dysfunctional nature of the system they inherited and maintained. Ad- mittedly, theirs is a peculiar "au- tonomous"behaviour which contrib- utes to gross violations of rights and the socio-economic and political de- cay of the state. Another factor that sustains the culture of crises is ex- ternal to the country. Firstly, a HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS number of governments, democratic and authoritarian, in the South and North, have directly and indirectly supported dictatorial regimes in the country. Through economic, diplo- matic and military assistance the wheel ofviolence and dictatorship is serviced. Secondly, by treating the crises as essentially internal affairs In the past three decades since sequence off tends to change other of the sovereign state, the interna- gained independence from qualities of life so that from a number tional community has done little to Britain, the country has experienced of different starting points, follow- avert violations of rights. Finally, some of the worst human catastro- ing different trajectories of change, by maintaining the unjust and ex- phes in modern times -gross viola- comparable results may ensue. This ploitative international economic tions of human rights, amounting to view seems to hold true for all the system which violates the right to genocide and generating millions of questions posited. Nonetheless, on development, the international com- refugees and internally displaced the balance of the evidence, this munity directly violates the rights persons; state sponsored terrorism, paper contends that while the ori- of Ugandans. dictatorship, nepotism, corruption, gins of violations of rights in Uganda The point is, the economic under- ethnicity, civil wars, famine; total lie in a blend of factors, colonialism development of the country, which collapse of the economy; the disinte- and its lopsided socio-economic and is a result of both internal and ex- gration and demise of the state. The political structures are central to ternal contradictions (past and magnitude and severity of the crises addressing the question. This is not present) further reduces the capa- are comparableto those experienced to suggest that origins of violations bility of the marginal state in pro- by Afghanistan, Cambodia, Ethio- may not be located in pre-colonial moting and protecting universal pia and the Sudan. While both the African societies, but rather, as a human rights. That is, a close link short and long-termcosts of the prob- territorial unit, Uganda did not ex- exists between economic develop- lems are devastating to the nation ist before European partition of Af- ment and advancement of human as a whole, the weight of the burden rica. rights. It is on this issue of develop- differs depending on gender, class, These oppressive, exploitativeand ment as a significant contributor to region, age group and the particular tension laden socio-economic and human rights that the commitment period. A number of important ques- political structures, preservedin the of Western democracies to human tions warrant investigation here: main since the colonial era, go a long rights in Uganda and other under- what are the origins of the crises? way in explaining the persistence of developed countries, is quite sus- Why do they persist? What can be the crises. What this means is that pect. done to avert them? the conventional overwhelming em- There are no simple solutions to There are many possible origins of phasis on the roles of rulers (Milton the crises. Nonetheless, by way of violations. Given the current state Obote, Idi Arnin, , Godfrey suggestion, this paper maintains of research on human rights in the Binaisa, , Tito that it is vital to cast the problem of country and the partial nature of Okello and ) and violations of rights in the context of literature, it is difficult to isolate their armies in those violations, of- the historical development of the any single factor from a series of ten obscures rather than clarifies country -because it is within such other factors that seem to be equally their functions in the broader struc- a perspective that the current issue important in addressing the issue. tures. of human rights and refugeeimay Again, causes and results of viola- This, however, does not mean that best be understood and tackled. tions are not easy to empirically these rulers are mere victims who The international community - isolate. That is, whatever starts the are helplessly constrained by the democratic governments, regional

- -- Volume 11, Number 3 and international inter-governmen- which today constitute Uganda, the beginning of the contemporary his- tal organizations, NGOs, academic politico-religious wars, discrimina- tory of violence and abuse of mili- institutions and religious commu- tory missionary education, the for- tary might in "overcoming" the prob- nities - should play an important mation of political parties, religious lem ofpolitical legitimacy in Uganda. role in bringing to an end the hu- and ethnic discriminations and the Thirdly, by using Semei Kakungulu man tragedy in the country. This problem of political legitimacy and and his Ganda troops and adminis- means that the international com- the role of the military in violations trators to spread colonial rule in munity should play a fundamen- of rights. It is hoped that this ap- other parts of the country, a new tally new role - come to grips with proach, though limited in scope, will dimension was added to pre-colonial human rights abuses in the country help explore the questions. intergroup tensions and ethnic con- and stop treatingviolations ofrights flicts. The majority of the conquered as internal affairs of the sovereign THRCOLOWIAL BACKCROUWD subjects in other parts of the coun- state. It also means that the rheto- TO HUMANRIGHTS try saw the expansion of colonial ric about the "new era" of human Vl0~~TloNs rule as a vital part of sub- rights and democracy should be An analysis of the history of human imperialism. It was therefore not tested against actual policies and rights violations in Uganda must surprisingthat Buganda rather than practice. Constant pressure should begin with an examination of the colonialism was perceived as the the be exerted on any regime in the conflict-laden, oppressive and ex- immediate enemy ofthe people (A.D. country to practice democratic plu- ploitative socio-economic and politi- Roberts, 1962, 435-50; M.S.M. ralism and protect human rights. cal structures fashioned and left Kiwanuka, 1968, 603-19; I.R. Also, it should be remembered that behind by the colonial regime - Hanocock, 1971, 305-23; Karugire, promoting and protecting human because this is where the immediate 1980); and finally, it was also at this rights will require initiating self- root causes of contemporary crises point in history that a new class of sustaining and equitable economic may be located. Colonialism by its political rulers and administrators development; a responsibility which very nature is inherently authori- emerged, whose power emanated the international community should tarian and exploitative -a flagrant almost exclusively from the illegiti- not shy away from. It is on this issue negation of the fundamental rights mate colonial state. Naturally, this that the question of debt crises and of the colonized. To begin with, the ruling class was accountable to the the policies of the World Bank and arbitrary and artificial creation of regime, not the colonized masses IMF and their implications for hu- colonial borders divided families, as (Mamdani, 1976). man rights should also be evaluated well as ethnic, cultural and linguis- The colonial policies of divide and and tackled. Certainly, it is inap- tic groups into different nation rule and "indirect rule" further propriate and misleading to create states. More specifically in the case marginalized prospects for national a false and rigid dichotomybetween of Uganda, this colonial design identity and unity. By granting dif- internal and external initiatives, lumped together into a single ad- ferent parts of the country different economic and political. Actions on ministrative unit over forty ethnic political and economic status, the all fronts should take place simulta- groups which formerly had not de- country shared only one thing in neously. Unless this role is taken veloped much in common ( Karugire, common, colonialism. It was also seriously, the international commu- 3; Minority Rights Group, July 1989; through this type ofpolitical arrange- nity will continue to address the Sathyamurthy, 1). Also, the colo- ment that the Buganda or Uganda symptoms rather than the root nial political strategy by which the Agreement of 1900 became a source causes ofgross human rights abuses various political units were inte- of new tensions within Buganda and and refugee flights from the coun- grated, rested on violence and politi- between Buganda and the rest of the try. Therefore it must be empha- cal manipulation. country (Sathyamurthy, 139; Mam- sized that only when human rights Four important points are worth dani, 1976,120-88).This Agreement conditions in Uganda improve sub- noting: firstly, the creation of strait- invariably forced other kingdoms stantially, will current and future jacket colonialboundaries separated and districts to "gang up" against human rights abuses and refugee peoples of the same linguistic and Buganda during the move towards a flows be averted. cultural groups. The Banyaruanda federal union. Similarly, the transi- This study will briefly cover the question, for example, has its gen- tion from quasi-federalism to a uni- period immediately before the era of esis in the European partition (Clay, tary state led to increased tensions formal European colonialism up to 1984;Catherine Watson, 1991).Sec- and political conflicts (G.S.K. the present day. In particular it will ondly, colonialism was essentially Ibingira, 1973). examine colonial strategies and tac- imposed by military violence andlor In order to understand the struc- tics of socio-economic and political through other forms of manipula- tural socio-economic inequalities integration of various countries tion and coercion. This marks the created by the colonial regime, it is

Volume 11, Number 3 imperative to highlight the basis of Acholi, West Nile, Kigezi. But in religion has played both roles. This colonial economic policy, as summa- the 19209, as the Belgians in- section, however, deals only with rized by Captain F.D.Lugard (Vol. I, creased exploitation in Rwanda, violations. The first major foreign 1893,381; cf. Ronald Robinson and the Banyarwandapeasants began religion introduced into Uganda was John Gallagher, 1963) the first ac- to emigrate to Uganda. In the late Islam. In Buganda, Arab traders credited representative of the Impe- '50s once again there was out-mi- who came from the East African rial British East Africa Company: gration from Rwanda due to apo- Coast took slaves and ivory in ex- The 'scramble for Africa' by na- litical crisis. As a result, the Brit- change for guns, clothes and orna- tionsofEurope-an incident with- ish introduced cash crop produc- ments. Soon this religion became out parallel in the history of the tion in Lango and Acholi in the closely associated with trade and world - was due to the growing 1920s and then in West Nile in the political power. Therelationship be- commercial rivalry, which brought 1950s. Today, the only remaining tween the new converts and the home to the civilized nations the cheap labour reserve is Kigezi. The kabaka's palace (king's), however, vital necessity of securing the only rest ofthe country continues to be a were not always harmonious. For remaining fields for industrial en- cheap raw material reserve. instance, in a concerted attempt to terprise and expansion. It is well, (Mamdani, 1985, 92-6) curb the growing influence of the then, to realize that it is for our A number of points emerge. Firstly, converts and Islam from undermin- advantage [emphasis in original] one of the central motives for the ing his power base in Buganda, in - and not alone at the dictates of colonization of the country was eco- 1875 Kabaka Mutesa I ordered the duty - that we have undertaken nomic. This led to the exploitation execution of about seventy converts. responsibilities inEastAfrica. It is and oppression of the people and the It is important to bear in mind that in order to foster the growth of the creation of at least two economic Islam (like Christianity later) spread trade of this country and to find an regions under a single political ad- in Buganda starting from the top, outlet for our manufactures and ministration. It is at this point that among the central administrative surplus energy, that our farseeing the north-south divide emerges more cadres (F.B. Welbourn, 1965,5). statesmen and our commercial men clearly as both political and eco- On the other side of the Nile, in advocate colonial expansion. nomic. National unity or integra- northern Uganda, Arab slave and Mamdani has this to say about some tion, it should be noted, is both po- ivory dealers, who were based at of impacts of the colonial economic litical and socio-economic; neither Gondokoro and Khartoum, in south- policy: has been achieved under this struc- ern Sudan, did not attempt to "rig- An analysis of how this country tural imbalance. This point is orously" introduce Islam. The fail- was integrated into the colonial stressed only because non-statement ure of Islam to spread in this region, imperialist economy would show of the obvious has tended in the past it has been argued, was partly due that there were two forms of inte- to derail debates on unity. Secondly, to the segmentary nature of the so- gration, depending on the region the colonial labour, land and taxa- cieties and the adventurous behav- we may consider. The first was tion policies increased the oppres- iour ofthe fortune seekers (Karugire, whereby an area was turned into a sion and exploitation of women in 56). By way of relevant digression, cheap labour reserve. This was the particular and the whole society in it is to be borne in mind that this migrant labour system whereby the general; and finally, this lop-sided part of the country suffered most wife remained a peasant produc- economic and political policies go a from the slave trade (Karugire; John ing food in the village, but the long way to explaining the persist- Beattie, 1971,671. Surely, it was not husband migrated as a worker to a ence of famine in Karamoja and other because of Islam that the propaga- plantation. He was employed only parts of the country and the vicious tors of the religion became engaged part-time, the rest of the year, he struggle for political power in violations of human rights. The returned to the village and lived (Mamdani, 1985,92-6). fact remains however, that among off the food cultivated by his wife. other things, Islam became closely The second term of integration was RELIGION, C~~IWSMAND linked to absolute political power, whereby an area was turned into a HUMANRIGHTS VIOLATIONS slavery and slave trade. reserve of cheap raw materials. Historically, it is not paradoxical to At the "request"of Kabaka Mutesa You take the above system, with argue that religion can be and at I in 1875,the explorer Henry Stanley wife producing food and the hus- times has been a cause of human asked missionaries to come to the band cheap labour, collapse the rights abuse. This is not to suggest kingdom. It is conceivable that distance between husband and the that religion is not or has not been a Mutesa equated the whiteman with wife ... Now, in Uganda, there were strong moral force for the promotion the power of the gun and it is there- quite a few cheap labour reserves and protection of universal human fore likely that his prime motive at the outset ofcolonial rule: Lango, rights. In the context of Uganda, was to check Egyptian expansion-

Volume 11, Number 3 ism from the north by enlisting the collaborating or accommodating and east where provisions of educa- support of the Europeans (J.Taylor, class to serve the interests of the tion were poorer than in the south; 1958; C.C. Wrigley, 1959; D.A. Low colonial regime (EducationPolicy ). thus further dividing the country and Pratt, 1960; Low, 1971). As a As cited in Low and Pratt the dual and heightening intergroup conflicts result ofthe"request", in June 1877, political usefulness of this form of and breeding future uneven compe- the Church Missionary Society from education -technical training and tition for scarce resources. It is im- Britain ("Bangereza") reached the ideological indoctrination, is perative to indicate that educational Kingdom. Less than two years later, summed up by Lord Lugard in a discrimination was even more se- in February 1879, the White Fa- discussion of a similar form of edu- vere for women, whose position in thers, who were Roman Catholics, cation of sons of Fulani chiefs in patriarchal societies was already arrived from France C'Bafalansa"). Nigeria: quite oppressive and marginal. The arrival of Christianity soon I hope that they would thus be In the 1920s when the Govern- gave unprecedented prominence to taught not merely to read and write ment assumed more direct responsi- religion as a factor in political ri- but to acquire an English Public bility for education by providing fi- valry and domination in the coun- Schoolboy's ideas of honour, loy- nancial help to missions and estab- try. Military battles for political and alty and above all responsibility. lishingits own schools, the situation religious supremacy were fought in It is by such means that I hope the seemed to improve a bit. However, Buganda by the three foreign reli- next generation of Fulani rulers religious, regional and gender gious groups with their own armies may become really efficient, reli- discriminations remained essen- of local and foreign-backed converts. able and honest co-operators with tially unchanged; government as- The politico-religious wars came to the British in the administration sistance towards education during an end when Captain Lugard natu- of the Protectorate. (Low and Pratt, this period reflects these contradic- rally threw his military might be- 171) tions (cited in Mamdani, 1976, 16). hind the numerically fewer Protes- In retrospect, Mamdani concludes Since the Binns Commission (1951) tants (Karugire, 75; R. Oliver, 1956, that: and the Report on African Educa- 56). As a result of the Protestant This was not education, but train- tion in Uganda, drawn up by a com- victory, in Buganda the society be- ing; not liberation, but enslave- mittee under Bernard de Bunsen came classified in descending order ment. Its purpose was not to edu- published in 1953, a series of com- of importance, "Protestant, Catho- cate a person to understand the missions have been set up by vari- lic and Muslim" (Mamdani, 1976, objective limits to the advancement ous regimes to address the problem 216). From 1893 to 1971, through- of individual and collective wel- of equitable and relevant education out the country both theUtraditional" (EducationReport, 2). The situation fare, but to train aperson to accept and the "new" leadership became today, however, indicates that the and even administer the limits in firmly allied to the Protestant camp. problem has been further compli- an 'efficient, reliable and honest' cated by decades of socio-economic way. Such training could most ef- and political anarchy. To make mat- MISSIONARYEDUCATION fectively be imparted in a control- ters worse, the present IMF Struc- Education is a fundamental right, led environment. (Mamdani, 1976, tural Adjustment Programme in the not a privilege. However, in all parts 162) country has made accessibility to of the world, accessibility to and Also, different missionary denomi- and affordability of education a far- affordability of formal education re- nations established schools strictly fetched dream for the majority of mains more a privilege than a fun- for members of their religious sects. Ugandans. Also, in a situation of damental human right. To begin For example, King's College Budo chronic anarchy, education seems to with, in the context ofUganda, "from and Gayaza were for Protestant boys have lost its value. the earliest years of the British Pro- and girls respectively, particularly tectorate until 1925... formal educa- those of the "royal blood". St. Mary's tion was entirely in the hands of Kisubi, on the other hand was for voluntary agencies, mainly Chris- Catholic boys -also predominantly tian missionaries who founded pri- from families ofthe chiefs (Welbourn, At this juncture, it is imperative to mary and secondary schools and 8). As for the Muslims, since they remind ourselves of the close link teacher training colleges in many had no missionaries who could pro- between religion and politics in the parts of the country" (Education vide them with schools, their posi- country; this allows for a better un- Policy Review Commission Report, tion became even more precarious. derstanding of the negative and pa- , 1989, 1).One of the pri- This institutionalized discrimina- rochial motivations for the forma- mary objectives of missionary edu- tion and inequality was more com- tion of political parties on the "eve" cation, it is argued, was to train a plex and devastating in the north of independence. As M.S.M. Kim

Volume 11, Number 3 Ref%e

- -- - - wanuka (citedin Karugire, 161) cor- individual elites from the two politi- arrest and detention of five cabinet rectly points out: 'Tor a period of cal camps, not an alliance of the ministers in 1966; Obote's unilat- over seventy years, religion became regions where supposedly the par- eral suspension of the 1962 consti- the springboard to power, privilege ties were strong. Furthermore, both tution and dismissal of Mutesa as and influence in Uganda. All he- parties had divergent views on al- President in February 1966; the ul- reditary rulers, all Secretaries-Gen- most every conceivable subject timatum by Buganda Parliament eral, all District Heads, all District (Karugire, 182; Ibingira). As part of ordering the Central government to Chief Ministers were Protestant". the bargain, Kabaka Mutesa I1 be- remove itself from the soil of Uganda moved to independence came the president of the country; Buganda before May 30, 1966; the without a political party that was thus combining his hereditary and attack on the Kabaka's palace by national both in its composition and monarchical position in Buganda northern dominated troops led by behaviour - "political parties and with the functions of a constitutional ; the murder and torture of their leaders aimed at striking down head of state in the country. This thousands of Baganda by the troops; some section of the country or up- conflict-ladenarrangement soon pro- the flight ofthe Kabaka Mutesa into lifting some other section at the duced enormous tensions and con- exile; the abolition ofkingdoms with expense of someone else" (Karugire, flicts between the Prime Minister their special constitutional provi- 168). For instance, the Uganda Peo- and the President. Three important sions in September 1967; the "anti- ples Congress (UPC)was essentially points should be highlighted. First, imperialist" move to the left by anti-Buganda and predominantly right from the time of their incep- Obote. From this time on, the re- Protestant (A.B. Mujaju, cited in tion, political parties in the country gime was surviving on borrowed Karugire). As for the Democratic remained based on sectarianism. time. The country had become a Party (DP), it was predominantly Second, the UPC/KY alliance main- police state with Buganda suffering Catholic and was formed to redress tained the Protestant hegemony and more pronounced violations of rights the power balance in their favour. allowed for the continuation of dis- than any other part of the country As Karugire puts it, the party was crimination against the Catholics (A.M. Obote, 1968; Nelson Kasfir, formed "not as a step towards unit- and Moslems in the country; and 1967,52-6;Picho Ali, 1967168,ll-3; ing the country under the umbrella finally, the manipulation of ethnic- Akena Adoko, 1967, 10-2; Abu of a single national, less still nation- ity and religious allegiance by the Mayanza, 1967,20-5; Uganda Par- alist, party; it was a step towards ruling elites and those vying for po- liamentary Debates, 1965-66;A.G.G. conforming to the religious polarities litical power became a prominent Ginyera-Pinyewa, 1974,32-44). that had existed in Uganda's public factor in post-independence Ugan- A number of important points life since the turn of the 19th cen- dan politics. should be noted: firstly, the infant tury" (Karugire, 162). The Kabaka Obote's position from the very be- democratic institutions which Yekka (KY) the "King Alone" ) was ginning was extremely complicated; emerged were immediately suffo- formed by monarchists in Buganda his shaky regime was constantly cated by the legacies of colonialism who thought that by usingthe name haunted and entangled by divisive and the uncompromising quest for that had great emotional and cul- and complex colonial legacies. One "absolute" political and economic tural appeal in the area, the move- such seething and divisive problem power. Secondly, the use or misuse ment would gain enormous support. was related to the status of the "lost of the military to "resolve" internal The primary objective of the move- counties", which the colonial regime political conflict continued as it had ment, however, was to ensure the had seized from Bunyoro and trans- during colonialism. From then on, removal of the DP from office before ferred to Buganda (Sathyamurthy, the survival of post-colonialregimes independence. Another objective 106; F.D.Lugard, Vol. 2,1902,235; would be essentially determined by was to carve some political space for J.R. Postcethwaite, 1947). Among the army, not the masses of the the monarchy in an independent other things, it was the referendum Ugandan society. Thirdly, the vari- unitary state; this was a direct re- on the lost counties that dealt a fatal ous interest groups which had be- sponse to Buganda's failed attempts blow to the UPC/KY honeymoon. come disillusioned or disappointed to secede from the country. Without examining the details of by Obote soon allied themselves with Through the marriage de con- subsequent developments, a number some factions of the army. This alli- venance between UPC and KY, the of significant events which occurred ance of domestic classes was DP was blocked from gainingpoliti- included: the dissolution ofthe UPCI strengthened by the support from cal power. With the victory of the KY alliance in 1964; power struggle some prominent western countries UPC and KY, Dr. A. Obote formed between Buganda and the Central and Israel. The latter group in the the first independent government Government; the split within UPC; coalition "feared" that Uganda was in 1962. It is important to indicate the split within the army between drifting to socialism or communism that the UPC/KY was an alliance of pro-Obote and anti-Obote forces;the during the era of intense Cold War

Volume 11, Number 3 rivalry. Obote's own stand against tion, the plight of cultivators of cash pose his machinery of repression 'imperialist' penetration of neo-colo- crops, Uganda's failure under him and coercion on the civil society. As nial Africa and western support to to cooperate with sister countries of in the military, his first targets were the apartheid state of South Africa the East African community, con- the Acholi and Langi -to the rest of forced the external interests to look centration of power in the hands of a the country and the international for a friendly leadership in the coun- tiny class of wealthy individuals, community, by and large, business try (Mamdani, 1983). Thus external domination of all key offices in 'Ugan- continued asusual. However, in 1972 forces exploited internal contradic- da's political, commercial, army and when Amin ordered forty thousand tions to remove Obote from power in industrial life' by Langi elements, Ugandan-Asians, holding British 1971. the existence of a private army un- passports, to leave the country in As the Obote regime became more der the co trol of the Cabinet and ninety days, the international com- dictatorial and repressive, abuse of dominate1 by the Langi and munity "discovered" that the regime human rights drastically increased. maladministration of the Armed was violating human rights and for- By using a predominantly Acholi- Forces (The Birth of the Second Re- mally protested against the decision Langi based military (Amii Omara- public, Entebbe). (cf. Twaddle, 1975). This seemingly Otunnu, 1987)against Buganda, the Understandably, aggrieved par- contradictory response was essen- North-South divide widened. Draft- ties - national and international, tially due to the fact that the reset- ing illegitimate constitutions which werejubilant at the overthrow of the tlement of the expelled Asians be- protect the interests of illegitimate Oboteregime. In the streets of Kam- came the responsibility of Britain regimes would now become a promi- pala, for example, thousands of peo- and the international community. nent factor in the Uganda political ple celebrated what they thought Ironically, at a time of increased and constitutional history. In other was the passing of the era of dicta- state terrorism, overt repression and words, constitutions, whether sus- torship and anarchy. At the interna- anarchy, Amin became the Chair- pended or redrafted would have no tional level, Britain and Israel man of the Organization of African meaning to regimes which do not rushed to recognize and promote the Unity. A report by the U.S. Commit- adhere to a democratically instituted regime, which was partly their own tee For Refugees makes a similar constitution. Ethnic tensions sur- child. The position of the British observation: faced within the ethnic-based army, governmedt was echoed by the Brit- In February 1977, Amnesty Inter- especially after the murder ofpromi- ish press. Consider, for example, a national estimated that killings nent Acholi army officers - Briga- position advanced by The Daily Tel- under Amin's regime numbered dier Okoya and and Col. Omoya. egraph on 12 July 1971, that Amin: 40,000 to 30,000 but the UN Com- The Acholi-Langi military alliance provides a welcome contrast to mission on Human Rights shelved became a distant and elusive myth. those African leaders ... who bring a British attempt to have the atroci- African rble into discredit in their ties investigated. In May, Uganda GENERALIDI AMIN: own coulttries ... Dr. Obote who itself was actually voted a member 1971-1979 violated Dganda's Independence of the commission. It is an irony of Most accounts of the 25 January Constitutiion and was justifiably thisperiod that, while the interna- 1971 coup agree on one basic point; ousted byl Gen. Amin, was in that tional human rights community General Amin, who had been placed category +..Gen. Amin, always a condemnedAminls massacres and under house arrest, upstaged Obote, staunch fkiend ofBritain, has been governments deplored his bellig- while the latter was away attending quick to @press this in his coun- erent statements, life under Amin the Commonwealth Conference in try's poli*. His request now for the continued normally for many who Singapore (Ali A. Mazuri, 1975,110- purchase fequipment for re-build- were in regions not touched by the 1). In keeping with the image mili- ing of Ug nda's defences deserves violence. (1985, 7) tary coup leaders in Africa present the most 1sympathetic considera- The only factual error in this state- immediately after coups, Amin tion from $verypoint of view. (Cited ment is, by 1977, every region in the started off by sounding conciliatory in Omar -Otunnu, 109) country had been visited by Amin's and offered eighteen popular points Immediate4 y after his major public violence. What differed was the de- for overthrowing the Obote regime. campaigns, aimed at creating some gree of violence and those affected These points included: Obote's rule breathing s ace for his regime, Amin by it. It was in this same year that by emergency, detention of innocent embarked n restructuring the mili- the murder of Archbishop Janani people, restriction of various tary for the sole purpose of political Luwum and two cabinet ministers freedoms, corruption in high places, survival. turned the international community inability to curb kondoism, failure Having t mporarily resolved the increasingly against the regime. to organize popular elections, eco- perceived hreat from within his With increased dissention in the nomic impolicy, burdensome taxa- military, iin moved swiftly to im- military, Amin's attemptedccannexa- Volume 11, Number 3 tion" of Tanzania's Kagera in Octo- stood. The Uganda National Lib- into his presidency, President Lule ber 1978 and Tanzania and the ex- eration Front which was formed on was voted out of office by powerful iles'counter-attackin January 1979, 26 March, 1979toC'replace"the Amin factions within the quasi-parlia- the stage was set for the overthrow regime, brought together at least ment, NCC (New African, Septem- of the regime; this was completed in twenty-two diverse ideological, reli- ber 1979, 12-3; Africa, July 1979, May after the capture of the West gious and ethnic exile groups (G. 22-3). Nile province. Kanyeihamba, 1989). The only two Although the "numbers game" in things the group agreed upon were: Any credible human rights is complex and con- fmst, that Arnin must be overthrown. attempt to grapple troversial (cf. Michael Stohl, David In order to do that, there was a need with the questions Carleton, George Lopez and Stephen for a loose coalition which would of democracy, human Samuels, 1986, 592-606; Robert J. coordinate opposition to the regime. rights, refugees, Golstein, 1986, 607-27), the report This was also a pre-condition for by TheMinority Rights Group (1989, Tanzania's support which would fi- national unity, 7) estimates that between one hun- nally lead to the overthrow of the stability and . dred thousand and five hundred Amin regime; and secondly, that development, must thousand people were massacred the power vacuum must be filled by be Informed by during Arnin's rule. Hundreds of them. the historical thousands fled the country and thou- Like its political wing, the UNLF, sands were internally displaced. which consisted of rival clusters of development of There was also a total breakdown of influence, the fighting force, the the country. the economy and social services - Uganda National Liberation Army including health care and educa- (UNLA) was essentially a military Although it was the leftist ele- tion. umbrella of personal armies with- ments, led by Professor Wadada out any commitment or loyalty to Nabudere, which were largely in- the nation. The military coalition strumental in instigating the re- comprised the personal armies of: moval of Lule, it was "the clout of Obote and David Oyite-Ojok, Tito segments of the Front representing Okello, Yoweri Museveni, Akena the interests of UPC and FRONASA P'Ojok and Col. Omaria. Since the (led, respectively, by Paulo THE UGANDANATIONAL majority of exiles who fought were Muwanga, a Muganda and Yoweri from the North, the UNLAwas domi- Museveni, the Defence Minister) LIBERATIONFRONT nated by people from that region. In that really prevailed in the decision After a decade of military despotism other words, the military was once to remove Lule from power" under which the mass of the people more dominated by the North. It (Sathyamurthy, 662). Sectarianpoli- had to bear the brunt of fascist op- must, however, be indicated that tics had once more re-emerged. The pression and continued imperialist people from West Nile, who are tra- governing body continued to use the penetration, the promise of a return ditionally considered part of the old repressive state apparatus which to democracy once again gave rise to North, were not in this northern- it inherited without altering it in popular enthusiasm, even as Amin's dominated army. any substantial way. As a matter of false promises to liberate the Ugan- With Amin the "common enemy", fact, repressive laws were used dan people from the yoke of tyranny ousted, an intense and vicious power whenever they suited the conven- that they had endured under Obote struggle rocked the UNLF and the ience of the ruling elites. drew enormous crowds of jubilant National Consultative Council The power struggle between the people to the streets over eight years (NCC). As for President Lule, a left and the right within the UNLF before. But the sufferings of the mass Muganda, he continued to broaden led to the election of a compromise of the people have continued una- his power base by strengthening candidate, , to re- bated ... (Sathmurthy, 658) the Baganda clique in the new gov- place Lule. The elevation of Binaisa In order to understand why the hopes ernment at the expense of equally to power was greeted by demonstra- and aspirations of Ugandans were power angry cliques. What Lule for- tions in Buganda. The point is, with again betrayed by the ruling elites got was that he lacked the military the removal of Lule, the Baganda who filled the power vacuum cre- backing of the UNLA or the Tanza- lost faith in the new administration. ated by the overthrow of Amin, the nian Peoples' Defence Forces More important, Binaisa who had formation of the new regime, its eth- (TPDF). Moreover, he was just a been Obote's first Attoney General, nic, class and ideological base and 'cconsensus"nominee to a provisional was seen as one whose central job political agenda should be under- presidency. Less than two months was to pave the way for the return of

Volume 11, Number 3 Obote. During this initial but major house arrest for several months in dominated UNLA blocked some DP period of political crises, the major- the President's House in Entebbe, candidates from being nominated for ity of the twenty thousand Tanza- while the Military Commission re- the elections. In the North, for exam- nian troops and the vastly expanded placed UNLF as the interim gov- ple, supporters of DP were either UNLA engaged in gross violations of ernmentpending national elections harassed or lost their property. The human rights. Hundreds of thou- in December 1980. (Sathya- utterances and actions of the leader- sands of Ugandan women were murthy, 668) ship of UPC made it apparent that raped, thousands ofpeople weremur- Binaisa was removed from office and the party was determined to "win" at dered in cold blood, civilians lost theMilitary Commission led by Paulo all costs. their property and political oppo- Muwanga and his Vice Chairman, Despite the dubious move by the nents were either murdered, de- Yoweri Museveni, assumed power. Chairman of the Military Commis- tained without trial, or forced to flee sion, Paulo Mwanga, to personally the country. The situation was par- announce the results of the elections, ticularly bad in two parts ofthe coun- the Commonwealth Observer Group try, Buganda and West Nile. (COG)Report described the elections In Buganda, the protest against ma 1980 ELM~TIOW as generally free and fair and the the removal of Lule brought massive Under such tense socio-economic, results in which the UPC was de- military repression on the people. political and military conditions, the clared victorious, valid. It was de- Also in Bombo area, where the ma- 1980 general elections were held. clared that the UPC won seventy- jority of Moslems from West Nile Four political parties participated in two seats, DP, fifty-one and UPM, had settled, women, children and the campaigns. Tthe UPC led by one. Existingevidence indicates that the elders were murdered, moveable Obote continued to receive its major either the DP would have won the property seized, houses, hospitals support from the Protestant oommu- elections or the UPC lead should have and schools blown up by TPDF and nities in Acholi, Lango, Teso and been by a much smaller margin. The the UNLA. In West Nile, those who Bugishu. It also obtained some sup- point is, the COG Report gave inter- had not fled into Southern Sudan or port from Bushenyi in Western national legitimacy to the regime, Eastern Zaire were massacred by Uganda. The DP, led by Dr. Paul not internal legitimacy. the combined troops. As in Bombo, Kawanga Semogere, maintained its Instead of going directly to the houses, hospitals, mosques and support in Buganda, Western "bush", the DP gave military and schools were destroyed in West Nile Uganda and among Catholics in other logistical support to groups engaged by the soldiers (Minority Report, 9- parts of the country. The Conserva- in a war against the UPC govern- tive Party (CP), led by Joshua 11). ment. It was a faction of the UPM, led Mayanja-Nkangi, an up-dated ver- In a desperate attempt to stop po- by Yoweri Museveni that was the sion of the KY,acquired its tiny sup- tential candidates from campaign- first to declare war against the re- port from the monarchists in ing on party platforms in the elec- gime. A number of possible explana- Buganda. The Uganda Patriotic tions scheduled for 1980, Binaisa tions may be advanced to suggest Movement (UPMI, led by Yoweri insisted that elections would be or- why Museveni, whose infant politi- Kaguta Museveni, a small break- ganized under the umbrella of the cal party lacked support in the coun- away UPC faction, attracted very try, went to the "bush". Firstly, since UNLF. This move was vehemently limited support from young people in rejected by the UPC, DP and he was among the few with personal Buganda and Western Uganda armies opposed to Obote, he chose to Museveni's FRONASA. As if that (Sathyamurthy, 699). was not enough warning of impend- lead a military opposition to a regime The elections were characterized that had rigged the elections. Sec- ing danger his divided government by intimidation and violence meted faced, Binaisa went ahead and: ondly, having tested political power out by the UPC against its oppo- right from the overthrow of Amin committed the fatal mistake of dis- nents. As a matter of fact, on many missing the army chief (whom he until his defeat at the hand of a very occasions during the campaigns popular DP candidate during the elec- offered the Ambassadorship to Al- Obote challenged the leadership of tions, Museveni saw only one avenue geria) after making a vain and the DP to parade its army, if it had left for "recapturing" political power: secret appeal for Kenyan military one. Clearly, Obote sent two impor- the military overthrow of Obote. help in order to ensure Uganda's tant messages to the nation. First, security. Nabudere and his politi- that UNLA was a UPC army, not a cal followers in NCC, well realis- national army; secondly,that the sup- ing that the end was drawing nigh, port of the army would be the critical DOWN OF LAWAND ORDER simply fled the country ... Binaisa decidingfactor in the contest for lead- Faced with the intractable problem was swiftly out-manoeuvred by the ership in the country, It was there- ofinternal political legitimacy, Obote armed forces and placed under fore not surprising that the UPC- had to rely substantially on the insti-

Volume 11, Number 3 tutions of coercion. Obote's self-in- Since it could not achieve any deci- and Bahima allied themselves with flicted dilemma was further compli- sive military victory against the NRA, the DP. Following the overthrow of cated by guerilla wars, especially in the UNLA adopted a counter-insur- Obote I, some of them left refugee Buganda and West Nile. The war in gency strategy of cutting off human camps and settled on land in Ankole. West Nile which followed the over- and material support for the insur- Alarge number ofBanyarwanda also throw of Amin was devastating to gents in the Triangle. It destroyed joined Amin's security service. How- the area. By 1983, it was estimated granaries, drove people away from ever, after the overthrow of Amin's that there were sixty thousand refu- Bombo, rounded up civilians (those regime, some of the refugees returned gees from West Nile in Eastern Zaire who survived were put in UNLA and to refugee camps because they feared and three hundred and fifty thou- Special Force "protection" camps). a backlash from the UPC Bairu and sand in Southern Sudan. Further- At the height of the crisis, in 1983, people whose land they had earlier more, there were over three hundred thirty-six overcrowded "resettle- occupied. thousand displaced persons, most of ment" camps were identified in the As aresult of their association with whom had settled areas near the Triangle by aid workers, with a total the Amin regime, the Banyarwanda borders controlled by the UNRF. It is population of between one hundred were accused of having contributed also estimated that tens of thousands thousand and one hundred and forty to the survival of the brutal military of civilianswere murdered in Koboko, thousand. After unsuccessfully de- regime. Ironically, many 'Vgandans" Aringa, Arua and Moyo. The major- nying that gross violations of human who worked for Amin were freely ity of these people, it is believed, rights existed in the Luwero Trian- roaming the streets of Kampala and were murdered in the war of revenge gle, thegovernment finally indicated other cities. As a matter of fact, some by the UNLA and government mili- in its appeal for international emer- of these "Ugandans" had declared tias from Acholi, Lango and Teso. gency aid that there were seven hun- their "allegiance" to the UPC and. Reports indicate that the guerillas dred and fifty thousand internally even occupied powerful positions in in this region were also involved in displaced persons in the Luwero area the country. The point is, in a situa- committing atrocities against the resettled in one hundred and twenty tion of internal crisis, it is very easy civilian population, especially peo- five thousand nearby camps. Reports to use refugees as scapegoats. Per- ple who did not support the insur- of atrocities committed by the UNLA haps a more convincing charge la- gents (The Minority Group, 9-11). indicate that hundreds of thousands belled against the refugees was that In Buganda, three main guerilla of people were massacred, including they were supporting Museveni's movements engaged the UNLA in those who were in the UNLA "pro- NRA. What this charge, however, bitter military battles, especially in tected" Kikyusa camp. Tens of thou- fails to point out is that most of the the Luwero Triangle. The best or- sands were reported detained invari- refugees joined Museveni's group ganized and most effective of these ous military camps, prisons and po- when the persecution became un- was the lice cells. Hospitals, schools, bearable (Clay,17). (NRA) led by Yoweri Museveni. This churches, mosques and houses were As at the end his first administra- group comprised the Baganda, reduced to rubble. Moveable prop- tion, Obote's regime would be over- Banyankole, Banyarwanda, Bakiga erty was appropriated, children and thrown by the military. During the and Rwandese refugees (cf. Watson; elderly men tortured and women war in the Luwero Triangle and fol- Edward Khiddu-Makubuya, 1991). raped (various Amnesty Interna- lowing the death of Army Chief of The NRA attempted to close the tional Reports, 1980-85). Staff, Brigadier Oyite-Ojok, a bigrift Kampala-Gulu Road (Bombo Road) Another group that faced persecu- developed within the Acholi-Langi by destroying military and civilian tion under Obote's regime was the militaryhegemony. Obote's attempts vehicles. The result of this military Banyarwanda. In September 1982, to create a new military alliance be- strategy led to the murder of hun- the UPC establishment in Western tween the Langi and Itesot height- dreds of innocent civilians travelling Uganda, under the leadership of the ened military confrontations within between the North and Buganda Minister of State in the Office of the the UNLA and finally led to the over- (Lance-Sera Muwanga and Andrew President, Chris Rwakasisi, evicted throw ofhis government in July 1985. Gombya, 1991). Supporters of the and tortured an estimated seventy- UPC and able-bodied persons who five thousand Banyarwandas from THE REGIME OF did not join the NRA in Luwero were their homes. Some forty thousand GENERALTITI OKELLO also reported killed, abducted or tor- fled to Rwanda and thirty five thou- The Okello regime moved swiftly ture (A.M. Obote, 1990). According sand took refuge in UNHCR refugee and granted general amnesty to all to various NRA reports, most major camps. A number of possible expla- political prisoners. By strikingamili- campaigns by the UNLA were re- nations may be advanced for the tary alliance with factions ofArnin's pelled with heavy losses of lives and persecution of this group. Firstly, in former army to overthrow Obote, military equipment on the govern- the 1960s, the majority of the the war in West Nile ended and ment side. Banyarwanda (who were Catholics) thousands of refugees returned to

Volume 11, Number 3 Re%e 31 their war ravaged region. The re- were forced behind him or her and parts of the country. Six years fur- gime also reached a temporary peace tied so tightly at the elbows and ther on it seems that the authori- with every fighting and political wrists that the chest walls were ties have grown to tolerate a per- group, except the NRA. From early strained and breathing interfered sistent and serious level of human September to December 17, 1985, with to a point of fatal death. How- rights violations by the NRA. The the Nairobi Peace Talks, which ever, by and large, the NRA re- continuing abuse of the rule of law aimed at bringing the NRA into an mained disciplined throughout the suggests that the government no interim government with other country. As a result of this relative longer regards strengthening re- groups, took place. Although the discipline, the NRA gained support spect of human rights as apriority. Peace Agreement was signed under in otherwise hostile terrain, the East The government is failing to take the chairmanship of President Dan- and North. decisive steps to prevent NRA hu- iel Arap Moi, the cease-fire soon This period of discipline, however, man rights violations. The repeated collapsed and war continued be- soon came to an end as the NRA failure to take prompt action to tween the UNLA and the NRA. With started raping women, looting, tor- investigate reports ofNRA human the benefit of hindsight, it is clear turing and indiscriminately mur- rights violations effectively means that neither side was really commit- dering innocent people in the North that despite a public commitment ted to peaceful resolution of the and the East. Two points should be to respecting human rights, the Ugandan conflict. established at this juncture. First, authorities infact condone human During this period, violations of after its militaryvictory in the North rights violations ... Furthermore, human rights continued in areas and the East, factions within the it has been government policy to controlled by the two major protago- NRA embarked on revenge against entrust the NRA with a major law- nists. In south-western Uganda, people from Acholi, Lango and Teso; enforcement role throughout the where the NWRM had estab- and second, the collapse of disci- country, at the expense of the ordi- lished its military and civil adminis- pline within the NRA coincided with nary police or others ... The con- tration, those who did not readily insurgencies in the North and East. tinuing violation of human rights lend support to the movement were Both the NRA and thevarious armed by soldiers suggest that there are either murdered or tortured. The groups in the areas continued to significant weaknesses in opera- NRNNRM, however, attempted to attack and kill civilians. As a mat- tional procedures within the NRA improve its relations with civilians ter of fact, the same strategies of and that the army does not regard by meting out summary "justice" to gross violations of human rights the itself as accountable to the civil some of its soldiers who did not obey UNLA had used in the Luwero Tri- society. ( the central command. The UNLAon angle and West Nile are being used Report, 4 December, 1991, 21-2) the other hand, continued with its by the NRA in these areas. Hospi- The only problem with the report is acts of atrocities; indiscriminate tals, schools, churches, granaries that it tries to create a false and rape, looting and murder. As a mat- and houses have been destroyed by rigid dichotomy between the NRA ter of fact, the Okello regime had no the the NRA. The insurgents have and the NRM. control over the various factions of likewise looted, raped and murdered It is important to briefly examine the fighting groups it had reached people from their own home areas. the circumstancesunder which large an accord with. During this short Amnesty International Report suc- waves of "voluntary repatriation" period, as Mamdani puts it, Kam- cinctly summarizes this point: took place during 1987-88 (The Mi- pala resembled Beirut, a capital city Major human rights violations nority Rights Group, 22). As soon as under siege and controlled by differ- have occurred in Uganda since the Museveni regime came to power, ent military factions. 1986 and have continued to be over three hundred thousand from frequent in 1991. They have been Gulu and Kitgum fled to Southern THE REGIME OF particularly acute in areas where Sudan. Inadequate living conditions LT.-GENERALMUSEVENI the NRA is fighting armed insur- in refugee camps and continued mili- Immediately the NRA successfully gents - and in 1991 there have tary attacks on those camps, forced fought its way to power, on 25 Janu- been especially serious problems over two hundred and fifty thou- ary, 1986, the massacre in Southern in the north - but are not re- sand people to return to the war Uganda came to an end. It is impor- stricted to those areas. When the zones in the North. The notable point tant to note that as the UNLA was current government took over in is that the repatriation was not based fleeing the city, hundreds of Acholi January 1986 it inherited a legacy on a perception of improved situa- - children, women and old people of gross human rights violations tion in the areas where refugees had were killed by the NRA and its sup- frompreviousgovernments.There originated, rather it was due to an porters using "Kandooya" or "three- was immediate improvement in equally terrible war situation in the piece tying" in which a person's arms human rights situation in many Southern Sudan. In other words,

Volume 11, Number 3 most of these people preferred to die man rights. Yet, refugeek who flee in their home country than in South- such repressive regimes become the ern Sudan where many had been subject of international concern. killed the Sudanese People's Libera- The strong statements made by tion Army and epidemics. the PrimeMinister of Canada, Brian I Mulroney, tying development aid to Subscribe to Refuge! CONCLUSION human rights at the Commonwealth Refuge This paper has attempted to show and Francophone summits, for ex- York Lanes Press, that there is a continuity of viola- ample, deserve some credit. How- York University tions of . ever, offlcial declarations of intent 351 York Lanes The root causes of violations, it has will not do the trick. Policies and 4700 Keele Street North York, Ontario M3J 1P3 been pointed out, may be found in practice must be consistent with Telephone: (416) 736-5843 the oppressive and exploitative socio- stated position. It is, hoyever, im- Fax: (416) 736-5837 economic, cultural and political perative to indicate that Canada, Electronic Mail via Bitnet Address: structures. These structures were like many Western democracies, has REFUGE@YORKVMl put in place by the colonial regime been conspicuouslysilent about con- Subscription Rates for One Year: and "developed" by neo-colonial tinuing gross violations of human Canada $25.00 administrations. In a world of in- rights in Uganda. On this note, a Overseas $30.00 U.S. creasinginter-dependence, external more coherent and consistent policy Please enclose payment payable to Refuge, factors have continued to signifi- than the one applied to Kenya, may with your order. cantly contribute to the crisis. There- help exert pressure on the Museveni fore, any credible attempt to grapple regime to open up the political proc- with the questions of democracy, ess and hold free and fair elections state to perform its role in the area human rights, refugees, national to be contested by all political par- of human rights. Surely violence, unity, stability and development, ties. The question of acceptable hu- corruption and militarism affect the must be informed by the historical man rights practices must be cen- development of the economy. At the development of the country. There tral in dealing with the regime. In same time, the unjust international is an imperative need to build viable other words, the Western nations economic system violates the rights civil institutions; allow for the emer- should support democratic rule and of the people's development. There- gence of democratic institutions and respect for human rights, not dicta- fore, it is imperative that the inter- rule; create a truly national, disci- torship and gross human rights vio- national community should critically plined and productive army; pro- lations. examine and change the exploita- mote and protect universal human The international human rights tive international economic system. rights; and initiate self-sustaining groups, and academic and religious Also, in this light, the roles of the and democratic economic develop- communities should pay increasing World Bank and the IMF should be ment. While the bulk of these initia- attention to conditions of violations re-evaluated in terms of develop- tives lie in the hands of the chained of rights in the country. Histori- ment and human rights. In other and voiceless Ugandans, promotion cally, most of these organizations or words, we should avoid a major flaw and protection of universal human institutions wake up too late to ef- in human rights debates which as- rights is the responsibility of the fectively influence positive change sumes that there are two separate international community. in the country. Also, some journal- or semi-autonomous stages in the The , the Common- ists and scholars who should expose struggle for human rights, political wealth Organization, the Organiza- violations of human rights, have con- and then economic, internal and then tion ofAfrican Unity, European Eco- sistently refused or failed to do so external. Effective and genuine ac- nomic Community and other re- because of ideological and/or per- tion now will a'ssure a positive move gional and international inter-gov- sonal reasons. Surely, without in- towards democracy,improvement of ernmental organizations should stop formation, the role of the interna- human rights practices and economic treating human rights violations in tional community in promoting and development. This will help to avert Uganda and anywhere else as an protecting human rights becomes the creation of future refugees. internal affair of a sovereign state. diminished. The point is, the practice of "non- It is common knowledge that there Note interference" in the0internalaffairs" is a close link between human rights *Ogenga Otunnu is a Doctoral can- of a sovereign state, undermines the and economic developme t. In that didate in the Department of History authority, effectiveness and cred- respect, the economic u 1derdevel- at York University and a Research ibility of such organizations from opment of Uganda imposks further Associate in the Centre for Refugee addressing gross violations of hu- constraint on the capability of the Studies.

Volume 11, Number 3 Ref%e 33 80 (New York: United Nations SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, 1982).

Amnesty International Reports, Clark, John Mustafa Kogali and International Migration Review, various issues, 1966-91. Leszek Kosinski Population and 15,53-54, Spring-Summer, 1981. Development Projects in Africa Asfaha, A. "De l'Erythr6e au Sou- (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer- Karugire, S.K. A Political (London: Heinemann, dan : Contribution gbographique sity Press, 1985). l'btude d'une politique 1980). d'assistance aux rbfugies" These Clark, John Leszek Kosinski Re- de Doctorat (Paris: E.H.E.S.S., distribution of Population in Af- Khasiani, S.A. "Refugee Research in Africa: Problems and Possi- 1988). rica (London:Heinemann, 1982). bilities"Internationa1 Migration, XXVIII, 3, 1990. Armstrong, A. "Aspects of Refugee Clay, J.W. The Eviction of Wellbeing in Settlement Banyaruanda: The Story Behind Kibreab, G. African Refugees. Re- Schemes : An Examination of the Refugee Crisis in Southwest the Tanzanian Case" Journal of Uganda (Cambridge, MA: Cul- flections on the African Refugee Problem (Africa World Press, Refugee Studies, 1, 1, 1988, 57- tural Survival, 1984). 73. USA, 1985). Dunn, Elwoodt and Tarr, S. By- -"Planned refugee settlement ron, Liberia: A National Polity -"Local settlements in Africa: A Misconceived Option?" Journal schemes: The case of the in Transition (London: The Mishamo Rural Settlement, Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1988). of Refugee Studies, 2, 4, 1989, Western Tanzania" Land Re- 468-490. form, land settlement and coop- Gasarasi, C.P. "The Tripartite Ap- eratives 112, 1986, 30-52. proach to the Resettlement and -"Rural Eritrean Refugees in the Integration of Rural Refugees in Sudan. A study of the Dynamics Bulcha, M. "Sociological and Eco- Tanzania" Research Report 7 1 of Flight" in P. Nobel ed. Refu- nomic Factors in Refugee Inte- (Uppsala: Scandinavian Insti- gees and Development in Africa gration: The case of Ethiopian tute of African Studies, 1984). (op.cit. 1987[a]) 37-46. Exiles in the Sudan" in P. Nobel ed. Refugees and Development in The Globe and Mail 13 Feb. 1988, -"Rural Refugee Land Settle- Africa (Uppsala: Scandinavian D.3 (Toronto). ments in Eastern Sudan : On the Institute of African Studies, Road to Self-Sufficiency?" in P. 1987) 73-90. Hansen, A. "Managing Refugees: Nobel ed. Refugees and Develop- Zambia's Response to Angolan ment in Africa (op.cit. 1987[bl) Chambers, R. "Hidden Losers? The Refugees 1966-1977" Disasters, 63-71. Impact of Rural Refugees and 3, 4, 1979, 375-380. Refugee Programs on Poorer Kuhlman, T. "The Economic Inte- Hosts" International Migration Harrell-Bond, Barbara Imposing gration of Refugees in Develop- Review, XX, 2, 1986,245-263. Aid: Emergency Assistance to ing Countries: A Research Refugees (New York: Oxford Uni- Model" Journal ofRefugee Stud- -"Rural Refugees in Africa:What versity Press, 1986). ies. Vol. 4. No. 1 ppl-20, 1991. the Eye does not See" Disasters, 3,4, 1979, 381-392. Holborn,Louise Refugees (New Jer- Liberia: Reliefand Reconstruction, sey: The Scarecrow Press, 1976). A Staff Report Prepared for the Christensen, H. "Survival Strate- Use of the Subcommittee on Im- gies for and by camp refugees" International Migration Policies migration and Refugee Affairs, Report (Geneva:UNRISD, 1982). and Programs: A World Survey, US. Senate Committee on For-

Volume 11, Number 3 eign Relations, Washington D.C. Committee Ior neluge~~ --, November27,1990 (Washington "Prepared Statement of Patrick Report of the ILO (Geneva, D.C.: 1991). L.N. Seyon" 77 in Emergency 1983). Situations in Sudan and Libe- Mamdani, M. "Disaster Preven- ria: HearingBefore The Subcom- tion: Defining the Problem" Re- mittee on African Affairs of The West Africa June 7-13, 1991 (Lon- view of African Political Eco- U.S. Senate Committee on For- don) 3149. nomy, 33, August, 1985, 92-6. eign Relations November27 1990 (Washington D.C., 1991). Zetterqvist, J. "Refugees in Bot- Mamdani, M. From Citizen to Refu- swana. In the Light of Interna- gee: UgandaAsians Come to Brit- Rupensinghe, K. ed. Conflict Reso- tional Law" Research Report 87 ain (London: Frances Printer, lution in Uganda (London:James (Uppsala: Scandinavian Insti- 1973). Currey, 1988). tugof African Studies, 1990).

Marchal, R. "Le Soudan terre Sathyamurthy, T.V. The Political d'asile" in Le Soudan Contempo- Development of Uganda: 1900- rain. M. Lavergne ed. (Karthala: 1986 (Hants, England: Gower Teacherltrainer for the refugee1 Cermoc, 1989) 576-598. Publishing Company, 1986). asylum seekers' teachers in refugeeldetention centres in Hong Kong Migration News (Geneva: Inter- Shettima, Kole "The Conflict in national Catholic Migration Liberia: A Failure in Mediation?'' Qualifications: University degree in Commision, 1984). Mimeo (1991). Education andlor certificate in training for trainers Neldner, B.W. "Settlement of Ru- Stein, B.N. and L. Clark Older minimum one year teaching experience ral Refugees in Africa" Disas- Refugee Settlements in Africa. Teacher training experience ters, 3, 4, 1979, 393-402. Final Report to the US. Agency Excellent skills In for International Development, workshop presentation Potten, D. "Etsha: A Successful Refugee Policy Group, Draft Fluent in English Knowledge of Vietnamese Resettlement Scheme"Botswana (Washington D.C., 1986). language would be an Notes and Records, 8,1976,105- advantage, but not necessary 117. Twaddle, M. ed. Expulsions of a Experience in working with Minority: Essays on Ugandan refugeelasylum seekers Rogge, J.R. "Africa's displaced Asians (London: The Atholone The suitable candidate is mature, population: dependency or self- Press, 1975). motivated, creative and is not afraid to work with limited sufficiency?" in J. I. Clarke, M. resources. Helshe will work in the Khogali and L. A. Kosinski eds. UNHCR Documents: Curriculum Development Unit in Population and Development Asileen Afrique Documentaire, Whitehead Detention Centre with Haut-Commissariat des Na- one other teacherltrainer under Projects in Africa (Cambridge the supervision of the Teacher University Press, 1985) 68-83. tions Unies pour les r6fugi6s Training Unit Leader. an inter- (G6neve: 1971). preterltranslator, alongside the Curriculum Development Unit -"Africa's Resettlement Strate- Caring For Refugees Since 1951 Manager, and six support staff. gies" International Migration UNHCR Public Information Salary commensurate Review, 15, 1, 1981, 195-212. Section (Geneva). with experience. Applicants are asked to submit their resumis tor -"A Geography of Refugees :Some Refugees 48, Dec. 1987, Public Director illustrations from Africa" The Information Service (Geneva). International Social Service Professional Geographer, XXIX, Hong Kong Branch 2, May, 1977, 186-193. 6th Floor, Southorn Centre Refugees Oct., 1988 (Geneva). 130 Hennessy Road Wanchal, Hong Kong Ruiz, Hiram "Statement of Hiram Towards self-reliance: A pro- Ruiz, African Policy Analyst, U.S. gramme of action for refugees APPLY IMMEDIATELY

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Call for Papers

Conference "Refugees in the '90's - National and International Perspectives: Integrating Policy, Practice and Research"

October 14-17,1992 Vancouver. British Columbia. Canada

There is an urgent need for those working with refugees to share information, problem identification, and research in order to foster healthy public policy. To this end there will be an international conference held in Vancouver, B.C., Canada bringing together policy-makers, service providers, practitioners, and researchers. There will be a series of pienaries, workshops, panels and seminars focussing on:

1. Policy factors such as: what makes a refugee? who pays and why? global trends

2. Service issues such as: refugee children, the older refugee, family violence, training of workers, models of care; treatments of victims of torture

3. Service factors such as: information sharing, databases, models of selection and intervention

4. Policy issues integrating the above

This conference is sponsored by the Western Social Policy Forum and co-sponsored by Forensic Psychiatric Services Commission of B.C.; Gerontology Research Centre, Simon Fraser University; Vancouver Association for Survivors of Torture (VAST); and with the cooperation of Culture, Community and Health Studies, Clarke Institute, Toronto.

We invite interested persons to forward proposals for panels and/or abstracts of papers for presentations. If you would like to contribute to this conference, please write:

Erling Christensen Executive Director Western Social Policy Forum Box 32,545 East Broadway Vancouver, B.C. VST 1x4 Telephone: (604) 240-7267 Fax: (604) 873-1920

Proposals are to be submitted no later than March 15,1992. Completed papers will be requested for submission no later than June 15,1992. Proceedings will be published.