The Copernican Turn in Early German Romanticism

Home , 19th century, Dieter Henrich, German Romanticism, Novalis, Romanticism

chapter 1 The Copernican Turn in Early German Romanticism

Jane Kneller

This essay addresses the complex relationship of early German romantic philosophy to the so-called “Copernican” turn Kant took in his critical philosophy. I defend the claim that the early German Romantics assumed Kant’s Copernican insight had been firmly established, and went on to expand and transform the critical philosophy into something uniquely their own and not subsumable under standard “realist/idealist” distinctions used to describe this period. I preface the argument by suggesting that early German Romanticism’s most innovative philosophical contributions are methodological rather than metaphysical, and that they represent philosophical “break” between Kant and German post-Kantian Idealism in much the same way that a musical intermezzo functions between larger movements in musical compositions. Section I applies the metaphor by suggesting that Kant’s Copernican Revolution represents the first movement of Classic German philosophy, setting the stage for early German Romanticism’s reception and transformation of it, particu- larly in the philosophical work of Friedrich von Hardenberg, known as Novalis. Section II draws conceptual connections and also points of departure between Novalis and Kant, and concludes in Section III that on balance the disconnects between the Copernican turn and early German Romanticism underscore the independence of the latter, and separates early German Romanticism in a fun- damental way from both Kantian and the post-Kantian Idealism.

1 Between Kant and Post-Kantian Idealism: Romanticism as Intermezzo

The brilliant collaboration of writers, critics, and philosophers who shared philosophical dialogue and projects—the so-called “Jena Circle”—was short- lived: It lasted only from the mid-1790’s into the early 1800’s. Yet it had an outsized influence on literary and critical theory through the 19th century and well into the 20th. Unfortunately the same cannot be said of the philosophical work of its two central figures, Novalis (Friedrich von Hardenberg) and Friedrich Schlegel. Especially in the Anglo-American tradition, their fun- damentally interdisciplinary and collaborative undertaking, together with

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004388239_003 The Copernican Turn in Early German Romanticism 19 their dismissive view of grand systems approaches of the time rendered their work philosophically insignificant or even irrationalist in the eyes of Anglo- American academic philosophy throughout much of the 20th century. It was not until the 1970’s and early 1980’s, when the work of Dieter Henrich and the publication of Manfred Frank’s lectures on early German Romanticism in Einführung in die Frühromantischen Ästhetik (Introduction to early German Romantic Aesthetics) that some philosophers in the Anglo-American tradition began to recognize the unique philosophical contribution of the early German Romantics. Frank’s characterization of Novalis’ Fichte Studies as “the most sig- nificant philosophical contribution of early Romanticism” prompted serious investigation into the philosophy of early German Romanticism among scholars and students of German philosophy in the classic “Idealist” period from Kant’s critical philosophy through Hegel.1 Meanwhile Fred Beiser’s ground- breaking book The Romantic Imperative brought renewed scholarly interest and attention to the early German Romantics.2 Not surprisingly perhaps, there is still much debate about the precise nature of their philosophical contributions. Among the group of scholars now championing early German Romantic philosophy the question of how best to label that philosophical position has prompted a debate about how, or even whether, to position these philosopher-poets within the German Idealist tradition. Frederick Beiser and Manfred Frank have taken up opposing views on the nature of the metaphysical commitments of the early German Romantics, and the most recent round of debate has seen Frank arguing that its two most central figures, Novalis and Friedrich Schlegel, prominently espoused views on issues such as the nature of the “Absolute” that were very much at odds with post-Kantian German Idealism. Frank argues that Novalis adopted what he calls a Kantian “ontological realism”:

In contrast to Fichte and in agreement with Kant, Novalis professes an ontological realism. Such a realism is perfectly compatible with the view that the unity of being and consciousness is the transcendent presup- position of our self-consciousness, an unachievable idea of reason in the

1 Manfred Frank, Einführung in die Frühromantische Ästhetic (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1989), 248. Novalis: Schriften, Vol II, Das philosophische Werk I, “Fichte Studien,” ed., Richard Samuel in collaboration with Hans-Joachim Mähl and Gerhard Schulz, revised by Richard Samuel and Hans-Mähl (Stuttgart, Berlin, Cologne, Mainz: Kohlhammer, 1981). In English translation as Novalis: Fichte Studies, ed./trans. Jane Kneller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). Hereafter NS and FS, respectively. 2 Frederick Beiser, The Romantic Imperative: The Concept of German Romanticism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).