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UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE UNPROFOR
Page 1 of 2_
ROUTINE PR!ORITY IMMEDIATE UNCLASSIFIED UN RESTRICTED UN CONFIDENTIAL UN SECRET
OUTGOING FAX NO; DATE: _ 21 DECEMBER 1993 TO: STOLTENBERG FROM :~HORNBERRY /; GENEVA UNPROFOR, ZAGREB · ~ I ~ FAX NO: (41-22) 917-0079 FAX NO: 38-41-170 199 I ATTN: DRAFTER: /ls
SUBJECT: EL~CTIQNS IN SEB~IA - LATEST :QNOEFI~IAL RE~UL~S
INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:
. . . - AS REQUESTED, ATTACHED PLEASE FIND SELF-EXPLANATORY FAX ON THE ABOVE SUBJECT.
DISTRIBUTION:
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RADIO ~E:LGRADE, 2l DecQlll):ler 1993 , at 9:45 hours A.~ord.ing to the latest unofficial resu.lts a..TLnounced by -the Republic of Serbia Electoral Cor.rra.ittee based. on statistics (2/3 o"f the ·electoral material ha-ve. bee.i.'1 counted) ana if the election results a.re ll!)t 2l.?1nulled iD :SOJlle election uni.ts because o.f irreguJ.a.rities, the OOl!!position of the Serbian P2.rlirona.T1t will be as £ollc:,ws::
S?S Party {Socialist ~arty 0£ Serbia) - 121 seats DEPOS (Damocratic ?!ove:meut of Serbia1 .;4 seats SRS l S~iail . '.Rad.leal Part".f} - 40 seats DS (De:mocntio Party} - JO seats DSS (Uem.o-cra:tic Pa-Tty of Serbia.) ... i seats :OZVM (De!nocratic union o.f Vojvodi.-ria ID:Ul~ariar.s) 5 seats SDP (Social Democratic Party) l seat Coal.ition of the .Movement. for the Activity of Albanians in Kosovo (:from PeY.lujevo} 2 seats
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OFFICE OF THE SRSG MOST IMMt=nlATE ROUTINE PRIORITY I~'fir
(ONCLASS IFIED) UN RESTRICTED UN CONFIDENTIAL ON SECRET ONLY Otl"I'GOING Fil NO.: DAT!l/TIMlr 17 December 1993 TO: SAS Palace Hoeel, Vienna FROM1 OFF.ICE OF THE SRSG ., ZAGREB FAX NO,: 43-1-512-2216 J'AX: ATTN1 Mr . T, Stoltenberg i'IlsB llEll'. NO.a ~JJ~~~ OR.Ai'TlilR l~ 'coL B m0v~srr MA TC THE SRSG INli'O: BTOLTENBtRG, GENEVA STJBJ:5:CT t SI.RB :E!:EHAVIOT.Jll, MlllTING WI'l'K HVO AND :e:CH INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION': SRSG
MESSAGE: 1 . ATTACHED PLEASE FIND MORE INFORMATION ABOUT SERB BEHAVIOUR . 2. THE REPORT FROM GEN. BRIQUEMON'l"S MEETING WITH GEN. PETKOVIC ]!.NO GEN. D~LIC IS ALSO ATTACHE~.
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TO:
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SUBJECT:
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UNPROFOR
:MILITARY INFORMATION BRANCH
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM
To : cos •-f Stt4iC- ';: .., From l CMIO ~ Drafter: Maj w. Date : 17 Dec 9:3
Subject: ASSESSMENT ON OBSTRUCTIVE BSA BEHAVIOR 'I'OWARDS UNPROFOR IN BH
1. starting !rom the beginning of October '93 UNPROFOR in BH experianoed continuous and escalating obstruction of operations trom the Bosnian Serb authoriti.:!s. Part of this e~calation seems to be linked with ittc~eased military activity of BSA i n Northern and Eastern BH with the aim of blocking con~oys with humanitarian goods and putting ~ore pressure on the Musl i ~ ~ide. However , the increasing tendency of the obstruction directly against UNPR.0F0R is becoming :more clear. The tacts could be evidencei:3 as: - indiraot mortar , arty an~ tank !ire towards convoys and OPSI - retusal of clearances for logistic supplies and troop : ·-""" rotating convoys; - darn~nds o'L datailed inspections of Qupplies beyond established procedures; - attempts to search of personal belongings and equipment of soldiers in TJNPROFOR escorts; - limits on number of convoys per day on particular routes, etc. Most of the events were reported in the a:r:-ea ZVORNIK-'I'UZLA SARA..1~VO-GORAZDZE-SR~BRENICA-ZEPA. 2 . The abo~e mean a noteciable change of attitude to~ards UNPROFOR, In the last three month period ot low military activity the BSA behaved more or less properly, demonstrating readiness to cooperate in securing hUlllanitarian aid convoys. In the period of BiH-HVO !ighting in Central Bosnia and intensified. convoy blocking the BSA was trying to show itself, in ternia ot power ana territory, as able to ensure free flow of reliet convoys. This behavior, aimed at changing the attitude of international community towards the Serbs as a first step towards lifting the sanctions, was unsuccessful, 3, The changing ot attitude t~wards UNFROFOR can be related t o gen. R, Mladic abeenae in Geneva peace talks and signing on
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29 of November and the joint declaration about unimpeded movement of humanitarian aid in his behalr by Mr. R. Karad~ic. : 4. The decision to putt pressure on UNPROFOR was made tor internal as well as external political reasons. Internally it is a part ot propaganda campaign aimed to lower the confidence towards international community and consolidate the nation living in still worsening aconomicai conditions. Externally it demonstl'."ates, that no peace !Solution 1n BH can be reached without close cooperation with the Serb side as being the most powerful faction. Thia policy compared to the one presented in para 2. didn 1 t change its goals, hut the method is diffsirant and more dasperate. ·· 5. Increased pressure on UNPROFOR seems to be a centrally prepared and coptrolled action. Having nothing to lose it is highly ii~ely that the Serbs could act similarly for a long time. I f they want to win the international community coope.r~tion, they probably do not intend to go too far in threatening 'UNfROFOR. However such a behavior raises the potential risk of unintended tragedy significantly.
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A!TN: l. FO~CD CO. N0£R ·rILJ RiJ'.NO I BHCS/ . ( Gi!?n:iU..!J COT) ONLY PRAti!R : .L'l"C MOtJG~D\I 2. cos+ CI !t ATFAl~S '1"I'l'LE : HA 'l'O COMO ~!L~SINCJ OFF,: t'l' EN :n.Hlll7!'... ~,ro 'r
~ . ' , l . Lt Gen S~lQUEI NT, ~ssisf;d by M~ de MELLO, chaired a ~,,ting .i ~twe~n Gen D~L:re, iH, ~nd Gen Roso, M\10 1 in V!so;,,;o, on l 6 Dec' ~9'j', ,
2. ·The ~a.in iss\.l ccncern•4 th• LIT~ t:Nz route, bQth p~rtie~ '. decid~d to crd~r a local ceasa fire ~nd a;resd to tae~lit~te the •. ~s;:i;.ac;e cf tH.l.I!lerni a~ian· con,r,,roys bat.ween Hostar and Jablanica, 'accordi~q with ths aeneva aq~e-tna~t. A cop~ of the ne~ regienal '. agr\ile:nen t is a t.te. ed, as w~11 as the a.gre~r.iant signed cm 2s . ·Nove~bQr 1993. It has hean &grea~ that the convoys will not move :d~ring. the night..
~. o~n ROSO conf rmad that a~l lr4ines Si?Hi o.bs.t~clea on tni•. :roac1 will be re~QVed an elaar~~ fo~ 18 Oece~•r 19~3, in nis .AO~ .
. 4. l{o al~o stat d th~t h~ · g;,ye order to all cw the oot1pl11ta . installation of SP MT in~~. Mc,tar West, · -"""" '"' . .... - .....----4 •1 ---- . -■ ,IIMt .. .
. _.,' 't' I, I ' I •, ., I ., I • '"' j ; . Gen ROSO 41.so ll-:i-oJrii:s~d tt18.t the two ij{~) ·el:ioopte;-s l:il0ekad ir, ;: ic.\.l.90-x-ja ~il.l :Oa,eleased within the ne*:~/:/ aw da:,s. HVO pilots . ill fl~. tn:U:\ to pl:.t .. Di vul j B B&rrae~~i. theNal'Vel. rrhsa s;H ; ~lets w1ll be&~ hQrisad tc racov~r th•~~ heliccpteT5 in Spli~. ; : i he t~chn.leal in~ . =-t:.::.on ~ill ba ~ad.a by ;'i'HV. · teahnic1ans, I I ' I 1· ' ~I t' I : 1I , I I: Thi! Generals 11.::0 t.nd :ROSO Al.Jc;, dec:!;dj'd ta • C~l:STMAS TRUC:11: ro~ 2~0001 ?e~e r t9j3 until ?32400 J~~. a~y l994•, , . l I :! •
1 ' lNQ. t:~ll"tCJ~: oth g~neral.s ac:~•pt1d /:'. ;~.: ·.allow f~ee aooe111 t0r ;h~ss oonv0ye· in.t C·~nt:-al ,Bc:,s~ia, >,, ?!'Js1~ting will. );)e ctiqan1•e:i iY.t Mcm~ay ~o 'Oec= 4r a-: sa:ra jevo ai:n,,ot~I}· undtr the· chaintanship ,}.· M.r ·.l-U1Y~ - C i!. .\~tai:::s Offico:i:- r ·.I .!.s•ljak, in orde7:' t= 1 r1naI .l~~e arita.ti.e1"t ot the ~ont:c;,. ' :·ij:nd'J ~;tinetar1a• ot tn"aIC I 1,j• I •1 ' I I 'i
8 • ~.u...... ~~~~~~.,...: This hoipitaJ:t:~ 11.ct."1allY tiloOkdd. in ~l0cQ ~nd ~cha ~l~d t0 ~G deplo~~d ~~~Mesta~ laat. G•n RbSO aoc&pt~d tQ ~utho s$ th~ mova df tha ~oj tt1l. Detail~ will ~e c::onfi:n,;ieo by tha C'5-: d.\U·ir'lg hit n-ext :,; t\ :, etir1g with Cdt' .S)A!>.T . .t
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! 1Q,CALi,C~~SEF!BE AG§!MJNT.MQSTAB - !IJELA ; • l ~e.neral ~oso. Cof a.nd.er of the WO i:t'.rm', and aene:r;-~l 05£.lC, Convl'l&nde r of ths · Hi army., undar ~h• cha1 :mansh;ip 0£ Lt Ganer al BRIQUEMON~t ~nder ke to orda~ A lc~al CijaQefirQ in tne 4raas cf 1:.!0STAR .. SA!..AXOV~ • :Bl.:liLA - DREZN..ICA - GRAl=lOV~CA •· J~~ANICA, · durini; day light .t c.rder to allow fraa movement ct hunia..~ltaria.n convo~.!! · ol LJ'NHCR or other- i nt:arriat i onal a;•nQi ea escQrt a'3 .bf lJNP~OrOR units.
se co:,vc:i,-s will . . e planned under c0~tr0l o: SP>J:Af end ~ovement ,pleMs ,.;.,j _ll be tor rdecl by ,SPA!Af to th; lil"VO .and lUH parties, ,through t1aig0n Of ~qrs, with a no:~al not£ee ol 48 hours ~ut at .1 ea.et: 24 hcurs,
1-hi~ agr.etMnt must be conside~$d as •n Addition to the agree~nt ~1gnad ,on 25 NQYS~ r 1;93 b~ Gan •Pi1XOVZC and Gen O!Llc, Which rema1~• fully valid
ROSO Ganeral orr..tc::
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~~n~r~l ~osoi n1~elnik Glavnc; itclera HYO i ~•ne:al oa11e. :-tc:-nar.de.rit S:.aba ~rh0Yrie koh"ianda >irmija Bil-!, pod~r•d1jed~i!tv ;e~eral~ ?~~ovnik Briquemont-a i2daju nara4enje 1a 1oka1ni ~:s~i •• .ri ~- r € r, 1~ ? a cl r u j \l : MO f.:T 11 R-~A !,Al
. ove.j ipo:~2,u.. mo:a ;iiti _p:ilwaC,an ~aQ dOcifAtak spcre.Z\JmU ;c~~~,' :·. j~ l'otpisa.n 2! n V:mcr! 1;93, od strata ;enerala PetJ(cvi=a 1· 9ener~1, Cilit1, koji ja ~o~ nl ,riazi,
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C..nera l P'atkc:ivi Q, ropz:ssent 1ng the . l-!VO a.nd Ga~aral• Del ic., Co.tnrc.ander in Chie:·l:o: tha '!ilf Army, lJnd.ru· the ~ha:trruanshifl cf Lt Genaral Eriquemont formally ~e;0gnira the u:gan~y ct GUAR.A.):TEES OF FREE MOVZ..~'!' 0 .HUM>.Nl1.IAA.IA.N C:ONV0'/5 in :eos~ia-Hei:regoY.1,na.
1 , 'rh:t.., ~r•&dom. Qf mg eme.nt muat ba ;uara..~t11d without ra1t.1ct1on / · ct a.ny ~ind PY the cc~d&rs of th• two parties at .every level II .' 0£ CQff\:\Mii, -The t~o partias un ertaxe ta g,Jitantea THE SECURITY OF CONVOYS '. against uncontroll ~ elamant~ or ~!n~its within their artas of : ~espo~sibili~y 1n •ope~~t£on Witn tJNP~OFOR, T0 realisa this, liaisQn o!fice4s w 11 ~a·axcbanged ·at e!ch le~el. · : 0t part~cular tm~o ta.nc~ is THE ONLY ~0013 WlTM LARGE CAPACITY i·a.nd ~hich is ~ccea i~le t0 convoys during wintar; this is the !·route HZTttOY!C ·- NO TAR ..: JA!t.iANICA .. S~J~O - TUZtiA, wh~c:h 1= I ;fol lowed by both 1 . oad and a :-ail~ay,
11he t~0 partiec g~ antea t~&t any :urtrier eama;e to this road ·~;i:d :re i 1way wi 11 ha i,rov1nt1d wt th1n th,i r a:a~s of e~t:-ol.
Q to a1•i•t .iQ the ~~ploY1Qent ot tr.NP~070R ng eq-u!pi:nsnt to aliow the bypa~s1nq of tha Givar1 sYc::h a=1ist:ance, UMP~010k tn·tends t=i 0~ei-at10nal in thQ a:-ea bi, tha a~d cf
Thts' agreer.~nt will t ~·,'el , ...... , . .' !' j'.~Qfj'!'A V.\ H.f MAN' I ~1:AR~.f'_Qtl9£,i_iL~.IDfi: l HE'RCEGQ:!.l.lJi~ l ~erl~i,:·~l r}f!tkov:tc ptedi.tav11ik ~vo .. a :i. general Delic, sl.11.vni >~omar,d~r• ~: A:i:-mi j.e BiH, an ·.1 pti su1tvu gene:ral a potpukovnil
•i'ia sl Qboda >< .rat an a mor'a bi t.J. garantova.r,a :baz ikakvih ogrard. cenj a ~d stran4 kcmand ata/~ap0vja~nika obje Strane na avakom nivou :.j .ihovih: xomancii/ apQvje.dnistava, · Kad ::e· ri.jec o nek ntrol1sanirr.' elernentims :l.li bar.iditima. pri~ut~im ~ podr~cjima koja su p~d ~dgovornoscu tlh Strana1 dvija Stran8 pr~~zimeju na sa da ~e u saradnji sa UNPROJOR-cm gatantovati~ SZBJEDN0ST K0N'V0 lMA,· u tom cilju ca 11 na svim nivo1ma 1.zvrsiti .azmj~na ~fictra ,a vezu, Od naroc:i te j e va.znosti . .J!:~lNI PUTN'l 'PRAVAC SA OGROMNIM KAPACITErOM, i k i je u toku :ime ~oit~pan konvojima: to ja putni · -,~avac H.!TK VIC - MOS'l'AR - JABL>.NICA .: SARAJEVO - l't1ZL.~. xoji Dbuhvat~ i ~ti zaljeznicu.
i Dvije :Str!..;1e gara tuju. da c~ bile ka~va daljnja ostecenja ovog .1 p1Jta i :ze1Ja:znice i ti sprijece.ria u podruojima koja se nal~2:e pod ;· ':ijihovim kont.rola n,d je : Strane s~glasna da pruie svcju pomoe prili~om razmi~estanja ini ~jarskih :radnil(a. UNPR0F0R-a, kao 1 "opre.rna Z& mostovra '..l cilju aobilezenja rn0stova u Sijalo:l. Kad mu :Oude pruzena pomoc, VNP 0F0R nemje:rava da ra1pola.-:e sa s:istamom ferija XOji ~~ bit1 u fu xciji u top podrueju ~o kraja deca~ra lS93. ;odi,ne . - _ -- . .. """"\.r:;-.
Dvaj · ~po:i::azu c:e 0011\&h bit:i. proslijedjen ~mandantima/iapo jedni6ima na svim nivoima. ,.
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\ gQ~AV~ HVJ4;NlTARNE P~MQC! U Bo!NI I Hi8;JQOYIHI • 1. l: c::enera.l ~et:i
'>Ta s 1000-da ln·atanj' m. 0:-4 ~:l ti ;a:rantova.na be~ ilu.kvi ~ 0gran1 c1nja :iod .1t:-atia· :..oman~ari a/.1apovjednika obja StrMe na s-.,a;com n1vou :njihovih ~cmandi/m ovje~n11tava,
·J ' ' E210l16 22 1P ~A3N3~ ~ONn 0S:E1 E6, 'Q' J b -± l .I. I ti I lJ ~J fX - 2•13 6 F ~OH: Of'l UHP~OFOR COHM CEN ON FAX 8050 Page 1 of -'l HQ 5125 TS I: ZSZ3 • D 1S -Dec-9J 20: 4S c· -. J s 11 & o9:, 0 ~ PAGE 1 of.;. USRSG: OUTGOING F>..X NO. SRFC- B/2 7 DATE: 15 DEC 93 SA: TO: GEN J.COT FROH : MJ..J. GEN. v. KOUK~t[KO FORCE COMMAND ER SRFC UNPROFOR BELGRAD E vl3 -✓-? f7 ' c;.,,''1, ,...... -.,,, - 1//\: FAX NO.: FAX IN1IA.RSAT: 873-1512502 //(h . OR BELG RA DE 38-11-609368 I ATTN: GEN J,COT FILE .REF,NO: DRAF TER ! MAJ .L/....RIONOV ------· ------.. - TITLE: so TO SRFC Uff O: DFC, cos UNPROFOR PAX NO.: INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: SUBJECT: BI-v.EEKLY SITUATION REPoRT FOR THE PERIOD O? 1-15 DE; C I MESS A-GE GENERAL SITUATI ON IN f RY: ~- CD 1_. The ove rall s i tuation in th.e Federal Republic of Yu. gos la via ;> shows further signs of deterioration 1 as the i mpact of CfrO international sanctions p~rsists and political parties in Serbia CO() are competing for parliamentary seats out of their own party interests. Increased prospects of a peace ful settle ment of the cMO Yugos lav crisis are still too far to help the Government with its coPo roost worrying domestic difficulties. ,4cos p/c The economic and ~ neta ry chaos continues. Food pr ices have ,:'\ cu> ,:)1 gone up so much that few people can afford e.ven meager amount of - ,_ decent food. Inflation rate keeps climbing new highs as the t\- C Government keeps printing banknotes. There are esti1'llates that , r,L- Dece:mbsr inflation rate will far supersede the November figure C 1Y O ( 20, 190%). under these circumstances, social tension continues rising. The past two ~eeks have witnessed a dramatic increase ir. the number of strikes, protests and rallies in Belgrade demanding minimum vages pecked to a foreign currency . .rnC::: ~z C""J r- · - ,.. . ·- ._; __,- . J. G/1 2 ·g;i 0 8 : lb 'o' J ;:, 4 I 1 -i G I U l• Ld '.1 UV TO:, rx 206 H:Oli: OF' J lJHf'~CFO R C0nnCEH OH FR>< 8050 P,~ge 2 of '1 t1 5 G : 110 5125 2 TS l : ----=2:.::S....:2...c.3 __-,- ______lS-Dec-93 20:4S -----,.,-, l L SJ ·--;;0;·17 o'-J ~ -116Qs-j 6S The p~rl i awentarf el ectio;, cam po ign in Sei-bia continues, attra c tino far l e ss than expected enthusie.sm from the gen e :-a l public, who a:re p reocct..:pied °"'ith their own subsistence. The lcrge numbe r 0£ candidates ar;d political parties vying for parlial:!entary seats seems only to benefit the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia ;ere) I ~>h.:l~h l-.-- 1c..---r~ ..... _J __ _,,_..) l..·J ···-··.z -~._,Q ..... 'f..,;-Jo.O O D .L.:JO..l...LJL O .l.;.lJ.fl':j 1-!l!';;:! l ead at the moment. Deputies fram the ruling parties of s ~rbia and Montenegro deliberately did not show up on 9 decffii\ber at the Federal Parl iaroent ' e Chal1lber of citizens session , the first dl:ly afte r i ts recess. Deputies from other op_posi tion parties conde;-.;ned this as a p l cy to deprive them of a q~orun and hence a chance of criticizing the Government several days befc~e the Serbian Parliamentary Glections. 2 , .SPE<;IfIC SITUt.TIONS I'S FRY; -FRY ( SERBIA ): The Fedei:-al Govern:rnent Co11J::.:.i ttee tor cooperation with UNPROFOR denied blocXing the No:::dic batta lion in the logistic base in Pancevo. The Federal and Serbian Authorities gave pe:r-mission fo~ arrival and transit of Swedish , Danish and Norwegian troops across the terr i torj of FRY , under the co;;di tion that UNPR0F0R HQ provided per.miss i on for ent:cance into B & H and transit to Tl.i.zla, the colfilnittee stated . -MONTENEGRO: Th6 l-t,.:,,.t.,,i i cl.JL.toJ l yuvt:!rnment rejec-cea JA aernands t o build a new naval base in the bay of Valdanas , a base for patrol boats i n Krnjica a n d a tasting range on Lustica peni nsula. Min.ior disagree;,:,ents of Hontenegrian government do ~sn,t rnake significant influence on the situation. -KOSOVO: A. The Albanian Preside~t , Sali Se~isha , was reported by radio Tirana o n B Dec 93 to ha•;e 6t~ted at the congress of the Albanian Democratic Party that his country ~ill Hreact with all ~s3ns at its disposa l " if conflict:s in Koscvc or- some other region populated by J..lbanians occur. The President dedicated a large part of his speech to pos sible conflicts in Kosovo , claiting that the ''q:reater Serbia ~ants to renov e one rnillion Albanians through ethnic cleansing'' · (Albanians in Koscvo constitute about 90 % of the two mi llion people livi ng there). B . Mr . Serreqi , Mi~ister of Foreign Affairs of Albania , urged on internati onal presence in Kosovo. E.Com.rnent: Regardless the State ments of Albanian lea d e rs FRY auth orities cons•ider '1Kosovo pr obler.i 11 as its internal problem. - VOJVODINA; HR.Hegedus Laszlo fro~ the Democratic forum of Hungarians in Vojvodina stated that almost 35,000 ethnic Hungarlans have left FRY for Hungary. Tnere is shortage of food, medicine, gas and petrol. Pag e 3of '1 UHPR0 F0R C0H HCEH OH fA X 8050 {J : FX 2436 FR OM: OPl 15 -De c-93 20: 45 _ ZS 23 ,r.,: HQ~ 5125 2 TS I : ~.· ~ , l l ~ 00 ,1 p:Stc-?1{7 3/q Charity rn.ove~~nt ~ in Hu ngory stq~te~ ~o bring foo d and medicine t o Vojvod ina . AlthotJgn the Serbs are not ope nly t ry i ng to (;!thnica. lly cleanse Vojvodina :many Hungarians are said to be subj ect to harassroent6. ·,, 3. SEEC e,SSE SSM:EN'!' ; -POINTS OF CONCERN: A. It seems that force might be used to ensure the elections and following deveioproents of the situation. B. It should b e noted that , ~hile the civil Affairs brahch has a fully pledged Pre,ss and Information office I the Military does not have such an Office. Therefore, the Military is handicapped in its means,methods and sources of collecting, collating and disseminating informati on . The only means available are the nedia contacts with Hilitary authorities of Yugoslavia Armed Forces end Military attaches. - POINTS OF INTEREST: At meetings with AJT,erican, Ii::alian and other military attach.es in Belgrade they e xpressed the n ec,2ssi ty to have briefings on UNPROFOR mission on regular basis. They a re looking for a meeting with FC dw:-ing his visit to Belgrade. -PERSOHAL ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION: Since the economic situation in FRY has been deteriorating further, the :majority of the population cto esn ,t look for the forthcoming elections ~ith enthusiasm considering that none of the parties have realistic programs to stop the fall of the level of living standards. 4. M.EETJ.HGS HITH LQChL CIVILib.N AND MtLITA,...!sY b.UTcQRITIES: ' No DATE FRY AUTHORITIES PROBLEMS DISCUSSED l 01DEC93 COL WXSIC, DEPUrr'Y CHIEF -SITUATION ON FRY- OF DEPA.RTHSNT FOR fYROM BORDER RELATIONS WITH (PROTESTS FROM GOC INTERNATIONAL UN FYRO~ COMMAND); ORGANIZATIONS OF YUGOSLAV -NORDBAT2 MOVEMENT; ARMY GENERAL STAPF -PANCEVO BASE; (DRIOYAGS) 2 10 DEC MR.MILE PESUT, SECRETARY -ARR..~NGEMENT OF FC's OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT VISIT TO BELGRADE; COMMITTEE FOR COOPEAATION -SITUATION IN FRY; WITH UNPROFOR (.FGCCU) -NORDBAT2 MOV~MENT; J U 1 - ::J J u, , , _ v Paye 4 of 4 LJ;;P~'.OFCH~ (CIH ,tCEH oH rnx suso TC.-: n,: 243& fi :; 10 DEC COL VuKSlC 1 CEr·0TY CHJCF -ARRl,N G EJ-LENT O ::' Tr..S OF' DRIOYAGS MEETING lHTH THr: CHIEF 0: GENERAL STJ\fF OF YA ; -l:l{PR0ro:R. PR0 Bi.,EMS 1}1 FRY ; -PNJCEVO BASE; -NORDEAT2 KOVI:HENT ; 4 13 DEC HR .G. HILH/OVIC , CHIEF' OF -DELIVERY OF THE FC's PRESIDENT MILOSEVIC ' s LETTER TO PRESIDENT CABINET HlLOSEVIC ; -TITT: UTEST INCIDENT; - AGREEMENT Of~ FR.2EDOM OF HOVRM"ENT ; -DEPLOYMENT OF },'ORDBAT2 TO I TS HISSION AREA ; 5 . CONTt,CTS WITH VN )J-{D FOREICJL..QE.E.J_~ A. Daily coordinati on 1,.1i th I.JNr!CR and engager.:.ent i n t.J1e sohitio;i o f the p~oblems ccncerning free movement of humanitarian co~voys thr o~gh FRY territory . B. No Di\T E lJ}l ,\ND FOREIGN OFFICIAL S FROBLE.HS DISCUSSED I l 02DEC9J B .GEJ-,; LUIGI DI BIASE, -EXCHANGE OF VIE~S ON ITALIAN H!LITARY hTTACHE THE f'RY CURRENT IN FRY, PRESIDENT OF SITUATION; -SHORT BRIEFING ON UNPROFDR ACTIVITY; 2 09 DEC MR. S . HJ>.TYS , HEAD OP -EXCHJ..N GE OP VIEWS ON BELGRADE ECHll CENTER THE SI'I'UA'I'!ON IN FR Y AND N'EIGliBORING COu""NTRIES; -SITUATION IN UNPROfOR HISSION AREAS; 3 12 DLC COL N.F'ALCO, THB NE''.l -DISCUSSION ON T HE I HEAD OF BELGRADE ECHH }V.Bl EVENTS IN FRY AND CENTER UNPROFOR 4 DAILY MR . 7-. . PICCOLl.,O , DEPll"TY -EXCHJ,,.}iGE OF HE.hD OF ECHH , BELGRADE INfORH.i..TlON ON THE SITUATION IN FRY , MAC EDON I A AND UHPROFOR ACT I VITY UNITED NA TIO NS Office of the SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA FACSIMILE TRANSMITTAL SHEET To: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA I. From:~ STOLTENBERG, ZAG~EB Date: 2 December 1993 Subject: LETTER TO DR KONTIC 1. Attached please .find copies of a routing slip addressed to you and a letter to Dr Kontic £or your clearance, passed to this office this afternoon by the HCA. 2. Please advise . DISTRIBUTION: AU lo N...... IN. fu ... . .~ .. \.. tS...... bJ=/.!,,e ....bR...... f!£ ······· 021 12 ' 93 17:21 'o'38 41 176709 l .\l. i\u1 v1, -..Ji, .._,,..,. ROUTING SllP FISHE DE TRANSMISSION TO: A: SRSG FROM: DE : Room No.-No de bureou FOR ACilON FOR APPROVAL y---1 POUR APPROBATION FOR SIGNATURE ! POUR SIGNATURE FOR COMMENTS i POUR OBSERVATIONS MAY WE DISCUSS? / ?OURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER? YOUR ATTENTION I VOTRE ATTENTION .. .. 0 21 11 · 93 17 : 22 '0'38 41 1 7 6709 C.\ PR OFO R SRS G 1 December 1993 Dear Dr. Kontic, As you are aware, a meeting was held, at the request of the Federal Government committee for Cooperation with UN Peacekeeping Forces, on 24 November, between Al!lbassador Cicanovic and Mrs. Yolanda Auger, Deputy Head of Civil Affairs, who was accompanied by Mr. Denis Truesdell, Legal Officer. It was indicated at that meeting by Al!lbassador Cicanovic that, since no reference was made in the Secretary-General's report of 20 September 1993, contained in Security Council document S/2740, to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or to UNPROFOR's role in its territory, the Comi ttee had found it necessary to seek clarification on the purposes of UNPROFOR I s continuing presence in the Federal Republic and the basis thereof, before proceeding with discussions to establish the framework of the relationship between your Government and UNPROFOR. We have brought the above-mentioned concerns to the attention of Mr. Stal tenberg and, at his request, after having looked carefully into this matter, have prepared the attached note on the subject. We trust that the existing dispositions, as set forth in this note, provide an adequate response to the issue raised by Ambassador Cicanovic. I . .. 0 21 12 · 93 1 7:23 '0'3 8 41 l ,b,U - 2 - We should like to take this opportunity to express our appreciation for the cooperation generally provided by your authorities to UNPROFOR's activities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) . We trust that, ·in this same spirit of cooperation, we may now be able to proceed with the finalization of a Status of Forces Agreement with your Government which would provide a clear framework for its relationship with UNPROFOR . Yours sincerely, Cedric Thornberry Head of Civil Affairs Dr . Radoje Kontic President Federal Government Committee for Cooperation with UNPROFOR Belgrade . -- • .• ...... • · . -~ . . ir...... • . - ...... - , ...... 02 / 1 2 · 93 17:23 '0'38 41 176 709 L\' PRO FOR SRSG UNPROFOR's presence in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) ,. r I UNPROFOR' s presence in the FRY is related to the performance of the functions detailed below. UNPROFOR has a sub-office in Belgrade. This sub-office was established in accordance with paragraph 21 of Annexx III of the report of the Secretary-General of 11 December 1991, which sets out the "Vance Plan 11 • This sub-office carries out military and Civil Affairs liaison functions, and includes also a press and information section. It also includes a civilian administration element which provides the necessary administrative support to UNPROFOR activities in the FRY. Other UNPROFOR activities in the FRY include the following: (a) The monitoring of airfields by United Nations military observers (UNMOs) in accordance with Security council resolutions 781 and 786. In this connection, it is of interest to note also the Joint Declaration of JO September 1992 by the Presidents of the Republic of Croatia and the FRY which, inter alia, welcomed the early stationing of international observers on airfields in their respective countries as a confidence-building measure; (b) The UNMOs' monitoring role in areas of the FRY which border Sector East in accordance with the agreements reached for the demilitarization of that area pursuant to the "Vance Plan"; and (c) The UNMOs' monitoring role in connection with the agreement reached concerning Prevlaka peninsula by the Governments of the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). The Secretary General's report of 28 September 1992 L contained in Security Council document S/24600 and Security Council resolution 779 refer. UNPROFOR also has a logistics base in the FRY and transits through its territory in support of its operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. In this connection, Security Council resolutions 758, 761, 776 and 795 are particularly relevant, as well as the commitment made by the Government of the FRY to the relevant decisions taken in the London Conference as reflected in an 11 September 1992 Joint Communique subscribed by then President cosic and Prime Minister Panic, and the Co-Chairmen. Lastly, it should be noted that, in accordance with the Secretary General 1 s report of 20 September 1993 (S/26470) and Security Council resolution 871, the establishment of three subordinate commands within UNPROFOR UNPROFOR (Croatia), UNPROFOR (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and UNPROFOR (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) - is without prejudice to 11 the existing dispositions in all other respects for the direction and conduct of the United Nations operation in the territory of the former Yugoslavia 11 ( emphasis added) . It should be noted also that resolution 871 reaffirmed resolution 743 and all subsequent resolutions relating to UNPROFOR. 02/ 12 ' !l3 1 7:2 5 '0'38 41 176709 FNPROFOR - SRSG ➔➔➔ SRS G GE.\ £ 11.-1. Note for the file SOFA - FRY 1. , At the. request of the FRY authorities, on 24 November 1993, Auger and Truesdell attended a meeting in Belgrade with Ambassador Cicanovic, Assistant Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs of the FRY . 2. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the mandate of UNPROFOR in the FRY which, from their perspective, relates specifically to the definition of UNPROFOR in the draft SOFA. In their invitation, it is pointed out, al though they i naccurately attributed this to us from a previous meeting on 8 October 1993, "that it is necessary in accordance with changes that happened after the Security Council Resolution 743 especially bearing in mind the provision of the Resolution 87 1 - to define the mandate and status of UNPROFOR in FR Yugoslavi a more precise and complete." 3. Cicanovic raised the point that para. 10 of the Secretary General's Report to the Security Council (S/26470) , dated 20 September, refers to the demise of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the emergence as Member States of four of its constituent Republics , BH , Croatia, FYROM and Slovenia, completely ignoring the FRY. In addition, Security Council resolution 871 mentioned the creation of three subordinate commands for UNPROFOR (Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and FYROM), leaving the FRY completely out of the process. 4. Therefore, FRY authorities were wondering how to justify UNPROFOR's use of Pancevo barracks as well as privileges and/or exemptions concerning the use of their roads, transport taxes, etc., when there was no defined mandate acknowledging the role of FRY in the U.N. peace effort. 5. Although the FRY authorities did not object to U.N . operations or activities on their territory (as a matter of fact, 02 1 12 : 93 17 :26 '6'38 41 1 76709 - 2 - it was made very clear that an increase of U. N. presence in the FRY could be welcomed), they were reluctant to carry on negotiations on the SOFA at this stage without having f i rst a clear statement regarding the U.N . mandate in the FRY. Cicanovic suggested that they would like to have this clear statement made in the form of a public statement, preferably from the Security council or the Secretary General, defining the role and purpose of UNPROFOR's presence in the Federal Republic of Yugoslav ia. After such statement were made, they would propose an amended draft agreement which would take into account the new situation which has arisen since the creation of UNPROFOR by Security Council resolution 743. 6. Auger stated that we were ready to consider amendments, within certain limits, to the proposed SOFA. In addi tion, she referred to consultations with New York which had confirmed our position that a SOFA should be signed with the FRY. 7. Cicanovic added that the substance of the text as it stands is acceptable, but there was a need to state the legal basis for the U. N. presence in the FRY, in order to answer "many questions 11 raised by FRY officials and military . 8. Auger replied that we would look closely into the matter. However, she stressed that there was a mandate for UNPROFOR in the FRY with respect to the monitoring of airfields by UNMOs, the UNMOs monitoring role in connection with the agreement on Prevlaka and some areas in the FRY which border Sector East. Further, the existence of our sub-office in Belgrade is provided for in the "Vance Plan" . As for the logistics unit based in Pancevo, although not attached to any specific mission i n the FRY, it could be seen as a contribution to the role devolv ed upon the FRY of cooperation in the achievement of peace in former Yugoslavia. 9. Auger indicated that their concerns would be conveyed to Mr. Stoltenberg and, if necessary, to New York. OFFICE OF THE SRSG Page 1 of b ROUTINE PRIORITY IMMEDIATE MOST IMMEDIATE UNCLASSIFIED UN RESTRICTED UN CONFIDENTIAL UN SECRET QlY OUTGOING FAX NO.: SRSG DATE/TIME: 1993 Oc,t 11b TO: S1(LSG ~0f"A FROM: OFFICE OF THE SRSG ZAGREB FAX NO.: FAX . ATTN: Ni.l,~ FILE REF. NO. : ( ~~c:J ~1 DRAFTER : MAJ tJ HARJt SO TO MA/S SG INFO . Oo .r,,.J - SUBJECT: R's t ~""') 11) ~ UJ"v\-i)--l ~ INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: R, FILE MESSAGE: ~-Iv\ (\~U,-Ul ~\-<. ~ Q__ Lef)"~ ~ ~ ~~ _r\,vv~... J--1, ~ ~ rcu_~~ ~ ~ vvv~lNL~ DISTRIBUTION: AS:.-""1"1 o r-! ...... I N~ ...... ' ~,, ··•···········. .. ~$. .... ····•·· .. •··· ...... --- ------········ - 60L9L "t H· BE :- · ·• . ~ UNPROFOR ROUTINE - _ PlUORlTY IMMEDIATE MOST IMMEDIATE UNCLASSIFIED UN RESTRICTED UN CONFIDENTIAL UN SECRET ONLY OUTGOING FAX NO.: - C 654 DATE: 25/10/93 T () · FRO M: HQ UNP,ROFOR ZAGREB . , ICFY p;,- cos ~-tlt-0 fad /[61 I FAX NO.: FAX NO.: . ATTN: FILE REF. NO.: DRAFTER: MATO COS . INFO: ! FAX NO: SUBJECT: EC REEL Y IO SERB CQMELAINI - RN : TRI UTION· :• ,~ - ~ '·' - ··,,c,. --, - .. ,-:, ._,;."-- ,"·--~ "" fNJ:g :. _Ah,-.: o· IS - B , - . -,._., '. . 1~ - ,,· :•r.,c!~:,- P!f MESSAGE - - - Brigadier General Novakovic made a protest to FC, General Cot, on 4 Oct 93 about the use of chem1cal agents (CS gas). - - - - - 1925, all According to Protocol, Geneva . t}:le use. of 'other gases'. is. prohibite_d in war. In accordance with Gen Novakovic request, FC has agreed to advise SC and ICFY. A copy of PC's reply is attached. SRSG'S«I((.)--- OFFICE-~~ Date: SRSG: DSRSG: SA: DIR: MA: General JEAN COT Force Commander UNPROFOR Zagreb 2Sh•. October 1993 Dear Brigadier General Novakovic, Toankyou for your letter of 4 Octob'er. I have taken note of the points you raised and, as requested, passed on your letter to the UN Security Council and the ICFY. Yours faithfully Brigadier General Novakovic Knin REPUBLIC OF SERB KRJ-.JINA S E...!IB A.R>i 'i HQ Confidenti~l,: No. 01-861 4. Oct 93 FROTE$T DlJE TO USE OF CHEMICAL AGENTS · 1s ~o be d~livered to: UNPROFOR HQ ZAGREB (Attn. Gen.J.COT) ALL UNPROfOR SECTORS' HQs RSK GOVERNMENT, l We wa r, ;: :. : ; ,:nr m. you and call your attention to the fact that the ustashe-neo-fasci st :forcs s i..1sc-d c he~ical agents · which . are forbi dden according to the internati cr.ai.. c or1 \· ,: ,·.· : ::e n ~ . Naraely, on 11/12 September 93, during confrontation in the ..trea of Turanj-Sajevac, the Krajina Serb Army ,special units · ~aptured the smoke pots and chemical rifle grenades. After chemical analysis, done by an expert tea~ in a special laboratory, it was established that chet'lical warfare agents, known as tear gas, were of Belgium pro · We request you to intervene and inform the UN SC, as well as the ICFX co-chairman. _sincerely Yours, COHX.A....~DE..~ Brig.Gen. Mile Novakovic Sector South HQ \•• \p~(I(> ... o::. . 7//1 ;~7.;-//~/> ~II t1poTecT· 36or yno-rpe6e ·_: ; vKCMAlUUi Yr-.TITi:OXIP-a 3ArPEE (Ha _r.HtruCX:.T reHepeJ1a ~a Ko-ra) l E1ourro33.U!{ roc..'1O,D;;-1He re.Hepa,,e, ~eJ111!':o ,n;.1 &."C. 06aajec.Tn.10 H c::.Kl?e:-i.~~ ;-;a:'! c: hy ,I.I,O cy ycTaw1<0-neO'..i\ cllJJ,,-:: 1.-,..;..,_t; C.H&re yr:~6~.sar.e x~jcKa 6op6e1-1a c.r,e,i:.cTo<':l, sao~eHa r:o t-:eljy-napo.n,.,.,Htt l. 11 '1 .• ., . t". ~ 6 . H• 011:-1~, _ ... , .. L .c~n-re=10~ ;,j. ro,1\l•n'ie ~u P.r,:,:;:t•,·e: 6cp et-uo< .n.eJCT.9..2 tom~o E.2U:y ;1.H.-reDBe~~1jy . H yno3Haa~a C'..;:uj:~-ra 5~6eW'!O:.H Yje~r-r1>e:-1,:x Ha~1Hj~, l.<20 rl KOrrr-r-;;:~j~il-1!:Ca. KOH C · no:.uToewe.'1. . . :0 0 0 §1 PRO'l'O~OL Fon 'l'IIE PROIIIDI'l'ION OF 'l'IIE USE IN WJ\R OF ASPIIYXIJ\'l'ING, G.P.1925 - 94 POISONOUS OR OTHER GASES, /\ND OJ? BAC'l'EIUQf.,OGICJ\L ME'.rIIODS OF W/\nFJ\.llE GENEVA, 17 JUNE 1925 Text reproduced from: "1'/ie I.aws of llrmed Co11flicts" IJictrich Schindler and Jiri Toma,1. Sijthoff & Noordhoff, Alphen an den RiJ'n, The Netherlands - Rockvil. le, •·•1a · ryla11d , us• . ll . , secon d edition,·1981, pp. 109-119 INTRODUCfORY NOTE. ll1c Geneva rrotocol or 1'925 was 1l~1wn up and Tiu: umJcrsll:ucJ l'foni1•olc11ll;uici, 111 , !11; 11a111c of their 1·cspct:livl! t:uvcrn• !dgncil at lhe courcrcnce for the supervision or the lntcrnallonal lradc In arms mcnls: and a mmunitlon, which was held In Geneva uniter the auspices or the League of Nallom from 4 May lo 17 June 1925. TI1e conference lidople MOST ;~.11t,/l:.::~ 1 /\Tt:. i: i - 2-~((;\ UNPROFOR -'-..,,.._,_ 0····-,··,c. :,-'. ·ROUTINE - PRIORITY - IMMEDIATE - MOST UNCLASSIFIED - RESTRICTED - CONFIDENTIAL - CRYPTO - ONLY - UNPROFOR - PAGE 1 OF 1 I l I OUTGOING FAX NO.: 3-2~ DATE: October 25, 1993 TO : SECTOR SOUTH FROM: GEN COT FORCE COMMANDER FAX NO. FAX: ATTN: FILE REF. COMMANDER DRAFTER: TITLE : FAX NO.! t SUBJECT: MEETING WITH SERB AUTHORITY ON WEDNESDAY 27. 1. A meeting is organized with serb authority on wednesday 27 October at Plivitce, by Ambassador Vollbaek (ICFY). 2. Please, contact General Novakovic · and tell him that the ICFY delegation will be accompagnied by Col De Scheel representing the FC .. 3. General Novakovic could take this opportunity to arrange the calendar for meetings in sectors, as saturday 23 in Topusko. OFFICE SRSG'S - ·--·------Date: DISTRIE.UTION: SRSG: Q.e;:[\.c. fll ...... J.~~.. .· -, u)S ··--• ...• '-t·················· ..... \ ········· OSRSG: ··· ·······························&::--····· SA: DIR : MA: -----· --~ ------=-·=-.., '71:•::r-- - - u-r,-..--o, .::.-v-~ - :, c; --U L------t,; b b L COCE RESTRICTED IMM~~(A re.· CZrJ- 135·3 COtM,. ·1 1• .• :;~i ~~ QUTGOING CODE CABLE {£ C'ZC.-,'llr '93 OCT 26 •7 :CS IMMEDIATE to ANNAN, UNATIONS 1 NEW YORK JNFO STOLTENBERG, UNPROFOR, GENEVA STOLTENBERO,ZAOREB FROM DATE NUMBER SUBJEt TROOPS REQUIREMENTS .. IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 871, REFERENCE · A. UNPROFOR Z-1287 t 2 OCTOBER 1993 B. UNNY MCS 2039 21 OCTOBER 1993 l In reference A. my requirements tbr troops to implement SCR 871 were clt;arly laid out. A.s atated by the SRSO. the rarties must have confidence that we can handle the task. My reqoest for six (6) battalions and siic (6) enttineer companies was a well considered on~. based on a c.:a.refuJ estimate of the tasks at hand . A1 l\n absolute minimum, I must have three ('.l) buttaJions and three (3) engineer compagnies a..oi, soon as poHible. Without the:,~ resource:;, l can not be expected to implement the SCRs 802, 847 and 871. 2 In Teference B, only two (2) battalions are mentioned in the letter to TCNs. I assume these are the battalions called for in Res. 847, adopted ('Jn june 93 , which have not yet materialised in theatre. 3 I must agwn request that the Security Council be made awar~ that it is counterproductive for It to pasa resolution after resolution without providing me means of implementing them. I have been 5iven a series of jobs, now I arn only asking for the too1t1 to do those jcb11 . Ifl do not have tho::ie resources, then the credibility and overaU etfectiv~ness of tue Force is ditnini1hed. Thia is e:ipeciwly the case with SCR 871 which has contributed to 11 conaiderablc raising of expectations on the part of the Croatian autborities. 4 I would llSk that this message be shown to the Secretary-Ocnera.l. He must know the urgency of my needs . DISTRIBUTION: .P.te:-T.1.c..r:J...... i.N .tc. . JNXE&NAL : .....?i £fff.l ...... W$...... FC, DFC, COS, COPO •• ii' l, I l, f .,·, •· UNPROFOR ZAGRE~b I :3 •3 :J- 1 O- 2 :J 1 0 : S S NOTE OH THE POLITICAL DRVELO.FMENT IN THE l7-R,Y - 1. Yester~ay.-.,.~J20-.. :• repUblican .Parlia:m.ent and call~ elections for 19 Dec~r .. The news camQ RS a political bombshell. This calculated political move angered both tittJ Serbian Radical Party ( SRS) and the Serbian ~enewal Movement (SPO), as it not only $aved the ruling Socialist • Party of s~rbia from losing the no-oo~fidence vote in the P~rliament, it also cauqht the opposition parties unpr~pared for an parliamentary electicn to bQ held in ju8t two ~onths' time. As a r~sult of this b~sically unconstitutional actton, the ruling SPS has increased its chances of winning the n'l!xt parliamentary election. 2. for sorne thne, th«i decision by SRS'$ leader Seselj to introduce a no-confidence motion on the Serbian Gcverrunent had be~~ regarded a~ ~n "inoautious ~ove~, as his party aid not $eem to hav~ enough support from the other opposition partiQs, ~hile leader of another moat influential opposition party the SPO Vuk Draskovlc banned his d~putiee from voting with the SRS. The dismal situ8tion in the othar opposition parties, in which their leaders engaged in internal ~quabbling rather than developing strategies to defeat the Government or 0q>loring ways of eonverging and uniting with other parties1 had given a very clQar impression that all h~d Qeen going Oh w~ll with the -ruling party, althougn.on a short tern basis, At --· , ,. _, I _. I '" " UNPRO FOR ZAGRE~_ 006 t:3:3:3-10-2:3 I O=SS 6 0 :3547 :3 --r--212g 3/ro - 2 - the ~eginning of the parliamentary debat~ on the SRS'~ no con.fidence motiqn,, · G:S&.nces_...tt(at th~_Serb1an Gcivernment ·· would fa--11.:. -· .- ----~- - -· ~ ,---=,._ ~- .• appeared to be glight. Even Seselj himself acknowledged that the s~rbian Governmentwoul SRS) t.1on 't h21ve enough vo.t:es". 3. Ho"'av·er, VUk Draskovic's declaration of r:.ot supporting the SRS 1 & motion was Ohly a tac~ic aimed at hiding his real intentions. At a tirne when there was not good opportunities on whioh his ~rty would benefit substantially and meddling in the SPS/SRS's "family matter" CO\lld serve no useful purposes, his avo~al sounded som~t,,:hat convincing. What is more, when he said he would not allow bis deputies tc support the Radical ?arty, he was re~lly making a telnt While he had been hoping that the fight bet~~en the s~s and the SRS would w~a.ken them both. Tl\.e only thing he was unsure of was how long h~ had to wait. Th~n the t~mpo of political developinents quickened tc the ~:: dwindled the sanguine expActa~ions of the Governnent. When another case of polic~ brutality in which a Belgrade woma.~ had been beaten WhQn Sh4::'! was standing in line for rationed flour '4ns bought to 1 ight, Vuk O~askov ic and his party il11l'llediately saw this as :n opportunity that they can take advantage- of. To eI:lba.rrass and discredit the Serb.!.an Go•,.~rnmant, they call IX\ !or the resig11atior1 of the Intgrlor Minister, 8 man in the inner circle of Presider.t Milosevic. Deputies of tte OEPOS ex~licitly said that the Interior .~ ~ Minister would have to l:'esign or the "Serbian Gover1~111ent will go", ------.. ,. '._;I V I • • 006 I '33 :3 --1 0 - 2 :3 1 0 : 5 6 UNPROF OR ZAC-i F-:'E~ .. ~ - 3 - and toey declined to accept the apology ~ade by the Minister to the woman ;ln hi~ own _n~~ and_ Q.Q_'oehalt·of ~hG. oaj:ire_sartj~a.n polic~-- - .\_ ,--.....~ - - . ·~ . _-J- . - force with a pledge that everything would be done to punish the culprits. 4. The S!>O's change of stance abruptly ravQrs~d the course of events in Serbia and created the ''arith1r.etic prerequisite!;" for thE! Serbian Government to fall. Amidst the prevailing esti~ations that the Governnent would fall soon even if it survived the no confidenoe vote, all political partl~r1 ha.d practically launched their ~lection campaigns, either by consolidating their ranks or announcing new strategies. The only doubt remai~ing w~s how early elections would be held. Some observers bEliaved tha~ the ruling Party wanted elections to be held as soon i?l-S possible w-hilt:? others consid~red that they would delay them until the next spring . s. ~lthough Pre~ident Milosevic's dissolution of th~ Farliarn.ent came unexpectedly, with -hindsight, the motive behind this shrewd poli tici!ln should have surprised nobodz-. The opposi. tior: parties wera apparently angered by his unconstitutional way of dissolving the ParliaMent, the timing of his decision as well as hi~ motive. According to the Serbian constitution, the President has the power to dissolve the Parliamentr but only when its work is blOc}C0d. As a mat tel:' of fact, the se:rb.ian Parliament was in the course of debating the SRS's inltiatod no-confidence motion and therefor,a its work was m::,t block«d'": I-'or this r~ason, Seselj .,. ._ _,, I '- ! 6 0:3547:3 U~~P ROFOR ZAGRE B 006 - 4 ... cri ticis~a Milosevic as 11 viola.t ed the. cons ti tut ion", Vuk Dra sko·,1i c d2scribed his move· a&. a "hJgh~hande9:. aot". and 1~anti-con&titutioI1.al. . : ---··-... ·~ ._....,- - ...... move 11 , and the other parties called it "risky", "a farce" 1 11 'Undernocratic 11 and the like. 6. The oppo~.i,..tio.n parties wei;-e lDOSt dismayed by the fact t.~at President Milosevic's tactio had saved the ruling SPS from an ilt\Jilediate defeat if the Parliam~nt would vot~-on the SRS initiated no-confidence motion, a first e~er possible defeat by th~ SPs. In this case, all the opposition parties w~re the loser. On tha otner hand, Milosevio'o having parlia111enta:ry @lQcticns held on 19 December would also bri.ng more advantages than d5.sadvantages to the SPS. In this case, the opposition parties will be the disadvantaged. -- As elections ~ill be held in two months' time during which the electoral law cannot be amended as there i~ no parlianent unless the G<>vernment change~ it b::y decree ► time is too short for many opposition parties to get access to th~ mostly state controlled media (especially the TV) through which thei r campai gn messages can n,ost effectively get across the voters, and to gather adequate caraF~ign funds. As these elections ar~ not to be held in six month$ ' time as some oppo$ition parti~s had hoped for, in which case the Government would take en the no-cor.fidence vote and lose it, the opposition is again at a disadvantage. , J 6035 47 3 ...... -· . UNPRCIFOR Z AGR EB 006 - 5 - -- President Milosevic and his Covernment had for sotna time been optimistic_ ab~ut~ll.;. .B.9et?1an pea..9e pr9spe<=t_s, but- t.ha Bosnia12 .. . ~- - · • . _...J. .. .- .. ~ · - - Parliament's rQjection of the peace packaga lata S~ptembe~ has made them less confident than before. Meanwhil~, they have also rQalized that sanctions would not be lifted very soon. Therefore, in 'the · ~inds of-both Milosevic and th9 ruling Party, holding the elections soone~ rather than lat~r would havQ tha advantagds of ~aintaining ~o~e o! the credit Milosevic had gained through-his mediating role in the Bosnian peao• talks and ~voiding the disadvantages Of being blamei:1 for sevei;-e,l mo:re rJonths' Guttering on the part of the populace frcro more economic hardships and continu~d $anctions. - - Social and economic situation in Serbia ahd th9 FR~ in the Jllonths to GOllle wlll not see any :nu~aningful improvement. However, when elections ~re held in O~oem.ber, the Goverruoent can ~~pect to preserve much of tbeir popular support and can even manage to put more goods and rood on the shelves one or two weeks befo~e th~ elections to $how that it h~s improved t.he economic situation, although this c~n only ~isl~ad some sinple-rninded citizens and old p~nsioners. If ele(;:tions are. to be held r:.axt spring; economic situation can get f~r worse than anybody cou~d imagine, so much so that no conjurer's trick by ths Government coul~ dec~ive those who have sndured another miserable winter. When ~lections ~r-e held o~ 19 Decembe:t, Yugoslav emigrant -~.J.. - wor ker sin European countries who are opposed to Milosevic and his 61.)J547J------• ' II 1, 1 II ! II \ U l... l. . ' A •"""" I I\., 006 Party arG not yet home for Christmas and for regi~tration, so no threat from t.hell'l...£._ 'R. .-c-1:~L-r1ke}.y that by a· ~.decree, -PrQsiden_t .:. . ' . ~ -- ... . ' _-J -- Milosevic may change the present proportional repr~sgntation elflctor~l systoro to a simple r.ia jori ty gystel!l. If th~ Go•1erruuent does not win in the first round of the elections h~ld und~r the new electoral system, the second round would be held o~ th~ 2nd or 9th of January, by which ttm~ th~sa emigrant workers will have left Serbia. 7. lt was no surprise that both the S.RS and the SPO had been very angry at Milosevic's move. Since last O~c~m.ber, Seselj's party had become more crganized and powerful and his own popularity ratings had been growing fast. surveys have shown that Seselj had won over ~any undecided voters in se~bia wbo could well vote for the s~s. Milos~vic's endeavour in the peace process in the tor~er Yugoslavia had also been interpreted by seselj as curtailing his increasing influence both in Bosnia and in Krajina. It sevm~d that Milosevic had realize<'.i that .t~ continued allittnce with Seeelj 's Radical Party would do mor8 dis~arvice than service to himself and his party. To convince th~ international co:rrununi ty to gradually lift th~ s~nctions against the FRY, Milosevic had to show that he had nothing to do with members of the SRS, many of whom are para:ro.ili tary trooptS in the tor:mer Yugoslavia. The SPS 's unprecedentedly tieroe accusations and abusQS against Seselj after Seselj introd~oe~ the no-confidence motion on the Serbian ·· J ' Parlial'Clent. was ind~cative o! its intent that it was tempted to 1333- 10 -2 3 10 :53 6 035 4 73 UNF'RIJFOR ZAGREB - ..:_ •-·• - • 1. ../.' V '-" - •• - J • \J• 1 j -, ._it 'w,11 ", L.,C.:.L , lJf,- ◄_,:- 00 6 - ••-• ..L J. 1...J ':.I ✓ _ ._ ,t._ I termiiMte its tacit alliance with seselj'~ Party and it possible rid him of the Serbi4r1 politJ.c'al ar~na . . .- .- -...... _ _ - .. ·---:.-___f- a. The SPO had be~n consider9d as the only party holding the balance shortly before the much-expected vote on the SRS' s no confidence motion. T~ undorline his party's importanc~, Draskovic called on Pr'2!sident Milosevic to hold COn$ulte.tions with th~ democratic opposition, dis~olve the Parliament and fonn a transi tiona.l Government of expert.s. When this tailed to produce the expected result, th~ SPO and the N~w Del:locracy party vowed to vote against the Governm~nt in tha no-confidenc~ motion. As Milosev:c's move on dissolving the Parliament upstaged Dr~skovic in the sense that he had to fight against the Govern~~nt en terms laid dow~ by the GoverM~4lt rath~r than by the del!K)c~~tic opposition, bras~ovic had good reasons to become frustrated. 9. At this moment, President Milosevic and the ruling SPS seem to~ in a more advantageous. position~ MiloBevio remains to be a f~rmidabl~ political heavyweight that no oth9r political figure can ma'tch. The opposition parties in the past undQr~sti'ltlatad hi£ political maneu.vers, fo!: which they had paid high prioes, i.e. losing two s:ucces~i ve elections. With his tactics and. power, including the state apparatus, h~ defeat~d former Prime Ministar Panic and got rid cf Fed~ral Pr~sident cosic. He still enjoys considerable popular support and _is r.eg_arded as the best man who - . . ,..J . represents and saf Gg-'Ja.rds Serl:>J.a I s na.tional interest, especi~11y by 6 (1:354 7:3 U~~PRIJFIJR ZAGREB 006 \-_,,. ,-,··.•.,rl lt"( tiCLIJr-'rll ) e ·-- . ~ 1:: I I t::-•·1';1 .Y;,t1 - e - the older generation and the pensioners, who constitute more than 25 per cent of -thEr-:::ralector=ate. H"3;_ is l!lso ~ t!ig~re · -whom · th~ __. ------.... ·---,...__ ..J- _ .- international community could or would count on to continue the Serbia's p0-sitiv~ inp\lt to tha peac~ procesa in Bosnian and Her~egovina, although his influence is not absolute. His party has abundant funds for Q1Qct1on oampaign and a firm grip on tha official m~dia, espeoi~lly th~ ri:v, by whose indoctrination many simple-minded voters and housewives have been mes~erized. 10. Opposition parties are now in a much lllore disadvsr,t.ageous position than before. They have been further ~eakened by Mllosevlc's move. Tima is not on their side as they have to decide th~ir next moves vary guickly. -- It is unlikely that th~ SRS would win much support in the election campaign. 1bere is a limit to ~hich their nationalistic zeal can sway th~ electorate and win mor~ following. Seselj's call for u111:>er~ting tne state medta" and reduce the SPS's lttonopoly ~e: un'iik~ly to bG very successful ih a ahcrt span of time. -- In addition to curtailing their personal ambitions a11d giving up their continual contention for power and positions, leaders of the various opposition parties have to :make ganuina ef!orts to patch ~P their differences on issues ccnc~rning Serbian nation~l interests ~nd form~ co~n platform with which they can - -~~ - really challenge the present Government. tt C 1 CI 'it 006 1•3:33:....10 - 23 1 1 : 01 603 54 73 I:'. ,·r- ·i--· 1,.-,_ If-<' 8 :-l ~,,,'. ,,_•: ..:-J .. ~Ll : I -·.1. '::f":1 ..) u :·: ~ b · -- A co~lition of the opposition that is expected to beconu~ an alternative goverri!1'~QJ in ~~ia co~id on_ly ~:. meaningful if t~ ..:.._ , - - ·--,...__ , . ....,,._ ...J.- • - - sro dQCides to jo'in-. Indications are that it would ~ di:f f icul t to persuade Draskovic to give up his intended boycott of the December elections. However, this does not rule out the possibility that he might change his mind and go to toe elections. His party is still the only party that the SPS worries most. Oraskovic has charis~a among and appeal to the voters. His position as the leader of the party is unoh~ilenged, as there would be no sw without Draskovie and therefore, the probabi.lity of a split is also slight. A coJllbination of th~ SPO'S and the citizen'6 Alliance'~ assets would make a signiticant difference in that this will offer both popular appeal and think-tank, But time is not on Draskovic 1 s sida and he knows this very well. And Oraskovic also needs more time fer his idea on a ci~il state and on hUJ:\Bn rights to get across to tne o~dinary people. l '.:.19:J - IU - 22 U2 : 18 .. CNZ 898 CYZ 770 Pl/2 01o(lt OUTGOING CODE CABLE TO: STOLTENBERG, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB INFO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA ✓ FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK DATE; 21 OCTOBER 1993 N NUMBER: Msc-2035 SUBJECT: ~ actions in the JJNPAli Further to our MSC-2025, please find attached a self explanatory letter to the Croatian Permanent Representative, Dr. Mario Nobilo. We felt that such a strong response was required since the information given to the Security Council for i nternal use was also made available to the press. c:::: -0 0:, -C 0:, GJ C/) ~- =- :;,:: co C""-' C/) c .• z ~ ··········• ...... o> 3 c:.: ==:> _. :..:. en ·············•··············• .. N 19 :3:3 -1 0 -2 2 02 : 13 560:3 .. CNZ 898 CYZ 770 P2/2 UNITED NATION.S • NATIONS UNIES .-.:. .. , .. ... ,0011•11 - ~4 1,tllll~C. l'C:,C T "'"-\. IJ ~ ,.,~o ..... r,~""• · NI If ,e,o ,, CA II..C. AD('Hllt , , ...... o,.c,. r ~ , ... r.:c••"Mlq\JI l,,l tofA TI Olo\l• Ml\o¥TO .. JII 21 October 1993 Dear Ambassador Nobilo, I should like to refer to your letter dated 15 October 1993 to the President of the Security Council (S/26588) and to a press release issued by your Permanent Mission today, in both of which you quote extensively from the daily situation reports of UNPROFOR to the President of the Secu~ity Council, I should like to emphasize that, contrary to your statement in the above letter, the UNPROFOR situation reports are not official documents of the United Nations. They are being made av•ilable upon the request of the Security counci l as one of many sources of information for the Council's internal deliberations. The up-dates contain the raw and i n many cases unconfirmed information provided by the field on a daily basis in a fast-changing situation. They are clearly treated by the council as such and are not quote~ in any official Counci l document. The situation up-dates are copied to you as a matter of courtesy. I would therefore appreciate your refraining from using the information contained in these s ituation reports , or quoting further from them, in any public document. I am most grateful for your cooperation i n this matter. Yours s~erely , Ll L.~ . ---- Ko!i n Under-secretary~General tor Peace-keeping Operations His Excellency Dr. Mario Nobile Permanent Representative of Croatia to the United Nations New York ' ,/ 18 -' 10 ' 9.3 20:10 'B',38 41 li6i09 liNPROFOR-SRSG 38 41 1767[1'3 [4)00 1 ,;3 010/11 / UNITED NATIONS Office of the SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY ~GENERAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA FAX TRANSMITTAL SHEET To: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK DISTRIBUTION: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA .&:::---n.ct-1 ...... J ..S.fc . ...,..,,.PM .Grl\: .················· ·····:-J ...... From: STOLTENBERG, ZAGREB .. SC-...... 1.JS .... ~ ···································bL ..... 0 ······························· .:SJb .... Info: ································ :::fw...... Date: 18 October 1993 Subject: VISAS AND TOLLS IN THE FRY Attached plE!ase memorandum of today's date addressed to Head of Civil Affairs, UNPROFOR, on the subject. UNITED NATIONS Office of the SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA To: Mr Cedric Thornberry Head of Civil Affairs Copy: Mr. Kofi Annan Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations ~L--v-- From: Thorvald Stoltenberg Special Representative of the Secretary-General Info: Date: 18 October 1993 Subject: VISAS AND TOLLS IN FRY '\ 1. During a recent meeting I had with President Milosevic and Foreign Minister Jovanovic, I raised with them the issues of visas and tolls which you brought to my attention in your Z-1280 and 1304. 2. On the subject of visas, I asked them to reconsider their position even if they were legally entitled to require visas. I noted in this regard that UNPROFOR's presence in the FRY was advantageous for the country. 3. On the issue of tolls/fees, I stated that such levies were not appropriate and I asked them to reconsider the decision on this point also. 4. President Milosevic was obviously not informed about the new requirements for the UN in the FRY. Foreign Minister Jovanovic replied that some countries had recently begun requiring visas from FRY nationals, which had led the Government to revisit its visa policy. UNPROFOR had been caught in that process. On the -~------·- ·------~--- - 2 - visa policy, UNPROFOR had been caught in that process. On the tolls, he stated that the FRY was short of revenue due to the imposition of sanctions and therefore had to levy tolls for road maintenance and repairs. ae promised nevertheless to look into both issues in the light of my requests. · '' ... CYCY ++ - ...... - 1~993-09-23 10:24 6035 473 UNPROFOR ZAG REB o,o / ,, czN:::-120; UK J ,Jl OF OR CRYPTO CABLE C? ~.=.Jo~o .fH•.,-r..t.P.~ ...... !N.&. . . l M M I!! D I A T E ..~.R...... ~~.. ... P5 ...... hL ..... PK COCE RESTRICTED ...... paga· .. ·1·· TO STOLTENBIRC, ICFY GENBVA INFO ANNAN, UNATIONS NEW YORI< FLIISCHHAUJR, UNA~IONS NBW YO~K FROM / C STOLTENBERG, UNPROFOR ZAGREB tJ~," DATE r: 23 SEPTEMBER 1903 NUMBlslR: tJNPROFOR z .. J18 B SUBJECT: VISA UQtJIRQQT ESWLUHIP BY 'tffE. OD.DAL R.JPU2LU: OE YQQOSIA\q;A_ ( SERBIA MP MQNT~HJQBQ l. Effective 19 June, the FRY issued regulations which require entry viaas for ~ll nat1ona11 of countries whioh, in th•ir turn, t•quire antry viaas tor PR~ nationals. These regulations e~e intanded to apply also to UNPROFOR metnl)ers. UNN'i MSC-1144 dated lB June r•tars. our position has been tnat, entry of UNPROFOR ••ftlbera, into t.he FRY ■hould be in •oeordance wit.h paragr•phs 32 Jnd J3 ot the d:tatt SOFA (on which there was nevar any diiaagreem•nt). Paragraph 32 provides inter a1ia that the Force Commander and members of UNPROFOR shall be exempt fro~ passport and viaa r•~ulationa and immigration inapeation. Paragraph lJ establ1anas the requirement• tor an individual or oolleotive 'fflOVelfl•nt ordar, issued by or under the authority ot 1:he Force Co11UDander or s p.trtic1pat1ng state and a personal identity card 1ssuec2 by UNPROFOR. We have h~d two meetings •t the Mini,try of Foraign Aftairs ot the FRY on this matt~r; one on 6 July and the ether 14 J~ly. UNPROFOR r•preaentation was hladed by Auger, who was joined at the 14 July meeting by CAO, the FRY delegation was headed by ~ra1:,assador Bogda~ovic, ooputy Mifli&ter or Foreign Affairs. +t CYCY ... l 993-09-23 10:24 6035 47 3 UNPROF OR ZAG REB 003 2 ' \ ) ) Am.bassa<:!or Cicanovic, also Deputy Mini ■ ter ot Foreign Affairs, who ha~ been our 1nterloc~tor in th9 SOFA negotiations, was also pres•nt but did not play an active role. The reasons for the deciaion at issue, aa conveyed to us, ware twofold. It was explained tnat they h•d had a V$ry liberal poliey in thi& t'$Spact bUt that since no~ s null\bar ot ooQntries ~ere imposing visa requirements on l'RY nationals, they hac1 de~ided likewi ■ e to astabli&h auch requirements. S$ccndly, ~e Jituation •ince UNPROFOR !ir$t came nad cnanged so that UN~ROFOR had now really no mandate in th,_ t•rritory of tha P'R'l, th~t sandaee having ainee been stated by tne security co~nc1l to oe in Croatia, 9H and the FYROM only. Thi• ia broadly true, except: I . (a) the mandate for monitoring of airfields by UNMOs; (b) th~ I moni~oring by UNMOs of the damilitarizad zone in Kontenegro in oonne~io~ with the Prevlaka manaate; and (c) the UNMOs residual ~onitoiing role in som~ areas ot the territory at the PRY which border sector East in accordance with the agreementa reached ror the demilitarization in that area. It shoul~ bf: not~ 1n ~hie connexion that snould t.J1a 11 cosmt1tio 11 cnan(lei to UNPROFOJ'('s mandate be made, this would reaffirm the FRY's position that basically UNPROFOR is a peaoe ... ke1ping mission outside tha FRY. The "Vane• Plan" a• it is aet out at Annex III at the Report of the Secretary-General, dated 11 Dace1&ber l9Ql, provt..d••, at P4ragr8ph 21, for UNPJlOFOI\ to have 11 I\Jb-office at Belgrac1e. we have presently itt Belgrade, a Military Liaison ottice and a civil Affairs Ott ioe headed by a Civil Affair• coordinator, which includes a Press and Information section, together v! th the naceseary ad.lllinietrati ve suppQrt tor same. we have a small logistios unit at the former JNA baee in Panoavo, which i~ used to supply our personnel in BH, and we supply our troops and other personnel in the PYRON through the tArritory of the 1''R'i. In addition, we hav• a nulrl))er of par ■ onruH who must go thete bt"ietly on various matters or UNP~OFOR~related business, o~ wno have to transit its territory en r¢ut~ to or from BH and the PYROM. w Ln..;r '"' '.'.::l '.::13 ---: 0 9- 2:3 10 : 25 6035473 UNPROF OR ZAGREB 1, 1 1)3 At th@ second meeting, CAO, Baldie, pointed out tnat &Ra rule United Nations solaiers do net travel with their passports in their possession, travelling instead on th11ir UN ID cards while on a mission. In reply, they also raised some ooncerns about iuisuse of UNPR0F0R ID cards - At the time, we ml!lde a counterpropoaal which is in accordance with paragraph& 32 and 33 of the draft Agreement: we offered to proviae them with advance information on the movements ot our 0ersonnel into the FRY, as w•ll as with the movement orders. In practice we have just been $ntering and exiting with the ID oard, not tully applying the above-mentioned provisions. It waa ngreea that they would di ■ cuas tbiG with thei:r authorities and we woulct discuss with ours. A follow up meeting was postponed and the matter lay dormant until a few days ago tifhen a meeting to continue discussions was requeated. It has now been set for 29 September. If a visa system can be agreed to which is sufficiently flexible so as not to hamper our operational requirement&, this should not perhaps in itselt, be a big issue. aowaver, this may also be a first step to their disen9aging themselves from the provisions of the draft and model SOFA which have so far been applied. It waa indicated at th• first of the above-mentioned meetings that, in view of the changed circumatances of UNPROfOR in the FRY, the question of a need tor a SOFA would hav~ to be reviewec at a separate future meeting, and tnat the convention on the Privileges and Immunities ot the United nations would aurr ice as a framework for governing the relationship between the FRY and UNPROFOR. In thie context, the acceptance or the visa requirement could be conatrued as an acceptance by UNPROroR that the draft and model SOFA~ do not apply to our relation•hip with the FRY. This could have other more far-reaching implications, not tna least of which being, the discontinuance of the obligation to provicte to UNfROFOR tree ot charge or at the most favourable rate, as appropriate, certain premises and facilities which, la predicated on the SOFA provisions. ~~-~-..,~ C-YCY It ~hould be noted that UNHCR, who was likewise taced with this visa requirement, has had to comply with it. They have so tar not had any major problems on this aocount ror their operation. Should our errorts to diasusde tne FRY trom applying t he viaa raquire~e~t to u1 fail, we snould have to consider what course of action to follow. In the interim, we intend, at the next meeting, to oontinue ~o maintain our po•ition. How•ver, unless political pressur& is exercised at a higher: level, UNPROFOR, as other United Nations organiiations operating in the area, may have no choice but to a:coept the viga requirement ana negotiate as flaxible prooadu~e& as poaainle. . l4]uiT2-~7 UNPROFOR-SRSG ..,..,.., SRSG GENEW A - . . I 2 S; 0 S ' 9 3 15_: 2 -1 "5'38 41 li6i09 28-AUG-1993 l~:43 BHC VB KlSELJAK THE ~EST oto/fl/ P.01 flfit/Q ·~OS 'ML M lffcl· s-Ps r-rz cc..: BH CO:M:MAND MA:J:N Page 1 off ROUTINE/PRIORITY/ UNCLASSIFIED/REST 0/0NLY .. OUTGOING FAX NO. DATJ: 28 12:00 At7GUST 1993 // / -· TO: CEDRIC THORNBERRY, DCM FR()M: VICTOR ~.NOREEV, CAC f ( Cl HQ, ZAGRES I BH COMMAND KISELJ'AK FAX NO: l·tAX: . l L ATTN: MOHAMMED ABDULAZIZ ' FILE REF NO ... CIVIL AFFAIRS, ZAGRE~- DRAFTER . DAVID TITLE . /'- ' RELEASING OFF . SIGNATURE .• I ( -. lit,. INFO ,.. FC, GEN COT DISTRIBUTION t CMOR, LT GEN BRit-EMONT -- (FORWARD) __Ac..-noW ...... i.tJ ~c .... COS, BRIG HAYES - (KISEIJAK) G2, G3, GS ·. ! - -~TS...... ':Jf::~.-. V FAX NO . ' _1',_~·---····················.s)·"'::.r:~ SUBJE:CT: SERB ASSEMBL'f r- OVERNIGHT UPDATE l,U'l ., ·····------·--- .... &a -:ruil MESSAGE ·------·--···· ··· ...... f'S · G 'J.J~ '!~, As requested by Bfr;ig Wilson, the following is an update on SC. the BH Assembly. · The Serb Assemb'l/y met in Pale yesterday for the first of two day-long sessions. , l\aradzic is pu bing hard to hav~ the Geneva package accepted by delegates. Ma y of those delegates, however, are arguing strongly against king the tarritorial concessions called for. Del~gat~s are sa 'd to be focussing on territories which they regard as tradit' nally Serb, but Which have be~n allocated for the 'Muslim' r ublic. Karadzic is reported to have lost patience with hard-line delegates, calling some of them 'paranoid', He s ~+guing that-gains · in international legitimacy are ~ore impor ant than the territory being surr~ndered.- (At present the s rbs control approxi~ately 70% of the BH's · area, unde~ the Gen va agreement they ~ould end up with 52%,) ~c--1 &- .... . u:1,1. 0 I Q;J ~ 40 • a:~ ..%... +e, "' J «·· a; .r .. (!;en-,..~ ~ ffi ~ ~,~·~ 010/,, TO: LORD OWEN MR STOLTENBERG FROM: JEREMY BRADE DATE: 23 AUG 93 SUBJ: ROLLBACK FIGURES ON THE BASIS OF THE LATEST MAP THE SCALE OF THE SERB WITHDRAWAL IS GIVEN BELOW. FIGURES ARE FOR TERRITORY CHANGING CONTROL AND DO NOT INCLUDE THE DEMILITARIZATION OF PALE. SERB WITHDRAWAL FROM CROAT MAJORITY REPUBLIC AS PERCENTAGE OF WHOLE COUNTRY 4.0 % AS PERCENTAGE OF SERB HELD TERRITORY 5 . 8 % SERB WITHDRAWAL FROM MUSLIM MAJORITY REPUBLIC AS PERCENTAGE OF WHOLE COUNTRY 10.4 % AS PERCENTAGE OF SERB HELD TERRITORY 14.9 % SERB WITHDRAWAL FROM SARAJEVO DISTRICT AS PERCENTAGE OF WHOLE COUNTRY 2.3 % AS PERCENTAGE OF SERB HELD TERRITORY 3.2 % TOTAL SERB WITHDRAWAL AS PERCENTAGE OF WHOLE COUNTRY 16.7 % AS PERCENTAGE OF SERB HELD TERRITORY 23.9 % ' AREAS QF SERB WITHDRAWAL CROATIA BANIA LUKA . • SERBIA AREAS CURRENTLY HELD BY SERBS FROM WHICH THEY WOULD WITHDRAW MONTENEGRO FORCES AND HAND OVER RULE: 16.7% OF THE COUNTRY 23.9% OF SERB HELD TERRITORY ZEPA-GORAZDE LINK ROAD WHICH IS PART OF THE MUSLIM MAJOR1TY REPUBLIC ..,. 0 ID /II . . ,~1 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE . . . . -STRICTE!)N THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA MEMORANDUM A: REF: TO: Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg JPM/jae cc: Ambassador Ahrens Ambassador Rey DE: GENEYE, FROM: Jean-Pierre Masset 27 July 1993 OBJET: SUBJECT: Mission in Belgrade and Vojvodina (20-22 July -1993) MAIN POINTS: Situation deteriorating in Sandzak First meeting between Agoston and Pankov next week President Milosevic's position Apart from my conversation with Foreign Minister Mr. Jovanovic on 22 July (my communication of the same day), I met: in Belgrade with Mrs. savovic, Federal Minister for Human and Minari ty Rights, Mr. Slavko Gordie , --Federal Minister of Education, Miss Vlatka Mihelic from Helsinki Watch and Ambassador Tore Bojh (CSCE). in Subotica with Mr. Bela Tonkovic, leader of the Croat community of Vojvodina and with Dr. Csaba Sepsey, deputy of Mr. Agoston, leader of the Hungarian community (who was out of the country). 1. Mr. s. Savovic gave me a lecture on the responsibilities of the international community and of the Croats in the present situation in former Yugoslavia. For instance, 40,000 Croat soldiers (from Zagreb) were fighting in Mostar and in the centre of Bosnia). For the rest, i.e. the minorities, the Yugoslav Government is in control and has nothing to hide. 2. Mr. Gordie confirmed the dimension of the parallel system of education in Kosovo: 300,000 young Albanians refuse to attend regular Yugoslav schools and universities. This was "a mark of the separatist policy of Rugova". If the Albanians were ready to accept two principles: (a) Kosovo is part of Serbia and of Yugoslavia; and (b) the matter is purely educational, then a dialogue may begin and Belgrade would be ready to make three concessions: acceptance of a long-term programme of education for the Albanians; reintegration of a large number of the 20,000 teachers who left the federal system; official recognition of the 2 years of schooling done by young Albanians in 1991-1993. As for the boycott of exams a last chance would be given to students in August-September. This said, curricula of studies in Albanian schools are unacceptable (for instance they ignore the Nobel Prize Ivo Andric). 3. The Helsinki Watch representative made a very sombre description of the situation in Bosnia (western responsibility in condoning Serbian aggression, double language of Milosevic, etc.) and in Yugoslavia (media under control, etc.). In the Sandzak, an ethnic cleansing operation has been going on for several months, the Serbs pushing the Muslims southward from the Bosnian border. Many are leaving the Sandzak. No foreign muslims have been seen in the area. 4. The CSCE Representative was of the opinion that - under the present conditions - we should not insist on maintaining missions in FRY, which would be unable to work, and he put part of the blame for the termination of CSCE activities in FRY on Member States because of their stiffness and their ignorance vis-a-vis Serbian pride. The problem should be reconsidered in broader terms. 5. The Croats of Vojvodina appear to have very reasonable requests regarding their "cultural autonomy" based on the fact that, for the first time in history, they are separated from the other Croats. They are refused the status of a minority since Belgrade claims they are one of the constituent peoples of Yugoslavia. Tonkovic insists on the point that they act as faithful citizens of FRY and they want to have, at least, one representative in the Federal Parliament. Arguing that borders should not be changed by force, they ask for the demilitarization of Vojvodina's border with Croatia and Hungary (50 kms). The departure of CSCE missions is seen by Tonkovic as an encouragement to extremists. 6. The Hungarian representatives noted two recent contradictory signals: a meeting is scheduled next week in Novi Sad between Agoston and Pankov, President of Voyvodina. Apparently Churkin played a role in this "small step forward" a renewal of incidents and threats against Hungarians ( Sesels' men marching in the streets of Subotica, destruction of a statue, some shots on private houses, etc.). They have a programme for autonomy, based, they claim, on Lord Carrington's ideas. - 3 - They say that their advantages in terms of education and media are gradually being reduced. The Federal Minister of Minorities, al though Hungarian herself, is not helping (this is an understatement). From other conversations, I note: President Milosevic Opinions are very different: some think he is fully in control (media, popular support, police, weakness and division of the opposition, etc.), others that he is losing ground (unemployment, economical difficulties, sanctions, etc.) and that he needs an enemy (hence, after the Croats and the Muslims, it may be the Kosovars). Sanctions Here also, local observers are divided: inflation (10% per day), difficulties of all sorts are making life unbearable and unemployment increases (possible social unrest). On the other hand, the country is self-sufficient in food; small commerce is booming (smuggling) and the situation may be acceptable for a long time. It has kept its essential capabilities (reserves of gasoline, spare parts, etc.) and, besides, is now 100% Serbian. This said, recent signs of discontent have appeared in the last weeks among young officers. -j'fn 24 MAI '93 12:55 UNOG GENEVA 41 22 91 70123 . ,.j b~ CODE R~STf~iC'T f:::D UtWG Tnlf.~i!J~it Palais d& '93 HAY 24 11 :52 u R P R o r o R OU'l'GOING CODI CABLB TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YOR~ !NPO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA FROM: WAHLGRD, UNPROFCR ZAGREB DATE: 24 MAY 1993 NUMSERi l)~C)fu~ ~,_ ~~\ SUBJECT: ~OPA • YUGOSLAVIA Reyr MSC-833, the lack of a SOFA has not proved tc be a ma.-ror impediment to UNPR0F0R operations in the FRY to-dat". As indicated in our UNPROFOR Z-417, the two major hold backs to the signing of a SOFA, at least on the face of the arguments currently being put forward, would appeal:' to focus on the name "Federal Republic of Yuqoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)" and the definition of UNPR0F0R. In the absence of a signed SOFA, we have, on occasion, invoked the provisions of tba draft agreement on the basis that thair Government's acceptance of UNPROFOR's pre~ence in the FRY implies acceptance of the established praoticea and principles of peace keeping, which of course form the basis of the model SOFA and in turn the draft agreement in its present form. While disagreement has been encountered with respect to the interpretation of some provisions of the draft agreement the applicability of the provisions th~mselvaa has not bean oontested. oisagrcacnn~nts of tha nature encountered so far will most likely oontinuQ in the future ~heth•r the SOFA is signed or not. It should also be noted that at our last meeting Ambassador Cicancvic stressed their commitment to cooperating fully with UNPR0F0R under its current mandate and aotivi ties in the FRY. There was no indication that this would not be the cose tor any future mandate with which they were in agreement. Accordingly, assuming that the FRY authorities accept in DISTRIBUTION: ·rs ~-···· .. kd2 ... -· BR...... -- '. ' ) . ·:. . 24 MAI page 2 of 2 principle the deployment of the monitors, it is considered that the laok of a SOPA would not be an impediment to such deployment, and that perhaps, given that th• deplOYffient of the monitors is considered to be in furtherance of UNPROFOR's mandate, even an exchan9e of letters might not be necesaary in the circumstances. I : j ENDAt.L 4r ..,. Ui'~F'F?OFOR Z AGR EB 038 P O PC't OPPICI 01 o/ fl Date ,. ... ,~~.fl~-- ~-·---~'" '- ~ PC ~ HEADQUAR~iRS UNITED NATIONS BOSNIA HERZ~~OVINA PROTECTION FORCE COMMAND, S.A.~l•.,JJii'V.Q 10 ~ - TO: HQ UNPROFOR ZAGREB ATTN; INFO; HQ BH COMMAND KISELJAK ATTN: cos, CAC 1U ECCM HQ ZENICA ATTN: AMBSDR~T1i__...'E=·~a~A~U~L~T~- FROM; BH COMD SARAJEVO LT GEN MORILLON DATE: 14 MAY 93 FILE: BHCS/8607 SUBJECT : REPORT ON MEETING WITH PROFESSOR KOLJEVIC 1. This afternoon, I met Professor Koljevic, at his request, to discuss the latest Serb proposals on the implementation of the VOPP . From our early discussions it was clear that the Serbs wished to see an •j'.I' , intermediate phase before full implementation of the ; ~ ·1 VOPP . The proposals put forward by Koljevic were as ,. J follows : ,'· . a. Complete withdrawal of Serb forces from contested areas . Executive or b. The establishment of an I ,, I Coordinating Committee for the day-to-day ' government of BH. t::..-7.,W -6>f f '1 /~ c. BH to be viewedc::.. '1 c...... '"'""'. az a proponent part of the p r oblems facing countries of the former FRY. 2. I confirmed wi th Koljevic the value and importance of · his · first proposal. In demonstrating its application I suggested that , as a first step, we combine into one the demilitarised areas surrounding Srebrenica and Zepa. The full Canadian Battalion could be redeployed to the area and the boundaries could be extended to include the maximum possible area which the Battalion could control . Serb and BH forces in the area wouia t:nen ne expect:ea ,:o w1t:noraw, a:r-cer wn1cn Ji the area would be surrounded by a UN patrol led and monitored corridor . The corridor would be completely demilitarised and weapons i nside it would be under UN control . For the sake of equality I suggested that both Serbs and Muslim villages be included in the Safe J Area. Koljevic asked why specifically the demilitarised areas of Srebrenica and Zepa should be conjoined and formed into a much extended ' Safe Area '. My response was that this was the most sensitive area 1n 6H at: present ana, rrorn an UNPROFOR po1n~ or v1ew, there were tactical and logistic benefits for doing so . For Sara j evo , I told Koljevic that I had insufficient resources to establish a full Safe Area for the city but , as a first step, heavy weapons of both Serb and BH f{ 58 0 Sl.vSS0 9 ~-uv J'"' c The Blue Routes should also be opened as quickly as possible. Interim measures such as these could be taken in many other areas and could lead to the quicker establishment of peace. 3. For the proposal at para 1.b. Koljevic said that any notion of Karadzic, Boban and Izetbegovic working together, in any form of interim coalition governing body, was unrealistic. The Serb proposal was that a Coordinating Committee, with representation from all sides, should be formed to carry out the day to day functions of the interim government. 4. The third and final proposal resulted from the Serb perception that the VOPP was too narrow in its outlook. The Serb view is that the problems of BH should not be treated in isolation. They believe that the VOPP should pursue an economic and infrastructure development progrumrne that embraces all the countries of the former FRY. A common statement on such issues as human rights, infrastructure development 1 and a free market economy would be appropriate. !n this respect, Koljevic felt that the EEC could play a prominent part. 5. In conclusion, Koljevic said that the sustained propaganda programme against the Serbs had been 5 8 0 8Ll75809 Lt:9t 9t-5 0-855t unjustified. recent hostilities in Central and Southern BH in which the Serbs had played no part. He also remarked that would require a massive injection of mani,ower . money J and resources. Moreover, when the UN eventually left SY, the Serb view wa= that the ~ituatiou woula rever~ to that which exists today. A readjustment of the Plan was seen as the most sensible way to proceed. OT • OT C)T-C i', -C"CCT E• XP1 : 8 - H. COMMAN DE R 871 111 24 7 5 1993- 87 1 111 24 7:- :4 S #< 2 010/0 HRADQUARTERS tJNITEP NATIONS BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA PRO'r~CTION FORCE COMMAND, SARAJEVO TO: HQ UNPROFOR ZAGR~B ATTN: FORCE COMMANDER INFO: HQ 1Hi COMMAND ATTN: COS, CAC FROM: BH COMMAND SARAJEVO .,r DATE: 4 MAY 93 FILE REF: BHCS/8607 'I - - SUBJECT: REPORT ON __J1~J~J'ING WITH "{J_~_E_ .PRESIOENT - D~_ KOLJEVIC 1. This afternoon, I attended a meeting with Dr Koljevic, the Vice President of the Serb Assembly. The meeting was at Koljevic's request . 2. During his opening remarks, the Vice Presic1ent stated that the country was now at a critical phase of the peace process and that hasty action , including milit~·ry intervention by the outside world, could be ~disastrous. However, he felt that a political f £~ ~elution was possible and that tomorrow's meeting of the Serb Assembly would make some generous proposals and conclusions in the search for a peaceful statement. 3. His reason for calling the meeting was to see if UNPROFOR could extend the Srebrenica 'model" for demilitarisation to other areas of BH - most notably: Sarajevo, Tuzla, Tesanj, Bihac, Gorazde and Zepa. He acknowledged that if the demilitarisation of Srebrenica and the surrounding area was successful then the same formula could help to secure a full cease fire and a qu i ck return to peace in these areas. With, at least, the presence of UNMO's on both Serb and BH lines he felt that a full cessation of hostilities could be achieved with a minimum of UN troops. COMl'lAN DE R .. 871 1 1 1 24 7 5 1993- 8 7 1 111 24 75 '. 4 S 4. I agreeo w1th the last proposal and we decided to deploy 1mmeo1ately UNMO's in the ZRPA area. In principle the.y will be in place tomorrow (5 May 93} after a meeting in Pale with our own Liaison Officers. For the demilitarisation process, I told Koljev1c that l ~greed with him in principle but that at the moment I had insufficient troops to perform such a task. I also stressed the importance of succeeding with Srebrenica first. I told him that I needed the full cooperation of his troops on the ground in the coming days. This would be particularly important over the period 7 to 9 May 93 when a second Company Group would deploy to the area to e~tend the DMZ to the present confrontation line. I also asked him to secure agreement for additional UNMO's to be deployed to Serb positions. Koljevic ,f' agreed to these developments. He was receptive also -, to my demand for the separation of forces. This would require the Serbs to withdraw their artillery, tanks and infantry units to positions 30, 10 and 5 Krns respectively from the curren~ confrontation line. This, I told him would be essential for security and confidence building among both the local population and the refugees whom I hoped would thus be encouraged to return to their villages. I emphasised to Koljevic that we must maintain the momentum of returning to peace and that the complete demilitarisation of the Srebrenica area, including force separation, should be completed by 10 May 93. He supported this view. 5. I then advised Koljevic of the need to press ahead quickly with the demilitarisation of Sarajevo and the opening of the 'Blue Routes" into and out of the city. He did not demur when I told him that the · - first step would have to be withdrawal of the heavy ' artillery threatening the city and that the Mixed Military Working Group (MMWG) should begin discussing these issues on Wednesday 12 May 93. 6. The final point discussed was when I suggested that international journalists should be allowed unrestricted access to BH. At this, Koljevic coulO not agree. He said that the Serbs had suffered from unrelenting aggression from the world's media and that the Assembly would need to discuss the issue fully before any decision could be made. MOST f MM.EQJA -:-~ OUTGO~ CODB CABLE t,t\OST :It,,\t-i\£ bl A i-G U N P R O F O a TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS NEW YORK c.=: -0 «=-- o:> (~ INFO: VANCE, ICFY NEW YORK 1,-·1 = ,_. - v? VANCE, ICFY GENEVA FROM: WAHLGREN, UNPROFOR DATE: ~O~l MAY 1993 NUMBER: SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM B-H AMBASSADOR IN ZAGRE§ .. ' . The attached was faxed to us today at 3 : 50 p.m • Abdul-Aziz of Civil Affairs was in touch with Bisera Turkovic , BH Ambassador in Zagreb who informed him that the source of information is reliable (HVO 108 Brigade in BRCKO). The information wae passed to the Force commander in Athens and UNPROFOR BH Command/Kiseljak, to verify and follow-up. At present we are unable either to confirm or deny the content of the fax. You will be kept abreast of new developments, Endall. DISTRIBUTION: ·5········ vJ·······-··-········ -··6-11= -·•·· ·····•··. ,·················-············-·-- ····HIN--·········· -···············-·.>--~ ...... ·. : ·;; , " ,'• · ,'. • • ,. ·, I• . ' ,. •• . ' . • ,(Q) . ·' ' • ,•:' ·. .'. . . • .'' • ,·, .. I,' ' AMBA~ RBiH 1 :-ror11 ~=~~~~~=~~~~~~:{ [~;~•tt~~ -. ~. ~ c.A-m./u1.d a,da. r.Aapul,lilu1. I'iltMM l r;f,a.rc.(1,//~IJbt~ t;l.aq t',(',b. U prj_logn vA~n ~n~t.Rv1 j11mo in£orrnaoije r.a vaae delje ~ori~c~nja. Zasrob,01,05.199;, - .' . • ·.. ' ·. . .. '. ,', . ·,. : . '• :·· ' ' · .' _: . , ... . ··' . ' :, .· .·· .,' . ·,,.•... .. ·:._:·... : _ ' ' .. . ., . . . .. : ...... • . . . ',· .. . . . ' ...... ' ' . .,;. - .. -· - - -· ' (0) ARMY OF i\-1~ ~~PUBLIC CF BCSNIA·l"\CtlZEOOYINA CHIEF ST Arr 01~ THF. 108th MOTOntSED BRIG/\DE B R C K 0 S~CREO ORDERS TO Tl-II: S:E:R91.AN COLOIERS iSSUEO 11-.J AP~IL, 29th 1 ss,, COUGHT OV COMMUNICATION MGANH CF THE BOSNIAN MtMY . Wl: DELIVt:ll YOU THIS TO TnANSLATE TO YOUR LANOUACJE ANO TO COPY, ANU PLEJ\$1: lt-: POE:.filOLC iO DIS I XISUTE TO lMPOR1'ANT ADRE.$~\:.:~ IN OROER THAT FRE~ W011LD GET TO KNOW AOOUT CONTINUINa OF MONSTROUS KILLING Of UNARMC::D OOSNIAN MUSLIMS AND CROAT$ BY SERBIAN ACJt{tSSOR. 0 R D E R OF THE COMMAND OF TiiE AGRESSOR ARMY ( o r I g I n ~ I) ' SER61AN REPUBLIC MILITARY OF THE. SERBIAN REPUBLIC HIGHER COMMAND OF THE SERBIAN REPUBLIC MIUIARY 0 RD ER: TO ALL CORPS OF THE MIUT.A.RY OF THE SERBIAN REPUBLIC: 1. TO MOBILISE EVEFlYON5 THAT COULD CARRY WEAPONS WITI-iOUT NO DIFFERENCE WHO IS EHO, OR HOW OLD IS HE I 2. TO ALL COMMANDERS OF ·1HE MILITARY OF THS SERBIAN REPUBLIC - YOU ARE ALLOWED FULL FREEDOM IN LEADING At~D PREPARING OF ALL ACTIONS - UNTIED HANDS! 3. TI-IIS or-FENSIYE IS Nt\MEO "ALL OR NOTHING", OR TRANSLATED'' TO LIVI:: OR TO DIE". '1, EV[:RYTHINO ALIV~ THA'f IS ON YOUR WAY NOT TO LEAV6 ALIVE. DESTROY ~v~"'T'T!-ilNO VVHIL:H I~ 1:.iQ~NIAN MUSLIM OR CROAT. 5, NOW WE DO NOi WANl lWO THIROS OF BOSNIA ANO HERZEGOVINA, NOW ALL OF BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA SHALL BE SERBIAN LAND 11..J THE UNION WITH MOiHER SERBIA. 6. IN ORDl:R TO ACCOMPLISH OUR GOALS YOU ARE FREE AND YOU CAt~ USE ALL 01= THE WEAPONS iHAT ARE AT YOUR DISPOSAL I 7. WE WISH YOU GOOD LUCK, ANO MAY 000D Ke~P YClU, YOU SERBIAN HEROES I BANJALUKA APRIL, :29th 1Qg3_ '-..' .:J • 0 l- l, L_.I - .:J '. ) (._, Ci Q l- ..' (0) SERBIAN REPUBLIC MIUTARV or Tl IG SE~SIAN RE?lJRI IC ~101-!ER COMMAND or THE SERalAN REPUBLIC MlUf ARY ORDER 1. ORDER TO ATIACK MAOLAJ WHICH WA8 BUSPt:Nl.)f;.0 ON 22.0~ .1Q~3. 1$ NOW I-JOT VALID. :i. w,.;. GAVE;: YOU A rULL r~c.r:OOM AND THEi LAST CHANCE; TO CCNQUARt: M~GL~J AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. IN THAT CASt;. i6SANJ WILL AUTOMATICALLY 9E SURROUNDED BY OUR TROOPE. SUT MAGLAJ MUST SE CONQUERED NO MATTER WHAT PRICE WOULD IT TAKE. IF NOT WE SHALL STOP SENDING YOU ANY KIND OF HELP. 3. SERBIAN COMMUNl'TY OF M.A.OLAJ MUSi BE $ERBIAl-l FOR REAL, WHERE, WHeN AND HOW WOULD IT 9E DONE WE ARE NOT lNTE~ESTED. ONLY THING WE ARE INTERESTED IN IS THA r IT MUST SE DONE iN SHORTf:ST TIME AND ON MOST EFFECTIVE WAY . . 4. PtrlSON RESPONSIBLE FOH THIS OPeRATION ARE YOU MR. LISICA (rOX) AND YOUR STAFF. WE WILL GIVE: YOU ALL THE W!:APONS ANO STAFF YOU WISH. ANO IN THE CASE OF FAILURE PUl~NISHMcNT WILL BE: ~TOPING OF ALL KIND OF HELP TO YOU ANO YOUR UNITE. BANJA LUKA, APRIL, 29th 1gg3_ +tr CYCY -'I+ 1393-04-1 9 19 =32 56 01 UNITED NATIONS HQ S NY 028 oro/ II CNZ-331 CYZ-191 Pl/J.s., ol.Q_ ·93 APR 19 19 :44 OUTGOING CODE CABLE TO: WAHLGREN, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB INFO: VANCE, GENEVA VANCE, NEW YORK u C', ~- .'. FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS ,· NEW YORK :..-: (.. J (_i) DATE: 19 APRIL 1993 NUMBER: MSC 618 r SUBJECT: Possible Involvement of FRY Troops in E~stern Bosnia 1. In an article of the New York Times on Sunday, 18 April 1993, Senator Biden claimed that according to UNPROFOR sources there was evidence of regular troops of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia being involved in cross border shelling as well as in military activity in the vicinity of Bratunac. 2. Please advise whether there is indeed such evidence available to UNPR0FOR. You will recall, that in early April we reported to the Security council that UNPROFOR, at the time, did not have any information to support the alleged involvement. DISTRIBUTION: ...lJ _v.:L::::::::::::::JhCC ·····················-··. DL_ : ------. 1993- 04 - 19 CrL.;r +tr 133- 01- ·07 19: 15 . . 5612 UNPROFOR ZAGREB } bl~/0 PO 010/ 11 1/2 ·93 ~PR - 7 18 :51 TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS NEW YORK FROM: VANCE, ICFY NEW YORK VANCE, ICFY GENEVA FROM: WAHLGREN, UNPROFOR ZAGREB DATE: 7 APRIL 1993 ~ NUMBER: Ul...lf~ 2 -4f' SUBJECT: LETlER ~ROM EBY QN SC&--8..l..5. I ATTACH LETTER FROM FRY-PM KONTIC ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN REGARD TO SCR 815. ENDALL. DISTRIBUTION: ' .....t.f .. 5..L)_··············PFT ·········---··············q ·~ · ::::~ ·· ·~ ········· ...... ·····--· -4+ CYCY -4+ PO rtl-'Zlli\!., rra-a~uaid.i.: 01 . 'i{U(.08.1,iAV"lA V'llderl\l C:uvaJ:nme1'1:• . Thu P~im~ Mlnlet$~ I, rt w,u wlth eur.-1u:iac; &Hd ~xtre1na noncarn that the Cov~rn.na"r.t c,f \.h .. i4'dttttal lter,~•blfc: ot ~U\JC>sitavia r11nQ1i.ved cort,s,in pruviliiun,i Qf Security (!ouno.i.l l\,111ol\l.t.ion N(,.81~ of Ma.r~h 30,lg9J b•c;11.l\a• of. tl1H co11v•quAJ'l.c.:ea 1:.htJ r appli<:&tl"n mlghl ha'le ,nn Lhe iJn\ll ar.i~ rd:,,. t . .lol') ¢~ l.hll .l.)tl f'OA(:u )) le1..n, Th~ Pedar~l ne~1blic of 1u9oslHvi~, ~• on• of ~h~ nign,. ':.oxJ.o• of 'the Vtlnc:t: 1'l•n, consJ.cl•:r.a ";h'-t 1:ho proviaion eif ' nEiao).ut \ol"l 81 ~ ict:o~d i.n(J t.o wbioh IJ~PAt con a ti 1:11 ~e ~.nt11g:cc,.l part, c,f thu t,op\lbl.ia of C1:011t;.ia !ft, ab11ol\J1:.e1;t cc,ntrary to t~• aubatanc¥ o! the p~•co plan dnd· th~b it ~•rioualy c~11~ . io qu.a11t.iot1 · it.a i111pla1nantatlon. , I 11hould l.ikt t.o avail mr••lf of tnis opportunity to 10mind ycu that Se~urity Couneil ~Gso ution No. 743, under which thtt UN ileAce F.orcc ( l1Nl'JtOi'OK) wai» ae tabli•hed, c;C>nf ii.·1:na th• ti rot parQ9:,·~ph o!. th• pe&c:e pl,n, n1'.meJ.y th•t this E'orno ii, ~ "intdz-im c,.:'r¥nqornent to ct•at.e ·chia c;ondition• of peac• and l'•curity r•~~it~d ~or tn~ n~yot1ation1 of an QVcrill eettloment of the Y\HJoala.v r.:~!11J.0• 1 and th.at th, Plan and it• imp,lam•r~tat:lcn •r• ''not .l~4lnm\ad, t(,) p.r.G~udg• thl'I t-,,.nnn cf· Q p91~~ial\l t•cattlc,m•nt". t;~=h content~ of the ~lan w•r• al•o veri!i•a by th~ da~ument ot ~nc 16th ,,-,,!cm pf tl1e. UN ~•tn•r•J. l\feezil.l;)ly o~ March 6,199 2. ~ou or.fl aWb.%'& of the fict th~t. on~ of the conditions f t~'i: t:he RC:Copta11oe of th& p1,e,::o, pl,•n by the highc.,tt .. autho:itill!I• of Yugoolnvia *nd ~~ajln4 waa th•l it no~ be pr~~udiciol to th~ t·e1olui:.i.on of thfll •t.atUM of Siu.bJ.ari nrfJo.s. 'l'h•t J.a why h1glt UN offici•l• ~a~e A~~ur~no•1 Lhat in cert•in UN doaum•nte the wo:d Croa"t 1,n w~s bft:l.nq uaed 011ly fte • r,ao~:-n,phio te:r:1n. '1'h~ mentJ.uned p.t'OV ,i.l)icm c.1f; ~01101,1,,1 tic,n Al 5 $.c, c;,:untr~ry l:.o ~v-•ryl:.hin9 11u3rQed ~u e.nd •~tl.\.bli:ahc,d .b~ S:h>toh,ti<,n 743 (U92) !11 · th&L rftt,Ptct. 'l'h• v.ra:iudif.:ing 1;1:f \:.he outi-:m• i:>f uu:rrfilnt pc:il1.ti:ci111l prOll H.~. Dr, ~outr~s ~outio1-Ghali UN s~crut~r,~Gon~ral New ; - .- --- _...._.... . ' . .. . Such det~i•j.cna cf th• Gttc~rit.y Cc,unc:il a,,d t.;r.1~ nou obB•rva11ca t.,f it• Rei,ol.u.t.ion No. 802 do not aontribut~ t.c:, t:he. el.J.mihatic.,n of tho dan9car af t;M: furthe1· · f.JIIOs1l.atlon of Wllr r:onfl.iot• but, on t.h• c;,ontrat·y, euo::::ollr.&911 Croat.io. to impcJ~~ it• an\:.hod.ty cjn tK,:,·:lto::-l•.- under tlN pi·c:rt1c:ld c.in by .torr.c,. Tld.~ lt iatt1:,,t~ct i:CI l:.i;y T.h• J.lltli11t 00f\(:~r.tr11.t.ton o.C th.- &l:~y oJ: CJ:'O,l'tl.a ,:he bo.1,•d•r• w.tth tha111a t,.:rritori'!lfl •nd J.t:.a p.i:up~i:a.l:.imu• for a a,:,;gre&iJion C\nd we:\',;. th~ t~rQahout ot ' lhft S•cu~ity Council 1n itu trc,at.ment uf UNflAn tll.:)l' ..!\l c.:o ••.r.ious,ly c::.ai.1 in quc,a1~iim th• eunf iclr.,nt:e ,,f th• pH01,.Ll\"a ond at:·i:,l\d):'J. ~ir.• of. l<.ra ~.!.1'!.a .tn thg U!l o.ud UNPllOFOR' and .i.n thlli.l:' t:uit..t:i::'t. uoo~ai·ot,inn "1,i.~t~ th• .E>rc.,1.ec:tiun .l'ureio. Aud al'I. ,.hi• c:oul.d. •nnul th• 11.l9t\it.i.crtnt. ))ot.ttiv• utfi,c\.t of t.h• p,,<'~• c>p,.:!:'at.J.c:,ri . I .whoul d .l.i'lur to O..KQIU.re you that ,:,he Govetnr.,l:n1. 0f Y'u9c!ltJl111:~:I ~ wj ;Ll c:ont.l.n,1• t.o •tt"ive ~f'l-r ~ho "'•"•.1.1111..."u 1.: 1tn:J t'uJ.l "'Pl", l,.:.,11t-J.on ...,£ 1.i.11 v~rit:• pl,n. for the ab<,,ve r.t1a11:>111 l 11houl~ lS.k• tC) &IJk bd n9 yuut· aut.hoi·it:y l!.o h~.r fc.,r t.he t ·GttJU1111i11atl0n m"nt;loni,ad p:rovlaior: ut. SP.cl!1;J.. ty council ~e1olu tion 8 l 5, or. RAcLoj• Kunt.if ' ... _ l:'rlree lotiniur.er. aud 1'1·01J.dent of t::h• C:QJIUl\itt~ti f.ox Cooperation With U~PROFOR Cc. 1 -;- Mt:• Cyt·us Vance ;' ' Co-Chair1n.s.ri ot the;; 'tnt.(lr.natic,nal Contarenctt \':In i:lJ~o .. lavi ~ - Genere.J. J:,ttra-Er.\c W4hl 3 APR 18 TO INFO ANNAN UNATIONS, NEW VANCE, GENEVA VANCE , NEW YORK ~ FROM WAHLGREN, UNPROFOR, DATE : 18 APRIL 1993 NUMBE:R UNPROFOR. SUBJECT VISIT OF RUSSIAN EMBASSY STAFF TO HQ UNPROFOR 1Bl1Q0B APR 93 1. It is again obvious that MOSCOW if following very closely the developments of the SREBRENICA situation. The representative of the embassy stated that Moscow was specitically interested in whether the agreement included the demilitarization of Srebrenica and whether UNPROFOR was satisfied that the guarantees given by both sides would allow the freedom of movement of the Canadian company. In reply I gave them a copy of the signed agreement and told them that if both parties cooperated and respected the agreement, we d i d not envisage problems with the move of our troops. 2. They also had a specific question on whethar UNMO'S would be given freedom of movement from both sides to monltor the use of heavy weapons/artillery. They stated that Karadzic had clearly agreed to this. I advis8d them that this issue would most certainly be discussed in the working group planning the implementation of the agreement. 3. We then discussed the passage of SCR 820 which they had not yet seen. They questioned whether paragraph 12 (border monitoring) had been included. After giving them a copy of 820, it was stated that they couldn't sea how UNPROFOR co~ld implement tnis direction under the present circumstances, I agreed with their concern. 4. I then stated that I personally, repeat personally, had doubts as to whom wielded the power in the Bosnian Serb community. They opined that from that polnt of view, Belgrade was recognizing that Karadzic had been overtaken by Mladic. Mladic has the popular support. No need to comment on that st~te of affairs. 5. Finally we discussed the likelihood of SCR 802 being ------~~ ------* CYC ( ++ 93 3-0 ~\;·18 12: 34 5612 UNPROFOR ZAGREB 0 24 p , r 2 -1/f/6 ratified by the Knin a~~orities. They stated that during their delegatiop visit ·to Knin, the local authorities auvised that circumstances had changed since the signing of the document in Geneva, and that in any case they were militarily ready and capable of repulsing any Croatian military venture. 6. Submitted for information. regards. Internal Distribution: FC, DCM, DFC, COS +t CYCY +t :393 - 04- 0 7 21: 59 561 2 UNPROFOR ZAGREB PC CODE RESTf~ICl.ED IMMEDIATE (~PROFOR OUTGOING CODE CABLE DISTRIBUTION : ---+tso ...... _ ..._.. .. 0 -(:. _ I M M E D I A T E ················--··-··-··--·--····-·--··--- -- t.:' 1, ·, .. .. f f"A·-·-,--·------·-··v · --·· · '"2;, \\ \;-' .....':,.,J. ..\LV...... ~ - TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS NEW YORK ' ,': ·~ INFO: VANCE, ICFY NEW YORK VANCE, ICFY GENEVA FROM: WAHLGREN, UNPROFOR ZAGREB c.:: DATE: 7 APRIL 1993 LJ ~ ~ r.:.:: ·~) r. •;.. J NUMBER: U IV P~ fQ i - '- -. '1 >lJ ::r:,, ,::J :::-rJ SUBJECT: DCM MEETING WITH SERa ItQCAL AUTHORITIES i .. ) . I -.J N ····- · 1. At their request, DCM today met with four "RSK" leaderco c-::s~ at.,... , · Topusko. They were Bjegovic ("PM" - designate), Novakovfc ( commander of the "RSK" Army), Milan Martlc ( "Minister of the Interior" and police chief) and Zivkovic (unidentified role, leader of sector north). DCM had UNPROFOR police commissioner O'Rielly, ss commander Rob, Auger, CACs Peterson and Kirudja, and other HQ and sectors' civil, military and police personnel. ECMM also attended. Meeting lasted J hours and discussions continued over lunch, Though some very frank exchanges took place, th~ atmosphere was excellent throughout. 802 1 815, freedom of movement, and economic matters (including 769) were the agenda. Little tangible was achieved, however. It could not really be expected that it would have been, given that their "assembly" is to meet within the next days to consider the 802 provisional agreement, and the depth and intensity of reaction to SCR 815. Bjegovic, whom we know of old, and indeed all members of the new team, made a good impression on the UNPROFOR delegation. Various follow-up meetings were arranged. Despite lack of concrete results, DCM tells me that it was the most promising meeting he has had with the Knin authorities in many months. Another very good sign was that Bjegovic conveyed Spanovic's greetings - former "Minister of Defence" and, until his dismissal after 22 January and public vilification, the most ... ' • • · L,tl,( """'" I ':I 9 3 - 0--1 - 0 7 2 2 : 0 0 561 2 UNPROF OR ZA GRE B 083 fT' ( I (0) 2 reasonable and constructive of our Knin interlocutors. Bjegovic said that he would shortly return to the "RSK". 2. It was made clear rather quickly that, although we had come to discuss inter alia implementation arrangements for 802, they were not prepared to do so at this time. They said that this had to await prior approval by their assembly. However, O'Rielly and senior ops. officer were able to outline our proposals to Martic and Novakovic over lunch, and in one on one discussions, and the Serbs appeared to approve them. 3. Bjegovic, in opening the · meeting, said that the people of Krajina had serious problems caused by the economic situation and by security. Their economy had been gravely affected by a war they had not wished to have. The situation had been bad enough before the war. 11 I am a born pacifist, and our people do not want to wage war, but they do want to be able to feed themselves. l shall direct all my efforts to the economic wellbeing of the people here." He said they wanted peace as soon as possible, and promised to gi ve his personal support to the 002 agreement, with an assembly session as soon as it could be organised. He returned to this theme a number of times - "peace and economic revitalization" - "many of our people are near to starvation" - "they have suffered too much". He also said that he wanted to look at the whole refugee question:- "why should the Serbs who are becoming refugees from Zagreb, I (d) 3 interesting proposal, as Bjegovic was among the gang of four (as were Spanovic, Martic and Zivkovic) who, on 18 January last, told DCM that they were ready to agree to the implementation of SCR 7fi9]. 4. The most difficult discussions related to SCR 815 in conjunction, especially, with the question of UNPROFOR's freedom of movement, which is greatly curtailed in sectors north and south at this time. All apart from Bjegovic addressed this with vigour and much bitterness. They said they were now endangered both by Croatia and the security Council, each of which appeared to be encouraging the other to even more hostile action. 815, they said, negated UNPROFOJVs presence,' and the Vance Plan, "and we reject it completely". Martic said he thought the mission would have little chance "unless this Resolution is nullified immediately". 815 had had a very bad effect on the people, some of whom now saw UNPROFOR as the first elements of an occupation force. They appealed to us to report that we could confirm that the life of Krajina Serbs under Croatian rule would be simply impossible. The references in recent resolutions to Chapter 7, said Novakovic in what was otherwise a surprisingly measured and reflective statement, had made the people believe that UNPROFOR was the military arm of the Security council, entitled to use force, and having changed from a peacekeeping to an enforcement presence. This was the cause of many 1ncidents ana threats to use force, and the popular question - "what is UNPROFOR doing here?" This drastic change of atmosphere had occurred partly because of 22 January, and partly because of 815, of which the latter contained the greater threat. The atmospheric change was said to be the reason for the Martic Novakovic letter in effect confining UNPROFOR to its guarded locations (which is being applied to some degree in some parts of Krajina). 5. In reply to all this, we told them that they should forget the idea that SECCO would "nullify" 815, If, indeed, the situation was • ~• L.:1L.:r 4+ '393-04- 07 22: 02 5612 UNPROFOR ZAGREB 083 P C (Q) 4 that we could not perform our mandate then FC would have to tell the secretary-General that this was so. If our freedom of movement was not restored very quickly it would be impossible to perform our tasks. If their Assembly approved the 802 agreement then, by next week, we would need to be able to move freely throughout the territory because we would have new and demanding tasks. Were we then to tell SECCO that UNPROFOR could not fulfil its role under the proposed ceasefire agreement? We suggested that they .bear in mind the dual nature of the Vance Plan - a peacekeeping force, UNPROFOR, and a peacemaking process under ICFY. Para. 5 of 815 did not impinge directly on UNPROFOR's mandate. It did not affect our tasks at all. It r~lated, instead, to the long-term political questions which were totally outside our mandate. The Serbs could state their objections to ICFY, once it began to undertake its functions in regard to their relations with the Zagreb authorities. It was, in short, none of UNPROFOR's business:- our task was to continue in the traditional role of an impartial peacekeeping force, leaving political questions to those best equipped to deal with them. If this were not acceptable to them then clearly the Council would have to think of some other solution. 6. This did not quite resolve the matter, but discussion of the issue, which came up repeatedly in the context of all substantive subjects, gradually became more relaxed. The crucial question is, whether reaction to 815 will prevent the Serb assembly from endorsing the 802 agreement. DCM feels that, on balance, there is a good chance that the agreement will be affirmed, but not without a great deal of difficulty and noisy attacks on SECCO and UNPROFOR. The other issue, freedom of movement, was to be the subject of follow-up talks in Knin and Topusko during the next days. 7. In the above circumstances, our reeling is that it would be counterproductive if SECCO were to endorse the 802 agreement before the Serb assembly has had the opportunity to endorse it, probably this weekend. It might be just the factor that would lead to its +t CYCY +t '393-84-07 22: 03 5612 UNPROFOR ZAGR EB 0 8 3 P(1 • (Q) 5 rejection; or another Croatian armed attack in the next days, about which Novakovic again warned. Novakovic also stated that "the Serb army will act according to the orders of the president of the republic in accordance with the decision of the assembly" - as regards the implementation of 802 agreement. Endall. iHr CYCY _.., 993-03-24 2 3 :14 5601 UNITED, NATIONS HQS NY .. . .. ' • , '' : I CYZ 128 CNZ 249 OUTGOING CODE CABLE ·93 MAK 24 23 :29 DISTRIBUTION: .H.to ...... ~ ti\ vJ .... . TO: WAHLGREN, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB :::rw ...... · ...... ~ INFO: VANCE, NEW YORK VANCE, GENEVA ·· kV.:::::::::::~::::::::::::::::::: .. ·. FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK DATE: 24 MARCH 1993 ---e...____ NUMBER: MSC-405 .__ SUBJECT: Bombing Incident in Gladovici and Osatica Attached for your attention please find a copy of the note verbale we sent to the FRY Permanent Mission today. Please keep us informed on any information which may be passed to you as a result o! the note verbale. I'/ • •o I• ,,.,.,...... - -.., " .. J:., ··\ lJ ~ ;._··i c :- ···:: :-.. ~ -,.l ) CJ> .,'I +Ir C Y CY ++ 042 PO '.:: 9 9' 3 - 0 :3 -.. 2 4 2 3 : 1 5 5601 UNITED NATIONS HOS NY ' . ' ~- CYZ 128 CNZ 249 P 2/3 UNITED NATIONS • NATIONS UNlES ro,TAl. ADtUISIS-.tiQRIUUI IIIOITAI.I: UNIT•O .... TIOhll , N "'· 10011 (AILI A001l1••-•O11s11s TllLIIG ...... ,oU1t· UNATION. "41W¥Ofl9' The Secretariat of the United Nations presents its compliments to the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to the United Nations and has the honour to refer to the statement of the security council dated 17 March 1993 in which the Secretary-General is requested to ensure that an investigation is made of the reported possible use of the territory of the Federal Republic of ~ugoslavia (S~rbia and Montenegro) to launch air attacks against the territory of the Republic of Bosniu and Herzegovina. A copy of the statement is attached. The secretariat of the United Nations would appreciate receiving any information relevant to the incident, and, in particular, any results of the investiqation the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) will initiate as requested by the security Council. The Chief Military Observer of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), Brigadier-General Bo Pellnas, has been designated to act as a point of contact in this matter. The Secretariat of the United Nations avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) the assurances of its highest consideration. 24 March 1993 Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the United Nations New York ·'H' C Y C Y _... 9 9 3 - 0 3 .~ 4 2 3 : 1 8 5601 • UNITED NATIONS HQS NY . 043 P O i CYZ 128 CNZ 249 P 3/3 UNITED NATIONS s Security Council Diatr. G!N!R.U. S/25426 17 Marcb 1993 ORIGINAL: ENGLISH HOT! BY THE PR!SIDBKT or THB S!CURITY COUNCIL Folloving consultations with the melllbers of the S•curity Council, th• President of the Council made the following statement, 011 behalf of th• Council, &t Lt• 3184th meettnq, h•ld on 17 March 1003, ln connection with the Col.lncil'a conaidaration of the item entitled "The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina", "The Security Council has been informed by the Secretary-General in a latter of 12 March 1993 of the viol•tion on 11 March 1993 by military jets, proceeding from the airport of Banja Luka, of Security Council resolution 781 (1Q02), relating to th• prohibition of military fliqhts in cne airspace of th• Republic of Bosnia •~d Herae9ovina, notvitbatanding t~e tact that Che BQanian Serbs at the airport had received appropriate notification bf United Nations observers that such flights vould con,titute a violation of the tald resolutioa. "The Security Council eciually takes note of t:.he report by the secret•ry-Ges:aeral .$.n hh letter of 16 March 1993 lncUcatbq that on , . _ ll M•rch 1993 new violation• of the no-fly 1one took place by planes that proc••d•d to bomb the villages of Cladovici a:d 01atiea in the Repu.blic ot Bosnia and H•rzegovina before leavinq in the direction of th• Federal Repu.blic ot Yugoslavia (Serbia and Moncenegro). The aJ:,ove flights are t~e first violations of Security Council re ■ olution 781 (1902) observed by UNPROFOR which involved coml)at •ct1vity. "The Security Council atroii9ly condemns all violat.ions of its relevant resolutions and underline ■ the tact that siGce the beginning of the monltorin9 op•r•~ions ln early November 1092, the Ueited Nations has reported 465 violatione ot the no-fly zone over the Republic of Boania and Hetse9ovi4a. "The Security Council demands that tb- ■ e violation• cease forthwith and reiterate ■ its stronq 4ttetmination to ensur ■ full respect of its resolutions. It particularly ~nderlines its coudamnatiau of all violations, espeeially those repotted by the Secretary-G•neral in his lecters referted to abova, at a time when the peace process ha1 reached a @ 93-15522 3763c (1) 170393 I• • • 170393 ---··· 23 : 27 ' PAGE = () 1 UNPROFOR ZAGREB 010 /11 : UIWG ir1/f:co,rirr: llnd UIJU i3 rr:if•;[:1](\l :r;, l:11,:, .siol.Q_ ' C(OO)E[ r!R?~~ICTED Pa!J1s i.in:~ t~ rii ions I I (0) "93>UJIPi19 ~- CAIL.I ,'., ' UQIIPXl'l'.I 22 .,,;C,') •I'",~ i,j :i DO~ 51 ;- Toi ANNAN, UNATIONB, NJl:W YORI< .. INFOi VANCE, UNATIONS, NEW 'iORJ< VANCE, ICFY, GEN~VA I I fROM: WAHLGREN, UNPROFOR, ZAOREB !~' DATE: 22 March 1993 NUMBER: l,,fN_ffUf'I__. Z - 3,f aUBJICTi PQXBINq %NQ~llf'l' 1B GLAPQYICI Alm QSATIQI, -.. "-:i ✓ ' • ~ •' Rafarance your MISC-377 or 18 March 1993. I, I believa that arigadier General Bo Pellnas, who is dealing with the Bombing incident in Gladoviei and oaatioa, and who ha• eotad as a repraaentative in direot contacts with the FRY Government, would be the best toeal point in UNPROFOR to follow up on the inveetigation. 2. I hAve ordered him to act in this capacity. DIST . . BUT/ON ...... ITYw. ··------·-··cv······ ··-- ...... ············· . ... ·······-·· ..... " . ______J I Dto{t( MISSION PERMANENTE DE LA R.S. F. DE YOUGOSLAVIE AUPRES DES NATIONS UNIES A GEN EVE 5, chem in Thury - Tel. 46 44 33 26 February 1993 Dear Sirs, I have the honour to transmit herein for your information a copy of the "Comments" of the F.R.Y. submitted on February 19, 1993, by Dr. Radoje Kontic, Vice-President of the F.R. of Yugoslavia, to Mr . Jean Durrieux, Chairman of the Working Group on Economic Issues of the ICFY, concerning the Report on the Valuation of Assets and Liabilities of the Former SFRY. Please accept, dear Sirs, the assurances of my highest consideration. ,J 1 ) l/,1" (d/[ } 7 l L{_,,/ I IdI CU-, ~ c-,Dr. Vladimir Pa icevic Deputy Head of Delegation of the FRY to the ICFY and Ambassador, Charge d'Affaires a.i. of the FRY to the UNO at Geneva Mr. Cyrus Vance and Lord David Owen Co-Chairmen of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia United Nations Office G e n e v a FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA C O M M E N T S ON THE BASIC PREMISES AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE REPORT ON THE VALUATION OF ASSETS AND LIABILITIES OF THE FORMER SFRY BELGRADE February 1993 1. DEPARTURES FROM THE AGREEMENT ON VALUATION IN THE SUCCESSION PROCEDURE AND PREJUDGMENT OF THE QUESTION OF THE CONTINUITY OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW The Report on the Valuation of Assets and Liabilities of the former SFRY makes uncalled for departures from the agreement reached at the meeting of the Group for Valuation held on May 27, 1992, in Brussels, which defined the place of the valuation of assets and liabilities in the integral succession procedure for the former SFRY. In terms of this agreement, valuation should be a technical operation of establishing the facts about the assets and liabilities of the former SFRY . Therefore, the valuation of assets and liabilities cannot and must not prejudge the arrangement to be made for their division. Division would be carried out according to legal rules which in this case would be formulated under an agreement between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as the predecessor state, and the newly independent republics of successors. What is more, without such rules, valuation would be difficult to carry out, even as a technical operation. In the absence of a criterion for determining what is "state property," the property subject to valuation has not been identified, with the result that the valuation is reduced to an aggregated inventory of all the individual proposals. The Group agreed to put aside the question of succession (separation or dissolution) until a competent legal ruling has been made on this question. Such a ruling is prejudged in this Report. In many places in the text and in a variety of ways (explicitly or by implication), the Report questions the 2 international continuity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (e.g. by using such terms as "the former Yugoslavia" or "the republics as successor states"; by treating Serbia and Montenegro separately; or by stating that the SFRY has ceased to exist and that it has been divided up into a number of successor states, etc .). FR Yugoslavia's consent and willingness to submit the jointly acquired assets and liabilities of the SFRY to a financial audit and division are thereby being abused, for FR Yugoslavia is thus transformed into a successor state and equated with the republics which were former federal units of the SFRY, even though FR Yugoslavia is incontrovertibly the predecessor state in the eyes of international law. FR Yugoslavia considers such an approach to the question of assets and liabilities unacceptable. Furthermore, it deems such an approach unconstructive, because it precludes an agreement on assets and liabilities, which can and must be treated as a separate issue from the question of the international status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the former republics of the SFRY . 2. THE KEY CONCEPT IN THE VALUATION HAS NOT BEEN DEFINED The essential prerequisite for an authoritative valuation of the assets and liabilities of the former SFRY is to define the category of "state property." Unfortunately, the Group has not moved from square one in this respect. Since the Report uses such terms as "army property," "federal property," financial assets and liabilities," etc., it can be inferred that the authors of 3 the text consider these categories relevant to the succession procedure. There is no legal justification for such a ploy. These concepts can only be of technical significance for the valuation process, as book-keeping categories within the general and indivisible category of "state property." In support of this argument we need only mention that these categories are not known to either customary international law or to the Convention on the Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts, which is invoked by some of the parties as applicable in this matter. The attempt to portray these categories as relevant to the procedure of succession betrays an intention to supplant succession as a legally regulated procedure with an arbitrary, mechanical dividing up of assets and liabilities. In short it is essential to define the category of "state property." For a definition of this type of property, international law refers us to the municipal law of the predecessor state, so that in this instance this category is defined on the basis of the national legislation of the SFRY which was in force at the moment of succession. Since the municipal law of the SFRY did not contain the concept of state property, the various forms of property known to Yugoslav law will have to be reconciled with the traditional concept of state property according to rules on the interpretation of legal norms. With due respect for the principle of justice and the need to prevent any unfair advantages , and mindful of the unique character of the regime of public, socially-owned property as the 4 principal for of property under the 1974 Constitution of the SFRY, we believe that the definition of "state property" supplied by the delegation from the Republic of Macedonia provides a correct basis and framework for elaborating the concept of "state property." This definition reads : "State property includes not only the property of the Federation and its institutions, but any such property formally owned by the Republics or by their nationals that has been fully or partially made of and financed by federal funds, or by other Republics." 3. UNJUSTIFIED REDUCTION OF THE ASSETS FOR DIVISION There is no good reason for calculation of assets and liabilities to be based on just the final year or last several years. As shown by the division of property among Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya (after the dissolution of the East African Community), the only limit on how far back into the past one can go is the availability of records. There can be no justification for not including in the division everything financed by joint resources, especially since accurate data are readily available. There are detailed accounts of investments for the period 1952- 1965, which were wholly financed from the Federation's funds, regardless of the republic in which they were made. This statistical data can be taken as a basis for the division: 1) because they are based on the original bank orders for the payments which were made through the National Bank, 2) because they are expressed in constant 1972 prices, and 3) because they 5 show where the investments were made. It is not difficult to establish the sources of financing for all major capital investment projects after 1965, if they were financed by Federal funds. By ignoring these arguments, the Report unjustifiably reduces the amount of assets and liabilities earmarked for division, the upshot being that some republics of the SFRY would unfairly receive a bigger share than others. For the sake of preventing unfair advantages, investment policy in the SFRY prior to 1952 should also be taken into account, notably the relocation of industries from Serbia to other republics, and prohibition of new capital investment projects, primarily in Vojvodina but also in other parts of Serbia, because of the conflict with the Cominform countries. It is possible on the basis of existing records to determine with a considerable degree of accuracy the damage which specific regions suffered as a result of Yugoslavia's global policy. The attempt to interpret the constitutional reform of 1974 as a division of assets and liabilities is technically incorrect and totally unacceptable, for it has been made with an eye to excluding a large portion of assets and liabilities from the division. Namely, the devolution of legal powers to regulate the management and disposition of property from federal to republican authorities did not change the nature of property rights of the property which remained as before socially-owned property. The socially-owned property remained unchanged in its conception after 1974, as uniform and indivisible in the SFRY, based on the explicit constitutional prohibition for anyone to acquire 6 property rights to it (Article 12 of the 1974 Constitution) and on the collective right of all workers to manage socially-owned property (Article 13) . The hastily drawn conclusion that there is no information concerning certain items of the inventory, and the assertion that information is being gathered all too slowly, are apt to bring about an unjustified reduction of the assets and liabilities subject to division. The argument that a speedy settlement is required because the European Community's budget does not have enough funds for negotiations is unpersuasive. It should be remembered that the division of the assets and liabilities of the east African Community took seven and a half years, and that data on virtually all the essential items in Yugoslavia's assets and liabilities have been collected in just four months. Therefore, the Report's criticism of the Yugoslav delegation for collecting information too slowly not only fails to stand up to scrutiny but is at odds with the expert group's praise for its successful presentation of voluminous and high quality data. The fact that information has been collected in just four months indicates that the distribution can be effected in a reasonable length of time without imposition of deadlines. 4. DEPARTURES FROM THE PRINCIPLE OF THE INDIVISIBILITY OF ASSETS AND LIABILITIES Prevention of unfair advantages is the fundamental principle proposed by the Delegation of Croatia, which should form the basis both for the entire negotiating process and for 7 the future agreement on a just division. Consistently applied, this principle requires that all items in the SFRY's assets and liabilities should be expressed in prices obtaining at the end of 1990, so that a uniform balance sheet can be drawn up as the sole way of reducing different physical magnitudes to a common denominator of value. It is at the same time the basis for a final and precise settling of accounts. Such a balance sheet postulates determination of how much of the total value of the SFRY's assets and liabilities is ''located" in the territory of each of the parties concerned, and how much of this total value, according to agreed criteria for a fair division, should ''belong" to each. Any difference that might arise would be dealt with in compensation arrangements. In disregard of these requirements, the entire undertaking of collecting data on individual items and their valuation is envisaged in the Report as a partial, physical apportionment of property and obligations according to selected priorities. It is suggested to the Group for Succession that instead of working on establishing principles and criteria for a fair distribution it should rather concentrate on the physical division of the concrete nominal units of the individual items in the inventory. Unless the total assets and liabilities are calculated at December 1990 prices and the criteria for a fair division are properly defined, prejudice will be done to that phase of work in which the interested parties are to formulate the legal rules to be followed in the division of assets and liabilities. These 8 rules might also come in handy to regulate forms of mutual compensation (in money, goods, or concrete material objects). 5. MISUSE OF THE IMF EXECUTIVE BOARD'S DECISION OF DECEMBER 14, 1992 The decision taken by the Executive Directors of the International Monetary Fund on December 14, 1992, is an ad hoc arrangement in keeping with the character of the Fund as an independent international financial institution. This decision cannot serve as a precedent for decisions at the Conference on Yugoslavia, neither as regards the accounting ratios used (quotas, etc.), nor as a legal rule determining the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's status as the predecessor state. Above all, this decision cannot be taken as a precedent for FR Yugoslavia's acceptance of so-called partial balance sheets for the division of the assets and liabilities of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 6. INCORRECT USE OF THE TERM "WAR DAMAGES" In a number of places in the Report the damage caused by the civil war in the former SFRY is referred to as "war damages." The use of this term in the case of Yugoslavia has no legal basis whatsoever. In international law the term "war damages" is used to refer to damage caused by an armed conflict between sovereign and independent states, while in the case of Yugoslavia we have a typical civil war. Therefore, the term "war 9 damages" should be replaced in the Report with the phrase "damages caused by the civil war." The term "peace treaty" is also unsuitable, for the actual accord was a political agreement to end the civil war. There is no doubt that these damages should be compensated, so that conditions can be created to normalize life in the territories of the former SFRY. The damages produced in the course of the civil war should be regulated in line with established international custom, which has also been sanctioned in the draft code on state responsibility. It is clear from the rules of international law governing compensation of damages caused by civil war that these questions have nothing to do with succession. The proper place for considering this matter and adopting decisions would be a Conference on the economic reconstruction of the economic area of the former SFRY. 7. DISREGARD FOR THE AGREEMENT ON THE METHODOLOGY FOR ASSESSING THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE SFRY According to the original programme of work, the first step was supposed to have been to draw up an inventory of assets and liabilities; next the methodology for making the valuation would be decided upon, and finally a balance sheet would be prepared. However, the work on the inventory has not been completed, and the phase of deciding on methodology has simply been skipped over. The delegations were not given the opportunity to comment on the proposed methods of assessing the value of property, so that the methods proposed in the Report reflect an unbalanced and 10 defective methodology. Such an approach fails to satisfy the requirement that all items on the inventory should be expressed in uniform prices and makes it impossible to make calculations on a uniform basis. CONCLUSIONS The foregoing comments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the Report on the Valuation of Assets and Liabilities of the Former SFRY point to the basic shortcomings of efforts made to date. The fol l owing improvements are needed : 1) valuation should be confined exclusively to a technical assessment of the value of assets and liabilities, which as such would in no way prejudge the final arrangements, which are to be made on the basis of agreement of all the interested parties; 2) the basic legal relationship between the predecessor state and the successors is to be agreed upon by them; 3) a proper valuation of assets and liabilities can· only follow a precise definition of "state property" in line with the constitutional system of the SFRY at the moment of succession; 4) succession should , of course, be speeded up, but not by setting unrealistic deadlines for collection of data, by restricting the time period to which the succession applies, or by cutting back the European Community's budget for the purpose, for otherwise the sum total of assets and liabilities would be objectively reduced and some parties would receive more than their fair share ; 11 ------·------ 5) the valuation of assets and liabilities should produce uniform criteria for division and final accounting of individual items and not for the purpose of partial division of real property or value: 6) the decision by the IMF Executive Board of December 14, 1992, cannot serve as a precedent for FR Yugoslavia's acceptance of what is described as a partial balance sheet, nor can it affect the country's international status; 7) a debate and common agreement on the methodology for valuation of the assets and liabilities of the SFRY should be a top priority in the next stage of the Group's work; 8) since in this case damages have been caused by a civil war and therefore are not war damages stricto sense, the question of compensation for this type of damages should be excluded from the succession procedure; 9) as regards archives, it is of the utmost importance to adopt a precise definition of State Archives to serve as a guideline in their classification and determination of the status of various types of these archives. 12 - SENT sv: YUGO SLAV MISSION GVA r AX d4o44J b.., 4 1LL ::, I1 uu 1::i.i, 1 MISSION f'ERMAN!NTE ce LA R. s. F. OE YOUQOSLAVI& AUPRES DES NATIONS UNIES URGENT A GENEVE BY FAX Date: 1 February 1993 Att. of: Wilma TO: Mr. Cyrus Vance Co-Chairman of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia United Nations Office - Geneva fax: 917-00-79, 917-00-80 FROM: H.E. Dr, Vla4imir Pavicevic Deputy Head of Delegation of the FRY to the ICFY, and Ambassador, Charge d ... Affaires a,i. of the FRY to the UNO - Geneva fax: 346-44-36 No. of pages (cover included): 4 (four) Message As agreed over the phone, I am · sending you "' the letter of Arnbassado-r Pav-icavic and the letter of President Cosic addressed to President Clinton to be transmitted to Mr. Cyrus Vance, Thanking you in advance, Yours sincerely, ~~r\{t Beba Sasic ~ MISSION PERMANi:NfE OE LA R.S.F, OE YOUOOSLAVII! AUPRES Di:$ NATIONS UNll!S A GENEY!: 5, chemll'I Tnury • i4I. -4644M 1 February 1993 Dear Mr, Vance, I have the honour to attach herein the letter .. j - ' ,_ - ~ -- - - .! ..::J -- - J... - ~ .. \. - .,pnited States of America, Mr, William Clinton, by the President of the Federal republic of Yugoslavia, Mr. D. Cosic, Please accept, dear Mr. Vance, the assurances of my highest consideration. /4 ~~? 4J"-'-'-< l~'? I Dr. Vladimir Pavicevic Deputy Head of Delegation of the FRY to the ICFY, and Ambassador, Charge d~Affaires a.i. Mr. Cyrus Vance Co-Chairman of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia United Nations. Office G e n e v a SENT sv:YUGOSLAV MISSION ~VA 1- ,i: -:;1.;> , I O • 0 I 1 1"'1/\ .,, ...... i.., --. FEDERA~ REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA THE PRESIDENT january 25, 199~ Dear Mr. President, I extend to you my heartfelt felicitations upon your taking office as President of the United States of America together with the wish that the intellectual and politieal expectations vested in you by the American people be shared by the whole of democratic mankind. I am a writer but by moral imperative also the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia inspired by the vital needs of my, Serbian people: the restor~tion of pea,ce and democracy on the soil of former Yugoslavia and in the Balkans. I am writing to you at a fateful juncture for my country, to ask for your understanding and assistance which will be remembered in the history of Serbia and Montenegro. Mr. President, you are inheriting a most unfavourable picture of my nation and the policy of the previous administration. ~egrettably, that policy cannot be said to have been democratic and friendly in all respects though those were precisely the attributes that adorned America's relations with the peoples of Serbia and Montenegro for more than a century. The Serbian nation today has been satanized and turned into barbarians due to untruths fabricated by the mass media using ideological stereotypes typical of two defeated ideologies: Nazism and Communism. On the basis of such political falsehoods and under the biased 1nfluence of the European Community and Islamic factors, Serbia and Montenegro have bean turned into outcasts, pariahs, punished by sanctions, banished from the world community; they are now being threatened by military intervention. At this fateful moment for my people, we have no time for del~ing into the past. I am addressing myself to you Mr. President, expecting you to act for the benefit of the future in whioh my people too may find salvation, I/. t t Mr. William Clinton President of the United States of America SEN T sv:YUGOSLAV MI SSI ON GVA i O; :l I ' / ' A On January 22, Croatia attacked Serbian Krajina, a territory under UN protection which under the Vance Plan is being protected by UNPROFOR . The Croatian army units are setting fire to Serb villages and raiding towns, not sparing even a medieval Orthodox monastery - Krk; casualty figures are already in the hundreds, killed and wounded police and civilians. The Serb populatio~ fearful of the genocidal behaviour of the Croatian military is starting another exodus. The Government of the · Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has a~pealad to the Security Council to act resolutely to halt the Croatian aggression ag~inst _ the Serbian Krajina and to have UNPROFOR forces regain positions they held prior to the Croatian attack. I appeal to your Government to support our request in the Security Council. ··· - - ·------•··· --, '---.---- -··- __ . .,._ "'"""'' Herzegovina being waged by Moslems, Serbs and Croats, ha~ entered a decisive stage: either the war will come to an end or there will be a major escalation. The Geneva peaee talks on Bosnia Herzegovina chaired by Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen have been seriously put in jeopardy by Croatia's aggression ~gainst, Serbian Krajina and by the strong genocidal offensive of the Moslem army in Eastern Bosnia which threatens two large Serbian hydropower stations and other important facilities on the te~ritory of the Federal republic of Yugoslavia. In the meantime, under the influence of the Islamic countries, a resolution is undor preparation in the Security Council which would lift the embargo on arms imports for the Moslems in Bosnia-Herzegovina. If that should happen. the war in Boania-Herzegovina will be internationalized and it will spread ~o the whole of the Balkans, a war in which the Orthodox nations will inevitably become involved. You have the power and th~ responsibility to prevent such a fatal initiative which together with military intervention on the Yugoslav soil would lead to a veritable catastropho in the Balkans. Mr. President, bo~h as a writer and as the President of the Republic, I wish to assure you that the truth of the Yugoslav tragedy is extremely complicated but that it has bean veiled by fantastic lies made up in the media and by cliches of vulgar diplomacy . Policies that fail to acknowledge reality are ideological policies; and ideological polieies have never been humanistic, democratic or peace-making. I expect you Mr. President, to include among your great projects which not only bring victory in elections but also in history, a realistic, just and peacemaking policy of the United States towards the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, a nation that has been a traditional friend and ally of the great American people, Respectfully yours, (signature) Dobrica Cosic I COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE INTEHNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE PAt...AIS OJ;!, LA l"AIX 2:Sl7 XJ LA HAYE PA'f:3•5A8 PE ..\ (!C PALACE :!-,17 KJ 1'!--'IE HA.GUE K ETH£"1i'< LA!',;0$ TEL£PHONE, (07'0) 3~«.u 1'S:LEX, 32323 T EL£PHONEI (070) 3>,24441 TELi::X; 3:!3:':3 TE:1-EGR., INTEl'\COUR"r LAHAYE CABLfi:S: IN"tl1:RCOV"AT THl U: PJU~Sltl!tNT :, BY FAX TO: 09 41 22 733 SB61 1 February 1993 (2 pages) Dear Mr. Vance and Lord Owen, Arbitration Panel Further to the request in your letter of 27 January, I am glad to be able to tell you now that I have nominated Professor Jose Maria Ruda., who has consented to accept appointment . . ~ President Ruda, an Argentine national, was a Judge· of the Intcrniil'l..i.~n~J. ~.-.11,-t of .Justice for 18 years, was its President from 1988-1991 and is now President of the rran/tTnitecl £ta~as Cld.1111:s Tribunal. His present address is: Iran/United States Claims Tribunal · Parkweg 13 2585 JH The Hague Tel: (70) 352.0064 Yours sincerely, Sir Robert Jennings II President (Dictated by Sir Robert: Jennings and signed in his absence) The Hon. Mr. Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen International conference on the Former Yugoslavia Rooro A-661 Palaia des Nations 1211 Gw=neva l0 c O = J .Sitld 9t, :S [ cQ 0 d , ltilOl President Jose Maria RUDA (Member of the Court since 6 February 1973; re-elected as from 6 February 1982; President since F'ebroary 1988) Born at Buenos Aires on 9 August 1924. Doctor of Laws. Lawye;, Faculty of Law and Social Sciences, University of Buenos Aires (1949). Master of Law (in International Law), New York University (1955). , Member of the Institute of International Law; Member of the Interna tional Law Association; Member of the Inter-American Institute of International Juridical Studies; Member of the Hispano-Luso-American - Institute of International Law; Member of the International Institute of Space Law; Member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Member of the Chamber formed by the Court to deal with the case concerning the Frontier Dispute ( Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali). Professor of Public International Law at the Faculty of Law and Social Sciences of the University of Buenos Aires. Former Professor of Public International Law at the National Defence College. Visiting Professor at the ~colegio de Mexico: course on Argentine foreign policy in the twentieth century (August 1963). Lectures on reservations to treaties at the Hague Academy of International Law (1975). · Officer, Division of Codification of International Law of the Office of _~ Legal Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat (1950-1955). Rapporteur of the Sixth Committee of the United Nations ~eral Assembly at the seve~teenth session of the United Nations General Assembly (1962); Cha1nnan of the Committee at the eighteenth session (1963). Member of the International Law Commission of the Urtlted Natiorn1 (1964- 1972); Chairman of the Commission (1968); observer for the Commission at the meeting of the Inter-American Juridical Committee (Rio de Jan¢iro, 1968); member of the Drafting Committee (1965, 1966, 1967 and 1970). Counsellor, first class, at the Argentine Embassy in La Paz, Bolivia (1957-1959). Chef de Cabinet to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Worship (1959-1961). Legal Counsel (1961-1965). Permanent Represen tative to the United Nations(l965-1970). Agent for the Argentine Republic before the arbitration tribunal in the Rio Encuenrro case (London, 1965- 1968). Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs and Worship (1970-1973). Representative at the 1959·1969 sessions of the United Nations General Assembly and Chairman of the Argentine delegation ( 1966-1969); delegate to the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (Punta del Este, 1962); representative at the United Nations Conference on Consular Relations and member of the Drafting Committee of the Convention on Consular Relations (Vienna, 1963); Chairman of the Argentine delegation to the Mixed Argentine-Bolivian Commission (1963); delegate to the Commission on River Traffic with Paraguay (1964); Chairman of the Argentine delegation to the Mixed Argentine-Uruguayan Commission on a comprehensive survey of the River Plate (1964~!966); delegate to the first extraordinary conference (Washington, 1964); repre sentative in the Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States (New York, 1966 and 1968); representative at the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties (Vienna, 1968); representative in the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the Sea-Bed. Rio de Janeiro (1968), and in the Committee an the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction (1969-1970). Author of numerous works and articles on public international law. - - -- \ -4+ C Y CY -4+ 1-'393 -'-0 1--21 0 2: 39 56 0 2 UNITED NATIONS HQS NEW YORK . ' . , . - . I 2 .i.iZ 04 I u j~ r 1/ 3 .. !ouTGOlNG CODE CAD~~ f ·- J ~ _-:) \ ,' I "' , , TO: NAMBIAR, UN4ROFOR; ZAGREB 1J \;~I ~i~ :::=-i .. ,, 0 INFO: VANCE, GENE~A •··•-·., ....· I. ./ } V N U'l Q'"' FROM: GOULDING, 1ATIONS, NEW YORK DATE: 20 JANUARY ~993 NUMBER: MSC-108 . SUBJECT: Beating Oil ifor Y~goslavia Please find jenclosed a self-explanator Note for the File on the above subjt;ct. I i I i '°l..,J c_ en --, ~ ::2:: N__. I I ~ ·----, . +t CYCY +t 002 p 1 1'993--01-'21 02 : 39 5602 UNITED NAT~O NS HQS NEW YOR K C • •· VISIT OP MR ii DJOKIC: BEATING OIL FOR I 1. Ambassador Dragl1 mir Djoki6, Charge d 1 affa res of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, called on Mr. oulding last night to seek UNPRO OR'a ~ssistance in relatio to a request submitted by his Go ernmeht to the sanctions C mmittee seeking 1 parmission for the 1mport -of heating oil into ugoslavia for humanitarian purpos~s. ! 2. The Committee h~d made it clear that the Y goslav request would only be appro~ed if an international age cy could supervise and monitof the receipt and distribu ion of the imported oil. Etfot'fs by the Yugoslav Governm nt to identify humanitarian organizr tion~ in Belgrade or Gene a to undertake this task had failed\, Me~nwhile, the temperat Belgrade had !allen below frerzing (though it was curre tly a few degrees above zero tpis w~ek) and schools, hos other public inatitutions f ere •eriously aff~cted. assador Djokic thPTQfnra h~~ad th2t1U'Ml'nd~on v~ulJ Q~~cc L~ p rlurm -cne necessary inspectionr to ~atisfy the Sanctions Committee, at least on a temporary \ basis•. ! 3. Mr. Goulding expt ained that, while he woul have wished to be of assistance tor \human:itarian reasons, and ould therefore have been willing to \saek the Security council's approval of I this expansion of UN~ROFOR's mandate, he had be n obliged regretfully to respo~d neg~tivaly when an enqui yin this regard had bean made~!l:>y the Department of Human tarian Affairs. The reason tor his p sition was that UNPROFOR d d not have the resources to carry o t this function. The inap ction of deliveries of heatin~ oil was~ labour-intensiv task which would require large ~Wlbers of specialized pers nnal scattered in locations (school~, hospitals eto.) througho t the Federal ~ ++ CYCY ++ UNITED NATIONS HQS NEW YOR K 002 P '1993-01-'-21 02 : 40 5602 I I .- Republic q_f Yugosla~ia. UNPROFOR only had a mall logistics unit near Belgrade;\_as for its personnel loca ed elsewhere, UNPROFOR had found ~t difficult to obtain fro Member States the authorized numbrrs' ot military observers, civilian staff and police required\ for its already approved andates. In a situation where it ~as overstretched and unde strength, UNPROFOR could not f ea~ibly take on such an a ditional function. ; 4. Mr. Goulding thf refore regretted he could not be of help. He infQrmally advis1d Amb~ssador Djokic to ap al to the sanctions committee 1to lift the requirement international monitoring of the o~l imports if such monitori g was impossible to arrange. : I Shashi T aroor 20 Januar 1993 cc: Mr. Goulding Mr . Eliasson Mr. Petrovsky Mr. Ngobi MISS I ON PE RM A NENT E DE L A R. S. F. DE YOU G O S L A V IE AUPRES DES NATIONS UNIES A GE N EVE 5, chem in Thury - Tel. 46 44 33 18 January 1993 Dear Sirs, I have the honour to enclose herein a copy of the letter of 17 January 1993 submitted to the UN Secretary-General , Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali , by the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Mr. Dobrica Cosic, concerning the aggression of Moslem forces, on January 16 , against the territory of FR Yugoslavia. Please accept , dea r Sirs, the assurances of my highest consideration. , ,;j, ~ } ,,,,.. "'{t. · fl~ ~I 00-.2 ~ "> Dr . Vladimir avicevic Deputy Head of Delegation of the FRY to the ICFY and Ambassador, Charge d'Affaires a . i . of the FRY to the UNO at Geneva Mr. Cyrus Vance and Lord David Owen Co-Chairmen of the Conference on Yugoslavia United Nations Off i ce G e n e v a FEDERA:L REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA T E E P R E 5 I D B N T Hie Excellency · Mr • BOUTROC DO{!TROS GHAT, T UN Secreta...~-General Belgrade, January 17, 1993 NEW YORK . .D~ax Mr. RAcreta,ry-General, At . a . time when progress was made at the Geneva Conference and· when significant peace-making decisions that would contribute to the ter:.mination of the tragedy in the for.mer Yugoslav Re~~lic ~f Bosnia and Herzegovina are pending, it is with extreme concern that I wish to in!orm you vf the aggression of Moslem forcea yesterday, on January 16, against the territory of FR Yugosla~ia. · As part of a general offensive in the area of the Se..;J;>,i.an . muniC?iJ,:>ality of Bratunac, in the early morning hours of . January 16, Mos.t'eril tore'=!~ l:ju.1...1.vundea a. nwnbar of ~t--1·hi ~n vil).aq~lii ;1.nd massar.red tne d~vlli_cUJ. ~pulation, and then npP.ned '3,,;tillery fire on the dam of the •Perucac• Hydro Power Station on Lue terrilv~y of PRY, intendin~ t.o cau~e an ecoloeJical catastrophe. n11P. to the · gravity of the situation, members · of the Army of Yugoslavia who are defending the dam, tired a few waLuing shotc. However, the Moslem forces did not cease firing at the dam of the Power Station:, but also opened strong concentric fire on the crew of the 1"".rmy of Yugoslavia at the . "Perucac" watchtower , and thoraa.fter nn the town of Bajina Basta which is on the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. · Besides direct aggression on facilities and troops on the territory of FR Yugoslavia, the Moslem army opened strong fire on thE3 access routes to the bridge near the village of Skelani · and U1t: · :t,:c i~ -it.e~lf; . n.v.e:r_ . w.h;i.~_h the civilian population was fleeing and over which the wounded and killed were beluy ev-ccu6.tod. ThP. Mosl~ infant;ry penetrated to the bridge itself and threatened to prevent the evacuation and massacre the refugees, the wounded and the killed, and several members of the Moslem army~rossed over to the territory of FR Yugoslavia. 1 Under such circumstances, the units of the Army of Yugosl~via took the necessary counter mea3ures. Further action of the Moslem army was prevented by artillery fire, as well as the continuation of the massacre of the civilian population and the wounded in the ;region of the bridge near the village of Skelani. This enabled the evacuation of the refugees, and of 150 wounded and 46 killed pGople to the territory of FRY. However, this tragic result is not _final, aince battles in the region of Bratunac and Skelani are ~tili going on, and Moslem force9 again this morning, on January 17, opened fire on the territory of FRY, which means that they are not desisting from their aggressive intentions and the ethnic cleansing of the Serbian population on the · left bank of the Drina river. Mr. S~cretary-General, r · bave described · l:ht,S\! ~Vento to enable you' to get a true picture of the extent of the crimes committed again.st the civll:i.an popula.tion &nd · of the dAgr.ee of the aggression against the territory· of FR :r:ugoslavia. Such a situation call~ Ioi: ~he trucing of adeqt.1At:F~ measures ,in order to pr&v"nt thP. fnrthei; escalation of the conflict, a.i1ned at £01:cibly drawing Yugoslavia into the war in B&H and provoking an international armed intervention. On this occasion also, I am faced with t he tragic fact that there are many in the world who do not care about the truth on the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bow else can one interpret the fact that many TV statlubl3 refused the offer m~,fr~ by TV Serbia to broadcast, within programme exchanges , Lli.., 1;.uth -• The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has on numerous occasions dr'awn attention to the Moslem war objectives and their unscrupulous political methods. Regrettably , international political fora have not taken our warnings into considerat~on so far. On the contrary, the biased and one-sided behavior of certain international factors encouraged and continues to encourage , the Moslem side . in the Bosnian-Berzegovinian civil and religious conflict, to aggressive and provocative conduct. The constant application 'of double standards in relation to the crisis in the former SFRY, :especially the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina, has 2 resulted even in the disregard of the presence of regular troops of the Army of the Repu.blic of · Croa.L.i.." v1°l t.he t.erritcry of thP. former Bosnia and nerz~~vina, and of the combat flight& of its Air Force. Such behavior directly prevents the reaching of e. f'~aeeful colution f nr . Boeni~ and Herzegovina. . Simul taneoui:,ly, the Serbian people as a whole are sy5tematically demonized in the · the media of certain countries and in ~he statemeuLo ~£ ~hoir mo~t responsible officials, this practically amounting to racism and overt war mongering. I wish to emphasize that in spite of the constant efforts to jeopardize the peac~ process, FR Yugoslavia not only will not give up, but will intensify ics efforts for putting an P.nd to the sufferin(] of the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina and arriving at a just political· so'lution and ensuring lasti111:1 ,1:,1eo.ee. I am convinced, dear Mr. Secretary-General, that we will continue enjoying your support and assistance in the struggle for peace and the truth, and that you will bring your influence and authority to bear to remove the danger threatening to interrupt the initiated peace process and invalidate the efforts and results accomplished so far. I ::sl.1v.ild kindly like tn ;rnk YOU transmit this letter to the UN Secu~ity Council, as ~n offkcl.u deeumont. Please ct~~~pt, Your [email protected], the. assurances of my highest consideration. Dobtica tosic THE PRESIDENT cc.' -Co-chainne.n of the · Conference on Yugoslavia 3 SAVEZNA REPOBLIKA JUGOSLAVIJA P R E b S E D N I K Beograd, 17. januar 1993. NJEGOVA EK~ELENCIJA BOUTROS BOUTROS GHALI GENERALNI SEKRETAR UN : NJ U JO R K . Poltovani gospodine generalni sekretare, U ;feiiie k~d~ je na ~enevskoj konferenciji postignut napredak i kada predstoje zna~ajne rnirotvorne odluke koje bi doprinele ;okon~anju tragedije u bivsoj jugoslovenskoj Republici Bosni i Hercegovini, sa krajnjom zabrinutc~cu Vas obavestavam '. da su muslimanske snage juce, 16. januara, izvrsile agresiju na teritoriju SR Jugos1avije • . U okviru opste ofanzive na podrucju srpske opstine Bratuuac muslimanske snage SU u ranim jutarnjim casovirna 16. ja nuara okruzile vise srpskih sela i izvr~ile masakr nad civilnim stanovnis~vom, a potom otvorile artiljerijsku vatru i po brani hidrocentrale "Perucac" na, tetitoriji SRJ, sa namerom da izazovu ekoioiku katastrofu. Zbog ozbiljnosti situacije, pripadnici Vojske Jugoslavije koji stite branu ispaiili su nekoliko upozo rava~utih hitaca. Medjutim, muslirnanske snage nisu obustavile - . v~tru na :' branµ hidrocentrale, nego su otvorile snainu koncentri~nu vatru L na posadu Vojske Jugos'lavije na karau11· "!'t=l.ucae", :i potom i na grad Bajinu Bastu koji se nalazi na teritoriji Savezne Rspublike Jug6s1avije. Pored neposredne agresije na objekte i ljudstvo na te1..i.t.:briji SR Juryoslavije, musl,imanska vojska je snazno dejstvov~la po prilazima i sarnom mostu kod sela Skelana, preko kojeg je bezalo civilno stan~vnistvo, a i evakuisani su ranjeni · i mrtvi.. Muslimanska pesadija je izbila na sam most i zapretila da bpre~i cvakuaciju i masakrira izbegle, ranjene i poginule, a nekolikq pripadnika rnuslimanske vojske preslo je i na teritoriju RR Jugoslavije. , ',, j I, It - 2 - TT t~kvo1 situaciji j edi~i~e Vojske Jugoslavije su preduzele nuzne protivmere. Artilje:::-ijskom vat~om spre cena SU dalja dejstva muslimc1u::,k1:: vojoJco, -. i onPmncrnr.An je <;ialii masakr civilnog stanovnistva i ranjenih u rejonu mosta kod sela Skelani. Time je orno'gucena evakuacija izbeglica, 150 ranjenih i 46 pogi 'nulih na teritoriju SRJ. Meajutim, ovaj tragir.ni bil~ns ni-i e kona can, jer borbe na podrucju Br atunca i Seklana traju, a musli manske snage su i jutros 17. januara dejstvovale po teritorij~ SRJ, ~to znaci 9a ne odustaju od svojih agresivnih namera i etnickoq ci~cenja srpskog stanovnistva na levoj obali Drine. Gospddine generalni sekretare, opisao sarn Vam ove dogadjaje kako biste stekli pravu sliku o razroerama zlur~na nad civilnirn stanovnistvom i stepen.u agresije na teritoriju SR Jugosla viji. Takva situacija nalaze preduzirnanje adekvatnih mera radi sprecavanja dalje eskalacije sukoba, s . naroerorn da se SR Jugosla vija silom uvuce u rat u BiH i isprovocira roedjunarodna oruzana intervencija. I ovom prilikom sarn suocen _sa tragicnom cinjenicom da mnogima u svetu nije stalo do istine o gradjanskom ratu u Bosni i Hercegovini. Kako d r ugacije tumaciti cinjenicu da su mnoge TV stanice u svetu odbile ponudu TV Srbije da, uokviru razmene, emitu.ju a utenticne sni:mke posledica dejstava muslimanske vojske i na taj hacin objektivho informi~u javnost svojih zemalja. 'l' reba 1.i da naglasavam da .je ve6ina tih zemalja direktno involvi:i:anil: .u re.savanje/ krize u bivsoj Jugoslaviji, pri cernu se srp;;ki narod naj pre satanizuje, zatim stavlja u svojevrsta~ geto, a onda mu se ;alju ultimatumi j unapred sudi. savezna Repu~lika Jugoslavija je .ukazivala vi~e puta na niuslimariske , ratne ciljeve i nj ihove beskrupulozne ~: f>oli ti~ke metode. Na · zalost,medjunarodni politicki forumi nisu do sada uvazaval.i: nasa upozorenjd. Naprotiv, pristrasno i jednostrano ponasanj~ pojedinih medjunarodnih cinilaca1 ohr abrivalo je, i . dalje ohrabruje, muslimansku stranu u bosanskohercegovackom grac;J.jai::,.,s~om i ver.skom sukobu na agresivno i provokativno ponasanje. Stalna primena dvojnih , standar 'da u odriosu.' .ria · k.L 1:zu u bi·vsoj SFR,T, . . a posebno na krizu u Bdsni i H=rcegovini, dovo~i 1 do prenebre- gavanja ;,":. ' - -:~~-::-~·. prisustva r e gularnih trupa vojske Republike - 3 - Hrv11ts1rn .na· teritonji. bivse Bosne i Hercegovine,kao i borbenih letova njerie avijac{je. ·' Takv~ ~ona~~nj~ direktno spretava I , iznalazenj~ mirnog re~enja za Bosnu i Hercegovinu. Pri tome su u sredstvima javnog informisanja pojedinih zemalja, kao i izjavama njiho~ih najodgovornijih ljudi_,sistematski demonizovali ~rp~ki n.::.rod . u r:e- 1 ini_,._ s.t~c prerasta u rasizarn i otvoreno ratno huskanje. 7.elim da. naglasim: uprkos pennamentncm nastojanju da se omete mirovni proces, SR Jugoslavija ne same da nece odustati, nego ce i pojacati napore da se prekinu stradanja naroda Bosne i Hercegovine i dodje do pravednog politickog r.e~~u_ia i ~:eczblddi trnjari mir. Uveren sam, postovani gospodi'ne general.u.i.----· ::,ckt-e'e..J.rc, da cemo u ,borbi za mir i istinu i dalje iroati vasu podrsku i pomoc, kao i da cete iskoristiti Vas uticaj i autoritet da se otkloneopasnost't kujc p~e~c d:;, prek'inn 7,apo9eti . mirovni proces ~ ¢~e~vrodQ dosnn~!nje. napore ~ rezultate. Molim da ovo pismo dostavite tiavetu b~:t.L~dnosti' U.N, kao zvanicni dokument. Primite, i ovom prilikom, izraze mog osobitog uvazavanja. Dostavljeno: P R j D., S E D N/C K - Kop=ed~ednicima Konferencije o Jugoslaviji ~·Uf.C-.t?()- ·: ._ .. ·-· Dobrica Cosic ,· ' . j. .·, ·_-., i 4' ++ CY CY ++ 1 9 9 3..:.0 1- 19 0 2: 5 5 5 602 llli_lTED NATIONS HQS NEW YORK ~~ PC C~Ti'. 038 CYl 027 Pl/2 Oto{ I/ ...... - Ot.rn,OING CODE CABI& c:::: -0 ""- ~ cu C' TO: NAMBIAR, U~PROFOR, ZAGREB Cu G:l c:._ :::c=, en INFO: VANCE, 2 =- ~-::- GEN ~VA v· _,. CD \0 C/j ~= FROM: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK 2 =...... , I ·~..... = -~ i ·= DATE: 18 JANUARY jl993 ' :=:, C: ~ : ·en =, NUMBER: MSC··097 .. ,'..') '", ... ·:.£~~. ::· '. SUBJECT: IJJJPQrt .2i. "D 1. With reference tjo your Z-042, attached for your attention ! please find a self-e~planatory memorandum from e to the Under I Secretary-General fo~ Humanitarian Affairs. ! Dl [.ri"R IBUTION : v o :·lfo ...... P~/rrt .. · :l:>t.... . -·-····· ...... ··············------· - . V1A ...... e~µ.& ·-··············---:::rw······· ·-··········---················ ., , , # 4+ CYCY 4+ 1 § s 3-·o 1- 1 s o 2 : s s 5 6 02 UN ITED NATIONS HQS NE W YORK 0 0 3 P O: #. . ' l)~ ~ .s C~7. 038 CYZ 027 ~2/2. -~ .. UNITED NAf JO~S ,.~ NATIONS UNIES \ INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Jan El~asson January 1992 Under-secrttary-General for Hum.anitari~n hffair~ i i FROM: Marrack Go~lding Under-Seer tary~General for Peace- eeping Operations SUBJECT: l. With reference ~o your memorandum dated 14 January 1992 requesting the assis~ance of UNPROFOR in provid ng technical experti~e on the aboVie subject , I should like t inform you that UNPROFOR's presence ~n the Federal Republic of ugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) is cdnfined to a Logistics Base in Belgrade. Moreover, UNPROFOR dqes not have a mandate whic would permit it to operate in that c~untry in the way outlined n your memorandum. 2. It would appear that in order to verify th faithful implementation of th~ agreement mentioned in yo r memorandum, observers would havQ ~o be assigned to monitor he move:rnent of the fuel oil from the' point of entry into the F deral Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia an~ Montenegro) to the exemp ed end-user, e.g . ho~pitals. . 3. I regret having to inform you that, the im ortance of this humanitarian effort nptwithstanding, UNPROFOR i not in a position to provide arsistance . .·. 1993- 01 - 19 02 :5 7 PA GE = 0~ ',I ,,' ' . . . . '·. ~' NITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE ·93 JAN 17 19 :5 2 U N P R O F O R · fl $3Jtl1JJ ··- 2bZ OUTGOING CRYPTO FAX . . ~( Cz/11- tP6f /' 7 C-i l/L.L ~ TO GOULD NG, UNATIONS, NEWYORK DISTRIBUTION: INFO . VANCE, ICFY, GENEVA ,0 /J . ~ ...... f.h{jm~-. FROM NAfiBI , UNPROFOR, ZAGREB ('/cit'- c L/1' . ····························,l)w . ~: .tY'.1.&: ······:...... ~.1%?.}.~f?J ·······························aj)SIYI . DATE . ----··········F£ ·······" NUMBER . SUBJECT: FROM THE FRY TO THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE RT P 1. ARE, HERE A QUEST FROM THE FRY FOR THE IMPORT OF FUEL FO HUMANITARIAN PURPOSES WHICH IS PENDING BEFORE THE SANCTIONS COMM~1ITTEE, FOLLOWING A MEETING HELD ON 17 DECEMBER, THE COMMITTEE SUG ESTED TO THEN PRIME MINISTER PANIC TO PREPARE A PLAN THAT WOULD V RIFY THE HDMANITARlAN NEEDS AND ENSURE THAT ANY PERMITTED IMPORTS WERE UTILIZED ONLY TO SATISFY THOSE NEEDS. 2. WE SHOULD LIK TO BRING TO YOUR ATTENTION THAT THE FRY HAS NOW SUBMITTED A PLAN O THE ABOVE EFFECT IN WHICH IT IS PROPOSED THAT UNPROFOR BE THEM NITORING AGENCY, THE ROLE FORESEEN FOR UNPROFOR IS OF A MUCH BROA ER SCOPE THAN THE ONE WITH WHICH UNPROFOR WAS ENTRUSTED BY THE$ CTIONS COMMITTEE IN JUNE 1992 IN REGARD TO SOME HUMANITARIAN FLIG TS FROM BELGRADE, ANO WOULD REQUIRE ADDITIONAL RESOURCES. WE UN ERSTAND THAT THE DEPARTMENT OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS HAS BEEN iVOLVED IN DISCUSSIONS WITH UNHCR AND UNICEF ON THIS ISSUE. UNHC WHILE EXPRESSING SYMPATHY FOR THE NEEDS OF VULNERAaLE GROUPS IN SERBIA, HAS INDICATED THAT IT DOES NOT HAVE THE CAPACITY TO ASSUME THE TASKS WHICH WOULD BE INVOLVED. ~------ 0<0/fl FEDBR.~~ REPU?LIC OF YUGOSLAVIA T E E P R E S I D B N T 3ia Excellency Mr. BOOTROC DOUTROS GRAT,T UN Secreta..1 -Ger.eral Balgr~de, January 17, 1993 NEW YORK At a ti.me when proqrees ~as wade at the Ger.eva Conference and when significant peace-I!eki~g decisions that ~ould contribute to the termination of the b:2g2dy in the former Yugoslav Republic of Bos:1ia and Eerz.esovir.~ o.re pending, it is with extreme concern tJ1at I wi5h to inforrr. )' Ou vf the nggrouicn of MoGlem fore cs yei:;terday, on January 16, e.go.inst the territory of FR Yugoslavia. As part of a gener-al of fcnsive in the area of the Se;QJan muni~irality of Erat~nac, in the early ffiorning hours of January 16, Hosle;n torct!';j ~ui..,.vu:-iC:¢a a nur::J:s.r '='[ .~,-1·hi rin ?iliaG-1• ind massar.n'!d tne c.i.vlll_b.U ~i:,ul~cion, -.nd thi:>n npf'.ned 9,,r;tillery fire en the do.lll of the • Perucac • Eydro Fc;.;Gr Station on Lb;:: terd.Lu.i.y ~f rnY, int'1ildinlJ t.n cau~e an ecolO Besides direct aggression on fccUities and t~oops on the territory of FR Yugoslavia, tbe }~~s~elli ancy opened strong fire on tbe iccess routes to the bridge ~ear the vill~ge of Skelani · &nci Uie · 't~ i .-{!S£ -itM.lf; . r>.V."3--L. ',.')i!'.=Jl the civilian population -....as fleeing and ov-e:?: \..·hich the ,.-c~nded and killed \..'ere beluy ev--c.cu.::i.tod. ThP. Mosle.Jll infant;ry penetrated to the bridge itself and threatened to prevent the evacu~ticn and massacre the refugee~, the ....,ounded and the killed, and se-.reral mew.bers of the Moslem army ?rossed over to tbe territory of FR Yugoslavia. 1 Under 5UC~ circumstances, the units of the Army of Yugosl~via took tho r.ecessat"y counter meo3ure~. Further action of the Hoslem army •,;as prevented by artillery fire, as \Jell as tbe continuation of the massacre of the civilian population and the wounded in the region of the bridge near the village of Skslani. This enabled the evacuation of the refugees, end of 150 wounded 6.r.d 46 killed pGopl~ to t~e territory of PRY. However, this tragic result is not finol, since battles in the region of Bratunac and Skelani are still c;oing on , end Hoele.m forces egain this morning, on Janu~ry 17, opened fire on the territory of FRY, which rncens that tbey are not desisting from their aggre~sive intentions and the ethnic clear.sing of the Serbian population on the · left bank of the Drina river. Hr. Secretary-General, I h~ve descr LbeJ lh"'s~ ~ventc to e~a.ble you· to get a true picture of the extent of the crimes committed agains't the ci.vlU.c.n i,:,opulution !.nd of the dAgr.ee of the aggression against the territory of PR rugoslavia, Such a si tU6tion callt1 [or the t.:J The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ht-.s on nurr,erous occ2.sio~s drawn attentio:1 to the l'.oslem wa.r objectives and their unscrupulous . poli ti.col rr.ethcds. Regrettably , international politicol f6ra have not taken our warnings into considerat~on so far. On the contrary, the bia.s0d and one-sided behavior of certain internation~l factors encouraged and continues to encourage . the Haslem side in the Bosnian-Berzegovini2n civil and religious conflict , to aggressive and provocative conduct. The constant application of double standards in relation to the crisis in the former SFRY, :especially the crisis in Bosnio end Herzegovina, ha.a 2 resulted even in tho disregard of the presence of rc9ular troops of the Army of tbe Republic of. Croa L.i.c1 .:..ri th~ t.Cl'L~- tcry of t~t> former Bcsnia ~nd ITontt-<;;6VinA, and of the comb~t f 1 :i.ghte of its ~ir Force. Such behavior directly pr~vents the reaching of ~ ~~~ceful colution fnr Bosni~ and Herzegovina. Si.multancou~ly, the Serbion poople 2.s a whole a.re sy:,temat.:.ically d<=monized in the the media of cert~in countries and in ~he st~tt!.!lituL~ vf tho~r mo~t responsible officials, thi~ practically anounting to racism and overt war n,cnger ing. I wish to 8.!I!phasize that in sp~te of the constant efforts to jeopardize the peace process, FR Yugoslavia not only will not give 'JP, but will intensify its efforts for putting an P.nd to i;.hc suff er.in9 of the piwples of Bcsnia and Herzegovina and arriving at a just pol~tical solution end ensuring ia3tluy ~~6ce. I e.rn. convinced, dear Mr, s~cretary-General, tho.t we will continue e:1joying your sUpf?ort and assist~nce in the struggle for peace and the truth, and that you will bring your influence and authority to bear to renove the da..~ger threatening to interrupt the initiated peace process and invalidate the efforts and results acco~plishcd so far. I ~liv.ild kindly like tn n:o.k yo1,; transmit this letter to the UN Secu.ri ty Counc.11, as '-\ll of £..:.c.:..6..1. de<:u.mcnt. lllease c:11,;(.;1c:}?t , Your Excollenr.y, the assurances of ~y highest consideration. Dobrica 6osic TEE PR3SIDE1~T CC, l -Co-chairnen of the Confcre~ce on Yugoslavia 3 .> ·1 ASSEMBLY OF THE SERBIAN REPUBLIC BIJELJINA (BOTH LINES CROSSED OUT) Esteemed People's Deputies, Having been informed of (neodgovorna isstupanja) of some of the participants in discussion during the Assembly of the Serbian Republic, we find it necessary to address you through this message. This is not the moment for us to compete in patriotism. This is the moment to make a thoughtful, far-seeing and brave decision. Tonight, you are making a decision on accepting the Wance-Owen plan which will have the crucial effect of your struggle for national freedom and human and civil rights. Your acceptance of Wance-Owen plan will have an enormous importa~ce both for the future of FR of Yugoslavia and its republics Serbia and Montenegro. We wish to inform you that during the last few days we have had extensive, long and tiresome discussions with the Co President on the Conference on Yugoslavia, Mr. D. Owen. In spite of this, during these conversations, we have come up to some important new issues, some of them being already addressed by R. Karadzic today. In the contest of above, and also in the context of the whole Plan, we wish to point out to you some of our views connected to the decision that you are about to take. During the conversations we have been given some very important clarifications; we have therefore decided that it is the best that they be presented and explained to all of us in a formal presentation, so that it could be transmitted to the Assembly of the Serbian Republic. As the outcome of the extensive conversations which we (Casie, Milosevic and Bulatovic) had during the last few days with Mr. Owen (and whose results in all the important points, leading to lifting of the worst and very grounded fears of the Serbian Republic) , the following conclusions have been made (presented in a detailed and formal manner to Mr. Karadzic and Mr. M. Krajisnik, in our presence): the realization of the Plan, according to this agreement, will commence by delegating three members of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, out of all the cons ti tu ting members nations, which will immediately begin to work on the drafting and accepting of Poslovnik (the "Arbitration/Parliamentry procedures"); after its accepting the realization of the whole arrangement could start. The agreement on the interim period cannot be put in effect before the acceptance of Poslovnik on the work of Presidency; guarantees have been given that, after the signature, on territories where the Serbian population, out of the Serbian provinces, is living, no HVO (Croatian Military Forces) or Muslim forces cannot come, but only UN forces, guaranteeing the personal and material integrity and security of the population; the realization of the agreement on the free movement of the civilians on the whole territory of the ex-Bosnia and Herzegovina will be strictly observed, as guaranteed by the UN; understanding has been shown for the demands of the Serbian side for certain changement in the region of Popovo Polje, by which both the interests of Serbian and Croatian sides would be taken into consideration; in this context, the negotiations between the Serbs and Croats will be organized ASAP; the grounds for necessary changes in eliminating the artificial separation of the smaller from the bigger part of the Serbian province N° 6 has been acknowledged; great attention has been given to the facts, brought out in connection with the complaints from the Serbian side, with respect to the regions of mountains Kozara and Grmec, as well ·as to some historical Serbian territories, where there was a genocide over the Serbs during the II World War and where the Serbian population reside todate; the conversation that we led separately referred tot he question of the province N° 3 and the need for territorial connection among the Serbian territories. All of us (both the representatives of the UN and ourselves) have come to the conclusion that there is a new reality in the province N° 3, due to the fact of the increased concentration of the Serbian population there; given that fact, and regardless of the transport regime through that province which will be given a necessary link, solving this important question once and for all (although we are not entirely pleased with the current situation), and thus excluding any possibility of cutting this link off; it has been stated that the changes on the offered maps, accepted by all 3 factions through an agreement, either before or after the adoption of the Plan, should be accepted by the Conference on Yugoslavia and the UN, as an undisputable solution. Same applies in case that the two sides reach an agreement on the exchange of territories or correct the borders, and which are not causing any "damage" to the third side; during the conversations which Co-President on the Conference on Yugoslavia had in both Belgrade any Zagreb, and also with the fonctionnaires of the UN, it has been clarified that especially nowhere where there is a Serbian population out of the Serbian provinces, no grouping . of the HVO and Muslim forces will be allowed, only UN forces. We believe that the more effective arrangement of the necessary corrections of the maps could be done in accordance with the demands of the Serbian side, in the frame of an Interim Presidency, through the consensus and in the frame of Boarder Commission, rather than in the continued war situation; In the view of above, it is clear and it represents our firm belief that the remaining of the open questions of the so-called interim arrangement and maps could have been solved more efficiently through the plan according to the procedure, rather than by its refusal and by continuation of the confrontations and bloodshed. The importance of the remaining open questions cannot even be compared to enormous human loss and destroy in case of the continuation of the civil war. It is our belief that the following facts should be given the attention: a) Serbian population in Bosnia & Herzegovina is given approximately 45% of the whole B & H; b) there is a certainty that the crucial question of t~e territorial link between the Serbian provinces must be solved and that the danger for Serbian population be separated and divided has been avoided; c) an agreement has been reached that the region of Popovo Polje be justly solved; d) the grounds for re-opening of the· question on Kozara, as an historical habitat of the Serbian people, who suffered the genocide during the II World War; e) there are possibilities for removing the artificial separation between the smaller and greater part of the province N° 6 and that the link between them could be achieved; f) there are legal grounds for solving some other questions, whereby the Serbs in B & H would not be affected (and it is our strong belief), even if the final outcome would be the least acceptable solution in the offered frame (what we do not expect). We do not expect that the decisions would be made in the worst of interests of the Serbian people, not only because it would have been illogical and unjust but also because the Serbian side, as envisaged by the Plan, makes the decisions by consensus; also because, without Serbian side's approval, B & H cannot exist at all. In the view of above, in our approach to Wance-Owen plan, we are not excluding further confrontations and misunderstandings, but we are strongly for the political solutions of those confrontations in future. Citizens of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro have shown their strongest possible solidarity with you, even much more than their possibilities allowed them to. They will continue to show it further, regardless on all threats (also confirmed by the Assembly of the FR of Yugoslavia by its Resolution). But also, on their behalf, we would like to tell you: in the moment that you have been guaranteed the equality; the right to decide by consensus; the territories proposed to you - you have no right to (ugrozavate) and to expose to risk of the international sanctions .10 million of the citizens of Yugoslavia, only because of the remaining open questions, which are by far less important than the results which have been achieved. We simply want to tell you that you have to have some limits to your demands. If you have been guaranteed that HVO and Muslim forces will not step on territories where the Serbian people reside, that no major decision in B & H will not be made without your approval, that the question of "corridors" cannot be avoided - then one should ask oneself for what and which purpose and to what benefit to Yugoslavia should be put under the tremendous loss because of the sanctions, to be put into effect today at 6 L/T. Your decision today does not have the same value as your decision tomorrow. Today - it is no to sanctions; tomorrow - a mere opening of a long and painful process of uncertain negotiations. We avail ourselves, as much as you are, of the right to make .,, the important decisions. We therefore demand from you that you accept our firm decision and accept the Plan. We avail ourselves of the right to make the judgment what is good for our country and the Serbian nation as a whole. This is the question of war and peace, and we have therefore chosen peace. This is not only peace for Serbia & Montengro, but for all of us. ..This is an honourable peace, guaranteeing you equality and freedom. The other solution is unnecessary war which could bring to all of us nothing but misery and suffering. a21 t y-