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The Renewed Threat of Terrorism to Turkey

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The Renewed Threat of Terrorism to Turkey JUNE 2013 . VOL 6 . ISSUE 6 Contents The Renewed Threat of FEATURE ARTICLE 1 The Renewed Threat of Terrorism Terrorism to Turkey to Turkey By Stephen Starr By Stephen Starr REPORTS 4 The Local Face of Jihadism in Northern Mali By Andrew Lebovich 10 Boko Haram’s Evolving Tactics and Alliances in Nigeria By Jacob Zenn 16 A Profile of Khan Said: Waliur Rahman’s Successor in the Pakistani Taliban By Daud Khattak 19 Tweeting for the Caliphate: Twitter as the New Frontier for Jihadist Propaganda By Nico Prucha and Ali Fisher 23 Rebellion, Development and Security in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas By Hassan Abbas and Shehzad H. Qazi 26 Peace with the FARC: Integrating Drug-Fueled Guerrillas into Alternative Development Programs? By Jorrit Kamminga People of Reyhanli chant slogans as riot police block them during the funerals of the victims of the May 11 car bombs. - STR/AFP/Getty or three decades, Turkey’s court-enforced blackout, but Turkish terrorist threat has been viewed authorities arrested nine Turkish 29 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity largely through the lens of men—believed to be linked to Syrian 32 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts Kurdish militancy. Yet just as intelligence groups—for their role in the Fone front closes down,1 a new hazard 4 attacks. has emerged, primarily as a result of the current war in Syria. On May 11, 2013, Mihrac Ural, an Alawite Turk from Hatay Turkey suffered the deadliest terrorist Province who has been an important pro- About the CTC Sentinel attack in its modern history when 52 Damascus militia figure in the conflict in The Combating Terrorism Center is an people were killed in twin car bombings Syria, has been widely blamed for the independent educational and research in Reyhanli, a town in Hatay Province bombings. Operating from Syria, where institution based in the Department of Social close to the Syrian border.2 The attack he commands a shabiha5 militia group, Sciences at the United States Military Academy, was not broadly reported or analyzed Ural presents a real and pressing threat West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses by Turkish media outlets3 following a to Turkey’s security today. This article the Center’s global network of scholars and analyzes the background and activities practitioners to understand and confront of Mihrac Ural,6 the recent anti-Turkish contemporary threats posed by terrorism and 1 Constanze Letsch, “Kurds Dare to Hope as PKK Fight- other forms of political violence. ers’ Ceasefire with Turkey Takes Hold,” Guardian, May 7, 2013. 22, 2013. 2 Matthew Weaver, “Turkey Blames Syria over Reyhanli 4 Kareem Fahim and Sebnem Arsu, “Arrests and Calls for The views expressed in this report are those of Bombings,” Guardian, May 12, 2013. Calm in Turkey,” New York Times, May 12, 2013. the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, 3 Karabekir Akkoyunlu, “Driven to Distraction,” The Ma- 5 Shabiha are Alawite militias that fight on behalf of the the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government. jalla, May 16, 2013; “Bombings Receive Scant Coverage in Syrian state. Turkish Media, Fueling Anger,” Wall Street Journal, May 6 Known in Syria by the name Ali Kyali, more informa- 1 JUNE 2013 . VOL 6. ISSUE 6 operations of the Revolutionary People’s forced its largely Sunni, pro-revolution before reportedly being offered Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C), and refugee population from their town.10 citizenship by the Syrian government, the effects of the Syria conflict on the An International Crisis Group report planned the attack.15 According to the security of the Republic of Turkey. It from April 2013 further identified the Turkish newspaper Zaman, he bribed finds that the increasing destruction of numerous points of contention between Adana prison guards to win his freedom the Syrian state will likely contribute refugees and rebel fighters and the in 1980 before fleeing to Syria.16 When to new terrorist threats against Turkey, resident population in Hatay. “Several Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leader forcing Ankara to recalibrate its security camps and the areas around them are Abdullah Ocalan was exiled in Syria and counterterrorism policies. frequently used by Syrian opposition between 1980 and 1998, he and Ural fighters, in large part Sunni Muslim, were reportedly acquaintances, sharing Syria Violence Spilling into Turkey as off-duty resting places to visit their a common enemy in the Turkish state.17 The Turkish government’s open families, receive medical services and financial and political support for the purchase supplies,” the report stated. Mihrac Ural is the current leader of Syrian political opposition and rebels “This is exacerbating sensitive ethnic the Urgent Ones (Acilciler),18 a splinter fighting the Bashar al-Assad regime has and sectarian balances, particularly in group from the Turkish People’s angered many Turks, with opposition Hatay Province, where more than one Liberation Party/Front (THKP/C).19 political parties and religious minorities third of the population is of Arab Alevi Acilciler formed in 1975 seeking the the most critical of these voices. Among descent [Turkish Alawites] and directly the latter, Turkey’s estimated 400,000 related to Syria’s Alawites.”11 ethnic Arab Alawite population—which “The threat to Turkey’s shares the same religious beliefs as the In an attempt to ease tensions, on May southern regions will ruling al-Assad family—is an important 25, two weeks after the bombings, constituency, as many support the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip increase the longer the war Syrian regime.7 Erdogan visited Reyhanli, stating: “We in Syria continues.” have not been, are not, and will not be Although the economy in Turkey’s abandoning you as a government or as Hatay Province has largely managed a state. I simply have this favor to ask to absorb the effects of the war over of you: do not give a premium to those return of Hatay Province to Syria.20 the border in Syria,8 sectarian and organizations exploiting this situation Inside Syria today, Ural is believed religious hostility is a major source of trying to create discord amongst us.”12 to be the commander of the “Syrian discord. Festering unease between the Resistance”—an Alawite militia based mostly Sunni refugees fleeing from In spite of Erdogan’s request, there along the Alawite-dominated western Syria’s Aleppo and Idlib provinces remains a feeling of historical coast.21 This militia has been blamed for and the Alawite communities in discrimination against Turkish Alawites a number of massacres in Sunni villages Turkey’s Hatay Province have pitted by elements of the Turkish state, which in Syria’s coastal regions, with Ural Alawite and Alevi Turks living in under the specter of war in Syria has threatening to “cleanse” at least one of Hatay and other southern Turkish pulled the community toward the al- the towns.22 provinces against both Syrian Assad regime and away from Ankara’s refugees and rebels.9 In September 13 own policies and goals. One key 15 Landis; Ismail Saymaz, “Head of Accused Group De- 2012, for example, the mostly Alawite Turkish dissident who has capitalized nies Responsibility, Blames Israel for Reyhanlı Bomb At- community of Samandag in Hatay on these tensions is Mihrac Ural. tack,” Hurriyet, May 14, 2013. 16 Aydin Albayrak, “Mihrac Ural, a Man with a Long The Case of Mihrac Ural tion on his background is available at Joshua Landis, “Do History of Terrorism,” Today’s Zaman, May 14, 2013. the Massacres in Bayda and Banyas Portend to Ethnic Although Turkey detained nine 17 Ibid. Cleansing to Create an Alawite State?” SyriaComment, Turkish citizens following the 18 Abdullah Bozkurt, “Role of Iran and Syria in THKP/C May 13, 2013. Reyhanli bombings, one figure, Terrorism Against Turkey,” Today’s Zaman, September 7 Turkey’s Alevi population number around 10-15% of Mihrac Ural, has emerged as a primary 21, 2012. 14 the population and are distinct from Turkish Alawites, suspect. A number of sources have 19 The Turkish People’s Liberation Party/Front the latter being Arab and not Turk. Turkish Alevis and claimed that Ural, a Turkish Alawite (THKP/C), also known as the similarly-named Turkish Turkish Alawites (who are ethnic Arabs) share similar who fled to Syria in the early 1980s People’s Liberation Front, is a communist/socialist mili- belief systems. See Soner Cagaptay, “Are Syrian Alawi- tia group that was influential among Turkish leftists in tes and Turkish Alevis the Same?” CNN, April 17, 2012. 10 William Booth, “In Turkey, Alawite Sect Sides with late 1960s/early 1970s. It is viewed as a founding organi- 8 Didem Collinsworth, “Hatay: The Syrian Crisis and Syria’s Assad,” Washington Post, September 14, 2012. zation for a series of leftist splinter groups, including the a Case of Turkish Economic Resilience,” Turkish Policy 11 “Blurring the Borders: Syrian Spillover Risks for Tur- DHKP/C, although it is no longer thought to be an active Quarterly 12:1 (2013): pp. 119-124. key,” International Crisis Group, April 30, 2013. organization in Turkey. 9 “Alawite Turks” are Turkish nationals, but they are 12 “Prime Minister Erdogan Visits Bomb-Hit Reyhanli- 20 For a brief background with context of the Syrian ethnic Arabs. Turkish Alevis and Alawite Turks have UPDATED,” WorldBulletin.net, May 25, 2013. conflict, see Hugh Eakin, “Will Syria’s Revolt Disrupt similar belief systems but they are different in a number 13 Stephen Schwartz, “Erdogan, Iran, Syrian Alawites, the Turkish Borderlands?” New York Review of Books, of other ways. Both communities are in conflict with flee- and Turkey Alevis,” Weekly Standard, March 29, 2012. June 24, 2011. ing Syrian refugees and rebels in Hatay Province.
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