The Chief Executive: Kennedy, Crisis, and Decision-Making

By Edward F. Batchelder

Senior Honors Thesis History University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

April 29, 2020

Approved:

Michael Morgan, Thesis Advisor

Benjamin Waterhouse, Reader

1

Acknowledgments

I must thank Dr. Michael Morgan for his support, guidance, and tutelage. I owe him a tremendous debt of gratitude. I also want to thank Rachel Kiel, who has helped me every step of the way. My family has been incredibly supportive, and I especially thank my dad for instilling in me a passion for history. This project was also made possible by the financial assistance I received from the Boyatt Award in History and the Tom and Elizabeth Long Research Award.

2 Introduction

“How could I have been so stupid?”1 John F. Kennedy posed this question to his trusted advisor and speechwriter Ted Sorenson in April 1961 after he had just publicly accepted blame for the recent failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion. The invasion of Cuba was the president's first major setback since taking office that January. Up to that point, “everything had broken right for him since 1956. . . . Everyone around him thought he had the Midas touch and could not lose.”2 Frustrated with his foreign policy machinery, which he blamed for the disaster, the president made changes designed to prevent future policy failures. Kennedy had more faith in his intuition than in his national security advisors, which compelled him to take more ownership of policy creation.

A few weeks after the invasion, Kennedy ignored the warnings of his advisors and met

Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev in Vienna. Kennedy was underprepared and outmatched at the meeting. The unsuccessful summit catalyzed a crisis in Berlin. The president once again changed aspects of his foreign policy machinery. This time, however, Kennedy’s changes successfully addressed problems with his policy creation process, and his administration outlined a strategy that helped resolve the Berlin crisis.

This project explores how Kennedy managed his national security apparatus and oversaw the creation of foreign policy. The narrative and language of the work also connects modern management theory that emerged at the time to the Kennedy administration. Beyond its historical applications, the research and analysis given here reveals a lesson about management. As a leader and executive, it may be more important to avoid making bad decisions than to make good

1 Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Bantam Books, Inc, 1966) 309. 2 Arthur M. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965) 259.

3 decisions.3 This was certainly true of Kennedy. For a president in the nuclear age, the downside risk of a miscalculation was unlimited. Kennedy recognized the imbalance of risk and reward, particularly in Berlin. The failures of the Bay of Pigs invasion and the Vienna summit indicated that in order to avoid future bad decisions that might put the country at risk, he needed to overhaul his management style and his policy-making process. After many growing pains, the

Kennedy administration created a successful Berlin policy that resulted from effective institutional decision-making, not the president's intuition.

In 1982, John Gregory Dunne wrote, "There are no new facts about the Kennedys, only new attitudes.”4 Scholars have not yet used the facts available about John F. Kennedy to connect his leadership to modern management theory. Former Harvard Business School professor Phil

Rosenzweig argued that the measure of a manager is “the willingness to examine one’s own actions and seek a measure of wisdom.”5 Evaluating Kennedy against this standard provides a new perspective on his administration. Kennedy’s willingness to learn from his mistakes and change course after his failures in Cuba and Vienna illustrate the two themes of this thesis: executive management and the importance of the decision-making process.

Kennedy’s success in Berlin leads to two central questions. How did the president’s diagnosis of his administration's problems affect the process of decision-making? How did his

3 The importance of avoiding bad decisions comes from Adam Grant, an organizational psychologist, and professor at Wharton. In an interview with Netflix CEO Reed Hastings, Grant spoke about how executives guide company culture. Grant concluded that while it is good to make smart decisions, it is more critical to avoid decisions that would negatively affect the company. The President of the United States is like a CEO in many respects. Accordingly, I have applied Grant’s thoughts on decision-making to the Kennedy administration. Reed Hoffman, interview with Reed Hastings and Adam Grant, Masters of Scale, podcast transcript, March 5, 2020, https://mastersofscale.com/reed-hastings-culture-shock/. 4 John Dunne, “Elephant Man,” Review of The Kennedy Imprisonment: A Meditation on Power, by Garry Wills, The New York Review of Books Volume 29, Number 6, April 1982, https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1982/04/15/elephant-man/. 5 Phil Rosenzweig, “Robert S. McNamara and the Evolution of Modern Management,” Harvard Business Review, December, 2010, https://hbr.org/2010/12/robert-s-mcnamara-and-the-evolution-of-modern-management.

4 management style influence foreign policy during the first eight months of his presidency? This thesis argues that after the failures in Cuba and Vienna, Kennedy came to several conclusions: elaborate machinery was not innately ineffective; he should trust his advisors; and he should avail himself of more dissenting opinions. Based on these lessons, Kennedy rebuilt some of the formal foreign policy machinery that he had previously dismantled, relinquished his grip on policy creation, and halted debate until he could hear from noteworthy advocates of more hawkish policy.

The young president initially showed supreme confidence in his management style. After the election, Kennedy was eager to reach the White House and change the structure of the executive branch to better suit his own preferences. His predecessor, Dwight Eisenhower, relied on formal machinery—for example, a subcommittee of the National Security Council—to inform his foreign policy decisions. The newly elected president preferred a less rigid approach.6

Because he prized efficiency, Kennedy wanted to eliminate some of Eisenhower’s formal machinery, which in his view slowed the creation of foreign policy. The new structure was less

“elaborate,” which Kennedy hoped would provide “more flexibility than in the past.”7 McGeorge

Bundy, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, who had the task of dismantling much of

Eisenhower’s machinery, remarked that Kennedy desired less formality in policy creation because “all Senators are disorderly.”8 The desire for informality was felt throughout the White

House. In an interview with the author, on April 24, 2020, Charles Daly, former Staff assistant to the President for Congressional Liaison, claimed that Kennedy’s style was “very loose and relaxed.”

6 Michael Beschloss, The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960-1963 (New York: Edward Burlingame Books, 1991) 68. 7 Schlesinger, 209-210. 8 McGeorge Bundy quoted in Beschloss, 68.

5 Kennedy’s managerial intuition seemed reasonable, but his changes caused problems. For example, he “wanted his staff to be small, in order to keep it more personal than institutional.”9

By changing the machinery to fit his own disorganized management style, he fixed something that was not broken. Kennedy made changes designed to “increase his influence,” and expedite the flow of information. A faster process was intended to give Kennedy “more room to maneuver” when thinking about different policy proposals.10 No one in Kennedy’s camp stopped to consider that there might be negative tradeoffs between speed and quality. Terminating ostensibly superfluous staff and reorganizing the White House had the unintended effect of obscuring the flow of information to the president.

The president's confidence prevented him from seeing important warning signs, and his new system failed him. The Bay of Pigs was largely the result of Kennedy putting too much faith in military advisors and rushed timelines. Instead of having room to maneuver around various policy recommendations, the president had created a system in which “bureaucratic momentum” held him hostage and pressed him to approve a foolish plan.11 Kennedy felt betrayed by the proponents of the invasion (the CIA, the Joint Chiefs, and, to a lesser extent, the State

Department). In the wake of the disaster, he “moved to increase his grip on his foreign policy government” in order to avoid repeating his past mistakes.12

Although Kennedy had lost a brother in the Second World War, he described the Bay of

Pigs as the worst day of his life.13 The president was despondent over his shortsightedness, and wanted to rebound by scoring a foreign policy victory. During the Cold War, however, there was

9 Sorensen, 262. 10 Sorensen, 259. 11 Sorensen, 302. 12 Beschloss, 146. 13 Robert Dallek, An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy, 1917-1963 (New York: Back Bay Books, 2013) 367.

6 no such thing as a quick or simple victory. Journalist Stewart Alsop said that the Bay of Pigs was a moment that should have “cured any illusions that Kennedy had about the certainty of success.”14 After Kennedy had time to process the failed invasion, Eisenhower offered to meet with him at Camp David. The two men discussed the challenges of leading a nation and discussed Kennedy’s next steps. Eisenhower told Kennedy that if he wanted to get out of the situation he was in, the only way to do so was with a success. Kennedy replied, “Well, I assure you that, hereafter, if we get into anything like this, it is going to be a success.”15 Unfortunately,

Kennedy could not keep his word. At that time, he did not have a management structure capable of handling complex geopolitical issues.

Confident in his charm and interpersonal skills, Kennedy thought he could ease tensions between the US and the USSR by having a face-to-face meeting with Khrushchev. He pursued a summit meeting in Vienna as soon as possible after the failed invasion. With such a quick turnaround, he lacked the time to prepare properly. The decision to press on with the meeting showed that Kennedy felt confident in his foreign policy knowledge despite limited experience.

He did not have full command over the situation in Berlin. The leaders met a month and a half after the invasion, and the meeting went poorly for the president. Kennedy told reporter James

Reston that his opponent “beat [the] hell out of him.”16 He accepted responsibility for the result, and lamented his lack of preparation.17 Despite the failures, Kennedy never lost his ability to be reflective, and resolved to mend the problems that afflicted his administration.

14 “Joseph W. Alsop Oral History Interview,” interview by Elspeth Rostow on June 18, 1964, Kennedy Library. 15 Quoted in Richard Reeves, President Kennedy: Profile of Power (President Kennedy: Profile of Power (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993) 102. 16 David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York: Ballantine Books, 1993) 96-97. 17 Dallek, 413-414.

7 To address some of the problems that caused both blunders, Kennedy created more committees to handle national security and foreign policy. In doing so, he effectively reversed some of the changes he had made to Eisenhower’s apparatus. For example, he increased the resources of the State Department during the Berlin crisis. He requested that the department create a Berlin Task Force that would deal exclusively with issues on Berlin, inform him about developing problems, and provide him with policy recommendations.18 To further educate himself on issues, Kennedy appointed a number of personal advisors, including Harvard

Professor Henry Kissinger.

These changes corrected an important flaw in the policy-making process: that momentum could dictate policy, as it had during the Bay of Pigs. Specifically, Kennedy learned that a slower and more deliberate process of policy creation could counter the momentum of inferior plans.

This change resulted directly from the introduction of the Berlin Task Force and new reports from personal advisors. The president’s ability to examine past events and adjust his machinery accordingly demonstrates that he was a “conscious and critical” manager.19 In keeping with this more methodical process of policy creation, the president said little about Berlin in public before he finally articulated his administration’s policy on the divided city in a speech on July 25, 1961.

By that point, seven weeks had elapsed since the Vienna summit.

After this speech, some observers asserted that he was not looking for a win.20 Kennedy stopped rushing into situations in pursuit of a conventional victory, such as toppling a government in Cuba or signing a treaty in Vienna. Using Kennedy’s Berlin policy as evidence

18 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Waging Peace and War: Dean Rusk in the Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson Years (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988) 337. 19 James Burnham, The Managerial Revolution: What is Happening in the World (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1941) 73. 20 Sorensen, 514.

8 that the president learned from his mistakes brings up an ancillary question: what did a win in the

Cold War look like? For Kennedy, the top priority was preserving peace. The president planned to achieve this outcome by avoiding putting Khrushchev in a position where he would feel compelled to fight.21 Doing this meant seeking mutually agreeable outcomes that would not damage Soviet prestige. Success was any result that could be considered mutually beneficial for the US and USSR. The president navigated the Berlin crisis with great skill. His flexible policy, born out of his failures, maintained peace and reduced tensions between the US and USSR.

Current scholarship gives Kennedy little to no credit for his handling of the Berlin crisis.

American historian Michael Beschloss asserts that Kennedy’s foreign policy machinery manufactured erroneous decisions during the crisis and ultimately eroded relations between the

US and USSR. Two other Kennedy biographers, Robert Dallek and Richard Reeves, both understate the importance of Kennedy’s turnaround in the summer of 1961. Kennedy does get some praise, however, from many of the people who worked closely with him in 1961, including

Arthur Schlesinger (Special Assistant to the President) and Sorensen, who argue that the president averted disaster in Berlin.

This thesis distinguishes itself from the current literature on Kennedy’s presidency.

Presidential historians analyze the president mostly though the finished product of policy, but this thesis focuses instead on the process of foreign policy creation. It offers new insights about the connection between the Berlin crisis, Kennedy, and modern management theory. Using the

Berlin crisis to illustrate Kennedy’s shift in executive management further distinguishes this work from the existing scholarship. Many accounts of Kennedy’s foreign policy use the Cuban missile crisis to demonstrate that he learned from the Bay of Pigs and Vienna disasters. By

21 “Memorandum of Conversation,” FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 5, doc. 91.

9 contrast, this thesis shows that Kennedy corrected his mistakes shortly after the Vienna summit, more than a year before the missile crisis. Kennedy learned that process mattered. By slowing down the pace of internal debate, relying more on his advisors, and rebuilding the machinery that he had previously scrapped, Kennedy reached better decisions.

This project develops its argument over three chapters. The first chapter, which examines

Kennedy’s actions before his inauguration, makes the case that he was determined to change

Eisenhower’s foreign policy machinery in order to increase his own influence in creating policy.

It also analyzes the new system’s weaknesses, which contributed to the Bay of Pigs disaster.

The second chapter, which covers the period from the Bay of Pigs to the Vienna summit, argues that Kennedy should shoulder the blame for both failures. Although Kennedy publicly accepted responsibility for the Bay of Pigs, he privately blamed the CIA. In this respect, he refused to acknowledge the problems that his own flawed process had caused, not least by requiring him to make decisions based on bad information. The president trusted his luck, allowed himself to be swept along by his cabinet, and authorized an ill-conceived mission.

Kennedy then made another poor decision by rushing into the Vienna summit, which produced another setback for his foreign policy.

The final chapter examines the period between the Vienna summit and the erection of the

Berlin wall. After the summit, Kennedy took two months to prepare his Berlin policy—a significant departure from his previous approach. Other changes that he made led him to adopt a policy that favored negotiation rather than decisive action, as his July 25, 1961 speech

10 demonstrated. Kennedy’s newfound flexibility allowed him to achieve his ultimate goal of avoiding war without surrendering to Soviet provocations.22

This thesis deploys evidence from many sources. The most important resource for original documents—including materials from archived collections on Cuba, Berlin, and

National Security—was the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library in Boston. The Library’s Staff

Memoranda, National Security Council meeting notes, Campaign Files, Pre-Presidential Papers, and oral histories reveal Kennedy’s thoughts on how he wanted his foreign policy machinery to operate. Files from other presidential libraries, such as the Clark Clifford Papers from the

Truman Library, illustrate how Kennedy’s management style differed from that of his predecessors. Documents from the Foreign Relations of the United States series demonstrate how Kennedy altered his approach to management. Meanwhile, the Public Papers of the

President series furnished Kennedy’s speeches. To contextualize contemporary criticism of the president, this thesis uses two newspapers, the Washington Post and the New York Times. In addition, eight memoirs and books written during the 1960s provided further primary source evidence. Finally, 16 secondary sources were consulted, including biographies of Kennedy by

Robert Dallek and Richard Reeves.

Besides its scholarly insights, this thesis sheds light on vital questions about leadership and decision-making. Kennedy carried the burden of leading the United States in an era of existential nuclear danger. The president's triumph was the preservation of peace. How did he make decisions under pressure? How did he operate under conditions of intense scrutiny and

22 “The steps I have indicated tonight are aimed at avoiding that war. To sum it all up: we seek peace—but we shall not surrender. That is the central meaning of this crisis, and the meaning of your government's policy.” John F. Kennedy, “Radio and Television Report to the American People on Returning From Europe,” June 6, 1961. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy: 1961: Contains the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President, January 20 to December 31, 1961, 445. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1962. University of Michigan Library.

11 ambiguity? How did he recognize when we are wrong? Studying Kennedy provides insights that are relevant to any reader. His change of direction on Berlin offers a powerful blueprint for anyone who has had to learn from failure. This thesis is not simply a story about Kennedy; it is also a story of how we must all battle our pride and hubris. Kennedy spent the first four months of his presidency searching for a win. However, it was only after he realized the flaw in this attitude that he began to succeed.

12 Chapter One Introduction

At the time of his election as president, John Kennedy was inexperienced and relatively new to electoral politics. His meteoric rise coincided with a boom in modern management theory. There was a prevailing idea at the time that people with “no special expertise in any particular industry or technology” could nevertheless “step into an unfamiliar company and run it successfully.”23 Kennedy’s actions after he won the election demonstrated that he believed he could run things better than his predecessor could, and he did not hesitate to change the managerial status quo. Kennedy focused on two main aims between his election and inauguration: improving the efficiency of his foreign policy machinery, and searching for talented men for his Cabinet. Unbeknownst to Kennedy at the time, his focus on these two goals would lead to some catastrophic pitfalls.

Kennedy believed President Eisenhower’s system of governing was inefficient. The second-term senator wished to create a system that would better fit his management style, one involving less reliance on cumbersome formal processes that in his view had slowed down

Eisenhower’s administration. Kennedy wanted his staff to be small “in order to keep it more personal than institutional.”24 He thought a small but functional team would be nimble and could respond to issues more quickly.

Kennedy also asserted that with the excessive machinery in Eisenhower’s White House, subordinates were at the center of the decision-making process.25 He advocated for a shift toward central decision-making. The Chief Executive, Kennedy said in 1960, must be “the vital center

23 Robert H. Hayes and William J. Abernathy quoted in Rosenzweig. Management became a field pioneered by academics, and modern management theory ushered in a scientific way to think about the structure of organizations. 24 Sorensen, 262. 25 Dallek, 300.

13 of action in our whole scheme of government.”26 Determined to be at the center of his government’s machinery, Kennedy vowed to “place himself in the very thick of the fight.”27

Once Kennedy arrived at the White House, he altered his predecessor’s foreign policy machinery to consolidate his influence and remove apparent redundancies to make the creation of policy more efficient. The young president felt no obligation to keep the structure the way it was, and instructed his team to “promptly slaughter committees right and left,” paring down the inherited machinery.28 Kennedy felt that he needed to have advisors inform him on recommendations in advance of any policy discussion. Peter Drucker described Kennedy as a

“reader,” “someone who surrounded himself with a brilliant group of writers who assisted him by writing to him before discussing memos with him in person.”29 The reliance on the fast flow of information would theoretically give Kennedy ample time to deliberate for himself before constructing his own policy directives.

Kennedy’s mistake, though, was conflating speed with efficiency. Efficiency should be the byproduct of a well-oiled policy-formulating machine, not the end goal, which should always be good policy. It was less efficient to fix a hastily developed policy than it was to develop a good policy slowly.30

This chapter argues Kennedy concluded that keeping the elaborate machinery of his predecessor intact would stifle his ability to tightly control foreign policy; therefore, he felt he

26 Schlesinger, 120. 27 Schlesinger, 120. 28 Schlesinger, 210. 29 Peter Drucker, “Managing Oneself,” Harvard Business Review, January, 2005, https://hbr.org/2005/01/managing- oneself. 30 Howard Marks, the founder of Oak Tree Capital, got his start in the 1960s. He believed a manager’s goal was to achieve exceptional returns. Achieving exceptional returns required the efficient use of resources. Marks recognized that speed was not a determining factor in decisions that led to outperformance. Efficiency and speed are often correlated, but there was no causal relationship between the two. Therefore, it did not matter if the machinery was slow because correcting a policy misstep would require an inefficient allocation of resources. Howard Marks, The Most Important Thing: Uncommon Sense for the Thoughtful Investor (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).

14 had to dismantle the restrictive machinery in order to support his style of executive management.

As a result, Kennedy decreased the size of his White House staff and eliminated several subcommittees of the National Security Council. Instead of fostering efficiency, however,

Kennedy created a system that lacked clear interdepartmental lines of communication, and thereby hamstrung debate. In the previous administration, Eisenhower had preferred to receive information via a continual, scheduled flow of meetings and briefings. For that reason, Drucker called Eisenhower a “listener.”31 In the new system, Kennedy excused himself from participating in many of these meetings. He preferred instead to receive information from his White House staff, who only worked on reports when explicitly asked to do so. Kennedy, being inherently unaware of his own knowledge gaps, was unable to ask for the information he most needed. The unintended consequence of Kennedy’s changes to machinery was flawed policy.

The current scholarship does mention the changes Kennedy made to his foreign policy apparatus. The best blow-by-blow accounts come from the people who worked with Kennedy, such as Arthur Schlesinger, Special Assistant to the President, and Ted Sorensen, Kennedy’s speechwriter. Written in the 1960s, these accounts’ proximity to Kennedy’s unfinished term did not allow them to analyze all the effects of some of the president's changes. As Sorensen admitted, “My participation as a member of the Kennedy White House staff is still too recent to permit me to give an objective account of its personnel and their part in the government.”32 Although Schlesinger and Sorensen use the rhetoric and vocabulary of modern management theory in describing the changes in the Kennedy administration, neither of them draw a direct parallel between what happened in the White House and management theory. As for biographers, they cover the time between Kennedy’s election and the Bay of Pigs as part of

31 Drucker, “Managing Oneself.” 32 Sorensen, 258.

15 the historiography, but their narratives do not analyze the inherent flaws of Kennedy’s policy machinery. The current scholarship fails to connect the changes Kennedy made to his predecessor’s machinery to his management style. A better approach to analyzing Kennedy includes viewing some of the changes he made through the lens of modern management theory.

This chapter exposes the disconnect between Kennedy’s goals of efficiency and the results that followed his changes in the machinery. Analyzing Kennedy’s campaign and administration up to

April of 1961 sets the stage for the two notable failures of his presidency, the Bay of Pigs and the

Vienna summit.

The Campaign and the Cabinet

Kennedy had plenty of wisdom and charisma, but virtually no foreign policy experience.

As a candidate, Kennedy could not hide his deficiencies during the campaign. The major theme of the race in 1960 was “the threat of global communism,” making foreign policy a salient issue that Kennedy needed to address.33 In July 1960, “the overwhelming majority of those interviewed regard relations with Russia and the rest of the world as being the primary problem facing the nation today.”34 Senator Kennedy sought to be the youngest president ever elected, and his age impacted many narratives during the campaign, particularly the one around foreign policy experience. Kennedy was 43 years old in 1960, and faced off against Vice President

Richard Nixon, who touted his connection to Eisenhower’s successful foreign policy record.

Kennedy’s youth greatly influenced the way others perceived him on the campaign trail. For

33 CNN, “1960 Presidential Debates,” accessed November 20, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1996/debates/history/1960/index.shtml. 34 George Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935-1971 (New York: Random House, 1972) 1683.

16 example, President Eisenhower privately mocked Kennedy, referring to him as “Little Boy

Blue.”35 These critics equated his youth with inexperience.

Although Nixon was just four years Kennedy’s senior at age 47, he benefited from his association with the incumbent. Kennedy’s opponent led in the polls during the early part of the campaign, as voters saw him as more mature and experienced.36 Nixon’s platform centered on the success of the Eisenhower administration, and the Republican nominee claimed that he would build on its success in the fight against communism. Nixon declared, “There is no part of our record of which we are more proud than in the area of national security and in the conduct of foreign policy.”37 This association to Eisenhower buoyed Nixon, as the sitting president was historically popular, with an average approval rating of 65%.38 In the words of one of Nixon’s most direct campaign slogans: “It’s experience that counts.”39 But experience was not the only thing that resonated with voters. The race became extremely tight in the aftermath of the first of what would be four televised debates. On camera, Kennedy appeared poised and confident, while

Nixon was noticeably perspiring. This display of confidence eased public concerns about

Kennedy’s age and inexperience and allowed him to pass Nixon in the polls. The 43 year-old senator converted momentum into victory in November.

During the campaign, Kennedy refused to reveal a preference for who he would appoint to serve in his Cabinet. Kennedy thought filling positions before the election was premature and might confuse issues between the two candidates. Despite the superstition revolving around

35 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953-1956 (New York: Doubleday, 1963) 10-11. 36Gallup, “Gallup Presidential Election Trial-Heat Trends, 1936-2008,” Accessed November 20, 2019, https://news.gallup.com/poll/110548/gallup-presidential-election-trialheat-trends-19362004.aspx#4 37 “’What Nixon Said: A collection of his Public Utterances, 1946-1960,’ DNC Issuance: National Security: National Security – General.” Box 1023, Folder 32. Kennedy Library. 38 Gallup, “Presidential Approval Ratings,” Accessed November 20, 2019, https://news.gallup.com/poll/116677/presidential-approval-ratings-gallup-historical-statistics-trends.aspx 39 Beschloss, 23.

17 Dewey’s 1948 fate-defying decision to name a Secretary of State, Kennedy did in fact look ahead to the presidency in matters of foreign policy.40 In July 1960, Kennedy asked Adlai

Stevenson, the Democratic nominee in the last two elections, to lead a foreign policy task force to prepare for a possible transition of power.41 Kennedy was also forward thinking with regard to his public statements. Knowing Berlin was such a hot-button issue, Stevenson had privately advised Kennedy to avoid “extended discussion” of the issue.42 Kennedy listened carefully to this advice, knowing that statements made during the campaign could handicap future negotiations with the Soviets. To this point, he only mentioned Berlin six times in speeches made in the fall of 1960. For Kennedy, it was more valuable to maintain a level of flexibility when it came to future Berlin policy than it was to assert a greater rigidity on communism to win votes.

Kennedy won the election by a narrow margin, which had an impact on future policy in the form of his choices for his Cabinet. He wanted to communicate a message that he would put the nation’s best interest above partisan politics. Members of the Kennedy team called this

“reassurance”—a way of reassuring the public that the young president could be counted on to make thoughtful decisions.43 Kennedy mostly chose people who had not previously held political office. One way to assure the country was to base his selections simply on talent. Sorenson dubbed this the “great talent hunt of 1960-1961.”44 This practice was consistent with the managerial idea that no matter the circumstances, smart people could excel at management. Part of “reassurance” also involved establishing some level of continuity with the Eisenhower administration. Kennedy announced that J. Edgar Hoover and Allen W. Dulles would retain

40 Sorensen, 251. 41 “Editorial Note,” FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 8, doc. 1. 42 1952-1964; Adlai E. Stevenson Papers, MC124, Public Policy Papers, Department of Special Collections, Princeton University Library; Beschloss, 30. 43 Schlesinger, 125. 44 Sorenson, 251.

18 control of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency, respectively.45 Although some liberals were unhappy with the decision, Kennedy thought the political cost of removing these two men would be “considerable” and therefore undesirable.46

Typically, choosing a Secretary of State is one of the most important appointments a president makes. However, consistent with Kennedy’s desire to retain control of foreign policy, picking a Secretary of State was a secondary priority for him compared to choosing the rest of the Cabinet. According to Kennedy, the most important position to fill was the Secretary of

Defense. The Soviet Union posed a deepening threat to America’s future, and in addition, the president lacked confidence in handling domestic issues. Kennedy therefore prioritized national security and set out to find a defense secretary.47 He wanted a moderate Republican for the job, because this would give him political cover for the inevitably hard decisions he would have to make regarding defense. This position ended up being challenging to fill. Kennedy had inadvertently limited his pool of candidates by stances he had taken during his campaign, including his criticism of the inadequacy of US defenses.

Kennedy’s first choice for the position was Robert Lovett, a Nixon supporter who had served as Truman’s Secretary of Defense. Lovett declined the offer due to health concerns. Next,

Kennedy considered offering the job to Eisenhower’s Secretary of Defense, Thomas S. Gates.

However, Kennedy realized he could not appoint the same man who bore the responsibility for decisions he had criticized during his campaign. Striking out on two people, Kennedy told Clark

Clifford, the man in charge of the transition to power, “I don’t care whether a man is a Democrat

45 Schlesinger, 125. 46 Schlesinger, 125. Kennedy’s decision was made to the dismay of other liberals who recognized that Dulles was typically hawkish and had hoped for more change. 47 Dallek, 309.

19 or Igorot. I want the best fellow I can get for a particular job.”48 Kennedy’s urgency to fill the position caused him to stop worrying about the candidates’ politics. Although Lovett turned down the job, he was impressed with Kennedy, and helped connect him with more candidates.

Through Lovett, Kennedy connected with Robert McNamara, a Republican executive at Ford, who became Kennedy’s man for defense.49 Initially, McNamara declined the offer, but accepted after several meetings with Kennedy. McNamara was the best example of how modern ideas of management influenced Kennedy’s Cabinet. He was a “whiz kid” business executive who had never held political office.50 McNamara favored spreadsheets over ideology, and was driven by a calculated sense of analytical rationality.51

Kennedy’s second major Cabinet appointment was Dean Rusk as Secretary of State.

Kennedy had met both Rusk and McNamara for the first time a full month after his election on

December 8, 1960.52 Rusk was the only member of the new Cabinet from the Roosevelt-Truman era. Everyone else was very young; in fact, Kenney’s Cabinet was the youngest to date in the

20th century. No one had held elected office for as long as Kennedy, and he had only be an elected official for just over a decade.53 The youth of this group made them less inclined to be concerned about deviation from Eisenhower-era practices. They did not know what was typical, so there was no innate opposition to Kennedy’s management style.

The Cabinet’s lack of experience resulted in a hesitation to provide staunch opposition to policy recommendations. Kennedy’s advisors did not feel free to “criticize each other’s work,”

48 Schlesinger, 129. Igorot is an ethnic group in the mountains of the Philippines. 49 Schlesinger, 131-133. 50 Rosenzweig. 51 For his many faults, McNamara was credited with bringing “coherence to the management of the American military establishment.” In part, this coherence is evidence that outsiders can use the skill of management to improve organizations. Rosenzweig. 52 Schlesinger, 131-133. 53 Sorensen, 253.

20 and this limited debate, as there was a bias towards agreement.54 The consequences of such

“groupthink” would become all too clear in the months ahead.55

Kennedy did not feel beholden to people who had helped his campaign financially, but he had no problem elevating many members of his campaign team to high-level positions. The final

Cabinet contained only one member who had contributed $1,000 or more to a candidate during the 1960 election cycle: Douglas Dillon (the future Secretary of the Treasury), who, together with his wife, had contributed over $26,000. Ironically, the Dillon gave this amount to Nixon, not Kennedy.56 Kennedy did award high-level positions to those who had advanced his campaign with their hard work, time, and dedication. Kennedy named Ted Sorensen as his Special Counsel and Pierre Salinger as his Press Secretary. Both men had worked with Kennedy during his campaign, so their appointments came as no surprise. Kennedy also tapped Larry O'Brien

(campaign strategist), Kenny O'Donnell (political consultant), and David Powers (a friend from

Boston) to become special advisors, and each of them wielded influence.

From the outset, Kennedy thought about his White House staff in a different way than the rest of his Cabinet. “No staff member was appointed in order to please, or to plead for . . . any group or government agency.”57 With staff appointments, Kennedy did not seek political cover by appointing someone who might satisfy a particular constituency. In foregoing politics, he picked people he knew and trusted, showing that he may have valued the opinions of his personal staff more than other Cabinet members. His staff included some of the most important

54 Sorenson 304; Schlesinger, 209. 55 Commentators coined the term “groupthink” to define the tendency toward reaching an uncontested consensus. Yale psychologist Irving Janis pioneered the research in this field after he read Author Schlesinger’s A Thousand Days. Janis used the Bay of Pigs invasion as the case study to explore the psychology behind how Kennedy’s cabinet featured brilliant men who all converged on a bad decision with little opposition. Irving Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1983). 56 Sorensen, 251. 57 Sorensen, 260.

21 participants in creating the new administration’s foreign policy. Kennedy knew he could not know everything, so he had his personal staff feed him information he needed to know. Sorenson said Kennedy “could not afford to accept” any recommendations from his Cabinet “without seeking an independent judgment” from his personal advisors.58

Kennedy believed that if his White House staff gave him information that he requested, he would possess all the relevant information on a given subject. This belief clashed with how he had set up his machinery. A principal responsibility of the staff was to “refine the conflicting views of various agencies.”59 The weakness of this system was a problem of assumptions. If

Kennedy assumed there was a congruency of views, he would not test his assumptions by reaching out to his staff. As a result, his staff gave opinions only when requested; his staff

“advised him when he sought” their advice.60 The inherent flaw was that the system would only work if Kennedy properly recognized his blind spots on every issue and deliberately availed himself of the opinion of his advisors. Before the Bay of Pigs, his advisors were “too deferential” and only served as another level of concurrence. For this reason, Kennedy’s staff could not provide a thorough enough dissenting opinion for their role to function as the president had intended. The lack of functionality ultimately proved problematic because it limited discourse on policy.

Streamlining

During his presidential campaign, Kennedy criticized the foreign policy planning machinery of his predecessor, and he made changes as soon as he took office. Kennedy took aim at the National Security Council (NSC), which had evolved to become the centerpiece of foreign

58 Sorensen, 258. 59 Sorensen, 258. 60 Sorensen, 259.

22 policy planning machinery under the changes that Truman and Eisenhower had made during their administrations. At its inception, the NSC stated that the group’s purpose was “to advise the

President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security” so that agencies could cooperate effectively.61 Truman emphasized the advisory nature of the council, and did not want it to become an operating body that would press the president “to resolve spot issues.”62

After the first NSC meeting in 1947, Truman did not attend a council meeting for another ten months, and rarely went to meetings until the Korean War broke out in 1950. During the first meeting, Truman wanted to make it clear that the NSC was “his council and that he expected everyone to work harmoniously without any manifestations of prima donna qualities.”63 Truman avoided meetings because he felt that foreign policy should come from the State and Defense departments. The most important foreign policy directive from the Truman administration was

NSC 68. This document provided a sweeping outline of the nation’s aims in the Cold War. The report recommended that Truman revise and strengthen staff organizations under the National

Security Council.64 Truman initially ignored this recommendation, instead focusing on implementing his new defense strategy.

The Korean War marked an important turning point for national security. On July 19,

1950, Truman wrote to the members of the NSC, informing them that because of “the present international situation,” he wished to discuss every policy matter concerning national security within the NSC. Truman began to preside over weekly meetings, a significant departure from his

61 Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery of the Committee on Government Operations, Organizational History of the National Security Council (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1960) 2-7. 62 “Memorandum for the President, Aug. 8, 1947” Clark Clifford Papers, Box 11, Harry S. Truman Library. 63 James Forrestal, The Forrestal Diaries (New York: Viking Press, 1951) 320. 64 “A Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary (Lay),” FRUS, Vol. 1, doc. 85.

23 previous avoidance of NSC gatherings. Although the president was now in attendance at meetings, the role of the NSC remained purely advisory. His presence indicated that the NSC was an effective and necessary part of implementing foreign policy, but it was not used to generate that policy in the first place.

While Truman used machinery on an as-needed basis, Eisenhower relied on formal machinery for all his major foreign policy decisions. Drawing on his military background,

Eisenhower took measures to strengthen the NSC in the form of numerous sub-committees and interdepartmental groups. By building out the NSC, Eisenhower gave it more extensive oversight on policy creation and implementation. Eisenhower attended NSC meetings on a weekly basis and seldom missed them. Eisenhower’s preference for formal machinery in the planning process is evident from his Cold War national security policy. For example, for a project code-named

Solarium, Eisenhower commissioned three groups to devise an approach to the Soviet Union.65

Each group presented an approach with a different level of aggression. All three submitted their findings to the president, who then brought each proposal to the NSC to debate and jointly make a final decision. The agreed-upon policy was NSC 162/2. This policy shows how Eisenhower relied more on committees and boards within the NSC than his predecessor did in creating foreign policy.

Kennedy adopted a different approach than either of his predecessors. He formed task forces to study single issues with specific directives, and asked the group to lay out their recommendations via memorandum. By contrast, Eisenhower had groups study reoccurring, open-ended issues. Eisenhower also preferred to have these groups debate issues with him in person rather than rely on formal memoranda for their views. Before Kennedy won the election,

65“Minutes of the 155th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, July 16, 1953,” FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 2, Part 1, doc. 79.

24 he commissioned various committees and task forces to report on the process of foreign policy creation and national security.66 Ted Sorensen first brought up the idea in the pre-convention period, and then-Senator Kennedy asked for the task force to prepare a report on foreign policy creation.67 In the post-convention period, Adlai Stevenson, Kennedy’s defeated Democratic political opponent who later joined Kennedy’s campaign team, led a committee that produced a report on the state of foreign policy creation. Simultaneously, Kennedy asked Stuart Symington, former Secretary of the Air Force, to head a task force on the organization of the defense establishment.

In late August, Kennedy commissioned a committee to deal with national security policy.

Its members were Paul Nitze, a Truman administration member and principal author of influential Cold War document NSC 68; David Bruce, a foreign intelligence consultant under

Eisenhower; and Roswell Gilpatric, former Under Secretary of the Air Force who later became

Kennedy’s Deputy Secretary of Defense.68 The period between Kennedy's election and inauguration featured many important memoranda that indicated just how concerned the president was with changing the NSC.

The recommendations that followed led to streamlining the NSC to encourage more debate. The desire to streamline suggests that capitalist and managerial theory influenced

Kennedy’s thinking. In business, streamlining helps reduce operational inefficiencies that are either costly or slow, and in turn, increase profitability. Kennedy borrowed this concept, and saw opportunities to reduce bureaucratic inefficiencies to save time in some areas to give him more flexibility in others. The idea of streamlining came from the belief that several redundancies

66 “Editorial Note,” FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 8, doc. 1. 67 “Editorial Note,” FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 8, doc. 1. 68 Schlesinger, 155.

25 existed, and that he could improve the flow of information if he could reduce these redundancies.

Speeding things up in the NSC would also avoid “agreement by exhaustion,” an issue that plagued the NSC under the Eisenhower administration.69

Stevenson’s foreign policy committee delivered its findings to Kennedy on November 14,

1960, just after the election. The report first laid out some basic facts about the NSC. It stated that the purpose of the NSC was to “advise the President on domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security.”70 This conclusion was identical to the conclusion

Kennedy’s predecessors had reached. In other words, even before Kennedy took office, his team thought of the NSC’s role in much the same way as previous administrations. Despite this fact,

Kennedy thought the operational aspects of the NSC could change.

During the Eisenhower administration, 20 people were usually present at these meetings, including the President, Vice President, Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Director of the

CIA. Additionally, the President invited the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of the

Bureau of the Budget, along with his personal advisors, to attend the meetings. There were two principal subsidiary bodies, and each was to be “chaired by the President’s Special Assistant for

National Security Affairs” who, at the time, was Gordon Gray.71 There was also a Planning

Board and an Operations Coordinating Board (OCB). The Planning Board prepared briefing papers for the NSC, and the OCB supervised the execution of national security policy.

Stevenson’s report criticized the state of the NSC, saying it “produces watered-down, least-common-denominator compromises which are seldom of much use as policy guidance to the operating agencies.”72 The report frequently mentioned operating agencies (State, Defense,

69 Schlesinger, 209. 70 “Briefing paper on the National Security Council, 1960,” Box 0993, Folder 18, Kennedy Library. 71 “Briefing paper on the National Security Council, 1960,” Box 0993, Folder 18, Kennedy Library. 72 “Briefing paper on the National Security Council, 1960,” Box 0993, Folder 18, Kennedy Library.

26 CIA) which Kennedy did not pay much attention to while President-elect. The overarching theme of the report was that the NSC was not as effective in producing actionable recommendations. The NSC was a good forum for debate, but it was a poor vehicle for finding coordinated consensus on recommendations. One potential cause of the lack of effectiveness was the “excessive expectations that have grown up around it, largely because its role has been exaggerated by the Eisenhower Administration and wrapped in mystery by the press.”73 Later actions taken by the president prove that he shared this view. The report made sure to highlight the size of the NSC as a growing problem. Attendance at NSC meetings was too large, the report said. “It should be kept as small as possible, in order to permit frank discussion.”74 In addition to

Kennedy’s own task forces, the Senate Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery of the

Committee on Government Operations, chaired by Senator Henry M. Jackson of Washington, was also studying the NSC.75 The recommendations of the committee and Kennedy’s own groups influenced the president to make significant changes to the NSC once he took office.

Committee member and presidential advisor Richard Neustadt was able to cut through the partisan politics of the Senate group and told Kennedy precisely what he should do with the

NSC. On December 8, 1960, Neustadt wrote Kennedy a memorandum titled, “The National

Security Council: First Steps.” In Neustadt’s own words, he wrote the memorandum to give a concrete answer to the question: “What are you [Kennedy] to do about the NSC between now and January 20?”76 Neustadt advocated that Kennedy should establish an Executive Secretary for the NSC that would assume the “functions of all Eisenhower’s White House assistants and

73 “Briefing paper on the National Security Council, 1960,” Box 0993, Folder 18, Kennedy Library. 74 “Briefing paper on the National Security Council, 1960,” Box 0993, Folder 18, Kennedy Library. 75 “Editorial Note,” FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 8, doc. 1. 76 “National Security Council: First Steps,” December 8, 1960; Box 322, Folder 19, Kennedy Library.

27 consultants” in the NSC sphere.77 In doing this, he believed that Kennedy would achieve the benefit of not “encumbering the White House” with the “layering of staffs that has been characteristic in Eisenhower’s time.”78 This was the uniform criticism of the Eisenhower administration that Kennedy received. Neustadt also recommended ad hoc meetings and said they would “be the preferred vehicle for preliminary planning and for operations coordination.”79

Neustadt knew Kennedy well and seemed to pick up on his management style, understanding that he did not favor formal machinery and felt most comfortable handling things in an ad hoc manner.

By adapting the NSC to fit his management style Kennedy hoped to address two primary problems: the size and frequency of meetings. It was his belief that a high frequency of meetings meant that each meeting spent time discussing less important issues. This conflicted with

Kennedy’s style, as he preferred to be involved in meetings only when very important things were being discussed. Kennedy also felt that the larger the meetings, the less time each individual would have to speak. To increase debate, Neustadt recommended smaller meetings of more senior officials. He felt that this would open up communication. The possible consequence of these recommendations, left unstated by Neustadt, was that by removing people from the meetings, the potential for dissenting opinions was reduced. While speaking time for individuals would be increased, there was no guarantee that this would promote more discussion. In addition, spacing meetings farther apart and limiting their frequency had the potential to make the NSC less effective. While conversation might focus on more pressing issues, the body could cease to be effective if it could only discuss issues a week after they happened.

77 “National Security Council: First Steps,” December 8, 1960; Box 322, Folder 19, Kennedy Library. 78 “National Security Council: First Steps,” December 8, 1960; Box 322, Folder 19, Kennedy Library. 79 “National Security Council: First Steps,” December 8, 1960; Box 322, Folder 19, Kennedy Library.

28 The criticism of the NSC that Neustadt offered to Kennedy suggested that Eisenhower was the cause of these problems, and that he could make the NSC more effective by making some simple changes. Neustadt also hinted at the fact that Kennedy could place anyone he wanted in these secretarial positions to chair subcommittees if he reorganized the NSC staffing structure. Kennedy had the power to do this because he would be acting by executive order and therefore would not require Senate approval on his appointments. In Neustadt’s words, this would ensure that these new appointments would be Kennedy’s “guys” and not the result of some compromise.80 Secondly, Neustadt recommended eliminating the OCB by putting former

OCB responsibilities under a new all-encompassing secretary position. Neustadt’s overall conclusion was that the NSC was too big and was not effective enough.81

Around the same time Kennedy received these reports, he was also in talks with

Eisenhower about the transition of power. During his transition to the role of President, Kennedy received advice from Clark M. Clifford, a Washington attorney who had served as general counsel to President Truman. In this role, Clifford worked a back channel between Kennedy and

Eisenhower and served as a general liaison between the two camps. Clifford’s first meeting with the Eisenhower administration was on November 14, 1960.82

The first meeting between Kennedy and Eisenhower took place on December 6, 1960.

Based on Eisenhower's recollection of the meeting, it was apparent that during the transition,

Kennedy’s focus was on reorganizing White House staffing, the Pentagon, and the National

Security Council.83 Eisenhower gave this account in 1965, well after Kennedy had made many of

80 “National Security Council: First Steps,” December 8, 1960; Box 322, Folder 19, Kennedy Library. 81 “National Security Council: First Steps,” December 8, 1960; Box 322, Folder 19, Kennedy Library. 82 “Conversation with Richard Bissell about a ’Personal Assistant to the Commander-in-Chief-Elect’,” November 25, 1960. Box 322, Folder 19, Kennedy Library. 83 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging peace: The White House Years (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1965) 712-713.

29 the changes that Eisenhower had cautioned him against. For example, Eisenhower stressed that the NSC was intended only to advise the president. He noted “any member could present his frank opinion on any subject.”84 Eisenhower clearly was defending his version of the NSC, and showing resentment to the changes Kennedy made. Meanwhile, Kennedy supported the hypothesis that Eisenhower had created a cumbersome system that was not effective. Eisenhower had good reason to rebuke Kennedy’s assumptions. Eisenhower explained that the NSC “had become the most important weekly meeting of the government,” indicating how vital this body was, in his opinion, to foreign policy planning. Eisenhower also rejected the idea that streamlining the NSC was a good idea, remarking that “streamlining such an organization in the belief that too many advisers and assistants are impeding the making of wise and prompt decisions” would not be the right choice. In this meeting, Eisenhower cautioned the president- elect away from reorganization until “he himself could become well acquainted with the problem.”85 The evidence from Eisenhower’s recollection demonstrates that Kennedy endorsed the conclusion of his advisors and thought that he could improve the NSC by reducing the size and frequency of meetings. Kennedy’s actions showed a certain level of naiveté and hubris; he was confident that he knew the best path forward even before he had truly become familiar with the existing machinery. The fact that his predecessor had much more experience, including serving as Supreme Allied Commander during World War II, did not dissuade him from advocating a different course.

Kennedy verbalized his view on streamlining in a meeting with Jackson after his subcommittee produced recommendations about how to fix the NSC:

I intend to consolidate under Mr. Bundy’s [McGeorge Bundy, Kennedy’s chief National Security Advisor] direction the present National Security Council secretariat, the staff

84 Eisenhower, Waging peace, 712-713. 85 Eisenhower, Waging peace, 712-713.

30 and functions of the Operations Coordinating Board, and the continuing functions of a number of special projects staffs within the White House. I have asked Mr. Bundy to review with care existing staff organization and arrangements, and to simplify them wherever possible toward the end that we may have a single, small, but strongly organized staff unit to assist me in obtaining advice from, and coordinating operations of, the government agencies concerned with national security affairs.86

Kennedy hoped “to use the National Security Council and its machinery more flexibly than in the past. . . . The Subcommittee’s study provides a useful starting point for the work that

Mr. Bundy will undertake in helping me to strengthen and to simplify the operations of the

National Security Council.”87 Kennedy had already begun making changes to his foreign policy machinery with every appointment he made before the inauguration.

Conclusion

Once Kennedy was sworn in, he acted quickly to make changes to the national security apparatus. The first change happened in the first meeting of the NSC on February 1, 1961.88

Kennedy intended to hold fewer NSC meetings with a smaller group of more senior people, a decision that exactly followed Neustadt’s recommendation. In theory, this would help unencumber the group at large and shift emphasis towards senior members now that fewer meetings took place. Bundy wrote that, ideally, “Policy recommendations would be brought to the NSC without being obscured by inter-agency processing but with adequate previous consultation and the presentation of counter proposals.”89 This encapsulates the outcome that

Kennedy desired in “streamlining” the NSC. As a means of comparison, in December 1960,

86 The National Security Council: Jackson Subcommittee Papers on Policy-Making at the Presidential Level (New York: Praeger, 1965), 302–303. 87 The National Security Council, 302-303. 88 “National Security Council Meetings, 1961: Index.” Box 313, Folder 1. Kennedy Library. 89“Record of Actions Taken at the 475th Meeting of the National Security Council,” February 1, 1961 FRUS, 1961- 1963, Vol. 8, doc. 8.

31 Eisenhower had four NSC meetings in four weeks. The first four meetings of Kennedy’s administration took place over twice that period, between February 1, 1961 and March 22, 1961.

Kennedy continued reversing the changes and precedents set by Eisenhower. In February, he signed an executive order that eliminated the Operations Coordinating Board. Kennedy thought that eliminating the OCB would “strengthen the responsibility of the individual departments.”90 With regard to the functions of the NSC without the OCB as a body to make sure that policy was actually implemented, Kennedy said he would maintain “direct communication with the responsible agencies, so that everyone will know what I have decided.”91 The State

Department, Defense Department, and CIA retained a great deal of power in recommending policy. In combination with fewer meetings, another consequence of this decision was less group input into planning. For example, if a plan presented at a NSC meeting needed revising, Kennedy would request that the revised plan be delivered to him, and not at a subsequent NSC meeting.

Updated proposals were frequently shared with Kennedy and created on an as-soon-as-possible schedule, necessitating ad hoc meetings as opposed to the weekly NSC meetings seen in the

Eisenhower administration. For example, leading up to the Bay of Pigs invasion, the meetings to discuss revisions to CIA plans rarely included the full NSC staff. This was not due to secrecy, as the original and final plans were discussed at NSC meetings. In essence, this meant that fewer people had the opportunity to debate policy recommendations and this could limit a form of checks and balances.

In addition to the NSC, Kennedy also made changes to staffing at the White House staffing and the State and Defense Departments that streamlined policy creation. With regard to

White House staff, Sorensen said that his team focused on domestic policy, while McGeorge

90 The National Security Council, 304. 91 The National Security Council, 304.

32 Bundy’s team focused almost entirely on foreign policy. The two teams “combined in relatively small staffs the functions of several times as many Eisenhower aides.”92 Sorenson boasted in his memoir that “instead of adding specialists in my own office, I relied on the excellent staff work” of other agencies. Throughout his tome, Sorenson never missed a chance to talk about how the

Kennedy administration employed the most intelligent people.

Kennedy deliberately kept his staff small, as he posited that more personal relationships would result, which would be beneficial to policy planning. Personal relationships would benefit planning because limiting “special assistants” would speed up the flow of information. 93

Kennedy thought it would be best if there were fewer middlemen. Despite these major changes elsewhere, the CIA and the Pentagon remained largely unchanged through the early months of the Kennedy administration.

Kennedy’s changes to Eisenhower’s foreign policy machinery demonstrated his desire to keep tight control over foreign policy. For all of his changes, though, Kennedy was attempting to fix a system that was not broken. An essential issue with the changes he made was that they shut off key channels of debate. He inadvertently created an environment where too few people participated in discourse over important policy compared to the previous administration. This was to prove problematic for the administration, the country, and the world in the coming months.

92 Sorensen, 262. 93 Sorensen, 262.

33 Chapter Two Introduction

The Bay of Pigs was the first time John Kennedy felt he had failed at anything, and insiders later claimed it shook the president to his core.94 Kennedy himself called it “the worst experience of my life.”95 As commander-in-chief, Kennedy now faced the consequences of the changes he had made to his foreign policy machinery in the first months of his administration.

The Bay of Pigs debacle changed Kennedy’s management style and his administration’s approach to crafting foreign policy. Kennedy blamed CIA officials for the failed invasion and no longer leaned on them for foreign policy advice. In their place, the president increased his personal influence on the creation of foreign policy. Kennedy relied more on his intuition rather than recommendations from CIA officials and other advisors.96 Despite the blow to American prestige caused by the Bay of Pigs, the president saw an opportunity to advance American interests.

Kennedy hoped to meet with Russian leader Nikita Khrushchev and resolve pressing issues regarding the division of Berlin. Two months after the Bay of Pigs invasion, he and

Khrushchev met in June in Vienna. Instead of easing tensions between the US and USSR or yielding an agreement on the divided city of Berlin, the two leaders made little progress, and

Kennedy’s performance drew substantial criticism. Kennedy’s challenger in the 1960 election, former Vice President Nixon, who had a “dim view” of Kennedy’s administration, said that

“never in American history has a man talked so big and acted so little.”97 Kennedy’s camp also criticized his performance. Vice President Lyndon Johnson said, “Khrushchev scared the poor

94 Honoré Marc Catudal, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis: A Case Study in U.S. Decision Making (Berlin: Berlin-Verlag, 1980) 67. 95 Richard M. Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978) 234-235. 96 Kennedy began to refer to CIA officials as “experts,” distinguishing them from his other advisors. 97 “The President’s News Conference,” June 28, 1961. PPP: JFK, 1961, 481.

34 little fellow dead.”98 Georgi Bolshakov, a Russian living in America who was important to the

US-Soviet backchannel, recalled that the Russians were “amazed” that Kennedy appeared to be so “affected and scared” by Khrushchev.99 The president left Vienna with another stain on his foreign policy record.

Scholars, political contemporaries, and Kennedy himself have all agreed that the Bay of

Pigs was a failure. However, they disagree on the question of who deserves the blame for this invasion. Schlesinger, who wrote the most authoritative account of Kennedy’s administration, blames Kennedy's unfamiliarity with the presidency. He said, “[Kennedy] had not had the time or opportunity to test the inherited instrumentalities of government.”100 Kennedy believed his mistake was “to pay any attention to the CIA and military brass.”101 Historian Michael Beschloss argues that Kennedy is the one who deserves the blame for bad decision-making. These accounts all have elements of truth to them, but only suffice as partial explanations for the failure.

Additionally, each narrative fails to make a connection between Kennedy’s altered management style in the wake of the invasion and the subsequent failure in Vienna. Kennedy was always willing to learn from his mistakes, but did not always make the right corrective adjustment. This chapter will argue that Kennedy’s diagnosis of his administration's flaws in the wake of the Bay of Pigs invasion was limited, and this obfuscated the underlying problems with his foreign policy machinery; consequently, the president changed his management style. Because of the unproductive change after the invasion, the president distanced himself from his advisors, rejected their advice, and rushed into the summit meeting. The consequence of this change was a

98 Quoted in Beschloss, 234. 99 Quoted in Beschloss, 234. 100 Schlesinger, 258. 101 Hedley Donovan, Roosevelt to Regan: A Reporter’s Encounters with Nine Presidents (New York: Harper & Row, 1985) 77.

35 shift in the nucleus of decision-making, with Kennedy having a tighter grip on foreign policy creation than ever before.

The Bay of Pigs

Eisenhower’s administration had lasting effects on Kennedy’s presidency. The most important holdover was Allen Dulles and his plan to invade Cuba. Dulles was the director of the

CIA under Eisenhower, and Kennedy decided to keep him in that position. With his slim margin of victory, Kennedy was hesitant to remove “a national icon” like Dulles. Kennedy allowed

Dulles to keep his post because the political cost of terminating him “would have been considerable.”102 Dulles and Eisenhower had been planning an invasion as early as March 1960.

When Kennedy took office in January 1961, the plan his predecessor had devised was ready and just needed the president’s approval. Although Dulles and CIA officials urged Kennedy to endorse it, he insisted that his national security apparatus examine it first. The stakes for

Kennedy were high, as this was the first foreign policy test of his administration. His decision to spend more time thinking about the plan was reasonable, but he was unknowingly putting his faith in a flawed system. The extra time was an ineffective countermeasure, and it could not prevent the “shocking number of errors in the whole decision-making process – errors which permitted bureaucratic momentum to govern instead of policy leadership.”103

Cuba had become a concern for the Eisenhower administration in 1959, when Fidel

Castro overthrew Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista. After taking power, Castro raised American suspicions by establishing close ties with the USSR. The Eisenhower administration took steps toward eliminating the influence of the communist leader in South America, and in March 1960,

102 Schlesinger, 125. 103 Sorenson, 302.

36 Eisenhower directed the CIA to plan covert action against the Castro regime in Cuba. The CIA presented its recommendations to Eisenhower via a paper prepared by the 5412 Committee, a further reminder that Eisenhower favored formal machinery when developing foreign policy.104

The changes Kennedy made to his foreign policy machinery after taking office showed that he did not share Eisenhower’s penchant for formality. Dulles requested that the president keep the 5412 Committee intact. The committee continued to operate “in theory” but Kennedy did not pay attention to it.105 Because of those changes, there were underlying differences between the machinery Eisenhower had used to plan the invasion of Cuba and the machinery that

Kennedy used to alter that plan. It would be counterfactual to assert that the plan Eisenhower devised would have been successful. However, it is reasonable to analyze the discontinuity between the two presidents’ machinery as one possible cause for the invasion’s failure.

Kennedy’s machinery lacked a necessary level of sophistication, which enabled poor decision- making, and he had fewer people working on the invasion plan than Eisenhower. In addition, the level of conviction in the plan seemingly had a lower bar to clear. The plan that Kennedy ultimately approved was different from what Eisenhower had envisioned.

Seven days into his presidency, Kennedy received the plan from the 5412 Committee that it had drafted under Eisenhower. The plan stated, “There had been three major lines of development under this program. The first was the political front, the second was the psychological front, and the third was training Cubans for paramilitary activities.”106 Kennedy agreed to keep the first two fronts of this program the same, as they were already being conducted and had inconsequential political ramifications. The president was concerned with the

104 “Memorandum of a Conference with the President, White House, Washington, March 17, 1960, 2:30 p.m.,” FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. 6, doc. 486. 105 John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2009) 241. 106 “Memorandum of Conversation,” FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 10, doc. 24.

37 third line. In the current form, the plan made use of the US Navy and 20 aircraft to support the paramilitary force, which would invade Cuba after the CIA finished training them in

Guatemala.107 Once the force reached Cuba, the CIA believed their presence would incite a popular rebellion against Castro.

CIA officials felt that time was of the essence, and they pressured Kennedy to act quickly. There were two reasons for the CIA to rush. First, the agency believed that if too much time passed, locals in Guatemala would discover the paramilitary force. Any attention from locals was undesirable because if word spread, people would know that the US was trying to influence other governments by force. US-Soviet relations would presumably suffer. CIA officials worried that the guerrillas could not “remain indefinitely where they are.”108 However, available documents do not offer evidence that the discovery of CIA operations was imminent.

Second, the longer Castro stayed in power, CIA officials insisted, the harder it would be to incite a rebellion against him.109 Dulles told Kennedy that “the longer an invasion was postponed, the more difficult it would be.”110

The CIA had the utmost confidence in the ability of the paramilitary forces, but Kennedy resisted the temptation to approve the plan immediately. The agency believed that the worst-case scenario was that the invaders would only reach the mountains after capturing the beachhead.111

Kennedy did not share the same level of confidence that CIA officials had, and upon hearing its intelligence, he asked them to review the proposal after a January 28, 1961 meeting and report to

107 “Memorandum of Conversation,” FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 10, doc. 24. 108 “Memorandum of Discussion on Cuba,” January 28, 1961. Box 35, Folder 17, Kennedy Library. 109 The lynchpin of the invasion was that the paramilitary force would be able to incite a widespread anti-Castro rebellion. Regardless of the size of the invading force, which varied over the iterations of the invasion plan, the CIA felt confident a rebellion would ensue. Yet the CIA predicted that a rebellion would be less likely the longer Castro remained in power. 110 Beschloss, 103; Cuba: General, 1961: January-April. Box 35, Folder 17. Kennedy Library. 111 “Memorandum for the President,” February 8, 1961. Box 35, Kennedy Library.

38 him immediately. The president said staff should not speak about this event with personnel

“beyond those most immediately concerned” with the planning of the invasion.112 The redundancy of this request at a top-secret meeting suggests that the president did not want other people in the executive branch meddling with the process of policy creation. Limiting participants was also evidence of Kennedy’s desire for central decision-making. McNamara, who shared this view, said “the more important the issue, the fewer people should be involved in the decision.”113

On February 3, 1961, Kennedy’s apparatus did not have a consensus position on the plan.

Officials at the CIA and Department of Defense advocated for an invasion, but the State

Department and several of Kennedy’s personal advisors advocated for less forceful means of undermining the Castro regime. In keeping with the president’s process of policy creation,

McGeorge Bundy, National Security Advisor, was the first person aware of this disagreement.

The president was not present at the meetings in which debate occurred but wanted to hear to the two sides debate the issue in an ad hoc manner. On February 7, there was a meeting at the office of Thomas Mann (the Assistant Secretary of State) which included members from the CIA, notably Richard Bissell; members from the Department of State and Department of Defense; and

Adolph Berle, Chief of the Department of State’s Latin American Task Force.114 The group failed to reconcile its differences and was unable to recommend a single plan of action to Bundy.

Therefore, it would be necessary to conduct an open debate in front of the president. Already, it seemed that the president’s new foreign policy machinery delayed debate, despite the president’s intentions to the contrary. This debate was to take place at a meeting on February 8, 1961.115

112 “Memorandum of Discussion on Cuba,” January 28, 1961. Box 35, Kennedy Library. 113 Quoted in Rosenzweig. 114 “Memorandum for the Record,” FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 10, doc. 38. 115 “Memorandum for the Record,” FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 10, doc. 38.

39 In a situation where the president wanted to “proceed as quickly as possible,” five days was a significant delay.116 Bundy briefed the president on the meeting, saying that the divergence in views had not been openly debated yet, so the president would be hearing the issue “quite fresh.”117 Bundy told the president a lie. The issue had been debated the day before, under the pretense that there was already a clear divergence in views. Following the second debate,

Kennedy sided with the State Department, deeming the political risk of the current plan too great, and pressed the CIA to draft alternatives to a “full-fledged” invasion. The NSC met the following day to discuss Cuba; however, there is no available record of this meeting.

Although Kennedy sided with the State Department, the issue was not yet fully resolved, and was put before the president again on February 17, 1961 at an ad hoc meeting. Mann had compiled a list of conclusions based on the 5412 Plan that the CIA had produced for Eisenhower.

Mann determined that the US would not be faced with the necessity of using armed force.118 His conclusion clashed with Bissell’s view that force was necessary. Bissell and the CIA had prepared a document that again advocated for an invasion.119 Bundy gave both reports to the president. According to the notes prepared by General David W. Gray, no definite decisions were reached at this meeting.120

The plan was nearing a final draft. The CIA submitted another iteration of the proposal on March 11, called the Trinidad Operation. 121 The proposed action was becoming more politically feasible because the US decided not to offer air support. In theory, this would distance the US from the invasion. The new plan did not please everyone. Rusk was upset because the

116 “Memorandum from President Kennedy to Secretary of State Rusk,” FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 10, doc. 33. 117 “Memorandum for the President,” February 8, 1961. Box 35, Kennedy Library. 118 “Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann) to Secretary of State Rusk,” FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 10, doc. 45. 119 “Memorandum of Meeting with President Kennedy, February 8, 1961,” FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 10, doc. 40. 120 “Editorial Note,” FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 10, doc. 48. 121 “Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, March 11, 1961,” FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 10, doc. 58.

40 meeting was called at Bissell’s request, and Rusk felt that the CIA was attempting to bypass the

Department of State.122 His frustrations reflected the irregular way in which policy was being created. Schlesinger was uneasy with how things were evolving and wrote to Kennedy expressing his concerns over the political viability of the plan. Schlesinger now became the most outspoken critic of the invasion.

The final draft of the invasion plan was sent to Bundy, which he then passed along to the president. The main change between the penultimate and final plan was the beach landing, which would be more “quiet now,” meaning that the US connection to the paramilitary fighters would be less obvious. The emphasis on quietness indicates that Kennedy agreed with the State

Department regarding the political ramifications of a connection between the US and the invading force. However, the evidence also seems to suggest that Kennedy misunderstood how quiet the invasion could actually be, as the CIA was fully aware that an invasion could not truly be kept quiet. The CIA position, written by Bissell, and presented to the president on February

18, indicated that the agency was fully aware that an invasion by a “paramilitary force would be widely assumed to be US-supported.”123 Regardless, this was the final form of the plan, which was code-named the Zapata Plan.124

According to those close to Kennedy, he had not completely made up his mind going into

Easter weekend at his home in Palm Beach in early April. He was still internally debating whether he should approve the invasion. Unfortunately, there are no documents or secondary sources that clearly indicate exactly what tilted the scales that weekend and caused Kennedy to give final approval. Once back in Washington on April 6, Schlesinger said that the mission was

122 “Editorial Note,” FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 10, doc. 59. 123 “Memorandum for the President,” February 18, 1965, Box 35, Kennedy Library. 124 “Editorial Note,” FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 10, doc. 65.

41 “destined to go ahead.”125 The president was “a prisoner of the moment,” and not likely to reverse his decision, so the operation’s biggest critic, Schlesinger, did not make another attempt to convince him that the invasion was a bad idea in its current format. Kennedy thought he had successfully mitigated political risk by whittling down the CIA’s originally “grandiose” invasion plan into something much more minimal.126 The strategic causes of this plan’s failure became apparent as the invasion force could not get off the beach. They were outnumbered and out- gunned by Castro’s forces, which were far more capable than the CIA had anticipated. Without air or sea support, the small paramilitary group was unable to succeed.

Before the failure, Kennedy believed that his military advisors were infallible, and therefore he did not push back on their recommendations enough. As he told Schlesinger, “If someone comes in to tell me this or that about the minimum wage bill, I have no hesitation in overruling them. But you always assume that the military and intelligence people have some secret skill not available to ordinary mortals.”127 Kennedy finally admitted what his chief critic

Richard Nixon had always asserted: he knew more about domestic issues than foreign policy, and his lack of confidence to overrule his military advisors even when they presented a watered- down plan that was destined to fail reflected his lack of experience and discomfort with the foreign policy sphere. There was a structural flaw in Kennedy’s foreign policy machinery.

Kennedy’s system not only gave him the final say, which is typical for any president, but it also situated him at the center of policy creation. As evident from his remarks to Schlesinger,

Kennedy did not possess the confidence or acumen to be successful in this capacity. Therefore,

Kennedy’s system of management deserves the lion’s share of blame for the events in Cuba.

125 Schlesinger, 256. 126 Schlesinger, 257. 127 Schlesinger, 258.

42 The Blame Game

It was immediately apparent that the invasion would not be successful when the invading force could not advance off the beach. Similarly, there was little hope that the US government would be able to claim that it was not involved. On April 21, 1961, Kennedy publicly accepted sole responsibility. In that press conference, Kennedy said, “victory has 100 father and defeat is an orphan. . . . I am the responsible officer of the government and that is quite obvious.”128

Despite this show of statesmanship, the president was fiery and upset in private. He could barely contain himself, and on several occasions he cried uncontrollably.129 The president’s wife, Jackie

Kennedy, said that she had never seen her husband so depressed.130

Kennedy felt misled by the CIA. “How could that crowd at the CIA and the Pentagon be this wrong?” he asked Pierre Salinger.131 Kennedy realized that the system he had created placed too much emphasis on the CIA, Defense Department, and State Department. He had originally wanted to emphasize “White House men” in the process of creating foreign policy, but the informality of his management left them out of the discussion on Cuba. Rational analysis of the facts could not take place in a system that lacked a coherent model for communication.

Schlesinger recounted that Kennedy never “called us in for a staff discussion of Cuba, away from the inhibiting presence of the grandees in the Cabinet Room.”132 The system Kennedy built relied on independent judgment from his White House staff. The system could only function if they “summarized and analyzed . . . products and proposals for him.”133 Kennedy did not frequently attend NSC meetings and he had limited foreign policy knowledge, which made the

128 “The President’s News Conference,” April 21, 1961. PPP: JFK, 1961, 312. 129 David Reynolds, Summits; Six Meetings that Shaped the Twentieth Century (New York: Basic Books, 2007) 184. 130 Dallek, 366. 131 Pierre Salinger, With Kennedy (New York: Avon Books, 1967) 196. 132 Schlesinger, 297. 133 Sorensen, 258.

43 White House staff’s summary and analysis crucial for his understanding of issues. With respect to the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy had received most of his information from the CIA instead of using his staff to “to make his decisions.” Kennedy referred to CIA officials and military leaders as the

“experts,” saying that all his life he had known “better than to depend on the experts,” and asked,

“how could I have been so stupid, to let them go ahead?”134 This question vexed the president, and according to Ted Sorensen, the failed invasion “altered Kennedy’s entire approach to executive management.”135

The president considered how he had gotten into this predicament. In focusing his blame on the CIA, he missed a key cause of the problem. It was not necessarily ignorance that led him to ignore trusted White House staff and favor “experts.” Rather, Kennedy had created a system in which he did not frequently avail himself of the opinions of his advisors. This was a critical flaw because, according to Sorensen, Kennedy’s personal advisors’ role was to help inform the president of issues with which he was not familiar, and during the Bay of Pigs, they had only marginal influence at best. For example, Schlesinger was the most outspoken critic of the invasion plan, but was unable to voice his concerns sufficiently because he lacked a forum in which to do so, as the president did not make extensive use of the NSC. Schlesinger’s only option to contest the plan right before the president approved it was in a letter. As outlined in the previous section, iterations of the plans were almost exclusively handled by various agencies and there was limited interdepartmental coordination.

After the Bay of Pigs fiasco, Kennedy looked to shore up the role of the White House in the area of foreign policy. He tapped his brother Robert Kennedy, who was the Attorney

General, along with Sorensen, to become involved in the foreign policy creation process. Both

134 Sorensen, 309. 135 Sorensen, 710.

44 people would be included in NSC meetings. Kennedy also reactivated the Foreign Intelligence

Advisory Board and ordered that all national security matters be channeled through McGeorge

Bundy. As a manager, Kennedy still preferred to receive directives in advance of meetings.

Bundy was now the gatekeeper for all national security information that reached the president.

Bundy brought in Walt Whitman Rostow, the first Deputy National Security Advisor. After the

Bay of Pigs, the president gave Rusk permission to carve out a floor in the State Department for rapidly developing foreign events.136 Kennedy saw Rusk as having been correct in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs, and this new responsibility represented a vote of confidence in the State

Department. As the focal point of the president’s blame, Allen Dulles felt that his own resignation was predetermined at that point.137 As a result, the president paid less attention to the

CIA and military brass in the aftermath of the invasion.

The invasion had consequences outside of the White House, as it altered relations with the USSR. Additionally, it raised doubts about Kennedy’s proposed summit meeting with

Khrushchev. Bobby Kennedy quickly recognized the consequences that the Bay of Pigs would have on Soviet perceptions of his brother’s administration. Bobby berated Kennedy’s inner circle, saying, “All you bright fellows have got the president into this, and if you don’t do something now, my brother will be regarded as a paper tiger by the Russians.”138 If the Russians believed that Kennedy was a weak leader, he would have virtually no room to negotiate from a position of strength. In a Cold War context, strength came from the opponent’s perception that a leader was willing to use nuclear force. With this in mind, the president could not back away from a summit. If he did, that would lend credence to the idea that the he was a coward.

136 Catudal, 67-79. 137 Catudal, 242. Dulles resigned later that year in November. 138 Quoted in Reeves, 95.

45 In 1960, Eisenhower and Khrushchev planned to meet. However, these plans were dashed on May 1, 1960 when an American U-2 spy plane was shot down over the Urals.

Khrushchev gave the US the opportunity to blame the flight on “Pentagon militarists” but

Eisenhower declined the opportunity to publicly reprimand the Pentagon, as it would make his administration look weak and disorganized.139 The summit was canceled, and the burden was left for the next president.

Kennedy’s view on a summit seemed to evolve over time, but he was steadfast in his support for negotiations. In 1959 he said, “It is far better that we meet at the summit than at the brink.”140 Kennedy saw summits as a good way to deescalate tensions, and was in favor of talking things out. Despite believing that a summit might deliver the two nations from arms escalation, Kennedy acknowledged that “the real roots of the Soviet-American conflict cannot easily be settled by negotiations.”141 During Kennedy’s presidential campaign, he also criticized

Eisenhower’s plans for a summit. Kennedy stated that regardless of the U-2 incident, the Paris summit was doomed. He claimed that the Eisenhower administration had failed “to build the positions of long-term strength essential to successful negotiations.”142

Kennedy had been a notable critic of the infamous Munich summit of 1938 between

Hitler and UK Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain. In 1940, Kennedy wrote his senior thesis at

Harvard on the failures of that summit. The thesis was published with the title “Why England

Slept.”143 Kennedy took the lessons he had written about in his thesis and applied them to his presidency. In his inaugural address, Kennedy stated, “Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let

139 Aleksander Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006) 289, 340. 140 Quoted in Reynolds, 175. 141 Quoted in Reynolds, 175. 142 “‘A Time of Decision,’ or ‘Where Do We Go From Here?’ Senate Floor, 14 June 1960,” Box 909, Kennedy Library. 143 Dallek, 61-66.

46 us never fear to negotiate.”144 From these utterances, one thing is clear: Kennedy was in favor of negotiating if conditions were right. While negotiations are not the same as summits, Kennedy thought he would benefit from a personal encounter with his adversary where he could negotiate several issues. Kennedy’s desire to meet with Khrushchev so quickly after the Bay of Pigs brings up an interesting question: why did the president want to rush into a summit after a disaster that

Schlesinger and others close to Kennedy blamed on rushed timing?145

Although Kennedy publicly hinted at a desire for a summit, Khrushchev was the first to press for one. Right after the election, Khrushchev had Mikhail Menshikov, the Soviet

Ambassador in Washington, pass along a message to Averell Harriman, a Kennedy insider, saying that the Russian leader hoped for “a return to the spirit of Soviet-American co-operation which we had during the war,” a period that coincided with Harriman’s service as US ambassador in Moscow.146 The former ambassador kept up Khrushchev’s pressure for a summit.

Kennedy did not understand why the Soviet leader was so keen for a summit. On January

10, 1961, he pressed George Kennan, former ambassador to the Soviet Union and author of the

“Long Telegram,” with this question. Kennan posited that the Soviet political position had actually weakened recently, but advised Kennedy against rushing into the summit.147 He theorized that the Soviet position was weaker because of the failure of the Paris summit and growing tensions with China. Dean Rusk also advised against a summit so early in the new presidency. On February 10, 1961, Kennedy called a special meeting to hear from veteran US envoys to Moscow. Harriman, Kennan, “Chip” Bohlen (former US Ambassador to the Soviet

144 “Inaugural Address,” January 20, 1961. PPP: JFK, 1961, 2. 145 Those close to Kennedy sought to take blame off the president when answering for the Bay of Pigs. Schlesinger specifically says the decision to invade “resulted from the fact that he had been in office only seventy-seven says.” Schlesinger, 258. 146 Quoted in Reynolds, 178. 147 Reynolds, 178.

47 Union), and Thompson (US Ambassador to the Soviet Union) were present. At the meeting, there was “considerable feeling among the experts that a meeting in due course, for an exchange of courtesies and the opportunity of becoming personally acquainted, might be useful.” But these men agreed that “nothing approaching a summit, in terms of serious negotiations, should be considered favorable for the president.”148 Despite these recommendations from men that

Kennedy had hand-picked for advice, the idea of a summit in the early summer gained momentum. The main reason was the president’s own “impatience” to meet his adversary in person.149 Kennedy thought an in-person meeting would be the best way for him to get a sense of his Soviet counterpart. On matters such as these, Bohlen remarked that Kennedy “really felt he had to find out for himself.”150 Kennedy rejected the caution of his advisors and followed his instinct that he could “exchange ideas in a meaningful way” with his adversary. He dismissed concerns that the US was in too weak of a position to conduct negotiations.151

In a letter to Khrushchev dated February 22, 1961, Kennedy expressed his desire to “meet personally for an informal exchange of views.”152 As far as timing was concerned, the president hoped that it would happen “before too long.”153 Over the next month and a half, the leaders agreed to meet in Vienna in early July. With the president’s confidence in his charm and interpersonal skills, he believed that a face-to-face meeting would provide a stronger position from which the US could negotiate. But his advisors still cautioned against the summit. They agreed that “nothing approaching a summit, in terms of serious negotiations, should be considered favorably for the present.”154 Bobby Kennedy, working the diplomatic backchannels,

148 “Notes on Discussion,” February 11, 1961. FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 5, doc. 26. 149 Reynolds, 181. 150 Charles E. Bohlen Oral History Interview,” interview by Arthur Schlesinger on May 21, 1964, Kennedy Library. 151 Reynolds, 213. 152 “Letter From President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev,” FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol 6, doc. 7. 153 “Letter From President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev,” FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 6, doc. 7. 154 “Notes on Discussion,” FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 5, doc. 26.

48 wanted to get details of a nuclear test ban fleshed out so the leaders could sign an agreement in

Vienna. He made it clear that Kennedy was “not interested in a summit where leaders just exchanged views.”155 Kennedy ignored his advisors and was prepared to negotiate at Vienna.

Kennedy’s disposition inclined him to handle matters himself at times when previous administrations had left such tasks to subordinates. Following this pattern, the president willfully ignored Kennan’s advice that issues that would be discussed in a summit could be better “treated at lower and more normal levels,” and he eagerly pushed forward.156 The Kremlin still thought there was merit to the discussion, and during May 1961, the official details for the summit were determined. Kennedy’s diagnosis of his managerial shortcomings after the Bay of Pigs caused him to ignore advice from virtually all of his advisors, representing a reversal in his pattern of decision-making.

The Summit

Kennedy hoped that the summit would produce a nuclear test ban, and Khrushchev wanted to end the division of Berlin.157 The leaders discussed these matters and others of mutual concern, such as civil war in Laos, but the conversation seemed to be stuck on Berlin. The summit concluded without either leader making headway on his goals.

Unwilling to return to Russia empty-handed, Khrushchev handed the US an aide- mémoire with an ultimatum: the United States had six months to recognize West Berlin as a free city and remove all forces. The ultimatum was a threat, and US capitulation would act as a peace treaty in the eyes of Moscow, allowing them to bring the Iron Curtain over West Berlin. From

155 Aleksandr Kursenko, One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro and Kennedy, 1958-1964: The Secret History of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1998) 302. 156 “George F. Kennan Oral History Interview,” interview by Louis Fischer on March 23, 1965, Kennedy Library. 157 Beschloss, 180.

49 the Soviet perspective, this would end the 16 year-old “German question.” The Kennedy administration recognized that agreeing to the ultimatum would have the following consequences: recognizing West Berlin as a free city would mean canceling all existing commitments, including occupation rights and rights of access. Kennedy immediately rejected this proposal due to its lack of political viability. The US would face irreparable prestige damage if it were seen as willing to abandon an ally.158 Both leaders had entered the summit hopeful for progress, and none was achieved. Kennedy did meet his adversary face-to-face, helping him gain a better feel for Khrushchev’s temperament and demeanor, but the meeting also convinced him that a crisis in Berlin was coming.

Kennedy knew that he had to communicate the gravity of the situation to the American people. He had originally instructed his Soviet expert Bohlen to have journalists frame the interaction as amicable, but eventually decided to convey a more somber message.159 Kennedy told his Appointments Secretary, Kenneth O’Donnell, that the New York Times “would be the place to do it.”160 The day after Vienna, Kennedy met with New York Times columnist James

Reston and did exactly that. In his front-page story for the newspaper, Reston wrote that

Kennedy and Khrushchev had disagreed on “all questions concerning Germany and Berlin” and that the conference ended in “hard controversy.”161 Other reporters mimicked Washington’s somber tone, and resisted dressing up the meeting as “pseudo-productive.”162

158 Schlesinger, 370-371. 159 Frederick Kempe, Berlin 1961: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Most Dangerous Place on Earth (New York: Berkley Books, 2012) 256.

160 Salinger, 182. 161 James Reston, “Vienna Talks End: Meeting Closes with Hard Controversy – Kennedy Solemn,” New York Times, June 5, 1961, 1,12. 162 Joseph Alsop, “Matter of Fact…: After Vienna,” The Washington Post, June 7, 1961, A19.

50 “Kennedy wanted to vent” about the summit and the conversation with Reston gave him an opportunity to ponder Khrushchev’s motives for being such a “bully.”163 Kennedy said to

Reston that his major problem was to “figure out what we can do” about Khrushchev’s aggression on the issue of Berlin.164 Because of the lack of US military support in the Bay of

Pigs invasion, Kennedy told Reston, Khrushchev “thought that anyone who was so young and inexperienced as to get into that mess could be taken. And anyone who got into it and didn’t see it through had no guts.”165 The Bay of Pigs was not Kennedy’s only action that had indicated weakness. During the summit, to Khrushchev’s astonishment, “Kennedy undercut his own arguments by saying he had inherited many of his policies and had no choice but to defend them.”166 A strange contradiction: Kennedy was willing to change Eisenhower’s foreign policy machinery, despite the former president’s advice, but he did not extensively deviate from his predecessor’s policy. It may seem counterintuitive that Kennedy chose to follow through with

Eisenhower’s plans while lacking his machinery, and indeed this was one of the biggest problems with the Bay of Pigs. Kennedy’s unwillingness to break with inherited plans caused him to look weak and highlighted his lack of confidence regarding foreign policy creation. The

Soviet leader saw Kennedy’s adherence to Eisenhower’s plans as a lack of emotional conviction.167

The president was in a precarious position, because having “guts” to go to war was the bedrock of Berlin policy. In Berlin, Soviet forces greatly outnumbered American forces. In theory, the Soviets would therefore encounter limited resistance invading West Berlin from the

163 Kempe, 257. 164 Quoted in Kempe, 257. 165 Quoted in Beschloss, 225. 166 Quoted in Beschloss, 228. 167 Beschloss, 228.

51 conventional forces stationed in the city. Kennedy’s desire to display his courage indicates that he believed fear of nuclear retaliation “was certainly” what “had stopped Soviet action up to now.”168 However, Kennedy was not sure that this strategy was viable anymore: “Unfortunately, there were some grounds for believing that after recent events in Laos and elsewhere, the West seemed to the Russians to be weaker and Mr. Khrushchev might no longer believe in the West's firmness of purpose.”169 The word “elsewhere” is noteworthy here, because it was in reference to

Cuba, further demonstrating that the president assumed his failure made him look weak. For that reason, Kennedy made a concerted effort to have his Berlin policy demonstrate an increased resolve. Kennedy told Reston, “If [Khrushchev] thinks I’m inexperienced and have no guts, until we remove those ideas we won’t get anywhere with him. So we have to act.”170

Before Kennedy could act to convince Khrushchev of his resolve, however, he went to

London to meet with UK Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to talk about the direction of Berlin planning. The two men were becoming friends, and the prime minister offered a welcoming face after Khrushchev had just “beat hell out of” the president.171 Macmillan quickly noticed the duress the president was under. To compound matters, Kennedy did not go into the meeting with

Khrushchev in good health; he was suffering from acute back pain at the time. Macmillan was aware of both the president’s physical state and the level of psychological torment he had endured as part of his meeting with the Soviet leader.172 Macmillan and Kennedy initially mulled over the possibility of immediately turning to negotiations.

168 “Record of Conversation,” FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 14, doc. 34. 169 “Record of Conversation,” FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 14, doc. 34. 170 Quoted in Beschloss, 225. 171 Halberstam, 96-97. 172 Harold Macmillan, Pointing the Way, 1959-1961, 355-359, 400; Michael O’Brien, John F. Kennedy: A Biography (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2005) 550.

52 The president was predisposed toward negotiations as a means to resolve conflict. But offering further negotiations in response to the failed negotiation at the summit was not a viable solution. Discussing the issue with Macmillan caused Kennedy to conclude that offering

“negotiations now might seem to be a sign of weakness.”173 Negotiations only work from a position of strength, and by Kennedy’s own admission, the US position was weaker because

Moscow questioned his resolve. Kennedy made another key assumption about the mindset of the

Soviets, positing that they believed the US edge was “gone on the nuclear side.”174 By assuming that the USSR had a greater nuclear arsenal, Kennedy was implicitly conceding the position of strength, ruling out the possibility of negotiations at this stage in early June.

The president's assumption was a direct result of his flawed foreign policy machinery.

The US actually had a stronger nuclear arsenal in 1961. The idea of a “missile gap,” a term coined by Kennedy while criticizing Eisenhower’s defense strategy during the campaign, was debunked by CIA reports in February, June, and September 1961.175 Publicly, Kennedy wanted to avoid making the Soviets second-guess their claims to superiority, fearing they would respond by starting an arms race. But it is a mystery why Kennedy told Macmillan, someone he trusted, this information if he knew it was not true. It is even harder to understand why it would become a key assumption driving Berlin policy. A possible explanation is that Kennedy’s lack of trust in the CIA ran deep enough that he did not have faith in their estimates of Soviet capabilities.176

Regardless, neither negotiations nor force were considered viable ways to immediately address the situation in Berlin after the meeting in Vienna. Kennedy was generally uncomfortable with

173 “Record of Conversation,” FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 14, doc. 34. 174 “Memorandum of Conversation with the President and the Congressional Leadership,” June 6, 1961. FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 5, doc. 91. 175 Beschloss, 328. 176 Kennedy did not know this at the time, but the CIA estimates were actually wrong. The agency overstated how many intercontinental ballistic missiles the Soviets had.

53 force, but authorized it in Cuba because he reasoned that the Soviets did not have enough of a vested strategic interest in the island to retaliate. This was not the case in Berlin, and therefore force was not seriously considered at this juncture.177

As an alternative to negotiations or force, Kennedy’s immediate response was to reiterate his administration’s commitment to Berlin. Specifically, “Macmillan told Kennedy that the best position for the West . . . would be to say that the Russians could do what they liked about a treaty with the D.D.R., but the West stood on their rights and would meet any attack on these with all the force at their command.”178 Reiterating this commitment provided a middle ground for Kennedy. In Cuba he had used force. In Vienna he had negotiated. The president’s past shortcomings impacted the way he viewed planning for Berlin. The early desire to find a middle ground between negotiations and force shows that he was learning from the Bay of Pigs and

Vienna.

Conclusion

The president is always the final decision-maker on foreign policy, but the driving force behind policy lies somewhere in an administration’s foreign policy machinery. In the Kennedy administration, the center of policy creation shifted between the Bay of Pigs and the Vienna summit. Before and during the Bay of Pigs, the so-called experts, mainly CIA officials, dictated policy. After the failure of that operation, Kennedy lost trust in these experts. He relied less on outside advice, and consequently, the center of policy decision-making shifted. The president tightened his grip on foreign policy. In the leadup to the Vienna summit, Kennedy’s advisors cautioned him against rushing into the meeting. However, the president ignored them, reflecting

177 There was not mention of force in the meeting with MacMillan. 178 “Record of Conversation,” FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 14, doc. 34.

54 their diminished influence. The president's diagnosis of his administration’s problems during the

Bay of Pigs directly led to his going into the Vienna summit underprepared.

What is contradictory about Kennedy’s desire to be at the heart of policy creation is the fact that the invasion of Cuba and a summit meeting with Khrushchev were originally

Eisenhower's ideas. Yet Kennedy decided to follow through on them with minor changes. In the invasion, Kennedy eliminated US air and sea support for the paramilitary force. The idea of a summit meeting was the same, but the pretenses were different. What does the president sticking with his predecessor’s plans reveal about Kennedy’s foreign policy apparatus?

Kennedy devised a system that was more influenced by momentum than leadership.

There are both structural and personal factors that contributed to the creation of this system.

Structurally, Kennedy eliminated much of the sophistication of the foreign policy apparatus he inherited from his predecessor. The president chose speed over thoroughness. Instead of presiding over regularly scheduled meetings that focused on Cuba, Kennedy entertained debate in an ad hoc, disorganized manner. These meetings defeated the role of his personal advisors, as they lost the forum to insert their voices in the discussion. The loose structure of interagency cooperation, which Eisenhower had more clearly defined in his administration, resulted in less cross-examination of policy recommendations.

Kennedy believed his changes would increase efficiency, but in reality, they cut him off from dissenting opinions. During the Bay of Pigs, groupthink prevailed. On an individual level,

Kennedy did not have the necessary experience to see how his administration was headed for a disaster. During Vienna, the president’s confidence got the best of him. Kennedy had never come across anyone with whom “he could not exchange ideas in a meaningful way,” and he thought

55 that Khrushchev would be no different.179 Kennedy’s assumption proved incorrect, and his lack of foreign policy expertise was exposed by Khrushchev. Despite these setbacks, Kennedy remained willing to change something that he did not believe was working, and this flexibility would prove useful as the Berlin crisis unfolded.

179 Robert Kennedy quoted in Beschloss, 234.

56 Chapter Three Introduction

In the five months after Kennedy’s inauguration, the president’s style of executive management had let him down in two notable instances: the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, and the unsuccessful Vienna summit. Kennedy assumed the CIA was infallible. As the agency’s invasion plan gained momentum, Kennedy’s machinery broke down. He had established a system where he only received dissenting opinions when he explicitly sought them out, which left significant gaps in his knowledge. His assumptions about the plan’s merits prevented him from availing himself of opposing views from personal advisors on the White House staff. Although his advisors had debated the nuances of the invasion, Kennedy approved the plan without hearing dissenting views from the operation’s chief critics. In short, he authorized a plan that he did not fully understand.

After the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy correctly recognized the disastrous invasion as both a policy and management shortcoming. Rather than identify the source of the problems, Kennedy instead scapegoated parts of his national security apparatus. He was upset with how much faith he had placed in the CIA, and told his speechwriter Ted Sorenson that all his life he had “known better than to depend on the experts.”180 In the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs, he relegated the CIA to planning for lower priority foreign policy issues. But Kennedy’s loss of faith extended beyond the CIA. He began to ignore deliberately the advice he received from policymakers such as

George Kennan and Dean Rusk. The consequence of this altered approach was that Kennedy further inserted himself into the process of foreign policy creation, to the exclusion of others, creating a new set of problems. No longer heeding the concerns of once-trusted advisors, the president rushed into the Vienna summit with little preparation, believing that he could ease

180 Sorensen, 309.

57 tensions with the Soviets and make progress on the issue of Berlin with a face-to-face meeting with Nikita Khrushchev. While not disastrous like the Bay of Pigs, the results were still not good, as the president was unable to achieve any of his goals for the summit.

Fortunately, Kennedy was willing to learn from his past mistakes. Unlike the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs, where he had failed to identify the source of his foreign policy errors, post-

Vienna the origins of the problem became clearer to him. The nature of the leaders’ meeting made the cause of his failure easier for him to diagnose. With fewer moving parts than the Bay of Pigs, the Vienna summit exposed flaws in Kennedy’s leadership style that could not be concealed by laying the blame on others. In Vienna, there were no advisors or external factors that Kennedy could use as scapegoats, whether in public or in private.

As he had done after the invasion of Cuba, Kennedy publicly accepted the blame for the foreign policy mistakes. His peers and the press were quick to criticize, citing his lack of leadership as the chief cause of this failure. In private, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan said, “‘I feel in my bones’ that President Kennedy is going to fail to produce any real leadership.”

Macmillan also recognized the sentiment in America towards Kennedy, noting “the American press and public are beginning to feel the same” concerns over his leadership.181

Faced with a crisis in Berlin, Kennedy took a step back and again decided to reevaluate his role in the creation of foreign policy. The tension associated with this crisis, and the possibility of war, made it clear to Kennedy that he needed to make significant changes in order to avoid another policy mistake. This chapter argues that Kennedy altered his approach to executive management after the Vienna summit in three key respects. First, he made more of a conscious effort to incorporate personal advisors into the decision-making process, and

181 Alistair Horne, MacMillan: The Official Biography (New York: Macmillan, 2008) 310.

58 proactively requested their recommendations. Second, he avoided making rushed decisions, choosing instead to wait for all recommendations to come in and to weigh them deliberately before authorizing any plans. Third, he reintroduced aspects of the machinery he had previously dismantled, as exemplified by the creation of the Berlin Task Force. By making these three changes, Kennedy decreased his reliance on his intuition in the creation of foreign policy. The changes were evident in the administration’s plan for Berlin, which Kennedy outlined in an address to the nation on July 25, 1961. Although he retained the ultimate authority to formulate policy, Kennedy’s plan for Berlin indicated a willingness to listen to a variety of complex viewpoints and an ability to synthesize them into a practical way forward.

The scholarship surrounding the first eight months of Kennedy’s presidency, especially analysis of the Berlin crisis, does not adequately analyze the president’s evolution as an executive manager. Many scholars have praised Kennedy for his handling of the crisis. For example, Robert Dallek and Frederick Kempe both give Kennedy credit for learning from his mistakes and avoiding disaster in Berlin. Their narratives, however, seem to only focus on the end result, ignoring the president’s decision-making process that got him there. In particular, the existing scholarship ignores both how Kennedy learned from mistakes concerning executive management, and how his corrections altered the balance of decision-making in the White

House.

After Vienna

After the failure in Vienna, Kennedy questioned whether the Soviets believed that the US would fight for West Berlin. He told James Reston, a journalist who accompanied him on the trip, “We have to see what we can do that will restore a feeling in Moscow that we will defend

59 our national interest.”182 If Moscow did not believe that the US would defend Berlin, two of the president’s major goals would be jeopardized: to keep Americans safe, and to maintain access to the divided city. The prevailing theory was that if the Soviets did not fear repercussions, nothing would stop them from closing off access to West Berlin. If the US were to lose access to West

Berlin, it would not be long before it was absorbed by the Soviet-controlled German Democratic

Republic. As a result, US allies would lose faith in its ability protect them, and greatly damage the nation’s prestige. Therefore, before Kennedy began to think about changing his leadership style to avoid future failure, he wanted to express American resolve.

Kennedy began his efforts to demonstrate that resolve after the Vienna summit with a speech he made immediately upon his return to the US on June 6, 1961. In this nationally televised address, he earnestly depicted his meeting with Khrushchev and the state of affairs in

Europe. Although his speech was frank, Kennedy’s words and demeanor indicated that tensions between the US and USSR over disputes in Berlin had reached crisis levels. Addressing the

American people candidly, he said, “Now we face a new and different threat. We no longer have a nuclear monopoly.”183 The threat included both the challenge that Soviet missiles posed to

American national security and the advances of communism. In the past, Kennedy had referred to the threat of “modern weapons.”184 Now, his direct mention of nuclear weapons represented a more blunt allusion to nuclear war as a possibility if the crisis could not be peacefully resolved.

In order to maintain peace while resolving the crisis, it was necessary for Kennedy to strike the right balance between emphasizing US commitment without appearing belligerent.

One way he sought to do this was by asserting America's legal rights to Berlin. In his speech, he

182 Quoted in Reeves, 173. 183 “Radio and Television Report to the American People on Returning From Europe,” June 6, 1961. PPP: JFK, 1961, 445. 184 “Inaugural Address,” January 20, 1961. PPP: JFK, 1961, 2.

60 declared, “Our access rights to West Berlin . . . are based on law and not on sufferance, and . . . we are determined to maintain those rights at any risk.”185 Kennedy’s point was targeted at three audiences. First, he wanted to communicate to Moscow that he was serious in defending Berlin, and the US would not forfeit its legal rights. Second, Kennedy wanted the people of West Berlin to have faith in America’s resolve to fight for their freedom. He repeatedly made the point that the US would never abandon its “obligations to the people of West Berlin.”186 Third, he wanted to alert the American people to the potential risks that lay ahead.

While the speech communicated resolve, an underlying priority of the administration was simultaneously to indicate flexibility. Moments before stepping in front of the cameras, Kennedy called members of Congress into the Oval Office and told them that he wanted to avoid saying anything “that would seem to put Khrushchev in a corner where he must fight back.”187 It was important that his language and actions not be antagonistic. Kennedy assumed Khrushchev would respond with force to situations that damaged the Soviet position. Therefore, a policy that provided a mutually agreeable outcome was essential to American success. In the president's eyes, negotiations represented the best hope for this type of outcome. To Kennedy, negotiations and face-to-face meetings avoided “miscalculation by one power of the interests and policy of another.”188 Avoiding miscalculation also took time and detailed study, which had the consequence of lengthening the timeline in which the US developed its Berlin policy.

Available evidence does not suggest that Kennedy’s administration seriously considered any recommendations on the Berlin issue in the first several days after the summit. The Pentagon

185 “Radio and Television Report to the American People on Returning From Europe,” June 6, 1961. PPP: JFK, 1961, 444. 186 “Radio and Television Report to the American People on Returning From Europe,” June 6, 1961. PPP: JFK, 1961, 444. 187 “Memorandum of Conversation with the President and the Congressional Leadership,” June 6, 1961. FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 5, doc. 91. 188 Schlesinger, 360.

61 continued to prepare contingency plans for Soviet action in Berlin, but such plans were part of an ongoing exercise that began long before the summit. In the days following the speech, there was one notable document that Kennedy saw containing policy recommendations. On June 7, Senator

William Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, sent Kennedy a proposal for turning West Berlin into a free city. He had put together the proposal with the help of Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield.189 The argument for a free city closely followed the requests made in the Soviet ultimatum. For that reason, Kennedy did not seriously consider this recommendation.

At this point, the president was less interested in specific policy recommendations than he was in organizing systems that would produce the future Berlin policy. Immediately after

Vienna, Kennedy told Dean Rusk to form a working group that would study the issue of Berlin closely. The group became known as the Berlin Task Force, and a whole floor in the State

Department was devoted to its operations. The task force was led by Foy Kohler, Assistant

Secretary for European Affairs, and his deputy, Martin Hillenbrand.190

The formation of the Berlin Task Force represented a considerable change in Kennedy’s leadership style. The task force was different from the groups Kennedy had previously established, such as the task force to study the innerworkings of the NSC before his inauguration.

The Berlin Task Force did not study a specific issue that could be resolved with a single memorandum. Instead, it was a piece of formal machinery that dealt with and studied the ongoing issues in Berlin and reported to Kennedy weekly.191 It would react to any information coming out of Berlin and would respond to occasional requests for more specific

189 Catudal, 258. 190 Schoenbaum, 337. 191 “Martin J. Hillenbrand Oral History Interview,” interview by Paul R. Sweet on August 26, 1964, Kennedy Library.

62 recommendations, in addition to carrying out its regular study. As the president started relying more on the State Department, the task force “became the major coordinating mechanism within the United States Government at the operating level for dealing with the Berlin problem.”192 On a day-to-day level, the group produced “practically all of the paper work that was done for the major conferences and meetings that took place on the Berlin and German problems.”193 The

Berlin Task Force was to study Berlin indefinitely, making it similar to the machinery from the previous administration that Kennedy had ignored or eliminated, such as the 5412 Committee that Eisenhower had used to study Cuba. Kennedy’s decision to establish the task force represented a fundamental shift from his early move to scrap Eisenhower’s machinery.

The changes in Kennedy’s outlook on management after Vienna and the Bay of Pigs also gave the recommendations of the Berlin group a new weight and significance. Martin

Hillenbrand remarked at the change in Kennedy’s approach to evaluating proposals during the

Berlin crisis. He noted that Kennedy “wanted to make sure that [the task force’s] answers really derived from an exhaustive analysis of the problem, and I think he was, during the early days of the administration, receptive to proposals which seemed intelligent and which seemed directed towards achieving a solution of the problem.”194 Hillenbrand recognized that Kennedy, early on in his presidency, was attracted to proposals that had the veneer of intelligence but lacked the depth needed to produce successful policy.

No longer interested in the path of least resistance, the president was now more focused on debate, leading to his emphasis on detailed analysis. Kennedy had the task force produce a

192 “Martin J. Hillenbrand Oral History Interview,” interview by Paul R. Sweet on August 26, 1964, Kennedy Library. 193 “Martin J. Hillenbrand Oral History Interview,” interview by Paul R. Sweet on August 26, 1964, Kennedy Library. 194 “Martin J. Hillenbrand Oral History Interview,” interview by Paul R. Sweet on August 26, 1964, Kennedy Library.

63 policy recommendation that was considered at what Bundy deemed to be “the most important

NSC meeting” ever—the last NSC meeting on Berlin before he articulated his administration’s position on July 25, 1961.195 Drawing another distinction between how Kennedy interacted with the task force and how he interacted with his foreign policy machinery during the Bay of Pigs,

Hillenbrand noted Kennedy “was not satisfied merely to accept the conventional answers of the experts.”196 Based on this account, it is clear that the task force represented an integration of two previously incompatible modes of thought within Kennedy’s management style. Instead of either relinquishing complete control to “experts” (like he had done during the Bay of Pigs) or centering himself in policy creation and shutting out other opinions (as he did in Vienna),

Kennedy was now embracing a more sophisticated model of policy creation. He did not accept recommendations at face value; rather, he synthesized the strongest aspects of all the plans given to him in order to construct the most promising policy. Although Kennedy was still the final decision-maker, the new process reflected an altered decision-making model that allowed his subordinates more say in foreign policy creation.

Two Schools of Thought

Kennedy had to perform a balancing act when formulating his Berlin policy. The president's remarks during his speech after Vienna were an attempt to “strike an effective balance between intimidating the Soviets and giving them a way out of their dilemma.”197 In addition,

Kennedy had to balance his White House. He no longer sought the advice of military experts from the CIA or Pentagon, but he did seek counsel from national security advisors, State

195 Quoted in Beschloss, 256. 196 “Martin J. Hillenbrand Oral History Interview,” interview by Paul R. Sweet on August 26, 1964, Kennedy Library. 197 Dallek, 418.

64 Department officials, White House Staff, and political consultants in addition to his new machinery. He also went to great lengths to encourage debate among these advisors. Kennedy made sure to avail himself of every opinion and option regarding Berlin policy.

After the post-Vienna speech, the military response to the crisis in Berlin was on the top of Kennedy’s mind, especially after Khrushchev publicly released the aide-mémoire that he had given Kennedy at the summit.198 Instead of turning to the Pentagon, he turned to former

Secretary of State Dean Acheson, a notable hawk, whom Kennedy knew would advocate for a strong military response. Kennedy did not share many of the same opinions as Acheson, but that ideological divide is what made Acheson’s perspective so invaluable. Kennedy held off debate on the issue of Berlin until he was able to read Acheson’s report.

Kennedy’s reliance on Acheson at this moment represented a commitment to fostering an environment where proponents of competing ideologies were given equal importance and time.

Acheson served as Secretary of State in the Truman administration and an outspoken critic of

Kennedy’s handling of the Bay of Pigs invasion. The relationship was further complicated between the president and Acheson, because Acheson had detested Kennedy’s father and openly criticized him.199 Nevertheless, Kennedy called Acheson “one of the most intelligent and experienced men around.”200 His hardline position was well known, and Kennedy’s request of his services drew substantial criticism. In keeping with some of the same modern management principles that guided the formulation of Kennedy’s Cabinet, the president was unfazed by the critics, as Acheson’s ability and intelligence trumped all. Kennedy justified his choice by saying he wanted to “avail himself of the ‘hawkish’ view of the Truman-era veteran before making up

198 Dallek, 418. 199 Kempe, 273. 200 Catudal, 44.

65 his mind.”201 The choice of Acheson showed that Kennedy was committed to avoiding a repeat of past mistakes. During the Bay of Pigs, the president had surrounded himself with a group of

“Kennedy men” and he felt that there had been a dearth of dissenting opinions.202 Therefore, he felt it prudent to bring aboard someone who held strong opinions and would provide a contrasting view to set the stage for debate on policy.

Ironically, Acheson believed his purpose was to cut through the “mush of administration decision-making” that resulted from the “Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Berlin

Contingency Planning,” better known as the Berlin Task Force.203 Acheson’s implicit assertion that one person is more efficient and useful than a group echoed Kennedy’s initial criticisms of the Eisenhower administration. In reality, the two worked in tandem and experienced synergies in producing recommendations. Acheson’s job was to give his holistic opinion on Soviet aims in

Berlin and to offer a recommended course of action based on his thesis, while the task force was responsible for contingency plans. Acheson provided “clear answers to urgent questions,” and his plans were able to “stimulate further thought and activity” in the White House and in the task force.204 Meanwhile, the task force regularly analyzed events as they happened and reacted to them by producing recommendations.

Before Acheson could share his report with Kennedy, Senator Mansfield advocated the free city approach that he had first raised ten days earlier. His proposed plan was to make Berlin an internationally guaranteed free city.205 The free city plan did not receive a favorable response from the president and the policy did not have much traction among Mansfield’s fellow senators,

201 Catudal, 44. 202 Schlesinger, 386. 203 Kempe, 273. 204 Kempe, 273; “Record of Meeting of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Berlin Contingency Planning,” FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 14, doc. 42. 205 Catudal, 123-124.

66 who frequently called it “unrealistic.”206 Mansfield stood before the Senate on June 16, 1961 and criticized the hardline position the administration was appearing to take by waiting for the

Acheson report. Mansfield and others were unsure whether Kennedy would adopt Acheson’s views, but his involvement was enough to stoke criticism.

Llewellyn Thompson, US Ambassador to the Soviet Union, advocated a more moderate approach. Before Acheson completed and gave his report to the NSC, Thompson submitted his own memorandum to the Secretary of State, outlining what he believed the Soviet goals were and how the US should respond. Thompson believed that Khrushchev was trying to strike a middle ground with his Berlin proposition, and the Soviet leader was “surprised and disappointed at our reaction to his proposal.”207 Thompson proposed a peace treaty, but added an element of negotiation, allowing the US to “save face.”208 Thompson included negotiation as a way to placate public opinion. He felt it would be publicly unacceptable to give up West Berlin to the

GDR by recognizing its independence. The ambassador stressed the need to act quickly in his memorandum to Kennedy. Echoing the CIA’s sense of urgency during the Bay of Pigs,

Thompson said “I consider it highly important that we attempt to reach decisions now on our policy during all phases of this problem, as otherwise we are in danger of drifting and losing opportunities.”209 Kennedy’s rejection of Thompson’s proposal is an important moment in his leadership transformation after the Bay of Pigs. During the Bay of Pigs, that same logic had been used to justify invasion: that the US would have less of an opportunity for a favorable outcome if

Kennedy waited to act. While Kennedy continued to take his time, Thompson’s idea of

206 Catudal, 124. 207 “Memorandum: The Berlin Question,” June 19, 1961, Box 81, Kennedy Library. 208 “Memorandum: The Berlin Question,” June 19, 1961, Box 81, Kennedy Library. 209 “Memorandum: The Berlin Question,” June 19, 1961, Box 81, Kennedy Library.

67 negotiations began to gain support. Although Acheson had not released his report, it was evident that he would not support negotiations.

The State Department was divided on the issue of Berlin. Rusk did not endorse either a doctrine of negotiations or one favoring military buildup.210 Instead, he was criticized for advocating for the status quo. He believed that the US already had a Berlin policy, and there was no need to create a new one. Kennedy’s special assistant, Arthur Schlesinger, called Rusk’s position “circumspect.”211 Rusk was content to let the Soviets make a first move and then create an adaptive policy; he did not take Moscow’s threats as a serious first move. He was relatively alone in this position.

Rusk was forced to more actively consider a new policy position once Khrushchev publicly released the Soviet aide-mémoire. In fact, Kennedy requested that Rusk draft the administration’s response, which no longer allowed Rusk to sit back and wait for another move by the Soviets.212 Although Kennedy was unimpressed with Rusk’s initial assessment of the situation, he still sought Rusk’s opinion, open to the chance that it might influence eventual policy. Kennedy’s management style was further growing and changing after the Bay of Pigs and the Vienna summit. He had uncritically sought outside opinions during the first disaster, and then avoided being influenced by external ideas during the second. His outreach to Rusk, despite initial policy disagreement, indicates Kennedy’s new willingness to gather and critically assess outside opinions without being entirely beholden to them.

A consequence of Kennedy’s new process of operating though formal machinery was a longer period between his requests for memoranda and his receiving them. Despite his earlier

210 Schoenbaum, 338. 211 Schoenbaum, 338. 212 Schoenbaum, 338-339.

68 complaints about efficiency, Kennedy did not view this as a problem; he was now insistent on giving his people enough time. The State Department’s reply to the Soviets was still unfinished at the end of June. At this point, Kennedy was coming under increased pressure to speak publicly on the issue of Berlin. It was starting to appear to the public that Kennedy was falling behind the

Pentagon in his determination to face down the Soviet challenge. Again, just as they had during the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy’s military advisors recommended plans that involved force. Unlike during the Bay of Pigs episode, though, force made these plans less politically viable. In response to criticism of inactivity from the press, Kennedy told Press Secretary Salinger that

“this shit has got to stop.”213 Despite feeling the strain, no evidence suggests that the president began to rush those who were producing reports on Berlin.

With pressure mounting, Kennedy decided to speak publicly on Berlin for the second time. On June 28, he spoke at a press conference and fielded questions about the issue.214

Kennedy’s speech did not include news of specific policy implementations, but it provided insight into the president’s thinking on the issue of negotiations. In the speech, Kennedy said that the US “shall always be ready to discuss any proposals,” referring to his administration’s willingness to negotiate with the Soviets.215 The press asked the president questions about the lack of completed contingency plans, and he responded by saying that the Pentagon had finalized reports. However, he did not offer any specifics. Based on his answers, the president was clearly waiting for the Acheson report and the discussion of the report at the NSC meeting. Kennedy had newfound deference for the NSC and his advisors when crafting policy for Berlin.

213 Quoted in Dalek, 419. 214 “The President’s News Conference of June 28, 1961,” June 28, 1961. PPP: JFK, 1961. 215 “The President’s News Conference of June 28, 1961,” June 28, 1961. PPP: JFK, 1961.

69 A few hours after the press conference, Acheson submitted his 25-page report, which provided the most substantial fodder for the Berlin Policy debate. The report was presented at

National Security Council meeting No. 486 one day later.216 Acheson’s basic thesis was that the current division and proposed unification of Berlin was not the primary issue that motivated the

Soviet ultimatum. He believed that the situation was a “conflict of wills” by which Khrushchev was testing American resolve.217 Acheson reasoned that Khrushchev’s hope was that he could force the US to back down, which would shatter its world power and influence.218

From a policy planning perspective, Acheson’s report was extremely significant. The paper recommended partial mobilization, deployment of additional American troops to Europe, and general measures that increased America’s ability to wage a nuclear war.219 But the most important feature of the report was Acheson’s staunch opposition to negotiation. In the preamble of his report, Acheson says: “He [Khrushchev] cannot be persuaded by eloquence or logic, or cajoled by friendliness.”220 Acheson thought that the US needed to respond with such firmness that Khrushchev would be convinced that the US had the resolve to go to war. The US could not blindly commit to defending Berlin, so Acheson laid out three Soviet actions that would be considered provocation enough for war: the Soviets could not threaten Western garrisons in

Berlin; they could not infringe upon air and ground travel; and they could not interfere with West

Berlin’s place in the free world.221 Acheson had “thrown down the gauntlet, but Kennedy wasn’t yet prepared to pick it up.”222

216 Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential Papers. National Security Files. Meetings and Memoranda. National Security Council meetings, 1961: No. 486, 29 June 1961. Kennedy Library. 217 “Report by Dean Acheson,” June 28, 1961. FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 14, doc. 49. 218 Schlesinger, 381. 219 “Report by Dean Acheson,” June 28, 1961. FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 14, doc. 49. 220 “Report by Dean Acheson,” June 28, 1961. FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 14, doc. 49. 221 “Report by Dean Acheson,” June 28, 1961. FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 14, doc. 49. 222 Kempe, 282.

70 There was considerable pushback on Acheson’s report. Criticism came from a White

House group led by Schlesinger, Carl Kaysen (an NSC member), Thompson, and George

McGhee (Director of Policy Planning). This group felt that Acheson’s recommendations were too severe and, if implemented, had the potential to antagonize Khrushchev enough to the point where nuclear war would be likely.223 They believed that if Kennedy blindly accepted the recommendations of this report, the US would definitely be regarded as “pushing Khrushchev into a corner,” the very outcome that the administration had sought to avoid.

Despite Kennedy’s confidence in Acheson’s abilities, he was not satisfied with the amount of information included in the original 25-page report.224 Still wary after the Bay of Pigs, the president wanted to avoid being under informed. Acheson’s report was the most comprehensive recommendation to date, yet still insufficient. Kennedy directed McGeorge

Bundy to study the matter further and present his findings at the NSC meeting in two weeks. At the same time, Kennedy instructed Acheson to examine negotiations as an alternative.225 The president had begun to reveal his predisposition toward negotiation, and his request that Acheson look into the matter supports this analysis. Kennedy’s request to Acheson also marked the second time the president asked an advisor to report on a position they did not favor (the first being when he had asked Rusk to prepare a response to the aide-mémoire). In the debate surrounding the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy had not asked anyone to construct a case for a position he was not currently advocating. Kennedy was now taking a far more dynamic approach to debating policy.

Rejecting the Two Options

223 Schoenbaum, 337. 224 Schlesinger, 387. 225 Catudal, 150.

71 In late June and early July, anxiety over the crisis was rising, and Kennedy’s silence raised questions about his leadership. On June 30, 1961, Time reported “a widespread feeling that the Administration has not yet provided ample leadership in guiding the US along the dangerous paths of the Cold War.”226 That same week, the Economist reported, “Unless Mr.

Kennedy takes a decisive grip on the wheel, the West is in danger of by-passing one possible line of compromise after another until it reaches a dead end where neither it nor Russia has any choice except between ignominious retreat and nuclear devastation.”227 These bleak options weighed heavily on Kennedy. He would later describe the choice between surrender and war as

“holocaust or humiliation.”228 The choice between these two unacceptable outcomes was the basic foundation of the Acheson doctrine. However, Kennedy would heed the Economist’s warning. By July, the president had finally seen sufficient discussion of his options. Now, it was appropriate for him to reinsert his voice into the debate, which he steered towards a third option: negotiations.

While the White House was digesting the Acheson report, the president was anxiously anticipating the arrival of the State Department’s response to the Soviet aide-mémoire. The draft was given to Kennedy on July 17, 1961.229 By this point, Kennedy was not pleased with how long the draft had taken, and his newfound patience was wearing thin. Although he was upset by the time lag, the president was even more frustrated with the substance of the response. The State

Department believed that negotiations at this time would be too challenging, and Kennedy felt that the overall response was weak and feckless. He thought that if his administration went

226 Quoted in Dalek, 417. 227 Schlesinger, 386. 228 “Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Berlin Crisis,” July 25, 1961. PPP: JFK, 1961, 537. 229 “Paper Prepared by Secretary of State Rusk,” July 17, 1961. FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 14, doc. 71.

72 forward with this tempered response, people would “just think we’re soft.”230 Despite outside appearances, Kennedy’s displeasure with the State Department at this juncture does not indicate a reversion to the mean in terms of his executive management. In contrast to his passivity during the Bay of Pigs decision-making process, the president was now holding people accountable in the moment, rather than blaming them after the fact.

Meanwhile, opposition to the Acheson report was growing, and the president was listening. The critics with the most impact included Kennedy’s special assistant Arthur

Schlesinger, as well as a handful of influential senators such as Mansfield, William Fulbright,

Hubert Humphrey, and Claiborne Pell.231 The soft-line position advocated by these men was considerably nuanced. In short, while the group “acquiesced in Acheson’s reiteration of the three essential Western interests in Berlin” and did not oppose military buildup in some form, they differed from Acheson in that they “urged active negotiations without delay.”232

Schlesinger felt that the Acheson report did not adequately explore diplomatic possibilities for resolving the crisis. In his capacity as special assistant, Schlesinger was very close to the president during the Bay of Pigs. He was one of the president’s only advisors to advocate against the invasion. However, Schlesinger reproached himself for only offering

“limited dissent” while the CIA convinced Kennedy to invade.233 On July 6, Schlesinger met with State Department legal advisor Abram Chayes and NSC member Carl Kaysen to discuss their collective concern over the Acheson report. Perturbed by similarities to the Bay of Pigs,

Schlesinger did not wait for Kennedy to ask for his advice and swiftly penned a memorandum to

230 Hugh Sidey, John F. Kennedy, President (New York: Atheneum, 1963) 178. 231 Schlesinger, 384 232 Catudal, 149. 233 Kempe, 296; Schlesinger, 383-390.

73 the president advocating a more flexible policy. Like Kennedy, Schlesinger was determined not to repeat his mistakes.234

Kennedy immediately responded to Schlesinger’s memorandum. The president “agreed that Acheson’s paper was far too narrowly directed to military problems,” and remarked “with emphasis that Berlin planning had to be brought back into balance.”235 Schlesinger’s next objective was to produce a full report that would balance Acheson’s buildups with the soft-liner stance. Kennedy wanted the report within two hours so that he could have it in time for his weekend meeting on Cape Cod.236 The quick turnaround Kennedy asked for demonstrates his enthusiasm for Schlesinger’s proposal.

Kennedy’s policy on Berlin began to come into clearer focus during a meeting in Hyannis

Port on July 8. The attendees were Acheson, Rusk, Schlesinger, Bundy, Henry Kissinger (special advisor to the president), and McNamara. Inspired by Schlesinger’s full memorandum, Kennedy began to assign tasks to members of the meeting that they were required to report on in ten days.

He asked Acheson to develop a “political program;” Rusk to produce a negotiating prospectus; and McNamara to develop a plan for increasing non-nuclear forces.237 Once the members had completed their reports, they participated in a series of meetings in order to develop a coherent policy direction. The nation’s plan was confirmed at a follow-up NSC meeting on July 19, where they agreed upon limited military build-up and negotiations. After the necessary approvals from

Congress had been secured, Kennedy’s speechwriter Ted Sorenson drafted the speech the president would give to the nation outlining the policy he and his team had just formulated.

234 Schlesinger, 386. 235 Schlesinger, 387. 236 Schlesinger, 387. 237 Schlesinger, 388-389.

74 A New Policy for Berlin

The Kennedy administration’s new policy for Berlin expertly balanced firmness with flexibility, making sure to send a strong message to the Soviets without provoking them. The plan had two major parts: 1) a military build-up designed to convince the Soviets that the US was prepared for war if necessary, and 2) an indication of openness to negotiations that could ultimately deescalate the situation in Berlin. In the words of Bundy, Kennedy channeled Teddy

Roosevelt by speaking “softly while he describes his new big stick,”238 with the “big stick” representing the military buildup. Instead of the rapid buildup favored by Acheson, the authorized policy favored a more gradual plan advanced by the doves. This plan involved doubling the men on active duty in the Navy and Air Force and increasing the Army’s strength from “875,000 to approximately 1 million men.”239 Overall, Kennedy’s proposed changes involved putting more than three billion dollars into the Armed Forces. The overall goal of this two-fold policy was to avoid war while at the same time maintaining US interests in Berlin.

Kennedy outlined the new policy in his July 25 address to the nation. The specific language of Kennedy’s speech was targeted to the Soviets and to America’s allies, with the aim to convince them that the US would protect West Berlin and had the resolve to use nuclear weapons. At the same time, the speech very subtly extended an olive branch if the Soviets were willing to negotiate, as long as the freedom of West Berlin was not compromised. Throughout the July 25 speech, there were continual references to points of policy and specific omissions that can be tied back to debates over the prior month—debates that were facilitated by Kennedy’s new management style.

238 Quoted in Dallek, 259. 239 “Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Berlin Crisis,” July 25, 1961.

75 One item that did not end up in the final speech or policy was the declaration of a state of emergency. Instead of declaring a national emergency, Kennedy, in his speech, described his investment in the military as “part of the long-term build-up” of conventional American force.240

This point of policy had been heavily debated earlier in the month. In the NSC meeting on July

13, Acheson had argued for a national state of emergency declaration.241 In effect, the declaration implied immediate expansion of the armed forces. Schlesinger and Sorensen were principal opponents of the declaration. Sorensen encapsulated the logic behind the dove position by saying that a state of emergency would challenge Khrushchev’s prestige “to the point where he could not back down.”242 Kissinger, who was in the dove camp at the time, stated that a gradual buildup would actually be more indicative of American resolve compared to an unsustained aggressive expansion.243 Kennedy sided with Kissinger’s position after letting the debate play out.

Kennedy addressed how he would fund a gradual build-up in his speech, saying it would require “more taxes.”244 Members of the Berlin Task Force had argued, in a meeting on July 19, for this explicit reference to taxes. Acheson’s report had not provided specifics on how the president should fund his military build-up. The task force, however, advocated for taxes “in order to give the American public a feeling of participation in the crisis.”245 The reference to taxes in Kennedy’s speech was subtle. Nevertheless, it is a clear example of how the Berlin Task

Force affected the administration’s final policy on Berlin.

240 “Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Berlin Crisis,” July 25, 1961, 534. 241 “Report by Dean Acheson,” June 28, 1961. FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 14, doc. 49. 242 Schlesinger, 390. 243 Schlesinger, 389. 244 “Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Berlin Crisis,” July 25, 1961. 245 “Memorandum of Minutes of the National Security Council Meeting,” FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 14, doc. 77.

76 During the July 25 speech, another way that Kennedy provided the American public with a sense of agency was in his announcement of the creation of a new Civil Defense plan. The plan would increase America’s preparedness for the threat of nuclear attack through the building and stocking of fallout shelters, the creation of new warning systems, and other measures. Kennedy told the American people he would request that Congress “identify and mark space in existing structures--public and private--that could be used for fall-out shelters in case of attack . . . to improve our air-raid warning and fallout detection systems . . . and to take other measures that will be effective at an early date to save millions of lives if needed.”246

In this part of the speech, Kennedy displayed his ability to communicate a clear message to two different audiences. On one hand, Kennedy was trying to prepare the American people for a scenario that was becoming increasingly more realistic. Kennedy’s speech on June 5 used very different language. When referring to helping West Berlin in a time of need, Kennedy said, “We must, I believe, assist them if we are determined to meet with commitments of assistance our words against the communist advance.”247 Seven weeks later, Kennedy warned “it would be a mistake for others to look upon Berlin, because of its location, as a tempting target. . . . Any dangerous spot is tenable if men—brave men—will make it so.”248 Kennedy invoked imagery of

Americas’ victory at Bastogne in WWII to make the point that even if West Berlin was seemingly untenable, the US would fight bravely to protect the city. Further, Kennedy spoke in explicit detail about preparedness for nuclear weapons: “To recognize the possibilities of nuclear war in the missile age, without our citizens knowing what they should do and where they should

246 “Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Berlin Crisis,” July 25, 1961. PPP: JFK, 1961. 247 “Radio and Television Report to the American People on Returning From Europe,” June 6, 1961. PPP: JFK, 1961, 446. 248 “Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Berlin Crisis,” July 25, 1961. PPP: JFK, 1961, 534.

77 go if bombs begin to fall, would be a failure of responsibility.”249 The phrase “if bombs begin to fall” is far more explicit than anything Kennedy had said before in his speeches. The fact that the administration talked so frankly about nuclear war and outlined fallout scenarios sent a clear signal to the Soviets that America was committed to the idea of waging nuclear war.

Throughout the speech, Kennedy continued to use language that allowed him simultaneously to speak directly to America's allies, its citizens, and the Soviets. To this effect, when discussing the potential of using force, Kennedy said, “we must also be ready to resist with force, if force is used upon us.”250 His use of “we” referred to both Americans and NATO allies.

Previously in the speech, Kennedy evoked the founding principles of NATO, warning that “an attack upon that city will be regarded as an attack upon us all.”251 The use of “us” meant West

Berlin, and by extension, the West at large. Kennedy then combined these principles of NATO with American resolve, when he said, “The solemn vow each of us gave to West Berlin in time of peace will not be broken in time of danger.”252 Kennedy’s message to our allies was that

America would intervene to protect freedom, and that they should stand with the US.

Although this speech reassured a domestic audience, its most important audience was the

Soviets. Kennedy’s reference to potential use of force was meant as a clear warning that the

Soviets should heed. It spelled out unmistakably that the US was prepared to use force if the

USSR used force in any capacity to infringe upon the rights of West Berlin. In fact, one of the most interesting aspects of Kennedy’s diction is that throughout the speech he almost never mentioned East Berlin or Germany. His language framed America’s legal rights as exclusively present in West Berlin; for example, when speaking about Americans’ rights in Germany, he

249 “Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Berlin Crisis,” July 25, 1961, PPP: JFK, 1961, 534. 250 “Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Berlin Crisis,” July 25, 1961, PPP: JFK, 196, 534. 251 “Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Berlin Crisis,” July 25, 1961, PPP: JFK, 1961, 534. 252 “Radio and Television Report the American People on the Berlin Crisis,” July 25, 1961, PPP: JFK. 1961, 539.

78 only mentioned West Berlin. Such targeted language reiterated Kennedy’s point from Vienna that the Soviets were free to do what they wished in East Berlin.253 Although Kennedy recognized that America had no legal jurisdiction in East Berlin, he alluded to self- determination, saying that the many East Berliners who chose to flee were “voting for Western- type freedom with their feet.”254 Kennedy’s words were an unmistakable declaration of

America's ideological supremacy.

For every assurance of America’s will to fight, Kennedy extended an olive branch of negotiation. A flexible policy would balance military strength with the desire to negotiate. For example, Kennedy said, “We will at all times be ready to talk, if talk will help. But we must also be ready to resist with force, if force is used upon us.”255 The general message was quite clear: the US was willing to talk, but was not afraid to fight. However, there are nuances within the diction that give insight into policy formation. Stating that the US was open to negotiations “at all times” was a strong endorsement of the dove position. When Kennedy met with Macmillan in

June, they determined that the US should only negotiate from a position of strength. Now, in late

July, Kennedy rejected that stance, advocating negotiations regardless of perceived strength. One might argue that Kennedy had achieved a position of strength, but there is no evidence to suggest that the Soviets had altered their assumption regarding American resolve. Indeed, in July 1961, the Soviet Ambassador to the US said “when the chips are down, the American people won’t fight for Berlin.”256

After Kennedy gave this momentous address, the crisis momentarily died down.

Khrushchev even remarked that “so far the strongest intimidation has been Kennedy’s

253 Kempe, 312. 254 “Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Berlin Crisis,” July 25, 1961, PPP: JFK. 1961, 538. 255 “Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Berlin Crisis,” July 25, 1961, PPP: JFK. 1961, 534. 256 Menshikov quoted in Beschloss, 255.

79 speech.”257 This lull did not last long, as approximately two weeks later, the Soviets began to construct a wall around East Berlin. The wall, more than anything Kennedy could have said in his speech, helped Khrushchev solve his refugee crisis. By trapping people inside of East

Germany, the Soviets became content with the status quo, and so did the Americans. Because this wall technically did not infringe on US legal rights of access to the city, it did threaten the

American position. Further, it seemed as if the two nations could now coexist despite the lingering German question.

Conclusion

Kennedy summed up his administration’s position perfectly in his speech on July 25:

“we seek peace – but we shall not surrender.”258 The formulation of Kennedy’s Berlin policy in the wake of the Vienna summit was heavily influenced by his changed approach to executive management—most notably, the slower pace at which Kennedy operated. During the Bay of Pigs invasion planning, Kennedy did not pause the policy creation process to wait for memoranda from people he trusted, such as Schlesinger. One of the most important factors in the administration's Berlin policy was Acheson’s report, as it provided substance for debate. By waiting for this report, Kennedy slowed down the creation of foreign policy, a stark reversal from the rushed process preceding the Bay of Pigs and Vienna summit.

In addition, after Vienna, Kennedy once again placed faith in his advisors. But this time, he made sure to balance the input he received to avoid being held captive by one side like he was with the CIA during Bay of Pigs planning. The creation of the Berlin Task Force showcased the president's willingness to place authority back in the hands of the State Department. He was now

257 Quoted in Kempe, 320. 258 “Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Berlin Crisis,” July 25, 1961, PPP: JFK. 1961, 539.

80 correcting some of the early mistakes he had made when he dismantled some of Eisenhower’s foreign policy machinery. Kennedy corrected his foreign policy failures by changing his approach to executive management, which had the result of producing a successful Berlin policy, one that found middle ground between a number of competing proposals.

81 Conclusion

Kennedy was the nation’s first true “Chief Executive.” He was a technocrat, enthusiastic about ideas of efficiency, and he shook up the White House with a new outlook on executive management. Peter Drucker, a notable management consultant, penned the philosophies and practical foundations that guide nearly every modern enterprise. In his view, leadership “is not charisma and not a set of personality traits.”259 If leaders were neither born nor made, they must be self-made. President Kennedy was not a self-made man in the traditional sense, but he possessed the ability to remake himself after each of his failures, embodying the essence of

Drucker’s quote. Kennedy’s ability to be introspective was particularly crucial, as he demonstrated a great capacity to learn from two notable setbacks. Kennedy survived the early turbulence of 1961 and eventually earned the distinction of a skillful crisis manager.

Not everyone viewed Kennedy’s fluid thinking as a good quality. Rivals criticized

Kennedy for his lack of conviction, but they overlooked the importance of his evolution as a leader and policy planner. Kennedy initially desired a conventional success in the realm of foreign policy. His failures in Cuba and Vienna greatly vexed him, and compounded the anxiety he felt from his small margin of victory in the election. Producing a tangible result, such as regime change or peace treaty, might allow him to prove himself in the public eye. Kennedy’s actions during the summer of 1961 revealed that he had stopped associating success with traditional military and diplomatic victories. After Vienna, Kennedy changed the way he spoke about the purpose of foreign policy.

Critics also suggested that Kennedy lacked the desire to win. The first five months of

1961 furnished plenty of evidence, and the president’s July 25, 1961 speech, which outlined the

259 Peter Drucker, “Leadership: More Doing Than Dash,” The Wall Street Journal, January 6, 1988, pg. 14.

82 US response to the 1961 Berlin crisis, seemed to confirm the accusation. The speech demonstrated the president’s newfound attitude, which critics dubbed a “no-win” policy.260 The critics were correct in the literal sense when it came to “winning,” as Kennedy did not use the word “victory” or “win” in this address. But Kennedy’s actions demonstrated that the nuclear age had made traditional slogans and policies such as “unconditional surrender” obsolete.

Perhaps the president's greatest achievement was learning to ignore the idea of a conventional win when formulating his Berlin policy. Kennedy began his presidency looking for quantifiable and traditional victories. In Berlin, the president searched instead for flexibility.

Kennedy crafted a strategy that did not put the Soviets in a position where they felt the need to lash out. Instead, the White House emphasized negotiations and created a situation where the two powers were able to deescalate the conflict while maintaining peace. Critics failed to understand that this flexible response did in fact represent a firm conviction on Kennedy’s part. Success and victory were not the same.

The framework of Kennedy’s flexible response was testament to his improved leadership style. The president was no longer blinded by the military and intelligence officials who had convinced him that the Bay of Pigs invasion was a good idea. In Berlin, Kennedy had the wherewithal to reject plans that favored significant military action. Commissioning the Acheson report indicated that the president wanted to hear a hardline position, but his actions showed that he was not beholden to one. Additionally, Kennedy created formal machinery such as the Berlin

Task Force, showing that he no longer placed a premium on receiving recommendations quickly, and cared more about the quality of policy debate. These changes show that Kennedy learned

260 Sorensen, 514.

83 from his early mistakes and succeeded in Berlin by altering his approach to executive management.

Modern management theory features an interesting paradox relevant to Kennedy.

Managers must be reflective, but also have an unwavering conviction that their management structure is an infallible vehicle for decision-making. If all decisions are the result of rational thought with complete information, why would there be a need for reflection? The answer is that no decision can be made under conditions of complete certainty. Nobel laureate Herbert Simon called this “bounded rationality.”261 Decision-makers are “limited by the information they have and by the time available for analysis.”262 Kennedy embodied this limitation of management theory when he changed Eisenhower’s foreign policy machinery. Kennedy did not seem to realize that “organizational processes sometimes inadvertently steer people into making bad decisions.”263 Despite being surrounded by some of the smartest people in the world, Kennedy still made bad decisions. To his credit, however, he reflected on his failures, and used them to create a new process, which allowed him to succeed.

Kennedy’s willingness to correct his mistakes during the Berlin crisis offers a masterful case study in leadership. Admitting error is never easy. In his speech on July 25, Kennedy said that no man “who does not bear the burdens of this office” could understand “how heavy and constant would be those burdens.”264 Kennedy struggled to carry them. Early in his administration, he responded to failure by blaming advisors and increasing his influence on policy creation. After Vienna, Kennedy recognized that the flaw was in his leadership and relinquished his tight grip on foreign policy machinery. Stepping back and slowing down

261 Quoted in Rosenzweig. 262 Rosenzweig. 263 Rosenzweig. 264 “Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Berlin Crisis,” July 25, 1961. PPP: JFK, 1961.

84 resulted in more substantial policy debate and the creation of new processes that provided checks and balances. Kennedy’s accomplishment was humbling himself during one of the tensest periods in modern history.

This aspect of Kennedy’s presidency is worthy of further study by anyone who strives to be a good leader. Anyone’s life features moments of tremendous pressure and stress. Ambiguity and failure are unavoidable, but we can decide to learn from our mistakes. Without the will to improve, experience means little. Kennedy was not simply important because his willingness to adapt helped prevent nuclear war. Instead, his evolving leadership style should be studied again and again because all of us, no matter how powerful, can admit our flaws, correct our mistakes, and change for the better.

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