Nrm and Uganda's Realities
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NRM AND UGANDA'S REALITIES Greg Larkin The triumph of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) h: dramatically changed the complexion of Ugandan politics. Mar observers of Uganda have, in large part, attributed the victory of tl NRM in January 1986 to the movement's support among the muc abused Ugandan people, especially the peasantry. In an interview givt shortly before assuming the Presidency of Uganda, Yoweri Museve: credited the success of the National Resistance Army (NRA) to i comminnent to the principle of popular sovereignty: "We tell ot soldiers that the people are the sovereign force in our land and th, anybody who is against the people is an enemy of the country." 1 Giv( the extreme levels of corruption, decay, and brutality which ha-. characterized Ugandan politics for the past twenty years, it would see1 very unlikely that the NRM could radically transform the state i Uganda in a short period of time. Nonetheless, there is growin evidence that democratic elements are emerging in Uganda. Indeed, fundamental reality of Uganda politics which cannot be ignored is th; the Ugandan people are both willing and able to defend their rights an interests. Thus, the challenge facing the NRM is whether the principle which guided it into power can be built upon to create a democrati political system. Until the victory of the NRM in Janoary 1986, two leader dominated post-independence Ugandan politics: Milton Obote and Ic Am in. Most observers of Ugandan politics agree that these tw individuals were loosely aligned during the 1960's. In fact, whe 1 "Yoweri Museveni • My Mission," New Afric=. March 1986, p. 7. UFAHAMU, VOL. XV, NO.3, Winter 1986187 UJFAHAMU 157 Obote scraped Uganda's independence Constitution in 1966, it was Col. Idi Amin, then the Anny Deputy Chief of Staff, who led the military attack on the Kabaka's palace, which temporarily aided Obote in clinging to power.2 In January 1971, Amin staged a coup d'etat ousting Obote who was attending a Commonwealth conference in Singapore. The causes of Amin's coup have been vigorously debated by scholars, yet the consequences of his rule have become negative, and, in many ways, have yet to be overcome. Amin's excesses justified by grandiose delusions (if at all) were well reported by the Western media and in the popular press.3 This can be partially attributed to Amin's volatile relationship with the Zionist state. His first trip outside of Uganda was, in fact, to Israel.4 as However, as Amin's need for foreign patrons to consolidate his rule ty diminished, Ugandan-Zionist relations quickly deteriorated and became te hostile. This process culminated in one of the most infamous events of :h the 1970's: the Israeli raid on Entebbe in July 1976. m The military overthrow of the Amin regime by Tanzanian troops ni and various Ugandan liberation groups did little to end political chaos ts and violence in Uganda. Milton Obote was returned to the Presidency Jr of Uganda in what was argued by opposition groups as rigged elections at in 1980. Thereafter, Obote's second Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC) :n government maintained itself in power mostly through force of arms. •e The magnitude of the atrocities committed by Obote's 1980-85 regime, n especially by his National Secwity Agency (NASA), have only recently 5 n been exposed and reported. There really cannot be an accurate death g toll from the political violence which has engulfed Uganda for the past a twenty years. It has been estimated that over half a million people were lt killed during Amin's regime. Furthermore, during Obote's second d government, there are reports that perhaps 300,000 people perished in :s the violence, especially in the "Luwero Triangle" where the atrocities of c 'S 2 Li Jm Jorgensen, Uganda: A MO<km History. (London: Croom Helm. 1981). p.229. 0 3 n See Mahmood Mamdani's /mpui4Jismawi Fascism in Uganda. (Nairobi: Heinemann. 1983). 4 Jorgensen, pp. 272-273. S SuNew AfricQil. February & March. 1986. - 158 Larkin Obote's troops reached genocidal proportions.6 The political violence also took its toll on the Ugandan state so that by the time that Obote wa: again ousted as President of Uganda in July, 1985, the Ugandan state had almost completely ceased to function. Armed Popular Sovereignty One of the critically important consequences of the politica chaos in Uganda is that a significant proportion of the Ugandan peoplt have armed themselves for their own protection. In fact, one of the startling revelations of the NRA victory was that among the NRJ soldiers there were women and children. This is not to infer that th1 NRA is a children's army, but even Museveni acknowledged that th1 presence of 12 or 13 or 14 year-olds posed special problems: "Th1 solution is to provide them (the children) with security. By security, don't mean guards, but education and the certainty of employmen afterwards. "7 The real significance of armed children is that it clearl: indicates that modem weapons have penetrated virtually all levels o Uganda's society, due to constant rebellion and warfare dating from th Amin regime. Certainly, the NRA victory can be partially attributed t1 harnessing support among the victimized Ugandan people. In fac1 Museveni has stated that the law of the NRM included provisions forth execution of NRA soldiers for the intentional killing of a civilian, an1 that five NRA soldiers have been executed for violating this code.8 Yc: obviously, the distinction between soldier and civilian has been severel: blurred in Uganda, and this, in tum, bas unmistakable implications fo Museveni and the NRM government. It is extremely unlikely that tb NRM government will be able to quickly find a means to disarm th Ugandan people. Given that popular sovereignty is armed, the ~ government would seem to be extremely constrained in making polic: that might antagonize any segment of society and possibly lead t1 violence. This could be one factor in the inability of the NR~ 6 "Children of War", New African. May, 1986. p.l8. 7 ~Children at War", New African. May, 1986. p. 19. 8 s~NewAfrican. March, 1986. p. 7. UlFAlHIAMU 159 e government to formulate a national budget during its first year in power. s In short, the successful resistance tatics which brought the NRM to e power may, in turn, hinder its ability to govern. Thus, Uganda has radically changed from the one political extreme of virtual anarchy to the other extreme of democracy - democracy in the sense that the Ugandan people may have more power than the Ugandan state. Human Rights l e e The issue of human rights in Uganda can be divided into two \. areas. First, there is the monumental problem of prosecuting those e individuals who, under the Amin and Obote regimes, so flagrantly e violated the human rights of the Ugandan people. Second, the NRM e government must find a way to presently safeguard human rights in I Uganda and guarantee these protections in the future. Certainly, one of the challenges facing the NRM is how to It confront the brutality of Uganda's recent political history. It probably y would not be possible to prosecute all those people who terrorized the tf Ugandan people; given the nature of the political violence, it could be e very difficult to distinguish the guilty from the innocent. Nonetheless, it is very possible that the credibility of the NRM government would 0 suffer if the NRM neglected or chose to ignore the crimes of the Amin t, and Obote regimes. This dilemma is highlighted when one considers e that most of Uganda's judicial and legal professionals were either killed d or fled into exile during the 1970's and 80's.9 Obviously, it is still :t possible for more traditional African methods of justice to be carried y out, especially at the local level. Yet, it could be that those most tr responsible for the state violence against the Uganda people may never e be brought to justice. Museveni referred to this dilemma when e reflecting on short-lived peace talks in Nairobi with Tito Okello's ,1 Ugandan National Liberation Army (UNLA) government: "Okello was y not in control of UNLA and not in control of the situation. That was 0 part of the problem, because the people who committed crimes must be ,1 tried and punished and since... the criminals were very high up ... in the hierarchy, we could hardly succeed whether we had an agreement or not." 10 9 See Jorgensen, pp. 309-315 for description of the Amin era. 10 "Yoweri Museveni · My Mission," New African. March. 1986. 160 Larkin One critical test of the NRM's ability to govern Uganda will I the protection of human rights. The establishment of law and order : Uganda has to be regarded as essential in the safeguarding of hum ~ rights. The NRM must be given credit for the reduction (but n• elimination) of violence since gaining power. However, the NRM h: correctly defined human rights as being more comprehensive. As 01 NRM Commander, reflecting on the politics of the 1980 election stated: "[A] friend voted UPC because they promised her a blanket. B the blanket was her right, not a favor to be bestowed on her." 11 human rights includes such basic needs as food, clothing, shelter, ar medical care, then the NRM government obviously has a great deal• work yet to accomplish. However, it does seem very likely that tl Ugandan people understand all too well that human rights cannot I taken for granted.