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South Africa's Military Establishment South Africa's Military Establishment http://www.aluka.org/action/showMetadata?doi=10.5555/AL.SFF.DOCUMENT.nuun1972_19 Use of the Aluka digital library is subject to Aluka’s Terms and Conditions, available at http://www.aluka.org/page/about/termsConditions.jsp. By using Aluka, you agree that you have read and will abide by the Terms and Conditions. Among other things, the Terms and Conditions provide that the content in the Aluka digital library is only for personal, non-commercial use by authorized users of Aluka in connection with research, scholarship, and education. The content in the Aluka digital library is subject to copyright, with the exception of certain governmental works and very old materials that may be in the public domain under applicable law. Permission must be sought from Aluka and/or the applicable copyright holder in connection with any duplication or distribution of these materials where required by applicable law. Aluka is a not-for-profit initiative dedicated to creating and preserving a digital archive of materials about and from the developing world. For more information about Aluka, please see http://www.aluka.org South Africa's Military Establishment Alternative title Notes and Documents - United Nations Centre Against ApartheidNo. 25/72 Author/Creator United Nations Centre against Apartheid; Ahmad, Barakat Publisher Department of Political and Security Council Affairs Date 1972-12-00 Resource type Reports Language English Subject Coverage (spatial) South Africa, Southern Africa (region) Coverage (temporal) 1972 Source Northwestern University Libraries Description Documents military expansion of South Africa since the Sharpeville Massacre of 1960. Expantionist efforts constitute a serious menace not only to the oppressed people of South Africa but to the independent African States and to international peace. Format extent 22 page(s) (length/size) http://www.aluka.org/action/showMetadata?doi=10.5555/AL.SFF.DOCUMENT.nuun1972_19 http://www.aluka.org UNIT ON APARTHEID UNIT ON APARTHEID DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS No. 25/72 NOTES AND DOCUMENTS* December 1972 SOUTH AFRICA'S ILITARY ESTABLISKEIr by Dr. Barakat Ahmad (India) Lm 1 973 Af r Ca- an a "The enormous emansion of the military forces and the military equipment of South Africa since the Sharpeville massacre of 1960, as documented in this paper, constitutes a serious menace not only to the oppressed people of South Africa but to the independent African States and to international peace. "That the racist r~gime of South Africa has been able to obtain large quantities of sophisticated military equipment from other countries, despite its defiance of the international community and despite the arms embargo instituted by the Security Council in 1963, is a source of gravest concern. The governments and companies which supply the arms to the South African r~gime bear a heavy responsibility for the drift to disaster in South Africa. "It is imperative that governments and organizations must take urgent and effective steps to secure the full implementation of the arms embargo against the South African r~gime." H.E. Edwin Ogebe Ogbu (Nigeria) Chairman Special Committee on Apartheid 72-26616 *All material in these notes and documents may be freely reprinted. Acknowledgement, together with a copy of the publication containing the reprint, would be appreciated, INTRODUCTION The South African Government began a rapid build-up of its military forces in 1960, the year in which several African States achieved independence and in which the Sharpeville massacre aroused world concern over 9ptGhid. In the White Paper on Defence and Armament Production, tabled in Parliament in 1969, the South African Government claimed that "in view of the ever-increasing threats from the outside, it decided in 1960 to modernize and expand a practically obsolete Defence Force". 1y It may be noted, however, that in 1960, the opposition to aprtheoid in South Africa remained non-violent and there had been no evidence of an external threat to South Africa. The South African Government accelerated the military build-up after the establishment of the Organization of African Unity at the Summit Conference of Independent African States at Addis Ababa in May 1965. The Minister of Defence said in Parliament on 28 May 1965: "...In the light of the threats which are now being made against our country at Addis Ababa, the question of ensuring that adequate training is given to our Defence Forces is even more important now .. .I trust the time is not far off when we shall train every young man for military service. It cannot be done at present as yet, but we are working in that direction. We are increasing the number every year. We want to train every young man whether he has flat feet or not." 2/ The African States had, in fact, made no threats but had declared that the cause of the oppressed people of South Africa was the cause of all the African peoples. Another justification for the military build-up - in the context of the flight of foreign capital after the Sharpeville massacre and the resultant economic problems - was indicated by Dr. T.E. Donges, then Minister of Finance, in his budget statement in March 1965. He said that inasmuch as 48 per cent of the defence expenditure would be spent in South Africa, it would stimulate the 1! Cape Times, 3 June 1969. The South African Foundation explained in 1968: "In 1960, when African States in increasing numbers were receiving independence from their former colonial rulers, and when Liberia and Ethiopia first introduced the case on South West Africa to the International Court at The Hague, a military appreciation was made of a possible threat to South Africa's peaceful existence and safety as a result of the unsettled world political conditions. It was decided then what the strength and structure of the South African Defence Force should be and what equipment needed to be acquired. The result of this enquiry was that whereas the republic in 1960-61 spent only 45.8 million rand on Defence, by 1964-65 this figure had risen to 210 million rand." Background to South African and World News, Johannesburg, November 1968 - _Has )_28 M'ay 1963, cos67-6784 economy, while bolstering the confidence of investors and prospective immigrants. Peace would be ensured, he said, by "taking certain steps, as if one were preparing for war, so that the economy can be stimulated." 3' As pressures increased for the isolation of the South African Government because of its akzartheid policy, the military build-up began to be seen in another context. It was felt that South Africa would become a more attractive ally to the '!estern Powers if it was militarily stronger. As Die Burer, the Nationalist Cape Town newspaper, commented on 20 April 1967 after the announcement of the purchase of three submarines: "Our military power helps decisively to determine our role in international politics, not only for a hypothetical future, but for the present. An ally is sought to the extent in which he is worth having; it is the strongest whose friendship is sought. V4 The build-up of the military forces of South Africa cannot be regarded as intended for the national self-defence of the country as generally understood, insofar as the South African Government is concerned mainly with the so-called "white nation". The following exchange in the South African Parliament in August 1970 is illustrative of its policy: "Mr. R.M. CADMAN: May I put a question? Under the Government's policy, are the Coloureds and the Asiatics part of the South African nation or not? "The MINISTER: No. The Government has never adopted the attitude that there is a nation of 20 million people in this country. This Government has always adopted the attitude that there is a white nation, a Coloured population, an Indian group and a number of black nations in this country... "LUe say that under our system we shall allor only white officers to be in charge of white soldiers. The fighting capacity of our Defence Force will consist mainly of whites. 7e say that we are training a Coloured Corps for auxiliary services, as well as for certain services in Defence Force units, but they will remain under white control... "Ve regard the Indians on the same basis as the Coloured Corps. Then the hon. the Leader of the Opposition asked me whether I would commission them. I then said: 'Yes, over their own people, when they are ripe for it.' As far as the Bantu are concerned, we say that we shall employ them only in certain auxiliary services as labourers. But we shall not employ them within the context of the South African Defence Force in any fighting capacity. Very well, our point of view is clear now." 5/ 3j South African Digest, Pretoria, 11 April 1963 Q Quoted in Cape Times, 21 April 1967 _j House of Assembly Debates (Hansard), 31 August 1970, cols.2940-2941 I. EXPENDITURE ON DEFENCE The South African budget estimates for defence have increased sharply since 1960, the year of the Sharpeville massacre. The estimates of expenditure since 1960-61 are as follows: 6/ Estimate of expenditure Year for defence (in millions of rands) 1960-1961 44 1961-1962 72 1962-1963 120 1963-1964 122 1964-1965 233 1965-1966 229 1966-1967 256 1967-1968 266 1968-1969 254 1969-1970 272 1970-1971 257 1971-1972 316 1972-1973 344 The recent increases contradict Government statements in 1966 and 1970 that there would be no further substantial increases in the defence budget. 1hile half of the expenditure in 1960-1961 was for salaries, wages and allowances, this item accounted for less than a quarter of the expenditure in recent years.
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