The German Occupation of Norway

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TTEThe Gr Ocuato of Norway.

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INFORMATION BULLETIN

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

SEPTEMBER 1940

THE GERMAN OCCUPATION OF NORWAY

SRESTRI !944 by auhorit

E. S. JOHNSTON Colonel, Infantry CSaTODIAIT

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON . 1940

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INFORMATION BULLETIN

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS- NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

1. The INFORMATION BULLETIN, is published by the Chief of Naval Operations, Intelligence Division, for the purpose of disseminating information of general interest to the naval service. 2. The BULLETIN is a confidential publication which shall be handled and transported as required by article 76, United States Navy Regulations 1920, except as noted below: (a) It is not a registered publication, nor is it assigned a short title. (b) No accounting reports are required except the post-card receipt enclosed with the initial distribution. (c) It is assigned class C stowage. 3. Each command should make provision so that a wide circulation to its officers may be effected. 4. In each command copies of the BULLETIN, after circulation, shall be collected and burned, excepting such copies as a command may desire to retain for reference purposes. Individuals who receive copies of the BULLETIN shall burn them after they have been read or within reasonable time after receipt. Destruction reports are not required. 5. While some of the information is public property in the country of origin, it is at once apparent that the information, opinions, and statements contained herein are of such a confidential nature that they must be safeguarded. 6. Officers are requested to forward for publication in the BULLETIN reports on subjects of timely interest, and, in particular, material which is not for general publication. 7. Suggestions and .criticisms of the BULLETIN, particularly of a constructive nature, are requested from all officers.

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FOREWORD

1. This volume of the BULLETIN has been compiled from the numerous sources of information available to the Division of Naval Intelligence. As is customary, presumption and surmise have been avoided. 2. It is undoubtedly too early to draw definite conclusions from the Norwegian campaign but it is believed that the Naval Service should be furnished with as complete a record of the operations as could be compiled from the material now available. 3. Inasmuch as certain of the information used herein was obtained from confidential sources, it is directed that the entire contents be so considered. W. S. ANDERSON, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Director of Namval Intelligence.

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CONTENTS

Introduction_____------Ix Chapter I. German Operations During the 3 to 5 Years Preceding the Occupation of Norway on April 9, 1940------1 Chapter II. Events Immediately Before the Occupation------10 Chapter III. German Memorandum to Norway-German Proclamation to Norway--Early Morning Events ------19 Chapter IV. Operations on April 9, 1940------31 Chapter V. German Plans of Occupation ------59 Chapter VI. Transportation and Protection of Troop Convoys-Use of Parachute Troops ------63 Chapter VII. Method of German Advances-Why Rapid Progress Was Made------Chapter VIII. German and Allied Operations in Norway ------72 Chapter IX. German Pacification of Norway------102 Chapter X. The Armed Forces in Norway------111 Chapter XI. Casualties in the Norwegian Campaign------116 Chapter XII. Lessons from the Occupation of Norway ------121 Appendix I. Established Airplane Types and Air Units ------125 Appendix II. 1. Characteristics of German Armored Cars ------129 2. Characteristics of German Tanks ------130 Appendix III. Report from Capt. Edvard Veths------137 Appendix IV. Capt. Menken's Notes------140 (VII)

INTRODUCTION

Norway, on April 9, 1940, became the victim of the war between the Allies and Germany. Her neutrality, which had survived through World War I and 7 months of World War II, collapsed as the Germans overran the nation and pushed the economic war of blockade and counterblockade into an active military and naval phase. Norway had been free for many years from the menace of invasion. After wars with her northern neighbors in the Middle Ages, her only external troubles were dynastic squabbles which involved union with and separatioi from Sweden and Denmark. In 1905, Norway sepa- rated from Sweden through peaceful negotiations and, after a plebis- cite, Prince Charles of Denmark was elected King and ascended the throne as Haakon VII. He reigns as a constitutional nonarch. Norway preserved her neutrality throughout the 1914-18 war, although she lost, chiefly due to German mines and submarines, about 1,200,000 tons of her merchant marine and nearly 2,000 seamen. This huge merchant marine, which was quickly rebuilt after the war, has always been Norway's pride. It was the fourth largest in the world at the commencement of World War II, and consisted of 4,308 vessels of 4,756,000 gross tons. Up to May 1, 1940, Norway had lost 54 ships totaling 120,000 tons and 392 sailors. Norway's only "Lebensraum" is the sea, and until the German invasion it was profiting from the war trade and the national income was rising rapidly. The chief Norwegian exports to England have been wood pulp, iron, steel, and iron ore, fish, paper, and cardboard. For Germany, the all- important consideration has been iron ore and steel, from both Norway and Sweden, and exported through the Norwegian port of Narvik. Germany has also taken fish, furs, hides, and cod-liver oil. Shipment of Swedish iron ore from Narvik was te issue on which Norwegian neutrality finally floundered. This port annually shipped nearly 8,000,000 tons of ore to Geriany and other countries, nost of it going to Germany. Germany also uses the Swedish port of Lulea in the Gulf of Bothnia but, as this port is blocked by ice for 4 months in the year, doubts have been expressed that alone it could handle a sufficient volume to meet Germany's war time needs. Iron ore and its transportation, which was the source of one of Norway's largest peacetime profits, became, in the end, the main reason for her occupation. A land of fjords, with a 12,000-mile coast line, and surrounded on three sides by the sea, Norway is the most sparsely populated country in Europe, with an area of 124,556 square miles and a population, of 2,907,000. Culturally, idealogically, and economically, her destiny is bound to the rest of Scandinavia. Descendants of the earliest Teutons and Vikings, the nen and women of Scandinavia have a, common heritage and for centuries have worked together. (IX) Three-fourths of Norway is unproductive. It is a barren, mountainous land, with an average elevation of 500 meters. There are more women than men in Norway because of the emigration of males and the high mortality in the dangerous business of seafaring. Norway's principal city is Oslo, with a population of 250,000, plus an additional 150,000 in the suburbs. Thirty percent of the population of Norway is dependent on agriculture, 28 percent on industry, 10 percent on transportation, 7 percent on whaling, and the rest on public administration and the professions. There are more than 250,000 farms in Norway, and about 90 percent of them are owned by the men and women who work them. One of the chief sources of wealth is the vast forests covering 29,455 square miles of Norway, 70 percent of which is, under pine trees. Norway's most important mineral products are pyrites and iron ore (1,048,300 tons and 1,075,588 tons, respectively, in 1937). Her fisheries were valued at 81,307,000 kroner ($20,000,000) in 1936 when 1,120,210 metric tons of fish were caught, mostly herring and cod. In 1937, 1,192,000 barrels of whale oil were produced. Legislative power in Norway is vested in the Storting, or Parlia- ment, which, meets once a year. The 150 members, elected every three years by direct vote, sit sometimes in two sections, but the country actually has a single chamber government, with few checks and bal- ances. The King may veto a bill twice, but it becomes a law if passed a third time. Prime Minister John Nygaardsvold has been in office since 1935. He is a former common laborer who was once a lumberjack in Can- ada. Of all the Scandinavian nations, Norway has probably veered furthest toward the Left, in her government, although the Labor Party, at present in power, has abandoned much of its radicalism in the last few years. This party has, however, consistently fought any decided increase in the national defense, and must be held responsible for Norway's military weakness at the time of the occupation. Norway's Army is a national militia with universal and compulsory service. The strength, of the permanent forces in 1938 was 1,900 officers and 12,000 men, but 6 divisions, or nearly 100,000 men, could be mobilized. The Navy, designated for coast defense, in 1938 num- bered about 750 officers and men, besides 700 conscripted annually. This personnel manned 4 coast defense ships of about 4,000 tons each, 2 mine layers, 9 destroyers, 9 submarines, and a number of torpedo boats and miscellaneous patrol craft.

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GERMAN OPERATIONS DURING THE 3 TO 5 YEARS PRE- CEDING THE OCCUPATION OF NORWAY ON APRIL 9, 1940

1. German Fifth Column activities-General (MID-Bulletin No. 6.)-Since the invasion of Poland, Norway, Holland, and Belgium, the term "Fifth Column" has become synonymous with German subversive activities. The notes which follow are based on information on these activities as collected by the British Air Ministry. a. While in some foreign countries earmarked for invasion the subversive German activities were kept very secret, in others they were almost blatant. In Poland the German minority was rioting weeks before the German invasion. In Holland there was no check on the movement of the large numbers of Germans in the country; detailed preparations were made by the Germans, in spite of counter- measures taken by the Dutch. In Denmark and Norway, however, the citizens had no inkling that a Fifth Column was in their midst, and the Governments had nothing to show them how they should act. b. The preparations for establishing control in those foreign countries which have been invaded by Germany appear to have been aimed at the following main points which are of equal importance: (1) Centers of communication, telephone exchanges, wireless, broadcasting, and power stations; (2) Transportation centers, air, sea, and land; (3) Centers of importance to the Government and the fighting services; (4) Any other objectives which are vital to the life of the country, e. g., essential factories. c. The final aim is- (1) To do everything possible to help the German forces to occupy the country in question; (2) Actual sabotage on a well-ordered military plan; (3) Demoralization and confusion of public opinion and armed forces with a view to breaking the will of the people to resist; causing panic and confusion in order to make ordered resistance impossible. d. The ground for these schemes is, in the first place, prepared by the use of methods of infiltration varying from contact with political parties and group to direct pressure brought to bear upon individuals, whether of German origin or nationals of the country in which they reside. f. The German "Fifth Columns" have so far been encountered in countries where there was a large German minority (Poland), or where German influence was always powerful and the people were to a degree German in origin themselves (Denmark, Norway, Hol- land). In Poland the large German minority was living on the borders of the Reich, separating it from Poland proper. The development of a Fifth Column here was clearly the simp]est matter for the German Government. In Denmark and Norway, Fifth Column preparations may not have been so extensive, since only small opposition was expected, but they were made thoroughly and with the utmost secrecy. In Holland the Fifth Column was organized to its fullest degree, and all the resources of the German Secret Service were used. Both in Scandinavia and in Holland the creation of Fifth Columns was chiefly in the hands of Embassies, Legations, Consulates,

Quisling, leadcrj" of Norwegian Nazis

Press, and Travel Bureaus, and heads of German business houses. Also, especially in Holland, pro-Nazi political elements, not of German origin, were valuable allies. Indirectly, Germany had attempted to weaken these countries' urge to resist by means of propaganda aimed at the young people; commercial pressure or enticements and by fomenting political discontent. The Flemings in Belgium were constantly restless; in Denmark and Norway there were considerable Army aid police elements who despised their Social-Democrat Gov- ernments. In Holland there was the vigorous Dutch Nazi Party (N. S. B.), openly antipatriotic to the last minute. g. The actual objectives of the Fifth Columns in the Low Countries, Scandinavia, and Poland were- (1) To capture airdromes and potential landing grounds for aircraft (including seaplanes). (2) To guiie parachutists and troop-carrying machines to landing grounds; to guide bombers to targets. (3) To capture key points or strongholds and hold them until the arrival of land forces. (4) To harass troops and police by sniping; to draw their fire away from the enemy by seizing positions and inviting siege. (5) To carry out all obviously useful sabotage.

French soldiers escort "Fifth Column" spies to an internment camp near Namsos, Norway.

(6) To work on the credulity of the populace by the dissemination of rumors. h. In Holland as soon as the German invasion commenced, the Fifth Column came into action in many towns and cities. In The Hague, Dutch Nazis began to shoot from their houses. False reports and telephone calls started to reach the Dutch General Headquarters and valuable time was lost checking them. In Rotterdam 3,000 Germans assembled secretly oi an islaid in the river, mostly armed, and held the position easily until troop-carrying seaplanes alighted nearby and disembarked heavily armed troops. Throughout the country the Fifth Columnists were waiting for parachutists and airborne troops at prearranged points, ready to direct them. Cars were stolen for this purpose. Food, disguise, and hiding places were ready. Dutch armored cars, badly needed for fighting, were called off to round up armed bands of Fifth Columnists, who were prepared to engage them until the main German forces arrived. All this time aircraft were being guided by signals (see subpar. m.). In The Hague it was reported that the German Embassy staff had caused mines to be laid under the Dutch General Headquarters buildings, which were discovered by the police. i. In Belgium the Fifth Column's activities were more obscure; sentries were found murdered, military telephone lines were constantly cut, and dissension was sown in the Army. Agents were mingled with the refugees; some of these were subsequently discovered during the evacuation from Boulogne. At Calais, agents dressed in French uniforms, who had 'arrived with the refugees, preceded the German troops, and gave false information to the effect that approaching German troops were French. Otherwise their plans and the results thereof have not yet been revealed, but on the whole they seem to have been less successful here than in other countries due to wide counter measures. (See below.) j. In Denmark the Fifth Column obtained control over the Copen- hagen Telephone Exchange in a short time. Further activities were not necessary as there was no resistance. k. In Norway preparations for Fifth Column activities must have been most thorough; false orders were given to coastal batteries to "cease fire." Military communications were cut. Munition factories were captured. Alarming and misleading reports were spread among the civil population. At Bergen some 50 armed members of the German Consulate were able to seize and hold points of the city while German troops who had been concealed in disguised ships came ashore. At Narvik German consular officials had been trained to take over duties as district governors as soon the invasion started. 1. In Poland rioting among the German minority and assassination of Polish officials preceded the German invasion. The Army, as it advanced, was supplied with hidden stores of gasoline, food, and horses by the Germans. Parachutists and troop carriers were guided to the landing grounds or were warned of danger, by signals. Loca- tion of Polish troop headquarters, concentrations, batteries, land mines, etc., were all made known by signals from behind the Polish lines, as well as by secret wireless communication. Officers were assassinated; troops and transports were fired on and billets were burned. Immense confusion was caused by false orders and rumors, and fi litary lines were often cut so regularly that it was impossible to use them. m. In all the countries invaded the Fifth Column signalling was mostly done by rockets and lights, and by secret wireless transmission. Great use was made, especially in Poland, of setting fire to haystacks. huts, etc., laying out sheets, newspapers, etc., in special patterns; even cutting corn and grass in special shapes. Torch signalling was also carried out from chimneys. It is known to be the opinion of some German pilots that without signals most of these landings would have

170,000 sets of British battle dress were captured at Arras. failed. Cases are now being investigated in the eastern counties (of England) of suspiciously marked barns which might be used as signals for the information of enemy aircraft and parachutists. Alvorlige tider

Signs posted everywhere in Norway prior to the occupation. Translation: "Critical times-Be careful with what you say!" n. Counter measures-Holland.--In spite of repeated warnings about the danger of Fifth Column activities, the Dutch, though ad- mitting that they were aware of the menace, did not take adequate active steps to deal with it. Practically the whole of the country was placed under a state of siege and the area over which foreigners could travel without a special permit was greatly reduced. This limited the movements of Germans to a certain extent but they were left free in Rotterdam, The Hague, and Amsterdam. Soon after Germans had begun invading Holland a military intelligence staff officer ordered the internment of the members of the German Legation. Street firing in The Hague was started by Germans and was continued by Dutch Nazis. It was impossible for a time to enter or leave buildings in the neighborhood of G. H. Q. Armored cars had to be withdrawn from a corps reconnaissance group detachment to provide a mobile reserve around G. H. Q. for patrolling suspect areas. In order to control movement a complete system of road and focal point sentries was introduced and all passersby, including armed parties, had to produce proof of identity. Thus movement was greatly slowed down owing to time lost trying to convince sentries of one's bona fides, while troops badly needed elsewhere were tied up in internal security tasks. The activities of the Fifth Column were one of the main causes of the collapse of the Dutch. The principal lesson to be drawn from the Dutch failure to deal with this internal menace proves that steps must be taken to stamp it out before operations are imminent. If they are not dealt with before operations begin it will not be possible to control them and their effect may be decisive. The necessity of intern- ing all Germans and Austrians, both male and female, has been em- phasized, as well as all persons having German or Austrian connections; also the necessity of arming all police is obvious. o. Counter measures-Belgium.-Details of measures put into effect to deal with Fifth Column activities in Belgium are at present lacking. Early precautions had been taken to control circulation in the frontier region, and travel except to and from neighboring countries by direct routes was prohibited to foreigners in a zone 15 kilometers deep along the eastern frontier. Regulations for control of all persons of foreign nationality were thoroughly tightened up. All foreigners were required to account for their presence in Belgium, and a check was made on their employment and dates on which they entered the country. The police were given wide powers to search private dwellings and business establishments in order to prevent the concealment of explosives and uniforms for possible future use. Legislation was introduced compelling the nationality of any car owner to be displayed on his car so that it could be easily recognized by the police. This measure aimed at preventing a sudden concentration of foreign saboteurs or others who might have received notifi- cation from the German Embassy of an impending attack. All public highways were carefully patrolled, cars being frequently stopped in order to check documents, etc. As soon as information was received of German aggression all known Germans were arrested together with a large number of Communists and extremist Flam- mands. The last two categories included a few deputies. On the second day of the German advance orders were issued for all bill boards to be destroyed immediately as these were apparently being used to pass information to Germans. It is not known yet whether Fifth Column activities assisted the Germans to make their initial break in the Belgian forward defenses. On the whole, the Belgians seem to have succeeded in dealing with the internal menace. Only minor cases of sabotage of railways, telegraphs, and telephones have so far been reported. According to the British Consul at Ghent, the citizens formed a very efficient antiparachute service in a short time. Every street corner was watched from dawn to dusk by a man supplied with an armlet stamped by the burgomaster, and a whistle. The instant a parachutist or Fifth Columnist was sighted, the whistles were blown and troops or police, who were always about, were on the scene at once. p. The situation in the United States with respect to the possibili- ties of subversive activity in the present emergency, may be indicated generally by the statistical information given below. Aliens in U. S.: German ------343, 000 Russian------244, 000 Italian------500, 000 Japanese------40, 000 All others------2, 373', 000

3, 500, 000

Naturalized Americans of indicated origin: German------1, 380, 000 Russian ------725, 000 Italian------900, 000 All others-- 4,------995, 000 8, 000, 000 Number in Communist Party (active) ------100, 000 Number in Communist Front Organizations and sympathizers------500, 000 2. German Fifth Colvnk n activities in Norway' (0. N. I.)-(a) The German Fifth Column activities in Norway were primarily in the hands of the German Minister, under whom were high ranking and efficient military and naval attaches. There were numerous consuls, press attaches, commercial attaches, businessmen, and travel bureaus, who worked directly under the Minister and his military advisors. All of these men were military or naval officers and each had as his mission to- (1) Get accurate data for military maps for their locality showing all military objectives, roads, communications, etc. (2) Be ready to lead German forces, upon landing, to their immediate objectives. (3) Be ready to destroy all Norwegian communications immediately upon invasion, and to take over these communications for their own purpose. (4) Be in close contact with Nazi sympathizers and arrange for accurate espionage work. (5) Encourage discontent between police and military officers and the labor government, and generally to foment political discontent. (6) Arrange for efficient signal communications between their agents and the German armed forces in event of hostility. (b) The United States Naval Attache, Oslo, had occasion to see the German military maps of several sections of Norway. They were complete in every respect and far more accurate than any maps used by the Norwegians. The best Norwegian maps were ordinary automobile road maps. The other Norwegian maps were old, made on polyconic projections, and were etched so much that it was very 259762-40-2 difficult to pick anything out of them. The German maps were, on the other hand, both complete and easy to read. There is no question but that the Germans had made their own maps, with all military roads, objectives, etc., placed on them by expert cartographers. 3. Familiarization of German officers with Norwoegian territory.- The United States Naval Attache, Oslo, talked to numerous German officers while in Norway. For several years past many of them told of their vacations spent in Norway. They all "loved" Norway and were sorry they had to occupy her to save her from the Allies. The naval officers at Bergen spent weeks every summer yachting in and around Bergen. This was true of other naval officers at Stavenger and Oslo. Army officers seemed to like the various valleys, and had fished at all the prominent fishing streams. Undoubtedly, the key officers, both naval and military, in every advance column, were thoroughly familiar with every part of the territory assigned to them. They were, of course, greatly aided by the exact local knowledge of their ever-present "consuls" or attaches. In several known cases, the Norwegians were trapped by the Germans due to the Germans having a far better knowledge of the roads in that vicinity than they did. 4. The Nazi Party in Noroway.-The Nazi Party in Norway, was small and not very powerful. The leader, Vidkrun Quisling had been Minister of Defense in Norway in 1932 and 1933, but his political power had declined at a rapid rate since that time. At the time of the occupation, his party was not represented in the Parliament and a conservative estimate of his party's strength in Norway was only between 5,000 and 7,000 voters. However, Quisling was a frequent visitor to Germany, and only a few days before the occupation, he had had a personal interview with Hitler. During Quisling's time as Minister of Defense, he planted many of his men in important military posts where they remained until the occupation. The labor government's policy of totally neglecting Army matters left these Quisling followers a fertile field for pro-Nazi activity. This explains how, in certain places, Norwegian resistance collapsed before any damage had been done. 5. Other Nazi influences in Norway.-The Nazi Secret Service had been busy in Norway for years. One of their main channels for corruption and intrigue was the Nordische Gesellschaft with branches throughout all of the Scandinavian countries. Ostensibly founded for the purpose of spreading "Nordic Culture," the Gesellschaft was a vast network of espionage and treachery. German business houses, travel bureaus, and their representatives held many secret German agents who organized an efficient spy service and, in some cases, carried on sabotage work. The Norwegian occupied areas at the start of the occupation were completely organized for German spies, with efficient communication by short-wave radio to German headquarters. These spies were also efficient in giving signals to the German Air Force for local attacks. Secret agents were known to be in the Norwegian forces. As an example of one way in which these agents affected the Norwegian forces, a report from General Erichsen (Norwegian First Division at Fredrikstad) is quoted: So as to throw some light on the conditions under which the divisional staff worked and the opinion which the enemy had of the divisional staff, I might mention the following: 9

Owing to information given by the commander with regard to certain influences in the district, conditions which also became apparent to the division, the latter found it necessary to try to keep the whereabouts of the divisional staff secret, so that virtually only the telephone staff and the orderlies were informed of the quarters of the divisional staff. When it became obvious on Friday, the 11th instant, that the whereabouts were known in the district the quarters were immediately changed. The same evening in the dusk a car full of young men in Norwegian uniforms came roaring up to the old quarters and occupied them. A young man in a lieutenant's uniform and armed with a pistol forced his way in and asked for the staff. When he was told that they had moved and no one knew where it was, he made a remark to this effect: "Then we'd better continue to look for them." This occurred on Friday evening right in the center of a district occupied by Nor- wegian troops and between Mysen and Askim. CHAPTER II

EVENTS IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE OCCUPATION (ONI)

1. The "Aitmark" incident.-The tender Altmark, which accompanied the armored pocket battleship Graf Spee, was boarded by the crew of H. M. S. Cossack in Joessing Fjord on February 16, 1940. At this time about 299 British prisoners were rescued. The Altmark finally reached Kiel 011 March 27. The British use of armed force in this case was considered by the Norwegians the most flagrant breach of their neutrality. Their excuse for not resisting the British was that they had only two small torpedo boats against a whole division of British destroyers. The Germans, on their part, used this affair as proof that the Norwegians did not desire to maintain neutrality, and their controlled newspapers made much over this. It was an incident that prepared the German people, to a large extent, for the German occupation of Norway. It was not, however, in any way, a direct reason for the occupation; this reason can be found only in the German War Plans prepared many years before. 2. German press propagana.-The German-controlled press always prepared the German people for events that were to follow. Beginning with the Altmark affair, the German press consistently pointed out how Norway failed to enforce her neutrality, and, according to them, was actually working hand in hand with the Allies. Knowing how the Germans had, in a similar manner, prepared the way for the occupation of Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, it was a foregone conclusion that the occupation of Norway was only a question of time. However, strangely enough, the German press was ominously silent for a week or more before the occupation, and this silence was instrumental in throwing the Allies off their guard. 3. Return of German merchant ships.-During the months of Jan- uary and February, German merchant ships from many parts of the world succeeded in reaching Germany through Norwegian waters. The Norwegian patrols knew this and actually escorted many of them through their inland passages. Official Norwegian sources showed that from February 1 to 17, 22 German merchant ships entered Ger- man ports via Norwegian waters. 4. Proposed Allied aid to Finland.-The proposed Allied aid to Finland was another excuse used by the Germans for the occupation of Norway, but, as mentioned before, it had no bearing on it at all. While the British had numerous vice consuls in all Norwegian ports, they do not appear to have been naval officers who could really plan for the landing of troops. A French assistant naval attach6, who travelled continuously over the west coast of Norway during January and February, was looking for landing facilities for from four to eight divisions. His work was never completed. It is not believed that the Allies had key officers who really knew the Norwegian coast.

(10) In this respect they were certainly far behind the Germans. It was the difference between the "on the spur of the moment" plan of the Allies and the long range, thorough plan of the Germans. 5. Allied mining of Norwegian waters.-On April 8, the,Allies announced they had mined three areas in Norwegian waters, one at West

Haiburg -. T GERMA N' Y April 8. Allied mining of Norwegian waters. Fjord just south of Narvik, one at Hustadvik about 80 kilometers south of Trondheim, and the other at Stadtlandet about midway between Bergen and Hustadvik. German troopships had already entered Narvik and Trondheim. These mine fields, if laid, could not have been guarded, or could not have been effective, as they offered no problem to German naval vessels and other transports that passed these places from April 7 to 9. The main German occupational forces had left from Baltic ports as early as April 4. Other disguised transports had left earlier. There is strong suspicion that these mine fields may have

Genan transport, disguised as collier, unloading mobile antiaircraft gun at Troldh eim. been only proposed mine fields. At this time. the Reynaud government, strongly pro-British, in France was about to be overthrown, and Laval, an anti-British and pro-Italian, was to be asked to form a new government. To avoid this, the British, earlier than they desired, published the news about the miue fields in Norwegian waters. It is very likely that the British destroyer mine layers, reported at sea on April 9, were there to lay out these mine fields. 6. German "eivilians" enter Uslo.-During the week preceding the occupation, numerous young Germans entered Oslo, ostensibly for business reasons. The hotels were full of them. These were German soldiers, who were all in uniform, compeltely equipped, and ready for duty on Tuesday morning, April 9. They were used to take over the radio, telephone, and telegraph stations, tried to capture King Haakon, and did capture important military stores, such as gasoline, and protected them until the arrival of other troops. Many were used for signaling to the bombers that came in after daylight, and others sent confusing orders over the telegraph, telephone, and radio to Norwegian commanders at various points.

Oslo, capital and largest city in Norway.

7. German transportsenter Norwegian harbors.- German transports carrying troops and equipment were known to be in the ports of Nar- vik, Trondheinm, and Bergen, and possibly in other ports, from 1 day to 2 weeks before the occupation of April 9. All of these had used Nor- wegian pilots and many had been escorted by Norwegian patrol boats. One of these in Narvik had used American colors. 8. Germanpsychology (note by U. S. N. A., Oslo).-On April 7, the German Minister showed moving pictures of the German-Polish campaign to many of the high Norwegian officials, and Members of Par- liament. It was a striking lesson to them of what should happen if Germany should occupy Norway. 14

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^.,, i '' .att At 7 p. mi., Monday, April 8, the German Naval Attache swore under oath as an officer and a gentleman to Captain Steen, Norwegian liaison officer, that Germany would not touch Norway "tonight." He was technically truthful but only by a few hours. The German Assistant Naval Attache for Air entertained Captain Steen at a very sociable and delightful dinner Monday from 8 p. m. to midnight. The Assistant Naval Attache got into uniform immediately after and a few hours later was killed as he led some of his "civilian" German soldiers on an expedition to capture King Haakon. 9. England's abortive attempt to capture Narvik.-From most reliable authority, England had a force of well-equipped and well-trained men, numbering about 25,000, which sailed from English ports on April 3, under heavy escort, to capture Narvik. Due to misunder- standings with the French High Command, the English gave orders

Kongsvingcr, 80 kilometers northeast of Oslo. Important Railroad Center. On main line Oslo-Stockholmn Railroad and( junction to Kongsviger-Trond- heiml Railroad via Osterdahlo Valley. for this force to return on April 5. The force landed in English ports on April 7, and was immediately dispatched to France, the naval escort returning to its bases. The English had no trained troops available for duty in Norway after April 7. News of this abortive attempt became known to the Germans only after the retreat of the English from Namsos on May 1. Had this English force landed in Narvik, there might have been a far different story. 10. Indications of a German invasion.-(a) Press reports from Copenhagen indicate a concentration of German troops and transports in Baltic ports, on Thursday, April 4. (b) Press rumors from Copenhagen indicate intense activity at Baltic ports on Friday, April 5. (c) Ship movements out of Baltic ports reported Saturday, April 6. (d) Definite movements of German transports and naval units heading north in Kattegat on April 7. (e) April 7, a British plane of the coastal defense on reconnaissance flight on eastern side of North Sea sighted,, shortly after noon, a large naval force escorting transports heading north. The pilot failed to report by radio, and only mentioned the contact verbally upon return to base some 4 hours later. A squadron of bombers was sent out from an east coast base, but failed to make contact. The

Elveruni, 90 kilometers north of Kongsvinger on Kongsvinger-Trondheim Rail- road. This town was completely destroyed by German bombs.

Commander in Chief Home Fleet was not informed of this movement of the Germans until too late for him to intercept them. (f) German troop transport, Rio de Janeiro, out of Hamburg, was sunk off south coast of Norway by Polish submarine, with loss of 150 German soldiers on April 8. Another 150 soldiers were rescued by Norwegian patrol boats. German tanker, Posidonia, out of Ham- burg, also headed north, sunk by British submarine on April 8, near Stavern. (g) German transports and naval vessels recognized at many places on Norwegian coast on afternoon and evening of April 8. Fredrikstad, 90 kilometers south of Oslo on eastern entrance of Oslo Fjord. HeadquartersNorwegian First Division. It was bombed on April 11 to scat- ter troops mobilizing there.

ROros, 200 kilometers north of Elverum on Kongsvinger-Trondheim Railroad. Stategic Copper Mining District. 18

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410 CHAPTER III

GERMAN MEMORANDUM TO NORWAY-GERMAN PROC- LAMATION TO NORWAY-EARLY MORNING EVENTS

1. German mnemorandum.-About 5 a. m. on April 9, after German forces had already launched their attacks on Norway, the German Minister presented the following memorandum to the Norwegian Foreign Minister. The memorandum was referred by him to the Norwegian Government, which was already assembled, and it was unanimously rejected. [Translation]

MEMORANDUM FROM THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT TO THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT

Contrary to the sincere desire of the German people and its Government to live in peace and friendship with the English and French peoples, and despite the absence of any sensible reason for mutual conflict, the rulers in London and Paris declared war on the German people. On starting this war of aggression which they had long prepared and which is aimed against the integrity of the German Reich and the existence of the German people, England and France also opened a naval war against the neutral world. When, to begin with, they attempted, in complete disregard of the most primi- tive rules of international law, to establish a hunger-blockade against German women, children, and old men, they simultaneously subjected the neutral states to their ruthless blockade measures. The direct result of these illegal methods of fighting which were inaugurated by England and France and which Germany had to meet with its measures of counterattack, was most severe injury to neutral shipping and neutral trade. Over and above this, however, the English action delivered an annihilating blow to the concept of neutrality itself. For its part, Germany has nevertheless endeavored to preserve the rights of the neutrals in seeking to restrict the naval war to the zones. of the sea which lie between Germany and its adversaries. England, on the other hand, aiming to divert the danger from its islands, and at the same time to put an end to trade between Germany and the neutral world, has sought more and more to carry the naval war into the waters of the neutrals. In pursuit of this typical British method of warfare, England has, in flagrant breach of international law, to an ever-increasing extent committed warlike acts at sea and in the air in the territorial waters and in the sovereign territory of Norway. Germany foresaw this development from the very beginning of the war. Through its internal and external economic policy it has been able to prevent the attempt of the British hunger-blockade against the German people and the severing of German trade with neutral countries. This has in recent months revealed the complete collapse of the British blockade policy to an ever-increasing degree. This development, as well as the hopelessness of the direct attack on the German western fortifications, and the constantly increasing anxiety in England and France at the successful counterattacks at sea and in the air, have recently led the two countries to an increased degree to endeavor by all available means to bring about a shift in the theater of war to the neutral continent in and out of Europe. That England and France direct their attention here primarily toward the territories of the small European states is in accordance with Brit- ish tradition and goes without saying. The English and French statesmen have in recent months quite openly proclaimed the extension of the war to these

(19) 20 areas as the fundamental strategic ideas of their conduct of the war. The first opportunity to do this was offered by the Russo-Finnish conflict. The English and French Governments declared publicly that they were determined to intervene with military forces in the conflict between the Soviet Union and Finland, and for that purpose to use the territory of the Nordic states as a basis of

2Aa

operations. Only the speedy conclusion of peace in the north, which took place contrary to their wishes and expectations, prevented them from carrying out this resolve at that time. When the English and French statesmen subsequently declared that they intended to make the carrying out of the action dependent on the consent of the Nordic countries involved, that is a crude untruth. The Reich Government has in its possession documentary proof that England and France had jointly decided to carry out this action through the territory of the Nordic countries even against their will if necessary. e7

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"N But the decisive point is the following: From the attitude of the French and English Governments before and after the Russo-Finnish War conclusion of peace, and from the evidence available to the Reich Government, it is clear beyond all doubt that the decision to aid Finland against Russia was also intended to serve still further plans. The additional aim pursued by England and France in Scandinavia in this connection was, and still is: (1) To cut cff Germany from its northern ore supplies by occupying Narvik. (2) By thus landing Anglo-French forces in the Scandinavian countries, to establish a new front for a flank attack on Germany from the north. The intention here is that the countries of the north should serve as theaters of war for the Anglo-French troops, while the Nordic peoples should, in accordance with the old English tradition, assume the role of auxiliary and mercenary troops. When this plan was temporarily foiled by the Russo-Finnish conclusion of peace, the Reich Government obtained ever clearer knowledge that England and France were undertaking certain definite efforts to realize their intentions as quickly as possible in another form. In the constant endeavor to prepare for an intervention in the north, the English and French Governments have in recent weeks quite openly proclaimed the thesis that there can be no neutrality in this war, and that it is the duty of the small nations to participate actively in the struggle against Germany. This thesis was spread abroad by the propaganda of the Western Powers, and supported by attempts at steadily increasing political pressure on the neutral states. The concrete news reports of impending attempts of the Western Powers to land in Scandinavia have recently become more and more numerous. But if even the slightest doubt could have remained as to the definitive determination of the Western Powers to intervene in the north, it has been finally eliminated during the past few days: The Reich Government has come into possession of unimpeachable evidence that England and France intend to carry out a surprise occupation of certain areas' in the northern countries in the very next few days. The northern countries for their part have not only failed to offer any resistance to the acts of interference thus far committed by England and France, but have even tolerated the most serious intervention in their sovereign rights without taking suitable counter measures. The Reich Government must therefore assume that the Royal Norwegian Government will likewise take the same attitude toward the actions of England and France which are now planned and about to be carried out. But even if the Royal Norwegian Government were determined to take counter-measures, the Reich Government fully realizes that the Norwegian military forces would not suffice to oppose the Anglo-French actions successfully. In this decisive phase of the struggle for existence which has been imposed upon the German people by England and France, however, the Reich Government can under no circumstances permit that Scandinavia be made into a theater of war against Germany by the Western Powers, and that the Norwegian people, whether directly or indirectly, be misused for the war against Germany. Germany does not intend to stand idly by and permit the realization of such plans by its adversaries. The Reich Government is thereby assuming the protection of the Kingdom of Norway during this war. It is determined from now on to defend and finally safeguard the peace in the north against any Anglo-French attack by all the means at its disposal. The Reich Government did not desire this development. The responsibility for it is borne solely by England and France. Both countries, to be sure, hypo- critically proclaimed the protection of the small countries. In reality, however, they commit violence against them in the hope that they will thus be able to carry out their determination to annihilate Germany, which they proclaim more and more openly every day. The German troops, accordingly,. are not entering Norwegian territory with hostile intent. The German High Command does not intend to use the points occupied by the German troops as a base of operation in the struggle against England, as long as it is not compelled to do so by measures taken by England and France. Rather, the German military operations have only the aim of safeguarding the north against the intended occupation of Norwegian bases by Anglo-French forces. The Reich Government is convinced that by this action it is also serving the interests of Norway. For this security, provided by the German armed forces, offers the Scandinavian peoples the only guarantee that their countries will not, after all, become a battlefield during this war and perhaps the scene of the most frightful fighting. The Reich Government therefore expects the Royal Norwegian Government and the Norwegian people to understand the Germ'an action and to offer no resistance of any sort to it. Any resistance would have to be, and would be,

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crushed by the German forces with all available means and would therefore only lead to completely useless bloodshed. The Royal Norwegian Government is accordingly requested to take, with the greatest possible speed, all measures 259762-40 3 to insure that the advance of the German troops may take place without friction or difficulties. In the spirit of the good German-Norwegian relations which have always existed, the Reich Government declares to the Royal Norwegian Government that Germany does not intend by its measures to infringe the territorial integrity or political independence of the Kingdom of Norway, either now or in the future.

APRIL 9,1940: 2. German proclamnation.-One of the first acts of the German commander upon arrival in Norway was the publication of the following proclamation: [Translation]

PROcLAMATION TO THE ARMED FORCES AND POPULATION OF NORWAY

Without any reason, and contrary to the sincere desire of the German people and its government to live in peace and friendship with the English and French peoples, the rulers of England and France declared war on Germany in Sep- tember of last year. It was, and is, their intention, if possible, to bring about decisions in theaters of war which are further removed and therefore less dangerous to France and England, in the hope that it would not be possible for Germany to oppose them there effectively. For this reason England has, among other things, continually disregarded the sovereign territory and sovereign waters of Norway. * * * It has constantly endeavored to make Scandinavia into a theater of war. When an outward excuse for this appeared no longer to exist, as a result of the Russo-Finnish conclusion of peace, it was publicly announced and threatened that the German commercial traffic in Norwegian * * * territorial waters in the North Sea would no longer be tolerated. It was declared that (Eng- land) would itself assume police authority there. Finally, all steps were taken to obtain by surprise possession of the bases on the Norwegian coast which would be necessary for this purpose. The greatest war agitator of the century, Churchill, who had already worked to the detriment of mankind in the first World War, stated openly that he was not willing to allow himself to be restrained by "scraps of paper and legal agreements or neutral rights." He it was who prepared the blow against the Norwegian * * * coast. Several days ago, he was appointed the responsible chief of the entire British conduct of the war. The German Government has thus far watched the measures taken by this man. But it cannot permit that a new theater of war should now be created at the behest of the Anglo-French warmakers. These attempts have been known to the Norwegian * * * Government for months. Their attitude has likewise been no secret to the German Government. They are neither willing nor able to offer effective resistance to the English incursion. For this reason, therefore, Germany has resolved to forestall this English aggression and to assume protection of the neutrality of the Kingdom of Norway * * * with its own forces and thereby to provide them definitely with security for the duration of the war. It is, accordingly, not the intention of the German Government to obtain a base of operations against Eng- land by this means, but exclusively to aim to prevent Scandinavia from be- coming the battlefield for the extension of the war by England. For this purpose strong German forces have, since this morning, taken military possession of important objectives in Norway * * *. Agreements are at present being reached regarding these measures between the German Reich Government and the Royal Norwegian Government. These are intended fully to observe and safeguard the integrity of the Kingdom, the preservation of its armed forces, the freedom of the Norwegian people, and the future independence of that country. Pending the conclusion of these negotiations, it must be expected of the clearsightedness of the armed forces as well as the common sense and good- will of the populuation and of all administrative authorities that they refrain from any passive or active resistance. This would be completely useless and would only be crushed by all available means. All military and civil authorities are therefore called upon to establish immediate contact with the German military commanders. R~omsdal Valley bctwcen Dom bas and Andalsnes. Railroad and auto road shown. The population should go about its usual daily work and see to it that peace and order are maintained ! But from now on the German armed forces will see to the safeguarding of the country against English attacks. The German Commander: (Signed) voN FALKENHORST. 3. Early morning attempt to capture King.-The following report by a Norwegian staff officer describes the German attempt to capture the King, in which the German Assistant Naval Attache was killed:

REPORT BY A STAFF OFFICER CONCERNING CERTAIN OPERATIONS LEADING UP TO HAMAR

During my stay in Oslo my nephew, Knut Bache, got the following account from his friend J. Kobro, whom I also know: Kobro was stopped by the Germans in his private car and ordered to drive to Hamar with a German detachment of 96 men. The German officer in commend took his seat next to Kobro in his car which went first. The German was an educated and fairly decent fellow, and as Kobro speaks fluent German a guarded conversation sprung up between the two of them while they drove along. Kobro gave his opinion of the coup, and the German replied, among other things, that he was forced to the conclusion that most of the German officers considered that they had by and large a grim task to perform in Norway, and he agreed that the way they had set to work was not above discussion. But, he said, their object was to smash England. They had worked for that for 20 years, and they would shrink from no means to attain their end. The task of the detachment was to try to get into touch with the King or the Government who were presumed to be at Hamar. On the way they suddenly saw in front of them a Norwegian force of 3001 dragoons on the march, fully equipped, but without any sort of rear-guard or other precautions. Before they could lift a hand they were surrounded by the Germans who soon disarmed them, whereupon they were placed in the cars under guard. The dragoons were commanded by Major Quist. The motorized column then proceeded north, but was shortly afterward stopped when fire was opened on them from a line of Norwegian soldiers who had taken up their positions. The German air attache in Oslo, who was with the detachment, was killed, but otherwise the Germans had no losses. The German commander immediately had the column halted, got hold of Major Quist, put a flag of truce into his hand and ordered him to fetch the officer in command of the Norwegian force. He approached, and the German said that they were going to get to Hamar, whether they were fired at or not. The Norwegian commander replied that they would not be allowed to pass. The German then showed him the 300 Norwegian dragoons and pointed out that they would be used to cover the Germans. The Norwegian commander refused to give any guarantee that there would be no firing, and the parleying then ceased. The Norwegian dragoons were therefore ordered to stand up in the cars with their hands in the air and in such a way that they covered the Germans. The commander ordered Kobro to keep well down and to drive at full speed, remark- ing that they had a 50' percent chance of getting through. In this way the German force got through without fire being opened by the Norwegians. Once more the column passed a defended Norwegian position in the same way. In one of the places the German commander had stopped after they passed through and had gone out to inspect the Norwegian position and especially the position of a Norwegian field gun, for which he expressed his admiration. He said he had been with the Army in Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, but in none of these places had he seen anything approaching the excellence of the Norwegian use and adaptation of road blocks and their use of country. He said that they could never have got through without being covered by the Norwegian dragoons. He also expressed the opinion that he could not imagine that the Norwegians would resist at all, as they would be forced to admit that it was quite hopeless. To this Kobro answered that it was not a question of that: We would defend ourselves at all costs. In this connection I can affirm that Oslo is full of young boys and grown men who are going about just waiting for a chance to slip away so that they can join up and fight. This is also reflected in German-controlled Oslo newspapers, which daily contain warnings from the German commander directed against those who tried to slip out or who help men of military age to get away. Thus it was forbidden for men between the ages of 16 and 50 to travel south or west within the occupied areas. There was a list of the various acts which would result in the offender being shot out of hand. People who supported the Norwegian mobilization would be brought before a German military tribunal. Likewise people who helped to conceal Englishmen or Frenchmen, etc. Kristiansand, hill in near background to right is fort.

Air view Kristiansand, south coast port of Norway, taken by R. A. F. from 9,000 feet on April 10 showing destruction of 10,000-ton German merchant ship. Fort at Kristiansand is immediately to right of burning vessel. Stavanger, 160 kilometers northwest of Kristiansand. Sole airport is 20 kilometers south of town. Large navy air base is near Sole.

Bergen,, wcest coast port, 160 kilometers north of Stavanger. The "Konigsberg" was moored to the far side and an ammunnition ship to the near side of quay shown on right center. The quay and both ships were destroyed by British dive bombers. Oil storage tanks right rear were also destroyed. 4. Germans take over radio, telegraph, and telephone.-The Nor- wegian order for mobilization was given about 5 a. m. or a little later. A very short time later, the Germans were able to secure control of the radio station and immediately sent orders counter- manding the mobilization order. They sent other orders, ostensibly coming from proper Norwegian authority, of such a confusing nature that no one could understand what was wanted. They got control of the telegraph lines and were able to send orders to various post commanders to surrender their posts and not to fire on the Germans. Each Norwegian commander had to dletermine for himself how to interpret the strange orders he received. Within a few

Trondheim, /130 kilometers northeast of Bergen, an important seaport with short and direct railroad line to Sweden and two railroad lines to Oslo, one via Gudbransdal valley and other via Osterdal valley. hours, Oslo was cut off from telephone communication with com- munities outside the city proper. By evening, as far as communications were concerned, Norway was split into hundreds of isolated regions. 5. German insight into Norwegian character.-Quoted here are the instructions given the German soldiers in their conduct toward and treatment of the Norwegian populace. These instructions were probably prepared long before the troops arrived in Norway.

[Full translation]

DIRECTIONS FOR GERMAN SOLDIERS IN NORWAY

All soldiers must realize that they have not entered an enemy country but that the troops have come to protect the country and its inhabitants. Therefore, observe the following: (1) Norwegians have a distinct policy of patriotism. Moreover, the Nor- wegian people feel themselves strongly bound to the other Nordic peoples. Therefore, avoid everything that can hurt their feelings of national honor. (2) Norwegians are liberty-loving and individualistic. They refuse all force and all subordination. They do not like military discipline and authority. Therefore, few commands, no harsh words ! They fill Norwegians vith disgust and are without effect. Explain and persuade in a matter-of-fact way ! One gets farthest with a sense of humor. Unnecessary sharpness and patronization wounds their self-respect. (3) Norwegians (compared with Fresian peasants) are reticent and reserved, slow to think and act and suspicious of foreigners. Therefore, no excited tempo! Take things quietly. (4) Norwegian homes are, according to old Germanic tradition, sacred. Hospitality is gladly given. Property is inalienable. Homes are unlocked. Theft is almost unknown and is considered very shameful. Therefore, avoid every unjustified encroachment, even when goods are easy to get at. Filching and pilfering are considered theft nnd are forbidden under all circumstances. (5) Norvegians have no understanding of var. The seafaring and commercial people feel sympathy for England. They fear Russia. With few exceptions there is no understanding of the aims of National Socialism. There- fore, avoid political discussions ! (6) Norwegians love a comfortable domestic existence. They can be won with friendliness, by small attentions and by having their persons respected. Therefore, no forvard behavior, especially toward women ! (7) German is understood almost everywhere if it is spoken slowly and distinctly.

Narvik, 670 kilometers northeast of Trondheim. Mail shipping port for Swedish i~on ore. CHAPTER IV

OPERATIONS ON APRIL 9, 1940

GERMAN NAVAL PLAN OF INVASION

On March 27, German merchant ships were concentrating at Kiel. By April 5, it was known that units of the war fleet and a sizable number of troops were being concentrated in the sector of Rostock- Warnemunde and that of Stetten-Swinemunde. Many merchant ships, loaded with troops and equipment left these areas and arrived at Norwegian west coast ports prior to April 9. By April 3, most of the available German submarines are known to have left their bases and their distribution is known to be as follows: Ten submarines along the coast of Norway from Aalesund to Narvik, their mission probably consisting of preventing the Allied forces from entering the Fjords of Trondheim and Narvik. Seventeen submarines posted between the Shetlands and Norway, their mission consisting in protecting the approaches to Bergen and Stavanger, and controlling the movements of the British Home Fleet. Three submarines in the vicinity of the coast of Scotland. Three submarines off the Shetland Islands and as far away as the Faroe Islands.

NoTE.-These submarines sank five merchant ships in the vicinity of Scot- land, Faroe Islands, and the Shetlands and one British supply ship at Aalesund. They attacked, but without success, the Allied troops transported to Norway. All of them were ineffective against high-speed and well-escorted convoys. One submarine was sunk by Allied escort vessels in Vaags Fjord. Three others are believed to have been sunk and an additional four damaged. For the occupation of Bergen, Trondheim, and Narvik, the Ger- mans concentrated at Wilhemshaven, the Scharnhorst, Hipper, nine destroyers, and three light cruisers with a few torpedo boats which we will call group A. For the occupation of Kristiansand and Stavanger, the Germans concentrated at Kiel the Gneisenau, Admiral Scheer, Karlsrmhe, and some destroyers and torpedo boats which we will call group B. For the occupation of Oslo, the Germans concentrated at Kiel, the former pocket battleship Deutchland, the heavy cruiser Blucker, light cruiser Emden and some torpedo boats which we will call group C. Group A left their base about midnight April 6-7, and proceeded at high speed to the north. On the morning of the 7th, a part of this force, a cruiser and six destroyers was sighted by a British aircraft but failed to report them immediately. That afternoon the whole group was attacked unsuccessfully by the R. A. F. and due to (31) bad weather, contact with them was lost. On the 8th at daylight the British destroyer Glowworn was sunk 140 miles west-northwest of Namsos by the Hipper. It appears that the Hipper and the nine destroyers had left the others and were making high speed toward Narvik. That afternoon the Sharnhorst, light cruisers and torpedo boats were sighted heading west about 100 miles northwest of Trond- heim, apparently marking time. The Sharnhorst and Hipper were there to cover the operations. At daybreak on the 9th, the nine destroyers entered Narvik, two light cruisers arrived at Bergen and one light cruiser and the torpedo boats arrived at Trondheim. On the afternoon of the 9th the Hipper and Sharnhorst were together about 75 miles southwest of Lofoten Island and engaged H. M. S. Renown which was on patrol in this vicinity. After a short engagement, the Scarnhorst and Hipper escaped to the southward in a heavy snow storm. The Hipper proceeded to Trondheim where she arrived on the 10th, the Sharnhorst continuing to cover the operations until the 11th. On the 11th the Sharnhorst and Hipper, one light cruiser (Koln) joined near Stavanger and proceeded to the southward where they were joined by the Gneisenau on the 12th. All these were sighted the morning of the 12th headed eastward off the southern coast of Norway en route to Kiel. Groups B and C left Kiel the morning of the 8th and were sighted on the way across the Grand Belt and again in the afternoon they were sighted crossing the Kattegat. The Gneisenau and Scheer covered the operatings off the southern and southwestern coasts of Norway. On the morning of the 9th, the Karlsruhe and several destroyers entered Kristiansand. Other destroyers entered Stavanger. The Karlsruhe was sunk either by gunfire from the fort or by torpedo from the British submarine Truant. The Scheer was badly damaged by a torpedo. Group C entered Oslo Fjord and occupied Oslo on the 9th. The Blucher and two torpedo boats were sunk and the Emden badly damaged. The Deutchland left Oslo on the 10th to return to base. The British Home Fleet left Scapa Flow the night of April 7-8 and headed northwest. On the 11th, it was known to be about 30 miles off Namsos but it never made contact with the Germans. Ap- parently the Germans were kept well informed of the location of the Home Fleet by their air force and submarines and were able to keep clear of it. Bad weather interfered with the operation of the British observation planes and they were unable to locate the Germans. 1. Oslo.-(a) Action in Oslo Fjord.-Report to the King from the chief of staff to Admiral Smith Johannsen concerning the fight at Horten and in the Oslo Fjord on April 8-9, 1940. Having in the course of Monday, April 8, received from the Naval Defense High Command in Oslo certain information which pointed to impending movements of a critical nature, the personnel of the first naval defense area were given orders with regard to certain steps to be taken, so as to be prepared to make effective use of the small forces at our disposal at short notice. The chief of the first naval defense area issued orders to the district commanders and naval forces under his command that vigilance should be intensi- fied and that material and ships should be ready for immediate use. In the afternoon-as far as I can remember at about 4:30 p. m.-the chief of the first naval defense area received order' from the admiral in chief that the First Minelaying Division should proceed to load up with mines, but not to lay any until further orders were forthcoming. Upon closer consideration the chief Group A: Leaves Wilhelmshaven night April 6-7 and occupy Bergen, Trond- heim, and Narvik. "Hipper" sinks "Glowwiorm" April 8. "Sharnhorst," "Hip- per," "Renown" engage April 9. Group B : Leaves Kiel April 8 and occupy Stravanger and Kristiansand. Group C: Leaves Kiel April 8 and occupy Oslo Fjord and Oslo. of the first naval defense area suggested by telephone to the naval defen high command that lighthouses and beacons should be extinguished imme( ately in accordance with the staff regulations. This was approved. Hort( and Karljohansvern were blacked-out, and on the authority of the O. C. nav

Germans occupy 0 Narvik, Trondheim, ® Kristiansand, and 0 Bergen, Oslo on April 9.

defense, orders were given to the Outer Oslofjord Defense area to instrui the director of the Vestfold Power Station to black out the whole of Vestfol About 11 p. m. we received a report from the outer Oslofjord defense ar( way in. This information was nassed on to the naval defense high command, Oscarborg, Kristiansand area command, as well as to vessels directly under their command and also to outposts at Karljohansvern and other places within the district. The information was likewise passed on immediately to the 0. C. first district command, General Erichsen. The police at Karljohansvern were then ordered to arrange for the immediate evacuation of the civil population. The officer commanding the infantry company which had been posted to Karl- johansvern was ordered to keep his force in readiuess to beat off any possible attempli to effect a landing, and likewise the antiaircraft command was ordered

The configation of Oslo Fjord shows how compltely thc Norwegians must have been taken by surprise for the Nazis to penetrate these waters, evcn at the cost of heavy losses.

to be prepared. The draft of recruits on board the training ships were new- comers, and had as yet received no military training whatsoever. The officer in charge of recruit training was therefore ordered to take them all with him and march out of the town so that they might be safe. The Olaf Trygvason, whose departure from Karljohansvern after being re- fitted had been delayed, was ordered to tie up to a buoy in the harbor, so as to be ready for action, and the minesweepers Otra and Rauura, which had been ordered to make ready to proceed to the second naval defense area, were now ordered to get steam up and prepare to guard the entrance to the naval harbor. As some time passed, after the first report that Bolarne was engaged in battle, without our receiving any further information, I telephoned to the 0. C., outer Oslofjord defense area, Commander Tandberg Hansen, and asked if there were any further details to hand, and whether Rauoy was involved in the action. The commander reported that no further information had come in, and that there was mist in the fjord, which rendered observation difficult. Meanwhile we. would try to get into touch with the forts. A little while later the commander telephoned me and reported that several unidentified warships had sailed up past both Rauoy and Bolarne and that Rauoy had only managed to fire four shots. A few hours then elapsed without our getting any fresh reports either from the outer Oslofjord defense area or Oscarborg, and we were thus in complete ignorance as to the identity of the vessels which had sailed past. It had not

Forncbo Airport. Oslo. Germans hare gractly enlargcd it. It is built on solid rock and is almost impervious to bombings

been possible to ascertain the nationality of the ships, and as they had not, as far as we knew, replied to the fire from the fort, there was a possibility that they were British ships, trying to get in before the German ships which had been reported to be on their way north through Danish waters. The O. C. first naval defense area decided therefore to send out a minesweeper so as to try and identify the intruders. The officers in command of the minesweepers were reservists with comparatively little military experience. The admiral was therefore of the opinion that it would be best if one of the staff officers went with them. I suggested that I should go myself, and to this the admiral agreed. I first went on board the minesweeper Rauma, commanded by Reservist Lieu- tenant Wisnes, but as she was not yet ready to get under weigh, I gave the commander instructions to guard the entrance to Veslos in accordance with the decision of the 0. C. naval defense. and went out in her sister ship, the Otrca, under the comnmand of Reserve Captain Dabli, as this vessel was ready to move off. The time was then about 2 a. inm. of April 9. Shortly before I left the staff I had been in telephone communication with the 0. C. first minelaying division, who informed me that the mines would be on board, ready for laying, in about 1 hour's time. Meanwhile the O. C. first naval defense area had received instructions from the admiral in chief not to have mines laid before further orders were received, as he hinted that there was a chance of help coming from England. Immedliately behind the Otra, the submarine B2, under Cant. Stranger Jo- hannesen, left Knrljohansvern, so as to try to get in past Oscarsborg, as had been decided by the chief for naval defense. The B2 had been laid up for inspection and repairs at Karljohansvern. She had no torpedoes or weapons on board, could not dive, and could only use one engine for surface cruising.

German staf ofiicr.s arriving in Oslo April 9

After a conference with the chief for naval dlefense the Otra sailed off with her navigation lights on, the idea being if possible to get close enough to the intruders to parley and to protest against the intentional violations of neutrality. The Otra's small gun was after all not a weapon seriously to threaten a warship; and as the ship had only recently been commissioned, the crew had not yet had a chance of firing the aun. We first sailed from Vealls toward Gullholmen, but swung round in mid- fjord and set a south-southeast course, so as to steam out a stretch and look for the intruding warships. It was misty. Almost just off Basty lighthouse we caught sight of a darkened ship on our starboard bow, which looked like a warship. We continued to steer toward her and when about 200 yards from her we turned on our searchlight, and at the same time I had a boat made ready to put out. The gun had previously been manned for action. In the first beams of our searchlight I thought that the ship looked like the large minesweepers which were built in England at the end of the last war, but as soon as our searchlight went on, a far stronger searchlight was turned on us from the ship we were watching which blinded us completely and quite obscured the strange vessel. I had the Otra swung around to starboard in the direction of the unknown ship, which had started up her engines and was sailing north, to disappear in the mist. We gave chase with such speed as we could muster-about 12 knots-but did not get into touch with it till we had gone north as far as Gullholmen. Meanwhile we had reported in code per radio to the O. C. naval defense that we had observed a minesweeper near Bastiy. When we once more got into contact with the strange vessel, which was then on our starboard bow, i. e., east of the Otra, the vessel once again increased speed and went north. Shortly afterward we saw several vessels on our starboard bow, in the direction of Nessabukta. We continued on our course, but the vessels we had spotted set off and steered in a westerly direction across the Otra's bows. When we had approached to within a few hundred yards, we again turned on our searchlight and lit up the nearest ship. It was a destroyer which immediately followed the same tactics as before, and turned on its searchlight which blinded us, but not before I had had time to make sure that it was German. There were in all two destroyers and three minesweepers. We got to within about 100 yards of the nearest ship, but strangely enough they did not fire, despite the fact that our gun crew stood ready the whole time with the gun loaded and aimed. As my duty was to report, and not to give battle, I would not give orders to fire until we were fired on. We then informed the first naval defense area that five ships had been observed to be German. They now steered a southwest course for Horten, and we followed them for awhile, at the same time sending a report by radio that the enemy was outside Karljohansvern. As the vessels were between the Otra and Karljohansvern, we could not get past, and I therefore gave orders to come about and make for Filtvedt so as to get into communication with the chief of naval defense. As we approached Filtvedt firing broke out from the direction of Oscarsborg, so we realized that the fort was being attacked. We kept close to the west shore and continued toward land. As soon as we cleared the headland near Filtvedt we saw three conflagrations-one on the top of Kaholmene, a smaller one farther west, and a considerable fire on the Dribak side. We steamed up to Filtvedt quay and moored outside the B2 which had already come in. At the same time following German ships came out from the Dribak Sound-one 10,000-ton pocket battleship, the cruiser Ermden, one large destroyer, two minesweepers absolutely full of men. The crew of the B2 had already landed, as the vessel was quite lacking in weapons. As it would have been quite useless to try to put up any sort of a fight with the Otra's 40-millimeter gun, I also ordered the crew on this boat to go ashore under cover, as I considered it probable that the Germans would sink both vessels as they passed, for it had by now become light, so that we could not count on the Otra not being observed. The B2, which was moored on-shore from the Otrca was, however, almost completely hidden by her. The German ships meanwhile passed by, without firing or examining the Otra, so they pre-. sumably did not see her after all, or else took her to be a merchant ship. After many fruitless, attempts we managed to get a trunk call through to Admiral Smith-Johannesen, at Karljohansvern, so that I was able to give a verbal report both of the events of the night and also of what I had observed at Oscarsborg as well as the German ships passing. The admiral told me that the attack had by then begun at Horten. I told him that it was my intention to try to get the Otra and the B2 in past Oscarsborg, and then return to Karljohansvern via Oslo. The admiral agreed to this, but doubted whether there was any point in comning back. Meanwhile the German warships had continued past Filtvedt and the battleship, together with the smaller ships anchored off the northern extremity of Jeliy. Some of the people on board the minesweepers were seen to be put ashore on the mainland at Soon, it being noticed that a small Norwegian passenger-boat was stopped and commandeered for this purpose. I ordered steam up again on board the Otra, and had the ship made ready, as it was my intention to try to hug the shore with the B2 close alongside so that she would be hidden, and to go so slowly that the ships off Jely would have some difficulty in noticing that we were under way. It was still a trifle misty, and I was prepared to lay a smoke screen so as to add to the mistiness. We were about to cast off when the air suddenly filled with the whirring of airplane engines, as a swarm of German planes flew north toward Oslo. Some of them flew quite low right over the Otra and the B32, and as more planes kept coming, I considered it useless to try to bring the ships in in daylight, and gave up the idea. Upon reaching Filtvedt I had been told that telephone communication with Oscarsborg had been broken. After several unsuccessful attempts, however, it was possible to regain communication with the fort after the aerial bombardment 'had begun. The Commandant himself came to the telephone and proudly informed that they had sunk the largest of the ships which had attacked the fort, and he thought it was the Gneisenau. He reported that he had himself been with the main battery during the action, and had given orders that fire should be held until the ships were within easy range. The first shot was fired at 1,400 yards range and was a direct hit. Likewise the second. As the leading ship passed into Drobak Sound she had been hit by at least two torpedoes, which tore holes in her and caused her to sink rapidly. An attempt was made to beach the ship by Digerud, but she went down with her stern lifted high above the water and her three propellers thrashing the air. Oil burned on the surface, and was still burning as I spoke to the Commandant. It was presumably this burning oil we had observed as a fire near the Driibak as we sailed in. When I spoke with the Commandant the fort's 40-millimeter antiaircraft battery had repeatedly been in action against passing planes. As yet no hits had been recorded. I next tried to get in touch with my C. O. by telephone, and after a number of unsuccessful attempts I got through. I gave a report of the attack on Oscarsborg and the sinking of the Gneisenau as well as the aerial attacks. The admiral told me that Braruddsen near Horten-where there was an antiaircraft battery-had been taken by the Germans and that Karljohansvern would also have to capitulate. At Herfi5l I got in touch with a man who had been a signaller on board the Olav Trygvason during the battle in Karljohansvern harbor on April 9. He told me that when the attack came, the Olaf Trygvason lay moored to a buoy as ordered, while the Rauma was lying near Ostien as I had reported. Two German minesweepers, full of men, came at great speed in through the Vealis Channel. The Olav Trygvason first fired a warning shot at the first, and as she did not heave-to, the Olav Trygvason fired a salvo which caused a great explosion and made the boat a wreck which remained lying near Silvkronenon on the west side of the harbor. The minesweeper Rauma tried to engage the other German minesweeper, which replied with a withering machine-gun fire which swept the bridge of the Racumna, and the commander, Reserve Lieutenant Wisnes, was killed. The Olav Trygvason then turned her guns on this German minesweeper and shot away her entire superstructure. Some of those on board were seen to make their way ashore to Silvkronen. The wreck drifted and sank. A little while later the cruiser Emden was seen to bear down on Karljohansvern. The Olav Trygvason then cast off from the mooring buoy and sailed up and down the harbor for a while. When the range- finder showed 4,500 yards, fire was opened on the Emnden, and the Olav Tryg- vason had apparently found her range at the second salvo. According to my informant 16 shots were fired in all, with apparently good results. Thereupon the firing ceased as a result of an order by semaphore from the 0. C. naval defense, and white flags were hoisted on the vessel. According to the information I received by 'phone from Captain Steen in the admiralty staff on my arrival in Oslo, the O. C. naval defense had received an ultimatum from the German officer who led the attack on Horten. Ten minutes were allowed, and the demands entailed that resistance should cease, otherwise the town would be bombarded. The O. C. naval defense got through to the admiral in chief on the telephone and put the matter up to him. The admiral in chief had not then been willing to take the responsibility for rejecting the ultimatum. I feel it necessary to point out that, apart from the two antiaircraft batteries, one of which had already been captured and the other of which had only a limited field of action, the H. Q. station was entirely without antiaircraft defense. The Olav Trygvason was still intact and had only three men lightly wounded. On the other hand, the O. C. naval defense had had a report from me that one 10,000-ton battleship, the cruiser Emden, and three destroyers, together with minesweepers, were free to operate against the H. Q. station. The whale boat Pol 3, under Commander Welding-Olsen, R. N. R., was patrolling the exterior lines and was the first unit to observe the invading enemy. Welding-Olsen at once attacked with his single gun, but was met by an annihilating fire from automatic and other guns. The gun on Pol 3 was destroyed, 259762-40-4 and the commander got both legs shot off. A certain proportion of the crew was rescued from the sea by the Germans. Welding-Olsen, however, who deliberately had brought himself to fall into the water, was drowned.

German troops entering Oslo, April 9.

Germans defending Oslo.

(1) Results at Horten-0O. N. I.-The Olaf Trygvason sank two submarine chasers and badly damaged the Emden. The Emden lay alongside the dock in Oslo for nearly 2 months, and then she finally arrived in Germany under very reduced speed. The casualties on the subchasers were heavy, as both were loaded down with troops. (2) Results at Oskarborg-O. N. I.-The Blilcher was sunk with practically all hands. The oil fire on the water prevented survivors from swimming ashore. The island on which Fort Oskarborg is situated was heavily bombed at daylight, 150 or more bombs being dropped. The antiaircraft fire from the fort was ineffective, and no planes have been reported as being shot down. The fort surrendered without being hit by a bomb and was taken over with all guns and torpedo tubes intact. (3) Bolarne (at west entrance to Oslo Fjord) .- Unconfirmed but apparently reliable sources indicate that this fort continued to fight whenever German ships appeared until the ammunition ran out on April 11. The fort had very little ammunition. There is no definite evidence that the fort at Bolarne caused any damage to any enemy ship.

NOTE.-The N. A. Oslo visited Dribak on April 11 and had occasion to go to the water's edge, where he was less than 1,000 yards from Oskarborg. The trees on the hills back of the fort were badly burned due to the bombing, but there was no sign of damage to the fort. On that day, both German and Norwegian flags flew from flag poles on the fort. The wreck of the Blicher was not visible as the water there is deep. (b) Action in Oslo proper-O. N. I.-M. I. D.-(1) The following is quoted from N. A. Oslo's War Diary for April 8 and 9:

Monday, April 8, 1940.-I left Stockholm at 10: 30 p. m., Monday, April 8, when newspaper reports indicated German ships and German troop movements through the Skagerak, and I expected German occupation of at least a part of Norway. Our train was stopped about 7: 30 in the morning, April 91, on a siding 40 kilometers from Oslo, and about 6 kilometers from the airport at Kjeller. The train had orders to remain until further orders. At 8: 20 a German scouting plane, flying very low, about 500 feet, circled over our train and disappeared in the direction of Kjeller air base. At 8: 30 four German bombers were seen approaching Kjeller in two divisions of two ships each. A little later at least four bomb explosions were heard. The four ships then circled the field, and four more bombs were dropped. The planes then disappeared in the direction of Oslofjord. During the bombing the Norwegian antiaircraft fired only six shells and none of the bursts were estimated to be within 1,000 feet from the planes, and considerably off in deflection. I estimated that the planes bombed from an altitude of 7,000 feet. About 10 o'clock another German observation plane circled over our train three times and disappeared. About 10: 30 the train proceeded into Oslo at very slow speed, and arrived about 11: 45. There were no taxi or other facilities at the station, and I carried my suitcases across the street to the American consulate. Thousands of men, women, and children were evacuating the city, using trains, busses, and other means of transportation. I could get nobody on the telephone, so I went up the street for breakfast. While eating breakfast about 12: 40 p. m., an air alarm sounded and German bombers came over and dropped four bombs, one of which hit the Akershus Fortress (on the Oslo water front), but did practically no damage, the others falling in the water nearby. I proceeded as fast as I could to the water front, expecting further bombings of Akershus, but no further bombing took place. I proceeded then to our consulate and met Mr. Mdrch, who is a son of Captain Mdrch in the Norwegian Navy, and is a clerk at the American consulate. The consulate was vacant except for him, so he offered to take me to the Norwegian naval headquarters. Only a petty officer was here and he had orders to send everybody to the Foreign Office. We went to the Foreign Office, but this also was vacant except for a minor bureau chief, who tried to arrange a call for me on the commanding officer of the Akershus. We could not make telephone connections, so he sent a messenger with us, and we arrived at the Akershus about 1: 20 p. m. On our way there a German observation plane flew over our heads about 500 feet and then (irectly over the Akershus, without a gun being fired at it. I thought then that the city must have capitulated. While at the gate of the Akershus trying to get permission to enter by means of my passport, a messenger came and informed all of us that all orders from then on bad to be approved by German authority. We, of course, could not get in. Going toward my hotel, about 2 10 p. m., i saw a small car with 2 German officers, 2 enlisted men, take station in front of the Storting. About 3 o'clock, 3 companies of German troops marched past and proceeded to the Akershus; each company consisted of 240 men with 12 machine guns per company. I then went to our legation, arriving there about 4 o'clock. At 4 20 I heard 4 airplanes which were very high, but felt sure they were German bombers. They circled over our legation, and about 4:25, when im a position about 2 miles

German artillery iu Norway.

north of the legation they dropped 4 bombs. I heard a few short strings of machine-gun fire, but no other antiaircraft fire. The planes again made a circle, and dropped 4 more bombs in about the same place. I hurried as fast as I could to the scene of this bombing and found 0 homes wrecked, and 1 home burning fiercely. I recovered fragments of the bomb, which made me believe they were ordinary demolition and incendiary bombs of 50-pound weight. The casing was about one-eighth inch thick. The position of the bombing was about one-half mile away from the barracks of the King's Guard. It is now established that these were 4 German planes and that they bombed because they thought Oslo had not surrendered. Only 2 persons were injured and after interviewing 7 of the residents of 3 of the houses destroyed it seems a miracle that many should not have been killed. Returning to the legation I requested and got an appointment with the German naval attach, Captain Schreiber, for S p. m. I was received with great enthusiasm. The German legation was filled with people, mostly German officers and civilimns whom I later found out were Norwegians connected with the Norwegian Nazi leader, Mr. Quisling. The naval mttachd gave me the folloving information-most of which I have since established as erroneous. First, that the bombing that afternoon had been done by English bombers and that one of them had been shot down. This is positively untrue. He stated that the German loss in occupying Oslo was 30 dead, all casualties occurring at Oscarsborg; that he estimated the Norwegian dead at 20. This information is also incorrect and will be taken up later. He also stated that the Norwegian Government had resigned, and that Mr. Quisling was now Premier. Mr. Quisling has been set up as a German puppet government, but has no connection with Kind Haakon's Government. As a matter of fact, King -Haakon's Government has ordered the arrest of Mr. Quisling, which is an order that cannot be carried out. He insisted on my calling on the Minister, and the 3 of us talked together for about 5 minutes. The gist of all this was they will give up Norway and Denmark when the war is over; that they will not interfere with local government or local facilities, and they would be very little bother to anyone. Later events indicate that this is going to be far from the truth. They had no intention of invading Sweden and that they took over Norway with regret, and only because England forced them to do so. They did state, however, that from now on the real war starts.

(2) A reliable news reporter, Leland Stowe, who was at Oslo at the time, states as follows:

Meanwhile, we had spent an eerie night in Oslo's Grand Hotel with a succession of air alarms, the first of which sounded at 12:35 o'clock in the morning, about the time mobilization was ordered. At first I could not believe my ears, as the sirens were so different from those in Helsinki. They sounded like motorcars honking in a traffic jam. Later Stevens and I decided that the Norwegians were only air-alarming as a precaution. So I refused to get up until 7 o'clock, when a Finnish diplomat informed me of the ultimatum and the Government's decision to leave. At 7: 45 o'clock, while we still had not the slightest idea what had happened in Oslo Fjord and at Horten, five Nazi bombers suddenly came roaring over the rooftops, so low they almost touched them. We watched them come, expecting bombs momentarily. For 21/2 hours German planes dove over the city, always only three or five in number. They were intended to terrorize the populace into surrender and the authorities into inaction .while the first troops landed by air at Fornebo outside the city. Thousands of Osloans gazed curiously and fearfully, but no panic occurred. None of us dreamed that German warships were in the inner harbor and that Oslo was already doomed. We still thought that British ships and planes might come at any moment. It seemed utterly incredible that the narrows of Oslo Fjord could have been forced by the Germans, and its powerful forts silenced. The same madness of incomprehensible events continued all day long. First was mystification over the complete lack of defense of the city by its naval forces and coastal forts. Then it was the immunity. of the low-flying Nazis planes to thousands of machine-gun bullets which pattered almost incessantly until after 10 o'clock. Then it was the further fact that only one antiaircraft battery seemed to be firing against the German planes, and this became silent ofter firing only a few shells, all of which were inexplicably wide of the mark. Finally, at 10:30 o'clock, came an equally fantastic lull in which German planes only circled occasionally and absolutely nothing seemed to happen. Tens of thousands of persons, clustered in the streets and on the sidewalks, looked and waited, utterly baffled. We all asked, where were the British? but also, where were the Germans? But Norway's capital in every quarter was the scene of dazed disorganization, completely without leadership. Apparently even the men who had been called to the colors did not know where to go or simply forgot about it. The streets were filled with men of fighting age, all standing watching the German planes, waiting and speculating, but doing nothing and going nowhere. It was like this until 2: 30 o'clock in the afternoon. Then, as I rushed up to the hotel desk, a porter asked me, "Aren't you going out to see the Germans come in ?" "What do you mean, the Germans?" "Yes, they are marching up Carl Johan boulevard any minute now." I called Irvin and Stevens and we rushed outside into the strangest con- ceivable scene. Oslo's beautiful main boulevard was jammed with people, all flocking to see the Germans come in. Strangest of all, Norwegian policemen were calmly forming lines along the sidewalks and clearing the streets for the German's triumphal entry. One of the policemen told me that the Germans would be there within 10 minutes. All this and what followed I told in a dispatch which was filed that afternoon-but the Germans had just taken over the telegraph building and I learned 2 days later that not a line of my dispatch was ever sent. Meanwhile, we supposed that the world knew most of the story. We waited half an hour on the hotel balcony with an excellent view all the way up the boulevard to its beginning, at the foot of the hill on which the Royal Palace stands. Shortly before 3 o'clock, two trucks filled with a dozen German soldiers rolled up the street. The soldiers lolled in them, with their guns dangling, as if they had been assured that they had not the slightest resistance to fear. From the rear of the second truck two machine guns poked their noses meaningly straight down the boulevard. Their operators lay prone with intent, hard faces, ready to fire. This was the only show of force, and all that was needed.

German Artillery in Norway.

At 3 o'clock there was a murmur through the crowd. We could see two mounted men swinging into the boulevard in front of the palace, then six more, then the head of a marching column in field gray. The mounted men were Norwegian policemen actually escorting the German troops which were occupying the capital. We looked uncomprehendingly. Later I was told that Norwegian policemen never carry nny kind of arms. This was also why they failed to fulfill the Government's order to arrest Major Quisling. The German column marched steadily nearer through a lane of 20,000 or 30,000 Osloans, fully half of which were men of military age. A tall, broad- shouldered officer, Gen. Nikolaus von Falkcnhorst, and 2 other officers marched directly behind the mounted police. Then came the German regulars in columns of threes, as if tq make the line look as long as possible. One out of nine carried light machine guns; all toted compact aluminum kits and bulky shoulder packs. They were hard-muscled, stony-faced men. They marched with guns on their shoulders, with beautiful precision. Mostly, they stared straight ahead, but some could not restrain triumphant smiles toward the onlookers. Several times General von Falkenhorst and the other two officers returned Nazi salutes from persons in the crowd who must have been German advance agents who had been busy in Oslo for weeks before the crowning moment. From our hotel balcony two Nazis gave the salute. I noticed in particular the beaming face of a chic, slim, blond German woman whose husband had been very active in our hotel since we arrived on the previous Thursday. It was a thin, unbelievably short column. It required only 6 or 7 minutes to march past. It was composed of only 2 incomplete battalions-surely less than 1,500 men in all. Norway's capital of nearly 300,000 inhabitants was being occupied by a German force of approximately 1,500 men! The last of the German troops went by without a single jeer or hiss, without a single tear noticeable on any Norwegien face. Like children, the people stared. Thousands of young men stood watching this occupation parade. Not one hand or voice was raised. We could discern no sign of resentment upon any face about us. This was the most incomprehensible thing among all the incomprehensible things of the fantastic 24 hours. Somehow it seemed as if curiosity was the strongest sentiment in the throng of Osloans who watched the Germans come in. No other emotion was betrayed in the countless faces we scanned anxiously. The only indignant people we met or saw that day were foreigners. The Norwegians of Oslo seemed stunned beyond recovery. Every one acted curiously like children suddenly given a chance to see a parade of strange creatures out of prehistoric times-Some- thing which had no connection with real life. But within 2 hours real life was making itself felt in Oslo. The Germans had occupied the capital without dropping a bomb, without firing a shot within the city limits. They simply had paraded in and taken it over much as French- men or Italians might parade into a colonial interior village somewhere in Africa. Now they went to work. It was the urgent task of the tiny force of 1,500 men to seize key places in the nation's capital. They did it swiftly, without any fear of interruption. (3) The following report of the German .occupation of Oslo was made to the M. I. Section, Dutch General Staff, by a reliable pilot of the Royal Dutch Airlines (KLM) who had made a routine flight to Oslo on April 8 and returned his plane to Holland on April 16. The report was passed on to M. A., The Hague, by the officer who had received it originally: The pilot was awakened early on Tuesday morning, April 9, by formations of German planes flying low and at great speed over Oslo. He hurried to the Fornebu airport, where his plane was hangered and arrived prior to the landing of the first German troops. Numerous members of the German Legation staff were already on the field making preparation for the landing; among them he recognized at least one of the military attaches. The first transport planes (Junkers 52) appeared at about 8:30 a. in., escorted by very fast, twin motor, monoplanes which the pilot maintained were JU 88s. (This seems questionable since the JU 88 is primarily a dive bomber.) Au- tomatic rifles and light machine guns had been thrust through the windows of the transport planes to provide protection in flight. Transport planes landed, wing to wing, in formation of five on a comparatively small field. Safety of personnel and planes was utterly disregarded in the apparent attempt to obtain speed and surprise. Ten machines were cracked up on landing during the first hour. Damaged planes and injured men were dragged off the field and left without attendance. Three thousand infantrymen, heavily equipped with automatic weapons, were landed within 2 hours. The first echelons to land had been employed, under members of the German Legation staff, to commandeer motor vehicles. The first 1,000 men to land were thus transported into Oslo and employed in the occupation of the city under the direction of the German Military Attache or his assistant. The remaining 2,000 were moved through the city toward the north. The KLM pilot returned to Oslo during the occupation and stated in his report that unarmed Norwegian officers and soldiers sat in cafes and stood on the street watching the Germans take over. There was no resistance at any point. The original force of 1,000 men held Oslo until Thursday afternoon (April 11) when reinforcements arrived by water. 46

Three troop ships disembarked 6,000 infantry on the afternoon of April 11. This force was equipped with infantry weapons; no heavy material was seen. The greater part of this reinforcement passed through the city toward the north. On Monday, April 15, three transports discharged a small number of light tanks and a large amount of horse-drawn artillery which also moved north through the city. The pilot received permission to fly his plane back to Holland on Tuesday, April 16, and returned via Copenhagen. It was his impression that the Ger- mans were avoiding wholesale destruction from the air in Norway. In the airport at Copenhagen there was little indication that normal routine had been disrupted.

NOTES BY N. A. OSLO

From 1: 55 to 3:45 p. min., on April 10, the N. A. counted 48 transports leaving Fornebo and 57 arriving. Assuming an average of 20 men per plane, this would make 1,140 men in 1 hour and 50 minutes, or at the rate of 700 men per hour. At 3:40 p. m. this date, two or more transports collided on landing and blew up with loss of all hands. Five wrecked transports were seen on the morning of April 11, when the N. A. visited Fornebo. Eleven transports were scattered on the outskirts of the field undergoing repairs. No troop transports arrived while he was at Fornebo on the 11th. However, 10 large troop steamers came to the Oslo docks that afternoon. 2. Bergen.-(a) The N. A. Oslo, after a visit to Bergen May 16 to 21, reported on the fighting there on April 9 as follows:

Two cruisers and several destroyers, amongst them the Konigsberg and Bremse, escorted in troop ships and ammunition ships. One of their high ranking officers told me that they did not expect the Norwegians to fire at them at all. The Norwegian officers at the fort at Bergen received orders to abandon the fort several hours before the Germans arrived. The officers left, but the men stayed behind. The Norwegians fired 7 salvos at the Konigsberg, the first 5 missing but the sixth and seventh made hits, killing 16 and wounding 32:. The Bremse also was hit in the bow. The Koniysberg fired on the fort with 2 salvos. There was no other fighting by the Norwegians. The troops were landed and the town occupied by 7 a. inm. (b) Log of the Master of the American steamship Flying Fish: April 9: At 2 a. m. received orders from harbor master to black out the ship; 2: 30 a. min., vessel and city of Bergen completely blacked out; 4 a. min., heavy gunfire heard outside harbor; 4: 30 a. min., German warships entered Bergen harbor flying signal "No vessel allowed to leave harbor"; 5 a. min., a second warship and destroyer entered harbor; 5: 30 a. min., a landing party of German soldiers, numbering about 30, disembarked at head of Skoltegrund Mole fully equipped with hand grenades, gas masks, helmets, rifles, and extra ammunition. They scattered into a battle formation (open order) and headed at double-time toward heart of city; 6 a. min., two torpedo boats, painted white, "suicide type," landed armed soldiers, fully equipped; 6: 05 a. min., 6' or 8 German aircraft flew over harbor and city dropping leaflets. Heavy fire from Fort Hellen, 1 mile north of Skoltegrundskaien, at cruisers, who returned fire and bombarded forts for about 5 minutes. The German bombers circled over the fort, dropped several bombs, and then all firing ceased; 7 a. min., German flags hoisted on the fort; 7: 45 a. min., German naval party boarded ship, posted guard at radioroom and examined ship's papers; departed at 8. 15. One destroyer docked on other side of Skoltegrundskaien and commenced repairing shell hole in bow, where shell had struck her on starboard side, close to waterline, and passed completely through her foc's'le. Several wounded men were landed and removed in ambulances, and 4 men who had been killed were landed and removed in hearses. The destroyer discharged ammunition, antiaircraft guns, machine guns, and supplies. Mobile bicycle forces and infantrymen continued to land from 4 men-of-war laying in the harbor. Antiaircraft guns were stationed on roof tops of warehouses on the dock and on the ends of the dock. The Flying Fish made ready to sail, lines singled up, pilot aboard, awaiting orders; 3: p. min., orders were given to evacuate city by buses, cars, motorboats, or any other means of transportation available; 5: 15 p. min., received orders from German admiral to leave berth as an air raid was expected; 6: 25 p. min., 8 Allied war- planes raided the harbor, attacked the warships, circled overhead, bomb-diving and dropping bombs. No ship was seen to be hit. Shore batteries and antiaircraft guns returned a steady fire. No plane was hit, although they circled and machine-gunned the destroyer on the other side of the dock from us; 6: 35 p. min., all firing ceased as planes flew over a hill to the west. Pilot left without consulting master; 6: 46 p. min., left dock and proceeded to anchorage 31/2 miles north of Bergen in a small bight near Eidal on the island of Aske; 7: 55-8 p. min., heavy firing heard from shore antiaircraft batteries as 1 Allied plane flew over city. April 10: 7: 30 a. min., air raid by Allied war planes. One German cruiser, name unknown, was hit amidships between its two funnels by bombs dropped by an Allied plane. Bombs were also seen to drop on or near Skoltegrund Mole, where the cruiser was laying; 9 a. min., clouds of smoke and flame were seen to rise from the cruiser and an explosion was heard. The cruiser began listing to port and sinking by the head as flames rose to a height of about 100 feet. The cruiser's head sank deeper and deeper, taking a 450 starboard list, her stern projecting into the air, showing her propellers; 9: 50 a. min., cruiser capsized and sank completely out of sight while columns of black smoke arose high in the air. Two German freighters maneuvered around our anchorage. Their names were the Baronfels and Leonaheart. April 11: About 8: 301 p. m. at night the city of Bergen was completely blacked out except for the steamship Baronfels, which was at the Skoltegrund Mole, all lit up and discharging cargo, ammunition. An air-raid alarm was sounded as a large explosion was heard from the warehouse on the deck. All lights were extinguished at once and the blackout was complete. April 12: At 4: 45 a. inm. a squadron of Allied war planes circled the city. No bombs were dropped or land batteries heard to fire. After circling the city a second time the planes attacked, dropping bombs all around the steamship Baronfels and warehouses on Skoltegrund Mole. Shore batteries commenced firing, but the planes escaped undamaged. At 5 p. m. during an air raid a plane circled between the Flying Fish and the line of fire of shore batteries and a spray of machine-gun bullets struck the Flying Fish, hitting the fore deck and drums of oil on deck. No member of the crew was injured. Later it was found that two houses on the shore in the line of fire were slightly shattered. April 13: All quiet. No air raids or other action visible. April 14: At 8: 23 a. min., air raid; three Allied planes circled city and dove over wharves and steamship Baronfels at Skoltegrund Mole. A cloud of smoke was seen to rise from the Mole, and an explosion was heard. An Allied plane flying about 200 feet over the water burst into flames and dove into the water, only the tail remaining visible above the surface. Within 20 minutes the plane sank. At 12 noon, a launch containing German naval officers approached the ship and advised us to put out all lights and black out at night. April 15: A tug came alongside and pilot came aboard with orders to proceed to dock and discharge cargo of fish oil; 2: 36 p. min., all secure at Johann C. Martens oil dock at Sandviken, Bergen. At 7 p. m. received orders from Mr. Dunlap, American consul at Bergen, for all officers and members of crew to leave vessel. All hands, except all five engineers, two water tenders, and one oiler, abandoned the ship and were quartered at the Hotel Bristol, Bergen. The vessel was laying in a dangerous position in a flying harbor. On the following day, acting under further orders from the American consul, the ship was completely abandoned by the skeleton crew who had remained to keep up steam and the engine plant was allowed to die out. During each day of the following week various officers and crew members made daily trips of inspection to see that everything on board was all right. The cargo oil was pumped out by shore pump and shore gang, the vessel being shut down and completely cold. * * * April 16: On April 10, the American ship Charles D. McCormick was laying at Doksjaier wharf. A German destroyer was tied up alongside her. When the air raid started the planes machine-gunned the destroyer. Some of the machine-gun bullets struck the American ship Charles D. McCormick, cutting mast stays and wire rigging in two. No members of the crew were injured. Immediately after conclusion of the air raid, the Charles D. McCormick proceeded up the fjord to a safe anchorage.

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Bergen is protected by a complex labyrinth of islands and submerged rocks, making navigation difficult even in peacetime. The islands tower above the channels, completely commanding them, and there are many "bolt holes."

April 21: All five ship engineers, two oilers, and one watertender returned aboard the ship and raised steam. During all the time the ship was abandoned, American flag flew night and day. April 22: The American Consul ordered the crew to return to the ship and secure for sea. About 5 p. m., German naval authorities removed transmitting apparatus from the vessel's radio set. The master was advised that they would be returned the next morning when the vessel was ready to sail, and that a pilot and naval escort would be provided to guide the vessel through the mine fields. The American consul attended the funeral of an English aviator who was killed when his plane crashed somewhere near Bergen, April 14. The American Consul handled the affairs of over 40 British prisoners interned in Bergen. April 23: German naval authorities returned the ship's radio equipment and gave the master permission to sail. A military launch led the way out through the mine field, the vessel following closely with a Norwegian pilot on the

Sole airport at Stavaflnger. Note how plces are wcll seattcred over field. R. A. i'. have just bombed a runway. bridge. At 11:17 a. in. the German launch signaled all clear, and the vessel proceeded out of the fjord, clear of the German mine fields. About 2 p. m. the pilot was dropped and we proceeded with caution toward New York. Extra lookouts were posted about the vessel, and officers stood, watch and watch. At 7:25 p. m. we sighted a contact floating mine about one-half mile off our port hand. Reduced speed and proceeded to steam ahead dead slow during the night. Crew ready for any danger that might occur. 50

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y a 3. Stavanger.-(a) The N. A., Oslo, on his visit to Stavanger on May 21-22, reported as follows: Left Bergen at 10: 45 a. m. and arrived at Stavanger at 11: 45 a. m. in a Junkers seaplane. The Germans told me that this seaplane had been flying night and day between Stavanger, Bergen, and Narvik; I rode in the front cockpit and they gave me a ride over the town before departing for Stavanger. The plane made 180 kilometers per hour and we flew only at about 300 meters altitude. That afternoon a brother of our vice counsul in Stockholm, Mr. Sigmund, took us for a ride around Stavanger and then we went to the airport at Sole, which is about 20 kilometers south of town. I called on the Commandant and he escorted us to the field. On the morning of the occupation, according to the Commandant, there were only 20 Norwegian soldiers at Sole and they put up no fight. The Germans first landed about 200 parachuters who took charge of the airfield. Then they landed about 400 planes full of troops. On landing, he stated, they lost 40 planes in crack-ups and considerable men. I saw in a junk pile at least 40 transport planes, two Norwegian biplanes, and probably the wreck of about 15 bombers and fighters. This airport at Sole would be a class AA airport in any country. The northeast-southwest runway is paved at least 100 feet wide and nearly a mile long. The southeast-northwest runway is just as wide, but not quite as long. There must be at least 600 acres in the whole field. The runways had not been hurt by any British bombing. I noticed 12 or 15 scars in the grass where bombs evidently had burst, but these had been smoothed out with little trouble. The whole field could be used for landing or take-offs. I noticed 3 or 4 broken windows in the Ad- ministration Building, but the hangers were intact. Apparently the British bombers that attacked Sole were based in England and they must not have used anything but very light bombs. Their efforts as regards Sole were puni- tive and useless in the extreme. They probably destroyed some German planes. The only damage to the city was where a British bomber had been shot down and fell on top of a school building, destroying the roof and setting fire to the building. The British bombed Sole again at midnight, but next day when I was at Sole, I noted the bombs had done absolutely no damage. The Germans had 12 transport planes and 19 Messerschmidts scattered over the airport. At one corner of the field appeared to be 5 medium bombers. The Germans were building a large new east-west runway about 5 kilometers north of Sole. NorTE.-The N. A. believes no parachute troops were landed at Sole and that the number of transport planes was no greater than 250. 4. Kristiansand.-(a) N. A. Oslo War Diary, April 12: The following is an eyewitness report of the occupation of Kristiansand by the Germans Tuesday morning as given by an American of Nor- wegian descent, who had himself served 3 years in the Norwegian Army, at Odderoen, the fortress at Kristiansand. He was staying at a hotel only a short distance from the waterfront.

Six German planes arrived at 5: 15 and dropped numerous bombs near the fort and the territory immediately surrounding it. Some dropped in town as the town is very close to this fort. He saw 2 civilians killed. The German ships arrived and opened fire at 6: 20. The ships consisted of 1 cruiser, the IKarlsruhe, of 6,000 tons, and 4 destroyers. The shell fire created havoc in the town. About 7 o'clock a bomb exploded the ammunition dump on the fort and shortly thereafter the fort surrendered. During the fight the Norwegian ship Garm and torpedo boat Gion kept up a constant antiaircraft fire. There is no information as to what became of these two ships. The German cruiser at the commencement of the bombardment was about 0 miles away, near the lighthouse on Oxo, but came rapidly toward the entrance. Destroyers were northeast of the fort and closer in. The Norwegian boats were about a half-mile south of the fort. The fortress had two 21-centimeter guns, four 24-centimeter howitzers, and four 15-centimeter guns. Besides, she had several batteries of antiaircraft guns. The Karlsruhe was sunk by the fort. 52

The sinking of the German troop ship Rio de Janciro by a Polish submarine occurred 10) miles northeast of Kristiansand. Eighty camne ashore in boats and the Norwegian ship Odin brought in 30 living and 20 dead. This occurred Sunday morning.

. V

Germans landing antiaircraft gun at Kristiansand. NOTES BY N. A. OSLO

On his visit to Kristiansand, May 23 to 25, the N. A. Oslo viewed the damage done to the city. Only four 6-inch shells fell in the city, but they did serious damage to the buildings they struck. The effect was about the same as that of a bomb of 100 pounds. Another shell had hit a church steeple and cut it off squarely as though with a huge knife. The airport which is an hour's drive northeast from Kristiansand, was taken over by troops landed from transport planes with no resistance. This airport has a northeast-southwest paved runway about 100 by 3,500 feet. The field was being extensively enlarged. The English had bombed this airport on several occasions, but did no damage. The Germans claim that neither did they destroy any planes. The Germans had one squadron (18) of Messerschmidt 110's and eight medium bombers scattered over the field. The N. A. Oslo Diary as of May 22 is as follows:

We took off from Sole at 6 p. m. and arrived at Kristiansand at 7 p. mn. The transport plane was about the size of our Douglas DC-3. The interior was completely clear of nonessentials, seat installations, etc. The two emergency exit windows were fitted with two machine guns; the rear baggage compartment door was closed, but I imagine they had machine guns back there. The cockpit was also closed so I could not see what they had there. The plane had plenty of power and left the ground about 15 seconds after giving her the gun. The pilot then made a sharp turn to the left, when we could not have been more than 25 feet off the ground. The landing was very rough and for a moment I expected a ground loop. My impression was that the Germans use very green pilots for this work. The airport at Kristiansand is also quite large and easily approached, though not in any way as good as that of Sole. However, the Germans are making it larger and were using most modern American equipment for this purpose. This equipment had just recently been purchased by the Norwegian Government. The fort was not damaged and all the batteries were intact. The safest place to be in all German bombings seems to be on or near a good gun. They did not destroy anything which they could themselves make use of later.

5. Narvik.- (a) The following is an eyewitness account of the Ger- man occupation of Narvik on April 9:

The capture of Narvik was accomplished early today (April 9) after two German destroyers had torpedoed two Norwegian warships in Narvik Harbor early this morning, causing an estimated loss of 540 lives. Immediately afterward, German troops landed from the destroyers and occupied the town. The Norwegian warships and a British merchant ship lying in the harbor fired on the attacking German destroyers, but their resistance was quickly broken. The German attack on Narvik, 200 miles above the Arctic Circle, on the Atlantic and chief loading port for Germany's iron-ore supplies, which the Allied blockade had tried to choke off, began at 4:50 a. min., and 40 minutes later the Germans were in full possession. The German destroyers landed 1,500 to 2,000 troops to carry out the occupation. Although there were Norwegian Army and Navy units in Narvik and the city was protected by antiaircraft batteries, neither the troops nor the people made any display of resistance in the city proper. So far as was revealed, only one policeman and a soldier were killed, in addition to the Norwegian sailors who lost their lives in the torpedoing of the warships in the harbor. The German destroyers ran into the harbor at 5: 40 a. m., under cover of a heavy snowstorm and were not seen until they were close to shore. They opened fire on two ships, one Norwegian and the other British. The British ship returned the fire. 54

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- . The two Norwegian warships also opened fire and a few minutes later torpedoes struck them. Of the crews of 562 men aboard the Norwegian warships, only 20 were known to have survived. The German troops reached the center of the city at 5: 05 a. m., and at 5: 30 had completed their occupation of the port. As the Germans arrived a fringe of Norwegian troops waited on the outskirts. The German warships continued on beyond the Narvik fjords. The British consul and his staff disappeared quickly when the German destroyers hove into view. A United States citizen, Andrew Maisano, of Wilming- ton, Del., was on one of the Norwegian vessels. The German destroyers had penetrated the Allied blockade along the coast to the amazement of residents of the port. When the destroyers emerged from the swirling snow, many of those on shore believed them to be British warships.

Germans landinq at Narvik fromr destroyer, mornin~g of April 9. This picture taken by CcGerman officr who w;as lateCr captured by British.

Realization of the attack came only when the Germaln warships opened fire with 4.7- and 6-inch guns, causing panic in the crowded harbor. "Where is the British Fleet, which everyone thought was so strong?" people were heard to say. There wams pessimism and dlespair in their words. Narvik's resistance was weak, although the two Norwegian warships went into action immediately andl kept their guns pounding until the German torpedoes struck them from close range. Two British merchant ships loading in thie harbor took up the battle. The crews leaped to their guns, pitifully small against the 6-inch rifles of the Germnan ships. Two British ships were sunk in the engagement, and a German merchant ship ran aground. Maisano, a mnember of the crew of a Norwegian freighter, said he counted almost 100 bodies in the water as he came ashore in a launch. Of 23 merchant ships in Narvik HIarb'or when the Germans entered, 9 were German, 4 British, 4 Norwegian, 3 Swedish, and 1 Netherland. After the brief battle in the harbor, the (German destroyers moved up to the docks and dropped anchor. The German soldiers, in green-gray uniforms much like those of the Norwegian soldiers in Narvik and wearing steel helmets, marched down the gangplanks and into the streets in formation. They carried automatic arms, ready for action at the first show of resistance. But the people greeted them in silence. 250762-40 -5 For the first time in months, Narvik's iron-ore docks-the cause of this war in Norway-were silent. Three heavily loaded ore ships, Norwegian, British, and German, were tied up at the loading docks. They were not harmed in the naval attack. The crews of all the merchant ships in the harbor were ordered ashore, however, and Nazi prize crews were put aboard the vessels. The Germans seized four armed merchant ships, which they now will be able to use in enforcing their foothold on Norway's Atlantic coast. No shells fell in the town of Narvik and the only damage noticed was a shattered window in a shop on the main street, broken by concussion of the shell- fire. The speed of the German occupation seemed incredible. When the German destroyers moved in the German vice consul of Narvik let out a yell, ran across the street and hailed a German officer with the Nazi stiff-arm salute. "Heil Hitler!" they cried in unison. A platoon of Norweigian soldiers in a truck came abreast of the German soldiers. They exchanged salutes and then the Germans politely dispersed the Norwegian soldiers, but made no effort to take them prisoners. Before the German warships came into the harbor, the evacuation of the Narvik area was well under way, particularly the removal of old women and children, who were hustled eastward to the Swedish border. One entire train was loaded with Swedish citizens, mostly women and children. There were 3,000 Norwegian soldiers in the Narvik area before the Germans arrived, but most of these had scattered back to the hills along the Swedish border late today (April 9). It was believed in Narvik that the Germans would lose no time in spreading out to obtain a series of other strategic bases along the coast, and everyone waited to see whether the British and French Fleets would attack in an effort to frustrate this. General Blomberg, in 1935, while he was Chief of the German General Staff, visited the Narvik region on a vacation and sailed among the many fjords aboard a private yacht. That vacation journey, it was believed, may have provided the original plan carried out in today's (April 9) methodical occupation of Narvik. (b) From reliable sources, additional details are reported as follows: The Norwegian coast-defense ships sunk by torpedo were the Norge and Eidsvold. They carried crews of 270 men each. Their casualties were extremely heavy, estimates being from 400 up. Both were taken by surprise and were not ready for action. The first German troop landings were from German disguised troop ships, one of which was alongside the dock. There were three- or possibly four-such troop ships in the harbor, all of which had arrived prior to the morning of April 9. One German liner of 9,000 tons, the Bockenheimn, not informed of the German attack, thought the British had arrived, and the captain put her on the beach and set fire to her. The local Norwegian military forces consisted of 1 company of about 100 men, and this force retired eastward along the railroad. The Germans landed about 3,000 men, many of them expert skiers from the Tyrol, and many of whom spoke Norwegian. 6. Trondheim.- (a) From reliable sources, the capture of Trond- heim was accomplished without resistance on the part of the Nor- wegians. A German light cruiser and three destroyers entered the harbor and took over the city without opposition. Fort Agdenes, on the west side of the entrance and controlling the entrance to the city proper, had obsolete guns. South of it, about 2 miles across the channel, was a battery of three old 5-inch guns. On the east side of the entrance were two batteries of three 8-inch guns each. All guns were very old. Indications are that these batteries were taken German landing at Trollcmein, April 9. over by soldiers from the rear, probably soldiers who hadl arrived previously on disguised German transports. A small Norwegian force of about 160 men heldl the fort at Hegre, about 26 miles east of Trondheim. This was a fairly modern fort, built to prevent a Swedish invasion, and with all guns pointing east. These guns were remounted to face west, and this fort held out for nearly a month. A small airport at Varnes, about 12 miles east of Trondheim was taken over by the Germnans without resistance. All guns at the entrance to Trondheim were taken by the Germans intact. Two German destroyers remained in Trondheim and were largely responsible for the disastrous retreat of the Allies later at Steinkjer. Cn v

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GERMAN PLANS OF OCCUPATION

1. It seems to be established that the Germans expected to occupy Norway without opposition as they had Denmark. Their original plans called for the occupation of the coastal towns and Oslo, and all air bases. They then expected to make these places invulnerable to attack from the Allies, and to improve and make use of the air bases for attacks on England. 2. The flight of the King and Government from Oslo and their call for all Norwegians to mobilize and resist invasion was a severe blow to the German plans. The Germans made every effort to capture the King on the morning of April 9; and failing in this, they sent their Minister and naval attach6 to call on the King at Elverum on Wednesday, April 10. In the meantime, on the evening of the 9th, the Germans had proclaimed Quisling as Premier, and had asked him to form a new Nazi government for Norway. The German minister and naval attache were instructed to try to get the King to approve of this appointment, and, if he did, to have the King return to Oslo and assume the position of technical head of the Norwegian Government. The Germans would then hold the key points they had occupied and "protect" Norway from the Allies. The Norwegians were to demobilize and let Germany take over their forts, naval vessels, and military equipment. The King and his Ministers scorned this proposal and ordered the arrest of Quisling. The Minister and naval attache returned to Oslo late Wednesday night. 3. Early Thursday, the Germans made strenuous efforts to destroy both King and Government by terrific air bombardment of Elverum and vicinity. Through their efficient spy system, they knew the movements of the Norwegian Government and followed them with air bombardments. It was at this time that they realized that only a major occupation of the whole country would bring required results. However, they decided on Friday, April 12, to make one last effort to get the King on their side. When the American naval attache called on the German naval attache at 1 p. m., Friday, he was asked by the German naval attache to go with him to his Minister. The Minister was in Army uniform. The Minister asked the Ameri- can naval attache to take this message, direct from Hitler, to King Haakon:

That Norway could have peace at once, if the King would appoint a Prime Minister that understood German aspirations, and who would be satisfactory to both Hitler and the King. This man need not be Quisling, and, as a matter of fact, Quisling was really not the man Hitler wanted. Quisling would, however, be satisfactory, and the longer he remained as the appointed Prime Min- ister, the harder it would be to get rid of him. They really wanted a man the King himself would appoint. Germany had only the kindliest feelings toward Norway and only wanted to protect it from the Allies and prevent the Allies

(59) 60 from making it the battlefield of the world war. They had no designs on Norway after the present war had been finished. 4. The American naval attache replied that he would take this message to his own Minister who was following the King, as he had no authority to deal directly with the head of a government, and he would leave on this mission the following day, provided the Minister

Kil Haakon (celnter) an;d Crown Prince Olaf seek refuge from German bombs at Elvernum. would give him safe passage through all German lines. This safe passage was given by the Minister. Next morning, before leaving, the United States naval attache called on the German naval attache and the latter recommended that the American attache go east via Kongsveigen to the Swedish border, and then north in Sweden until he received information as to the location of his Minister. When asked why he recommended such a long detour, he replied that there would be bombing operations on any other road. This statement, and a study of the map, showed that 15 American women and children at Sjosjoen, near Lillehamnmer, would be in danger, so the naval attach called on General Falkenhorst, got free passage through the German lines, signed by the general, and warned him not to endanger the lives of these Americans until the naval attachi could evacuate them to Sweden. As a result of this diversion, Hitler's message was not delivered to the American Minister until April 24, when the Min- ister was in Stockholm, and the message never got further. 5. The German general plaln was to send large forces to Oslo, including all types of mechanized equipment, transport service, etc., and to use this as a hub to send strong detachments up every valley, radiating from this point, and to join up with other German forces advancing inland from the coastal towns. In the original occupation of other ports, considerable equipment, such as antiaircraft batteries, field artillery, transports, and light mechanized equipment had been sent with the original transports. In every case, the equipment carried by transports was so arranged that each ship was a unit to herself, including in her holds equipment of all kinds, so that the loss of one ship only meant the loss of one unit. With this equipment went trained crews to man it. A few transport ships were sent after April 9 to the ports of Kristiansand, Stavanger, and Bergen, but, in the main, most of the troops to Kristiansand and Stavanger came either direct from Oslo or by transport plane, and the troops for Bergen, Trondheim, and Narvik were sent by transport planes and seaplanes.

Ruins of Elverun.

6. The first transport ships for Oslo came direct to the city. After April 12, many of them stopped at Larvik, a fine port on the west entrance to Oslo Fjord and connected with Oslo by a paved highway. This port also made it convenient to send troops southwest, west, and northwest over good automobile roads. Other troops were landed on the east entrance to the Oslo Fjord at Skieberg for the occupation of important cities like Fredrikstad, Holden, and Moss. These troops then worked north along the Swedish border until they made contact with forces from Oslo which were working south and east from that city. 7. The German forces in Kristiansand, Stavanger, Bergen, Trond- heim, and Narvik were to extend their area of operation up every fjord and valley radiating from those cities as quickly as the supply of troops permitted. 8. The following air bases were taken over by the Germans on April 9: At Oslo.-(1) Fornebo, commercial aviation field on southwest outskirts of city. (2) Kjeller, military field, about 25 miles east of the city. NoTE.-In the capture of Kjeller on April 9, the Germans got 19 Curtis fighting planes which were still in their crates. These were the only modern planes the Norwegians possessed. At Eidsvoll (60 kilometers north of Oslo).-New field, largest in Norway under construction. At Kristiansand.-(1) Commercial field at Kjevik, an hour's auto ride east of Kristiansand. At Stavanger.-(1) Commercial field at Sole, 20 kilometers south of Stavanger. At Trondheim.-(1) Commercial field at Vaernes, 20 kilometers east of Trondheim. Two others developed at Tillet and Lade. These were all the available air bases in Norway. The Germans immediately set to work to- (a) Protect them by installing searchlights, antiaircraft batteries, and listening devices and by providing fighter planes. NoTE.-The airports at Fornebo and Kjeller were unprotected for nearly 10 days, except for fighter planes, due to the transport carrying this equipment being sunk. (b) Improving the fields. Fornebo was doubled in size within 30 days. Kjeller, which had poor landing fields in wet weather, was enlarged and paved runways provided in less than 6 weeks. Kjevik was being enlarged. A large new east-west runway was being made 5 kilometers north of Sole. The space around Sole was cleared so numerous planes could be parked in the surrounding woods. Vaernes was being enlarged and improved. A new field was being built at Voss, 70 kilometers east of Bergen (nearly completed by May 25). Unconfirmed but reliable information is that a new field is being built near Geilo about midway between Bergen and Oslo, probably for use as a main overhaul plant for planes. Excellent seaplane bases were available at all ports occupied, as well as at numerous other places. CHAPTER VI

TRANSPORTATION AND PROTECTION OF TROOP CON- VOYS-USE OF PARACHUTE TROOPS

1. In the original occupation of Norwegian coastal cities, German troop transports, in most cases, made their own way to all or nearly all of the ports occupied. At Narvik, one came in flying the Amer- ican flag. These ships were in most cases piloted safely through Norwegian territorial waters by Norwegian pilots unaware of their cargo. Specific cases have been cited where Norwegian patrol boats escorted them on their journey. One transport, the Rio de Janeiro, was sunk on Sunday, April 7, near Kristiansand by a Polish submarine. All ships, cruisers, destroyers, subchasers, and transports, carried troops-no space being wasted. Only the heavy covering ships were left unencumbered. 2. The first large troop transports to Oslo, consisting of 10 large cargo ships, were escorted by numerous small boats, such as patrol boats, subchasers, minesweepers fitted with depth charges, antiaircraft guns, and, in many cases, torpedoes. In addition, German scouting planes ranged for many miles in all directions from the convoy, and numerous bombers and fighters guarded in the immediate vicinity. The small boats made a very effective screen around the convoy and submarine attack at close range was extremely difficult and hazardous. All later convoys were similarly protected. 3. Troop transport by land and seaplanes were carefully guarded by bombers and fighters from Denmark to the entrance to Oslo Fjord and as far as Kristiansand for planes going to the Norwegian west coast. From there to their landing fields, fighters from airports in the vicinity were ready to take to the air to protect them.

NoE.-N. A. Oslo rode in a transport land plane between Stavanger and Kristiansand and a transport seaplane between Bergen and Stavanger. The crew of the land plane consisted of only one pilot, one radioman, and four machine gunners. There were two 20-millimeter machine guns mounted in the two after emergency exit windows. There may have been other machine guns forward and aft, but they could not be seen, and no crews were provided. The seaplane had the same number in the crew. Flying between Bergen and Sta- vanger, the machine guns were not mounted, but could have been mounted in a few minutes. Strict watch for enemy aircraft was kept at all times. The pilots of both these planes were very young, not over 21 to 23 years, and their flying technique was very poor. They gave every indication of being inex- perienced. The pilots for the bombers and fighters were older, over 24, and the squadron commanders were over 30. All of them radiated experience, confidence and ability.

4. Land planes carried troops to Kristiansand, Stavanger, and Oslo from Germany direct, at first, and later from Danish fields, mainly the one at Copenhagen. Land planes were also used to carry the troops from Oslo to Trondheim. Seaplanes carried troops from Stavanger to Bergen, Trondheim, and Narvik, and from Bergen and Trondheim to Narvik. These plane transports operated from dawn until dark, until the Allies departed from Norway. In the begin- (63) First German transport ships entering Oslo Fjord. Old type destroyer right center.

Nazi parachute troops landing at Narvik. ning, the land planes operated in divisions of five to Oslo, and in divisions of three from Oslo north. Later, there seemed to be no set arrangements, planes going out singly, in pairs, or in larger groups. No strict formations were kept. NOTE.-The N. A. Oslo observed these transports entering Oslo, and also saw them flying north, while he was in the Gudbrandsdal (Valley). They all went over the same path as though they were following a painted line, and all alpparently had strict instructions to fly at a stated altitude. This may have been due to the inexperience of the transport pilots. At any rate, had antiaircraft batteries been planted on their route they could have caused havoc to them. Planes north of Oslo were unprotected by other planes. These transport planes never tried to return the little Norwegian 30-caliber antiaircraft fire encountered. They kept strictly to their one task. However, they were always out of range of these small machine guns. 5. Use of Parachute Tr'oops.-About 200 parachute troops were landed at Dombas on April 14, in units of about 30 each, on 6 different hills around the town. They were equipped with bicycles (which were of no use as the snow was 6 or more feet deep), acetylene torches, cameras, radio, and full equipment. They destroyed all telephone connections and terrorized the farmers generally, before they were killed or captured on April 20. Other parachuters were landed at Narvik from time to time, and food, ammunition, and medical supplies were also dropped to the German forces there.

NOTE.-The N. A. Oslo on April 20, while in Dombas saw the tanks used by the Germans for dropping equipment, etc., from the air. They were aluminum cylindrical cans about 15 inches in diameter and 4 feet long. Unfor- tunately, the Norwegians had taken away all equipment captured from the (Germans, and none was available there for inspection. He was told that the lbicycles could be folded into a very small unit and easily assembled for use. The radios were small and compact and capable of both sending and receiving. Dry batteries were used for power. Blasting charges for destroying telephone posts, etc., hand grenades, axes, saws, machine guns, automatic rifles and ammunition were among the other supplies.

Parachute troops landing. CHAPTER VII

METHOD OF GERMAN ADVANCES-WHY RAPID PROGRESS WAS MADE

1. By the evening of April 9, the Germans had completely occupied Oslo, Kristiansand, Stavanger, Bergen, Trondheim, and Narvik. The exact number of troops in each place is not known, but an ap- proximation, based on various sources, would indicate: In Oslo, 3,000; in Kristiansand, 2,000; in Stavanger, 5,000; in Bergen, 2,000; in Trondheim, 3,000; in Narvik, 3,000. In every case, 500 to 1,000 troops took charge of the city, and the rest formed spearheads that forced their way up the various valleys and fjords. These spearheads never retreated. If stopped by superior Norwegian forces, they stopped, dug in, and awaited reinforcements which were not long in coming. At first, these spearheads consisted of 2 or more motorcycles with sidecars, carrying a driver and 2 machine gunners. About 5 kilometers behind them would be a bicycle patrol of from 30 to 60 bicyclists, armed with rifles, machine guns, and hand grenades. A few kilometers behind them came a truck towing a light field piece, and carrying several heavy machine guns, and crews of about 20 men. Behind them would be the rest of the company of about 150 men, usually traveling in commandeered cars and trucks. These latter troops were armed with rifles, automatic rifles, light and heavy machine guns, hand grenades, etc., and were followed by soup kitchens and commissary supplies. At dark, the main company would stop and the advance patrols of motorcyclists and bicyclists would fall back to join them. Bridges would be guarded for several kilometers ahead of this body, and all bridges to the rear would be left guarded.

NoTE.-The N. A. Oslo had occasion to pass through several of these patrols on his way to Lillehammar on April 13 and 14. His car was stopped by all German guards and patrols. His pass, signed by General Falkenhorst, was honored immediately by all of the Germans except in one instance. Here, two privates, guarding a bridge about 2 kilometers ahead of their main body, refused to look at the pass, started to empty the attache's car, and demanded that he get out. One of them was extremely nervous and handled his light machine gun in a very dangerous manner. Upon the attache's demand that they call their senior officer, and his refusal to leave the car until they did call their senior officer, the German finally looked at the pass, and, seeing the general's name, quickly apologized and let him pass. The Norwegian patrols were all very nervous and far more dangerous than the Germans. They would be guarding broken bridges or large tree obstructions on the road, and were very prone to fire first and investigate afterwards. They patrolled all roads back of their advance posts and all of them were extremely critical of the passports or of the pass which had been obtained at the first Norwegian headquarters. Travel was very slow on this account, and it was finally necessary, in order to get anywhere, to have a Norwegian soldier detached as an escort. 2. These spearheads advanced into the interior with utmost bravery and even recklessness. The only thing that saved them from terrible losses was the disorganized resistance of the Norwegians. NOTE.-The N. A. Oslo, en route to Lillehammar on April 13, was turned back near Kongsvinger by a broken bridge. Going westward to find another road (66) 67 to the north, he passed a German motorcycle patrol, and a little later, his car skidded into a ditch in (6 feet of snow. Just then the German bicycle patrol arrived. The road was narrow with steep hills, covered with forest, on each side of the roadl. The N. A. asked the Germans to help him out of tile dlitch. They gladly did this, all except 10 dropping their bicycles and guns to try to lift the car out of the ditch. (One Norwegian machine gunner could have got all of them, in a few seconds. When they failed to get the car out, they went on, anlldl a few minutes later the truck and field piece caine along. They un- hooked the field piece and tried to haul the car out but failed. During this timne, they were comnlpletely disarmed and could have been wiped out by a few Norwegians.

German spearhead advancing near Trondheim. Note smoke of bombers ahead.

3. As soon as the hleavy and intermediate mechanized equipment arrived, this usually led the main advances, although bicyclists were still noted ahead of them. The tanks as a rule protected the pioneers or combat engineers when they repaired broken bridges. In this conlnection, the Germans had unusually well-trained and efficient pioneers. They were aided by having unlimited amounts of heavy logs and lumber close to every broken bridge but, even so, their work displayed efficiency and thorough training. The rapid advance of the Germans in all of the valleys can be mainly attributed to the efficiency of the pioneers. 4. Due to the complete dlisorganization of the Norwegian forces, and to the ineffective aid given to Norway by the Allies, there was not any really determined resistance offered to the Germans at any place, with the exception of the action around Narvik. Even here, the action was of a mninor scale as regards number of men involved and casualties suffered. Norwegian activity was limited to rearguard actions and guerrilla warfare, and none of these seriously delayed the German adlvances. As a result, Norwegian casualties

Typical spearhead advance. Bombers are clearing the cway. on land were very small, and the German losses only moderately heavy considering the number of men engaged and the reckless way in which the Germans advanced. The Norwegian failure to offer determined resistance was not due to lack of courage, but to complete disorganization, absence of trained officers, and lack of equipment of all kinds, especially artillery, antiaircraft batteries, airplanes, machine guns, antitank guns, and ammunition. The Ger-

mans have admitted that individually the Norwegians were mar- velous soldiers, with great bravery and endurance and marked ability as sharpshooters. 5. The main German advances, after arrival of the ship transports, were supported with mobile artillery, both light and heavy, and complete transport trains, motorized and horse-drawn, that supplied them with necessary food and ammunition. All of these heavy trucks and wagons were loaded in Germany and as soon as unloaded, their crews drove them off to their appointed missions. There was no time lost anywhere in reloading or unloading. This fine organization was another important factor in the speed of the

Nowegian soldiers taking eorcr on approach of German bomber.

German advance. The Germans did not depend on the local neighborhood to supply them with anything. rhey did, however, take over all Norwegian military supplies they could acquire. None of their operations were delayed a second because they had expected but did not get any item of supply from the occupied territory. 6. The greatest aid in the rapid advance of the Germans was, of course, their air force. Several high officers in the German Army and Navy told the N. A. Oslo that they believed the Air Force was entitled to 80 percent of the credit for the success in Norway, and the Army and Navy together to the remaining 20 percent. Of course, no one by itself could have done anything. It was the. power of the Air Force, backed up by the closest possible cooperation of both the Army and the Navy that accomplished this incredible occupation. It was the Air Force that led the way, softened the resistance and, when necessary, blasted away the opposition so that little was left to be done by the Army or Navy but to occupy the territory. It kept the English Fleet away from every port except Narvik by its show of deadly power. It blasted any hope the Allies ever had of landing a force in Norway that would be sufficient to fight with any chance of success. It kept English aircraft carriers far from the Norwegian coasts and thus made their bombing raids in Norway ineffective because of the great distance the planes had to operate from their bases. It made English air raids unprofitable by the efficiency of their fighters. It carried troops at remarkable speed to places where they were needed. It supplied them with food, munitions, anid medicine, and it protected troops moving by air, land, and sea. The German occupation of Norway is maiily a. story of an overpowering air force, merely aided by forces from the

Efficient German pioneers rebuild a bridge. Logs and lumber were available cvery whecrc.

Army and Navy, who, acting alone, would have fouid the couitry practically invulnerable. 7. However, the success of this occupation caniot be fully meas- ured alone by the niere strength of Germany's Army, Navy, and Air Force. It was the close cooperation of all three that made this operation so successful. The Gernan general, in charge of all operations, the German air chief of Norway, aiid tIhe German acliral of Norway had rooms and offices for thenselves and their staffs in the same hotel in Oslo. These three, together with their staffs, worked as an integral uiit. For all practical purposes, the three commanders and staffs were one. 2.9762-4o t3 CIIAPTER VIII

GERMAN AND ALLIED OPERATIONS IN NORWAY

By the evening of April 9, the Germans had occupied Oslo, Kris- tiansand, Stavanger, Bergen, Trondheim, and Narvik. Troops were being rushed by air to all of these. places except Narvik. (Narvik was later reinforced by air.) The Norwegians had ordered mobilization early in the morning of April 9. Amid great confusion, members, of Norway's six divisions were attempting to organize. Their situation was approximately as follows : First, Fredrikstad ; second, Hamar; third, Kristiansand; fourth, Bergen; fifth, Trondheim; and sixth, Narvik. All were poorly equipped and many men were even without rifles. They had no antitank or antiaircraft guns and only a few machine guns. Their supply of ammunition was very low. The Germans, on the other hand, were equipped at all ports, except Oslo, with mechanized equipment as well as mobile artillery and other complete equipment. The forces at Oslo received their first large convoy of transports with mechanized equipment the night of April 10-11, and from then on transports arrived daily. Germans also unloaded large numbers of troops and equipment at Larvik on the west entrance and at Skieborg on the east entrance to Oslo Fjord. Good automobile roads lead out from Larvik to south and west Norway, and from Skieborg to the north and east.

CONQUEST OF SOUTHERN NORWAY

German troops from Oslo formed spearheads as follows: (1) To the northwest toward Honefoss; (2) to the north toward Eidsvoll and Hamar; (3) to the northeast toward Kongsvinger; (4) to the south on the east side of Oslo Fjord toward Moss, and the Norwegian fort at Mysen; and (5) to the south on the west side of Oslo Fjord toward Dramman. German troops landing at Larvik and Skieborg expanded their area of operations, and were soon in contact with the spearheads from Oslo. Spearheads 3 and 4 with the troops landed at Skieborg cut off the Norwegian first division at Fredrikstad and forced it to cross the Swedish border where they were interned on April 15, thus elimi- nating all Norwegian resistance in southeast Norway. Very little Norwegian resistance was offered by this division. Norn-The N. A. Oslo went to Fredrikstad on April 11. The German troops from Oslo had arrived as far south as Drobak, opposite the fort of Oskarsborg, about 25 kilometers south of Oslo. He was told that the Norwegians were mobilizing at Fredrikstad so he drove there. About 20 kilometers north of Fredrikstad, he passed a gas station which had been bombed an hour previously, wrecking the gas station, a large truck, and a small car. All were burning fiercely. There had been six trucks en route to Fredrikstad, but the (72) others escaped. It was especially noted that the Germans did not bomb the paved road, although at least six bomb holes were counted near the road. They only machine-gunned the road. This is another example of how the Germans saved what they expected to use and actually did use later. Arriving at Fredrikstad, there were five homes burning fiercely and others badly damaged from bombings an hour before. In this case, the Germans apparently used blanks in machine guns to scare the people away an hour before they bombed. There was only one invalid woman killed in the bombing. However, the Norwegian mobilization was completely demoralized. Many young men were

Germans land troops and mechanized equipment at Oslo, Larvil, and Skieborg on and after April 10. standing around various places looking for officers to lead them to places where uniforms, arms, and ammunition could be obtained. It was established that most of the 3,000 Norwegian soldiers who crossed the Swedish frontier were unable to get either uniforms or arms. The German Air Force just did not give them a chance. Many Norwegian soldiers had only a little button on their caps to indicate they belonged to the Norwegian Army. German forces on the west side of the Fjord occupied Drammen (the Norwegian mine factory was located here), captured 300 prisoners, 7 field pieces, and a large quantity of rifles and ammunition; lvalsmoen, the Norwegian drill grounds; and Kongsberg, the arma- Norwegians build barricade.

German soldiers taking cover behind light tank, ment factory, capturing at the latter place ninety 40-millemeter antiaircraft guns, many 20-millimeter and smaller machine guns, practically all that the Norwegians possessed.

NOTE.-The N. A. Oslo was told by reliable Norwegian authority that the 40-millimeter antiaircraft guns had been collected at Kongsberg for overhaul just previous to the occupation. This was the work of treacherous Nazi- sympathizing Norwegian officers. There was no damage done to the armament plant at Kongsberg, the torpedo plant at Horton, the mine plant at Dramman, or the powder plant at Honefoss before the Germans captured them. The Germans put all these plants into operation as soon as they had consolidated their position.

By April 15, the Oslo Fjord area was in German hands. Small scattered Norwegian forces continued to operate for a few more days in the area to the west of Oslo Fjord before they surrendered. On April 16, in the south, after a brief fight at Evje (about 50 kilometers north of Kristiansand), 2,000 Norwegians and 150 officers of the Third Division surrendered to a much smaller force of Ger- mans. This eliminated all Norwegian opposition in south Norway. There was no fighting of consequence around Stavanger. At the end of the first week, the Germans had captured one division and forced another across the Swedish border. They were in complete control of southern Norway and had captured most of Norway's artillery, machine guns, ammunition, and ammunition factories. By April 22, Germans had opened up communications and traffic between Sta- vanger, Kristiansand, and Oslo.

BRITISH MINE FIELDS IN SOUTH NORWEGIAN WATERS

The British announced on April 12 that they had mined waters from Bergen south as far as Wilhelmshaven, as well as both the Skagerrak and Kattegat. These mine fields were ineffective as they did not stop German troop ships entering Norway.

OCCUPATION OF BERGEN- OSLO RAILROAD

Spearhead No. 1, from Oslo, entered Honefoss without serious opposition by April 15, capturing the powder factory. The Norwegians had blown up important railroad bridges and were offering stiff resistance to the further westward advance of the Germans from Honefoss. The spearhead from Bergen advanced against spirited resistance from the Norwegian Fourth Division eastward along the railroad. They also sent another spearhead by Navy transports escorted by destroyers up the Hardanger Fjord. By April 24, the land spearhead was near Voss, an important city about 70 kilometers east of Bergen, and the Navy spearhead was at Granvin, at the head of the fjord and only 20 kilometers southeast of Voss.. At these points they were ready to attack the Norwegians at Voss from the rear. In the meantime, the Germans bombed Voss and threatened to destroy the whole city if the resistance did not cease. The Norwegian Fourth Division then opened negotiations for surrender and by May 1, the Bergen-Oslo railroad was completely in the hands of the Germans.

NoTE.-The N. A. Oslo left Oslo May 14 on the first through trip to Bergen. He had to change trains 6 times, walk 1 mile around 1 broken bridge, drive in a German military car 9 miles around another bridge, go about 18 miles by boat in Hardanger Fjord, and make the final 60 miles by bus. The trip took 2 , days when the usual time was 11 hours. When in Voss on May 15, the N. A. saw where the Germans had bombed this town to discourage further resistance by the Norwegians who had been quite energetic up to this time. On the south side of the railroad track, 2 areas were completely cleared away by bombs. On 1 area 4 blocks long and 3 blocks wide 48 foundations were counted. Similar devastation was apparent in other areas. These areas were close to the railroad station and tracks, the large transformer station, railroad bridge, and road bridge, none of which was touched. The houses destroyed, 72 or more, were business blocks, small factories, and homes. The town surrendered immediately after the bombardment. The Germans used their regular technique in bombing nonmilitary objectives to eliminate resistance, while saving all military objectives for their own use.

Bergen, showing ammunition ship aflame alongside wrecked quay. The smoke nea- end of dock iayj be that of the "Konigsberg" which is sunk here. To right are most of the 53 merchant ships captured, mostly Norwegian, Sw-Cdish, and Finnish.

THE CAMPAIGN IN CENTRAL NORWAY

The most important resistance to the German occupation occurred in the campaign in central Norway, from Oslo north to Trondheim, Two large valleys, Gudbransdal on the west, and Osterdal on the east, run roughly north and south between these two cities. Both valleys have railroads and auto roads. In the Gudbransdal Valley, the important towns to the north of Oslo were Eidsvoll on the southern end of Lake Mjosen, Hamar, on the east side of Lake Mjosen, and 77

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K J 78 about midway between Eidsvoll and Lillehammar, Lillehammar on the northern end of Lake Mjosen, Ringebu, Dombas, Hjerkinn, Opdal, Inset, Storen, and Trondheim. At Dombas, a branch line of the railroad goes northwest to Andalsnes. In the Osterdal Valley, the important towns are Kongsvinger, Elverum, Rena, Alvdal, Tynset, Roros, Storen, and Stavanger. The only connections between these two valleys is the railroad and auto road between Hamar and Elverum and two mountainous roads in the north, one between Hjerkinn and Alvadal, and the other between Inset and Tynset. On

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FRAHCE BELGIUM 13 APR 1940 - , ' zorni/es British mine fields reported laid on April 12. the west side of Lake Mjosen is an auto road, on which is the important town of Gjovik just across the lake from Hamar. Both valleys meet in the north at the town of Storen. The Olso-Bergen railroad runs 50 kilometers north of Oslo to Roa, before it turns west to Hornefoss. A branch of this railroad continues north and northwest of Roa to Faeganas, a distance of about 120 kilometers. The Norwegian Second Division was concentrating in the Hamar, Elverum, and Lillehammar area. They offered some resistance at Battle front on April 22. Germans nearly surround Norwegian Fourth Division at Moss and advance westward from Honefoss. Three German spearheads operate from Trondheim. Kongsvinger before falling back to the north toward Elverum and also some resistance at Eidsvoll before falling back to the north toward Hamar. The German spearhead however reached Hamar

British land at Namsos on April 16 and at Andalsnes on April 18. French land at Namsos on April 19. British plan attack north and south from Donmbas.

on April 20 and Elverum on April 21 and was able to cut off the Norwegian forces north of Kongsvinger before they could fall back on the main Norwegian forces north of Elverum. These Norwegian forces held out in the southern part of the Osterdal Valley until their supplies were exhaused when they surrendered on April 30. 81

The main body of Norwegian troops retired to the northward in both valleys.

NOTE-The N. A. Oslo heard from a high Norwegian officer that General Laake, the Norwegian commander in chief, got out of Oslo just before the Germans arrived and a small force of Germans chased him nearly as far as Elverum. He had many narrow escapes from capture and after being also bombed, the old man resigned, and General Ruge took command. When the N. A. called on General Ruge on April 15 at a farmhouse near Lillehammar, the general said he would be compelled to spend "miles rather than men," and hope that assistance from the Allies would come before it was too late. At that time, he had communication only with Elverum on the south and Dombas on the north. He was using couriers to carry messages to Norwegian forces near Bergen, Trondheim, and Narvik. He had no information from Oslo or south Norway and had, as yet, received no word from Trondheim, Bergen, or Narvik. Ammunition was very short, and he also had more men than rifles. There were only three battalions of field artillery-two near Hamar and one east of Trondheim. He was using unarmed soldiers to build barricades. The N. A. saw only one Norwegian observation plane. The nine Norwegian combat planes had been destroyed or captured the first day of invasion. General Ruge's plan was to delay the German advance up the, Gudbransdal and Osterdal Valleys as much as possible and to fall back to the north, hoping that Allied aid would catch up to them somewhere. The N. A. also drove over these same roads to Lillehammar on May 6 to 9. Between Hamar and Lillehammar the road was badly broken due to shell fire and mines. Eighteen destroyed buildings were counted alongside this road, and there may have been many others off the road. By the time the Norwegians had retreated to Lillehammar, they had only two field pieces left and it is believed these were lost soon afterward. The Norwegians evidently held on at Hamar for some time, but then retreated precipitously, as hundreds of cars, buses, and trucks of all description, were strewn along the road. Most of them appeared to have been deliberately shoved over a precipice when they ran out of gas, and the Germans were busy hauling them out and towing them to repair stations. One heavy German tank was wrecked, apparently by a road mine. German soldiers guarding the tank became nasty when the N. A. attempted to inspect it. The guns had been removed, and it was partly covered by canvas. However, the forward armor seemed to be at least 3 inches thick. On his return to Oslo on May 9, the N. A. was stopped for 2 hours while a German transport train passed, going north, the first part motorized and the second part horsedrawn. There were about 60 large trucks, followed by at least 60 horsedrawn wagons. All were covered, but among supplies noted were telephone and other electrical equipment, gasoline, ammunition, and food. Two troop trucks containing 50 men each accompanied this train, as well as motorcycle, bicycle, and other troops riding in the trucks. Nearly all were Alpine troops from Bavaria and Austria. On April 16, King Haakon was in the vicinity of General Ruge, near Lillehammar. Trondheim is about 50 kilometers inside the Trondheim Fjord which extends another 90 kilometers northeast of that city. Besides the railroad running south to Storen and thence to Oslo via the two large valleys, there is another important railroad running east to Sweden. About 30 kilometers east of Trondheim, at Stjordal, a branch of this railroad runs north to Namsos, via the important towns of Levanger, Steinkjer, Snasa, and Grong. Trondheim lies about midway between Namsos in the north and Andalsnes in the south, approximately 150 kilometers in a direct line from both. The Allied plan of action was to land at both Namsos and Andalsnes and to capture Trondheim by pincer movements from the north and south. The Norwegian Fifth Division had headquarters at Grong and their troops were occupying Steinkjer on the south, and were to cooperate with the Allied troops landed at Namsos. The Allied troops landing at Andalsnes were to proceed to Dombas where one The Trondhein region now evacuatted by the Allies. A pictorial map looking south west, with Nanisos, front where Allied troops adranced, seen in the right foreground; Stein kjer in the eenter; and Hegra in the left distance.-Specially drawn by C. E. Turner. In this pictorial map of the Trondheim area, the country is viewed from the northeast that is, as it would appear to a British aircraft flyilng over Namsos. The first British landings at Namsos took place on April 14, sailors being the first to occupy the town. British troops and French Jhasseurs Alpins followed a few days later. A good account of the events at Nansos was given by a Daily Telegraph correspondent, who said that of the two main sectors, one-the western-including the main road southward from Namsos to Bangsund and Roedhammer, was taken over by French and British troops, and the other, along Lake Snasavata. held by fairly large Norwegian forces. The Nazis hovever held the bead of Beitstad' Fjord, where the two roads from Namsos meet. The Norwegian mountain fortress of Ilegra surrendered on May 5, after holding out for more than 3 eeks. The withdrawal of all Allied troops south of Trondheim was announced by the Premier on May 2, and the evacuation of Namsos by the War Office the following day. section was to proceed north to Storen and attack Trondheim from the south, and the other section was to proceed south to Lillehammer, join the Norwegian Second Division, and attack the German forces coming north. The British made their first naval landing at Namsos at 2140 on April 14 and Army landings on April 16. Navy landings were made at Andalsnes on April 17 and Army landings on April 18. The French landed at Namsos on April 19. The Navy contingents were small, each of about 300 marines, who were to make preparations for the landing of the troops later.

NorTE.-The N. A. Oslo saw the British marines at Dombas on April 20. They had helped the Norwegians wipe out the remaining German parachute troops near Dombas that morning. They were well clad for the cold climate but the only equipment they had was rifles.

The British landed at both Andalsnes and Namsos without being bombed. However, they were not sufficiently equipped with mechanized equipment, antiaircraft, or field artillery. The troops were not seasoned. Neither place was prepared to resist bombing attacks. Subsequent landings of troops were severely bombed with heavy losses in equipment and some casualties. Both towns and all docks were demolished. The Germans at Trondheim sent spearheads to the north as far as Steinkjer; to the east, where they attacked the Norwegian Fort of Hegre, and to the south toward Storen. Two German destroyers held command of the fjord and were instrumental in causing the Allies to retreat from Steinkjer. The fort at Hegre held out until April 26. The British force at Andalsnes proceeded to Dombas at once, and about 750 of them went as far south as Ringebu, where they joined the Second Norwegian Division on April 21. The Germans had pushed the Norwegians back rapidly, entering Lillehammar on April 22 and Ringebu on April 24. In the meantime two German spearheads had advanced to the northward, one going north from Roa and the other north from Eidsvoll on the west side of Lake Mjosen, capturing the town of Gjovik and joining the other German forces at Lillehammar on April 22. A detachment of about 1,500 Norwegians from the Second Division was cut off from the main body by these two German columns and were forced to retreat northwest toward Faegernas and, pursued by the Roa column, surrendered there about May 1. In the Osterdal Valley the Germans advanced against stiff opposition and occupied Alvdal and Tynset on April 24 and started spearheads across the mountain roads to Hjerkinn and Inset for the purpose of attacking the British forces advancing toward Storen on the flank. Another spearhead continued northward toward Roras encountering strong opposition. The Allied help was not enough to stem the German advances. The overwhelming strength of the German Air Force, and the lack of Allied mechanized equipment and antitank and antiaircraft guns made resistance impossible. By April 25 the British northerly advance toward Trondheim was stopped south of Storen, and a retreat toward Dombas was begun on the 26th. The Allied troops north of Trondheim retreated from Steinkjer when the German destroyers and Air Force made their position untenable. On May 1-2, the British and French bad retreated to Andalsnes and Namsos and had embarked on transports for England. The Norwegian Second Division, now at Andalsnes, surrendered on May 2 and the Fifth Division at Grong surrendered on May 5.

April 24: German spearheads isn northern Osterdal. English and Norwegian forces falling back to Dombas. Allied forces at Steinkjer.

The embarkation of they Allied troops at both Andalsnes and Namsos was carried out under terrific bombardment by the German Air Force Both towns were completely destroyed. Three destroyers were sunk by bombs on the way to England, AT NARVIK

The Germans on April 9 occupied the railroad to the east of the town as far as the Swedish border. They met rugged resistance from a small body of Norwegian soldiers, garrisoned at Narvik at the time of the occupation. The main action in the first week here was naval and will be taken up under "Naval Action." The English landed troops at Narvik on April 15.

April 28: Resistance in Osterdal Valley overcome-Allies falling back to Dombas and Namsos-Hegre falls, giving Germans control of railroad to Sweden.

By April 24, the British and French troops had landed at Beis Fjord just south of Narvik and at Tromso about 120 kilometers north of Narvik. Other landings were made in the vicinity of Narvik. Severe fighting continued around Narvik. About a thousand Ger- mans were trapped at Gratanger and surrendered on May 1. However, the Germans were now beginning to get reenforcements and supplies by air from Trondheim. The Germans also started an advance northward from Trondheim, after the withdrawal of Allied troops, and with practically no resistance took Mo, 200 miles north of Trondheim on May 22; Fauske, 100

German. spearheads, April 30. miles south of Narvik, on May 31; Bodo, 90 miles southwest of Narvik, on June 1. The Allies, in the meantime, captured Narvik on May 29, and continued the attack on the Germans along the iron ore railroad. 87

However, the German Air Force commenced a terrific air attack on the Allies and reenforced their troops by air. On June 8-9, the Allies embarked and left the Narvik area, taking with them to England the Norwegian King, Crown Prince and government along with a few Norwegian officers and troops. The Norwegian sixth and last division surrendered on June 9, thereby completing the occupation of Norway.

Harstad

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Allies landed first troops on April 15, and made subsequent landings at Beis Fjord. A battalion of Germans was trapped at Gratangen and surrendered. The following is the British version of the capture of Narvik: The capture of Narvik, which was effected on the night of May 28-29, by the Allied forces had long been delayed owing to the difficulty of operating in deep snow over such broken country. German air superiority, which had resulted in damage during the past week to three of our cruisers, seven trawlers, and four supply ships, was successfully challenged on May 25 when R. A. F. fighters destroyed three 4-engined Junkers and believe that they accounted for four cther enemy aircraft. On May 26 an attack was made on the German outpost on Ankenes Peninsula, south of Narvik, when hand-to-hand fighting took place and severe loss was inflicted on the enemy. At midnight on May 27-28, a landing under cover of naval bombardment, French artillery fire, and action by R. A. F. fighters was made by a battalion of French Foreign Legion and a battalion of Norwegians, 2 miles to the east of Narvik. The landing was not seriously opposed and the town was captured during the early hours of May 29. During the operations H. M. ships were attacked by enemy aircraft and slight damage was done to the A. A. cruiser Cairo and the destroyers Whirlwind and Walker. NAVAL ACTIONS AT NARVIK

Action between the Scharnhorst and Hipper and H. M. S. Renown, Tuesday morning April 9 as given in official report to Admiralty. Meanwhile far to the north off Narvik, on this Tuesday morning at daybreak, the Renown, one of our battle cruisers, perceived the Scharnhorst and a 10,000- ton Hipper class cruiser, which had evidently come up with the force the day 259762-40--7 88

before, in the distance dimly. Amid snowstorms, a tempestuous day, sea running high, gales blowing furiously, our battle cruiser opened fire at 18,000 yards. After 3 minutes the enemy replied but almost immediately turned away. After 9 minutes the Renown observed hits on the forward structure of the German battle cruiser, and thereafter her whole armament stopped firing. Thereafter her after turret began firing under local control. The speed the battle cruiser maintained was very great, and the Renown had to push to 24 knots through very heavy seas breaking over her forward turrets and guns. After a further 2 minutes of firing a vertical column of smoke from what they called a possible

German advance north of Trondheim in May to relieve Narvik. Air base established at Bodoe. second hit was observed on the Schurnhorst which then turned away and directly retired at a high speed without further firing. During this period a shell had passed through our vessel about the water line without bursting * * * a second shell went through the foremast carrying away the main aerial. There were no casualties on board the Renown. The destroyers which were with her were unable to keep up in the heavy seas at the speed at which she was going. The 10,000-ton cruiser Hipper now drew across the battleship Scharnhorst. * * * The Hipper threw a smoke screen across her to cover her retreat. The Renown opened fire on the Hipper, which turned away. Both ships now retired at high speed, the Hipper swinging to fire a broadside from time to time, and also dodging. Firing was intermittent, as all the time snowstorms were sweep- ing across and closing the view, and the sea was running very high; but in the end we much regret to say that they succeeded in leaving us. Firing finally ceased at 29,000 yards, when they became quite invisible. 89

r ,. .

German infantry vanguards in a Norwegian village.

FIRST NAVAL ATTACK ON NARVIK Source: Statement by Prime Minister in the House of Commons on April 10, 1940.-New York Herald Tribune, April 11: The House will * * probably wish to hear the account which I have just received of the fierce action fought by British destroyers against German forces in Narvik this morning. Five British destroyers steamed up the fjord and engaged six German destroyers of the latest and largest types, who were also supported by the shore batteries and guns newly mounted ashore. H. M. S. Hunter was sunk and II. M. S. Hardy was so severely injured that she had to be run ashore and becanme a wreck. The Hotspur also received serious damage, and the destroyer Hostile slight damage. The remaining vessel, the Havock, was untouched. After a most determined action against superior forces with larger and more modern ships, in face of gunfire from the shore, the damaged Hotspur withdrew, covered by the other two destroyers. The enemy appeared to be in no condition to attempt pursuit. One 1,690-ton German destroyer was torpedoed and believed sunk, and three were left heavily hit and burning. It is perhaps not less important that six merchant ships suspected of containing the unloaded stores of the German expedition were sunk on the coast by the British destroyers. On the way out they met the German ship Ravensfeldt, which was found to be carrying reserve ammunition for the landed German force. The vessel was blown up. SECOND NAVAL ATTACK ON NARVIK Source: Admiralty communique of April 25, 1940: Full details of the second battle of Narvik on April 13, when a strong force consisting of the 30,000-ton Warspite and nine of the most modern British destroyers cleaned up Narvik harbor and sank seven German destroyers were published by the Admiralty tonight. Germans raid Andalsnes. One destroyer and six German supply ships had been sunk in an earlier Narvik raid on April 10. Three days later the Warspite's force finished up the job against a gallant but inferior German force. The task assigned to the Wlarspite, a World War battleship, was reduction of the shore batteries. In this job she was assisted by the flotilla leader Cossack, which figured in the Altmiark incident. To take the Warspite, which has eight 13-inch guns and 6-inchers, up a narrow fjord was somewhat a feat in itself, especially as it was known German destroyers were lurking in the bays. Nevertheless, with destroyers acting as a screen, the Warspitc's planes flying out ahead and the destroyer Icarus leading the van, the squadron started at noon in a mist and drizzle. The first contact was made at 12: 26 when a German destroyer appeared from the mist on the south side of Ofot Fjord. The Icarus, Bedouin, Punjabi, and Cossack opened fire, but the enemy turned away.

Namsos after German bombing.

The squadron then passed the wreck of the ammnnunition ship 1auenfels which had been blown up in the earlier attack. At 12: 45, another German destroyer loomed out of the mist. Five minutes later another appeared, and British destroyers engaged both. A few minutes later the Warspite opened up. As the British squadron moved on, engaging the two Germans with all their strength, word was received from a plane that another German destroyer was in Ballangen Bay. The Icarus, still leading, sighted her at 1: 07. The Bedouin, Pun jabi, and Eskimo, dropping the attack on the first two Germans, shot ahead and engaged the new enemy ship along with the Icarus. In 8 minutes a rain of British shells set her afire in three places, but she kept answering with a single gun until the Warspitc silenced her. Meanwhile more Germans appeared until there were six. One German plane was seen at this stage, but did not attack then or later, but planes of the fleet air arm attacked Narvik harbor works with bombs. The WVarspite swung into position close inshore and silenced one enemy howitzer. The Punjabi and Foxhound were in support of the Cossack. The destroyer action by now had developed into a running fight, both sides zigzaggilg, and is best told in the following extracts fnoa the log of oine of the British ships 581:5, nile enemy badly hit : 2 02. shore batteries firling:o 2: 01, enemy destroyer on fire ; 2 05, Germaa destroyer hit ly torpedoes, another enemy destroyer on fire; 2 :10, enemy fired torpedo; 2 :15, another eneny destroyer onl fire; 2: 15, this enemy again hit; 2: 24, two explosions on second enemy destroyer to catch fire ; 2: 25, two explosions on another burning enemy destroyer."

Germans adcancc over roads obstructcd by Norwegians.

Thus 2 hours and a half after the raid started with four British ships concentrating on shore batteries, three German destroyers were finished ; one was a blazing wreck in Ballengen Bay, one drifted derelict north of Narvik, her crew swimming for shore and one beached herself toward the northeast. The remaining German destroyers, one badly damaged, fled up Ioinbaks Fjord with the Eskimo, I'orcster, Hero, Bedou in, and Icarus after them. Rombaks Fjord is 10 miles long, but narrows at one point to 200 yards and has a sharp bend at the end. As the Eskimo, in the lead of the pursuing British, came through the neck, the damaged German destroyer, beached just on the other side, opened up on her and she sustained damage. It should be understood that at this point the British could not see what lay ahead as the Ger- mans left a smoke screen behind them. Lack of sea room made the other British ships ieave the Eskimo to leal with the German cripple alone, which she soon did. Then the other British ships stormed on for the three remaining Germans. They were at last against the ice at the end of Rombmmks Fjord. The bows of one stuck out of the water ; one lay to the north, apparently umdamaged ; and the third was afire aft. The British ships fired on the two afloat; but, receiving no answer, soon ceased. Armed parties lowered away to investigate, but before they reached the German vessel that apparently was unhurt, she listed and sank. She had been scuttled. On the last German destroyer--the Hans Ludemana of the Roeder class, as apparently all the others were-which was afire, the boarding party found only one officer wounded on a stretcher. The ship was too far gone for salvage, so after taking off the officer, the Hero gave her the coup de grace with a torpedo. With all the enemy destroyers finished, the British withdrew, leaving two destroyers in command of the harbor. One of these took off the Hardy's survivors from the earlier raid who were at Ballangen. An armed landing party of 24 captured 120 Germans who came into the town. Before they reem- barked, the British left rifles and anmmunition for Norwegian miners who were to guard the prisoners. Three British destroyers were damaged in the action.

Germans advancing over rough tcrrain in central NorwaU.

NAVAL ACTION OFF NARVIK ON 8 JUNE, 1940

On Saturday, 8 June, the German wireless announced the battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had sunk H. M. S. Glorious. It has later been stated that several hundred survivors were rescued. As reconstructed, the following appears to be the sequence of events: (a) H. M. S. Glorious, with plane guards H. M. S. Acasta and Ardent, was sent to Narvik to reembark certain R. A. F. aircraft and return to England. (b) At the same time the final evacuation of Narvik was in progress and a convoy of troop ships, supply ships, etc., was also at sea en route for England. (c) H. M. S. Valiant (BB) was sent out from Scapa Flow to cover this transit from a southerly position. (d) No larger covering force was allowed to be dispatched from Scapa Flow because the government was concerned over the threat of invasion. (e) Apparently the German intelligence reported the presence of the Glorious at Narvik and the load of aircraft on board her. Based on this information, the German force, which appears to have been composed of Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Deutschland, Admiral Scheer, two or three cruisers and some dlestroyers, was dispatched to intercept. (f) R. A. F. air reconnaissance over Germany failed to report the departure of this force. Both air and submarine reconnaissance along the Norwegian coast likewise failed to make contact with this German force. (g) Although without positive information, it appears the vis- ability was low. It is known that fog patches existed in this area. (h) It is believed contact with the Glorious was made at very close range; the British ships were surprised; and sunk by gun fire (possibly by torpedoes) after a very brief action.

German tank advancing ocver snow-co cred roads. Soldier aids with shovel.

(i) It is doubtful if the Glorious had aircraft in the air. It is probable that the R. A. F. planes were unable to fly off and their presence on the flight deck blocked the ship's regularly assigned aircraft from getting off. (j) It is understood that about 50 planes, complete with their pilots and crews, were lost when the Glorious sank.

OTHER ACTIONS

The following is the British official report of the sinking of the destroyer Gloooorm:

"* * * On Sunday night, news was received from the air reconnaissance * * " that German battle cruisers, with a number of other cruisers and vessels and destroyers, were out at sea and moving very swiftly northwards. The commander in chief immediately put to sea to find them and bring them to action. At the same time, independently of this, a strong British naval force was approaching Narvik in order to lay a mine field off the Norwegian coast. * * * The mine field was laid according to plan at daylight on Monday morning. * * * "One of the destroyers of this northern force which went to lay mines lost a man overboard on Sunday afternoon and stayed behind some time to pick him up. This destroyer, the Glowworm, was proceeding northwards to rejoin its force when, at 8 o'clock Monday morning, she saw first one and then two enemy destroyers, which she engaged. She then reported an unknown enemy ship before her to the northward. These incidents came to us one by one at a few minute intervals as they occurred, but the last message ended abruptly, and we can only conclude that the Glowworm has been sunk by the greatly superior forces of the enemy which she had to encounter."

Allied aircraft carrier attacked by German bombers. (2) It is believed that the Glowworm fell in with the same force which met the Renown the following day-namely, the Scharnhorst, Hipper, and accompanying destroyers. The following additional naval actions are interesting. April 11.-Penelope, CL, 5,270 tons, grounded somewhere on the Norwegian coast. Damage slight. Refloated. April 14.-(a) Glasgow landed a naval party of 300 at Namsos. (b) Two companies of Scots Guards landed at Sag Fjord (north of Narvik). April 15.-(a) Landing Forces at Harstad and Namsos covered. (b) Furious aircraft attacked German aircraft on frozen lake north of Narvik. April 17.-(a) Suffolk, accompanied by 4 destroyers and using fleet air arm for radio spotting, bombarded Stavanger airfield. The protecting force of fighters to have been furnished by the Royal Air Force failed to arrive. Suffolk fired 217 rounds of ammunition. Damage to Stavanger is unknown, but German air activity reported greatly reduced. On her retirement Suffolk was subjected to 33 dive bombing attacks in which 82 bombs were dropped. Of these, one was a direct hit and several were near misses. The direct hit was aft. Suffolk returned to Scapa Flow under her own power, steering with her engines. On arrival, she was badly down by the stern with her weather deck awash, and she had to be beached to avoid sinking. The personnel casualties amounted to 27 killed and 34 wounded. 96

(b) Faulknor destroyed a German ammunition and gasoline dump at HIerjangen, northeast of Narvik Bay. Apparently this was accomplished by a landing party because one man is reported to have been killed in reconnaissance. (c) An advance party of 30 enlisted men was landed at Andalsnes and reported no sign of Germans in that vicinity. Naval forces began covering the disembarkation of troops there. (d) Norwegian troops were transferred from Kirkenes to Tromso in British transports, escorted by British and Norwegian naval craft. April 18.-(a) Thistle (SS), 1,0O0 tons, reported overdue and presumed lost. (b) Hotspur (DD), 1,340 tons, and Punjabi (DL), 1,870 tons, damaged in Narvik actions on April 10 and 13, respectively, were reported seaworthy. April 19.-(a) British destroyers patrolling off Afo Fjord. (b) Additional landings covered by naval forces in Narvik area and at Namsos, Andalsnes, and Aalesund. In latter two places Royal Marines and Royal Navy landed in addition to the British Army. April 20.-Rutlandshire, trawler, sunk by bombs off Namsos.

Allied troops landing at Bjervik, north of Narvik.

DIVE BOMBING OPERATIONS IN BERGEN (FROM OFFICIAL SOURCES)

The first dive bombing operations conducted by either the Allies or German forces against men-of-war occurred on Wednesday, April 11, when 16 "Skuas" of the fleet air arm proceeded from the Naval Air Station, Haston, near Kirkwall in the Orkneys, to Bergen and attacked a German cruiser of the Koln class. This cruiser was previously reported damaged by one hit by the Royal Air Force. The pilots concerned in the dive bombing attack claimed three direct hits and that the cruiser sank. Each "Skua" carried one 500-pound bomb. The dives were steep, between 70 and 80 degrees. Bombs were dropped at less than 2,000 feet. Sixteen planes took part in the action, and each dropped its bomb at the target. One plane failed to return and was last seen climbing into the clouds after dropping its bomb. Hopes were expressed that the crew might have been picked up by a friendly ship, but no report to this effect has as yet been received. Press reports indicate that 15 planes of the same squadron bombed a transport and small supply ship in Bergen harbor on April 15 and that the transport was set afire and small supply ship sunk. NoTE.-The Konigsberg and an ammunition ship were sunk in this attack.

AIR AND NAVAL ATTACK ON THE "SCHARNHORST," JUNE 13

From official sources.

The 26,000-ton German battle cruiser Scharnhorst has received considerable damage from attack by our Navy and Air Force. A German destroyer has also been hit by a torpedo. One of our submarines sighted the Scharnhorst soon after she had left Trond- helm Fjord. The battle cruiser was clearly on passage to a safe port where she could repair the damage sustained when hit by at least one heavy bomb during an attack by the aircraft of the fleet air arm on June 13. She was heavily escorted. The submarine attacked the Scharnhorst and obtained one hit with a torpedo. As soon as the report of this attack was received, R. A. F. aircraft of the coastal command were dispatched to shadow and keep in touch with the enemy. Shortly afterward an attack was delivered on the damaged battle cruiser, but one of the escorting destroyers was hit by a torpedo. Two of our aircraft failed to return. An hour later a bombing attack was made on the Scharnhorst by R. A. F. aircraft of the coastal command. In spite of intense opposition resulting in the loss of three of our aircraft, bombing attacks were pressed home and three direct hits with heavy bombs were made on the Scharnhorst. Two enemy fighters were also shot down in flames. Units of the Royal Navy were immediately dispatched at high speed to intercept the German forces, but with visibility rapidly deteriorating, further contact was not made. The submarine attack on this same ship is as follows:

Some details of the stalk carried out by the British submarine Clyde against the crippled German battleship Scharnhorst were disclosed by the Admiralty today. The Clyde was patrolling off Trondheim Fjord in heavy weather and under skies filled with German aircraft when she sighted two large..German warships with an escort of destroyers. There was a heavy sea running and the Clyde had to carry out her hunt under difficult conditions. There was the incessant danger of exposing too much of her periscope in order to see over the waves, and there was the danger in the rough sea that the submarine, attacking at periscope depth, might break the surface. The stalk continued, though the Germans altered their course away from the Clyde. Torpedoes were fired at long range. One found the target and the explosion was so great that it shook the Clyde, putting out some of her lights. The Germans counter-attacked immediately, but failed to damage the submarine. The Clyde was unable to wait to see the exact extent of the damage done to the Schurnhorst. British battleships coming up for the kill were unable to find the enemy. The German Air Forces cleared the way for all spearheads and prevented, to a large extent, any efficient mobilization of the Nor- wegian Army. They kept the British Fleet away from all ports except Narvik. They made any determined invasion of Norway by the Allies impossible. Their reconnaissance planes kept their naval vessels completely informed of the position of the British Fleet and thereby saved them from any serious encounters with it, and, in addition, kept their own air and naval forces informed of all British naval positions so that they could successfully attack them. e o

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Wreck of railway at Narvik.

Narvik bomnbedt by Germans. 101

AIR OPERATIONS

The British reconnaisance planes, on the other hand, were unable to keep the German naval forces under surveillance, and thereby prevented the British Home Fleet from completely destroying every unit of the German Fleet. The British dive bombers did excellent work at Bergen, destroying the Konigsberg, Biernse, two important ammunition ships, and a large store of gasoline. Their air attacks on airports at Sole, Kristiansand, and Fornebo were without important results. The British were unable to establish air bases in the Trondheim area and this spelled doom to their expeditionary forces in that area. Their air base near Narvik was not developed enough to permit them to successfully resist the German air fleet based at Trondheim and this doomed their forces in Narvik. CHAPTER IX

GERMAN PACIFICATION OF NORWAY

1. Events in Oslo.-The events in Oslo following the occupation of Norway, beginning on April 9, are described by despatches to the State Department, from the American Legation in Oslo, excerpts from which follow:

The Legation's previous reports. have indicated over a long period how reluctant the Norwegian Government, headed by Mr. Nygaardsvold, has been to outlay public funds on military defense force. Faced suddenly with the fact of a number of German naval units coming up the Belt, it apparently was completely paralyzed. I have it from a reasonably reliable source that after the British mining of Norwegian territorial waters, the Norwegian Army Command requested authorization for a general mobilization, but was refused by the Nygaardsvold Government, reputedly on grounds of expense. I learned also from the same source that the Norwegian Naval Command requested authorization to mine the Oslo Fjord but that when the order was finally given by the Minister of Defense it was too late to carry out the measure before the entrance of the German warships. There are conflicting stories regarding the matter of Norwegian mines in the Oslo Fjord, but none of them can be verified. Little, if any, preparation on the part of the Government itself to prepare for flight seems to have been made until the early morning of April 9, at about the time when the first news came that the Norwegian coastal defense was resisting the advance of German naval units entering the Oslo Fjord. On the evening of April 8, the Legation made constant inquiries of Foreign Office officials regarding the reports of German naval movements, but these officials were without precise information. It was not until about 4: 10, a. i., April 0, that it first received word of the approaching German advance on Oslo. At that time the British Minister, Sir Cecil Dormer, telephoned me at my house that German naval units were proceeding up the fjord and inquired urgently whether the American Legation would take over British interests in case he were obliged to evacuate. I got in touch with Minister Harriman who, as soon as possible, telephoned the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Dr. Koht. Dr. Koht told her briefly that Norwegian forces had fired on four German warships in the fjord and that Norway was at war with Germany. He added that his information was that five warships were en route to Bergen. Dr. Koht said that the Government was leaving Oslo for Hamar by special train at 7 a. m. The King and his family would accompany the Government. * * * Before the Government left by special train for Hamar at 7 a. in., April 9, mobilization of the Norwegian Army and Navy was broadcast. The exact time the broadcast was made is not known, but at any event it was completely ineffective. There was apparently no time to organize, if any organization had been possible, and according to all reports the record of the Norwegian mobilization is one of orders and counterorders, resulting in a completely chaotic situation. I have been told by a good source that the German Minister called at the Foreign Office of Dr. Koht in the early morning of April 9 and handed a note to the Norwegian Government stating in effect that Germany intended to take over the protection of Norway against aggression on the Western Powers' part, which it knew was imminent, that the German Government demanded the demobilization of the Norwegian Army and Navy, and the control of Norwegian coastal defenses and airports. The German Minister also stated that the only possible course for Norway to take was to accept German military occupation and that if the country resisted such resistance would be crushed. Dr. Koht consulted with representatives of the Norwegian Government and the Storting, (102) 103 who were assembled in another Foreign Office room, and shortly afterwards informed the German Minister that the Norwegian Government refused the German demands. * * * Shortly after the Germans had occupied the city, Mr. Vidkun Quisling, a former Minister of Defense in 1932 and the leader of the pro-Nazi element in Norway, hitherto considered relatively small, announced the formation of a new government. It seems clear that in expecting no resistance the Germans contemplated that the King would accept the Quisling Government and that the whole of Norway would be brought into line by a fait accompli. The Quisling Government lasted only until April 15, a matter of a week. * * * I wish to point out here that on April 15 the diplomatic missions in Olso were forbidden to send messages in cipher and have not been permitted to do so since then. The dean of the diplomatic corps was informed by the German Legation that all missions must despatch their telegrams en clair and the impression was given that this applied both to transmission and reception. All telegraphic messages are subject to censorship and are received at this Legation with an approval of the censor written upon them. From that moment therefore I had no recourse but to discontinue reporting to the Department by telegraph on political and military matters. Other diplomatic missions, I am informed, have likewise discontinued telegraphing their governments. On April 15, an announcement was made to the press that the Quisling Government had withdrawn and after consultation with the German Minister, now termed the German Plenipotentiary, the Norwegian Supreme Court appointed an Administrative Council of seven members to take over the civil administration in German-occupied territory. It appears that Dr. Braier, the German Minister Plenipotentiary, went by motor to the King at his refuge northeast of Oslo, in an attempt to win his approval of the Quisling Govern- ment. This was not given. During its week of office the Quisling Government was viewed with dislike by the citizens of Oslo and little, if any, support was accorded it. In any event, on the appointment of the so-called Administrative Council, Mr. Quisling was offered thanks for his "public service" and given the nominal job of organizing the demobilization of the Norwegian forces. The Administrative Council is composed of seven responsible Norwegian citizens who are endeavoring to make the best of a difficult situation. Its position was well viewed in Oslo. Since its establishment the Administrative Council has taken over more and more matters, such as those involving rationing and financial questions. The city, however, is under German military rule. The commander in chief is General von Falkenhorst, who issues German proclamations, translations of some of the more important of which are enclosed. As reported by telegraph, restrictions are being enforced in great rapidity. Rationing, banking, police, and visa restrictions are increasing. The use or purchase of coal for private houses is forbidden. The German authorities so far, it is believed, have not requisitioned the food reserves of Oslo, but they have taken some control over such items as military supplies, horses, fodder, etc. German currency, so far used in payment of purchases made by individual soldiers and the military establishments, is legal tender at the rate of 1.662 { Norwegian crowns equal to 1 mark (Reichskreditkassen Scheme). I am informed that already 1 million crowns have been handed in to the Bank of Norway for exchange. Another matter of possible interest to the Department is the position of the Norwegian Foreign Office. Shortly after the occupation of April 9, the Foreign Office personnel remaining in the building, were visited by German officials who took over the Foreign Office's archives. These archives are being subjected to a close examination by ununiformed Germans believed to have been sent from Berlin especially for the purpose. The Norwegian Foreign Office personnel now has no access to the archives and to all intents and purposes does not function. * * *

[Translation of proclamation of the German commander in chief (April 9)]

WARNING

I have taken.over the task of ensuring safety to Norway from attacks made on the side of the Western Powers. The Norwegian Government has refused several offers to cooperate. 259762-40 8 104

The Norwegian people must now themselves decide the fate of their country. If the commands are obeyed, as they were with great understanding by the Danish people who found themselves in the same situation, Norway will be spared the terrors of war. If opposition is made and the hand reached out with friendly intentions is refused, I will be forced to use the strongest and most forceful measures to break resistance. Those assisting the former Government, which has fled, in giving orders of mobilization or spreading false rumors, will be brought before a military court. Any civilian found with a weapon in his hand will be shot. Any person destroying establishments which serve traffic and intelligence services or municipal organizations will be shot. Any person using weapons of war which are contrary to international law will be shot (dumdum). The German Army, victorious in many wars, the large and powerful flying forces, and navy of war, will see that my commands are fulfilled. The German Chief Commander, VoN FALKENHORST, Infantry General.

ITranslation]

THE NORWEGIAN POLICE TAKE OVER GUARD DUTY IN CONJUNCTXON WITH THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES (APRIL 9)

(1) In accordance with enclosed ordinance the Norwegian police has taken over on own responsibility and in cooperation with the military authorities the guarding of establishments, supplies, etc. The police will maintain such guard as is necessary. (2) The military authorities will take care of details in its territory, above all decide the objects to be guarded in the future. (3) Announcements will be made through the press and radio.

[Translation]

ORDINANCE FOR THE INVADED TERRITORIES IN NORWAY (APRIL 9)

In accordance with the decision of The Hague war conventions of 1907, I pronounce the following ordinance for the territory of the Kingdom of Norway which is occupied by German troops: (1) Protection of important constructions, that is, bridges, railway works, food establishments, electricity and water works, and so forth, supplies and tank works, is taken over by the Norwegian police. (2) To maintain this protection the Norwegian police authorities are permitted to use the civil air protection service and assistant police. The establishment of guard duty will be made in conjunction with the German Commander. (3) The Norwegian police authorities are entitled to employ older people to strengthen the police corps. The chief of police is fully responsible that these recently employed people are entirely reliable. (4) The Norwegian police authorities must maintain exact control of new members employed as assistants through lists. In addition they must be furnished with stamped identification cards. (5) The assistant police must use steel helmets only when on duty. Women are permitted to wear uniforms or steel helmets only when there is a real alarm. I remind that any one causing damage to important works will be punished by death. The chief commander in group XXI. VON FALKENHORST Infantry General, 105,

[Translation]

COMPULSORY VISA REQUIREMENTS

Regulations regarding the introduction of compulsory visa requirements between the occupied areas in Norway and the other Scandinavian countries: Authorized by article 43 of The Hague war conventions of October 18, 1907, I decide with legal validity as follows: ARTICLE 1. Beginning the date that this regulation is made public, compulsory visa requirements are introduced for all persons who travel to or from foreign countries, also from and to the Scandinavian countries (Finland, Sweden, Den- mark, and Iceland). ART. 2. Only persons who are in possession of an entrance visa issued by a German authority authorized to issue visas (in foreign countries German Legations and Consulates) may travel into the territory occupied by German troops. Visa for travel to foreign countries from the occupied areas is issued by the German occupation authorities. The passport authorities are the consular branch of the German Legation in Oslo, Klingenberggaten 7, sixth floor. ART. 3. Violation of the above regulations will he punished with fines up to 1,000 crowns or imprisonment up to 0 months, provided a higher punishment has not been fixed in accordance with the penal code. The chief commander in group XXI. VON FALK-ENHORST, Infantry General. OSLO, April 15, 1940.

[Translation]

FRANCTIREUIJS ARE PARDONED

A PROCLAMATION FROM THE GERMAN SUPREME COMMAND IN NORWAY ON THE OCCASION OF ADOLF HITLER'S BIRTHDAY

But the warning is renewed very sharply. On the occasion of the Fuhrer and Reichskansler Adolf Hitler's birthday I have decided, in the! same large-minded spirit in which the Fuhrer proposed his large-minded one and only offer of April 9, to the Norwegian people and the Norwegian Government, to make use of-and for the last time-my supreme right and to pardon all Norwegians who according to international martial law have forfeited their lives. I call upon the Norwegian people, who have been led astray by the Nygaard- svold Government and who are about to meet their ruin if they continue the absurd and futile resistance, to receive the outstretched German hand of friendship. But if the Fuhrer and Reichskansler's largeness of mind and the leniency which I am today showing should be construed by Norway as a sign of weakness, the German sword will. strike Norway with all its sharpness and force. OsLo, April 20, 1940. VON FALKENHORST.

[Translation]

PROCLAMATION

The German Chief Commander in Norway has sent out the following: 1. Because' of the loyal attitude taken by the people, I cancel the restrictions regarding traffic of vehicles and people between the police districts Oslo and Aker, Asker and Baerum, to become effective from April 23, 1940. 2. I have received reports that there exist hidden military weapons and decide therefore the following: a. The possession of military weapons and ammunition is forbidden to Nor- wegian citizens and all foreigners belonging to countries which are at war with Germany. Hunting guns, souvenir, and ornament weapons are not considered military weapons. 106

b. All military weapons and ammunition must be delivered to the local police authorities not later than April 28, 1940. The police authorities will arrange for the transportation of such weapons to the nearest local military commanding authorities. c. If there are found large supplies of military weapons and ammunition in the possession of persons and citizens mentioned in (a'), or if a citizen keeps secret the knowledge of the existence of various weapons or larger supplies of weapons and ammunition, he will be liable to strict punishment. Reports concerning the knowledge of weapons and ammunition should be made to local police authorities, who will collect the same. 3. To maintain quiet and order in the economic life, I decided in accordance with articles 43-52 of the Hague Conventions regarding land warfare of October 18, 1907, the following: PARAGRAPH 1. All passive resistance on the part of the people in the occupied territory of Norway against regulations of the commander of the German army of occupation is forbidden, particularly every refusal to work. In so far as particular instances of this kind already have been lawfully taken care of by special decisions, in the German criminal court, the application of these decisions will not be touched upon. PAR. 2. Men of military age in the territory of Norway which is occupied by German military power may only be permitted to leave their place of residence when permission in each particular case has been granted by the local German troop commander. PAR. 3. Action contrary to this arrangement will be punishable in accordance with paragraph 4 of the regulations pertaining to special court punishment at times of war. In particularly serious instances action may be taken to exceed the general decisions regarding punishment and to employ the death penalty. VON FALKENHORST.

[Translation]

EDICT OF THE FUHRER REGARDING THE EXERCISE OF GOVERNMENTAL POWERS IN NonRwAY, ArIL 24, 1940

The Nygaardsvold Government, by its proclamations and conduct and by the military fighting actions which are taking place in accordance with its will, has created a state of war between Norway and the German Reich. In order to insure public order and public life in the Norwegian areas which are under the protection of the German troops, I order the following: ARTIOLE 1. The occupied Norwegian areas are placed under the "Reich Coinm- missar for the Occupied Norwegian Areas." His seat is at Oslo. The Reich Commissar is the protector of the interests of the Reich and exercises the supreme governmental authority in the civil sphere. ART. 2. The Reich Commissar may utilize the Norwegian administrative com- mittee and the Norwegian authorities to carry out his orders and to exercise the administration. ART. 3. (1) The basic law hitherto valid shall remain in force, so far as it is consistent with the occupation. (2) The Reich Commissar may establish basic law by decree. The decrees shall be published in the "Journal of Decrees for the Occupied Norwegian Areas." ART. 4. The Commander of the German troops in Norway shall exercise the military sovereign rights, and his demands shall be carried out in the civil sphere solely by the Reich Commissar. So far as and as long as the military situation requires, he shall have the right to take measures necessary to carry out his military commission, and to establish the military security of Norway. ART. 5. To carry out his orders the Reich Commissar may utilize German police organs. The German police organs shall be at the disposal of the Com- mander of the German troops in Norway so far as the military needs require, and the functions of the Reich Commissar permit. ART. 6. The Reich Commissar is directly responsible to me, and will receive regulations and instructions from me. ART. 7. I appoint Oberprisident Terboven to be Reich Commissar for the Occupied Norwegian Areas. 107

ART. 8. Regulations to carry out and supplement this Edict will be issued, under my guidance, in the civil sphere by the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancery, and in the military sphere by the Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces. Berlin, April 24, 1940 The Fiihrer Adolf Hitler The Chairman of the Council of Ministers for Reich Defense Goring Field-Marshal General

The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancery Dr. Lammers

The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces Keitel The Reich Minister of' the Interior Frick

[Translation]

PROCLAMATION

Upon order of the Fiihrer, as Reichs Commissioner, I have taken over the entire civil authority in the occupied Norwegian territory during the duration of the occupation. As my principal duties I consider: Maintenance of quiet, safety, and order, The securing of an orderly economic and cultural life for the population, and Utilization of all potentialities to meet the military needs in a country where unfortunately it is still necessary to conduct warfare against the will of the German Reich's Government. I take up my duties meanwhile in the determination to limit inconvenience and burdens for the people to that which is unavoidable. The determining factor for this is that the people accept my propositions loyally and follow them willingly. The Norwegian Administrative authorities have placed themselves at disposal for cooperation. They will continue in their offices and handle their duties as hitherto. Reich's Commissioner for the occupied Norwegian territory. TERBOvEN. OsLo, April 26, 1,940.

From the Legation's report of April 28:

His (The Reich's Commissioner) duty of utilizing the occupied territories' "potentialities" for military necessities is causing apprehension. Large reserves of food and raw materials have been imported and stored both before and since the outbreak of war in September 1939. While the Germans have not yet tapped these reserves to any extent, there is always a thought here that it is only a matter of time before they may requisition them to supply their own military establishment in Norway, or possibly even transfer them to Germany. The division of control between German civil and military authorities and between the German and the Norwegian civil administration is not being effected without confusion. It is clear that the Norwegian Administrative Council, appointed on April 15 by the Supreme Court with the approval of the German authorities, will be subordinated to the Reich's Commissioner on broad policy questions and will have the task of seeing that German instructions in that regard are carried-out. Many Germans are already reported to have arrived as functionaries in the Reich's Commissioner's' establishment, as well as units of the 108

German Safety and Secret Police to organize the Norwegian Police on more effective methods to counter sabotage, et cetera. The Norwegian Administra- tive Council is now endeavoring to fulfill the demand made upon it for an additional 300 offices required by the German civil and military administrations. The Storting building has become the office of the Reich's Commissioner and the Foreign Office is being obliged to move to smaller quarters as its building is to be taken over, it is believed, by the German police authorities. The Germans have assumed advisory positions in such Government offices as the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Supplies, as well as the Bank of Norway. At present a chaotic position exists in banking circles as no decisions of any importance can be made without obtaining prior approval. Press ard all tele-communication services are under German censorship. * * * The Norwegian Administrative Council is endeavoring to hold together the remnants of civil authority and to make the best of an extremely bad situation. The three Norwegian citizens who now appear to represent existing leadership in this area are Mr. I. B. Christensen, Chairman of the Administrative Council; Mr. Paal Berg, the presiding officer of the Supreme Court; and Bishop Berggrav, the Bishop of Oslo and senior ecclesiastical authority of the country. The attitude of these tbree men since the early days of the occupation has been largely one of acceptance of the inevitable and the hopelessness of resistance to superior force. Many signs of defeatism have been evident since the early days of the occupation. There is also a general feeling that cooperation with the Germans is essential lest sterner measures be invoked and even lest the a ttempt be made to put Quisling again into power, a step which the Nor- wegians here greatly fear. =r. * The official statement of the Norwegian Government, temporarily residing in London, is as follows:

STATEMENT IsSUED JUNE 24, 1940, BY THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT, TEMPORARILY RESIDING IN LONDON

The Norwegian Government have received reports from Olo stating that the German usurpers in Norway are trying to make representatives of the Norwe- gian people acquiesce in an arrangement according to which the King should waive his constitutional functions, the legally appointed government under the Prime Minister, Mr. Nygaardsvold, should be dismissed from office and a council of the reign should be installed which should take over the functions of the King and of the Government. According to the reports, representatives of the different political parties have been forced to give their consent to this plan. It is quite obvious that in whatever way such a scheme is carried out the new order will only be the result of pressure which a foreign army occupying the country is able to exercise and that it can never be the expression of the will of tbe Norwegian people nor a body of true representatives of that people. The decision to acquiesce in such a change of the constituted order will always remain contrary to the constitution. There is no constitutional body which has the right to act in the place of the Norwegian Storting. Any such decision would be in open conflict with the constitution. The constitution lays down in its first article that the Kingdom of Norway is a free and independent state which canm neither be divided nor ceded. The constitution in its last article disposes that there shall never be made an amendment to it which contradicts the spirit of it. The independence of the country is the greatest and the highest principle of the constitution. Any action which is taken in contravention of this principle violates the constitution. The constitution lays further down that any one who obeys an order which in any way impedes the liberty of deliberation of the Storting is guilty of high treason thus implying that any decision made by the Storting under duress is invalid. In consequence the revision of the constituted order in Norway according to the scheme mentioned can never be valid and can have no effect either om the position of the King or on that of the Government. The Government will not be the accomplices of acts which violate the constitution of Norway. They will in all circumstances to the best of their means defend. the complete independence of Norway amd they cannot advise the King to waive any of the functiois vested in him as the King of a free and independet Norway. King Haakon remains the Comstitutioal King of Norway according to the 109 free choice of his people and he exercises the functions devolving upon him under the constitution. The Government appointed by him have received an unanimous vote of confidence of the Storting at its last meeting which could be held in entire freedom. On that occasion the Storting having heard the Govern- ment, decided that Norway should not accept the German demands which could never be reconciled with the independence and liberty of the Kingdom. It is the constitutional duty of the government to continue this policy and maintain the independent action of the Government of Norway as far as this is possible. In its last meeting the Storting resolved that if a free and independent Govern- ment could not maintain themselves within the borders of the country, they ought provisionally to take up their place of residence outside the country. Therefore, the King and the Government are for the moment in Great Britain. But using all the means of action, military, economic, and administrative of which they still dispose, the King and the Government will continue to do their duty towards Norway in conformity with the full powers given to them by the Storting and they will do their best to look after the welfare of the Norwegian people in all domains. The Government remain assured that they act in perfect accordance with the free will of the Norwegian people in continuing to fight for the independence of Norway. They are firmly convinced that sooner or later this fight will be crowned by victory. 3. Disarming and the release of soldiers.-The Germans wasted little time in releasing the Norwegian soldiers as soon as they surrendered and had been disarmed. This was especially true of the soldiers who had been hurriedly mobilized at the outbreak of the war. The regular officers were detained until about June 1, and the few professional soldiers at various captured forts were held later than the others. By May 10, nearly all of the soldiers from Trondheim south had been released. 4. Arrival of the Gestapo.-The Gestapo arrived with the first troops, although they were greatly increased in number later on. Almost half of them were in uniform and the other half were in civilian clothes. (The insignia on the uniform cap of all Gestapo is the skull and cross-bones, a very appropriate and significant insignia.) They operate under the direct orders of the German Civil- ian Commissioner and are supposed to "cooperate" with the Norwegian police. Their actual duties are to search out any type of insubordination on the part of the civilian population, and any disloyalty of any kind of their own people. They are in every sense of the word a secret police force, and their power to crush all opposition is supreme. 5. Rebuilding the ravages of war.-The Germans immediately set to work to rebuild railroads, roads, telephone lines and all other military objectives destroyed by the war. They were especially adept at rebuilding broken bridges. Norwegian labor, under German super- vision, was used. The Germans paid better wages than had ever been paid in Norway before for common labor. However, they also printed the money they used in making these payments.

NOTrE.-By May 18, the N. A. Oslo saw no signs of rebuilding the destroyed parts of the towns of Voss, Bergen, and Kristiansand. By talking to civilians in these places, he understood the delay was due to lack of money. The people, whose places had been destroyed, were ruined financially, and could not obtain funds to rebuild. All of the bank accounts had been impounded and they could not draw out what money they did possess. However, some way will probably be worked out to finance the rebuilding. 110

6. German treatment of civilians.-The German military were extremely considerate of the Norwegian civilian population after the locality had been occupied. In many bombings of cities, it is believed they deliberately warned the populace to get out so that comparatively few civilians were killed. Due to very strict discipline, the soldiers or sailors never bothered the civilians. NoTE.-The N. A. Oslo, in his travels over the most populated parts of Norway, never heard a complaint from any Norwegian civilian on the treatment they had received from the German military. They were all very apprehensive about the German Secret Police. The Norwegians, while accepting the occupation as a necessary evil, were gradually coining to ignore the Germans as far as humanly possible. Girls, who had been seen talking to Germans, were promptly shorn of their hair. This attitude on the part of the Norwegians is keenly felt by the Germans but suffered in silence. Eventually, with the growing importance of the Gestapo, this may lead to trouble for the Norwegians. CHAPTER X

THE ARMED FORCES IN NORWAY

GERMAN ARMED FORCES IN NORWAY

1. Discipline.-The discipline of the German armed forces in Norway can only be described by the word "magnificent." This applied to everyone, from the highest officer to the lowest enlisted man, and to all of the forces, Air, Army, and Navy. Due to this extraordinary discipline, there was no looting, no excesses of any kind, and no damage, outside of military operations, inflicted on any of the civilians or their property. There was no drunkenness, no rowdyism of any kind, and no disturbances between soldiers, sailors, or civilians. The men, especially, showed the results of their fine discipline. They were especially smart in all manual of arms, in their military bearing, in their style of marching, in the manner of their salute, in the cleanli- ness of their person and uniform, and especially in the manner of performing their duty. Whether watched by an officer or not, they would execute their orders with a snap and efficiency as though they were making a personal appearance before Hitler himself. This was evident at all times, whether off duty, on outpost, as orderly, or on the field of battle.

Nozr.-The N. A. Oslo was extremely impressed with the soldiers he met in his travels in Norway. Those on dangerous outpost duty showed no fear and were efficient, courteous, and prompt. On a trip in a German military car from Halden to Fredrikstad on the night of May 4-5, the German private driving the car was as fine a companion as one could find anywhere. When he became lost in the blackout and ran out of gas, he very efficiently woke up Norwegians and soon got gas. When he dropped the attache at his hotel in Fredrikstad, the doors of the car swung open, his heels clicked as the attache alighted, and the doors then closed, all with the rapidity and noise of a machine gun. The N. A. saw, on many occasions, small units with only a corporal or a private in charge leaving for their posts of duty. They would all be talking and laugh- ing together when, on one short word from the leader, they would fall in at lightning speed, and, on another word, would sling arms and step off like West Pointers. In two cases, when advance bicycle patrols were met, the men looked absolutely all in from their long marches; yet when the second lieutenant in charge spoke to them they snapped into a perfect military attention and salute, as though they were on parade. They looked and acted as one might describe perfect soldiers. The sailors at Bergen and the air-force men at Stavanger and Kristiansand showed the same discipline as the soldiers in central Norway. Discipline seemed to be born in them. 2. Training.-Unquestionably their perfect discipline was but an indication of their efficient training. All of them seemed to be trained especially well in the particular duty they were detailed to perform. In addition, they all showed that they had a fine, broad knowledge of the general duties of any soldier. Reliable reports show that all men, in addition to their general training and to their special training, were given extensive training in preparation for the campaign they (111) 112 were to undertake. For example, those going to Norway were drilled at embarkation and disembarkation, both from ships and planes. They were trained in what they had to do on disembarking. For instance, the men landing from planes at Fornebo in Oslo had, before leaving Germany, been drilled in exactly what they were to do, all military objectives being simulated, placed in correct relative positions. Another indication of their training was the efficiency with which all mechanical equipment was supplied, maintained, and overhauled. They got the maximum of service out of every piece of equipment from a rifle to a heavy tank or plane. NOTE.-The N. A. Oslo was particularly impressed with the apparent thorough knowledge the three branches, Army, Navy, and Air Force, seemed to have of each other. They really acted as though all three branches had followed the same system for a great part of their training. It is unquestionably true that the close cooperation of these three branches in the Norwegian operations can only be explained by some system of training that was general to all of them. Their strength lay in their training, for this developed the fine cooperation which existed. The only lack of training seemed to be in marksmanship. Many Nor- wegian soldiers remarked on this. The Germans apparently depended more on volume of fire than individual fire. The N. A. Oslo, on several occasions, viewed their antiaircraft fire and was impressed only by the volume, not its accuracy. 3. Morale.-Being well trained and well disciplined, it goes without saying that their morale was high. This was especially evident in their operations. All of them, officers and men, vied with each other to reach their objectives on time in spite of opposition. In many cases, when far outnumbered, they attacked with such spirit that they defeated their foes and caused them to surrender. High ranking officers were many times found with the leading patrols. In the field all officers ate only what was supplied their men, even after the fighting had ceased and the officers could have had anything they wanted. In spite of the strict discipline, and the almost excessive amount of saluting, clicking heels, etc., the forces seemed democratic. There was a fine comradeship between officers and men under this flashy outward show of respect. NOTE.-The N. A. Oslo, when at hotels, noted that whenever an officer or soldier left the dining room, he would stop at the exit door, face the room, click his heels and give the Nazi salute. They always marched and turned in a very military manner. The sentries at the steps leading to officers' heady quarters would click their heels and salute whenever an officer passed and many times when noncommissioned officers passed. Privates saluted privates on the street. One of the best expressions of their morale was their singing. Squads, platoons, companies, and, in one case, a whole battalion sang as they marched to their various duty posts. Even in this, they were well trained. They sounded more like a trained opera chorus than a group of soldiers. Perfect harmony prevailed. The songs were marching songs and especially written for each campaign. The one written for Norway was especially fine. Nor.-The N. A. Oslo noted on his trip through Norway in May that the German officers and soldiers in charge of prisoners were "old timers" to a large extent. The officers were usually veterans of 1914-18. Many of the officers and men in the transport trains were also veterans of the former war. It is believed that many of these were sent over after the main fighting had ceased, to do the main occupational duty. It appears certain that at least one German fighting division left Norway for Germany in May. There were persistant but unconfirmed reports from Norwegian sources that Austrian and Bavarian X113 soldiers, many of whom had been guests of Norwegian families as children after World War I, had refused to fight the Norwegians, and a bloody battle had resulted between them and German soldiers. The action occurred "near Oslo," and the casualties varied from 300 to 3,000. There unquestionably was some sort of mutiny here, but it was suppressed immediately, and no official report of it was ever released. 4. Troops used.-The German troops used in Norway appeared to be mainly reserve divisions organized in November 1939 and which hadad bad only about 5 months' training prior to the occupation. The active infantry divisions of the first line were not employed. It is evident that the training of these reserve divisions had been efficiently maintained over the years previously, when they could reach such a peak of efficiency with only about 5 months' intensive training. The total German force used in Norway was approximately 150,000 men.

Norwegitulz n Fontier eGtrrds..

THE NORWVEGIAN AR MED FORCES The Norwegian forces were really militia. Their previous training was perfunctory. However, their training in rifle fire was excellent, and all of the Germans admitted that they were superb marksmen. The most glaring deficiency of the Norwegian forces was the lack of trained officers. Most of the officers had very little more training than the men. The Norwegians undoubtedly had the material for a superb army, as the men were fearless, hardy, and intelligent. However, even this excellent material was impotent without proper training. Both discipline and morale were lacking without training or proper leadership. Norway was a perfect example of how futile it is to spend time and money on a militia which 114 receives so little training as to be useless in war, and which provides for an insufficient number of trained, professional officers who could be depended upon to lead and organize the national forces for war. Training, to be effective, must be complete. Halfway measures in this regard are worthless, and money spent on it is money thrown away.

Norwegian Ski Troops.

DISPOSITION ANI) STRENGTH OF NORWAY'S ARMED FORCES

Army,.-The exact number of men in the Norwegian Army can only be approximated. Many of those mobilized were unable to get uniforms or arms. The order to mobilize was not given until the morning of April 9, and most of Norway's large cities were occupied before the young men in those towns could join the army. Most of the men were therefore drawn from the small towns and farms in the interior. The approximate number and disposition was as follows: First Division-Fredrikstad_ _ ------3, 000 Second Division -Oslo-Hamar ------3, 500 Third Division-Kristiansand------2, 000 Fourth Division-Bergen _------1, 500 Fifth Division-Trondheim-- 4, 000 Sixth Division-Narvik -_------3, 000 Navy.-The whole Norwegian Navy had been mobilized since the beginning of the war. In addition, they had added numerous patrol boats, converting for this purpose fishing boats, yachts, etc. These were lightly armed, usually with one small gun. One hundred and four boats of all types were in service on April 9. These included 4 coast defense ships, 9 small destroyers, 3 torpedo boats, 23 patrol and smaller torpedo boats all fitted as mine sweepers, 9 submarines, and the rest mine layers and auxiliary patrol boats. 115

The Coast Artillery was under the Navy. All forts were manned, but only with peacetime crews. There were 207 officers on active duty with the Coast Artillery on April 9. No mines had been planted, and all forts were short of ammunition. Air Force.-There were 85 pilots in the Air Force. The only modern planes were 19 Curtis pursuits which had just been delivered and

Norwegian volunteers. were still crated when they were captured by the Germans on April 9, at Kjeller. Other types available were 9 pursuits (destroyed on April 9); 23 observation (most of which were lost in the first few days); 9 light bombers; 8 torpedo planes; 6 gladiator scouts; and about 50 training planes. Except for some observation work, the Norwegian Air Force had no part in the air operations. Allied Forces: British-French.-The total number of British and French troops landed in Norway is not known at this time. The first contingent of 300 marines landed on April 14 at Namsos, followed by about 3.000 British troops at this port on April 16. British marines landed at Andalsnes on April 17, followed by about 3,000 troops on the 18th. The French landed about 2,000 Chasseurs Alpins at Namsos on April 19. The British marines and troops were lacking in discipline, training, and morale, and made a very poor showing. The French Chasseurs Alpins were crack troops in every respect, with fine discipline and morale. They carried on in a highly courageous manner under the most trying conditions, CHAPTER XI

CASUALTIES IN THE NORWEGIAN CAMPAIGN 1. The total actual casualties in the Norwegian campaign will probably never be known. At the time this is written, we can only make estimates based on the most reliable data available. The casualties in the land operations are known to be small. The heaviest casualties among the German land forces occurred on the first day when numerous transports en route to Norway were sunk by Allied naval action. 2. The naval losses during the Norwegian operations, believed to be reasonably correct from information received to June 30, 1940, but probably incomplete, were:

BRITISH NAVAL LOSSES

Name Tons Date sunk Date damaged Cause-Remarks

BATTLESHIP

Rodney 1_ 900 I_ Apr. 9, 1940 -- 1,000-lb. bomb-negligible damage-4 officers and 7 men wounded-about 60 miles southwest of Bergensfjord. BATTLE CRUISERS

Renown I______32,000 Apr. 9,1940 Gunfire of Scharnhorst-unex- ploded shell completely through at waterline-another damaged foremast-north of Narvik. AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

Furious (?)2 3 ___ 22, 450 (?) (?). Glorious _._._-______. 22, 500 June 8, 1940. Gunfire of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau off Narvik. HEAVY CRUISERS

Suffolk 1 __ ___ 10,000 Apr.17,1940 ___ One bomb hit off Stavanger. 27 killed, 34 wounded. Effingham..------9,550 May Wrecked uncharted rock Nor- wegian coast. LIGHT CRUISERS 3 Glasgow 35 9,100 ______- Apr. 9,1940 Slight splinter damage from aerial bombs-1 killed, 4 wounded. Southampton 3 5______9,100 Apr. 9, 1940 Slight splinter damage from aerial bombs. Southampton---____.. . 9,100 May 25, 1940 Severely damaged by bombs off Narvik. 1 (Glasgow type)4 ...... 9,100 Prior Apr. 19, Unconfirmed German claims 1940...... sunk north of Shetlands by SS. Penelope 3 5, 270 (?)ay 27, 1940.. (?). C urlew _...... 4, 290 May 27, 1940 Off Narvik-A. A. cruiser-by bombs. Cairo --...... 4, 200 ------May 25, 1940 Off Narvik-A. A. cruiser-by bombs. DESTROYERS Glowworm 1 1, 345 Apr. 8, 1940 . Enemy gunfire off Norwegian coast. Gurkha ------1,870 Apr. 9, 1940 . Bombed and sunk-5 officers and 10 men lost-about 60 miles southwest Bergenfjord. Hunter I 1,340 Apr. 10, 1940___.. _ Gunfire, German DD's and shore guns, Narvik. 6 officers and 105 men lost. See footnotes at end of table. (116) 117

BRITISH NAVAL LOSSES-Continued

Name Tons Date sunk Date damaged Cause-Remarks

Hardy 1_ ___ 1, 505 Apr. 10, 1940_ Beached. Severely damaged by gunfire, Narvik. 2 officers, 4 men killed; 3 officers, 6 men wounded. Hostile 1__ _ _ 1, 340 Apr. 10, 1940 .-- Slightly damaged, Narvik. Hotspur 1______1, 340 -..do.__ Seriously-...... damaged, gunfire at Narvik. Eskimo 2 3 1,870 Punjabi2 3- - - 1, 870 Apr. 13, 1940 - - Slightly damaged, Narvik. Cossack 23______1, 870 Eclipse 1_ 1, 375 Prior Apr. 19, Bomb splinters-"near miss." 1940. Afridi'1 ...... 1,870 May 3, 1940 (?)__ Bombed-sunk Namsos. Grom 1 (Polish) ...... 2, 144 Reported May Bombed-North Sea. 6, 1940. }------Acasta ------1, 350 June 8, 1940.. .. JSunk by gunfire Scharnhorst and Ardent______1, 350 ---- _dod o - . - - - Gneisenau off Narvik. Fame.... 1, 350 May 26, 1940 --. Slightly damaged by gunfire in Firedrake_____ 1,350 .. . do ... - - -- f Narvik. Windsor______1,100 May 28, 1940 ____ Air attack off Ramsgate. Walker ______1,100 do --- Air attack off Narvik.

SUBMARINES

Thistle 1 1, 090 Reported Apr. Missing-53 officers and men 1 - 16, 1940. believed lost. Sterlet _ 670 Reported Apr. Missing-6 officers, 35 men be- 30, 1940. lieved lost. Tarpon 1 1,090 -- do ...... Missing-5 officers, 48 men believed lost. Triumph 3--- 1, 090 Prior Feb. 27, Mine-14' bow blown off- 1940. reached port. S eal ...... 1, 520 Captured May ------Disabled by mine and captured 6, 1940. by Germans off Swedish coast. ESCORT VESSELS

Bittern 1______190 | Apr. 30, 1940 --- Bombed, set afire, own depth charges exploded-N am sos. Later torpedoed by own forces. Pelican 2 3.. 1, 200 (?)

MINE SWEEPERS

Dunoon 1 710 Reported May Mine-3 officers, 24 men missing. 1,1940. TRAWLERS

Rutlandshire 1_____.. 458 Apr.21, 1940.. Air attack-Namsos. Larwood 1 452 Apr. 28, 1940 (?)_ Apr. 28, 1940... Bombed--Norwegian coast. Hammond 1_ .______452 Apr. 29, 1940 (?) ------Do. Bradman 1_ 452 Do. Cape Siretoko 1______590 ..do --.... Do. Warwickshire 1 466 Prior May 8, Bombs. 1940. Cape Chelyuskin 1.... _ 494 ---.d o ------Do. Jardine 1 452 ----.do . ------Badly damaged St. Goran 1- __ 565 Sdo by air attack. Astonvilla 1______546 do -- - - Sunk by gunfire own forces- Gaul 1 531 Trondheim "area."

1 Official British sources. 2 Confidential. 3 Believed reliable. 4Doubtful reliability. 5 Officially admitted as "two cruisers," names not announced.

FRENCH NAVAL LOSSES

Name Tons Date sunk Date damaged Cause-Remarks

CRUISER MINE LAYER

Emile Bertin 3...... 886 ___ Prior May 7, Damaged by air attack off Nar- 1940. vik. DESTROYERS

Bison 1- 2, 436 May 3, 1940 ----- Air attack-North Sea. 118

GERMAN NAVAL LOSSES

Name Tons Date sunk Date damaged Cause-Remarks

BATTLESHIPS

Scharnhorst3...... 26, 000 Apr. 9, 1940.... Gunfire, Renown. Forward turrets possibly out of action-i1 possible hit aft. Gneisenau... _ _..------26, 000 _-_------do------do Gunfire entrance Oslo Fjord. 2 months to repair. Admiral Scheer 3____.... 10, 000 ------A pr. 11, 1940 - Torpedo(es). H. M. S. Spear- fish. HEAVY CRUISERS 1 1 0 , 0 0 0 Bluecher _ Apr. 9.1940. Norwegian coastal batteries and torpedo, Oslo. LIGHT CRUISERS

Karlsruhe 1-.______6,000 Gunfire from fort and torpedoed by H. M. S. Truant at Kris- tiansand. Emden 1------5, 400 Apr. 9, 1940. __ Seriously damaged by shell fire by Olaf Trygvasson, Oslo. Koln------6,000 ------Gunfire-2 months to repair. 1 CL (Koenigsberg) 1__ (?)6, 000 Apr. 10, 140----- Sunk by bomb at Bergen. Leipzig 4______6,000 Prior Apr. 23, Slight damage. 1940. TRAINING SHIP

Bremse------1,460 May 9, 1940 .. Sunk by bombs off Bergen.

DESTROYERS 6

Leberecht Maass 1-.---- 1,625 (?)------Sunk. Max Schultz 1-----.... 1, 625 Apr. 11, 1940 Claimed sunk, torpedo-planes- Trondheim. Wilhelm Heidkamp 1____ 1,811 Anton Schmitt 1-.... 1, 811 Wolfgang Zenker 1 . 1,625 Apr. 13, 1940 Sunk by gunfire, Narvik. Von Armin 1______1,625 Possibly Des-Divs. 2 and 4. Erich Giese 1______------1625 ------Total 9 Erich Koellner 1______1, 625 Hans Ludemann 1----- 1, 811 Apr. 13, 1940 Von Roeder 1------1,811 (?)---- -... Sunk at Narvik, gunfire. Hermann Kuenne 1----- 1, 811 C)()(?) Do. 3 destroyers ______- ..._ (?) ______I (?) Damaged.

TORPEDO BOATS 7 (?) (?) Probably 2 Norwegian South Coast. mine sweepers sunk at Hor- ton, Apr. 9. Albatros------800 (?) - - - Bombs at Bergen. 4------...... (?) (?)______4 damaged. SUBMARINES

1 3 (?)------(?) Apr. 10, 1940 -- (?) .. Claimed by Zulu off Orkneys. 14 (?) _...... (?) (?) ------2 or 3 others reported sunk. (?) Apr. 16. 1940 .. Bomb. 3 . ------(?) (?) ------3 others reported sunk

1 Officially admitted by German Admiralty. 3 Believed reliable. 4 Doubtful reliability. B Germans admit-total, 11 Destroyers sunk. 7 Germans admit 1 sunk. 8 Germans admit 6 sunk. Transports, merchant vessels, store ships, trawlers.-Britishclaim to have sunk or captured about 300,000 tons of German merchant shipping during Norwegian operations. Above list believed reasonably correct from information received to this date, but probably incomplete. 119

NORWEGIAN NAVAL LOSSES

Name Remarks

COAST DEFENSE

Norge ------rBy German DD's at Eidsvold I------I Narvik. Haarfagre 1.____.______Captured by Germany at Horten. Tordenskjold______------Do.

DESTROYERS 2 Gyller 2 ------Balder ------Captured-remanned by German crews. Odinl2 Alger2 Sunk at Stavanger. Tor Sunk by Norwegians.

MINELAYPERS

Olar Tryggvason 2 Captured by Germany 2 at Horten. Froya ------Sunk at Trondheim.

SUBMARINES 2 - 2 B (class) 2 ______Captured by Germany. 1 B (class) 2 ______Sunk by Germany. 2 A (class) 2 ..-______._____------Sunk by Norway. 1 A (class ______Sunk by Germany.

TORPEDO BOATS ------Hal 3_- - - Captured at Oslo.

GUNBOATS

Senja 3 (?)------Set afire by British guns after capture at Nar- vik (unconfirmed report). Tyr --- _-_------281 1 Apr. 21, 1940------Sunk Hardangerfjord.

1 Officially admitted by Norwegian Admiralty. 2 Believed reliable. 3 Doubtful reliability. NOTE.-The Germans claim they sank 11 Norwegian warships and captured 2 armed coastal vessels, 3 destroyers, 7 mine layers, 2 mine sweepers, 14 torpedo boats, several submarines, and numerous patrol boats.

3. The total losses in the air will probably never be known. The British and German claims and counterclaims are so far apart that no reasonable conclusions can be reached. About 50 British planes were lost when the aircraft carrier Glorious was sunk and the Ger- mans claim another 87 planes of all types were shot down during operations on the West Coast up to June 30. There is no accurate estimate as to the number of German planes, especially transport planes, that were lost in the landing operations, or of the number of German planes destroyed by British attack on airdromes. The Germans admit the loss of 90 planes while 27 more were damaged. 4. Land losses.-The Germans admitted on June 14, 1940, that their total losses amounted to 1,317 dead, 1,604 wounded, and 2,375 missing while being transported by sea or otherwise. This latter figure is undoubtedly in error and should be far greater. Norwegian estimates 259762-40 -9 120 of German casualties, those lost at sea and on land, total 35,000 to 55,000. The Norwegian losses on land have never been published, but neutral observers place them from 300 to 1,000 killed, and about the same number wounded. Their losses at sea total about 600. The British and French losses on land or sea are not known. The losses on land in the Trondheim area were not large. Those in the Narvik area were considerable. Accurate reports of casualties, if ever published, will have to wait until the war is over. CHAPTER XII

LESSONS FROM THE OCCUPATION OF NORWAY

The following notes were prepared by M. I. D.

1. Prelininary observations on the German operations in Scandinavia.-a. Preparatory measures.-(1) Secrecy and training.-The campaign was characterized by thorough preparation and secrecy regarding the German intentions. Many persons in Germany must have been aware that it was the intention of the German Government to land troops in Scandinavia; in spite of this, no information of German intentions leaked out. Moreover, by a series of con- tradictory rumors, the objective of the expedition was cleverly disguised. For several months a considerable number of formations received a special- ized training to fit them for combined operations. The troops employed were equipped and clothed for the type of operations they would be engaged upon and use was made of the mountain divisions containing trained skiers. It is reported that troops intended for Narvik had been specially trained and equipped to operate in small groups of five, quite independently and self-supporting; the intention being that these groups should live on the country. Units were even provided with such items as sun-glasses and lanoline ointment as protection against weather conditions. (2) Information about the theater of war.-The Germans were clearly in possession of excellent information of the theater of war in which they were to operate. It has been the custom to send German officers abroad every year to study possible theaters of operations and their topography. Detailed information was also provided by German officials and residents. (3) Use of the "Fifth Colunmn."-The main uses of the "Fifth Column" were: (a) Guiding troops to important localities, buildings, and vital points. (b) Providing local information on enemy's dispositions. (c) Sabotaging defensive arrangements; for example, putting fire control and telephone systems out of action. (d) Issuing orders contradicting mobilization and spreading false reports among defending troops in the hope of leading them to surrender. b. Strategical.-(1) Deception and feints.-Landing on the Norwegian coast was not confined to one single place. Landings were made at many points simultaneously. The German object was to confuse the enemy as to where the main effort was to be made and induce him to disperse his forces. The plan of campaign in Poland was marked by similar strategy. (2) Use of maximum force.-The German operation was conducted as a "total war," i. e., the full cooperation of the Army, Navy, and Air Force was ensured. It is a German principle to use the maximum force at the decisive point. Nor- way became for the time being the decisive point, and, having started the operation, the German command did not shrink from losses in order to achieve its object. It must always be expected that German operations will be carried out with the maximum available forces at what is considered the decisive point. (3) Maintenance of the objective.-The Germans observed the principle of the maintenance of the objective; the main task of the German Air Force was support of the advance of the army. Direct support was given by bombing and machine-gunning enemy troops and strong points, and indirect support by attacks on hostile aircraft, aerodromes, bases and transports of the opposing forces. c. Tactical.-(1) Tactical employment of troops.-The principal fighting was in the Gudbrandsdal and Osterdal and adjacent valleys. These valleys, which are broad in the south, narrow down to mere ravines at their northern ends where they are very easy to defend against ground troops but are absolute traps for the defenders when attacked from the air. The German command used small detachments of motor cyclists and of infantry, sometimes in trucks, supported by armored cars and tanks and aircraft to act as spearheads of the (121) 122 advance. As in Poland, these detachments operated in most difficult country and pushed ahead without regard to flanks and the fact that they might be out of touch with their neighbors. As soon as they met opposition, forward detachments were rapidly reinforced from the rear; or if the opposition was found to be too great, their line of advance was altered and they were allotted new objectives. One method of German advance was for the tanks with artillery to move down the center of a road at about 6-7 m. p. h., infantry following them close behind, lobbing grenades and using the tanks as shields. Meanwhile, other parties of infantry (usually ski troops), operating on either side of the road, outflanked the defenders. By her action in Poland and Norway, Germany has shown that she does not expect infantry to advance without the aid of armored fighting vehicles and close support from low-flying aircraft. * * * It should be noted that a German infantry division is well equipped to deal with low-flying attacks. It is thought that it is the intention to have eventually 84 20 mm. dual purpose antiaircraft and antitank machine guns in each infantry division for this purpose. (3) Air attacks.-It is reported that many of the air attacks against troops were carried out by twin-engined Heinkels using both bombs and machine guns. * * * This bombing was at first carried out from about 200 feet, but later from a greater height. The Heinkels had machine guns which fired downwards at a steep angle and, even if there were no casualties, all traffic came to a standstill while shelter was sought in woods, etc. Machine gunning from aircraft is reported to have had a demoralizing effect although casualties were small. (4) Use of aircraft for transport of troops and supplies.-The German command made full use of troop-carrying aircraft both for landing parachutists and conveying reinforcements with their full equipment and in some cases guns. They also relied on supplying units at Trondheim and Narvik by air. (5) Flexibility of German organization.-The extreme flexibility of the German organization should be noted. There appears to have been no rigid corps organization, but units and formations were switched from one commander to another as the circumstances dictated, temporary groups being formed. This regrouping to meet changing circumstances was also evident in Poland. One reason for this practice is that units in the German army are self-contained with standardized equipment and transport, thus allowing them to be moved from one formation to another with the minimum of administrative and other difficulties. (6) Speed and ruthlessness.-The German operations, as in Poland, were characterized throughout by speed and ruthlessness. This is in accordance with German teaching, viz. that it is better to do something quickly, even if it is wrong, than to hesitate and thereby possibly lose the initiative. Ruthless- ness will always characterize any German military operations. A German order envisages as the intention the "utter destruction" of the enemy forces. d. Conclusion.-The main lessons to be learned in Norway do not differ funda- mentally from those which were apparent from the Polish campaign; (1) thorough and secret planning, (2) thorough reconnaissance, (3) use of maximum force at the decisive point, (4) speed and ruthlessness in execution, (5) the extensive employment of armored vehicles in support of infantry, (6) the use of the German Air Force in direct and indirect support of ground operations. The following notes were prepared by the Naval Attache, Oslo, as a result of his personal observation of the Norwegian campaign. They are presented with the desire to stimulate discussion throughout the naval service. THE VALUE OF THE OFFENSIVE

1. (a) Germany was prepared to take the offensive. Her long-range planning had provided her with exact knowledge of the country and its defenses, and with key officers who knew the country thoroughly. Her forces were designed to carry on an energetic offense. Her war plans were complete and up-to-date and her officers thoroughly familiar with them. She was ready to strike, and strike with overwhelming force, at the time she wanted to strike. Her plans were carried out with extreme secrecy and her enemies taken by complete surprise. (b) With this well-trained and perfectly equipped striking force, she was able to take and hold places from numerically greater but untrained and poorly equipped forces. 123

(c) While not neglecting her power for defense, Germany concentrated her training on offense, and developed the proper equipment for this purpose. The outstanding lesson of this campaign is the confirmation of the age-old tenet: "A good offense is the best defense." To defeat Germany, any country must develop a better offense, with better equipment, than Germany now possesses. To provide only a defensive force will be of no avail.

NAVAL AND OTHER LESSONS

1. (a) Strong land-based air forces (within their own radius of action) can dispute control of the sea with the opposing navy. (b) German air superiority prevented England's fleet from undertaking large- scale operations in any port except Narvik while the subsequent German development of a good airport at Trondheim was largely responsible for the withdrawal of the Allies from even Narvik. 2. The effectiveness of the dive bomber was one of the outstanding lessons of the war. These bombers became increasingly destructive as both British and Germans perfected their technique and skill in their use. They are practically impossible to hit by antiaircraft fire except from guns on the target attacked. This fire must be of extremely heavy volume, and multibarrelled automatic guns from 27 to 40 millimeters in caliber have been found to be effective. All vessels, whether naval or merchant, should be fitted with guns of this type capable of covering all angles of approach. For the same reason, important military objectives on land should have automatic antiaircraft guns on roofs. Batteries off to one side are ineffective against such attacks. 3. Large or medium bombers using horizontal bombing tactics from high altitudes had little effect against naval units. Larger guns, 3-inch and up, must be used against these bombers, and distant control is necessary for accurate firing. 4. Therefore, naval vessels should be protected by guns of this type capable of covering all angles of approach both for self-defense and for defense of convoys or other naval vessels in company. 5. The use of planes for bombing and machine-gunning the enemy in advance of the columns was thoroughly effective. This was especially true in Norway where there were no fighter planes or effective antiaircraft guns to oppose them. 6. Due to the vulnerability of carriers and to the fact that performance of land-based pursuit planes is so much better than that of carrier-based fighters, the latter must have marked local numerical air superiority before carrier groups can successfully attack land bases. 7. The best defense against aircraft is other aircraft. Antiaircraft batteries require more effective fire control than now obtains. 8. It would seem desirable that antiaircraft guns aboard ship, especially those for use against dive bombers, be stabilized in both planes, preferably automatically. 9. German air officers preferred heavy guns in their planes. They laughed at .30 caliber. They say they use 20 and 37 millimeter whereas the English use a .30 caliber. 10. Long distance fighters are as important as long distance bombers. Bombers without fighter support are ineffective in daylight. 11. The employment of dive bombers has already influenced operations and their further development may require even more revolutionary alterations in military and naval tactics. 12. Modern war equipment can only be successfully opposed by similar equipment or by equipment especially designed to combat it. It is folly not to arm to meet the most modern army with the most modern equipment. 13. Mechanized units were used successfully over very unfavorable terrain and the main reason for this is that the Norwegians did not have antitank guns to oppose them. 14. The close cooperation of the German Air, Army, and Navy forces was an outstanding feature of the campaign. 15. The use of small armed boats to screen troop transports for short distances was very effective. 16. The efficient German transport service, assuring the presence at the right place and without loss of time of everything needed, was another important feature. 17. Thoroughly trained pioneers saved much time and were entitled to a great deal of the credit for the rapid advance. 124

DEVELOPING OFFENSIVEI STRENGTH

1. To develop greater offensive strength than Germany now possesses, the following points should be considered: First: Further develop the dive bomber by providing for the followingg: (b) The carriage of larger bombs. (b) Quieter engines. (C) Larger flaps. (d) Smallest possible head-on target. (e) Longer range. (f) Air conditioned cockpit for stratosphere flying. (g) Larger machine gun fire adjustable to cover target on dive. (h) Intensification of pilot training. Second: Further develop long range bombers and long range fighters to accompany them. Third: Emphasize training in ceestial and dead-reckoning navigation. Scouting missions and bombing missions over water will continue to increase in distance, and all pilots should be required to be proficient in these types of navigation. Fourth: (a) Develop strong striking units, fully equipped with modern mechanized equipment, mobile artillery, and strong air force. These forces must be trained to operate on land and across oceans. (b) Design and build or alter existing ships to carry these striking forces. Ships to allow for quick unloading of mechanized equipment. (c) Striking forces must consist of land, sea, and air forces under unified command. Fifth: Develop tanks and other mechanized equipment superior to that used by Germany. Sixth: Develop large volume antiaircraft fire against dive bombers using multi-barrelled automatic gun batteries with efficient distant control (37- or 40-millimeter guns). Seventh: Develop stabilized mounts for automatic antiaircraft guns when used aboard ship, or stabilized directors for such mounts. Eighth: Develop mobile aitlaireraft batteries, both automatic and others from 3- to 6-inch, inclusive, for use with striking force. Ninth: The only way we can defend the Western Hemisphere is to take the offensive with efficient and sufficient striking forces. These must be able to cover the Western Hemisphere and cross the oceans. They must be so organized and equipped as to be able to take bases against strong opposition and to develop and expand them. We must think in terms of larger units than hereto- fore contemplated. These units must include land, sea, and air forces under unified command. APPENDIX I

ESTABLISHED AIRPLANE TYPES AND AIR UNITS

(1) Airplane types.-(a) German: Heavy bombers-Ju-86, Ju-88, He-ill: 2-engine. Transport-Ju-52: 3-engine. Pursuit (heavy) -Me-110 : 2-engine. Pursuit (light) -Me-109: 1-engine. Light (dive) bombers-Ju-87B: 1-engine. Scouts (Army cooperation)-He-126: 1-engine. Seaplanes-He-115: 2-engine. (b) British: Heavy bombers-Wellington and H. P. Hampden: 2-engine. Light (dive) bombers-Blackburn Skua: 1-engine. Seaplane-Short Sunderland: 4-engine. (2) Air units.-(a) Identified German air units.- Parts of First, Second, and Fifth Air Fleets, the last-named newly organized after September 1939. Tenth Air Corps (Flieger Korps). Superior unit composed of air divisions, etc. Seventh Air Division (Flieger Division). Superior unit, included in the above named Air Corps. The Air Division comprises, among others, air transport units and parachute troops. First Heavy Bombing Wing, "for special missions" (I. Kampfgeschwader zur besonderen Verwendung)-home base Stade, west-northwest of Hamburg. Second Air Group (II. Gruppe), belonging to the above-named wing. Second Company of Parachute Regiment I, I Battery-home base Stendal. The "Tiger" Wing, apparently a heavy bombing wing (at Oslo-Fornebo, April 10, 1940). The "Gruppe Gak," apparently a light pursuit group (Kristiansand). The "Flug G. 7," possibly same as Seventh Air Wing (Stavanger-Sole). (b) Allocation of German Air Units, 4/16-18/40.- Norway: Oslo-Fornebo : 1 heavy bombing group (?). 1 pursuit group. 1-2 air transport groups. Oslo-Horten: 1 seaplane group (He-115 (?)). Stavanger-Sole: 1-2 heavy bombing groups (He-111). 1 heavy pursuit group (Me-10). 1 seaplane group (He-115). Kristiansand : 1 heavy bombing group (?). 1 pursuit group (Me-109 (?)). Kjeller : 1 heavy bombing group (Ju-88). 2 heavy bombing groups (He-ll). 2 light (dive) bombing groups (Ju-87B). Trondheim: 1 light (dive) bomber group (Ju-87B). Karmoi: 1 seaplane squadron. Bergen: 1 seaplane squadron. (125) 126

Summary of units in Norway 0-7 heavy bombing groups. 3 light (dive) bomber groups. 2 scouting groups (Army). 2 seaplane groups (heavy, scout). 2 seaplane squadrons (scout). 1-2 air transport groups. Total about 15 groups, plus 2 squadrons, that is, in all, about 40-50 squadrons, or about 500 airplanes (one-half air fleet). In Denmark: Aalborg: 1 heavy air transport wing (about 100 Ju-52's). In Germany (District of Luebeck and Hamburg) : 2-3 air transport wings for transport services supporting Nor- wegian operations. Remaining German-based bombing, pursuit, and scouting units in large numbers for possible continued missions to the North or other directions (German Air Force main body). 2. In connection with the foregoing, it is heard in Berlin from fairly reliable sources that about 20,000 men were sent in the first detachments to Norway. Since the first day's landing operations, reinforcements have been sent by air to the extent of 3,000 troops daily in addition to continuing, almost daily, transports by water routes. As of April 25, 1940, it is understood that more than eight (5) divisions (150,000 men) were available in Norway.

He11 1-IK bonber over Norway. 127

Another Nazi machine adaptable for troop-carrying. The Junkers "Ju-90," whose passenger complement is 40.

A Junkers "Ju-52" in flight: It has been reported that these machines, designed for 28 passengers, have been carrying 40 soldiers at a time to Norway. 128

Germans loading a bomb.

Norwegian fighting planes. APPENDIX II

(Source: M. I. D.)

1. Characteristics of German Armored Cars 2. Characteristics of German Tanks

I. CHARACTERISTICS OF GERMAN ARMORED CARS

Serial 1. Leichter Panzersplihwagen (light reconnaissance car) Type: Superlight. Crew: Two or three, if fitted with radio (driver, gunner, and radio operator). Armament: One light machine gun model 1913 (obsolescent) which can fire against aircraft. Armor : 10 mm. in front, less at sides, proof against armor-piercing small arms ammunition in front but only small arms ammunition at side, as plates are vertical. Weight: 1.77 tons. Dimensions: Length, 10 feet. Width, 5 feet 7 inches. Height, 5 feet 5 inches. (W/O Aerial.) Number of wheels: Four. Speed: 50 m. p. h. on road. Radio: Some cars have radio set type d. Frame aerial is raised for use. Remarks: This is merely a light scout car and cannot operate against enemy armored cars without support of heavier types. Completely open top. Machine gun is mounted in a shield. Serial 2. Horch Leichter Panzerspiihwagen: Type: Light. Crew: Two or three, if fitted with radio transmitter (driver, gunner- commander, and radio operator). Armament: One machine pistol and one light machine gun model 1913 (obsolescent) with elevation up to 850 for antiaircraft fire. Armor: 10 mm. in front, 8 mm. at sides. All plates set obliquely. Proof against armor-piercing small arms ammunition all round. Weight: 4 tons. Dimensions: Length, 10 feet. Width, 7 feet. Height, 5 feet. (W/O Aerial.) Number of wheels: Four. Speed : 53 m. p. h. on road. 20 m. p. h. cross-country. Radio: Some cars carry transinitter-receiver with frame aerial which is raised for use; others carry receivers only. Remarks: Good cross-country capacity. Open top with grating roof which can be closed down to prevent grenades being thrown in. Open to fire from above. Some reports say machine gun is 13 mm. Serial 3. Same chassis and manufacture as serial 2: Crew: Two (driver and gunner-commander). Armament: One machine pistol and one 20 mm. superheavy machine gun and one light machine gun model 1913 mounted in one turret with elevation up to 850 for antiaircraft fire. Armor: Same as for Serial 2. Weight: 4.2 tons.

(129) 130

Serial 3. Same chassis and manufacture as serial 2-Continued. Dimensions: Length, 10 feet. Width, 7 feet. Height, 5 feet 4 inches. Radio: No. Remarks: This is an alternative model of Serial 2. It has a slightly larger turret, but has the same large opening on top protected by a grating. Some reports state that the machine gun is 13 mm. Serial 4. Schwerer Panzerspiihwagen 36: Type: Medium. Crew: Four (two drivers, one gunner-commander, one gunner. Second driver is also radio operator when car carries radio). Armament: One machine pistol and one 20 mm. super heavy machine gun, and one light machine gun model 1913 in turret. All-round field of fire in car not fitted with radio, but only 1500 right and left in cars with radio. Neither gun can fire against aircraft. Armor: 15 mm. on tuiret and front, 10 mm. elsewhere. All plates inclined from normal. Weight: 61/2 tons. Dimensions: Length, 16 feet. Width, 7 feet 4 inches. Height, 8 feet (w/c Aerial), 9 feet (with aerial). Number of wheels: Six. Speed: Cruising 40 m. p. h. Maximum 50 m. p. h., but only 20 m. p. h. cross country, 30 m. p. h. in reverse. Radio: Some cars have radio set. Rigid frame aerial. Remarks: Now obsolescent. This car was too slow and had only fair cross-country performance. In order to engage aircraft, the machine gun had to be taken from the car and mounted in the open. The car also carried smoke-producing equipment. Serial 5. 8-Rad Panzerspihwagen: Type: Heavy. Crew: Four or five, if car is fitted with radio. Two drivers, one gunner- commander, and one gunner, one radio operator. Armament: One light machine gun model 1913 and one 20 mm. super heavy machine gun (all-round field of fire). Armor: 30 mm. on turret, 5-20 mm. elsewhere. All plates inclined from normal. Weight: 9-10 tons. Dimensions: Length, 17 feet 6 inches. Width, 8 feet. Height, 8 feet 9 inches. Number of wheels: Eight. Speed: ? 53 m. p. h. Radio: Some cars have radio-wireless set. Rigid frame aerial. Remarks: There are unconfirmed reports that this car carries a 37 mm. antitank gun instead of the 20 mm. machine gun.

2. CHARACTrERISTICS OF GERMAN TANKS

Serial 1. TK, TKF, TKS: Type: Light. Country of origin: Poland. Weight: 2.5 tons. Crew: Two. Driver and gunner. Dimensions: Length, 8 feet 6 inches. Width, 6 feet. Height, 4 feet 6 inches. Belly clearance, 1 foot. Armor basis (thickest plate known) : 10 mm. Armament: 2-7.9 mm. Hotchkiss machine guns (1 spare). Ammunition carried: 2,300 rounds. 131

Serial 1. TK, TKF, TKS-Continued. Engine: 24 h. p., 4-cylinder Ford. 45 h. p., 6-cylinder Fiat. Drive: Front sprocket. Maximum speed on roads: 28 m. p. h. Radius of action: 85 miles. Suspension: Normal Carden-Lloyd light tankette with outside girder bearer on the suspension. Three jockey wheels connected by girder. Performance: Trench crossing, 5 feet. Step, 1 foot 4 inches. Water forded, 1 foot 8 inches. Maximum gradient, 45. Intercommunication : Flag. Remarks: May be equipped with 20 mm. machine guns and used as antitank machine-gun carriers. Carden-Lloyd design. Poland had 750. Serial 2. Pz Kw 1: Type: Light. Country of origin: Germany. Weight: 5.7 tons. Crew: Two. Driver and gunner. Dimensions: Length, 13 feet. Width, 6 feet 5 inches. Height, 5 feet 8 inches. Belly clearance, 1 foot. Armor basis (thickest plate known) : 14 mm. Armament: Two light machine guns. Ammunition carried: 1,625 armor piercing, small arms ammunition. Engine: 90/100 h.p. V-S. Air cooled. Drive: Front sprocket. Maximum speed on roads: 32 m. p. h. Radius of action: 95 miles. Suspension: Five bogie wheels with spokes, the last four being connected by an outside girder bearer. Rear idler wheel almost on the ground. Four jockey wheels. Performance : Trench crossing, 5 feet. Water forded, 2 feet. Maximum gradient, 45°. Intercommunication: Radio receiver. Remarks: A large number of these tanks are in existence, and may be converted to machine gun carriers and standard German armored vehicles. Two light machine guns mounted coaxially on roller type mounting. The turret has a rounded back and is on the right-hand side of the tank, and very squat. Serial 3. Light commander's tank: Type: Light. Country of origin: Germany. Weight: 5.7 tons. Crew: Three. Driver, gunner, and commander. Dimensions: Length, 13 feet. Width, 6 feet 5 inches. Height, 5 feet 8 inches Belly clearance 1 foot. Armor basis (thickest plate known) : 14 mm. Armaments: One light machine gun. Engine: 90/100 h. p. V-S. Air cooled. Drive: Front sprocket. Maximum speed on roads: 32 m. p. h. Radius of action: 95 miles. Suspension: Exactly the same suspension as Pz Kw 1. Performance: Trench crossing, 4 feet 7 inches. Water forded, 2 feet. Maximum gradient, 45°. 132

Serial 3. Light commander's tank-Continued. Intercommunication: Radio. Remarks: The hull is built up to form a square fixed turret, which has a light machine gun mounted on the right-hand side in a ball mounting. A square cupola is mounted on the top of the turret. Serial 4. F 4 HE: Type: Light amphibian. Country of origin: Czechoslovakia. Weight: 6.2 tons. Crew: Three. Driver, gunner, and commander. Dimensions: Length, 17 feet 6 inches. Width, 7 feet 7 inches. Height, 6 feet 11 inches. Belly clearance, 1 foot. Armor basis (thickest plate known) : 14 mm. Armament: One light machine gun (or two). Ammunition carried: 4,000 rounds. Engine: 120 h. p., 4-cylinder. Water cooled. Drive: Front sprocket. Maximum speed on roads: 28 m. p. h., 31/2 m. p. h. in. water. Radius of action: 90 miles. Suspension: Four large bogie wheels. High front idler wheel. Float which comes down as far as the top of the bogie wheels. The vehicle has twin screws at the rear, and a small round turret with a light machine gun on ball mounting. On the top of the turret is a round lookout cupola approximately a quarter of the size of the main turret. Performance: Trench crossing, 7 feet 1 inch. Maximum gradient, 35° to 45°. Intercommunication: Radio, flag, and lamp. Remarks:' 100 of these are known to exist. An improved model may have been produced. Serial 5. TN HP: Type: Light. Country of origin: Czechoslovakia. Weight: 8.5 tons, being raised to 12.5 tons. Crew: Three or four. Two gunners, commander, wireless operator, driver. Dimensions: Length, 15 feet 2 inches. Width, 6 feet 9 inches. Height, 7 feet 4 inches. Belly clearance, 1 foot 4 inches. Armor basis (thickest plate known) : 25 mm. being raised to 50 mm. Armament: One 37-mm. gun; two light machine guns. Ammunition carried: 90 rounds for gun; 2,700 rounds for machine guns. Engine: 125 h. p., 6-cylinder. Water cooled. Drive: Front sprocket. Maximum speed on roads: 26 m. p. h. Radius of action: 125 miles Suspension: Four large bogie wheels studded with rivets. Low rear idler wheel. Three jockey wheels. Performance: Trench crossing, 6 feet 5 inches. Step, 2 feet 8 inches. Maximum gradient, 40° to 450 Intercommunication: Radio, flag, and lamp. Remarks: A' large number of these have been delivered to Germany, and may be replacing Pz Kw 1. The model with increased armor may be used as an I tank. Round turret surmounted by round observation cupola on the right-hand side. 37-mm. and light machine gun mounted coaxially in turret, and one light machine gun mounted in the hull to left of driver. 133

Serial 6. Pz Kw II: Type: Light. Country of origin: Germany. Weight : 9 tons. Crew: Three. Driver, gunner, and radio operator. Dimensions: Length, 14 feet 8 inches. Width, 6 feet. Height, 5 feet 6 inches. Armor basis (thickest plate known) ; 15 mm. Armament: One 20-mm. heavy machine gun and one light machine gun. Engine: 125 h. p. V-8. Air cooled. Drive: Front sprocket. Maximum speed on roads: 28 in. p. h. Radius of action: 125 miles. Suspension: Five large bogie wheels, Christie type, four jockey wheels. Performance: Trench crossing, 4 feet 11 inches. Step, 1 foot 11 inches. Water forded, 2 feet 6 inches. Intercommunication: Radio receiver. Remarks: May be converted to flame thrower. A large number are in existence. Standard German armored fighting vehicle. Turret similar to Pz Kw 1. Has one henvy machine gun (with very long barrel) and one light machine gun in roller type' mounting. The back of the turret is flat. Serial 7. 7 TP: Type: Light medium. Country of origin: Poland. Weight: 9.5 tons. Crew: Three. Driver, gunner, commander (wireless operator). Dimensions: Length, 15 feet. Width, 7 feet 11 inches. Height, 7 feet 2 inches. Belly clearance, 1 foot 3 inches. Armor basis (thickest plate known) : 18 mm., may be increased - to 20-25 mm. Armament: One 37-mm. Bofors. One light machine gun coaxially mounted. Ammunition carried: 80 rounds for gun. 4,000 rounds for light machine gun. Engine: 100 h. p., 6-cylinder Diesel. Water cooled. Drive: Front sprocket. Maximum speed on roads: 22 m. p. h. Radius of action: 90 miles. Suspension: Eight small bogie wheels. Two bogies. High front driving sprocket. Spoked rear idler wheel. Four jockey wheels. Performance: Trench crossing, 0 feet. Step, 2 feet 0 inches. Water forded, 3 feet. Maximum gradient, 40°. Intercommunication: Radio. Remarks: This vehicle is probably being manufactured for Germany with an increased armor basis. It has a high turret with long- barrelled gun in round mounting. Square bulge at back of turret to take radio set. Serial 8. LT 35 S2a: Type: Light medium. Country of origin: Czecho-Slovakia. Weight: 11.5 tons. Crew: Three. Driver, commander, gunner (radio operator). Dimensions: Length. 10 feet 2 inches. Width. 7 feet 6 inches. Height. 7 feet 10 inches. Armor basis (thickest plate known) : 24 mm. 134

Serial 8. LT 35 S2a-Continuedl. Armament: One 37-mm. gun. One light machine gun coaxially mounted. One light machine gun on ball mounting forward in hull. Engine: 110 h. p., 6-cylinder. Drive: Rear sprocket. Maximum speed on roads: 16 m. p. h. Radius of action: 70 miles. Suspension: Eight small bogie wheels. Four bogies. One independent bogie below front idler wheel. Four jockey wheels. Both idler wheel and rear driving sprocket have large outside rim which overlaps the edge of the track. Performance: Trench crossing, 6 feet 6 inches. Step, 2 feet 7 inches. Water forded, 2 feet 7 inches. Maximum gradient, 40°. Intercommunication: Radio, lamp, and flag. Remarks: This vehicle is being exported, and it is unlikely that it will appear in great numbers. It has a high built-up hull, particularly noticeable from the rear. Round turret surmounted by observation cupola situated on the left-hand side. The 37-mm. gun and light machine gun are mounted side by side on oblong face of turret. A large buffer and recuperator above and extending half way along the gun barrel. Serial 9. CKD V8 H: Type: Light medium. Country of origin: Czechoslovakia. Weight: 16.5 tons. Crew: Three or four. Driver, commander, one or two gunners. Dimensions: Length, 17 feet 6 inches. Width, 7 feet 6 inches. Height, 7 feet 8 inches. Belly Clearance, 1 foot 6 inches. Armor basis (thickest plate known) : 32 mm. Armament: One 47 mm. gun. One light machine gun coaxially mounted. One light machine gun to left of driver. Ammunition carried: 90 rounds for 47 nmmn. gun. 3,000, for light machine guns. Engine: 245 h. p. V-8. Drive: Rear sprocket. Maximum speed on roads: 27 m. p. h. Radius of action: 96 miles. Suspension: Eight bogie wheels. Four bogies connected by an outside girder bearer. One independent bogie below high front idler wheel. Four jockey wheels. Performance: Trench crossing, 7 feet 6 inches. Step, 3 feet 3 inches. Water forded, 3 feet 3 inches. Maximum gradient, 41o. Intercommunication: Radio and lamp. Remarks: Latest design of Skoda tank. Will probably be extensively used by the Germans. The turret is streamlined, tapering towards the rear, surmounted by cupola on left-hand side. 47 mm. gun and light machine gun mounted coaxially in oblong turret face. Entrance to turret in hull to the left, behind turret. Serial 10. Pz Kw. III: Type: Light medium. Country of origin: Germany. Weight: 18 tons. Crew: Three or four. Driver, two gunners (and hull gunner and wireless operator). Dimensions: Length, 16 feet 5 inches. Width, 7 feet 6 inches. Height, 7 feet 6 inches. 135

Serial 10. Pz Kw. III-Continued. Armor basis (thickest plate known) : 25 mm. and 30 mm. (2 types). Armament: One 37 mm. gun. One light machine gun, coaxially mounted. One light machine gun in hull. Engine: 300 h. p. Drive: Front sprocket. Maximum speed on roads: 28 m. p. h. Suspension: (1)_ Six small independent bogie wheels with heavy rubber tires. (2) Eight small bogie wheels. (3) Five large bogie wheels. Christie type. Three jockey wheels. Performance: Water forded, approximately 2 feet 11 inches. Intercommunication : Radio. Remarks: Inferior cross country performance to British A 13, but superior in machine gun fire and observation. Standard German armored fighting vehicle. The turret is similar to Pz Kw II, but has large door on each side. 37 mm. gun and light machine gun mounted in bulge shaped mounting. Built into the rear of the turret and situated cen- trally is a small lookout conning tower vhich is round. Serial 11. Pz Kw IV: Type: Medium. Country of origin: Germany. Weight: 22 tons. Crew: Four or five. Driver, hull gunner, wireless operator, commander, gunner and loader. Dimensions: Length, 17 feet. Width, 7 feet 3 inches (approximately). Height: 8 feet 6. inches. Armor basis (thickest plate known) : 30 to 40 m. (originally 15 to 20 mm.). Armament: One 75 mm. gun. One light machine gun coaxially mounted, one light machine gun on ball mounting to right of driver. Engine: 350 h. p. Drive: Front sprocket. Maximum speed on roads: 31 m. p. h. Suspension: Eight small bogie wheels. Four bogies. Four jockey wheels. Performance: Water forded, 3 feet 6 inches. Intercommunication : Radio. Remarks: The armor plating on this tank has probably been increased considerably, which will impair its efficiency and performance. Standard German armored fighting vehicle. The turret is identical to the Pz Kw III, with one 75 mm. gun. Horizontal engine air louvres at rear on each side of built up hull. Serial 12. Pz Kw V/VI: Type: Heavy. Country of origin: Germany. Weight: 32 to 35 tons. Crew: Seven or eight One driver, commander, radio operator, three gunners; loader. Dimensions: Length, 25-26 feet. Width, 9 feet. Height, 10-11 feet. Armor basis (thickest plate known) : 50 rm. Armament: One 75 mm., or one 105 mm. and one 47 mm. or one 37 mm. mounted coaxially. Three light machine guns (one in main turret, one in each subsidiary machine-gun turret fore and aft). Engine: 350 (?) h. p. Drive: Rear sprocket. Maximum speed on roads: 20 m. p. h. (?). Radius of action: 75 to 85 miles. Suspension: Almost covered by armored skirting. Ten small bogie wheels. One independent bogie wheel. Four jockey wheels. 259762-40 10 136

Serial 12. Pz Kw V/VI-Continued. Performance: Trench crossing, 11 feet 6 inches. Step, 4 feet 7 inches. Water forded, 3 feet 6 inches. Intercommunication : Radio. Remarks: These particulars require confirmation. Turrent round at rear, surmounted by observation cupola to the rear. Massive gun mounting with either a 105 mm. gun mounted below 37 mm. gun, or a 75 mm. gun mounted at the side of a 47 mm. gun. Two small auxiliary turrets with one light machine gun each, one forward to the right of the driver, one behind main turret on the left. APPENDIX III

Report from Capt. Edvard Veths, Norwegian infantry staff officer, regarding the dispositions of the Norwegian forces north of Trond- heim, the disembarkation and partial disposition of the English and French contingents.

I was sent by the C. O. C., General Ruge, from G. H. Q., to Sweden to negotiate with certain Swedish authorities with regard to telephonic, telegraphic, and road communications. Further to make my way north in Sweden via Giiddede to Grong so as to establish contact with the 0. C. Fifth Division, General Laurantzon, and give him certain instructions and give him a clear picture of the situation farther south. While I was at the H. Q. of the Fifth Division, the landing of the first English detachment of about 3,000 men took place in Namsos. The Divisional H. Q. were visited by the English Kaptain Fleming, who, on learning that I had come from farther south, advised me to come to the English H. Q., so as to give a picture of the situation and reveal to the English command the plans of operation. The English commanding officer, General de Wiart, was not present at H. Q., which was then in Namsos and where I saw Brigadier General Phillip. The general explained that the troops, which had been landed the night before, had been taken on to Steinjer and had taken up strong positions and made contact with the Norwegian troops. The dispositions were more or less based on the idea that about two-thirds of the troops were placed in the first line with about one battalion in reserve near Namsos,. A number of field dressing stations were placed in the regions around Grong. The Norwegian forces were placed in the second line. A brigade had been formed of the Dragon Regiment, the Thirteenth Regi- ment (minus one battalion, which was in Narvik) plus the cadet detachment, and was put under the command of Colonel Getz, O. C., the Thirteenth Regi- ment. Brigade H. Q. here set up at Snidsa. Later on one battalion of the Fourteenth Regiment joined the brigade. General Laurantzen with his staff was quartered near Shade and thus had no direct control over any section, but the idea of this was that he was prin- cipally to establish contact between the brigade and the foreign contingent. The landing of the English contingent in Namsos had not been disturbed by German planes. In answer to my questions I was told in the English H. Q. that antiaircraft defense had been placed around Namsos, which I took as a matter of course. I was further told that the troops in the front line had been provided with the necessary artillery and motorized units. I took the liberty of pointing out to General Phillips the risk which the English staffs were running by remaining cooped up in Namsos, which is after all a very narrow town and consists mostly of wooden houses. To this the general replied that if the Germans came with their planes, not a single Englishman would be seen, to which I observed that the German bombs would probably find them all right. After getting a picture of the situation, I returned to the G. O. C. and made my report. The G. O. C. once more sent me north. During my absence the Germans had attacked the English and Norwegian troops at Steinkjer. An eyewitness, a lumberjack, who had taken up a position during the struggle immediately to the front of the English troops and at a slightly lower level, gave me the folliowing account: The Germans attacked with infantry and machine guns. From their positions the English fired mostly with machine guns, but their fire was, on the whole, poorly directed. The effect at any rate was negligible. When the fight had lasted a short while, an English soldier, who seemed very excited, came running along shouting out that an enemy destroyer had come up the fjord. The lumberjack, who told me this story, shouted out that this was impossible,

(137) 138 as there was half a yard of ice covering the fjord all the way down. Despite this, the soldier's cry about the destroyer having come in seemed to have a terrible effect on the English troops. They abandoned their arms pell-mell, threw down all they had, and fled back in a wild crush, about a thousand men in all; and they partly streamed through the Norwegian lines so that the Nor- wegian troops in the circumstances might have been tempted to join in the general stampede. However, the Norwegians stood their ground. They remained in their positions and let the British pass through. A considerable amount of the arms and supplies, which the English threw away, was later made use of by the Norwegians. The English also left a number of wounded behind, and our men could hear them for several days afterward moaning beyond their lines, without being able to assist them. When I returned to Divisional H. Q. for a second time, the French had already landed a number of troops. It was said that the disembarkation of the French contingent was marked by serious losses owing to a violent German bombardment. Not only was Namsos made a virtual heap of ruins, but a large amount of material and great stores of supplies were lost by the French. A number of Frenchmen were also killed. The French explained that they had started their disembarkation on the obvious assumption that the English had established as effective antiaircraft defenses as possible. However, this turned out not to be the case, and the result was as mentioned above. The day after my arrival at Divisional H. Q., I accompanied the brigade commander, Colonel Getz, to a meeting with the French G. O. C., General Audet, and his staff at the house of Dr. Overland, at Bergsmo. At this conference, the French air attache, Commander Schlin, and some members of the general's staff and other officers were present. The general gave his view of the situation, and the colonel gave his impression, and it was at once possible to note with some satisfaction a general agreement in their summing up of the tactical difficulties involved. The disposition of the various troops was more or less the following : In the first line the French had two battalions of Chasseurs Aipins, a number of tanks and a little artillery. In reserve they had a third battalion of Chas- seurs Alpins at Skage. The Norwegian forces had one battalion on the south side of lake Snaasa, one battalion on the north side a little west of Kvam, and two battalions in reserve behind, one on the north side and one on the south side (near Gjdrstad). Contact between the Norwegian and the French forward troops was to be maintained by patrols which were to meet for the first time at lake Gilte, at a time to be decided later. The big problem for both French and English commanding officers seemed to be the landing of further troops. Namsos no longer existed. The quay had partly been blown away by bombs so that at the most two boats of medium size could land troops at a time. Owing to the terrific bombardment which had taken place remains of ruined houses and other material were lying about, so that transport was seriously inconvenienced. We therefore discussed with the French H. Q. the possibility of effecting a landing at Bangsund and possibly a place situated a little north of Namsos. However, the road from Namsos to Bangsund was in bad shape, so we mobilized all the civilians we could lay hands on and a large number of lorries. This took place on Sunday the 28th. We thought that the road would probably be in very good condition by the Monday. The French General Audet and Colonel Getz had come to an agreement at the first conference that as soon as the troops had taken up their positions and contact had been established, they should immediately start intense patrolling operations in the enemy's flanks and rear, and in time start and advance in the direction of the Steinkjer sector. It was considered that a further advance would be inadvisable so long as the Germans had warships at their disposal in the Trondheimfjord. The next step would have to be the destruction of the German warships in the Trondheimfjord. In the course of Saturday, the 27th, and Sunday, the 28th, the Germans attempted an advance against the sector held by the Norwegian troops, but were driven back with loss. On Saturday, the 27th, Colonel Getz received a telegram from General Fleischer urging him to effect immediately a general blowing up of bridges and other breaches of the Nordlands railway, and to take similar precautionary measures 139 on the Nordlands road. Colonel Getz considered the measures unreasonable in view of the fact that the positions now held by the French and Norwegian troops could be said to be strong and retirement was hardly likely. He could thus only explain the reasons for the general's telegram on the assumption that the Germans had landed troops in Mosjien. I was therefore sent to the French G. . C., together with the telegram and the colonel's comments on it, with which the French General was in complete agreement. The general and I went together to the English H. Q. I suggested that a fighting plane should be sent to examine the situation, and to this they agreed. A torpedo boat was also sent north to make investigations. Colonel Getz waited anxiously for a report from the plane and the boat which set off at four o'clock in the afternoon. Naturally it would be possible for the aeroplane to be back that evening, and we would be able to get the report by phone. However, no report reached us in the course of Saturday evening or Sunday morning either. The colonel waited till about noon and tried to ring the English H. Q., but could not get through, as the Germans had once more bombed Namsos and broken the telephonic communication. After waiting for some time the colonel sent an orderly officer by car, but owing to the road conditions it was impossible to get a report till Sunday night. I mention this episode so that it may be understood that the English High Command seems to have had a somewhat peculiar view of the necessity of cooperation and good communications between the various units. At our meeting on the 27th, General Audet expressed a wish that we should form a few fast-moving well-armed sections of reckless fighters who were to attack the enemy's flanks and rear from our left wing. Actually, we had ourselves discussed the idea, but we had thought of forming sections of about a hundred men. The French General, hdwever, considered that they should be limited to 40 to 60 men. I undertook to organize these sections and as I knew that there were in Sweden, especially in Stockholm, a great number of Swedes, Finns, and Nor- wegians who had fought in the Finnish War, and would be eminently suitable for this purpose, I traveled to Stockholm on Sunday evening. After my arrival came the news that the English and French troops had left Namsos. Personally, I cannot easily understand any justification for such a step; and if it is true that the withdrawal of these detachments took place without Colonel Getz being informed, then much damage has been done. It will presumably entail our losing about 4,000 of our very best soldiers and a number of really efficient officers. The units in question, both those from Trondelag and Nordland, were by now getting used to warfare; some had been on neutrality watch near the Finnish border in winter, and could be said by now to constitute really good units. Colonel Getz had the nerves and the power of endurance which many seem to have lacked at this time. The same can be said of Colonel Wettre and the other officers directly in command of the troops there.

AIRPLANE BASES

The German airplanes had the upper hand in every way. Personally I saw nothing but German airplanes on the Namsos front. The Brigade had orders from the French General Command to get at least three airplane bases ready, and this was being done. It was related that the English one day sent out 10 fighting planes from their aircraft carrier near Namsos. A little later the aircraft carrier was attacked by a U-boat and had to make off for the open sea. The planes were unable to find their parent ship and made forced landings at various places, 8 of the 10 planes being wrecked. It is possible that the German supremacy in the air forced the Allied troops to leave the Namsos front. APPENDIX IV

The following narrative is based upon Capt. Menken's notes and news stories; except for the items April 26-28, which are the expe- riences of Menken's partner, S. A. Wilquin. The data on motor transport and Norwegian aviation, however, are Menken's.

Friday, April 26: On arrival in Namsos, the first thing that happened was that I was arrested by the French and taken back again to Grong. I had had no food for 72 hours, and only three hours' sleep. Saturday, April 27: The next day I returned to Namsos after release by the French, who turned me over to the British who gave me a permit to be around. This obtained, I went off to the Steinkjer front where I filmed a British patrol. During the time there, there were three machine-gun attacks by Heinkels who were patrolling the neighborhood. When I returned to Namsos I looked for a place to sleep, but could find nothing except a barn already filled with troops. Thankful for this, I turned in with them and went sound asleep. ..Sunday, April 28: While I was at British Headquarters, I saw planes come swooping down, bombing at Namsos dock. I made some good shots of this across the fjord. On my way to the pier, to get some closer shots, a munition dump nearby was hit. While I was shooting this, ambulances came roaring up, and the whole place turned into a kind of bedlam. I saw a man killed 15 yards from me. Soldiers rushed to save ammunition and lorries, while great shells were exploding all around them. The fire caused by the ammunition was still going hot at 2000. This we never saw extinguished. All this damage was done by one bomb from one plane, which dived out of the sun, dropped a 500-pound bomb, making a direct hit. Both the French and British pitched in and helped to salvage material, skis, lorries, and cars, many of which had flats and other damage. I had driven to the pier in a car and just missed driving it over a rolling box of fuses. Not one vehicle was destroyed during the bombing, although a number were damaged. One driver had two tires cut by bomb fragments, and he changed tires during the bombing under the shelter of a wall. He was Soldat

2 ieme Denis Barberis, of Nice. The general complaint of the. French was that their motor supplies never arrived. Under Captain Gris (French Transport Section-see May 2) was Lieutenant Jean Desmaisons, handling motor transport, who praised his unit to the skies. Desmaisons had 25 bullet holes in his Renault truck. These 5-ton trucks were good but too big for the narrow roads. The highway conditions were terrible. Even big Ford tractor tires slipped on the icy pavements. The finest performance was done by a Tracteur Latin which weighed 10 tons and hauled 20. There were also some Peugeot trucks. In all there were 50 machines which, when we left, all had their tires cut and motor blocks smashed. That was one lot of equipment the Germans couldn't make use of. After I had delivered the film I'd shot to the War Office, I left for Grong. Monday April 29 Drove toward Steinkjer, south of Nandelsaid, where there was a vague front. The patrols of both armies were crossing the road, of which I filmed the British. There were machine-gun attacks twice on the way down and twice on the way back. When a bomb fell right next to my car on the way back, I jumped from the road to the field. Apparently this was the same plane that had machine-gunned the car on the way to Steinkjer from Grong. A few hundred yards ahead there were some cars spilled across the road, with their drivers in a ditch. Later, after passing Bangsund, there was another machine-gun attack by what looked to be the same plane. Tuesday, April 30: In the morning I was at Grong where two German planes disturbed the peace by shooting at a telegraph station and firing two shots at a woman. Drove to Skage for filming British company lost from main body at Steinkjer, which had walked through snow and German lines for 52 miles in 48 hours. Then I heard planes going toward Namsos, for which I left with all speed. (140) 141

German equipment in Norway

German tanks in Norway 142

German tank.-Note howitzer

(International photo.) A German light tank. This perhaps is a 10-ton type, mounting one to two machine guns and carrying a crew of two to three. German tanks have been reported to number more than 6,000. 143

Gernmany has three main types of tanks: A nedium type, perhaps 20 to 25 tons. It mounts a gun probably 37-mm., or larger, in addition to several machine guns, and probably carries a crew of six or more. The Nazis are reported to have a number of other medium types.

(Acme photo.)

A Nazi type which is at least a large medium, perhaps a heavy, 25 to 30 tons. It mounts a 37-mmn. gun and one larger, perhaps 77-mm.; its machine guns probably correspond to the American 30-caliber. Its crew probably numbers eight or more. Germany's heaviest tanks are reported to be 60 tons and upward. 144

(Acme photo.) A two-man light tank. Britain's lights are of various sizes, from three tone upward; mount one to two machine guns, and carry driver and one to two gunners.

(Acme photo.) British tanks range from 3 to 70 tons: One of Britain's mediums, which, are of various sizes. The typical British mediumn probably mounts a 37-mm. gun, a lighter gun, and several machine guns, carrying driver and two or more gunners. 145

I arrived just in time to get in on an air raid. In a raid at 1100, 1 out of 6 planes was shot down, after 3 had thrown out 12 bombs. About 1600 more planes threw down 8 bombs and machine-gunned the whole town. One of these bombs got the Bittern, apparently hitting the gas and fuel storage. A cruiser got away, limping badly and soon I saw more planes going after her. About then I also saw fire from Grong. Tuesday, April 30: Today I witnessed again the sad spectacle of one more nation's death at the hands of the aggressors. Namsos today was not a battlefield such as one sees in steel engravings. If Creasy were to continue writing the story of the world's most decisive battles, the almost unfought battle of Namsos would certainly figure among them. At dawn I was sleeping in the home of the Lutheran pastor of Namsos-- a tall, gaunt man whose black surplice and ruffled white collar added to his simple austerity. It was a cultured home, simple in its domestic culture as the home of William Allen White in Emporia, Kans. Tracts of the Norwegian Seamen's Mission lay about the house, and the polished brasses shone in a parlor overlooking Namsfjord's placid waters.

A heavy, perhaps 140 tons or larger, mounting what may be a 75-mm. gun in addition to machine guns and carrying eight or more gunners. Britain's heaviest tanks are at least 70 tonners.

But in this home the host was not the pastor. This was the residence of physicians, doctors of medicine-and not doctors of religion. They were the doctors of the French expeditionary corps, with Commandant Thorang in charge. There were also Porje, Nesle, de la Bidour (all presumably French), and Lieutenant Orvin (Norwegian). All these men operated while bombing was going on, and buiding their own stuff for fractures. These doctors received me well. I was introduced by Bernard Valory of Paris Soir, by Baron von Blixen-Finecke, and Polly Peabody of Boston, of the Ameri- can Scandinavian Ambulances. We had bully beef and soup and cheese and hazelnuts for dinner, with honest French Pernod. When it came time for dinner there was a burst of antiaircraft overhead. There was the Boche, high overhead, taking one final slap at the British cruiser making out to sea. Then there was peace-peace such as only comes to those who have known the beauty of these northern nights. There was no darkness that was truly dark; there was only the dim twilight of a mystic quality that pilots and mariners know in northern lands. After my long, hard journey and the strain of the last couple of days, I had great need of rest. But the house was crowded with doctors, and there were many who had no beds. Dr. de la Bidour had his air mattress, and this he gave to me. I used the pastor's cushions, and with a blanket and a Burberry I was not cold. Wednesday, May 1: A dawn came that was no dawn, and with it the raking crack of antiaircraft rasping on the sky. Out of my bed and to the window I 146 rushed to see the fight. But there was no fight. High overhead flew the Nazi planes-Heinkels or Messerschmidts or Junkers. Whatever they were, they flew at one altitude-wave upon wave of them. And as they passed, the sky was dotted with puffs of smoke from antiaircraft far below them. All of this stopped at nine, after six raids of three to five planes each. Then came the full stark day with utter peace-a peace that lasted until the evening, except for two flights during the day that bombed but once, but set the guns to firing, too low, at the sky.

Nazi soldiers with an antiaircraft gun in an occupied town in Norway: The expression of the youth on the left is eloquent of his thoughts (S. and G.)

During the morning I tramped the weary miles to see the British press officer to present my credentials. Here one could find no cars. The officer was away, but someone else took me to a different headquarters. "My name's Menken," I said. "Mine's Fleming," he replied. "Fleming-Peter?" I asked. "Yes," he replied. "We just missed each other in China, didn't we?" "And in South America," I answered. This was the man reported dead last week, and here I was-riding along in his car. When there was no press officer to be found I walked on back the road to Namsos, even wearier by now. My helmet weighed on my head, and the camera on my shoulder. Soon two French sailors stopped me on the road. "Vous 8tes de New York, n'est-ce-pas?" They were the Navy's cameramen I'd worked with aboard their cruiser Georges Leygues. We had to have a glass of rum together before I went on. They knew less of the war than even I, and they begged for 147 news. They did not know that in the charred remains of this peaceful town lay the news center of the day-a center that will stand many years as tragic in the annals of free peoples. After my midday meal the doctors invited me to visit their hospital, not theirs, but the one taken over from the local authorities. It had been circled by 7 bombers within 100 yards. The annex had been hit. In this hospital lay the dregs of war. One ward held two civilians, in another a German soldier lay with a bullet through one lung. There were flowers next to his bed, and Dr. Migayron told me with pride how he had brought down the temperature of Private Fritz Peiker from Sebleswig, who had given his religion as National Socialist. In another ward lay a lieutenant of Chasseurs Alpins, with a bandage around his head for a mild concussion. By his bed lay the battered steel helmet which had stood between him and certain death. In the next room were the burned and battered survivors of the bombing of the Bittern, the

Nor wcyia mobile artillery destroyer which went to its death yesterday in the pall of yellow-gray smoke that could not conceal the courage of those who kept on firing with 27 of their comrades dead from a Nazi bomb that struck her stern. Their clothes a flaming wrap, and their mouths scorched with sailors' oaths against the raiding planes, they manned their guns and stood their posts as British scamen should. These were some of the men I saw in their white cots, nursed by the women who were not nurses-women who had been sick at first and retched at ampu- tations, and then come back for more, standing their turn at this wheel of life and death that spares not man, woman, or child. Later, against my will, I had to look at X-rays of the wounded I had seen. Each told in gruesome shadows a story of suffering, mangling, horror which cannot lie. As photographer to cameraman, the French roentgenologist told me how he had X-rayed every casualty that came into the hospital during the shattering raids which had dropped seven bombs within a hundred yards of this small refuge. Just then the guns barked out again, and I went out to film whatever was coming. At that moment arrived the British press officer whom I had sought all morning. Coming at just that moment he was furious that an unidentified cameraman should invade his domain. Little did I know then what worries he had. But when all was settled, we had a walk through the town and went off for dinner. 148

Into the wreck of Namsos began marching the expeditionary corps of France. Calmly, methodically, these tired men plodded along the road. Squadron upon squadron, company upon company, they came-in tens, in hundreds, until several thousands had gone past. All were well-equipped, well-shaved, and had their kits upon their sturdy shoulders. Here is the price of peace when war comes. But more than all it is the price of muddled thinking on the part of statesmen of the democracies. It is the work of minds who budget gasoline for reserve officers who long to fly. We in the front lines of Spain, Knickerbocker and Whitaker and I, foresaw 5 years ago the Russo-German pact. Where is the mentality of those in command of the destinies of France and England who send this puny force to a deserted fjord completely unprotected? Is either nation too poor to afford her men the arms to bear? The French sent antiaircraft men who had fired 70 rounds at targets for their training. And what did they bring to shoot down Heinkel bombers? A puny lot of (omitted) guns that fire a little shell half the size of a banana to a height of 3,000 feet. What can the gunners do against wave after wave of planes? Shoot and reveal to the higher-flying photographers their battery positions. And so, small wonder that tonight the great retreat began. Down the (omitted)' road poured the proudest troops of France, the Chasseurs Alpins. These little men with their long alpen-stocks, marching in retreat toward their ship with heavy packs that gave every one the semblance of a gnome, pounded with each hard step upon the frozen roads of Norway just one more curse upon the muddled thinking of those who direct their destinies and their armies. The days of the Grace of God and a few Marines are ended. The Marines need planes and cannon and antiaircraft that reach far into the sky. This was a Marine corps problem, the Namsos landing. And it was in every possible way a prime example of how not to do it. There were no planes and no guns- nothing. Whoever blames the troops here is in error. The blame must fall on military minds who still think in terms of arquebus and blunderbuss, and on political leaders who not only ignore tactics and the actualities of war, but who refuse to see the truth that stares them in the face. And so tonight, with the midnight sky glowering with northern lights that try to paint their tracery against a pastel background, the smoke from ruined Nam- sos still rises to the sky toward stars whose light serves only prisms and sex- tants to guide the messengers of death. Today a convoy was due at Namsos from Scapa Flow between 1800 and 2000 for the evacuation, from its ill-fated and poorly planned expedition, of the entire Namsos force, both French and English, which had consisted of from 5,000 to 6,000 men. Near the coast of Norway, North of Namsos, the convoy was attacked by German bombers of a large type (Heinkels or Junkers) and bombs believed to be of 1 ton each were dropped about 1300. These planes were too big for dive bombing 'and they used horizontal bombing technique during heavy antiaircraft fire with the result that there were not any hits. The bursts from these bombs threw the water higher than the masts of the biggest cruisers. Throughout the day, until a fog concealed the vessels, a German flying patrol boat kept the convoy under observation. Then the convoy disappeared in the fog banks and was temporarily safe, but at the same time it was prevented from carrying out its mission of entering Namsfjord to evacuate the forces. Thursday, May 2: This day the ships were untroubled by planes due, according to the comments of high ranking French naval officers, to the masterful navigation and seamanship of British Vice Admiral Cunningham who kept skirting the edge of the fog where he could see what he was doing, and also take cover in the event of the arrival of more aircraft. There were German aircraft frequently patrolling the area around Namsos, and they would almost surely have tried to prevent the convoy's entry. Just before dark, however, there were a number of long-range British planes over Namsos, and the moment it was dark the convoy steamed into the fjord at 2230 with Captain P. L. Vian commanding the Fifth Destroyer Flotilla leading the way in aboard Afridi. (Vian was the hero of the Cossackc-Altmark action). Transports were El Djezair, El Kantara and El Mansour, and they were commanded by bearded, salty old Admiral J. E. Gadart. These were ships of the Mediterranean runs which had been armored and armed with two 75-mm. antiaircraft, two 37-mm., some 4 pairs of 40-mm., and 4 Hotchkiss 7 mm., as well as about four 4-inch

1 Steinkjer-Namsos road. 149 150 naval cannon. The ships are now classified as auxiliary cruisers. Also present was Admiral E. Derrien commanding the French cruiser Montcalm. There was no question in the minds of all hands about the fact that this voyage was for the evacuaton of the entire Namsos force, both French and English. The French Chasseurs Alpins as even the churlish Norwegians had to admit, were superbly trained and equipped ski troops. It is no wonder that there was little liaison with the British, who had seen fit to send to the most important of positions a lot of Territorials, with little training, who were far different from the seasoned troops that are sent against the tribes of Asia and Africa. This was the force which, undefended by their own planes and acting without tanks or heavy motorized equipment, had to oppose the might of the German motorized units, airplanes, and brilliantly commanded fleet. The first action of the transports was to load 1,700 men aboard El Mansour, and this ship left the port about midnight escorted by the British cruiser York and some destroyers. About this time I was told that I might have to evacuate Namsos. The British kept me under strict arrest all day in a small hotel that was a British headquarters. During the day we listened to the broadcasts of Chamberlain's speech, and heard the British had abandoned Andasnes. So we knew there wasn't much between us and the Germans but a lot of muddy roads. We stood before Captain Peter Fleming in the little hotel. Fleming is a British gentleman. He told us we must make up our minds to go or stay. And when he said I must decide-make up my mind if I would join him leaving Norway or stay behind-I knew it was the end. The troops were all packing; the officers gave us the last of their tobacco. Is this the end? Why did the Germans drop three bombs into the bay this afternoon? To allow, perhaps, an enemy to evacuate as rapidly as possible, engaging them far out at sea. And if the planes that circled overhead-the Germans flying high above the futile antiaircraft, the 40 mm. guns that just throw powder-puffs-knew what we knew tonight, they were good strategists. But for an American who knew what all this meant to Flem- ing, and to the British gentlemen we all know so well, we felt that in this moment of their country's humiliation we must weep with them. Although I had been confined all day and supposed to be in ignorance of what was happening, I was only too well aware that there was a retreat in progress. My confidence in Allied success, however, did not let me believe that it was a complete evacuation. Yet when I learned the truth I asked to be allowed to sail with the convoy. This permission was at once granted to me, along with J. Nor- man Lodge of Associated Press, Bonney Powell of Movietone, Svend Wilquin of Paramount, and Frank Muto of the Daily Express. We drove to the still smolder- ing dock in what was left of Namsos through an orderly tangle of troops and transport, and carried our gear aboard El Djezair. At the last minute Muto decided to remain behind, and we wished him luck. As Muto rushed off the ship, on board ran Captain Robert J. Williams, from Bronxville and Toronto, in charge of transport, bringing back his dynamiting party. With him were some Chasseurs Alpins who included Sergeant Poyet, Sergeant Graile, Lieutenant Jean Lefort (Legion d'Honneur, 13th Class), a man from Nice, and Private Gilbert Ugnon (Croix de Guerre with palms, won in the Saar sector). Ugnon was the son of a big Lyons family. He said that at Nandalseid they blew the steel suspension bridge at 2045. Then they barricaded the tunnel at Bangsund to delay possible armored car attack. Then they mined and blew up the bridge at Bangsund (midnight tonight) with the most effective result. They were trying to blow a third bridge when the time grew short; so they had to blow dynamite uselessly. The destruction of the foundations of the bridges they said would take a month to repair for 9-ton traffic, or a new road. Having come with his party to the quay, Ugnon made a last tour and returned to ship with nine British engineers who were smashing cars which had been left behind, bringing with them 12 prisoners. Ugnon was the last man aboard. Friday, May 3: After loading 1,605 returning troops on board, El Diezair sailed from Namsos at 2: 15 a. m. Her nose lay in the mud at the quay, but she backed off almost immediately. Outside waited El Mansour and El Kantara, the other 2 French transports. There was an escort of 3 British cruisers (Devon- shire, Carlisle,and York), 6 British destroyers, and 1 French cruiser (Montcalm) and 1 French destroyer (Bison). The convoy carried 6,000 troops. At 0400, after the last sight of rocky hills and partly snow-covered skerries disappearing into the dawn, I fell asleep on deck. 0840. Awoke to the sound of the crashing of a bomb which fell 60 yards astern the El Diezair who fired off her own antennae with her machine guns. 151

On board were French General Gerard Audet, commanding the Thirteenth Chasseurs Alpins, Comn. Charles Goydet, his chief of staff, and many British staff officials. All these would have been an excellent prize for the Germans. Two planes flew high attracting antiaircraft guns, while a third dived out of the sun, The sky was full of bursts, but the diving bomber escaped. 0920. Came the second bombing attack. Six bombs fell 300 yards port side, and several small bombs 50 yards from the Devonshire. It was a terrific attack. There were 6 planes in two triads. The English shouted "Men under cover !" The French shouted, "Attention au soleil!" 1005. Third attack. There were 6 planes, 2 diving on the Bison, scoring a direct hit. Huge clouds of smoke poured from her at once. She was struck in the forward turret with the fire spreading to magazines causing a great explosion. One dive bomber was shot down here. Another dived on us and on a British cruiser. The bombs fell halfway between us and the cruiser, about 300 yards away. Another plane was shot down, and it plunged into the water, rested briefly on the surface, and then disappeared. There was no chance to rescue the pilot-the action was much too hot. There were 160 killed, 48 seriously wounded, and 40 uninjured. One of the wounded, with a broken arm, managed to don a life belt. Three planes dived on the Montcalm, the bombs falling clear. 1100. Distant gunfire, apparently from two destroyers on horizon acting as patrols, firing on Bison, which had dropped behind, to sink her. A plane patrolled overhead, dropping a bomb 500 yards from us on the port side. One British cruiser was ahead, another behind. All the ships were zigzagging constantly. Morning's operations included 39 aircraft. El Djezair fired 80 shells of 75 mm., 150 shells of 37 mm., and more than 3,000 50-cal. machine-gun bullets (13.2 mm.). The Devonshire, Carlisle. and Montcaln were all attacked. Mean- while, El Mansour, which had left Namsos midnight the second of May, accompanied by the cruiser York and destroyers, was undisturbed, as we later learned; but we heard heavy gunfire and believed naval battle was in progress. The Germans bombed Namsos after our departure. 1400. Fourth bombing. Explosions astern, probably from sinking of the Bison to whose aid 2 British destroyers had rushed. The fourth raid occurred immediately after we'd heard these explosions with a dive bombing attack by some Junker 87's which struck the British destroyer Af ridi just aft of the bridge, killing 11 officers and 48 men, mostly in the engine room. Among those wounded was Captain Vian, late of H. M. S. Cossack. The disabled Afridi, smoke curling high overhead in a loop as she plowed along at top speed, dropped astern and other destroyers rushed to assist her. 1530. Fifth bombing. We saw three bursts on the horizon where the Afridi was following. She was sunk this time. (During the middle of the day a German flying patrol boat was calmly ob- serving constantly, despite antiaircraft.) 1700. A huge, 4-motored British Sutherland patrol boat flew overhead. She'd come to spot submarines, and she cheered the troops on board enormously. 2150. All ships half-masted British and French flags in honor of lost destroyers and dead. 2225. Passed 13-ship convoy headed north. Two huge transports in convoy. There was much signalling and low-flying of patrol boat. 2230. Turned in. (Planes today were Heinkel bombers with speeds of 400-420, and new Junker 87's 2-place dive bombers with a speed of 450 km.) Saturday. May 4: 0700. Today the convoy was joined by a patrol of Bristol- Blenheims, and there was much improved morale aboard ship when they appeared. The Sutherland flying patrol boat also accompanied us throughout the entire day on submarine watch. 1100. German prisoners exercised. There were 38 in all. Some of them were wounded, one through the lung. He was in sick bay and seemed quite cheerful. Ten of theni had been captured at Malm from a merchant ship by the Norwegians, who took them to Skage and turned them over to the British the day before we left Namsos. They all seemed quite happy young men, and they were allowed to mingle on deck and smoke. The 10 from Maim had been held in a house in Skage where they were bombed by their own planes. 1200. Submarine scare. The convoy fanned out and increased speed, in zig-zag fashion. No depth charges were dropped. Planes skimmed the surface of the ocean. 258762-40--11 152

1300. The officers ordered the troops to march around the decks, to get a little exercise after having been in such crampedl quarters, and to clean up for disembarkation. The theory was that we had made a course from Nainsos northwest to above Arctic Circle, and then turned southwest. 1500. The enlisted men had their first tea, which improved their spirits greatly. 1600. The men were sent below decks in an effort to trim ship, which was riding high because of the absence of water, food, etc., and listing because of a combination of wind, high ground swell and the light weight. Meanwhile, the Chasseurs Alpins, who were sliding about the decks in their hob-nailed boots, and the St. Bernard clog on board, didn't help matters much.

SnowOZ( Slioes for \ orwce!cJitr l Hoirsc5..

2000. Good dinner of beef, noodles, and wine. 2258. We four journalists were "arrested" again, this time by the French. We were taken to new quarters where we remained during the stay at Scapa Flow, a militarized secret zone. (Remember the conditions.) Sunday, May 5: 0400. Still confined, we reached Scapa Flow, where we took on fuel, food, water, disembarked the British troops to a British ship, and got some mail. The troops were so excited at having mail that they ripped it open hastily thereby mutilating the contents so that the letters were almost unreadable. The wounded were taken off and we were left aboard with the French. 0730. Abbe Parquin held a service on board in honor of the dlead. The altar was on the promenade deck, candles flickering in the wind. Holy water was cast in the sea, while the Commandant and the Captain stood watching, and the men bent their heads in reverence. 0830. Breakfast on coffee and cheese. 1100. Telegram from London: "Proceed with all dispatch London." 1530. Lunched on ham, bread, and wine. 1640. Air-raid alarm which turned out to be a dud. No firing was heard. 1825. Departed Scapa Flow for Greenock Scotland. 153

2010. We four journalists were released, and messed with officers in what had been the hospital. A new convoy was organized with 13 ships in all, 6 of which were transports thereby relieving the awful crowding on board. In a message to all ships in the Home Fleet, al warships of Norway, Britain, France and other vessels attached to the fleet, Vice-Admiral Forbes, C-in-C of the Home Fleet, said: "In the last 2 weeks you have been engaged in the most important naval operation since the beginning of the war. I am proud of you in the accomp- lishment of your mission during which only 12 officers and men of the army in your charge lost their lives in spite of heavy air attacks. I am very proud to command a fleet able, against all odds, to fulfill its mission with such great determination and success." Monday, May 6: Steaming steadily and zigzagging through islands vest and north of Scotland, we dropped hook in Greenock at 0016.

British po/)n p)U( shiorin/ (1n noition so phlYJ

So today the Allied troops evacuated from the Namsos area of Norway reached Britain without the loss of a man on the three transports which carried them. But the French and British escorting fleet lost 1 destroyer each to the attacking German air force with losses estimated at 200 (lead and 75 wounded. Striking with vicious aggressiveness at all ships of the convoy, the German bombers sank the French destroyer Bison and the British destroyer Afridi. One German dive bomber was destroyed, and the others-estimated at about 50-failed through poor marksmanship to hit the convoys, cruisers, and troop ships. The terrific hail of antiaircraft hurled into the sky turned it into a flying fiasco (luring the series of five raids that could have caused the death of thousands. The technique of the Germans was masterful, but the poor performance of the men at the bomb sights saved our lives. One bomb of the hundreds that fell would have been enough to make a shambles of the transports, where every inch of space was occupied by the returning troops. The absence of Allied aircraft off the Norwegian coast, where they were most needed close to the new German bases, is sadly to be lamente. The Nazi planes could have 154 been driven out of the air by one squadron of pursuit planes, but we did not have that protection. None of us suffered any injury, but this has been the most powerful attack ever launched on a troop convoy in the history of naval warfare. While it showed that ships can be struck and sunk by diving bombers, it also showed that a powerful antiaircraft defense aboard a number of ships is effective in keeping horizontal bombers at altitudes where their accuracy is reduced. But it was one more proof that the only defense truly effective against aircraft is defensive aircraft in sufficient quantities to render the attackers unable to perform their missions. The courageous handling of the guns aboard El Djezair, where I was able to observe the French gun crews in action, was an inspiring example of the bravery and cool-headedness of the French Navy. Rear Admiral J. Cadart, commanding the transport flotilla, had his tattered two-starred flag flying aboard El Djezair and stood his post on the bridge, wearing his steel helmet, exhibiting the same efficient calm that characterized his officers and men. Below decks the British territorials were kept out of sight by their officers, and exhibited the certainly equal courage required of those who must remain still under tremendous danger without being able to help. For the American correspondents aboard it was an inspiring experience, but one which we would not soon wish to repeat. And for the 40 wounded men in sick-bay it must have been sheer horror. I saw three rats run from a lifeboat when the bombing began; one leapt to the boat deck, and two dived unhesitatingly into the churning sea. O