DOCSLIB.ORG

Appendix II Arbitrary Arrests

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text

Load more

Appendix II Arbitrary Arrests -------------------- List of those Detained Arbitrarily and Killed since 12 June Elections Killed by Government Forces: On 1 July, Tehran’s police chief admitted at least 20 fatalities in Tehran but the true numbers are most probably much higher and over 100. The Campaign has been able to identify some of the persons killed in Tehran during recent protests because of the extreme restrictions imposed by the government. There are also reports of fatalities in other cities but the Campaign has not been able to collect any reliable information. 1. Neda Aghasoltan, student, was murdered at the demonstration in Tehran on 20 June 2009 2. Naser Amirnejad, Aerospace PhD student, was murdered during the attack on the Tehran University dormitories on the night of Wednesday, 14 June 2009. His body was buried in his hometown, one of the villages in the city of Yasouj on 19 June 2009. 3. Mehdi Karami, 17, killed in Janat Abad Street, Tehran, 15 June 2009 4. Kianoosh Assa, chemistry student at Elm va Sanaat University, killed in Tehran 5. Yaghoub Barvayeh, master’s degree student at Tehran University, shot in the head in Tehran near Lolagar mosque, died in Loghman-e-Hakim Hospital on 25 June 6. Kaveh Alipour, killed in Tehran 7. Hossein Tahmassebi, 25, was beaten to death with batons to his chest at Nobahar street in Kermanshah on 20 June 8. Davoud Sadri, 25, killed on 15 June in Mohammad Ali Jenah Street, in front of a Basij base in Tehran. 9. Sohrab Aarabi, 19, died of gunshot wounds to his heart 10. Fatemeh Samsarian, killed during the silent march in Azadi Sqaure on 15 June, her son was also shot 11. Mohsen Ruholamini, the son of a supporter of unsuccessful presidential candidate, Mohsen ReZai, died of meningitis and was returned to his family reportedly bearing marks of torture and ill-treatment 12. Amin Javadifar, a student detained on 9 July, reportedly died in detention 13. Saeed Abasi, 27 year old store manager, was shot in the head on 30 June in clear sight of his father during a protest 14. Ramin Qahremani, 30 year old who was tortured in prison and whose body was delivered to his family recently. According to the NorooZ website, he was arrested in his home after agents identified him from a bank security camera. He was kept in prison and tortured for 10 days before being released. He told his mother that for several days he was suspended from his feet. He was taken to the hospital a few days before being released for internal bleeding in his chest. Ramin’s body was buried under the supervision of the police forces. 15. Alireza Eftekhari, 29 year old journalist who worked for the economic newspaper, Abrar 16. Mostafa Ghanian, graduate architecture student at Tehran University, was shot in his head while chanting “God is Great” on top of the roof of the 8 levels building in Saadatabad in Tehran by plain clothes officers on 16 June and died immediately. 17. Ashkan Sohrabi, 18, was gunshot on 20 June in Tehran demonstration 18. Taraneh Mousavi, was arrested on 28 June near to the Masjed Ghoba, she was reported as disappeared for several weeks and finally her burned body was found around Ghazvin. It was reported that she was severely under the sexual abuse while she was in detention. Her case was denied by the State while the reformist candidate, Karoubi, revealed the entire story. 19. Mohammad Kamrani, 18, was arrested in Tehran on 9 July 2009 and was transferred first to KahriZak detention and later to the Evin Prison. On 15 July 2009, his family was informed that he was in Evin and was transferred to the Loghman hospital under the guard control. His family was able to get permission to transfer him to Mehr hospital and he died on 16 July in the hospital because of severe injuries. 20. Abbas Disnad, teacher and shop owner in Karoun Street in Tehran, was beaten by baton on his head and got brain strike while he was getting back home on 20 June 2009. He went to Coma for 3 days and died while he was in the Shahriar Hospital. 21. Ramin Ramezani, 20, serving the compulsory, was shot on the demonstration in Tehran on June 15 and died in the hospital. 22. Behzad Mohajer, 47, was gunshot on his chest on 15 June 2009 in Tehran. After 47 days, his froZen body was submitted to his family. 23. Sorour Bromand, 58, was gun shot in Tehran on 15 June 2009, 24. Fatemeh Rajab pour, 38, was gun shot in Tehran on 15 June 2009 25. Hamid Madah Shourche, a member of the Mousavi’s campaign in Mash’had, was arrested while he was protesting in Goharshad Masque in Mash’had. He was tortured and died couple of days after the release, on first week of July, because of the brain blooding. 26. Masoud Hashemzadeh, 27, was gunshot on 20 June in Tehran and buried in Khoshkebijar in Rasht. 27. Pouya Maghsoud baygi, Medical student in Kermanshah, was arrested on 20 June by the Intelligence forces in Kermanshah, and died because of the severity of the torture in the prison. 28. Alireza Tavasoli, 12, died due to the hit by baton on his head on BeheshtZahra on 30 July, and buried in Arak. 29. Farzad Hashti, killed in Tehran 30. Sahideh Pouraqaee, died in custody after being arrested by plainclothes Basij officers while chanting “Allah-u-Akbar” on a rooftop. After 20 days, her body was identified by her mother in a cold storage facility in southern Tehran. She was beaten while in custody and acid was poured on her body. She was secretly buried by security forces in Section 302 of Behesht Zahra Cemetery. Injured people arrested by Intelligence Ministry and no information about their fate: 1) Ramin Rasouli 2) Farhad Azhari 3) Majid Nik 4) Mohammad Hossein Rafiee 5) Ali Asgari, he was shot in the eye and taken to Farabi Hospital 6) Farshid Karimi, was in Imam Khomeini Hospital The following list was published widely in Farsi, and the Campaign is trying to confirm them. The following list was selected among the list published in http://greenmartyrs.com/2: 1. Arman Estakhri, 18, was injured by baton on his head and went to Coma and died on 13 July 2009. 2. AbolfaZl Abdolahi, 21, was gun shot on 25 June 2009 in aZadi street in Tehran 3. Ahmad Naiem Abadi, was gun shot on 25 June in Tehran, 4. Amir Kaviri, high school graduated, 5. Iamn Hashemi, was gun shot on 25 June 2009 in Azadi Street in Tehran, 6. Iman NamaZi, student of civil engineering at Tehran university, died due to the attacks to the dormetories in Tehran on 20 June. 7. Babak Sepehr, 35, gun shot on Azadi Street, 8. Shayler Khezri, student, died during the attack to the Tehran University dormeroties, was buried in Piranshahr, kurdistan 9. Bahman Jenaiee, 20, was gun shot 10. Hamed Besharati, 26, gun shot at the Azadi Street, 11. Hossein AkhtarZand, died in Isfahan 12. Tina Soudi, gon shot in Enghelab Square on 25 June 13. Hossein Akbari, was arrested and later, his family was asked to get his body from the Emam khomayni hospital. His death was recogniZed as the brain hit and the marks of the baton’s hit were on his body at the time his family received his body. 14. Hossein KaZemini, 19, gun shot at the demonstration 15. Salar Ghorbani Param, 22, gun shot at the demonstration in Tehran 16. Salar Tahmasebi, 27, graduate student in Rasht, was gun shot in Tehran on 25 June 17. Saeed Esmaieeli khanbebin, 23, died due to the baton hit on his head and was buried in Khanbebin city in Golestan province, 18. Sayed reZa Tabatabaiee, was gun shot on 25 June in Tehran, Azerbayjan Street, 19. Ali Shahedi, 24, was arrested and transferred to the police station in Tehran Pars in Tehran and died on 26 June due to the baton hit on his head 20. Ali Fathalian, died in front of the Lolagar masque I nTehran during the demonstration in Tehran. 21. Fatemeh Barati, student, died during the attacks to the Tehran University dormitories 22. Farzad Jashni, died in Tehran and his body was buried in Abdanan in Ilam on 19 June 23. Fahimeh Salahshour, 25, died due to the baton’s hit on her head on 15 June in Tehran 24. Mobina Ehterami, student in Tehran, died during the attack to the Tehran University dormitories on 14 June 25. Moharam Chegini Ghashghaiee, 34, no more information 26. Mohsen Hadadi, 24, gun shot on his head on 25 June in Tehran 27. Mohammad Hossein BarZegar, gun shot on his head on 17 June in Haft Tir Square in Tehran 28. Mohammad Hossein FayZi, 26, no more in formation on his heath 29. Mohammad NikZadi, 22, gun shot on his chest in Vanak square on 16 June in Tehran 30. Maryam MehrAzin, 24, gun shot in Azadi Street 31. Masoud Khosravi, gun shot on 20 June 2009 on Azadi Street 32. Mostafa Kiarostami, 22, dies due to the baton’s hit on his head during the Friday Praying on 17 July after he was transferred to the hospital 33. MoaZeZ, 27, gunshot on his eyes on 25 June on Azadi Street in Tehran 34. Maysam Ebadi, 17, gunshot on 13 June in Falakeh sadeghieh in Tehran 35. Milad yaZdanpanah, 30, gun shot on Azadi Street in Tehran 36. Nader Naseri, gunshot on 25 June in Tehran on Khosh Street in Tehran and was buried in Babol, North part of Iran 37.
Recommended publications
  • A/HRC/13/39/Add.1 General Assembly

    A/HRC/13/39/Add.1 General Assembly

    United Nations A/HRC/13/39/Add.1 General Assembly Distr.: General 25 February 2010 English/French/Spanish only Human Rights Council Thirteenth session Agenda item 3 Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Manfred Nowak Addendum Summary of information, including individual cases, transmitted to Governments and replies received* * The present document is being circulated in the languages of submission only as it greatly exceeds the page limitations currently imposed by the relevant General Assembly resolutions. GE.10-11514 A/HRC/13/39/Add.1 Contents Paragraphs Page List of abbreviations......................................................................................................................... 5 I. Introduction............................................................................................................. 1–5 6 II. Summary of allegations transmitted and replies received....................................... 1–305 7 Algeria ............................................................................................................ 1 7 Angola ............................................................................................................ 2 7 Argentina ........................................................................................................ 3 8 Australia.........................................................................................................
  • PROTESTS and REGIME SUPPRESSION in POST-REVOLUTIONARY IRAN Saeid Golkar

    PROTESTS and REGIME SUPPRESSION in POST-REVOLUTIONARY IRAN Saeid Golkar

    THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY n OCTOBER 2020 n PN85 PROTESTS AND REGIME SUPPRESSION IN POST-REVOLUTIONARY IRAN Saeid Golkar Green Movement members tangle with Basij and police forces, 2009. he nationwide protests that engulfed Iran in late 2019 were ostensibly a response to a 50 percent gasoline price hike enacted by the administration of President Hassan Rouhani.1 But in little time, complaints Textended to a broader critique of the leadership. Moreover, beyond the specific reasons for the protests, they appeared to reveal a deeper reality about Iran, both before and since the 1979 emergence of the Islamic Republic: its character as an inherently “revolutionary country” and a “movement society.”2 Since its formation, the Islamic Republic has seen multiple cycles of protest and revolt, ranging from ethnic movements in the early 1980s to urban riots in the early 1990s, student unrest spanning 1999–2003, the Green Movement response to the 2009 election, and upheaval in December 2017–January 2018. The last of these instances, like the current round, began with a focus on economic dissatisfaction and then spread to broader issues. All these movements were put down by the regime with characteristic brutality. © 2020 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. SAEID GOLKAR In tracking and comparing protest dynamics and market deregulation, currency devaluation, and the regime responses since 1979, this study reveals that cutting of subsidies. These policies, however, spurred unrest has become more significant in scale, as well massive inflation, greater inequality, and a spate of as more secularized and violent.
  • Download Information from the Internet

    Download Information from the Internet

    IRAN SUBMISSION TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE FOR THE 103RD SESSION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE (17 OCTOBER – 4 NOVEMBER 2011) Amnesty International Publications First published in 2011 by Amnesty International Publications International Secretariat Peter Benenson House 1 Easton Street London WC1X 0DW United Kingdom www.amnesty.org © Amnesty International Publications 2011 Index: MDE 13/081/2011 Original Language: English Printed by Amnesty International, International Secretariat, United Kingdom All rights reserved. This publication is copyright, but may be reproduced by any method without fee for advocacy, campaigning and teaching purposes, but not for resale. The copyright holders request that all such use be registered with them for impact assessment purposes. For copying in any other circumstances, or for reuse in other publications, or for translation or adaptation, prior written permission must be obtained from the publishers, and a fee may be payable. To request permission, or for any other inquiries, please contact [email protected] Amnesty International is a global movement of more than 3 million supporters, members and activists in more than 150 countries and territories who campaign to end grave abuses of human rights. Our vision is for every person to enjoy all the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights standards. We are independent of any government, political ideology, economic interest or religion and are funded mainly by our membership and public donations.
  • INSS Insight No. 1482, June 6, 2021 from Election to Selection: Iran's Path to a New President

    INSS Insight No. 1482, June 6, 2021 from Election to Selection: Iran's Path to a New President

    INSS Insight No. 1482, June 6, 2021 From Election to Selection: Iran's Path to a New President Raz Zimmt The decision by Iran’s Guardian Council to disqualify the vast majority of the candidates in the coming presidential elections, including former speaker of the Majlis Ali Larijani, and Eshaq Jahangiri, First Vice-President under President Rouhani, in effect leaves the hardline cleric Ebrahim Raisi as the only candidate with real chances of winning the elections. This decision is another reflection of the regime's efforts to strengthen the conservative hegemony in the political elite, especially in advance of the struggle over the succession of Iran's leadership. The regime's blatant intervention in the election process indicates that it is determined to maintain conservative control of power centers even at the cost of further undermining public confidence, and that it estimates that it is capable of suppressing any possible protest. On May 25, 2021, following the screening of all the presidential candidates, Iran’s Guardian Council announced it had approved seven final candidates, out of the 592 candidates (including 40 women) who registered for the elections scheduled for June 18. That the vast majority of the candidates were disqualified came as no surprise. Since the beginning of the 1980s, only a few candidates have passed the screening process under the 12-member Guardian Council, half of whom are clerics appointed by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and half of whom are jurists appointed by the Judiciary Chief and approved by the Majlis. This time too, it was expected that the Council would disqualify any candidate it saw as someone who might undermine conservative hegemony in Iranian politics.
  • Decentralization and Democracy in Iran

    Decentralization and Democracy in Iran

    DECENTRALIZATION AND DEMOCRACY IN IRAN SAEID NOURI NESHAT THESIS SUBMITTED IN FULFILMENTMalaya OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHYof FACULTY OF ECONOMICS AND ADMINISTRATION UNIVERSITY OF MALAYA UniversityKUALA LUMPUR 2017 i Abstract It was only twenty years after the 1979 Revolution that local Islamic councils were legalized and launched everywhere in Iran as part of reforms to strengthen decentralization and enhance people’s participation in policy planning. However, although these councils comprise elected members, they have not been fully institutionalized within the local government system and within Iran’s hierarchy of power. Local councils, therefore, have not led to the greater empowerment of people. This study assesses the decentralization process within the power structure after the Iranian Revolution. The research aims to provide insights into these key questions: how was the structure of the post-revolution decentralization system different from that of the previous regime? Why has the policy of decentralizationMalaya not led to the sort of devolution that would enable people to participateof in decision-making? What are the political obstacles to the empowerment of the people, a professed goal of the post- revolution government? A qualitative research method involving a multiple case study approach is used here. Urban and rural communities were selected for assessment through purposive sampling. Easton’s theory of political system was applied as it provides an effective conceptual framework to examine and explain the data. TheUniversity results indicate that the post-revolution system is one that can be classified as a filtered democracy. In this type of political system, inputs from society have to pass through filters created by power elites.
  • Leadership Divided? Nima Gerami

    Leadership Divided? Nima Gerami

    The Domestic Politics of Iran’s Nuclear Debate LEADERSHIP DIVIDED? NIMA GERAMI LEADERSHIP DIVIDED? The Domestic Politics of Iran’s Nuclear Debate NIMA GERAMI The Washington Institute for Near East Policy www.washingtoninstitute.org Policy Focus 134 | February 2014 The opinions expressed in this Policy Focus are those of the author and not necessarily those of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, its Board of Trustees, or its Board of Advisors. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. © 2014 by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20036 Cover: Tehran newspaper headlines following signing of the Joint Plan of Action in Geneva. Design: 1000 Colors Contents Acknowledgments | v Executive Summary | vii 1. Introduction | 1 2. Limits on Iran’s Nuclear Debate: Secrecy and Self-Censorship | 3 3. Contextualizing Nuclear Decisionmaking: The Key Stakeholders | 9 4. The Political Landscape: Elite Factionalism and the Nuclear Debate | 19 5. Critical Junctures: Internal Divisions and Nuclear Policy Shifts | 31 6. Conclusion: Lessons Learned | 40 About the Author | 42 Figures Fig 1. Overview of Nuclear Decisionmaking in Iran | 11 Table 1. Formal Members of the Supreme National Security Council | 12 Acknowledgments I would like to express my gratitude to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, particularly Patrick Clawson, Michael Eisenstadt, and Mehdi Khalaji, for their encouragement, insights, and support during the preparation of this study.
  • Chronology of Events in Iran, December 2004*

    Chronology of Events in Iran, December 2004*

    Chronology of Events in Iran, December 2004* December 1 Iran releases two internet journalists. (ISNA) Two of those arrested for internet-related charges have been released. It was reported that Omid Me'marian and Shahram Rafi'zadeh were released on a 50m-tuman bail [approximately 58,000 dollars]. Agence France Presse (AFP) report of the same news on December 4: Four jailed Iranian reformist journalists, three of them recently released, have written letters of repentance, saying they were "brainwashed" by foreigners and "counter- revolutionaries". The Iranian press has carried the letters, allegedly written by imprisoned Javad Qolan Tamimi, Omid Memarian, Shahram Rafizadeh and Roozbeh Mir-Ebrahimi, freed in recent days, to the head of Iran's judiciary. "I was brainwashed by hardline elements to destroy the image of the regime by relating with counter- revolutionaries and talking to foreign radio," said the letter by Memarian, who maintained a controversial weblog. "I spread lies. As I was influenced and encouraged by the ones who have for years been wounding the Islamic regime," read a letter written by Rafizadeh. Tamimi, who worked for the Mardomsalari daily, wrote of his "abhorrence" of the head of the Iranian journalists association who tried to organise a demonstration on behalf of his jailed colleagues. He called for criminal proceedings to be initiated against "those who poison the atmosphere by ... supporting criminals like me". "If I committed this crime in another country, I would have been sentenced to death or life in solitary confinement, but under the indulgent Islamic system, people in charge of my case and prison officials are convinced that I converted honestly," he said.
  • Iran Page 1 of 30

    Iran Page 1 of 30

    2008 Human Rights Report: Iran Page 1 of 30 2008 Human Rights Report: Iran* BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR 2008 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices February 25, 2009 The Islamic Republic of Iran, with a population of approximately 70 million, is a constitutional, theocratic republic in which Shia Muslim clergy dominate the key power structures. Government legitimacy is based on the twin pillars of popular sovereignty-–albeit restricted--and the rule of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution. The current supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was not directly elected but chosen by a directly elected body of religious leaders, the Assembly of Experts, in 1989. Khamenei's writ dominated the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government. He directly controlled the armed forces and indirectly controlled the internal security forces, the judiciary, and other key institutions. The legislative branch is the popularly elected 290-seat Islamic Consultative Assembly, or Majles. An unelected 12-member Guardian Council reviewed all legislation passed by the Majles for adherence to Islamic and constitutional principles and also screened presidential and Majles candidates for eligibility. In 2005 hardline conservative Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad won the presidency in an election widely viewed by the international community as neither free nor fair. Civilian authorities did not fully maintain effective control of security forces. The government's poor human rights record worsened, and it continued to commit numerous serious abuses. The government severely limited citizens' right to change their government peacefully through free and fair elections. The government executed numerous persons for criminal convictions as juveniles and after unfair trials.
  • State, Dissidents, and Contention: Iran, 1979-2010

    State, Dissidents, and Contention: Iran, 1979-2010

    STATE, DISSIDENTS, AND CONTENTION: IRAN, 1979-2010 HAMID REZAI SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCE COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 2012 ©2012 Hamid Rezai All rights reserved ABSTRACT State, Dissidents, and Contention: Iran, 1979-2010 Hamid Rezai Why after almost a decade of silence and “successful” crackdowns of contention during the 1980s has Iran witnessed once again waves of increasing popular protest? What are the processes and mechanisms behind the routinization of collective actions in Iran since the early 1990s, which continue despite state repression? Why and under what circumstances does a strong authoritarian state that has previously marginalized its contenders tolerate some forms of contention despite the state’s continued repressive capacity? And finally, to what extent are available social movement theories capable of explaining the Iranian case? In “State, Dissidents, and Contention: Iran, 1979-2010” I engage theories of social movements and contentious politics in order to examine the emergence, development, and likely outcomes of popular contention in contemporary Iran. My study is the first project of its kind to focus on elite factionalism and its impact on popular mobilization in contemporary Iran. Although other scholars have extensively written on elite factionalism in postrevolutionary Iran, they have not analyzed the implications of the inter-elite conflict for the emergence and development of social protests against the Islamic Republic. While this study primarily utilizes political process and resource mobilization models, it acknowledges the importance of economic, ideological, and breakdown approaches for the interpretation of the emergence and development of popular mobilization in contemporary Iran.
  • The Path Dependent Nature of Factionalism in Post- Khomeini Iran

    The Path Dependent Nature of Factionalism in Post- Khomeini Iran

    HH Sheikh Nasser al-Mohammad al-Sabah Publication Series The Path Dependent Nature of Factionalism in Post-Khomeini Iran Ariabarzan Mohammadi Number 13: December 2014 About the Author Dr Ariabarzan Mohammadi is a Visiting Research Fellow with teaching duties in the School of Government and International Affairs at Durham University for 2014-15. Disclaimer The views expressed in the HH Sheikh Nasser al-Mohammad al-Sabah Publication Series are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the School or of Durham University. These wide ranging Research Working Papers are products of the scholarship under the auspices of the al-Sabah Programme and are disseminated in this early form to encourage debate on the important academic and policy issues of our time. Copyright belongs to the Author(s). Bibliographical references to the HH Sheikh Nasser al-Mohammad al-Sabah Publication Series should be as follows: Author(s), Paper Title (Durham, UK: al-Sabah Number, date). 2 | P a g e The Path Dependent Nature of Factionalism in Post- Khomeini Iran Dr Ariabarzan Mohammadi Abstract The main claim of this paper is that the anti-party system in Iran, or what is known as factionalism, is subject to a path dependent process. The political system in post- Khomeini Iran is not based on political parties. The authoritarian regime in Iran has not developed into a ruling party system as in Egypt under Mubarak. Instead, through its different stages of institutionalisation, the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) has gradually degenerated from what looked like a single party system during the ascendancy of the Islamic Republic Party (IRP) in the first and second Majlis (the Islamic Consultative Assembly of Iran), to an anti-party, factional system that has continued to the present.
  • Kirk US Institute of Peace Speech

    Kirk US Institute of Peace Speech

    The Conviction of Our Own Convictions Remarks by Congressman Mark Kirk November 4, 2009 U.S. Institute of Peace Thank you for the warm welcome. I worked with the Institute for more than 20 years. Your efforts are critical to our foreign policy – and I thank you all for your commitment. And to the protestors gathered in Tehran, I say this: the American people stand with you in your fight for democracy. This is the 30th anniversary of the attack on our embassy in Iran. On November 4, 1979, Iranian militants raided the Embassy and took 53 Americans hostage – a siege that lasted 444 days and changed history. As we gather here today, 30 years later, we see an Iran rotting from the inside out – a regime trying to silence a people crying out for freedom. Today, the Islamic Republic of Iran looks much like other dictatorships of the 20th century. They wear a different uniform and speak a different language, but the repression rings familiar. In Iran, the basic human freedoms we take for granted in America do not exist. Men, women and children are rounded up in the middle of the night and sent to prisons, never to be heard from again. Some for their religion, others for their politics and others because they dare to stand for the human dignity of all mankind. /// According to Freedom House’s 2009 Report, “freedom of expression is severely limited in Iran. The government directly controls all television and radio broadcasting. Satellite dishes are illegal… “Press freedom remains extremely limited. The Ministry of Culture must approve publication
  • General Assembly A/HRC/13/22/Add.1 24 February 2010

    General Assembly A/HRC/13/22/Add.1 24 February 2010

    UNITED NATIONS A Distr. GENERAL General Assembly A/HRC/13/22/Add.1 24 February 2010 ENGLISH/FRENCH/SPANISH ONLY HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL Thirteenth session Agenda item 3 PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF ALL HUMAN RIGHTS, CIVIL, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, Margaret Sekaggya Addendum Summary of cases transmitted to Governments and replies received∗ ∗ The present document is being circulated in the languages of submission only, as it greatly exceeds the word limitations currently imposed by the relevant General Assembly resolutions. GE.10-11297 A/HRC/13/22/Add.1 Page 2 Contents Introduction................................................................................................................................5 Algeria .......................................................................................................................................5 Argentina ...................................................................................................................................8 Azerbaijan................................................................................................................................16 Bahrain.....................................................................................................................................18 Belarus .....................................................................................................................................20