DOCSLIB.ORG

Perspectives on Terrorism, Volume 8, Issue 3

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Perspectives on Terrorism, Volume 8, Issue 3 PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 8, Issue 3 Table of Contents Welcome from the Editors 1 I. Articles Deterring Terrorism: a New Strategy 2 by Max Abrahms Eco-Terrorism? Countering Dominant Narratives of Securitisation: a Critical, Quantitative History of the Earth Liberation Front (1996-2009) 16 by Michael Loadenthal Should we be Scared of all Salafsts in Europe? A Dutch Case Study 51 by Ineke Roex Securing the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas from Maritime Terrorism: a Troublesome Cooperation? 64 by Senia Febrica II. Research Note Bangladesh: an Emerging Centre for Terrorism in Asia 84 by Sajjan M. Gohel III. Resources Bibliography: Arab Spring (Part 2) 92 Compiled and selected by Judith Tinnes Terrorists, Extremists, Militants: Selected Biographies, Autobiographies and related Documents and Writings 126 Compiled by Eric Price IV. Book Reviews “Counterterrorism Bookshelf” – Eight Books on Terrorism & Counter-terrorism Related Subjects 135 by Joshua Sinai V. Op-Ed Terrorism and Jihad: Diferences and Similarities 140 by Philipp Holtmann ISSN 2334-3745 i June 2014 PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 8, Issue 3 VI. News News from the Country Coordinators of TRI’s Network of PhD Teses Writers 144 by Alex P. Schmid VII. Notes from the Editors About Perspectives on Terrorism 148 ISSN 2334-3745 ii June 2014 PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 8, Issue 3 Welcome from the Editors Dear Reader, We are pleased to announce the release of Volume VIII, Issue 3 (June 2014) of Perspectives on Terrorism at www.terrorismanalysts.com. Our free online journal is a joint publication of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), headquartered in Vienna, and the Center for Terrorism and Security Studies (CTSS), headquartered at the University of Massachusetts’ Lowell campus. Tere has been a change in our Editorial Team. Tim Pippard, Assistant Editor for many years, has lef Perspectives on Terrorism. We thank him for his work. Given the rapidly increasing number of submissions to our journal, the Editors are welcoming suggestions for his replacement. We are looking for a qualifed candidate with broad editorial experience and professional expertise. Te three Directors of the TRI, acting as jury, have completed their evaluation of the submissions for the “Best Dissertation on Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism published in 2013”, reading more than 10,000 pages of text. Tree fnalists have been identifed. Teir names will be made public in the August issue of our journal which will also feature an article by the winner. Te Jury has decided to make the TRI Tesis Award an annual feature. We look forward to receive submissions of high-quality PhD theses completed in 2014. More about this in the next issue of our journal. Te core of the current issue of Perspectives on Terrorism consists of four articles. Te lead article is authored by Max Abrahms and addresses the question whether terrorism can be deterred (he will also talk about this topic on an upcoming TED talk). Tis is followed by a contribution from Michael Loadenthal. He challenges the notion that so-called “eco-terrorists” are terrorists, basing his case on unique empirical material. Also controversial is Ineke Roex’ article. She challenges the notion that all Salafsts should be viewed through the lens of counter-terrorism. Our fnal peer-reviewed article is authored by Senia Febrica. It deals with maritime terrorism in South East Asia looking through the lens of international cooperation. A Research Note by Sajjan Gohel focuses on Bangladesh and the potential for international terrorism posed by Islamists there. Joshua Sinai, our book reviews editor, ofers brief reviews of eight books he found time to read. Te Resource sections contains two bibliographies, one on the Arab Spring (a topic on which Judith Tinnes had already published earlier but which she has now updated) and one by another member of our Editorial Team, Eric Price. His bibliography focuses on the personalities of a number of terrorists and extremists. Te Op-Ed by Philipp Holtmann seeks to clarify how to diferentiate terrorism from jihad – a topic of great confusion. Finally, the editor of this issue summarises some news from TRI’s ten national networks of PhD Teses Writers. Te current issue of Perspectives on Terrorism was prepared on the European side of the Atlantic, while the August issue (PT VIII, 4) will be assembled by Prof. James J. F. Forest, the journal’s American co-editor at the Centre for Terrorism and Security Studies (CTSS) at the University of Massachusetts. Sincerely, Prof. em. Alex P. Schmid Editor-in-Chief Perspectives on Terrorism ISSN 2334-3745 1 June 2014 PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 8, Issue 3 I. Articles Deterring Terrorism: a New Strategy by Max Abrahms Abstract Terrorists are poor candidates for deterrence. Tey are difcult to deter because they are motivated by a wide variety of personal and strategic aims. Te diversity of these aims practically ensures that many terrorists will derive utility from their actions regardless of how governments respond. In fact, even opposite government responses tend to generate utility for terrorists due to the complexity of their incentive structure. To an extent, however, terrorism may still be deterred by dissuading terrorist supporters since they are critical for mounting large-scale terrorist campaigns. Compared to terrorists, their supporters are more deterrable due to the relative simplicity of their incentive structure. People generally support terrorists for a single reason—to achieve their political demands. Fortunately, a growing body of empirical research fnds that terrorism is a losing tactic for perpetrators to induce major concessions from governments. Te policy community can help to deter terrorism by teaching its supporters about the tactic’s politically counterproductive efects. Keywords: deterrence, counter-terrorism Introduction Traditional concepts of deterrence try to thwart unwanted behaviour by manipulating adversary incentives. Deterrence-by-punishment threatens to impose costs on the adversary for an undesirable course of action. Deterrence-by-denial seeks to deny him any benefts from it.[1] Clearly, both strategies are based on infuencing the adversary by reducing the utility of his actions. Unfortunately, neither approach is likely to succeed since terrorists are generally motivated by such a wide variety of personal and strategic aims that they are liable to derive utility from their actions regardless of how governments respond. Although traditional concepts of deterrence are unlikely to work against terrorists on any systematic basis, the tactic itself may be deterred with an alternative counterterrorism approach. Deterrence-by- delegitimisation focuses less on deterring adversaries themselves than their support constituencies.[2] Tis less well-known indirect form of deterrence ofers superior counterterrorism promise because terrorist supporters are more likely to be motivated by a relatively straightforward incentive structure. Unlike the perpetrators themselves, their supporters are generally driven by one main goal—the desire to coerce government concessions. In recent years, a growing body of academic research has found that terrorism decreases rather than increases the odds of government compliance. In this fundamental sense, the tactic of terrorism is politically counterproductive. Te policy community’s primary contribution to deterring terrorism should be to broadcast this fnding in a targeted public diplomacy campaign to terrorist supporters. Te argument of this article proceeds in three sections. In the frst section, an explanation is ofered why classic concepts of deterrence are doomed to fail against terrorists. Te strategies of deterrence-by- punishment and deterrence-by-denial are based on the unrealistic premise that governments can deter terrorists by simply removing the utility of their violent behaviour. Tis assumption is faulty not because terrorists are categorically irrational actors, but because they do not employ a uniform, consistent metric of success. Indeed, many terrorists seem to regard their actions as fruitful regardless of how governments ISSN 2334-3745 2 June 2014 PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 8, Issue 3 choose to respond. Te second section argues that most terrorism is deterrable, however, even if its practitioners are not. Tis section details the burgeoning academic literature on terrorism’s political inefectiveness and explains how this fnding can be exploited to deter terrorist supporters and, by extension, the tactic itself. Te conclusion issues an appeal to the policy community—work closer with the academic community on counterterrorism. Only by sharing our knowledge can we hope to deter the terrorism threat. Why Terrorists Tend to Be Undeterrable Te conventional approaches to deterrence are actually two sides to the same coin. In deterrence-by- punishment, the threat of reprisal is intended to deter the adversary with unacceptable costs. In deterrence- by-denial, the point is to deter him by removing the potential value of his actions. As Matthew Kroenig and Barry Pavel noted: “Whereas cost imposition strategies threaten retaliation, beneft denial strategies threaten failure. If actors believe that they are unlikely to succeed or reap signifcant benefts from a certain course of action, they may be deterred from taking it.”[3] When it comes to combating terrorism, however, this objective is intractable because its practitioners seem to derive value from their actions notwithstanding the nature of the government response.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • PERSPECTIVES on TERRORISM Volume 11, Issue 5
    ISSN 2334-3745 Volume V, Issue 5 October 2017 PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 11, Issue 5 Table of Contents Welcome from the Editors......................................................................................................1 Articles Countering Violent Extremism in Prisons: A Review of Key Recent Research and Critical Research Gaps.........................................................................................................................2 by Andrew Silke and Tinka Veldhuis The New Crusaders: Contemporary Extreme Right Symbolism and Rhetoric..................12 by Ariel Koch Exploring the Continuum of Lethality: Militant Islamists’ Targeting Preferences in Europe....................................................................................................................................24 by Cato Hemmingby Research Notes On and Off the Radar: Tactical and Strategic Responses to Screening Known Potential Terrorist Attackers................................................................................................................41 by Thomas Quiggin Resources Terrorism Bookshelf.............................................................................................................50 Capsule Reviews by Joshua Sinai Bibliography: Terrorist Organizations: Cells, Networks, Affiliations, Splits......................67 Compiled and selected by Judith Tinnes Bibliography: Life Cycles of Terrorism..............................................................................107 Compiled and selected by Judith
    [Show full text]
  • Violent Jihad in the Netherlands
    Violent Jihad in the Netherlands Current trends in the Islamist terrorist threat Violent Jihad in the Netherlands Current trends in the Islamist terrorist threat 2 Contents Foreword 5 Introduction 7 The murder of Theo van Gogh: consequences and effects 7 General trends in the development of jihadism 9 Framework of terms and definitions 10 1 From exogenous threat to home-grown terrorism 13 1.1 What is a jihadist network? 13 1.2 Historical development of network formation 15 1.2.1 The traditional phase: migration of jihadists 15 1.2.2 The proliferation phase: recruitment 16 1.2.3 The ‘home-grown’ phase: radicalisation and jihadisation 17 1.3 Three types of jihadist networks 17 2 Decentralisation and local implantation of international jihad19 2.1Al-Qaeda: from ‘network of gynetworks’ 19 to trademark and ideolo 2.2 Ideology of global violent jihad 21 2.3 Decentralisation of international jihad 22 2.4 Local implantation of international jihad 26 3 Radicalisation and the emergence of local networks 29 3.1Radicalisation, recruitment and jihadisation 29 3.2 The religious context of radicalisation 30 3.3 The socio-political context of radicalisation 33 3.4 The cultural and socio-psychological context of radicalisation 35 3.5 Emergence of local autonomous cells and networks 37 3.6 Backgrounds and functioning of local autonomous networks 38 3.7 The significance of the Hofstad network 39 4 Virtualisation of jihad 43 4.1The Internet as a propulsion of the jihad movement 43 4.2 Al-Qaeda as a virtual database (top-down) 44 4.3 The virtual umma (grass
    [Show full text]
  • The Renewed Threat of Terrorism to Turkey
    JUNE 2013 . VOL 6 . ISSUE 6 Contents The Renewed Threat of FEATURE ARTICLE 1 The Renewed Threat of Terrorism Terrorism to Turkey to Turkey By Stephen Starr By Stephen Starr REPORTS 4 The Local Face of Jihadism in Northern Mali By Andrew Lebovich 10 Boko Haram’s Evolving Tactics and Alliances in Nigeria By Jacob Zenn 16 A Profile of Khan Said: Waliur Rahman’s Successor in the Pakistani Taliban By Daud Khattak 19 Tweeting for the Caliphate: Twitter as the New Frontier for Jihadist Propaganda By Nico Prucha and Ali Fisher 23 Rebellion, Development and Security in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas By Hassan Abbas and Shehzad H. Qazi 26 Peace with the FARC: Integrating Drug-Fueled Guerrillas into Alternative Development Programs? By Jorrit Kamminga People of Reyhanli chant slogans as riot police block them during the funerals of the victims of the May 11 car bombs. - STR/AFP/Getty or three decades, Turkey’s court-enforced blackout, but Turkish terrorist threat has been viewed authorities arrested nine Turkish 29 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity largely through the lens of men—believed to be linked to Syrian 32 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts Kurdish militancy. Yet just as intelligence groups—for their role in the Fone front closes down,1 a new hazard 4 attacks. has emerged, primarily as a result of the current war in Syria. On May 11, 2013, Mihrac Ural, an Alawite Turk from Hatay Turkey suffered the deadliest terrorist Province who has been an important pro- About the CTC Sentinel attack in its modern history when 52 Damascus militia figure in the conflict in The Combating Terrorism Center is an people were killed in twin car bombings Syria, has been widely blamed for the independent educational and research in Reyhanli, a town in Hatay Province bombings.
    [Show full text]
  • U.S. Counterterrorism Priorities and Challenges in Africa”
    Statement of Alexis Arieff Specialist in African Affairs Before Committee on Oversight and Reform Subcommittee on National Security U.S. House of Representatives Hearing on “U.S. Counterterrorism Priorities and Challenges in Africa” December 16, 2019 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov TE10044 Congressional Research Service 1 hairman Lynch, Ranking Member Hice, and Members of the Subcommittee: Thank you for inviting the Congressional Research Service to testify today. As requested, I will focus particular attention on current trends in West Africa’s Sahel region, which is within my C area of specialization at CRS, along with U.S. responses and considerations for congressional oversight. My testimony draws on the input of CRS colleagues who cover other parts of the continent and related issues. Introduction Islamist armed groups have proliferated and expanded their geographic presence in sub-Saharan Africa (“Africa,” unless noted) over the past decade.1 These groups employ terrorist tactics, and several have pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda or the Islamic State (IS, aka ISIS or ISIL) and operate across borders. Most, however, also operate as local insurgent movements that seek to attack and undermine state presence and control. Conflicts involving these groups have caused the displacement of millions of people in Africa and deepened existing development and security challenges. Local civilians and security forces have endured the overwhelming brunt of fatalities, as well as the devastating humanitarian impacts. Somalia, the Lake Chad Basin, and West Africa’s Sahel region have been most affected (Figure 1).2 The Islamic State also has claimed attacks as far afield as eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and northern Mozambique over the past year.3 The extent to which Islamist armed groups in Africa pose a threat to U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Algeria's Underused Potential in Security Cooperation in the Sahel
    DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES POLICY DEPARTMENT POLICY BRIEFING Algeria’s underused potential in security cooperation in the Sahel region Abstract Algeria is a regional power in both economic, political and military terms. Up to now, relations between the EU and Algeria have been mainly based on economic considerations. The crisis in Mali, the Franco-African military intervention (AFISMA) and the terrorist attacks at the gas facility In Amenas in eastern Algeria have opened a new window of opportunity for reinforced cooperation in the field of security between Algeria and the EU in order to combat common threats. Given its strong military power and political stature in the region, Algeria has the potential to develop into an important ally of the EU in the Sahel region. The probable transfer of presidential powers in Algeria will offer a chance for Algeria to reshape its policy in the region, as an assertive and constructive regional power not only in the Maghreb but also in West Africa. DG EXPO/B/PolDep/Note/2013_71 June 2013 PE 491.510 EN Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies This Policy Briefing is an initiative of the Policy Department, DG EXPO. AUTHORS: Martina LAGATTA, Ulrich KAROCK, Manuel MANRIQUE and Pekka HAKALA Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union Policy Department WIB 06 M 71 rue Wiertz 60 B-1047 Brussels Feedback to [email protected] is welcome. Editorial Assistant: Agnieszka PUNZET LINGUISTIC VERSIONS: Original: EN ABOUT THE PUBLISHER: Manuscript completed on 24 June 2013. © European Union, 2013 Printed inBelgium This Policy Briefing is available on the intranet site of the Directorate-General for External Policies, in the Regions and countries or Policy Areas section.
    [Show full text]
  • Zerohack Zer0pwn Youranonnews Yevgeniy Anikin Yes Men
    Zerohack Zer0Pwn YourAnonNews Yevgeniy Anikin Yes Men YamaTough Xtreme x-Leader xenu xen0nymous www.oem.com.mx www.nytimes.com/pages/world/asia/index.html www.informador.com.mx www.futuregov.asia www.cronica.com.mx www.asiapacificsecuritymagazine.com Worm Wolfy Withdrawal* WillyFoReal Wikileaks IRC 88.80.16.13/9999 IRC Channel WikiLeaks WiiSpellWhy whitekidney Wells Fargo weed WallRoad w0rmware Vulnerability Vladislav Khorokhorin Visa Inc. Virus Virgin Islands "Viewpointe Archive Services, LLC" Versability Verizon Venezuela Vegas Vatican City USB US Trust US Bankcorp Uruguay Uran0n unusedcrayon United Kingdom UnicormCr3w unfittoprint unelected.org UndisclosedAnon Ukraine UGNazi ua_musti_1905 U.S. Bankcorp TYLER Turkey trosec113 Trojan Horse Trojan Trivette TriCk Tribalzer0 Transnistria transaction Traitor traffic court Tradecraft Trade Secrets "Total System Services, Inc." Topiary Top Secret Tom Stracener TibitXimer Thumb Drive Thomson Reuters TheWikiBoat thepeoplescause the_infecti0n The Unknowns The UnderTaker The Syrian electronic army The Jokerhack Thailand ThaCosmo th3j35t3r testeux1 TEST Telecomix TehWongZ Teddy Bigglesworth TeaMp0isoN TeamHav0k Team Ghost Shell Team Digi7al tdl4 taxes TARP tango down Tampa Tammy Shapiro Taiwan Tabu T0x1c t0wN T.A.R.P. Syrian Electronic Army syndiv Symantec Corporation Switzerland Swingers Club SWIFT Sweden Swan SwaggSec Swagg Security "SunGard Data Systems, Inc." Stuxnet Stringer Streamroller Stole* Sterlok SteelAnne st0rm SQLi Spyware Spying Spydevilz Spy Camera Sposed Spook Spoofing Splendide
    [Show full text]
  • 11 July 2006 Mumbai Train Bombings
    11 July 2006 Mumbai train bombings July 2006 Mumbai train bombings One of the bomb-damaged coaches Location Mumbai, India Target(s) Mumbai Suburban Railway Date 11 July 2006 18:24 – 18:35 (UTC+5.5) Attack Type Bombings Fatalities 209 Injuries 714 Perpetrator(s) Terrorist outfits—Student Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT; These are alleged perperators as legal proceedings have not yet taken place.) Map showing the 'Western line' and blast locations. The 11 July 2006 Mumbai train bombings were a series of seven bomb blasts that took place over a period of 11 minutes on the Suburban Railway in Mumbai (formerly known as Bombay), capital city of the Indian state of Maharashtra and India's financial capital. 209 people lost their lives and over 700 were injured in the attacks. Details The bombs were placed on trains plying on the western line of the suburban ("local") train network, which forms the backbone of the city's transport network. The first blast reportedly took place at 18:24 IST (12:54 UTC), and the explosions continued for approximately eleven minutes, until 18:35, during the after-work rush hour. All the bombs had been placed in the first-class "general" compartments (some compartments are reserved for women, called "ladies" compartments) of several trains running from Churchgate, the city-centre end of the western railway line, to the western suburbs of the city. They exploded at or in the near vicinity of the suburban railway stations of Matunga Road, Mahim, Bandra, Khar Road, Jogeshwari, Bhayandar and Borivali.
    [Show full text]
  • Deadly Attack on a Gold Mining City, Burkina Faso 10 June 2021 Sentinel-1 CSAR IW Acquired on 08 April 2015 at 18:11:17 UTC
    Sentinel Vision EVT-883 Deadly attack on a gold mining city, Burkina Faso 10 June 2021 Sentinel-1 CSAR IW acquired on 08 April 2015 at 18:11:17 UTC ... Se ntinel-1 CSAR IW acquired on 30 May 2021 from 18:11:21 to 18:12:11 UTC Sentinel-2 MSI acquired on 31 May 2021 at 10:15:59 UTC Sentinel-2 MSI acquired on 05 June 2021 at 10:20:21 UTC Author(s): Sentinel Vision team, VisioTerra, France - [email protected] 2D Layerstack Keyword(s): Security, natural ressources, mine, climate change, Burkina Faso Fig. 1 - S2 (31.05.2021) - On 5 June 2021, the village of Solhan in Burkina Faso was again attacked by armed assailants. 2D view Fig. 2 - S2 (31.05.2021) - At least 174 people have been killed in this mining community located near the border with Niger. 2D view Burkina Faso mourns after at least attackers killed 174 people in the village of Solhan. Elian Peltier of the New-York Times reports: "Armed assailants killed more than 100 people in an attack on a village in northern Burkina Faso, the government said on Saturday, burning houses and leaving many more injured in one of the deadliest assaults the West African nation has seen in years." Fig. 3 - S2 (02.05.2016) - The rise of artisanal mining (circles) between 2016 & 2021 led the city (rectangle) to grow quickly. 2D animation 2D view "The attackers struck early Saturday [5 June] morning, first at a gold mine near the village of Sobha, near the border with Niger, according to Rida Lyammouri, a Washington-based expert, before then going after civilians." Radio France International details: "The attackers also set fire to vehicles and shops after looting everything they could.
    [Show full text]
  • Freedom of the Press
    Libya freedomhouse.org /report/freedom-press/2014/libya Freedom of the Press Status change explanation: Libya declined from Partly Free to Not Free due to the impact of the deteriorating security situation on journalists and other members of the press, who suffered a spate of threats, kidnappings, and attacks in 2013, often at the hands of nonstate actors. There was also an increased use of Qadhafi-era penal and civil codes to bring defamation cases against journalists, with one reporter facing up to 15 years in prison for alleging judicial corruption. Although the overthrow of longtime leader Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi led to a dramatic opening in the political and media environments in 2011, conditions for press freedom in Libya deteriorated in 2013. The new Libyan government—composed of the legislative assembly, or General National Congress (GNC), and a cabinet headed by Prime Minister Ali Zeidan—failed to establish security and the rule of law. Various semiautonomous militias, which control different parts of the country, continued to assert themselves, employing increasingly violent tactics and contributing to an unstable operating environment for journalists, especially in the restive eastern city of Benghazi. In September, after a long delay, the High National Election Commission announced that it would hold elections in early 2014 for the Constituent Assembly, the body tasked with drafting a permanent constitution. The governing legal document during 2013 remained the Draft Constitutional Charter for the Transitional Stage, adopted during the 2011 civil war, which guarantees several fundamental human rights. For example, Article 13 stipulates “freedom of opinion for individuals and groups, freedom of scientific research, freedom of communication, liberty of press, printing, publication and mass media.” While these provisions are a positive start, they do not fully reflect international standards for freedom of expression.
    [Show full text]
  • Violent Radicalization Jamie Bartlett a & Carl Miller a a Violence and Extremism Programme , Demos, London, UK Published Online: 06 Dec 2011
    This article was downloaded by: [UVA Universiteitsbibliotheek SZ] On: 16 March 2015, At: 07:25 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Terrorism and Political Violence Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ftpv20 The Edge of Violence: Towards Telling the Difference Between Violent and Non- Violent Radicalization Jamie Bartlett a & Carl Miller a a Violence and Extremism Programme , Demos, London, UK Published online: 06 Dec 2011. To cite this article: Jamie Bartlett & Carl Miller (2012) The Edge of Violence: Towards Telling the Difference Between Violent and Non-Violent Radicalization, Terrorism and Political Violence, 24:1, 1-21, DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2011.594923 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2011.594923 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.
    [Show full text]
  • After the Arab Uprisings the Prospects for a Media That Serves the Public Alexandra Buccianti and Sarah El-Richani
    POLICY BRIEFING #14 SEPTEMBER 2015 After the Arab uprisings The prospects for a media that serves the public Alexandra Buccianti and Sarah el-Richani Sign up for our newsletter: www.bbcmediaaction.org AFTER THE ARAB UPRISINGS: THE PROSPECTS FOR A MEDIA THAT SERVES THE PUBLIC Contents Abbreviations 2 Executive summary 3 Introduction Beyond the Arab Spring 5 Part 1 The Arab media context 6 Part 2 Parallel worlds, virtual islands: The new politics of media in the Arab world 9 Part 3 Public service values: Diversity, universality and social cohesion 12 Part 4 The national broadcaster: Infrastructure, reach and culture 15 Part 5 Case studies 18 Libya: Few voices rise above the sound of the battle? 18 Egypt: Political polarisation and the endless promise of reform 21 Lebanon: Sowing social cohesion? 24 Tunisia: Reform in process 27 Part 6 Conclusions, recommendations and the case for institutional reform 30 Appendix List of interviews conducted 32 Endnotes 33 Front cover A woman watches Abbreviations from a balcony as demonstrators gather ACA Authority for Audio-visual Communication LBCI Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation in Tahrir Square, (Tunisia) International Cairo, in May 2011 PETER MACDIARMID/ ERTU Egyptian Radio and Television Union MBC Middle East Broadcasting Corporation GETTY IMAGES GCC Gulf Co-operation Council NAVC National Audio-Visual Council (Lebanon) HAICA Independent High Authority for Audiovisual OPT Occupied Palestinian Territories Communication TTV Tunisian Television INRIC National Body for the Reform of Information UEA United
    [Show full text]
  • Countering Violent Extremism the Counter Narrative Study
    ! COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM THE COUNTER NARRATIVE STUDY “Countering the Narratives of Violent Extremism FOREWORD The Achilles’ heel of our strategy against terrorism and violent extremism has been the failure to counter the narratives that groups use to recruit. As long as groups attract a steady stream of new members, the terrorism and violence will continue. This is why the strategy known as Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) is so important, and must be used as a counterterrorism tool alongside military, intelligence, and law enforcement operations. Through our partnership with the Qatar International Academy for Security Studies (QIASS), we offer critical guidance to those wishing to counter the narratives of violence and extremism. “Countering Violent Extremism: The Counter-Narrative Study” is the result of a year- long research project conducted by our team of former top law enforcement, intelligence, and counterterrorism officials. We traveled around the world, from Malaysia to Kenya to Norway to Northern Ireland to the United States, studying extremist and terrorist groups and interviewing their members, as well as those in government and other important stakeholders responsible for tackling the problem. As you will see from our “Findings,” we’ve put together some essential lessons. One of the most important takeaways is understanding the pattern(s) behind group recruitment. Terrorist and extremist groups first prey on local grievances—exploiting feelings of anger, humiliation, resentment, or lack of purpose. They then incorporate, into their violent pronouncements, conspiratorial messages that blame those they are targeting. Self-proclaimed religious groups use distorted religious edicts in their narratives. Recruiters achieve success by providing both answers and a sense of purpose to vulnerable individuals.
    [Show full text]