 1990s and is outdated. This acting as the worst-case backstop. Recourse to includes the primary cable that runs from U.S. assets would also be needed in an emergency. Greece to Albania and Croatia. The degree A clear distinction also needs to be established of protection given to these networks between national responsibilities and those of is unknown and will require further the EU and NATO. For such a scenario, where investigation given their vulnerability to possible, design equipment to meet civilian sabotage in light of the critical services infrastructure standards. Establish the means of they continue to provide. There are also transportation based on the quantity of materiel overland fiber optic cables which are being needed to meet the likely threat. Rail lift would laid along major road and rail rights of way likely be the primary mode of transportation in that could also be vulnerable. Emerging Europe. However, sea lift from a port in Northern and Disruptive Technologies (E&DT) will Europe, including on the Baltic Sea and directly to enable the targeting of hitherto hard-to- Libya, might prove faster than either rail (loading reach infrastructure, such as undersea and transit) and/or trans-loading to ships in Italy cables. The region is particularly vulnerable for onward dispatch to Libya. to such attacks as cables under the Adriatic are old and terrestrial cables are of poor Dealing with Legal/Diplomatic Standards quality and degrade the communications network. The consequences could be The plan must fit the challenge: Any deployment profound for military mobility in the plan for a major EU peacekeeping mission region, even if the goal is simply to slow in such a scenario as Libya must be worked movement and sow chaos. up based on the size of the EU Battlegroup (EUBG) to be deployed, the civilian resource Unexploded ordnance: The implications of base that will be needed to support it, and unexploded ordnance for mobility must the possible threats it might encounter. also be considered. There are mines and Planning must also take account of the time other devices across the Western Balkans needed to generate both force and resource left over from the conflicts of the 1990s. with a clear distinction established between This could make it particularly dangerous national responsibilities and those of the for convoys transiting off-road or stopping European Union (EU) and NATO. Contracts and camping. KFOR and EUFOR will again with commercial entities either assigned have the best knowledge of this issue, but by troop contributing nations (TCNs) to it is unlikely they are aware of all locations the battlegroup, or engaged directly by the germane to this scenario. There are also European External Action Service (EEAS) mines in the Sava River which could to undertake strategic lift, will need an present complications. activation/notice period of at least 30 days

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Scenario 5: Mediterranean movements and military requirements. Where infrastructure is not up to standard, alternative routes will need to be explored. There are plans for major improvements to European infrastructure over the next 7-10 years, which would also benefit from input from military planning authorities. A detailed infrastructure picture would also be central to building options into the deployment plan. Infrastructure is designed and funded to meet civil demands in Europe and for a deployment to Libya Mediterranean is probably adequate. Such flexibility is Sea particularly important for embarkation and disembarkation because the choice of port will make a difference to the speed of deployment. Given its new high-speed rail link, Genoa may be faster, although Naples could be more robust and secure. Marseille, Izmir, and Catania should also be studied. (sometimes 45 days). The same activation When ports are identified investment period will probably also be required for should be made to upgrade their respective the military assets of many contributing reception and berthing capabilities. This nations. approach would promote an overall profile of movement model from garrison to port Harmonize legal and diplomatic standards: to final destination over time and thus help Differing country-specific legal and identify which investments would net the diplomatic standards may affect movement highest returns. to Libya. Libya is not a benign environment so measures have to be taken to guarantee Renew CJTF arrangements: The Combined an unhindered reception, staging, and Joint Task Forces (CJTF) concept should onward movement (RSOM) of troops, be renewed and used with the particular inside or outside Libya. Switzerland’s goal of enabling an EU Battlegroup (EUBG) neutrality does not seem to pose problems to use strategic lift assets from NATO/ for the movement of troops, although EU members to rapidly deploy to Libya. there are limitations on the use of tunnels The EU should consider creating a system for military equipment and ammunition. similar to the U.S. Civil Reserve Air ’s neutral stance may pose problems Fleet (CRAF) or the U.K.’s Ships Taken for the movement of troops, but only in Up from Trade (STUFT) to requisition the case of a NATO Article 5 contingency. the appropriate assets to address the shortage of air and sea movement assets. Managing Infrastructure Requirements Aggregating the available large, medium, and Standards and smaller amphibious landing assets could enable a peacetime deployment if Infrastructure and planning: Critically, the commercial or large amphibious ships EU does not have an inventory of the are not available. If the deployment is a infrastructure that exists in member NATO-supported Berlin-Plus operation, the states. However, it does have a firm grasp United States might also be in a position of infrastructure standards because of to provide amphibious support, although the European Commission’s Directorate- Europeans should plan on the assumption General for Mobility and Transport’s that is not the case. (DG MOVE’s) gap analysis of civilian

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Force generation and rail mobility: If rail is the coordinating the national movement of preferred mode of transit, any EUBG would stocks within a battlegroup, especially need to be generated in Central Europe for those nations contributing relatively and then cross through Switzerland. small force elements. For example, one This is because no European country has of the 2020 EUBGs, which was led by significant rail capacity, with the possible Germany, was some 2,500 strong and exception of the Netherlands. Such a comprised of forces from eight nations, lacuna cannot be fixed by early planning. from Sweden in the north to Austria in Libya has nearly no railways, making that the south. NATO has stocks in Poland to option irrelevant for the movement of enable rapid response, but other states are heavy equipment. Road travel in northern not as well prepared for such a response Libya is also extremely difficult due to the (i.e., building such stocks). There is also high level of threat, and any deployment a particular problem if the movement is will need to be heavily protected. Planners planned from the north to the south of will also need to assess the limited Europe. Southern European countries, capacity, length, and security of telecom and/or partner countries in Africa, should cable infrastructure both into Libya (there be encouraged and supported to build up are just two undersea telecom cables into stocks and the appropriate storage facilities. Libya) and in country. Over time Telecom A mechanism also needs to be stood up by Italia should be encouraged to invest in a the EU Military Staff to better enable all new undersea cable. EU member states to contribute resources for operations on behalf of the EU, even if Design military equipment to meet civilian they are not sending troops. Other states standards: The developing high-speed rail can provide equivalent field office (EFO) or network across Europe is of sufficient combat health support (CHS) in support of strength and gauge to carry most military troop-contributing states. equipment. Where possible, such equipment should be designed to meet Essential regional partnerships: Partnerships in such civilian weight and gauging standards. region will be vital for such a deployment. This would also include the purchase Tunisia could act as an intermediary to by the state, and subsequent leasing out help the deployment of an EUBG. The to commercial entities, of dual-use rail Tunisian government has been a supportive platforms such as flat cars. and willing partner for both the EU and NATO. Tunisia is a longtime (since Develop comparative simulation technology: 1994) NATO partner and since 2015 has Comparative simulations, if not already regularly exercised and trained with NATO accomplished by operational planners, maritime forces. The use of intermediate would prove worthwhile, especially if staging bases (ISB) would allow the rolling stock is in short supply or other battlegroup commanders to shorten lines factors delay rail coordination. The option of communication and supply. Moreover, of primarily deploying by sea would tend Tunis has deepwater ports and warehousing to reduce the exposure to sabotage, cyber, that could also be used to sustain the and information disruption once port battlegroup. Tunisian Armed Forces could operations are secured. Such simulations also be invited to help safeguard the port would also help to address inadequate and onward transit to Libya, and could tunnel sizes and capacities en route to the assist with reception, staging, and onward port of embarkation (POE). movement (RSOM), probably with the assistance of U.S. European Command Stocks and storage in transit: Battlegroup (EUCOM) with pre-preparation, particularly members are individually responsible getting into theater and offloading in a for arranging storage with host nations. secure environment. However, there would be value in

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Determining Chains of Command, the contributing member states. The MPCC Control, and Communication also enables well-structured requests to be forwarded promptly by the member Maintaining the common operational picture: It states deploying permanent assets to any is vital that responsibility for maintaining operation in Libya. The possibility of the the common operational picture is preplanned involvement of the Movement established early. This is because any Coordination Centre Europe (MCCE) operational picture has two vital roles and its partners could also help grant to perform. First, to establish a higher- early access to naval and air transport level plan that enables a comprehensive missions or identify spare capacity to understanding of capacities, time share, reinforce, and ease military mobility. requirements, and movement windows. The responsibility for moving troops Second, to establish a lower-level detailed is with the contributing states, but the plan that acts as a live feed from convoy coordinating role of the JSEC should be movements and tracks critical cargoes. further explored and developed for use by Any such “picture” must be linked with EU-led operations. civil and commercial movement databases, particularly for rail. The Joint Support and EU-NATO multimodal database: NATO enjoys Enabling Command ( JSEC) could fulfil a full picture of multimodal database such a role if the operations are EU-led. capacities, and the EU should be prepared, where possible, to conduct military and Promote broad command and control civil-military operations from Supreme interoperability: Military air, rail, road, and Headquarters Allied Powers Europe sea infrastructure must be integrated into (SHAPE) based on a shared database. At the civil systems and given the appropriate SHAPE level, there are ongoing discussions authorities to enable the prioritization about the role of the JSEC in relation to of military requirement over civil and the Standing Joint Logistics Support Group commercial movements. The need to (SJLSG). The SJLSG should also be moved promote effective interoperability with the to Ulm now and its work fully integrated commercial sector is vital but traditional with that of the JSEC. military command and control structures may not provide an optimum locus. This JSEC and Defender 21: Tabletop exercises is because unless enforced by law the (TTXs) should be used to develop the role commercial sector might not be able or of the JSEC with the aim of revitalizing willing to respond to such a hierarchical and reinforcing the CJTF protocols. JSEC system. Such interoperability might be could, for example, operate in concert with strengthened by developing further the industry to better enable and coordinate concept of mission networks as outlined any services and capabilities they might in NATO STANAG AJP-6 on CIS Doctrine provide. Such a model could be exercised (2017). The use of highly encrypted secure at Defender 21. The seven-day “notice to civilian communications systems may move” should be made more realistic. It also enable deeper cooperation with the mandates that units are ready to deploy in commercial sector. their peacetime location within a week. This is not being met by most of NATO’s EU Military Planning and Conduct Capability: High Readiness Forces and whether the Planning is already in place to enable EUBG can achieve this is debatable. the effective deployment of EUBGs. The Military Planning and Conduct Capability Create a commander’s infrastructure dossier: (MPCC) is designed to lead planning, In advance of a crisis response operation primarily focused on supervising and all relevant information on infrastructure deconflicting the overall deployment should be placed in an electronic effort. Logistics are the responsibility of commander’s planning document. For the

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EU, this should be the responsibility of loading software, ship’s manifests, shipping the appointed force commander, but an networks, and even ships themselves. A impartial arbiter should also pressure test recent U.S. exercise in Charleston, South whether the overall deployment plan is Carolina, and Savannah, Georgia, revealed sufficiently flexible and well-established. the chaos that could be created by a Most EU member states already have capable digital red force. Mission critical experience of the Cold War culture of digital devices should be stowed during contingency planning which should be the transport stage of any deployment in restored. This is relevant in the NATO Faraday cages and social media monitored context, too, as the JSEC could be given in advance of an operation to gauge how responsibility for such a dossier that would much information is being leaked. Exercise also better afford planners with multiple cyber hygiene and protections regularly, options in the event a transiting nation such as during Defender 20. refuses to support the action. Leverage advanced national capabilities: The MCCE and third nations: The MCCE U.K. and Dutch National Cyber Security should facilitate communication with Centers are advanced cyber defense third nations and act as bridge for capabilities, and in the U.K.’s case an communications between the EU and offensive capability. Such centers can NATO and industry leaders embedded actively support both commercial and in the region. Host nation single points military entities during times of crisis. It is of contact and the MCCE should become vitally important that networked systems far more aligned. MCCE could also play are equipped with the latest defense an important role in better involving the technologies and operated by trained users. commercial sector as early as possible To foster more secure transfer operations in exercises, planning, and to better at ports of embarkation (POEs) and ports understand military requirements. of disembarkation (PODs), including ship networks and port operations networks, Anticipating Risks to Security and establish and maintain crucial links Establish political resiliency: Adversaries will with stakeholders such as local municipal seek to undermine political resolve by networks (water, energy, traffic control, and portraying the EU as militarily impotent. emergency systems), it would be useful to Any such deployment could well be the include private sector actors in unclassified first time that an EUBG is deployed into a and reclassified cyber exercises. major contested environment. The political : The pressure on the EU to demonstrate resolve, Establish Federated Mission Networks NATO concept of Federated Mission and its ability to maintain it, during a Networks could be used to reduce the swift and professional deployment would vulnerability of communicating within a be a major concern and possibly a critical complex multinational movement. Under vulnerability. this concept, the lead nation establishes a Mitigate deploying cyber threats: The most common network for all mission members likely form of hybrid attack would come to join via interface protocols. It is only in the form of a cyber offensive designed for the mission and is to be disbanded to disrupt a deployment. Anticipating how when the mission is complete. Such an cyber operations could be used against approach could also help establish close the deploying and deployed forces will be communication on the ground with the crucial, particularly attacks on personnel, United Nations and its relevant agencies. armored vehicles, and containers, as well as

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Bibliography of Relevant Publications EU Council of the European Union. 2018. “COUNCIL DECISION establishing the list of projects to be developed under PESCO.” March 1. https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6393-2018-INIT/en/pdf. eu2020.de. 2020. “Strategic Compass: Developing strategic principles.” August 25. https://www.eu2020.de/eu2020- en/news/article/eu-defense-strategic-compass-foreign-policy/2377030. European Commission. 2017. “President Jean-Claude Juncker’s State of the Union Address 2017, Brussels.” September 13. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_17_3165. European Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. 2017. “Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council – Improving Military Mobility in the European Union.” November 10. https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/join20170041-improving-military-mobility.pdf. European Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. 2018. “Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council on the Action Plan on Military Mobility.” March 28. https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/2018-military_mobility_action_plan.pdf. European Commission. 2018a. “Action Plan on Military Mobility: EU takes steps towards a Defense Union.” March 28. https://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/infrastructure/news/2018-03-28-action-plan-military-mobility_en. European Commission. 2018b. “Defending Europe – Improving Military Mobility in the European Union.” Factsheet. https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/2018-military_mobility_factsheet.pdf. European Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. 2019. “Joint Report to the European Parliament and the Council on Implementation of the Action Plan on Military Mobility.” June 3. https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/legislation/join20190011.pdf. European Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. 2020. “Joint Report to the European Parliament and the Council on implementation of the Action Plan on Military Mobility from June 2019 to September 2020.” October 19. https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/legislation/join20200016.pdf. European Commission. 2020a. “Mobility and Transport – Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T).” https:// ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/infrastructure/ten-t_en. European Commission. 2020b. “Mobility and Transport – Connecting Europe Facility.” https://ec.europa.eu/ transport/themes/infrastructure/cef_en. European Defense Agency. 2019. “Military Mobility.” Factsheet. https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/eda- factsheets/2019-05-14-factsheet_military-mobility10afb13fa4d264cfa776ff000087ef0f. European Union External Action Service (EEAS). 2020. “Towards a Strategic Compass.” November. https://eeas. europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/towards_a_strategic_compass_20_november.pdf. European Parliamentary Research Service. 2020. “Military mobility: Infrastructure for the defence of Europe.” Briefing to the European Parliament. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2020/646188/EPRS_ BRI(2020)646188_EN.pdf (European Army Interoperability Centre). 2018. “On the Way Towards A True Military Mobility.” Food for thought paper. http://finabel.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Military-Schengen-Towards-a-true-Military-Mobility-1. pdf. PESCO Secretariat. 2018a. “PESCO Projects – Military Mobility (MM).” https://pesco.europa.eu/project/military- mobility/. PESCO Secretariat. 2018b. “PESCO Projects – Network of Logistic Hubs in Europe and Support to Operations (NetLogHubs).” https://pesco.europa.eu/project/network-of-logistic-hubs-in-europe-and-support-to-operations/.

65 NATO NATO, “Wales Summit Declaration,” press release 2014 (120), September 5, 2014 [updated August 30, 2018], https:// www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm. NATO, “Warsaw Summit Communiqué,” press release 2016 (100), July 9, 2016 [updated March 29, 2017], https://www. nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm. NATO, “Brussels Summit Declaration,” press release 2018 (074), July 11, 2018 [updated August 30, 2018], https:// www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_156624.htm. NATO, “London Declaration,” press release 2019 (115), December 4, 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/ official_texts_171584.htm. NATO, “NATO 2030: Unified for a New Era: Analysis and Recommendations of the Reflection Group Appointed by the NATO Secretary General,” November 25, 2020, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/12/ pdf/201201-Reflection-Group-Final-Report-Uni.pdf.

NATO-EU NATO, “Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” press release 2018 (095), July 10, 2018, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_156626.htm. U.S. Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Joint Declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” July 8, 2016, https://nato.usmission.gov/joint-declaration-nato-european-council-european-commission/.

Reports and Papers Drenth, Margriet, Kimberley Kruijver, and Dick Zandee. 2019. Military Mobility and the EU-NATO Conundrum. July. The Hague: Clingendael, https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2019-07/Military_Mobility_and_the_EU_NATO_ Conundrum.pdf.

GLOBSEC. 2017. One Alliance: The Future Tasks of the Adapted Alliance. July 25. https://www.globsec.org/initiatives/ globsec-nato-adaptation-initiative-2/.

Hodges, Ben, Tony Lawrence, and Ray Wojcik. 2020. Until Something Moves: Reinforcing the Baltic Region in Crisis and Wa r . March 31. Tallinn: International Centre for Defense and Security. https://icds.ee/en/until-something-moves- reinforcing-the-baltic-region-in-crisis-and-war/.

LTG (Ret.) Ben Hodges, “Let’s Get Moving,” Europe’s Edge (blog) Center for European Policy Analysis, April 7, 2020, https://cepa.org/lets-get-moving/.

Marta Kepe, “Preparing for the Summit: Why Military Mobility Should be Top of the Agenda,” TheRANDBlog (blog), RAND Corporation, February 26, 2018, https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/02/preparing-for-the-nato-summit-why- military-mobility.html.

Mehta, Aaron. 2018. “NATO not moving fast enough on military mobility.” Defense News, November 1, 2018. https:// www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2018/11/01/nato-general-europe-not-moving-fast-enough-on-military- mobility/.

Scaparotti, General Curtis M., and Ambassador Colleen B. Bell. 2020. Moving Out: A Comprehensive Assessment of European Military Mobility. April. Washington: Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/ uploads/2020/04/Moving-Out_Military-Mobility-Web.pdf. Szopa, Maciej. 2020. “Military Mobility - A Key in Defending the NATO Eastern Flank.” Defence24.com, March 31, 2020. https://www.defence24.com/military-mobility-a-key-in-defending-the-nato-eastern-flank. Romanian Army trucks tow artillery across the Danube River during Exercise Saber Guardian 2019. Credit: NATO © 2021 by the Center for European Policy Analysis, Washington, DC. All rights reserved.

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