Number 80 December 28, 1987 A publication of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C. Cuba and Mozambique by Gillian Gunn When Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North presented his "freedom fighter" slide show to potential Contra patrons, he sandwiched between photos of Soviet submarines and Contra graves a chart purporting to identify the location of "Cuban troops" worldwide. Mozambique was promi­ nently featured, with the figure "700" alongside. In a similar vein, conservative U.S. media routinely refer to the presence of "Cuban troops" in Mozambique, and depict a "pro-Soviet dictatorship" supported by Cuban "military, secret police, and other personnel." These claims, and others of the same genre, warrant examination. Is the underlying assumption that Cuba acts as a Soviet tool in Mozambique supported by the historical record? Precisely what is the nature of the Cuban-Mozambican relationship, how has it evolved, and where might it lead? Pre-Independence Contrary to popular perception, the early pre-independence relationship between Cuba and the party that now governs Mozambique (the Frente de Libertac;ao de Moc;ambique, known as FRELIMO) was tense. Also contrary to conventional wisdom, Cuba did not seek a relationship with the Mozambican nationalist movement at the USSR's behest, but rather at the very point when both Castro and FRELIMO were on relatively poor terms with the Soviet Union. Such diverse sources as a leading FRELIMO journalist and an anti-Castro Cuban defector agree that FRELIMO's founder, U.S.-edu­ cated Eduardo Mondlane, and his successor, Samora Machel, had serious differences with both Fidel Castro and Che Guevara. The first contact between Cuba and FRELIMO occurred when Guevara met with the movement's representatives in Congo and Tanzania during his December 1964-March 1965 trip to Africa. In a speech at a conference of African liberation movements in Dar es Salaam, Guevara emphasized the need for the working class to be the vanguard in any "liberation struggle" and downplayed the need for "long-term mobilization of the peasant masses." FRELIMO's Mondlane (as well as tbe FNLA's Jonas Savimbi, who later founded UNIT A) vigorously disagreed with Guevara's recommen­ dations. Angola and Mozambique, Savimbi and Mondlane argued, were largely peasant countries with virtually no working class, and thus Maoist-style long-term mobilization ofthe.peasantry was better suited to Mozambican conditions than Guevara's "foco" strategy. 2 I CSIS AFR ICA NOTES Machel, who moved into the leadership position in full-scale revolution, and support to guerrilla movements FRELIMO following Mondlane's assassination in 1969, in both areas was at a token level. was even more outspoken in his rejection of Guevara's In sum, Cuba reached out to an African liberation ideas. In February 1974, two months before the coup in movement more closely allied to China than to the Portugal that ushered in the end of the wars of USSR at a time when Cuba's own relations with liberation in Mozambique and Angola, he wrote: "In Moscow were tense. Moreover, the intermediary addition to the unreality and idealism of these [foco] assigned a primary role in this relationship - the concepts, they are based on false premises." It was this maverick Guevara - was not one of Moscow's favorites. conflict which lay behind what Cuban defector Juan Benemelis has termed "a growing polemic with the top The Honeymoon, 1975-1979 leaders of FRELIMO" in the 1960s. Within two years after Mozambique became an Despite their differences, Guevara did offer Cuban independent state in 1975, Cuban-Mozambican assistance to FRELIMO in 1965. Mondlane promptly relations improved dramatically. Although Soviet and rejected the aid as unsuitable and FRELIMO continued Cuban policies moved in concert during this period, its guerrilla war against Portuguese aid, rule with FRELIMO maintained greater distance from both the from Algeria, Egypt, Israel, and China. The Cuban Soviets a!ld the Cubans than did some other African offer was renewed two years later, and again rejected. "revolutionary" movements. Relations between FRELIMO and Cuba in the Once in power, FRELIMO faced challenges in both mid-1960s were not altogether hostile, however. In the military and civilian arenas very different from those 1966, FRELIMO was invited to and participated in the it had encountered during the war against Portugal. In famous Havana Tricontinental Conference, and later the military sphere, it was no longer engaged in bush the same year FRELIMO condemned "the provocation guerrilla warfare, in which emphasis is on light of the American imperialists against the heroic people weaponry and high mobility. Instead, Machel and his of the Republic of Cuba." In 1968, FRELIMO accepted colleagues were tasked with governing a huge country modest amounts of Cuban medicines, war material, and (over 300,000 square miles) facing the possibility of training, but Cuba was always listed near the end of the conventional attack from either Rhodesia or South "thank you" communiques to donors - a list on which Africa or both. In these circumstances, the FRELIMO China was more often than not listed first. leadership reasoned, Mozambique would need heavy In addition to showing that the relationship between weaponry and other types of assistance required to Cuba and FRELIMO had an uneasy start, the above convert the guerrilla army into a conventional military events, and particularly their timing, suggest that Cuba force. was not acting as a Soviet proxy. There is other supportive evidence for this assessment: (1) In the mid-1960s, when Havana's outreach to Mozambique began, the FRELIMO leadership had received some Soviet military assistance, but identified much more closely with China, which it believed CSIS AFRICA NOTES Is a briefing paper series provided more appropriate weaponry and training for a designed to serve the special needs of decision makers peasant-based guerrilla war and had a more respectful and analysts with Africa-related responsibilities in attitude toward Mozambican nationalist sensitivities. governments, corporations, the media, research (2) In the late 1960s, FRELIMO supported the institutions, universities, and other arenas. It is a Chinese-assisted ZANU guerrillas who were then publication of the African Studies Program of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C. fighting for majority rule in Rhodesia from sanctuaries CSIS is a private, nonpartisan, nonprofit policy research in Tanzania and FRELIMO-controlled territory in institute founded In 1962. Mozambique. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, supported Joshua Nkomo' s rival ZAPU movement, EDITOR: Director of African Studies Helen Kitchen. which was operating its guerrilla activities from bases in Zambia. SUBSCRIPTION RATE: CSIS Africa Notes is sent (3) Cuba's relations with the USSR at the time of airmaiVfirst class to subscribers worldwide. The annual Castro's mid-1960s overtures to FRELIMO were subscription price for 13 Issues and occasional strained. Cuba was disappointed by Moscow's retreat in supplements is $48.00. Please make checks payable to: the 1962 missile crisis; by its failure to respond CSIS Africa Notes, Suite 400, 1800 K Street, N.W., "adequately" to either U.S. "aggression" in North Washington, D.C. 20006, U.S.A. Telephone: (202) 887-o219. Telex: 7108229583. Cables: CENSTRAT. Vietnam or intervention in the Dominican Republic; and FAX: (202) 775-3199. by Soviet moves to normalize relations with anti-Castro governments in Latin America. ISSN 0736-9506 (4) Throughout the 1960s, when Cuba was courting Mondlane, Soviet policy was based on the assumption that Africa and Latin America were not ripe for CSIS AFRICA NOTES I 3 In the administrative sphere, FRELIMO soon realized imperialism, highlighted Cuba's ethnic roots in Africa, that managing a nation involved vastly more technical and referred to Castro as "Comrade Fidel - guerrilla of skills than running a guerrilla movement. The transition the first hour." was made more difficult by the mass exodus of Castro picked up the theme of the common slave Portuguese entrepreneurs, technical experts, and background of Cuba and Mozambique: "This meeting bureaucrats, and by Lisbon's colonial-era education between slaves, the slave of Mozambique and the slave policies. To deal with the urgent requirement to develop of Cuba, worries imperialism. And imperialism has the managerial capability to keep the economy and reason to be worried .... " Castro's words were turned government machinery working, the FRELIMO into banner headlines by the Mozambican press. leadership, committed to a socialist economic model, A month after Castro returned to Havana, an event sought training assistance within a socialist political occurred in Angola that had the effect of further environment. strengthening Mozambique's ties with Havana. On May The Chinese, who had played a supportive role during 27, 1977, Angola's recently dismissed Minister of the the liberation struggle, were unable and/ or unwilling to Interior Nito Alves mounted a coup attempt against provide the kinds of material goods and services given President Agostinho Neto, in which a number of leading priority in the postindependence era. Because of MPLA figures were killed. The uprising was eventually China's disheartening experience in Angola in put down when Cuban troops joined Neto loyalists in 1975-1976 (when the Beijing-backed FNLA was soundly the streets of Luanda. It was a Cuban voice that defeated by the Soviet-aligned MPLA in a three-cornered announced over Luanda radio that the revolt had been power struggle), the Chinese were reevaluating their crushed and the government was back in Neto's hands. Africa policies. In addition, the weaponry China offered Soviet inaction in this emergency, and the relation­ for sale was not particularly suitable for conventional ship of a number of Alves supporters with the Soviet warfare, and cooperation in technical training was embassy staff, led many Angolans to conclude that hampered by language difficulties.