A Look at Presidential Power and What Could Have Been John T
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Richard Neustadt
!RICHARD NEUSTADT Presidential Power and the Modern President From this often-read book comes the classic concept of presidential power as "the power to persuade. " Richard Neustadt observed the essence of presidential power when working in the executive branch during Franklin Roosevelt's term as president. He stayed to serve under President Truman. It is said that President Kennedy brought Presidential Power with him to the White House, and Neustadt worked briefly for JFK. The first half of the excerpt, in which he shows how presidents' well-developed personal characteristics permit successful persuasive abilities, comes from the book's first edition. The excerpt's closing pages reflect Neustadt's recent musings on the nation, on world affairs, and on the challenges presidents face. IN THE EARLY summer of 1952, before the heat of the campaign, President [Harry] Truman used to contemplate the problems of the general-become-President should [Dwight David] Eisenhower win the forthcoming election. "He'll sit here," Truman would remark (tapping his desk for emphasis), "and he'll say, 'Do this! Do that!' And nothing will happen. Poor Ike-it won't be a bit like the Army. He'll find it very frustrating." Eisenhower evidently found it so. "In the face of the continuing dissidence and disunity, the President sometimes simply exploded with exasperation," wrote Robert Donovan in comment on the early months of Eisenhower's first term. "What was the use, he demanded to know, of his trying to lead the Republican Party. ..... And this reaction was not limited to early months alone, or to his party only. -
An Examination of the Presidency of John F. Kennedy in 1963. Christina Paige Jones East Tennessee State University
East Tennessee State University Digital Commons @ East Tennessee State University Electronic Theses and Dissertations Student Works 5-2001 The ndE of Camelot: An Examination of the Presidency of John F. Kennedy in 1963. Christina Paige Jones East Tennessee State University Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.etsu.edu/etd Part of the History Commons Recommended Citation Jones, Christina Paige, "The ndE of Camelot: An Examination of the Presidency of John F. Kennedy in 1963." (2001). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. Paper 114. https://dc.etsu.edu/etd/114 This Thesis - Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Works at Digital Commons @ East Tennessee State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ East Tennessee State University. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE END OF CAMELOT: AN EXAMINATION OF THE PRESIDENCY OF JOHN F. KENNEDY IN 1963 _______________ A thesis presented to the faculty of the Department of History East Tennessee State University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Masters of Arts in History _______________ by Christina Paige Jones May 2001 _______________ Dr. Elwood Watson, Chair Dr. Stephen Fritz Dr. Dale Schmitt Keywords: John F. Kennedy, Civil Rights, Vietnam War ABSTRACT THE END OF CAMELOT: AN EXAMINATION OF THE PRESIDENCY OF JOHN F. KENNEDY IN 1963 by Christina Paige Jones This thesis addresses events and issues that occurred in 1963, how President Kennedy responded to them, and what followed after Kennedy’s assassination. This thesis was created by using books published about Kennedy, articles from magazines, documents, telegrams, speeches, and Internet sources. -
Presidential Power in the Modern Era
1 Presidential Power in the Modern Era With box cutters and knives, nineteen hijackers took control of four commercial jets on the morning of September 11, 2001, and flew the planes into the towers of the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and Shanksville, Pennsylvania. The South and North Towers in New York collapsed at 10:05 and 10:28 a.m., respectively. Fires in the Pentagon burned for another seventy-two hours. In all, over three thousand civilians (including several hundred New York City fire fighters and police) died in the attacks. The greatest terrorist act in U.S. history sent politicians scrambling. Not surprisingly, it was the White House that crafted the nation’s response, little of which was formally subject to congressional review. In the weeks that followed, President Bush issued a flurry of uni- lateral directives to combat terrorism. One of the first was an execu- tive order creating a new cabinet position, Secretary of Homeland Se- curity, which was charged with coordinating the efforts of forty-five federal agencies to fight terrorism. Bush then created a Homeland Security Council to advise and assist the president “with all aspects of homeland security.” On September 14, Bush issued an order that au- thorized the Secretaries of the Navy, Army, and Air Force to call up for active duty reservists within their ranks. Later that month, Bush issued a national security directive lifting a ban (which Gerald Ford originally instituted via executive order 11905) on the CIA’s ability to “engage in, or conspire to engage in, political assassination”—in this instance, the target being Osama bin Laden and his lieutenants within al Qaeda, the presumed masterminds behind the September 11 at- tacks. -
The Ascendancy of the Secretary of Defense : Robert S. Mcnamara
The Ascendancy of the Secretary ofJULY Defense 2013 The Ascendancy of the Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara 1961-1963 Special Study 4 Historical Office Office of the Secretary of Defense Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 4 The Ascendancy of the Secretary of Defense The Ascendancy of the Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara 1961-1963 Cover Photo: Secretary Robert S. McNamara, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, and President John F. Kennedy at the White House, January 1963 Source: Robert Knudson/John F. Kennedy Library, used with permission. Cover Design: OSD Graphics, Pentagon. Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 4 The Ascendancy of the Secretary of Defense The Ascendancy of the Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara 1961-1963 Special Study 4 Series Editors Erin R. Mahan, Ph.D. Chief Historian, Office of the Secretary of Defense Jeffrey A. Larsen, Ph.D. President, Larsen Consulting Group Historical Office Office of the Secretary of Defense July 2013 ii iii Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 4 The Ascendancy of the Secretary of Defense Contents This study was reviewed for declassification by the appropriate U.S. Government departments and agencies and cleared for release. The study is an official publication of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Foreword..........................................vii but inasmuch as the text has not been considered by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, it must be construed as descriptive only and does Executive Summary...................................ix not constitute the official position of OSD on any subject. Restructuring the National Security Council ................2 Portions of this work may be quoted or reprinted without permission, provided that a standard source credit line in included. -
President Trump's First Term
The Year in C-SPAN Archives Research Volume 5 Article 1 2-15-2020 President Trump’s First Term: The Year in C-SPAN Archives Research, Volume 5 Robert X. Browning Purdue University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/ccse Part of the American Politics Commons Recommended Citation Browning, Robert X. (2020) "President Trump’s First Term: The Year in C-SPAN Archives Research, Volume 5," The Year in C-SPAN Archives Research: Vol. 5 , Article 1. Available at: https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/ccse/vol5/iss1/1 This document has been made available through Purdue e-Pubs, a service of the Purdue University Libraries. Please contact [email protected] for additional information. President Trump’s First Term: The Year in C-SPAN Archives Research, Volume 5 Cover Page Footnote To purchase a hard copy of this publication, visit: http://www.thepress.purdue.edu/titles/format/ 9781557538826 This article is available in The Year in C-SPAN Archives Research: https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/ccse/vol5/iss1/1 “For almost 25 years I have watched the C-SPAN Video Library evolve into the nonpareil of data on congressional institutional behavior. Most instructors of the legislative process have utilized the C-SPAN’s material in the classroom with great success. Here, in this volume, Robert X. Browning once again demonstrates the myriad ways scholars can advance conventional wisdom on the U.S. Congress and institutions with the C-SPAN Video Library’s seemingly unlimited data. Debates, hearings, and floor speeches are just a few fascinating resources that are brilliantly used in this volume. -
Simply the Best: FDR As America's Number One President Tony Mcculloch in the Words of Tina Turner's Iconic Pop Song of the 1
Simply the Best: FDR as America’s Number One President Tony McCulloch In the words of Tina Turner’s iconic pop song of the 1980s, to be “the best” is simply to be “better than all the rest.” While this is self-evidently the case, historians and political scientists who write about the institution of the U.S. presidency are obliged to justify their preferences and to produce a more detailed set of criteria against which the best presidents can be distinguished from “the worst” or from “the average” or from “the near great.” This is no easy task but the aim of this essay is more ambitious still – to distinguish between those presidents who are universally regarded as America’s greatest chief executives – George Washington, Abraham Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt – and to justify FDR’s claim to be America’s number one President.1 The starting point for this quest is the survey undertaken by Professor Iwan Morgan, Director of the U.S. Presidency Centre (USPC) at the UCL Institute of the Americas, and published in January 2011. In this survey of British experts on the U.S. presidency, FDR was placed first, Lincoln second and Washington third. This result was in contrast to similar surveys in the United States that have usually chosen Lincoln to be the greatest, with FDR and Washington jostling for second and third position. The USPC survey therefore raises three main questions which it is the purpose of this chapter to answer. Firstly, why did a survey of U.S. presidents amongst British academics lead to a different result from that usually obtained in the United States? Secondly, what criteria would it be best to use in judging the greatness or otherwise of a U.S. -
Tragedy Or Choice in Vietnam? Learning to Think Outside The
Tragedy or Choice in John Garofano Vietnam? Learning to Think Outside the Archival Box A Review Essay Lawrence Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. David Kaiser, American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins ofthe Vietnam War. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000. Fredrik Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. In 1965, the United States launched a major air and ground war on behalf of a weak ally against an experienced and committed enemy. Policymakers understood that domestic support would not last forever and would likely decrease as casualties mounted. War games and simulations had suggested that Washington might end up isolated internationally. Yet the nation embarked on a war that reduced U.S. power and prestige, claimed the lives of some 58,000 of its citizens, and led to a skepticism of limited war that still shapes civil-military relations and foreignTragedy or Choice in Vietnam? policy today. Given the risks and uncertainties, why did the United States go to war in Vietnam? After three decades there still is no consensus on this or any number of other basic questions regarding U.S. policy. The exchanges that followed U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s conditional apologia in 1995 demonstrated that neither a central architect nor his critics could agree on 1 whether the war was inevitable or winnable. In 2001, on the thirtieth anniver- John Garofano is a Senior Fellow in the International Security Program at the Robert and Renée Belfer Cen- ter for Science and International Affairs, John F. -
The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited and Reinterpreted Mark White
Fifty Years On: The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited and Reinterpreted Mark White Lecture Series Paper No. 9 i Fifty Years On: The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited and Reinterpreted Mark White Institute for the Study of the Americas School of Advanced Study, University of London Senate House, Malet Street London WC1E 7HU Copyright © 2012 Institute for the Study of the Americas All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form, or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior written permission of the publishers. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A British Library CIP record is available. ISBN 978-1-908857-04-0 ISSN 1750-3884 The Institute for the Study of the Americas publishes in its Lecture Series selected seminar and conference papers and public lectures delivered at the Institute by scholars associated with the work of the Institute. The Harry Allen Memorial Lecture commemorates a pioneer in the field of American Studies in Britain, who was the first director of the Institute of United States Studies. Previous scholars who have delivered this public lecture include Richard Carwardine, Peter Parish, Richard Crockatt and Steven Lawson. Professor John Dumbrell of Durham University served as outside reader for Mark White’s essay, which is based on the Harry Allen Memorial Lecture he delivered at the Institute for the Study of the Americas on 10 May 2012. About the author Mark White is Professor of History at Queen Mary, University of London. He is the author of seven books, including The Cuban Missile Crisis (1996), Against the President: Dissent and Decision-Making in the White House (2007) and (ed.) The Presidency of Bill Clinton: The Legacy of a New Domestic and Foreign Policy (2012). -
Apparent Perfection: the Image of John F. Kennedy
bs_bs_banner Apparent Perfection: The Image of John F. Kennedy MARK WHITE Queen Mary, University of London Abstract This article explores the issue of how the potent, alluring image of John Kennedy was constructed. The essay begins with an examination of how, even before reaching the White House, Kennedy was able to develop a multi-faceted image as a man of letters (with the publication of Why England Slept and Profiles in Courage), military hero (through his service in the Navy during the Second World War), precocious politician, erotic symbol and symbol of the family. The importance of image to the outcome of the 1960 presidential campaign, particularly in terms of the television debates with Richard Nixon, is assessed. Kennedy’s presidency is examined for the way it reinforced ideas about him that had come to the fore before he became chief executive: his use of the White House to showcase the arts, thereby strengthening his image as a man of letters and cultural refinement; the enhancing of his war-hero status with the release of the Hollywood film PT-109; the continued eroticization of his image through his public links with Marilyn Monroe, Grace Kelly and Anita Ekberg; and the prominence of his wife, siblings, children and parents in reinforcing the image of JFK as a symbol of the family. The impact of the assassination is considered for the way it created the Camelot mythology that came to adorn Kennedy’s posthumous reputation. How Kennedy’s image was sustained from the time of the assassination to recent years – through film, music, architecture and the visual image – will also be examined. -
Moral Masculinity: the Culture of Foreign Relations
MORAL MASCULINITY: THE CULTURE OF FOREIGN RELATIONS DURING THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Jennifer Lynn Walton, B.A., M.A. ***** The Ohio State University 2004 Dissertation Committee: Approved by Professor Michael J. Hogan, Adviser ___________________________ Professor Peter L. Hahn Adviser Department of History Professor Kevin Boyle Copyright by Jennifer Lynn Walton 2004 ABSTRACT The Kennedy administration of 1961-1963 was an era marked by increasing tension in U.S.-Soviet relations, culminating in the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962. This period provides a snapshot of the culture and politics of the Cold War. During the early 1960s, broader concerns about gender upheaval coincided with an administration that embraced a unique ideology of masculinity. Policymakers at the top levels of the Kennedy administration, including President John F. Kennedy, operated within a cultural framework best described as moral masculinity. Moral masculinity was the set of values or criteria by which Kennedy and his closest foreign policy advisors defined themselves as white American men. Drawing on these criteria justified their claims to power. The values they embraced included heroism, courage, vigor, responsibility, and maturity. Kennedy’s focus on civic virtue, sacrifice, and public service highlights the “moral” aspect of moral masculinity. To members of the Kennedy administration, these were moral virtues and duties and their moral fitness justified their fitness to serve in public office. Five key elements of moral masculinity played an important role in diplomatic crises during the Kennedy administration. -
Persuasion Is Not Power – the Nature of Presidential Leadership
PERSUASION IS NOT POWER The Nature of Presidential Leadership George C. Edwards III Texas A&M University and University of Oxford Abstract After briefly reviewing the theory and evidence regarding the impact of presidential persuasion, I provide an alternative view of presidential leadership as facilitating change. Next, I analyze current issues to show that the different orientations lead us to ask different questions about the president’s leadership efforts and to arrive at different conclusions about their consequences. Finally, I suggest avenues for studying leadership without persuasion that will enhance the prospects of our making progress in understanding presidential power. Paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, August 29-September 1, 2013. 1 Leadership is perhaps the most commonly employed concept in politics. Politicians, pundits, journalists, and scholars critique and analyze public officials, attributing both success and failure to the quality of their leadership. When times are bad, as people often perceive them to be, the reflexive call is for new—and better—leadership. The president is the most prominent focus of political leadership in the United States, and the notion of the dominant president who moves the country and the government by means of strong, effective leadership has deep roots in American political culture. Those chief executives whom Americans revere have taken on mythic proportions as leaders. Anecdotes abound about their remarkable persuasive powers, fed by the hagiography that envelops presidents and distorts both our memories and our critical faculties. Even though both the public and commentators are frequently disillusioned with the performance of individual presidents and recognize that stalemate is common in the political system, Americans eagerly accept what appears to be effective presidential leadership as evidence on which to renew their faith in the potential presidential persuasion to engender change. -
Mcgeorge Bundy, Oral History Interview – JFK#1, 3/1964 Administrative Information
McGeorge Bundy, Oral History Interview – JFK#1, 3/1964 Administrative Information Creator: McGeorge Bundy Interviewer: Richard Neustadt Date of Interview: March 1964, May 1964 Length: 192 pages Biographical Note Bundy was Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (1961-1966). In this interview, he discusses John F. Kennedy’s thinking and decision making style; his relationship with other members of his administration, including his close working relationship with Theodore C. Sorensen; the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs invasion; the Cuban Missile Crisis; Laos and the Vietnam War; the threat of military conflict with the Soviet Union over Berlin; and JFK’s relationship with other heads of state, among other issues. Access Open. Usage Restrictions Copyright of these materials have passed to the United States Government upon the death of the interviewee. Users of these materials are advised to determine the copyright status of any document from which they wish to publish. Copyright The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Under certain conditions specified in the law, libraries and archives are authorized to furnish a photocopy or other reproduction. One of these specified conditions is that the photocopy or reproduction is not to be “used for any purpose other than private study, scholarship, or research.” If a user makes a request for, or later uses, a photocopy or reproduction for purposes in excesses of “fair use,” that user may be liable for copyright infringement. This institution reserves the right to refuse to accept a copying order if, in its judgment, fulfillment of the order would involve violation of copyright law.