Countering Violent Extremism the Counter Narrative Study

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Countering Violent Extremism the Counter Narrative Study ! COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM THE COUNTER NARRATIVE STUDY “Countering the Narratives of Violent Extremism FOREWORD The Achilles’ heel of our strategy against terrorism and violent extremism has been the failure to counter the narratives that groups use to recruit. As long as groups attract a steady stream of new members, the terrorism and violence will continue. This is why the strategy known as Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) is so important, and must be used as a counterterrorism tool alongside military, intelligence, and law enforcement operations. Through our partnership with the Qatar International Academy for Security Studies (QIASS), we offer critical guidance to those wishing to counter the narratives of violence and extremism. “Countering Violent Extremism: The Counter-Narrative Study” is the result of a year- long research project conducted by our team of former top law enforcement, intelligence, and counterterrorism officials. We traveled around the world, from Malaysia to Kenya to Norway to Northern Ireland to the United States, studying extremist and terrorist groups and interviewing their members, as well as those in government and other important stakeholders responsible for tackling the problem. As you will see from our “Findings,” we’ve put together some essential lessons. One of the most important takeaways is understanding the pattern(s) behind group recruitment. Terrorist and extremist groups first prey on local grievances—exploiting feelings of anger, humiliation, resentment, or lack of purpose. They then incorporate, into their violent pronouncements, conspiratorial messages that blame those they are targeting. Self-proclaimed religious groups use distorted religious edicts in their narratives. Recruiters achieve success by providing both answers and a sense of purpose to vulnerable individuals. It is critical, therefore, that when countering their narratives we employ the most effective medium, message, and messenger. We have also seen that terrorists and extremists are, in many ways, in a stronger position today than in the past. The Internet and social media provide avenues for recruiting new members and disseminating terrorists’ and extremists’ messages. Previously concentrated in Afghanistan and Pakistan, today al-Qaeda’s counterculture is found as far afield as Nigeria and Southeast Asia. This 4 also explains the increase in homegrown terrorism in the West—seen tragically on April 15, 2013, at the Boston Marathon in the United States, and on May 22, 2013, on the streets of London. We are proud to launch the study at the first ever Global Town Hall on Countering the Narratives of Extremism, being held simultaneously in four cities—New York, Belfast, Singapore, and Dakar—on September 9, 2013. The event brings together world leaders, global counterterrorism officials, and subject matter experts, highlighting the findings of the study and its crucial lessons. This study not only offers guidance to those committed to countering the narratives of extremism but will, we hope, change the way that stakeholders see and confront this problem on a broader level. Ali Soufan 5 PARTICIPANTS RUDOLPH ATALLAH BARRY MCMANUS Senior Fellow, Vice President, Atlantic Council Africa Center Abraxas Corporation DON BORELLI THOMAS NEER Chief Operating Officer, Senior Associate The Soufan Group The Soufan Group KAREN GREENBERG GHASSAN SCHBLEY Director, National Security Project Associate, Center on National Security, RAND Corporation Fordham Law School UN Panel of Experts on Sudan STEVE KLEINMAN SUSAN SIM Director of Strategic Research, Vice President for Asia, The Soufan Group The Soufan Group KIERAN MCEVOY ALI SOUFAN Professor of Law & Transitional Chairman & CEO, Justice, The Soufan Group Director of Research, School of Law, Queens University STEPHEN WHITE, OBE Belfast Vice President for Europe, The Soufan Group ROBERT MCFADDEN Senior UK Police Officer Senior Vice President The Soufan Group 6 TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary 8. Key Findings 11. United Kingdom 17. Northern Ireland 27. Sweden 44. Norway 63. United States: Somali-American Community in Minnesota 79. Uganda 92. Kenya 103. Malaysia. 122. Indonesia 141. Singapore 154. Nigeria, West Africa, and the Sahel 170. Conclusion 193. Acknowledgments 195. Annex One 196. 7 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This Qatar International Academy for Security Studies’ Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) project, “The Counter-Narrative Study,” continues the work of our previous CVE project, “Risk Reduction for Countering Violent Extremism,” which examined strategic approaches to counterterrorism across multiple countries. This study builds on the previous QIASS research by revisiting some of the strategies identified in the first report and assessing additional strategies along with new and emerging cases. The focus of this report is the identification of efforts to counter the narrative of violent extremists. In Europe: Our team revisited London and Belfast, while Sweden and Norway were added as case studies. Site visits to Africa included Kenya and Uganda. Another team visited the twin cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul in the United States to assess the Somali-American community, in which over a dozen young men have left to join al-Shabaab, an al-Qaeda–affiliated group in Somalia. This case, while not a country study, is focused on a local, at-risk community within a country. There are additional communities that have likewise been identified as having risk potential. Within them are South Asian and Middle Eastern non-citizens committed to a violent form of political Islam, or their version of jihad; citizens from a variety of backgrounds who were raised and radicalized in the United States, and who might target U.S. officials and citizens in the name of putative jihadist causes; and citizens and residents from a range of backgrounds who go abroad to fight in the name of jihad. Throughout the Counter Narrative Study there is reference to ongoing concern about homegrown terrorists who are motivated by extremism on the radical right, such as neo-Nazi ideology, as well as left-wing organizations. This report also includes results of site visits to nations 8 with recently developed and maturing CVE programs and with large majority Muslim populations: Indonesia and Malaysia. Though not included as a site visit during this phase of CVE research, Singapore is included in the study; we report on its unique approach—and successes—in countering the narrative of violence. As part of this phase of the multiyear project, two Visiting Scholar research works were published: “Community Engagement Programmes in Europe,” by Stephen White and Kieran McEvoy; and “Leveraging Terrorist Dropouts to Counter Violent Extremism in Southeast Asia,” by Susan Sim. This report acknowledges the need for—and relevance of—a thorough review and assessment of the effectiveness of the counter-narrative programs detailed in this study. The majority of countries and officials we engaged with told us that their programs were in some nascent stage, and that statistical data was just beginning to be compiled, or the programs had not established criteria for gauging effectiveness. Our first CVE study identified many different approaches for the prevention and reduction of risk and focused specifically on disrupting engagement and reengagement in terrorist activities. The main theme for Counter Narratives Study team continues to be prevention—but with a specific focus on countering the (extremist) narrative as a means of preventing engagement in terrorism. 9 KEY FINDINGS While governments across the world have had many notable successes against extremist and terrorist groups, there is a growing realization at the highest levels that in one key area they have fallen short: in countering the narratives that inspire individuals to join such groups in the first place. This is costly. For as long as extremist narratives continue to inspire new recruits to join movements, the battle will continue for generations to come. This is why the strategic tool known as “countering violent extremism,” or CVE, is so important. It’s critical that governments utilize it alongside special operations and other important tactical weapons. Governments are now recognizing this, and there are many important lessons from across the world that they and others can learn. Our study offers many of these. Here are our top findings: +There is no cookie-cutter approach to countering the narratives of extremism. Tactics and methods need to vary not only from country to country but even within countries, and within different groups and communities. Extremist and terrorist groups tailor their recruitment methods based on the individuals, their location, and local grievances. They adapt their message to what is most likely to resonate. We need to do the same in countering them. The reasons people join groups differ radically from country to country. In some African countries, economic reasons factor highly. Elsewhere, it is religion. In other places it is tribal rivalries. Our strategies need to be similarly focused. Crafting broad messages about how “the West is not at war with Islam” is not effective. 10 +It’s easier for extremists to recruit today than ever before, thanks to the Internet and the spread of social media tools. This is a large part of why self- radicalization, and the phenomenon of the “lone wolf terrorist,” is on the rise. The Internet and social media tools have helped extremist narratives spread further afield. Today, for example, al-Qaeda’s counterculture, once centered
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