Arab Spring À L'algérienne

Policy Brief September 2013 Arab Spring à l’algérienne By Derek Lutterbeck and Rachid Tlemçani Executive summary Even though many of the socioeconomic conditions that have driven the popular Arab Spring uprisings and toppled several regimes across the Middle East have been present in Algeria as well, the Algerian regime has thus far been able to weather the winds of change. This policy brief takes a closer look at the “Algerian exception” by examining the protest movement in Algeria and why it has been more limited than elsewhere, as well as recent political “reforms” adopted in response to the protests. It argues that in addition to the experiences of the bloody decade of the 1990s, a number of factors account for the more limited protest movement in Algeria, such as the regime’s larger spending power and its experience in dealing with large- scale protests. While the Algerian regime has introduced reforms over the last two years, these have been mainly cosmetic, largely consolidating the political status quo. The policy brief also briefly discusses the threat of Islamist terrorism in the Sahel region, with particular reference to the recent In Amenas hostage crisis in Algeria. As for Algeria’s future evolution and pros- pects for political reform, fundamental change seems unlikely, at least in the short to medium term. Introduction The protest movement in Algeria: why has Algeria is often seen as a – if not the – major exception to it been limited? the profound transformations that have swept across the Despite the common perception of relative calm in Algeria, Arab world since late 2010. While in countries such as the country has in fact experienced a considerable degree Tunisia, Egypt or Yemen popular protest movements have of internal unrest in recent years. In 2010 alone security toppled long-standing autocrats and the rule of other Arab forces were called out to deal with more than 10,000 leaders has seemed increasingly shaky in the face of sit-ins, riots and similar protest incidents. Popular discon- growing domestic turmoil, the Algerian regime has thus far tent has been expressed across a broad spectrum of been able to weather the winds of change. This has been Algerian society, including by school teachers, medical despite the fact that many of the socioeconomic conditions personnel, communal workers, the unemployed and that have fuelled the anti-regime movements elsewhere, pensioners, who have demonstrated against their working such as high levels of unemployment, rising living costs, conditions, rising living costs and injustice generally. The and widespread cronyism and corruption, have been widespread sense of desperation has also been manifest in present in Algeria as well. This policy brief takes a closer the exodus of tens of thousands of young Algerians look at the “Algerian exception” and the differences to attempting to cross the Mediterranean to Europe each year experiences in countries such as Tunisia and Egypt. More – many of whom never reach their destination – and the specifically, it examines the protest movement in Algeria growing number of self-immolations, which have occurred and why it has been more limited than elsewhere, the practically on a daily basis. government’s response, and recent “reforms”, as well as the likely evolution of the current situation in the short to The protest movement reached a turning point on January medium term. 3rd 2011, when overnight the government decided to raise NOREF Policy Brief – September 2013 the price of staples such as sugar and oil, and to ban street demonstrations without using excessive force, while both vendors. In response, protests mostly of young and margin- the Tunisian and Egyptian police were quick to open fire on alised youths increased rapidly, also reaching previously protesters, killing hundreds. The Algerian leadership also calm areas, such as the deep south. In mid-February 2011 reversed its decision practically overnight to increase the a heteroclite grouping composed of opposition parties, prices of food, and disbursed some $35 billon in micro- human rights organisations, student and women’s associa- credits for projects that had been “dormant” in the drawers tions, and representatives from unofficial trade unions of bureaucrats for years. In addition, a range of public launched the so-called National Co-ordination for Change sector workers received significant wage increases. and Democracy, which called for political reforms and Compared to the Tunisian and Egyptian leadership, the regime change. The group was spearheaded by the Rally Algerian regime has a much larger distributive capacity, for Culture and Democracy, a political party that has its thanks to its hydrocarbon revenues and massive foreign main power base in the Berber-speaking areas of Algeria, exchange reserves (over $180 billion in 2012), which has although it claims to represent all Algerians. allowed it to contain the unrest without having to concede any significant political reforms. However, the protest movement in Algeria, although it did not die down entirely, never reached the same momentum as in Tunisia and Egypt, so what explains the difference? Political “reforms” and the parliamentary One important factor is certainly the still-vivid memories of elections of May 2012 the “civil war” (the expression itself is contested) of the In addition to this reactivation of the welfare state, the 1990s that gripped Algeria after the aborted 1991 elections government initiated a “political reform” process in in which Islamists won the first round. Unlike their neigh- response to the popular protests. Its main elements have bours, Algerians still carry the psychological and political included the passing of several new bills on information, scars of the “red decade”, during which state security associations, political parties, elections and constitutional forces, Islamist rebels and state-sponsored militias reform. However, human rights organisations, both inside engaged in acts of extreme violence, leaving more than and outside the country, have pointed out that rather than 150,000 people dead, many of them innocent civilians, amounting to genuine reforms, these measures represent while at least 7,000 disappeared. Many Algerians now fear additional tools for the regime to control Algerian society.1 that the Arab Spring could bring the country into a renewed Thus, while the Algerian leadership has presented these state of violence and chaos, as has happened in both Libya reforms as an attempt to enhance individual freedoms and and Syria. the country’s democracy, the various bills in fact strengthen the power of the executive, e.g. in areas such as Another weakness of the Algerian protest movement is that the registration of political parties and associations or in many of its proponents belong to the political establish- authorising imports of foreign newspapers. ment and thus do not have enough credibility to inspire a widespread popular uprising. It can be argued that the On the eve of the May 2012 legislative elections 23 new “organic intellectual”, to use Antonio Gramsci’s term, who parties were authorised, bringing the total to 47. This would be able to credibly articulate popular grievances and marked the first time since 1999 that any new political a call for regime change has been missing in Algeria. It party had been legalised. The newly created parties, was precisely the presence of leaders who were able to however, were hardly ready for the elections, with neither make this link between “social justice” and “regime sufficient grassroots support nor a clear political agenda. change” that made the revolutionary movement of 1954 Contrary to official declarations, the proliferation of “micro possible, despite the fact that the historic context was more parties” has rather increased the electoral masquerade difficult than today. Compared to this earlier revolutionary that characterises the Algerian political system. Indeed, movement, the problem with Algeria’s current elite is that many of the new political parties vanished immediately it is too fragmented, and is implicated in the system of after the elections and most of them arguably did not even corruption and mismanagement. As a result, its capacity to fulfil the strict criteria imposed by Algerian law on political organise and lead a broad popular movement is also very parties. limited. The so-called pouvoir (the power to be) has been able to manipulate and corrupt large segments of Algeria’s Moreover, candidates are perceived by the wider public as political class, be they nationalist, secularist or Islamist. being motivated primarily by financial interest. It is worth noting that the salaries of Algerian deputies have been Finally, compared to the leaders of Tunisia and Egypt, the raised several times in recent years and now amount to Algerian regime has responded more effectively to the almost 30 times the minimum wage. Even by regional protest movement. To begin with, Algerian security forces standards, this is high. In Tunisia, for example, the salaries are well trained and equipped to deal with large-scale of members of the National Constituent Assembly amount 1 See, for example, the joint report by the Algerian League for the Protection of Human Rights and the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network entitled Réformes politiques ou verrouillage supplémentaire de la société et du champ politique en Algérie? Une analyse critique, <http://www.algeria-watch.org/pdf/pdf_fr/remdh_re- formes_politiques_2012.pdf>. 2 NOREF Policy Brief – September 2013 to around ten times the minimum wage, even though they perceived as either terrorists or as part of the political too have been increased significantly of late. establishment. For the Algerian regime the key issue was to achieve a high The elections clearly demonstrated the Algerian regime’s voter turnout, and it made use of all available channels to unwillingness or inability to implement “change from convince people to participate in what it called an “historic” within”. The new cabinet that was unveiled some three election.

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