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Algerian Spring? BRIEFING PAPER Number CBP 8578, 23 May 2019 By Ben Smith Algerian spring? Contents: 1. 2011 and its aftermath 2. Street protests in 2019 3. Regional perspective 4. Outlook www.parliament.uk/commons-library | intranet.parliament.uk/commons-library | [email protected] | @commonslibrary 2 Algerian spring? Contents Summary 3 1. 2011 and its aftermath 5 Algerian stability 5 Oil price fall in 2014 5 Interest groups blocking reform? 6 Fear of instability 6 Moving on from the independence generation 7 2. Street protests in 2019 8 “Dramatic purge” 8 Continuing demonstrations 9 3. Regional perspective 11 Sudan 11 Morocco 11 Saudi Arabia and the Gulf 12 4. Outlook 13 2011 Mark II? 13 Cover page image copyright: Demonstrations in Algeria by Fethi Hamlati. Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International license / image cropped. 3 Commons Library Briefing, 23 May 2019 Summary Algeria has been one of the most stable countries in the Middle East and North Africa since the Arab uprisings of 2011. That has widely been attributed to fear of descending again into violence, after the vicious civil war of the 1990s. The relatively affluent government also bought stability by raising public spending. With the fall in oil prices around 2014, that strategy looked shaky. Sharp cuts to public spending in 2017 brought more people onto the streets than in 2011, as younger Algerians grew increasingly frustrated with squeezed living standards and massive youth unemployment. Protesters took aim at what they saw was unrepresentative government, corruption and an economy that served the interests of those in power; they were no longer impressed by the ruling generation’s rule in the independence struggle against France, which ended in 1962. In 2019, the protests that had begun in 2017 surged, with thousands taking to the streets in cities all over Algeria. By March 2019, tens of thousands were marching in Algiers, the capital. The authorities responded by cancelling Bouteflika’s election run and standing him down on health grounds. Fresh elections were set for 4 July but, as the demonstrations had not stopped, further steps were taken, with the Chief of Staff General Salah increasingly emerging as the most powerful figure. In April, there was a dramatic purge, with some of Algeria’s richest and most powerful men arrested or sacked from their positions, as the military tried to assuage the protesters’ demands. In the region The demonstrations have persuaded some commentators that the “Arab street” has become more vocal again. The fall of Omar al-Bashir in Sudan, similarly after prolonged massive demonstrations, also strengthened the impression of resurging demands for change. In Morocco there have been big demonstrations against the government in the capital, Rabat, and in the northern city of al-Hoceima. The power struggles have attracted the attention of powerful outside forces: Saudi Arabia and its allies the UAE, Egypt and Bahrain are concerned about developments in Algeria – and particularly whether it heralds a new “Arab Spring”. The Saudi group is also concerned about Sudan continuing a drift towards their rivals, Qatar and Turkey. Outlook The outlook for Algeria is uncertain – demonstrations continue, despite concessions from the authorities. The military appears to be trying hard to end the demonstrations without violence, but that attempt might not last indefinitely. If the stand-off in Algeria ends with bloody suppression, that might signal that any reborn reform movement, such as the one that rocked the region in 2011, had been strangled at birth. In any case, the situation has changed since 2011. After Libyan, Egyptian and Syrian uprisings ended in chaos and violence, external supporters of reform are more reluctant and the internal proponents of security and stability are strengthened. 4 Algerian spring? People in many countries of the region, however, still suffer from the problems that originally drove the uprisings of 2011: unrepresentative government, corruption, lack of economic opportunities, particularly for the young, and poverty. The present unrest underlines that those problems are far from being resolved. They may indeed be getting worse. 5 Commons Library Briefing, 23 May 2019 1. 2011 and its aftermath Algerian stability In 2011 and during the succeeding few years Algeria remained a special case in the Middle East and North Africa. It had conducted a serious experiment with democracy in 1991 and, when the military could not accept the likely victory by the Islamists and cancelled the election, a vicious civil war ensued, resulting in the deaths of more than 100,000 people. Even this paled compared with the war of independence from France from 1954 to 1962, where estimates of the number of dead range from some 350,000 to 1.5 million.1 Fear of a return to such levels of violence is thought to have played a part in keeping Algeria relatively peaceful. In 2011 the Bouteflika government ended the state of emergency that Increased public had been in place for 19 years and increased public spending by around spending 10% over the existing plan,2 increasing subsidies for basic goods and helping create new jobs in the first half of 2011.3 There were nevertheless some large pro-democracy demonstrations, to which the government responded with some generally cosmetic consultation exercises on further reform. A relatively effective counterterrorism policy also helped produce a steady decline in terrorist-related fatalities, which fell from 153 in 2009 to nine in 2016.4 The picture of Algeria as an oasis of stability seemed complete. Oil price fall in 2014 That stability looked increasingly threatened after 2014, however. Low oil prices seriously exacerbated economic problems, worsening the dissatisfaction among the relatively well-educated and growing young population that lacks decent job opportunities. About 70% of the population is under 30. Austerity programme 2017 The Government introduced an austerity policy in 2017, increasing taxes and reducing subsidies. These further reduced standards of living and More protests in added to the general discontent; there were more protests in 2017 than 2017 than 2011 in 2011, the year of the Arab uprisings. In the 2018 budget, the government backed off austerity policies and increased spending again.5 1 Algerian war, Wikipedia 2 Louisa Driss-Ait Hammadouche, L'Algérie face au « printemps arabe » : l'équilibre par la neutralisation des contestations’, Confluences Méditerranée 2012/2 (N°81), pp55 - 67 3 “Plus de 1 million d'emplois créés”, L’Expression (Algeria), 10 August 2011 4 Dalia Ghanem-Yazbeck, ‘Specter of jihadism continues to haunt Maghreb’, Middle East Institute, September 2018 5 ‘Algerian government pursues high spending for 2019 as it eyes elections’, Arab Weekly, 16 September 2016 6 Algerian spring? Interest groups blocking reform? The opacity of Algeria’s governing system makes it easier for a class of oligarchs to organise the economy to favour their own interests.6 This powerful business class, dependent on the State, is an obstacle to the thoroughgoing reforms that many commentators think are necessary to diversify the economy away from hydrocarbons and create more jobs. The close relationship between powerful economic actors and the state has led to severe corruption – another interest to be protected. Algeria’s ranking in Transparency International’s 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index was poor and significantly worse than the average for the region. In a recent paper, the International Crisis Group suggested that the Government needs to be more open with the people on economic challenges, and to focus on more economic inclusion, especially for young people.7 Fear of instability One reason for what has widely been described as political and Will acceptance of economic “paralysis” is that Algerians remember the civil war of the authoritarian 1990s, when hundreds of thousands died in battles between the State government last? and violent jihadi groups. Algerians seemed to have accepted an authoritarian government that offers stability, after the disaster of the civil war that lasted from 1991 to 2002. Algeria’s border with Libya has been officially closed since 2014 because of Algerian concerns that arms and unrest could spread from Libya. While Algeria has had success in combating terrorism within its borders the threat is clear. The In Amenas hostage crisis in 2013 demonstrated the possibility of serious terrorist attacks within Algeria. Algeria is also surrounded by instability and violent jihadi groups, particularly to the east, in Libya, and to the south, in Niger and Mali. Smuggling and hostage-taking are traditional methods of income generation in the Sahara and have been used to fund terrorism. In the context of US withdrawal of counterterrorism operations in West Africa, instability in Algeria could be particularly concerning. Memories of the civil war among the growing younger generation are fading, however, and may no longer be enough to counter dissatisfaction with daily life. One analyst said in November 2018: The collapse of purchasing power, daily difficulties and the provocations of officials have turned many Algerians against the regime. There are signs we are sitting atop a volcano. You can sense it in chants against the regime in football stadiums, in protests in the south and in strikes.8 6 ‘Algeria’s Entwined Economic and Political Policy’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 13 October 2017 7 ‘Breaking Algeria’s Economic Paralysis’, International Crisis Group, 19 November 2018 8 ‘Bouteflika heads for fifth term as Algeria economy worsens’, Financial Times, 19 November 2018 7 Commons Library Briefing, 23 May 2019 Moving on from the independence generation Probably the biggest threat to the country is achieving a peaceful transition from the present leadership generation, which derives legitimacy from its role the liberation struggle from France, culminating in 1962. Algeria has a more complex system of power than many other countries in the region,9 although the military remains probably the strongest actor.
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