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This Report Is Provided by the Afghanistan NGO Safety Office for the Sole Benefit of the NGO Community Operating in Afghanistan

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This Report Is Provided by the Afghanistan NGO Safety Office for the Sole Benefit of the NGO Community Operating in Afghanistan This report is provided by the Afghanistan NGO Safety Office for the sole benefit of the NGO community operating in Afghanistan. The information provided represents only the most recently available data and therefore situations are subject to change. This report is provided free of charge and therefore ANSO accepts no liability for the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report. ANSO WEEKLY SECURITY REPORT Report Number: 28 - 07 Reporting Period: 05th June – 11th of July 2007 CENTRAL REGION Regional Analysis One NGO related incident was recorded this reporting period. In the last reporting period a journalist from an INGO was illegally detained by NDS however was released without been charged. In Wardak, a national NGO staff member was abducted on the 3rd of July however was released unharmed on the 5th of July (details in provincial advisory). It has been noted that incidents directly involving NGOs has been increasing. Previous incidents involving NGOs seemed to be criminally related however NGOs are becoming more susceptible to AOG related incidents. In addition, AOG activity in the Province of Kapisa, Wardak and Logar seem to be indirectly affecting NGOs as humanitarian space is reduced as result of unsafe environments. AOG activity in the Central Region seems to be ‘closing in’ on Kabul and it is assessed that NGOs in Kabul Province may experience a rise in intimidation. With the AOG activity concentrated in the provinces of Logar, Wardak and Kapisa, hazardous environments are preventing NGOs of implementing programs. Key concern for the Central Region continues to be: • Suicide bombings • Roadside IEDs • Threat of abduction for ransom purposes • Criminal activities in the form of armed robbery and theft Provincial Advisory and Incidents 1. Kabul City No NGO related incidents were recorded this reporting period. Once again a VBIED attack has highlighted this week’s incidents. A black corolla rigged with explosives targeted a two vehicle ISAF convoy resulting in the injury of three soldiers. As previously reported, an increase in suicide and IED attacks has been noted on alternate routes to Jalalabad Road but have always targeted high profile vehicles. The last suicide attack on Jalalabad Road was on the 16th of June and since then there have been 2 suicide attacks and 2 IED attacks reported on alternate routes. (This total does not include unconfirmed IED attacks against ISAF and does not include IED discoveries). A night letter was received by an INGO national staff member. It specified details of his involvement with an NGO program in a Pashtun dominated province. This particular member lives in Kabul however works in another province all together. This is the second night letter received by an INGO this year. It is unclear weather this letter is AOG related or weather criminals are adopting similar Taliban methods in drafting this particular threat. Key concerns in the province: • Heightened threat of suicide attacks within Kabul city limits • Increase use of RCIED on primary and secondary roads • Civilian collateral damage as result suicide bombings Criminal Related: July/04/na/District 6: Three unknown armed men attacked a local man. NFI Criminal Related: July/04/na/District 16, Deh Khodaydad Area: An unidentified man armed with a pistol shot and seriously wounded two locals who were attending evening prayers at a Mosque. Arrest: July/04/na/District 8, Masjidi Itefaq Area: Police arrested a local man in the possession of a hand gun and a VHF radio. Other: July/05/na/Kabul city, Dashte Chamtala Area: Police discovered an underground prison containing hundreds of bodies. According to reports, the prison was a former military barracks that dated back from the Soviet occupation. VBIED: July/06/1215/District 9, Khwaja Zanboor-e- Wali Area: A black Toyota corolla (registration Plate no. 96425) rigged as a VBIED targeted an ISAF patrol convoy. As a result three ISAF soldiers and two by – standers have been seriously wounded in the explosion. Indirect Attack: July/07/2310 / District 10, Qalai Wakil Area: Two BM12 rockets was fired from north east side of Kabul province and impacted in a welding shop. Structure of shop has damaged, however no casualties were reported. Criminal Related: July/07/Night time/District 8, Dubai Plaza: Armed robbers broke into the residence of a local businessman and stole cash and valuables. IED Recovery: July/08/na/District 5, Qalai Kashef Area: District police discovered two mortar shells in an abandoned house. NFI Criminal Related: July/08/na/District 13, Dashti Barchi Area:. Armed robbers broke into the residence of a local businessman and stole cash and valuables. Explosion: July/08/na/District 2, Johe Shire Area: A gas cylinder exploded inside at a local residence. NFI Criminal Related: July/09/Evening time/District 1, Darwazai Lowari Area: Unidentified armed men in a two vehicle convoy opened fire on a vehicle transporting the head of the Criminal Investigation Branch (General Ali Shah Paktiwal) NFI. Other: July/09/Moring time/District 12, Prozha Ahmad Shah Mina Area: Approximately 100 residence staged a peaceful demonstration against the Ministry of Power and Electricity demanding power to their area. Warning: July/11/Night Time/Kabul City: A warning letter displaying the logo of the Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan was received by a national staff member of an INGO. The letter specified that he should stop working for the NGO. The staff member works in a Pashtun Province but received the letter at his home in Kabul. The letter warned that he has 15 days to cease work or he would b responsible for the death of his and his family’s death. 2. Kabul Province No NGO related incidents were recorded this reporting period. The security situation in the Kabul Province has been assessed as unstable. Incidents this week indicate that the Kabul Province continues to be affected by AOGs. At this stage there are no direct threats to NGOs however NGOs should still remain mindful that Kabul province is considered as relatively risky for NGO operations. Key concerns in the province: • The increase of road side IEDs across the province • Encroachment of AOGs in Surobi, Paghman, Musayi and Charikar Other: July/05/na/Deh Sabz District: Three ANA soldiers were killed, and seven others wounded when a hand grenade accidentally detonated during army training. Arrest: July/07/na/Paghman District: Three suspects who were accused of having involvement in the abduction of a female teenager were apprehended by police. Arrest: July/07/na/Qarabagh District: Police arrested a local individual accused of killing his mother. IED Detonation: July/09/na/Surobi District, Uzbin Valley, Qasa Jan Area: An ISAF convoy was struck with a road side IED.NFI Indirect Attack: July/10/0115/Paghaman District, near District Police HQ: Two BM12 rockets were fired from Bashahi hill top area. One rocket impacted inside a private residence and another impacted approximately 500meter away from District HQ. Indirect Attack: July/11/2110/Surobi district, Faqir Abad Area: Three mortar shells launched from the east side of Uzbin District impacted near the District Administration Office building. NFI. 3. Wardak Province No NGO related incidents were recorded during this reporting period. The security situation in the district remains tense and unstable for NGO operation across the province. Of particular concern is the deterioration of the once peaceful district of Bisood. Locals claim that armed Koochis believed to be allied with Taliban have been forcing people from their villages as result of land dispute. Media reports claim that approximately 4000 people have fled villages as result of looting and arson attacks. Previously disarmed Hazaras feel insecure in their villages and are now seeking refuge in various areas of Hazarajat. Koochis have been reported to be armed with mortars and RPGs and are reported to be surveying roads leading into the district. It is strongly advised that NGO traveling to Bamyan avoid using Jalriz Road. Travel through Parwan is advisable. Key concerns in the province: • Infiltration of AOGs alleging to disturb government and NGO employees • The presence of large numbers of AOGs across the region • The increase of clashes/attacks between security forces and AOGs • Increase of refuges in Bisood as a result of land disputes Criminal related: July/03/Night time/Chak District, Noora Kheil Village: An INGO National staff member was abducted at gunpoint whilst he was on his to his home from work. The abductee was released two days later unharmed. AOG Activity: July/04/Night time/Narkh District, Durrani Area: A secondary school was set alight by AOGs. As result three classrooms, the principal’s office, furniture and stationery were destroyed. AOG Activity: July/06/0500/Sur Pul, Maidan Shahr: Two fuel tankers were stopped by AOGs on the Kabul – Ghazni road. The fuel tankers were destroyed by RPG fire however the drivers were later released unharmed. Direct Attack: July/07/Evening time/Sayabad District: Five BM12 rockets impacted nearby the District Administration building. AOG Activity: July/07/1200/Nirkh district, Dashte Toop Area: AOGs destroyed an ISAF fuel tanker by setting it on fire. SAF Attack: July/09/Morining time/Sayedabad District, Haft Asiab Area: AOGs attacked a police convoy with SAF on the road between Haft Asiab and Salaar. As a result one police man was killed and another wounded. IED Detonation: July/09/Maidan Shahr District, Abrahim Kheil Village: A police vehicle was destroyed by a roadside RCIED. IED Detonation: July/10/1000/Sayed Abad District, Sultan Kheil Area: A police patrol vehicle was targeted by an RCIED resulting in the death of 10 police officers. AOG Activity: July/11/Night time/Sayed Abad District, Bazaar Area: A group of unidentified armed men shot and killed a local man who was accused of spying.
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