House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee

The UK’s response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa

Seventh Report of Session 2013–14

Volume II

HC 86-II

The Foreign Affairs Committee

The Foreign Affairs Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and its associated agencies.

Current membership

Rt Hon Sir Richard Ottaway (Conservative, Croydon South) (Chair) Mr John Baron (Conservative, Basildon and Billericay) Rt Hon Sir Menzies Campbell (Liberal Democrat, North East Fife) Rt Hon Ann Clwyd (Labour, Cynon Valley) Mike Gapes (Labour/Co-op, Ilford South) Mark Hendrick (Labour/Co-op, Preston) Sandra Osborne (Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock) Andrew Rosindell (Conservative, Romford) Mr Frank Roy (Labour, Motherwell and Wishaw) Rt Hon Sir John Stanley (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling) Rory Stewart (Conservative, Penrith and The Border)

The following Members were also members of the Committee during the parliament:

Rt Hon Bob Ainsworth (Labour, Coventry North East) Emma Reynolds (Labour, Wolverhampton North East) Mr Dave Watts (Labour, St Helens North)

Powers

The Committee is one of the departmental select committees, the powers of which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No 152. These are available on the internet via www.parliament.uk.

Publication The Reports and evidence of the Committee are published by The Stationery Office by Order of the House. All publications of the Committee (including news items) are on the internet at www.parliament.uk/facom. A list of Reports of the Committee in the present Parliament is at the front of this volume.

Committee staff

The current staff of the Committee are Kenneth Fox (Clerk), Peter McGrath (Second Clerk), Zoe Oliver-Watts (Senior Committee Specialist), Dr Brigid Fowler (Committee Specialist), Louise Glen (Senior Committee Assistant), Su Panchanathan (Committee Assistant), and Alex Paterson (Media Officer).

Contacts All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Commons, London SW1A 0AA. The telephone number for general enquiries is 020 7219 6105; the Committee’s email address is [email protected].

The UK’s response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa 5

Witnesses

Tuesday 21 May 2013 Page

Imad Mesdoua, Political Analyst, Pasco Risk Management, and Professor Paul Rogers, Professor of Peace Studies, Bradford University; Jon Marks, Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House Ev 1

Tuesday 25 June 2013

Professor Michael Clarke, Director General, Royal United Services Institute; Sir Richard Gozney, former UK High Commissioner to Nigeria and former UK Permanent Representative to the Economic Community of West African States; Virginia Comolli, Research Associate for Transnational Threats, the International Institute for Strategic Studies Ev 15

Tuesday 8 October 2013

Lynne Featherstone, Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Department for International Development, Susanna Moorehead, Director, Western and Southern Africa, Department for International Development, and Mark Bowman, Director-General, Humanitarian, Security, Conflict and International Finance, Department for International Development Ev 33

Tuesday 11 November 2013

Rt Hon Hugh Robertson MP, Minister of State, Samantha Job, Head of North Africa Department, Tim Morris, Head, Sahel Taskforce and Whitehall Sahel Co-ordinator,and Simon Shercliff, Head of Counter-Terrorism Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Ev 40

Tuesday 3 December 2013

Mark Simmonds MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Tim Morris, Head, Sahel Task Force and Whitehall Sahel Co-ordinator, and Catherine Inglehearn, Deputy Head of Africa Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Ev 51 List of printed written evidence

1 Professor Paul Rogers, Professor of Peace Studies, Bradford University Ev 59 2 Jon Marks, Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House Ev 62 3 Royal United Services Institute Ev 66 4 Sir Richard Gozney, former UK High Commissioner to Nigeria and former UK Permanent Representative to the Economic Community of West African States Ev 70 5 Department for International Development Ev 72

6 The UK’s response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa

6 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Ev 73; Ev 80; Ev 82; Ev 83; Ev 88

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Oral evidence

Taken before the Foreign Affairs Committee on Tuesday 21 May 2013

Members present: Richard Ottaway (Chair)

Mr John Baron Mark Hendrick Sir Menzies Campbell Mr Frank Roy Mike Gapes Sir John Stanley ______

Examination of Witnesses

Witnesses: Imad Mesdoua, Political Analyst, Pasco Risk Management, and Professor Paul Rogers, Professor of Peace Studies, Bradford University, gave evidence.

Q1 Chair: I welcome members of the public to this the towns, but in some of the mountainous areas; and, first evidence session in the Committee’s inquiry into perhaps most worrying of all, the early evidence that the UK response to extremism and political instability paramilitary elements from other countries have been in North and West Africa. moving into Mali. There was the incident two or three I am delighted to welcome our first two witnesses: days ago, in which four Egyptians were killed—one Professor Paul Rogers, who is professor of peace was quite well known—who had clearly been in Mali studies at Bradford university; and Mr Imad Mesdoua, for some time. That suggests that our fear that it might political analyst with Pasco Risk Management. Thank become a magnet for a wider group, quite apart from you both very much indeed for coming along. Is there the Tuareg who came across from Libya, may be anything you want to say by way of opening coming to pass. statement? Chair: We will probe that shortly. Professor Rogers: Just thank you for inviting us here Imad Mesdoua: I tend to agree. We have this afternoon. underestimated the complexity of the situation in Mali. One error that was and is currently being made Q2 Chair: My pleasure. May I start the ball rolling is that we tend to view the crisis in Mali in the sole by asking if Mali is a textbook example of good context of northern Mali, rather than looking at the international intervention, or is the jury still out? broader regional implications. We also tend to look at Professor Rogers: It is very much the case that the it in a very specific and limited timeline. We tend to jury is still out. I would be much happier if I were look at events in Mali starting from the coup or crisis able to look back from five years in the future. We are in 2012, but many of the problems facing the in the very early stages of what may develop in Mali international community in Mali and elsewhere in the and in its relationship to surrounding areas. At the Sahel go far back. The border issue, smuggling and moment, it looks like some progress is being made, drug trafficking, as well as drought and famine, go but one has to be very cautious. In particular, we are back decades. The Tuareg issue, as the professor coming into the hottest part of the year, when rightly noted, goes back at least 30 or 40 years. We traditionally there is much less movement; for that have, to a certain extent, underestimated the reason alone, there may be something of a hiatus. complexity of the problems in Mali at the moment. Imad Mesdoua: I tend to agree with what the professor said. Whether Mali will be seen as a success Q4 Chair: If the French had not intervened and the will depend to a large extent on how the elections go Islamic forces who were pushing south had taken in the month of July, and whether these elections are Bamako, what do you think the impact would have able to bring about a free and fair choice for the been on Britain’s interests, or the interests of Europe people of Mali and legitimate institutions, but also and the wider world? redefine the role of the military within Mali. Whether Imad Mesdoua: I think there would have been very it was a success will depend on the long-term serious consequences for western interests, not only objectives that are set out for the development of Mali in Mali but elsewhere. Mali is a key country, geo- and its political institutions, rather than just focusing strategically. Where it is situated is extremely on the security agenda that has been looked at thus far. important to western interests, and it is a key country for the stability of the broader Sahel region. You have Q3 Chair: Do you think we have underestimated the Mauritania, Niger, Algeria, Morocco and other complexity of it? countries that depend on the stability of that country Professor Rogers: I certainly think so, yes. It is a for them to be stable. That may explain Algeria’s combination of a number of different factors: the reluctance to get involved in the conflict. It would complexity of the ethnic make-up in northern Mali; have presented a major threat, especially in terms of the role particularly of the Tuareg; the relative roles security. I was at a talk a few months ago here in of Islamist tendencies; the extent to which the Islamist Parliament, where the key question was: is Mali the elements last year became quite embedded, not just in next Afghanistan? I think if the French had not cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:45] Job: 036016 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o001_MP FAC 21 05 13 corrected.xml

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21 May 2013 Imad Mesdoua andn Professor Paul Rogers intervened, we could probably have answered that Professor Rogers: On the question of the $4.2 billion, question with a “probably” or a “yes.” It would have that is indeed very welcome, but there is a proviso. become a haven for terrorist groups. When these kinds of pledges are made in this kind of Professor Rogers: One thing I would add is that the circumstance, it is not at all uncommon for there to French obviously intervened at relatively short notice. be double pledges—for countries basically to pledge It was clear that there was going to be foreign the same money in two different votes—and then the involvement from the ECOWAS states, probably this money actually is not delivered. The $4.2 billion, as coming September; that was the original possibility. it is now, is very good news, if it is implemented. I What is not clear is whether the movement of the think it is fair to say that the British overseas Islamist faction south was actually to have a chance development system is one of the best-regarded of taking Bamako, or whether it was to pre-empt any internationally, and one hopes that that would not be counter-move north. The information at the time a problem for Britain—in fact, I doubt that it would suggests that what they were about was moving south be—but it is a feature, when you have a number of to prevent one major airstrip from being in major pledges made by many countries, that the Government hands, so it is not clear that they would amount that actually gets delivered can be very much have gone as far as Bamako. If they had, I would less. We hope that it is not like that in this case. certainly agree with my colleague. Q6 Sir John Stanley: There are the Syrian refugees Q5 Sir John Stanley: You said that the jury was out right now, and the commitments that have not been as to whether the British intervention in Mali was a fulfilled there. good decision or a not-so-good decision, and I Professor Rogers: Precisely. understand entirely why you should have said that. Given that we are where we are, could you both tell Q7 Mr Baron: You both rightly say that the jury is us what you consider the British Government’s top out on Mali, and that we need to see how things policy priorities should be, as far as Mali is concerned, progress from here. Can you address the wider issue from now on? of whether the West’s involvement in Mali feeds into Professor Rogers: My own view is clearly that the a wider perception of Islam being under attack? Al- main requirement is to try, in the short term, to see Qaeda has been written off as a military force, yet it whether anything can be done to facilitate successful remains potent in a reasonable part of the Muslim elections. That is going to be particularly difficult in world. Part of that narrative, a number of the north, although there are some useful negotiations commentators are suggesting, is the one, spun by one apparently starting between the Government and some or two Muslim stations and the media, that Islam is of the northern groups. In the slightly longer term, under attack. To what extent do you think our one has to address the underlying problems. As my involvement in Mali feeds into that? Are there any colleague said, this is a long-term, historical problem. wider ramifications? It relates largely to the relative neglect of the north Professor Rogers: I think our involvement in Mali over a number of decades, so anything that can help will not feed into that too strongly, because our Mali, in terms of both promoting better governance involvement is relatively small. We do not officially and getting at the root of the underlying socio- have any combat forces there. We have assets, and we economic differences, I think would be of value. certainly have aided the French in their combat Where Britain can help, it should. It may not be a missions— priority for Britain, but Mali is a very significant country, and if it were really to fail as a state, the Q8 Mr Baron: Sorry, can I qualify my question? consequences would be serious. When I say “our”, I mean the West’s. Imad Mesdoua: I think the UK should be commended Professor Rogers: Certainly, as far as the West is already for what it has done in terms of helping Mali, concerned, yes. That will relate primarily to France at notably in the conference that was recently held on present. If you look at the entire picture across the helping the country to find funds to run its state, world, one tends to forget that from a radical Islamist because this is the major issue. I think $4.22 billion perspective, it is all part of a single picture. It is was put in by a large group of donors, and the UK absolutely correct that al-Qaeda as a central, provided quite a bit of assistance. hierarchical organised entity has been hugely One major thing I would add that the UK can and diminished, not least over the past three or four years, should be helping out with is the issue of policing because of the impact of the special forces and drone borders and intelligence sharing. That is a key issue attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but as a potent that is to a certain extent being overlooked by the idea, it is a very different measure, and that goes from French as they turn their attention towards mediating the Caucasus Emirate through to the Swahili coast, to talks between the MNLA and the Government, and as Yemen, Somalia, then parts of West and North Africa they focus on the Islamic insurgency. One thing the and, of course, pre-eminently at present, Iraq and UK can do is come into the region and the country Syria. There is this perception—a minority perception, and talk with their Malian counterparts about sharing but a significant one—that Islam is under attack. It is intelligence and providing the material to gather a mirror image of the view that you get in western intelligence and monitor and police the borders, quarters that Islam is the threat. It is powerful and bringing British expertise to a country that needs potent, and is aided a lot by the 24-hour news specifically these key things to maintain security and channels, and particularly the social media, and the to help these elections go smoothly. way propaganda can spread so rapidly. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:45] Job: 036016 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o001_MP FAC 21 05 13 corrected.xml

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21 May 2013 Imad Mesdoua andn Professor Paul Rogers

Imad Mesdoua: I think that western intervention in own country progressively as they start finding their Mali will definitely be a key element now of Islamic way politically. militants’—I would not focus specifically on al- Qaeda, and I will explain why—narrative in the Q10 Mike Gapes: So there cannot be a stable coming years. I am thinking specifically of Mali, but situation without the MNLA being involved? How also Syria, which is now a major hot spot for does that go with the fact that there has been an recruitment, or a major topic used to recruit new attempt in Kidal to drive them out? Are they part of jihadis. That is nothing new; it has existed for some the solution or part of the problem, or both? time. There is the classic narrative that al-Qaeda has Imad Mesdoua: In my opinion, they are part of the used of beit al-harb and beit al-salam—the house of solution. Some analysts will tell you they are not part war versus the house of peace, the house of peace of the solution; some people in the south of the being Islam and the house of war being what comes country will tell you they are not part of the solution. into the house of peace. That narrative will not We have to understand that there is a great deal of change, in my opinion. tension between Tuareg populations in the north and You spoke about al-Qaeda being diminished as a populations in the south, which are mainly composed military force. I would tend to agree with you that of Bambara and Fulani, or Peul, people. Part of the that is more and more the case in regions such as reason why the MNLA refused to hand Kidal over to Afghanistan and elsewhere. What we should not do is the army is that they fear persecution. They also do forget that al-Qaeda as an idea, franchise, or business not want to give up some of that autonomy; holding model, almost, in this arc of instability, as some are that city is a bargaining chip for them at the moment. calling it, which ranges from West to East Africa, is You have to include every key actor that is in the still a very strong and potent idea. That will come to north; you cannot just disregard a major military force replace the idea of al-Qaeda as a potent military force. that has been able to topple a state. For the Malians, Al-Qaeda and its agenda and narrative is a potent it is in their best interests to include them in the franchise. We should keep that in mind, in my solution, but I do not know if the professor agrees. opinion. Professor Rogers: As I hope my evidence made clear, I am not a country specialist—my evidence looks Q9 Mike Gapes: I am going to take you back to your more at the wider remit—but as far as Mali is remarks about the potential for this to turn into an concerned, and from talking to colleagues who know Afghanistan. Given the internal political crisis in Mali, the country well, it is pointed out that one of the the coup last year, and the difficulties between the problems of recent months has been the behaviour of north and south that you have talked about, how easy the Mali army elements of the forces. In fact, if you is it going to be to turn Mali into a state that is both look at the Mali army and the surrounding ECOWAS stable and democratic? Will it be like Afghanistan, or states, it is generally thought that only the Chadian will it be worse? military groups have been really effective, and they Imad Mesdoua: It is a very difficult question to have either withdrawn or are going to be withdrawn. answer. There are reasons to be positive; there are The Mali army, or elements of it, have a really bad signs that are positive for Mali’s development and reputation. There have been some real atrocities. construction as a stable state, but all will depend, as I There have been examples of people being killed and said earlier, on the elections—not necessarily the thrown in wells to poison the drinking supply. In a outcome, but the process, and whether or not they are sense, from the point of view of the Tuareg elements, free and fair. I think the French and international in particular, that is what they feared. Unless that can presence will do a lot to ensure that they are free and be reined in, it is going to be really quite difficult to fair elections. More importantly, on the issues of get negotiations going. I am not in any way saying identity and neglect of the north, those are going to there have not been atrocities on the other side as well, be the key elements in creating a stable state in Mali. but this is a significant element. A long-term, stable Negotiations between the MNLA, the Tuareg group security situation is not being achieved at present, and which, to a certain extent, initiated this whole crisis a lot of the success of the elections in the longer in the north of Mali, and the transition Government term—over the next year or two—will be bound up are going to be vital for Mali’s development in the with improving the security situation. coming years, because they might set up the framework for not only political representation, but a Q11 Mike Gapes: I have some more questions about fair distribution of the country’s wealth. The north has the UK role, but on this point about elections, the been neglected in terms of infrastructure and political elections in July are presidential elections, and there representation, and those issues are going to be on the are supposed to be parliamentary elections after that. table when these talks take place. Is the July timetable firm? I have been told that there I want to add that the UN presence in the country, may be a delay, that it may not necessarily be July which is expected, and which will not focus on the and that the parliamentary election may be delayed Islamic insurgency—it will leave that to the French until September, in the autumn. Is there a firm date troops that will remain on the ground—will secure for both? towns, roads and the country’s territory, and that will Professor Rogers: There is said to be, but I do not be vital to creating a stable state. It is a positive sign, think one should take that as read. If one wants to be but, again, Malian problems require Malian solutions, optimistic, there may be an advantage to some delay and it is up to the international community to help the if there are negotiations, particularly with some of the Malians strengthen themselves and take care of their groups in the north, but the problem is that any delay cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:45] Job: 036016 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o001_MP FAC 21 05 13 corrected.xml

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21 May 2013 Imad Mesdoua andn Professor Paul Rogers can be seen as a delaying tactic to prevent Imad Mesdoua: Exactly. That is exactly why. The improvements in governance, and that is the quandary. French come with quite a bit of historical baggage. Imad Mesdoua: I personally feel as though the There are accusations, which I am sure you have all country will not be ready logistically to have elections heard, of neo-colonialism—Françafrique, as it is on the set date, which I believe is 28 July, but the called. The accusation is that the French have a French President and authorities have been clear that tendency to get involved when their interests are at they would like that date to be a firm one. stake—gold mines in the south of Mali and uranium mines in Niger. I definitely think that it is in the Q12 Mike Gapes: So that they can leave? interests of the UK to get involved. How the UK gets Imad Mesdoua: Well, they have already started to involved is obviously up for debate, but the UK withdraw troops, but more specifically it is to pressure should bring its expertise in various areas. It does not their Malian counterparts to move ahead with the have to be a military contribution, but can be political transition. One reassuring aspect of the assistance in development or in consolidating and elections that I should add is that the transition strengthening the capacity of the Malian state to run Government, namely the President and his Cabinet, its everyday affairs. The UK is very good at that and have given assurances that they will not be running in it would be able to do it without its hands being tied, these elections or the parliamentary elections. I think because it does not have the historical baggage that that is a very good sign for Mali. France does.

Q13 Mike Gapes: Could the election be held in the Q17 Mike Gapes: That is helpful. Finally, may I ask whole of Mali or would it be difficult to hold it in about ECOWAS? Professor Rogers, you referred to the north? the fact that they were due to go to Mali in September, but events moved and as a result France had to Imad Mesdoua: It is obviously going to be difficult, intervene. Is it a failure of ECOWAS that they were in my opinion, to hold it in the north, given the unable to get their act together more quickly? What situation simply in Kidal. You have an entire city run does that tell us about their future capacity to deal by the MNLA, and that is out of Government hands. with conflict in the western Sahel? There are French and African troops in the city, but Professor Rogers: It was something of a failure, but you do not have control—the Malian Government— I think one has to recognise that if you look at just over that town. That is just one example of the about all the ECOWAS states, with the possible impediments to running the elections so soon, but you exception of Chad, the nature of their armed forces have other issues as well. When it comes to the voter means that they are simply not trained for this kind of registry, I think that the Malian authorities are not operation outside their own countries. If you look at ready yet. They have expressed that on several the very extensive training and support that you have occasions, I think, in meetings behind closed doors had with African Union interventions in Somalia, you with their French counterparts. That is not necessarily are dealing with armed forces, such as the Kenyans reported in the media, but it is a factor that we should and Ugandans, that have a greater capability for this, all consider. which really does not exist in West Africa. One could not really anticipate even the more elite groups in the Q14 Mike Gapes: Can I take you on to the fact that Nigerian army having any great capability in the UK is involved? Is nation building, which is intervening in another country. If the failure is there, effectively what is now being undertaken, something it is probably a failure to look longer term and to have in which we should try to play a leading role or, given units available that are able to do this. There is a huge that this is a French-led operation and we are very difference between maintaining security in your own much the junior partner, should we accept that we are country and doing it in another country. Some people playing only a minor role? could argue that one of the problems is that we have Professor Rogers: My personal view is that we should never ever had this idea of a United Nations accept that we should play a relatively minor role. If emergency peace service with troops always available, you are looking at the whole of West and North drawn from many different countries. Africa, Libya and certainly Nigeria are far more important in this whole thing. The development of Q18 Mike Gapes: That is Boutros-Ghali’s “An Boko Haram and Ansaru in Nigeria is, in my view, a Agenda for Peace” idea from 1992. lot more significant even than what is happening in Professor Rogers: Absolutely. Supposing there was a Mali, and that is where Britain has much stronger series of brigade-strength units available, including connections and can probably play a better role. That some from African countries, for intervention under does not mean that we should not be involved in Mali, UN Security Council agreement, that could have but relatively speaking, it is less important in the transformed the situation, but there have been 20 or wider region. 30 years’ worth of efforts to get that and we have failed so far. Q15 Mike Gapes: Do you agree? Imad Mesdoua: I have one additional point. It is also Imad Mesdoua: To a certain extent, but not fully. The an issue of funding for ECOWAS. One of the major UK has something to offer when it comes to the problems in the run-up to discussions about sending transition in Mali. troops to Mali was not the lack of political will— everybody was on the same page—but rather a lack Q16 Mike Gapes: Is that because we are not France? of funds and financial clout behind most states to cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:45] Job: 036016 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o001_MP FAC 21 05 13 corrected.xml

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21 May 2013 Imad Mesdoua andn Professor Paul Rogers invest in what is a costly exercise. Even though the to a certain extent, at the tactical level and at the political will was there and the western powers had operational level, as a slight deterrent for groups who given their assurances that they would aid ECOWAS freely move throughout these territories—the desert and, indeed, the African Union, the funds just were territories—because a lot of groups are going into not there. That is the bottom line. Libya now and using arms stockpiles and returning to their countries or flowing through this Saharan belt, Q19 Mr Baron: May I draw us back from Mali and into countries like Chad and as far as Sudan and look at Mali’s neighbours? As a Committee, part of Somalia. So what that drone base can do is serve as a what we are trying to do is better understand the deterrent, if it is used effectively, to help states locally struggle that is taking place with regard to extremist to police their borders. groups linked with al-Qaeda. Could a Mali situation occur in any of its neighbours, whether Niger, Chad, Q20 Mr Baron: May I press you a little bit on what Mauritania or anywhere like that? Could we have a makes up al-Qaeda in the region? Help us to better similar sort of situation? When answering that understand the threat—its attraction. Some question, could you also reflect on the importance or commentators would suggest that what al-Qaeda tends not of the fact that the US has just established a drone to do is hook on to local discontent, and when you base in Niger? look at the religious extremists in Maghreb or the Professor Rogers: The drone base established in Sahel or, indeed, Nigeria, there seems to be a common Niger is said initially to be for reconnaissance theme there. We know al-Qaeda is not a homogenous purposes, but going back to the earlier comments group as such, but a collection of local factions about how it is viewed from the other side, that is not expressing discontent in an obviously very local area. how it will be viewed. The very idea of any kind of How does that play here? Is that your understanding drone base in West Africa, relating to Mali or other of the threat from al-Qaeda and other extremist countries, would be viewed among the radical Islamist groups? In which case, is the answer to address the propagandists as a gift, because they will make the individual grievances as a way of combating the immediate connection with Yemen and with Pakistan. terrorist threat? There are also reports that the French air force, which Professor Rogers: If one looks at al-Qaeda overall does not have these kinds of facilities at present—it is and takes it in its form about 10 years ago, it had two involved in several drone programmes—is now distinctive features which are not typical of localised thinking seriously about buying in Reapers for use in revolutionary movements. It is a revolutionary Mali and elsewhere. Britain of course does have the movement. It wants revolutionary political change. It Reaper, but there are no plans to base it in West was transnational from the start, more or less—it has Africa. On that particular point, from a western its origins in Afghanistan in the 1980s—but by the perspective, this makes a great deal of military sense. end of the 1980s it was looking much more From the other side, I am afraid that it is something transnationally at the near enemy of the unacceptable of a propaganda gift. regimes in the middle east and the far enemy of the As to your specific question, I think my colleague is United States. probably more equipped to answer than me, except The second point is this extraordinary and almost that I would come back to the point that Nigeria unique aspect as a revolutionary movement: it is remains hugely significant. I hope the Committee will eschatological, in that it looks beyond this life. That be looking at that in its studies. is the real key. The elements in al-Qaeda do not see, Imad Mesdoua: To answer your specific question necessarily, their achieving their aims in their own about the risk of a Mali scenario occurring elsewhere lifetime, because it is a religious ideology, not neo- in the region, the factors that led to the crisis in Mali Maoist, for example, like the Naxalite alliance. That exist elsewhere in the region and, in some instances, is crucial to understanding the change from a more in countries that we do not necessarily expect, such narrow, semi-hierarchical paramilitary movement to as Tunisia and Libya. Niger and Mauritania are two an idea. We are dealing with time scales which may particularly fragile states with fragile institutions and be 50 to 100 years, in their view. Their idea of with similar grievances at the local level when it establishing a middle east-wide caliphate, maybe comes to identity. Tuareg rebellions have occurred extending to the world, is measured in 50 to 100 years before in Niger for example, so it is not a new issue or more, so they do not follow our kind of political for them. The leadership of these states is very time scales. cognisant of the fact that this is a threat to their own That was 10 or 12 years ago. How does that relate to stability, which explains even Chad’s reaction and now? Well, there are elements of that still, and there involvement as the conflict could spill over into its are elements which are—it is entirely looking long territory. Another aggravating factor that might lead term, but the individual elements may not be to similar crises in Niger or Mauritania, and perhaps transnational. So, for example, I think—you may even Burkina Faso, is the fact that these states and correct me if I am wrong—broadly, the more Islamist their institutions are under a tremendous amount of paramilitaries active in Mali are much more focused stress having to deal with a tremendous number of on Mali. Boko Haram is more focused on Nigeria refugees, which they are unable to cope with alone. itself. Ansaru, this offshoot of it, is more transnational, The free flow of peoples and arms—another set of hence its kidnapping of foreigners. factors which led to what occurred in Mali—is still If you look more worldwide, there are elements of the there for these countries and they are unable to deal al-Qaeda idea in Yemen which look transnationally, with that. The US drone base is going to actually act, hence the attempts to attack the United States. There cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:45] Job: 036016 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o001_MP FAC 21 05 13 corrected.xml

Ev 6 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

21 May 2013 Imad Mesdoua andn Professor Paul Rogers are elements in diasporas that are very much smugglers—criminals, bandits—that have transnational. Whereas if you take Syria, which is the reconverted, or have used this franchise, this al-Qaeda most important current area of Islamist paramilitary model, to expand. We have to look at the economic development, that is primarily focused on Syria, but agenda that they push forward, which is one of the extraordinary thing there is the way in which it economic predation, above all. That requires a has drawn in dedicated young paramilitaries from transnational solution. around the region. So there is that transnational element there. Q22 Mr Baron: If you had a hit list of things that I would also support what my colleague said about you would want to address in the region, to lessen the Libya. I think we underestimate the extent to which link of local grievances and extremists with al- the brutal Gaddafi regime suppressed Islamist dissent Qaeda—addressing the economics and poverty, and so in Libya, which meant that many such young Libyans forth, would obviously be high on that; closing down went overseas and got combat training. Quite a lot of large ungoverned spaces would probably, as best you them are back now. In spite of its innate wealth, it is can, be top of it. What else should be part of the mix? taking far longer for Libya to make a transition to a How should the West respond, in other words, to stable, peaceful society. We may have some years to these threats? go yet. Professor Rogers: Certainly, there are two elements Imad Mesdoua: To answer your question, I think that in which the economic aspect is important. One, as we have to view al-Qaeda or the rise of radical my colleague is saying, is criminality, and one can’t Islamism—militant Islamism—in north Africa strictly underestimate the importance of some west African through a north African lens. As my colleague was states—Guinea-Bissau, through to Mali and others— saying, groups like Ansar Dine, which are operating in terms of the drug route in use: primarily South in Mali, are very much based on local agendas, American drugs and the route through into Europe. It establishing Sharia law in the north, establishing is hugely important and it is very profitable. Sharia law in the country. That might have changed if The other economic element, as we alluded to earlier, Bamako had fallen, but as far as we know groups like was the relative neglect of the north—the socio- Ansar Dine, MUJAO and al-Qaeda in the Islamic economic divide. That is a fundamental thing, which Maghreb are operating in northern Mali. Groups that you find in many areas where you get this kind of attacked the BP and Statoil gas pipe in Amenas in radical movement developing. Terrorism does not Algeria are also groups that may use the come from the poorest of the poor—let’s be clear internationalist jihadi narrative, but in practice are about that; but I think relative deprivation is a very much focused, I would say, on local agendas, so different matter: the perception that you are relatively we have to see them through that prism. We also need more poor than another group. Given the huge to understand that their capacity to recruit, and their improvements in education and literacy of the last 40 capacity to thrive and to operate in this region, years that is a much more common factor. It goes a depends primarily on local factors. long way to explaining some of the neo-Maoist rebellions, particularly the Naxalite in India. One has Q21 Mr Baron: Can I just press you on that? The to really go beyond the immediate threat, always Prime Minister has used—I am sure he is not the only avoid the risk of seeing it purely as a radical, religious one—words such as “generational struggle”, which threat, and see what lies behind the motives of people, actually feeds into the jihadist narrative quite nicely. even if they are falling back on that part of their How do we then address the extremists in the region? identity. Are you suggesting that you could do it on an Imad Mesdoua: I would add one more nuance to that, individual basis—address each local grievance? I which is that in my opinion there is a difference suggest that is not, perhaps the answer; but how do between the radicalisation of, for example, youth in we address what the Prime Minister has described as the north of Mali or elsewhere in West Africa, and the the “poisonous narrative” that religious extremists radicalisation of youth that is currently occurring in feed on? North Africa—Tunisia, Libya and Egypt—where you Imad Mesdoua: They may be groups that have a have the very worrying rise of Salafist groups with regional and local focus, but the space in which they pretensions towards armed conflict or a willingness to operate, and their capacity to thrive, depends, as I engage in that. There are differences. In the north of mentioned earlier, not only on the weakness of states Mali, I would say that it is more an issue of in which they operate but on their capacity to move development and policing, whereas in other countries freely through the Sahara. So we are talking about in North Africa, the issues are more deep-rooted in groups with local identities, but that are actually marginalisation, political repression and, obviously, transnational threats, which require—and I would tend unemployment, which is perhaps the key word in to agree with the Prime Minister’s view on this—a cutting off recruitment methods and possibilities for transnational solution. these groups. This is not something that we can address just locally Professor Rogers: I saw one figure—I cannot give in an isolated context; but we have to understand it you a reference for it now, but I think that it is from a local perspective. We have to view it from the correct—that Tunisia, with a population of 10 million, perspective of local grievances. We tend to talk about has 140,000 unemployed graduates. That is a very this strictly from the point of view of Islamist large group of educated people on the margins. If we ideologies, but I would tend to focus on the economic go back—I think that this is relevant—to Saudi Arabia incentive these groups have. A lot of them are in the 1990s, the Saudi economy dipped somewhat cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:45] Job: 036016 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o001_MP FAC 21 05 13 corrected.xml

Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 7

21 May 2013 Imad Mesdoua andn Professor Paul Rogers because of their oil prices. That meant that there were Africa, but it all contributes. There has been research far more young men—tens of thousands—coming out that shows that it contributes, or has contributed, quite of the technical schools and the high schools into an substantially to the expansion and rise of radical youth economy with relatively little employment, unless in these countries. maybe they had a connection with one of the 1,000 princely families. That again is where they can get a Q26 Mark Hendrick: I would just like to pursue the kind of conviction that there must be another, more economic aspects and how they play into the radical way, and it is very easy for the radicalisers to ideological aspects, as well as the way in which have an effect in that sort of population. criminality is involved. Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb has made millions and millions of dollars, mainly from Q23 Chair: Professor, do you think that a high level smuggling but also from kidnapping. The French of population growth is a factor? Government in the past have paid ransom money for Professor Rogers: It is probably the one region of the the release of French citizens. How important is that world where the demographic transition is still supply of money from smuggling and kidnapping to relatively slow. Population growth is far less the extremists in the region? If we could cut off that significant than, for example, 20 years ago in Latin money, would it make the region safer? America, Southern Africa or much of South and Professor Rogers: If I may start very briefly, I think South-East Asia, with some exceptions. Across much in that region—that is the key phrase—it is relatively of the Middle East you have this demographic bulge; more important than elsewhere. I think you find that, the birth rates are falling, but you still have a very across the activities of groups that are generally under large proportion of the population aged between about the banner of al-Qaeda across the Middle East—apart five and 25. They are far better educated than they from Afghanistan, which had a huge income from have been in the past, because there have been some opium in the past, if I can include the Taliban very improvements, but with far fewer employment loosely in this category, although I know they are not prospects. part of the al-Qaeda group—by and large, away from The demographic bulge, combined with the economic the Maghreb, the elements of criminality and divide, lies at a lot of the heart of what my colleague kidnapping are not so dominant as sources of funding. was saying about the development of more radical My understanding is that that is much more important groups in Egypt and elsewhere. The problem is that in this region. as Egypt makes a transition to what we hope is more Imad Mesdoua: Again, we have to look at regional democratic governance, whatever form of governance specificities. In West Africa, I think it is important to has an incredible task ahead of it at a time of world economic recession and all these internal problems. cut off that source of funding. Every little bit helps. Groups such as MUJAO rose to prominence particularly because they were able to get money from Q24 Chair: You say that population growth rates are hostage taking and the kidnapping of, for example, falling; Niger is going to see its population nearly western foreign aid workers in the western Sahrawi quadruple by 2050. refugee camps in Algeria. Cutting off that source of Professor Rogers: There are exceptions, as I say. There are exceptions across that belt. funding is vital—more importantly, it is a deterrent— to ensure that it does not serve as an example for such groups to keep kidnapping western or other hostages. Q25 Chair: It is patchy. I tend to agree that, in North Africa or the Maghreb, Professor Rogers: It is very patchy, but the point is this is not the prominent or key source of funding. We that across the Middle East—I am personally more have to look at other, more complex sources of familiar with Iran—you have this huge proportion of funding, particularly emanating from very wealthy younger people coming through who are really quite well educated. That demographic bulge has still to individuals and organisations in the Gulf, as well as run, and I think that it goes to explain, for example, states that are funding groups. You have a very the very high levels of graduate unemployment in complex network. There is a whole spider’s web of Tunisia. terrorist funding networks that operate more Imad Mesdoua: If I may add one point, another key prominently in North Africa, but that is different from factor that we tend to overlook, which is essential in the Sahel. all this, is explosive urbanisation, which feeds into relative deprivation. The idea that you have large Q27 Mark Hendrick: What practical steps do you numbers of people—I will give you the example of think we in the UK could take with international my home country, Algeria—who migrate from the partners to cut off the flow? As I mentioned earlier, smaller cities and villages into the major cities: the French are actively paying ransoms. That is not a Algiers, Oran, Annaba. It is the same in Tunisia, Libya deterrent; it is an encouragement. What do you think and Morocco, I would say. Once they reach the city needs to be done to cut off the flow of finance? with the hope of finding a job, being educated and Imad Mesdoua: I think through greater transparency finding housing, they find a housing crisis, rampant and encouraging states, particularly Gulf states, first unemployment, 12 to 15 people living in houses made of all to police these banking transactions that go for two people—all the unintended consequences that relatively unnoticed. Those funds take different shapes come with rapid urbanisation and that are out of the and sizes. They can be investments made through control of Governments in the region. I am talking local business ventures and business partnerships, and specifically about North Africa, not necessarily West they fall under the radar, so it is going to be very cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:45] Job: 036016 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o001_MP FAC 21 05 13 corrected.xml

Ev 8 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

21 May 2013 Imad Mesdoua andn Professor Paul Rogers difficult. I think the UK can put pressure on states to of the revolution, because of the borders and because monitor these things and to increase transparency. there was a lack of central Government authority over To go back to the hostage-taking, kidnapping and regions that are difficult to control in the kind of payment of ransoms, I think that policy is changing in unstable situation that came after the revolution. France under François Hollande. At least rhetorically One thing I would say is that the demise, or fall, of speaking, the narrative has changed to say, “France the Gaddafi regime contributed, but was not does not negotiate with terrorists, and France will not necessarily the sole causal factor behind the Malian pay ransom money.” The French might be paying crisis. The seeds for the Malian crisis were there ransom money without saying that they are, but at anyways. I would say it was just an aggravating factor. least the narrative has changed, and I think the UK should stick to its policy of not negotiating with Q29 Mark Hendrick: You say “aggravating”, but terrorists. That is the best solution to protect British would you say it was perhaps an accelerating factor? interests. And do you think that Britain and France, in their zeal Professor Rogers: On the other aspect of funding, to see the removal of Gaddafi to help the opposition, particularly through the drugs trade, including the perhaps overlooked the fact that it would have this very large trade in illicit tobacco, you have the impact on Mali? problem of demand in the receiving countries, Imad Mesdoua: Yes, I think it’s the law of unintended including, in terms of cocaine, Western Europe. It is consequences. Arming the rebels might have seemed the same problem with the drugs trade as a whole. Do in the short term a good policy in the specific context you try to cut it off at source? Do you try to interdict of Libya, but the problem and the reality in this it? Or do you have different policies for the recipient region—as I mentioned earlier—is that any decision countries, where there is actually a demand? I think at the local level in one state will affect the other that applies as much to how we deal with things in states, because of the very geographic nature and West Africa as it does in relation to South America. because of the geo-strategic and geopolitical factors in that region. The fact that the borders are so porous Q28 Mark Hendrick: We have seen the trigger of means that if you are about to inject, or if you do thousands of Tuareg fighters that Libya had recruited inject, a certain quantity of arms or fighters, or a in the 1990s going back into Mali, and some people certain set of new political realities, in one given are calling it in Libya a post-blowback blowback, with political landscape, it will have an immediate effect the French coming in and pushing the Tuareg back on the country nearby. It just so happened that Mali further north and into Libya. What part, if any, do you had the ingredients, or the seeds were planted, for the feel the collapse of the Gaddafi regime has played in crisis to be accelerated, as you say. bringing in the forces that have put Mali under threat and that obviously necessitated the movement of the Q30 Mark Hendrick: I think we can see that in French into Mali? hindsight, but my question was: do you think that Professor Rogers: Within Libya itself, there is now a should have been foreseen by Britain and France? stronger element of Islamist-orientated militias than Imad Mesdoua: I think it could have been foreseen, existed in the population five years ago under Gaddafi, yes. I think it could have been foreseen, but it doesn’t when there was pretty tight repression of that kind of mean—I don’t think the intention was there. I think outlook. So you have that anyway, and then you have that in trying to assist one country to achieve what the transnational element. That relates, as you say, were very noble objectives in the short term, people— very much to the Tuareg who were part of the Libyan policy makers, decision makers—perhaps did not armed forces. necessarily look at what possible consequences could Therefore, there is certainly a double blowback within come after that. Libya itself. You have a stronger Islamist element, because of the lack of control in what was a very Q31 Mark Hendrick: That is my point. I am sure it repressive regime, but you also have the blowback in was not Britain’s and France’s intention to cause the terms of blowing back, first, into Mali and then, problems that we have seen in Mali. Professor Rogers, possibly, back into Libya. Again, it relates to this issue would you like to comment on that? of almost completely permeable borders. We are not Professor Rogers: Yes. If you look more broadly, at seeing a set of geographical entities; we are seeing an the time of the termination of the Taliban regime in entire region with extraordinary abilities for people to Afghanistan there were people warning against long- flow across borders and no real policing of borders in term consequences. There were much stronger most cases. analytical voices warning against the consequences of Imad Mesdoua: I would also say that what terminating the Saddam Hussein regime. There were contributed, to a large extent, was the availability of a few people who were rather concerned about how arms. I think a lot of militias were able to use the Libya would turn out, whatever the rightful motives. arms that were at their disposal immediately after the There is a certain irony, in that when Gaddafi came in revolution and during the revolution, either to achieve from the cold about seven years ago, for about five local objectives, which they are now parading in the years Libya went on quite a decent arms-buying spree, north of the country and showing that they utilise mainly from European countries. Indeed, just a week these weapons as a show of strength to maintain before the French and American intervention started, control over their respective territories, but also those you had one French company upgrading the Libyan arms obviously served the Tuareg, who are able to air force Mirages and an Italian company upgrading come—Libya became an arms bazaar in the aftermath some of the army’s equipment. That meant that, in a cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:45] Job: 036016 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o001_MP FAC 21 05 13 corrected.xml

Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 9

21 May 2013 Imad Mesdoua andn Professor Paul Rogers sense, the level of equipment among the Libyan armed in the Islamic Maghreb. All these groups—the names forces had improved since Gaddafi came in from the and the leaders—are known quantities to the Algerian cold, and some of that equipment has been of use now authorities and security forces. The country has to people who have gone through to Mali. That is an already experienced this peak of radicalisation, and it unexpected consequence, I’m afraid. Again, perhaps has sort of fizzled out in society. Islamists no longer it could have been foreseen. have a foothold in society, because they have to a I am bound to say that people who were warning certain extent been delegitimised by the civil war, and about the likely outcome in Afghanistan and Iraq were fragmented as political entities following that civil more prominent than people who were rather more war. cautious about Libya. In broad terms, as far as western Professor Rogers: I shall briefly move to the west, countries are concerned, there was a lot of support for because I think Morocco is a very interesting case. the French-led intervention in Libya. Even so, it has Leaving aside all the controversy over its control of been very disappointing to see the consequences and the western Sahara, what you have seen there, as the state of the country now, in spite of the fact that Mohammed VI has speeded up the rate of reform in it is inherently a pretty wealthy country. the light of the experience of the Arab awakening, has so far—it may be fingers crossed—meant you have Q32 Mark Hendrick: Mr Mesdoua, you are not seen the kind of problems in Tunisia and Egypt originally from Algeria, and Algeria appears at least reflected in what has happened in Morocco. I am to have avoided many of the repercussions of the Arab spring and seems to be quite politically stable. Do you bound to say that the same is not necessarily true for think it is as stable as it appears? Jordan, where I think analysts are far more concerned Imad Mesdoua: It is a country that shows signs of that there could be a sudden upsurge against King stability and that is important for the region at the Abdullah. moment, for western powers looking to find some kind of anchor in the region. At the macro-economic Q34 Chair: You see Morocco as very stable. level, the country is stable because of its large revenue Professor Rogers: Relatively stable, yes. To be fair, from oil and gas exports. Politically it is a country the present King was already more reformist. As I that is stable because you have a system that has understand it, the monarchy in Morocco is held in cemented itself following what was a very deadly and higher regard than, say, the equivalent monarchy in tragic civil war throughout the ’90s that cost the lives Jordan. Essentially, the rate of reform was sped up in of 200,000 Algerians. the light of events in Tunisia and Egypt, and so far One of many reasons that Algeria was able to avoid that has meant there is a stability. There are still the or remain immune to the Arab spring—I don’t underlying economic problems—the problems of necessarily like those terms—was because the country educated people on the margins—and the other had already gone through an Arab spring. A lot of problem of the relationship with the western Sahara, people said the start date for the Arab spring was in but so far Morocco is a case where, indirectly, the Tunisia with the jasmine revolution, but in Algeria Arab awakening has actually had an effect that people people very much consider it to have started in 1988 perhaps do not fully recognise. with the Berber spring. Algeria considers itself to be Imad Mesdoua: I agree to a certain extent, but I a stable country. Throughout the crisis in Mali it really would warn the Committee against dismissing the wanted to give that image of a nation that could be a western Sahara as an issue that does not require any stable partner for European powers. kind of attention. It is an issue that really needs to That said, I think the country does have quite a few be addressed. What is considered a low-level conflict factors, a lot of the ingredients that existed in Tunisia, actually has the potential to escalate, given the Egypt, Libya and elsewhere in the Arab world, where demographics and the fact that the status quo has not the Arab spring did take place. You do have addressed the kind of political solution that is unemployment, a housing crisis, a political system necessary. that has failed in many ways to regenerate itself, The Saharan youth currently in the refugee camps in bringing in more post-revolutionary youth into the Algeria are threatened by the prospect of system. However, the system cannot be compared with the regimes of Ben Ali, Mubarak or Gaddafi. You radicalisation, because they feel as though the still have enough space, as it were, in the political Polisario, the Government in exile, has failed. They arena to operate. That has helped the country to feel it has maintained peace and the status quo with remain relatively stable. Morocco. By maintaining talks with Morocco, and without engaging in an armed struggle, that Q33 Mark Hendrick: Are you saying that, because Government has failed them. You have the prospect of that, perhaps young people have not radicalised as of youth taking up what is a Saharawi intifada of sorts, much as they have in other countries? or even joining some of the groups in Mali. The Imad Mesdoua: Algeria peaked, in terms of geographical proximity is there. The last thing we radicalisation, throughout the ’90s. A lot of the groups want is to see Saharawi youth engaging in criminal and leaders of groups that you currently see operating activities in the north of Mali, or engaging in a full- in Mali find their roots in the Algerian civil war. Al- on armed intifada, when the option for a political, Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is an offshoot of the negotiated solution with Morocco is on the table. GSPC and the GIA, which are groups that operate in Professor Rogers: This has been going on for 38 Algeria. Abdelmalek Droukdel is the head of al-Qaeda years. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:45] Job: 036016 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o001_MP FAC 21 05 13 corrected.xml

Ev 10 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

21 May 2013 Imad Mesdoua andn Professor Paul Rogers

Q35 Chair: For the final question, can we go back to perspective—to maintain full security at these Algeria? Do you think the attack on the In Amenas facilities in the current climate, in the current context. refinery indicates that Algeria’s grip on the security We are dealing with a very mobile, very fluid threat. situation is not quite as strong as you might think? Full security will never be entirely guaranteed, but In Imad Mesdoua: Yes and no. The gas plants and the Amenas became a wake-up call for Algerian security oil facilities in the south of the country remained a forces. They saw that they needed to review, along sort of fortress throughout the ’90s, even at the peak with western companies operating in their country, the of violence and at the peak of the civil war. Algerian whole set of security dispositions and the apparatus authorities and security forces were very good at that was in place. maintaining security at those facilities, but a lot of Professor Rogers: It was exactly the same thing with the factors that existed throughout the ’90s have been the Saudis seven years ago, when you had the attack greatly altered by what is going on now in Libya. on the Abqaiq oil processing plant, near Ras Tanura. What explains the Algerian security forces’ reaction That more or less failed, and it led to the Saudis in In Amenas—it was a strong, forceful reaction— putting tens of thousands more security people into was that they were sending a message to other Islamist the oil facilities. groups in the region to not replicate the same thing. It Chair: Can I thank you both very much? It has been is very difficult—this is me speaking from a personal a really helpful session. Your sparing your time is very much appreciated.

Examination of Witness

Witness: Jon Marks, Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House, gave evidence.

Q36 Chair: I welcome back an alumnus of the House alliance that was heading towards Bamako in January of Commons, Jon Marks, who is now an associate was about to take the Malian capital. Something had fellow of the Middle East and North Africa to happen, but again, I do not think anyone had an programme at Chatham House. Mr Marks, welcome. idea of the consequences. Thank you very much for coming along. Is there The difference between Libya and Mali, if I may be anything you would like to say by way of an so bold, is that at the time—in February 2011, when opening statement? the Libyan revolt started to take off and was looking Jon Marks: There are a few points from the session as if it was going to pose a challenge to the Gaddafi before, which will tie in with what I was going to say regime—in London, Paris and in other capitals, on the laws of unintended consequences, and the view people at the very highest levels knew very little about that something has to be done as a mode of foreign what was going on, whereas at least the case of Mali policy, which is not a concept that I feel particularly was an accident that people saw was going to happen. comfortable about. While the previous witnesses were In the case of the change of leadership in Paris—Imad giving evidence, I thought back to two days before the made this point—at least the narrative changed on UN declared its no-fly zone in Libya. I was eating doing things like paying ransoms. In terms of some couscous with a family in Benghazi, and preparedness and policy with Britain, at least there someone phoned me up and said, “Jon, you’d better was a degree of consultation between the get back to the hotel. The whole thing is unravelling.” Governments, and preparation. For example, we were It was that moment when the Libyan revolution was able to get those couple of transport planes into turning backwards. The Gaddafi regime was, Bamako with remarkable speed. There was therefore surprisingly, at the gates of Benghazi—a city of a more preparedness, but again, how the situation was million people. I was sitting around eating couscous going to turn out was a very difficult call. It was also with a family, in which there were two young men disappointing. and two young women, who had just been listening to The last point that I want to make is that ECOWAS the strangely blood-curdling noises that Saif al-Islam was not united; there was talk before about the al-Gaddafi had been making, and I thought, “Well, ECOWAS force. If you look at it, there are two how does one respond? How does one turn round to militaries in the ECOWAS framework—the those people and say, ‘we don’t have the responsibility Senegalese and the Ghanaians, both of whom have a to step in and stop what is going to be really terrible terrific record of working with the UN. In the conflict to people who look and behave like my own kids?’” in Mali, they were the two that showed themselves to It is that unexpected consequence. be reticent. In fact, they said they were not going to The fact is, we could not know. If you walked around go. The third force, which was going to make up the Benghazi at that time with the different factions, no centre of the force, was the Nigerians. As I understand one—be they on the policy side, be they Libyans— it, people in Mali were extremely scared because of knew which factions were even going to put the potentially heavy-handed Nigerian forces, who themselves forward, and who the players were. There after all have delivered up to us the Niger Delta was all that talk, remember, about African conflict over many years, and who have been creating mercenaries, which is extremely pertinent to what is a fairly bad buzz up in northern Nigeria—a place going on now, but there was the view that things had where something has to be done, although quite what, to happen, just as when it seemed that the Islamist we can possibly explore later. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:45] Job: 036016 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o001_MP FAC 21 05 13 corrected.xml

Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 11

21 May 2013 Jon Marks

Finally, in trying to make policy and to work with There is another point that should be strongly people over these episodes, there is a real mentioned. Algeria, on its strong side, coming out of disappointment. There was on the part of the that very long war of independence from ’52 to ’62— permanent members of the Security Council—P3— we know the history; it was one of the great and most and other partners and stakeholders on the western convulsive of the anti-colonial struggles—was a European side, a real view that Africa should take a country that remained troubled, divided between lead, and that this should not be seen as a neo- potential civilian leaderships and the military security colonialist enterprise, particularly given the leading apparatus that eventually took full control of the state role of the French, and there has been mention of in the ’65 coup that overthrew Ahmed Ben Bella. Françafrique. The fact is, however, that the partners After all, that coup was launched by Houari have been problematic. The AU did not respond in Boumediene, whose key aide—and, for all his any way as quickly as people would like, and the presidency, Foreign Minister—was Abdelaziz ECOWAS force was not able to assert itself in the Bouteflika, the current President of Algeria. These way that people would like. It strikes me that even if issues matter. our policy expectations have changed, actually we There is a political system that is quite hard to were trying to force policy by projecting on to our address, but also there is a vibrant nationalism that potential partners abilities, and indeed volitions, that has a very defined way of looking at things. One of they might not actually have. That counts all the way the reasons why Algeria sees itself, I think—I do not around the region; the west, and in particular the UK wish to speak for the Algerians, but this is my in this case, are feeling their way. We could end up perception—as a strong regional power is reflected in with just one word, which would be Algeria. the fact that Algerian politicians, and particularly senior members of the Algerian military security Q37 Chair: In your written evidence to us, you establishment, have long held influence and been cautioned against us getting too close to Algeria. Are players in the politics of countries such as Mali and you concerned about the stability of Algeria? What is Mauritania. your thinking there? Can you elaborate on that point? The second fact is that out of the nationalism, there is Jon Marks: I first went to Algeria 33 years ago, and a very vibrant Algerian view of how politics should it is a country that I have been going to ever since— be enacted, which is absolutely right and proper. It is a country that looks to protect and reflect its national a country that formed me—so I am somewhat interest. One of the key factors that is enunciated in saddened to say that we should not embrace Algeria Algerian foreign policy making, and has been for ever, with all the enthusiasm on all fronts that we might. I is that they do not like foreign intervention. There is merely want to observe that, as Mr Baron cited earlier, also, of course, at a state and public level, an even the Prime Minister’s use of the generational struggle greater dislike of any foreign intervention that language, which unfortunately I found personally involves the major powers: the United States, one unhelpful at the time, is softening; I am pleased to see would have to include the United Kingdom, and of that. There was, however, the need to find a course, top of the list, France; theirs is one of the most partnership in Algeria, and a need to be able to pick complex relationships in global politics. Those are at up the phone and talk to someone in what was, after least two problems to make it difficult. all, an extremely dramatic episode involving British The third problem, in the hierarchical nature of things, citizens: the In Amenas attack. Yet to some degree is: who do you talk to? Algerian politics is still that person to talk to was not necessarily there, for a marked by faction fighting and internal complexities number of reasons that are specific to Algerian that seem to define how the country responds to its politics. interlocutors. That makes it difficult. Clearly, Algeria has a strong willingness to have a deeper—I would not actually say better—relationship Q38 Mike Gapes: Given all you have just said—if I with the United Kingdom on a number of levels. I can summarise, it is not an easy ally—what can the think that the United Kingdom feels the same. I have UK gain from trying to be a strategic partner of observed this over many decades of watching the two Algeria on security issues? How easy will it be for us sides trying to do business with each other. I merely to get anything out of that relationship? say that it is a difficult relationship, and one that Jon Marks: We can actually get quite a lot out of it. people should be aware of. Just to dig into that a little It is just understanding the extent of the amount of bit, I think on the question of the Algerian system— things that we have to put into it, and also, I would the stability that Mr Mesdoua talked about—stability say, the possible disappointments that may come out is certainly one word that you can use for a system of it. All the signals from Algiers are that it wants that does not necessarily move, but in the case of to have a very solid relationship. There are issues of Algerian decision making, it is still extremely intelligence sharing, and I can remember several hierarchical at all levels. For example, if you analyse episodes in which there has been intelligence sharing. the state energy company, Sonatrach, the military During the whole conflict between the Algerian state security apparatus, or Algerian politics, it very often and the Islamist movement, the Algerian authorities comes out as being an extremely hierarchical system were co-operative in trying to put together evidence. in which very few people are in a position to take I have personal experience of that, dating back to the decisions. That is something that people find very hard last decade. The Algerian authorities also have shown to get to grips with, and it does make for problems in a real enthusiasm over a long period of time for closer building a strategic relationship. military co-operation. Going right the way back into cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:45] Job: 036016 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o001_MP FAC 21 05 13 corrected.xml

Ev 12 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

21 May 2013 Jon Marks the civil war of the ’90s, there was continual tension Q40 Mike Gapes: Can I take up your point about over the fact that the Algerians were very keen to get the knowledge that the Algerian state has of extremist equipment, such as night-vision goggles, that we groups? There is the al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb would not actually give because of the prevailing organisation, and some of those people will have human rights situation. come out of the Algerian conflict— In many respects, I do not think that those issues have Jon Marks: Many, yes. changed, but the Algerian military are acquisitive. As Imad said, the Algerian economy has built up a very Q41 Mike Gapes: How much are they connected large amount of money, partly because they have into the wider al-Qaeda network, or is it more of a problems spending it because of their inability to franchise than an organisation that receives spend as much as they might do. You have a country instructions or orders? that has got $200 billion-worth of foreign reserves— Jon Marks: The collapse of Mali, opening up the about 5 or 6 years ago, it replaced the UK in the list prospect that there was going to be a failed state right of countries with the top 10 foreign reserves—and it in the centre of this region, really revived the al-Qaeda likes to buy military equipment. That poses a franchise. I have never been the hugest of believers in question: is that a place where Britain should be it. Clearly, the ultra-radical Algerian Islamist groups selling? have existed in an underworld where other groups In terms of understanding Islamist movements, the feed in and, clearly, at times the al-Qaeda franchise, Algerian security services clearly have an in particular at the moment when the Salafist Group experience—somewhat ruthless, but they are very for Preaching and Combat turned into al-Qaeda in the knowledgeable—in tackling underground Islamist and Islamic Maghreb, was on the up and had some appeal. jihadist groups that dates back 20 years, so However, these are very fluid episodes. Mali has presumably there is more room for intelligence revived al-Qaeda. It has almost been a prophecy that sharing and things like that. confirmed those who said that the potential for a failed I am not trying to say, “Don’t let’s have this state in the middle of the region could actually do this, relationship.” I believe hugely that we need a very but it is very much an Algerian group. If you look positive and strong relationship with the Algerian at the attack on the BP-Statoil-Sonatrach gas plant at authorities. All I am really trying to say is: let us go Tiguentourine near In Amenas in the middle of into this with our eyes wide open and with a really January, you have a group that was led by Algerians. clear view of what the policy goals, demands and It seemed to have, to a degree, Algerian motivations, desires are on both sides. although it is a very complex and difficult episode to understand. However, if you actually look at the Q39 Mike Gapes: The previous Government had a group, it reflects a wider and newer north African memorandum of understanding arrangement, with franchise. If you look at the number of people regard to potential terrorist transfers and so on, but involved, you had nearly a dozen Libyans and nearly there are still big issues about rule of law and human as many Tunisians, which is a first and which shows rights, and there is the Polisario issue, which was the evolution of that north African jihadist franchise. touched on in a previous conversation, where the UK What were they looking for? That is the most has a view internationally which is, I suspect, a intriguing question that has not fully been answered. problem for the Algerian Government. France, as I If you look at the attack on the gas plant, it actually understand it, has a view that is slightly different. seems to have had two very diverse targets. It seems Jon Marks: On Polisario, where there is an issue, in to have involved Mokhtar Belmokhtar, a real old the camps, it is an issue that is being allowed to fester. veteran of the Algerian conflicts and rumour mill and And the camps keep on growing: there are more and a poster boy for us Algeria analysts over many years. more people there. I have found that if you go down When that group first came, it looked actually as if there, the UN and old Polisario guys come up to me— they were looking for the usual kidnapping and I got shot at down there in about ’86, and since ’91 ransom, which is a big business. There is the well there has been a ceasefire. People have not actually known case of the Germans and French in the middle seen it. For the Algerians, I do not think that that is of the last decade, where the figures that I have heard an issue with Britain, because if you look at the and have been widely bandied about was that bottom line of the western Sahara dispute, it is Belmokhtar and his associates pocketed about €32 whether the former Spanish territory should be million. decolonised under the full UN process—basically, offering a referendum on independence—or continue Q42 Mike Gapes: In ransoms. to be subsumed into Morocco. As for the Algerian Jon Marks: Yes, from one major attack. It is a big point of view, which Britain would support as a and successful business. There are those who say that Security Council member, I do not think that there is if you go to places around the Sahel, south of Algeria an issue at all; the issue would be more with the and whatever, you can actually see villas built by Moroccans. these guys out of the ransom money. I have written On the other issues, the human rights situation in many times that it has been a business model, and it Algeria has considerably improved; the situation of looked like business as usual, but the attack had civil war is not there. When you visit Algeria, you another part to it and tying the two together I have happily walk around the streets and go into cafés and found extremely difficult. have a cup of coffee. You are in a normalised, The other part was when there was clearly a normal place. component of suicide bombers, which we have seen cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:45] Job: 036016 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o001_MP FAC 21 05 13 corrected.xml

Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 13

21 May 2013 Jon Marks remarkably rarely in recent times, who were putting at this is that for a long time the Sahara has had a on the explosive vests and going in and tying dark undergrowth. It is one of those places—I don’t themselves and hostages to the main gas processing like making comparisons, so I dare not—that is a unit. That, of course, would have created an question like Northern Ireland, where you would have extraordinary “spectacular” as they say. Remember underground security people mixing with political that this gas plant, which had so many workers there ideological people mixing with criminal people. I because it was being expanded, already produces have an old friend who used to mix in several of those some 2% of the gas that comes into the European gas circles and he concluded, “It is quite problematic. system, so you are talking about one hell of an Sometimes I get rather confused as to who I am and explosion. which one of the three I am representing.” There is a One the one hand, you had traditional business as degree of that in the Algerian situation. usual and, other the other hand, you had a Clearly, the Algerian security services are very “spectacular” that owes its conception, which clearly significant political players, reaching all the way went on over several months, and delivery to the across Algerian society. You can see that very clearly changes in the region and what happened in Libya, in the leading role they are playing in the anti- the number of different groups and players coming in and, indeed, in time-honoured fashion, the Islamist corruption campaigns and the huge number of arrests groups in northern Mali falling out among themselves across Algeria. During the conflict of the ’90s, there even before the French came in and started bombing were clearly people who penetrated some groups, both them. abroad and within Algeria. There are many narratives that would say that things got out of hand and that it Q43 Mike Gapes: In summary, would it be right to went much further than that and the Algerian military say that, although there has been this visible upsurge security establishment acted as an agent provocateur in extremism because of the events that you have just and were players in the game. The huge debate from referred to and the developments elsewhere in Mali, both sides runs on over that. the violent jihadism in Algeria itself, apart from this Clearly, there have been intense contacts, as one “spectacular”, has actually been going down? would expect, because, after all, we have discussed Jon Marks: Totally. It is very much diminished. If before the experience and knowledge of the Algerian you look at the levels of activity, there are still the old military security establishment in this business, and groups that were the GSPC and now call themselves you do not get that staying at home reading Google. al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. They have proved extremely difficult to budge, which is a separate Q45 Mark Hendrick: Following on from that, what question in itself. They are up in the Kabylie influence and knowledge should the Algerian security mountains to the east of Algiers, although they are services have had in the In Amenas incident? How starting to go. It has been remarkably limited. much did it tell us about the control they have over There is another in the west and most of that activity the peripheral areas of Algeria? has taken place in those vast Saharan spaces, which Jon Marks: That is a very good question. One of the has allowed people to go to places where they could things with the In Amenas incident is that although take refuge and regions where they have family and we have a long history of terrorist incidents—although people who will give them some form of support. It as Imad said, quite correctly, when we had the has basically been extremely limited. I would say that hydrocarbons fortress there were not really any major the big Algerian political challenges for a significant attacks—it reflected a couple of things. amount of time have come from places other than First was a need to be more assertive and more jihadists. international on the part of members of the traditional Algerian underground: it struck me that here was Q44 Mark Hendrick: Mr Marks, in your submission Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s franchise really changing the you referred to claims that the Algerian security way that it operated. Secondly, people were involved services have cultivated jihadist elements as assets in who were difficult to identify or who were not their efforts to control the region. How much credence identified, but there were security lapses and the do you give to those claims? Algerians themselves have recognised that. Jon Marks: A lot of this is speculation. If you look After the intense years of the civil conflict, things had at the issues surrounding Mali, as the previous witnesses said, the roots go back to a whole different just got relaxed. We have talked to people who were number of tendencies. The fact is that these players working as security advisers and operatives down in have been around. When the In Amenas attack the south, and clearly things had got very lax: it happened in January, I must have got 50 or 60 calls wasn’t the sharpest security performance that you from tabloid journalists asking, “Can you help us? We have ever seen. All sorts of questions have been asked want to do a timeline for the life of Mokhtar and are still being asked as to where the group that Belmokhtar.” Suddenly they have a new superstar and got to In Amenas came from—it seems it was Libya— the Bin Laden they have been missing, but that is not and how they crossed the border. It seems that they the case. These guys have been around for a long time. were in vehicles that had Libyan number plates and It has long been said that the Algerian security were wearing Libyan uniforms, and were kind of services have penetrated radical Islamist groups, and saluted through. There are a lot of issues, and people I think that that is fairly well documented. It is, after on all sides have realised that the situation was all, standard practice. The way that you have to look allowed to happen because things had got very lax. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:45] Job: 036016 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o001_MP FAC 21 05 13 corrected.xml

Ev 14 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

21 May 2013 Jon Marks

Q46 Mark Hendrick: Is it just a regional thing, travelling through southern Algeria? As with the In though? Is it that round Algiers and that area there is Amenas incident, is southern Algeria being neglected the most focus and the security services are keeping to some extent by the security forces in Algeria? an eye on the capital and the Government? Chair: The business in the Chamber is quite busy and Jon Marks: The security forces are pervasive. One of I can see that a winding-up speech is possibly going the major job creation schemes in Algeria has been to on, which means that there may be a vote, so can I recruit police, so when you are in and around Algiers ask you to keep your answers relatively brief? there are an extraordinary number of uniformed Jon Marks: It would be a pleasure. Yes, I think that officers, and many in plain clothes as well. Clearly one of the interesting areas of dialogue that you could that is under control. I think it is actually that the have with the Algerian authorities could be on the nature of the threat up north in terms of terrorism is levels of criminal activity in the Sahara. The view relatively limited. The gas attack was a genuine came up before about the porosity of borders and the spectacular the like of which we have not seen before. number of routes, and cocaine smuggling out of the That spoke for different and changing perceptions on other failed state in the region, Guinea-Bissau. These the part of people doing the attacks. are all tried and tested, time-honoured smuggling The other point I would make about the gas attack— routes that have merely become more efficient. It is a there was clearly a degree of laxness, but that also bit of business that is booming. shows how difficult it was to control—is that, although at the time it was immediately announced Q49 Mark Hendrick: In that case, how can Algeria that this was a response by the Islamist movement shut itself off from the instability that is taking place against the French intervention in Mali and that is in Libya and Tunisia? what the communiqués said, that was clearly a post- Jon Marks: I think it has a much stronger security facto rationalisation of an attack that had actually been backbone. With the current Government of Prime quite meticulously planned. There have been arrests Minister Abdelmalek Sellal, there is a perception that since of various drivers, and even the odd engineer. it is trying to get projects done faster, implement Clearly there were people on the inside, so it was an policy faster and get houses built faster. I think that attack that had been planned over a reasonably— that is actually the really big issue, because although people talk about the stability of Algeria, you are in a Q47 Mark Hendrick: Are you saying that attack country where the authorities themselves record 9,000 would have taken place whether the French had gone to 10,000 incidents of strikes, social protest and into Mali or not? localised dissent very year. Jon Marks: It seems like they had put in an awful lot It is a country where people can at least be vocal now of effort for it to do so. Yes; I think that you have the about what they feel about the lack of housing, the criminal side, you have the ideological side and you lack of jobs and all the social pressures. That is what also have the political side. Who doesn’t love to rush I was saying. This can provide the foot soldiers for out a good communiqué to rationalise your move terrorist groups, but the really big question is the when the time is right? It does look so, because the disconnect between what a lot of the population think plant was being softened up for such an attack, at least they are getting from the authorities and what the as far as we understand at present. authorities think they are giving. Chair: Thank you very much indeed. That is a really Q48 Mark Hendrick: Smugglers connected to interesting insight into a part of the world that we extremist groups appear to be making good money have not looked at enough. Thank you for your from the illegal trans-Saharan trade. Are they wisdom and expertise. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [SO] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:45] Job: 036016 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o002_MP FAC 25 06 13 (3) corrected.xml

Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 15

Tuesday 25 June 2013

Members present: Richard Ottaway (Chair)

Sir Menzies Campbell Mr Frank Roy Mike Gapes Sir John Stanley Mark Hendrick Rory Stewart Andrew Rosindell ______

Examination of Witness

Witness: Professor Michael Clarke, Director General, Royal United Services Institute, gave evidence.

Q50 Chair: I welcome members of the public to this alienation in people by and large under the age of second evidence session for the Committee’s inquiry 40—with one or two gurus who are considerably older into the UK’s response to extremism and political than that, so it is generational in that revolutionary instability in North and West Africa. sense. May I extend a very warm welcome to our first Where I disagree with the Prime Minister—in the witness, Professor Michael Clarke, the Director statement he made after the In Amenas incident—was General of the Royal United Services Institute? by implication in uniting all of these forces, as if they Welcome, Michael. You are perhaps more used to were all al-Qaeda. I think that that gave far too great appearing in front of the Defence Committee, but the a prominence to al-Qaeda core as an organising group, fact that you are here shows the overlap and the and it also ran the risk of uniting some of these strategic importance of this region. Is there anything disparate groups, who often will go along with the that you would like to say by way of an opening jihadist rhetoric on a temporary basis and for their statement? own reasons. The danger in the Sahel seemed to me Professor Clarke: Only that, in headline terms, the that our rhetoric would unite groups who will, by their apparent threat from foreign jihadist terrorism seemed own volition, tend to be fractious and fall apart given at one time to come from North Africa. It seemed to some time. Time is on our side in the Sahel area and originate from North Africa, and in the years around 2001 to 2005 that was the prevailing assumption. That North Africa. The worst thing we could do is to make assumption was changed by Operation Crevice in the mistake of uniting them by glamorising them and 2004, and then the 7/7 bombings in 2005 and by assuming them to be a universal threat to western everything that happened thereafter. interests. In a sense, the wheel is coming full circle, because the present concern is now much more on the old areas of Q52 Chair: Is there any other way of phrasing it? origin of a lot of jihadist terrorism, which goes back to How would you put it then? He had to address the North Africa. It has migrated, partly as an unexpected issue. You would have said, “They are and remain a consequence of the Libyan war of 2011, into the Sahel disparate group”? and into West Africa, so in a sense we are partly Professor Clarke: Yes. Some of the ideological revisiting some of the issues that seemed to be more hardliners in these groups had pulled along a lot of important to us in the years immediately after 2001. relatively secular groups. Boko Haram, in northern and western Nigeria, is pretty secular and is actually Q51 Chair: Our inquiry was sparked off by the In more concerned with a degree of territorial Amenas incident and the Prime Minister’s statement independence. It is not particularly committed to on the Floor of the House. I would not say that you Sharia law, whereas Ansaru, which is connected to were critical of his statement, but you had some Boko Haram—it is a splinter group—is very Sharia- comments to make about his phraseology then. The minded. The best thing we could do is to try to split PM said that we were involved in a “generational those two things apart. struggle” with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Equally, instability in both Algeria and Mali was its jihadist fellow travellers. Do you agree with that, or is it bigger than that? stimulated by the Tuareg peoples, who found that they Professor Clarke: No, I agree that it is a generational were in a different situation after the Libyan civil war. struggle. It is generational in the sense that the ideas The Tuareg fall into some ideological hardliners and behind what I call jihadism—I know that there is no some determined secularists. The most important really good term for this, but let us assume we all thing is to recognise that there is an ideological know what we mean if we say jihadism—are part of element to this struggle—what I would define, quite a generational evolution of thinking that could be seriously, as Islamo-fascist. The jihadists are Islamo- expected to last at least for a generation if not for fascists, and I would be prepared to defend that more. In that respect, yes, I think that the issue is position on the basis of political theory. They are a generational. group of Islamo-fascists who attract, through glamour, It is also generational in the sense that it arises from a group of warlords, criminals and fellow travellers, alienation among a spectrum of youth—not always who can be easily motivated but just as easily disadvantaged, but nevertheless a spectrum of disentangled from them if our strategy is correct. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:45] Job: 036016 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o002_MP FAC 25 06 13 (3) corrected.xml

Ev 16 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

25 June 2013 Professor Michael Clarke

Q53 Chair: That is interesting. Do you think that I have seen is not systematic. I am not aware of very there is any support for this at grass-roots level? If strong funding pipelines into West Africa. I am aware you have an Islamo-fascist group, I would have of strong funding pipelines into North Africa, but thought that it would be pretty unpopular at the grass- there is anecdotal evidence that some of that finds it roots level—the people in the villages who are way into West Africa. On the other hand, the funding struggling to get by. Is there hostility there, or do they required for a functioning group is not particularly support these people? great. Even small amounts of funding, even if Professor Clarke: In various parts of the region and irregular, can make quite a big difference in certain in South Asia, these groups can be fairly popular, parts of Niger or Mauritania. certainly in the short term, because in a period of chaos, they represent something, and they are better Q57 Mark Hendrick: Is there anything that we can organised. We should not be surprised that in the do about it? aftermath of the Arab Spring or Uprising—whatever Professor Clarke: Not very much on the funding side, we call it—political Islamists will do well, because because the sort of funding that is supporting they are better organised than most of the others, and Wahabism and Salafism across the region is very they do stand for something in a time of chaos; anyone dispersed. Many people think that a lot of it starts in who stands for something carries a certain amount of Saudi Arabia, but it does not even begin in the Saudi support. Government. It begins within Saudi sources and Yes, there is some support for these groups, but that sources that think of themselves as charitable support very often wanes when such groups take organisations trying to promote a particular view of power, even locally. They can often take power by Islam. offering—they say—accessible justice. They set themselves up as an alternative Government. They are Q58 Mark Hendrick: In January, in relation to the quick and arbitrary. They make decisions that local intervention in Mali, you wrote: “it is difficult to see people very often like, at least in the short term, but what military action can realistically achieve that will not many groups in the world actually want to live not make the situation potentially worse”. Is that still under a strict interpretation of Sharia law. your view? Professor Clarke: Yes. The issue faced in the region, Q54 Chair: One of our witnesses spoke of the in the Sahel, is that the distances are so great, and that democratic bulge—the population growth fuelling French action in Mali in a military sense has been instability through creating a number of young men relatively successful. Their losses have been fairly and women with little economic prospects. Do you small, and they have conducted some very effective think that that is a fair comment? operations which, from a military point of view, have Professor Clarke: Yes. Young people without excited the admiration of other military professionals. prospects are ripe for radicalisation of all sorts. There We have to say that. However, their ability to properly is plenty of evidence across the region and other contain the situation is limited. They can keep rebel regions of growing alienation among the under-30s groups on the move because the western forces have and, in many cases, the under-25s. The question that mobility, they have intelligence, and they have air we must address is what form that alienation takes. It superiority. So they can always keep groups on the does not always take a jihadist form. It does not even move, but they cannot attack those groups effectively. always take a violent form. It may take a form of They cannot undercut them completely. The groups indifference. It may take a form of complete apathy. can keep dispersing, which is what seems to be But alienation is the background from which it is easy happening. for determined ideologues to recruit followers and The French are able, in support of the Malian supporters. Government, to take control of all the southern cities and townships in Mali, and some of the north. They Q55 Chair: Do you agree that the demographic bulge can control the urban centres, which is reasonable, but is fuelling that? they cannot actually stop groups attacking those Professor Clarke: Absolutely. Yes. Across the greater centres or forming in other places by military means. Middle East, the proportion of young people under the It is like air in a balloon. You can keep it moving age of 25 is growing all the time. The effect of that is around, but you cannot ultimately diminish the clear: if those people can be satisfactorily amount of air. accommodated with prospects and jobs, that is a source of prosperity. If they cannot, it is a source of Q59 Mark Hendrick: Some of us from the endless instability. Committee visited Mali a few weeks back. We saw the training that went on between the Europeans Q56 Mark Hendrick: Professor Clarke, what training in Bamako. They were saying then that the evidence is there in North and West Africa of the work, while it may be effective in training an army, is jihadist groups getting funding from outside the area? not sustainable in the long term in keeping the rebels Professor Clarke: There is some evidence. I have to at bay. say that most of it is anecdotal, even to the security Professor Clarke: Yes. The French or the European services, but there is some evidence of funding that members can train the Malians. That is a useful thing finds its way from Saudi Arabia, which disburses so to do. It would be useful in any case because more much funding to Wahabist movements that a lot of it professional armies tend to be more democratic armies gets passed on. There is some evidence, but that which and more useful armies in terms of building societies. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:45] Job: 036016 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o002_MP FAC 25 06 13 (3) corrected.xml

Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 17

25 June 2013 Professor Michael Clarke

In this particular case, a more effective Malian army enriching the arsenals of a range of non-State actors, is an extremely important element. In a sense, what including terrorist groups.” Can you give us your the French and other Europeans are doing is training perspective as to how significant the removal of all the Malians to take over from them, so they can only types of weapons and ammunition from the former do—we hope with reasonable efficiency—what the Gaddafi stockpiles is in fuelling the conflicts taking French are already doing. So it contains the situation, place in Mali, sub-Saharan Africa, west Africa, north but, in itself, there is no answer within the sort of Africa and the Sahel? numbers we are talking about to the open spaces Professor Clarke: The short answer is very serious. problem in these countries. These countries will The arsenals that existed in Libya, as we all know, always be difficult to police, and the best you can were extensive, and there has been almost no control achieve is reasonable security in the urban centres. I over those weapons stocks. The new Government has am not denigrating that, because, if you can achieve proved virtually incapable of preventing those that, that is quite a lot. But it will not in and of itself weapons stocks draining away. In any case, before the diminish the force of Islamist rebels. fall of Gaddafi, a lot of those stocks were in effect wide open, and more weapons were coming in from Q60 Mark Hendrick: If the Islamists were to make the Gulf as part of the civil war against Gaddafi. another push in that part of Africa, as they did in Mali Weapons never go out of commission; they just go in 2012, where would it most likely come? somewhere else. Almost all weapons find a new home Professor Clarke: In the north; they can fall back on once a war is over. We worried at the end of 2011, their heartland. In Mali, the danger is in the when the Libyan war came to a conclusion, that the mountainous areas of the north. The capital is weapons would go southwards, which indeed they did. reasonably secure. The rebels could create incidents They went to the Tuareg rebellion, which destabilised in the capital, but again I think we have to distinguish Mali and then had knock-on effects in Mauritania and between those elements in Mali who are jihadists and Niger. Those weapon stocks seemed to go southwards. those who are trying to overthrow the Government, I think the community is not particularly bothered because they want to replace the Government in a about weapons going to Somalia, because it has more secular way. always been well-stocked. It is saturated with light weapons, in any case. Q61 Mark Hendrick: I meant outside of Mali. The biggest difference has been Libyan weapons Professor Clarke: I beg your pardon. Outside Mali, turning up in the Levant. The crisis in Syria is now a Niger and Mauritania are more vulnerable—not to an crisis across the Levant, from Lebanon through to organised takeover, but to rebel behaviour that may Iraq. The exam question we always set ourselves now affect western companies and interests. Northern and at RUSI is, will Lebanon and Iraq survive the Syria western Nigeria are also in a dangerous state. These crisis? It is really very serious. There is a lot of are very big areas and I would not expect any evidence that Libyan weapons are now circulating organisation to be able to mount an offensive in an pretty freely in the Levant, and that seems to be where organised way across the region, but if we are looking they will have the most destabilising effect. But for areas of potential vulnerability to an upsurge in unquestionably they go out in all directions. They jihadist terrorism, I would say Niger, north-western have certainly made a difference to the south of Libya, Nigeria and parts of Mauritania are all vulnerable. and now they have made a difference a long way Sir John Stanley: As you will be aware, the UK and away. a significant number of other western countries were significant suppliers of all types of arms and Q62 Sir John Stanley: Would you conclude from ammunition to President Gaddafi right up to the start that, as some people have, that the very act of of the Arab spring. You will also be aware that the UN Panel of Experts’ latest report on the supplying weapons in those circumstances means that implementation of Resolution 1973 in relation to you are basically supplying weapons into a Libya highlights the breakdown of security around the commercial market? The moment the weapons leave Gaddafi stockpiles of weapons and ammunition as one your possession—whether it is weapons or of the major sources of arms, ammunition and more ammunition—they become commodities to be sold at sophisticated weapons flowing out of Libya into Mali the highest price. and elsewhere in Africa, and also into the wider Professor Clarke: I would agree with that. There is Middle East. no such thing as an end-user guarantee on anything You will know that the Panel of Experts state in their other than the most sophisticated of weaponry. latest report: “The proliferation of weapons from Everything below the level of really sophisticated Libya has continued at a worrying rate and has spread aerial, maritime and ground-based combat systems— into new territory: West Africa, the Levant and, the really high-tech stuff that we produce small arms, potentially, even the Horn of Africa...Since the light weaponry or even medium-range weaponry, is uprising and the resulting collapse of the security on the market once it is sold to anybody. Those things, apparatus, including the loss of national control over as I say, do not go obsolete very quickly. weapons stockpiles and the absence of any border controls, Libya has over the past two years become a Q63 Mr Roy: Professor, can I take you back to your significant and attractive source of weaponry in the remarks on the role of France in Mali? We have been region. Illicit flows from the country are fuelling told that their military presence could remain in Mali existing conflicts in Africa and the Levant and for quite some time. In your opinion, how easy will it cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:45] Job: 036016 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o002_MP FAC 25 06 13 (3) corrected.xml

Ev 18 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

25 June 2013 Professor Michael Clarke be for France to disengage from Mali, and how long weapons are certainly generally available too. One of do you think it will take? the greatest examples was the Stinger missiles. Professor Clarke: Rather like the ISAF presence in Afghanistan, the disengagement is entirely dependent Q66 Sir Menzies Campbell: I was going to ask on the rate at which they can train an indigenous about those. force—in this case, the Malian army. Of course, they Professor Clarke: They1 were supplied to the could always choose to disengage before that training mujaheddin in the Afghan war of 1980–88, and about is credibly done, but they would take a certain amount 1,0002 were still extant at the end of the war. The of political criticism in doing that. United States tried a buy-back programme, but did not A successful disengagement, one where they can walk get more than 3003 at the very most, so there are away and say they have achieved their objective, 700 Stingers moving around the region. The good would be one that is coincident with the adequate thing about the Stingers is that they rely on two forms training of sufficient numbers in the Malian army. of battery, which were not easily supplied or However, that is a two to three-year job at the very replicated. Interestingly, Stinger have made very least in my estimation, and France has been talking small, occasional appearances on the world stage. I about withdrawing in a matter of months. It seems think that the general view is that we can now write 4 to me that there is a disconnect between the political off the 700 that were never found. However, that is statements that Hollande feels he has had to make and a relatively unusual case of a weapon that became the logic of the military situation on the ground. obsolete with time; most of them do not. We certainly have to expect that the ones you are talking about will Q64 Mr Roy: What effect does the potential failure remain current for at least 10 or 15 years, if not longer. to make a clear and swift break from Mali have on the United Kingdom and the United Kingdom’s interests? Q67 Sir Menzies Campbell: Can you just explain, Professor Clarke: I do not think there is a direct for the benefit of those who do not know, what a effect. The UK’s Ministry of Defence is taking a great Stinger is? deal of interest in what France is doing in Mali, and Professor Clarke: It is a shoulder-launched anti- indeed has offered some forms of support. As support aircraft missile that the Americans supplied to the mujaheddin. It turned out that the mujaheddin could to an ally, we have offered a certain amount of not use them very well against aircraft, but some of logistical help and help with air support. It seems to them learned how to use them against helicopters. me entirely appropriate that we did that. If the French Even so, there are different issues around this. operation in Mali went seriously wrong, I suppose Everyone assumes that if al-Qaeda got hold of these Britain might be under some pressure to find ways of weapons, they would use them very accurately; they helping. However, the idea of direct help with boots are actually quite hard to use. Even in the mujaheddin on the ground would be absolutely out of the question days, only a few members of the mujaheddin were in the present circumstances, if that is the thinking good at using them, and they were only good at using behind your question. them against Russian helicopters. Nevertheless, they The expectation, as I understand it, in the Ministry of did have a tipping effect on Russian perceptions of Defence at the moment is that the French operation the war. has gone reasonably well. As long as they are prepared to step up the training process—they are Q68 Chair: When the French go, do you think the getting some European support for that—they ought rebels will return? to be able to withdraw in a reasonably well-structured Professor Clarke: Yes. way. However, like all these operations, it can be knocked sideways by a particular event or another Q69 Chair: And then what? Do the French have to outrage, such as in the In Amenas case in Algeria. come back again? Professor Clarke: I doubt that the French will go back Q65 Sir Menzies Campbell: Please accept my again. I think that the Malian Government will find apologies for not being present when you began themselves involved with a low-level insurgency, giving evidence—I had to go back to my office to take which they will cope with either well or less well. a telephone call. I was interested in the exchange between Sir John Q70 Chair: You do not think that it will threaten Stanley and yourself about the marketability of Bamako again? weapons, particularly your evidence that anything up Professor Clarke: No. The Malians should be well to the most sophisticated is probably available enough trained to defend the capital, but I think that somewhere. May I ask you to tell us what we are they will find themselves with an insurgency in their talking about? We are talking about RPGs, mortars, north, because I see nothing from the research that we artillery and anti-tank weapons. Anything up to the do in our institute to indicate that the causes and the most sophisticated includes a lot of pretty facilities for the insurgents are any less than they heavyweight—I do not use that in the technical were. I do not see any reason to imagine that their sense—equipment, doesn’t it? will to try to take over will have lessened. I think that Professor Clarke: Yes, it does. Light arms, bullets, of 1 Note by witness: Should read around 1000 course the ubiquitous AK47s or whatever, and rocket 2 Note by witness: Should read 600 propelled grenades are universal and can always be 3 Note by witness: Should read 200 or so obtained, but mortars, light artillery and anti-tank 4 Note by witness: Should read 400 or so cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:45] Job: 036016 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o002_MP FAC 25 06 13 (3) corrected.xml

Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 19

25 June 2013 Professor Michael Clarke the Malians know that when the French leave, they security and local work through regional communities will have to take it on. Of course, as with ISAF in or local communities at a regional level, all of whom Afghanistan, the French may be planning to leave can make the open spaces less benign to the potential behind enablers and to offer all sorts of indirect rebels or terrorists. assistance, which may make a difference. But we will see how much they are prepared to leave behind as Q73 Mike Gapes: What do the situation in Mali and against the strength of any insurgency that develops. the events in 2012 and this year tell us about how effective the African Union or ECOWAS are and the Q71 Mike Gapes: I was in Mali a few weeks ago, potential that they have? and I was struck by the fact that there is tension Professor Clarke: Their potential is so much greater because of the desire of the Malian Government—or than their practical effectiveness, but having said that, the interim Government, pending a democratic their effectiveness is orders of magnitude more than it election—to restore authority as quickly as possible in was a few years ago, which is probably not saying all territories, including Kidal, where there is a very much. The African Union is able to put soldiers minority Tuareg group that is not accepting the role in the field of varying quality and on a political basis of the state. On the one hand there is that, and the wider issue of dealing with jihadist terrorist groups, that is not particularly united or solid. The technical which have come in, in some cases, from Algeria, possibilities of the African Union are improving, but Libya or elsewhere. However, is there a potentially one of the problems that it has is that it still tends to longer problem here? The Malians, for understandable depend on Nigerian troops who in some cases find it reasons, will be interested in state building once they difficult to involve themselves in these areas, because have got a legitimate government and this process, they are not necessarily regarded as neutral or trusted. whereas the international community will be Equally, however, Nigerian troops are there in mass; interested in ensuring that there is not a potential they have numbers and training and they are not at all ungoverned space in that large unpopulated area in the badly commanded. The African Union has some north of Mali. bright spots that are improving. The world’s Professor Clarke: I agree that may be a tension, involvement with the African Union has been rather because there will always be large ungoverned spaces formulaic to date. Much more might be achieved by in countries such as Mali and Mauritania. They are western powers involving themselves more in the too big to govern, except in very sophisticated ways, training and technical support to African Union troops which are not really available to them. Whatever and forces. happens in Bamako and the other towns and cities It is a delicate problem because African Union forces of Mali, the international community will always be do not want to be talked at or lectured at, all the time. concerned that they have some intelligence oversight There is a political sensitivity there. Nevertheless, on what is going on in between the urban centres, some very good work has been done in the past five because Mali is in a region that has become or six years, which could be done much more radicalised. The Prime Minister was right on that intensively in the next five or six. score: it is a generational issue. Whatever form of government prevails in Mali over the medium term, it Q74 Mike Gapes: The submission of a written paper will be a candidate area for the creation, and even the that we got from your colleagues in RUSI proposed training, of rebel groups. that the UK could have a role in trying to get better co-ordination and interaction between countries in the Q72 Mike Gapes: In January, you wrote that Sahara and the Sahel region. Given that our historical “chasing different groups round the open spaces of the relationship with many of these countries is quite Sahel has strictly limited utility.” That is a bit of an limited, and that France is much more historically and understatement, is it not? How much can regional co- currently engaged, would our involvement be operation help to deal with this? Given that we have welcomed? got such a wide area, arbitrary lines drawn on maps Professor Clarke: If it were in the right areas, I think by colonial powers and huge areas where the writ of central Government hardly runs at all, is this in effect it would. We still have a lot to offer in technical a problem that the world will have to confront, or can military support and our ability to offer back-up and regional co-operation deal with it? even training in command and control. There is also, Professor Clarke: I do not think that it is a hopeless remember, the Franco-British defence treaty of 2010, cause. There are things that can be done to minimise which is sometimes more popular in Paris than it is the nature of the problem. Local linkages can be built in London, particularly at present because the French up. Much greater attention can be paid to border would like us to do a bit more of the lifting on all security and international help can be given to that. of that. More intelligence co-operation always helps, and I would not rule out the idea that we could make a trying, as far as possible, to generate the work of local contribution in Commonwealth Africa, just because communities. All those things can be stimulated at a France has got it covered in Francophone Africa. It regional level. It is possible for states, like the United seems to me that there is a natural British-French States, those in Europe, and those external countries coincidence of interest, in which the French are taking that are concerned about what is going on in the Sahel, the lead—and that’s fine. We could choose to do more to try to help technically and financially to engender in the context of British-French relations in co- all these things: intelligence co-operation, border ordinating more. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:45] Job: 036016 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o002_MP FAC 25 06 13 (3) corrected.xml

Ev 20 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

25 June 2013 Professor Michael Clarke

Q75 Mike Gapes: Specifically on Algeria, we went country raises special issues. Not all countries are as to Algeria before we went to Mali. There seemed to democratic or as respecting of civil rights as we think be some enthusiasm, at least rhetorically, for the that we are, and therefore there will be lots of Algerians to have closer co-operation with the UK. compromises, but the partnership is the way forward. That ties in with what the Prime Minister said in All of that makes perfect sense. January, and the Foreign Secretary’s speech at RUSI A number of people after the speech were left in February. One thing that struck me—and I would wondering what was different or new about this be grateful if you could confirm this—was that the approach, other than to lay it all out in a very clear Algerians have a very traditionalist view about non- way. The essence is: what could the partnerships interference in the internal affairs of other countries. contain? The defence engagement strategy may fit into On the one hand, they want co-operation, but entirely this: the idea that, as we draw down from Afghanistan, on their terms. They want technology and assistance we use our forces in a more politically astute way, or but it is, “You give us it; we control it.” There is also we use them to create more overtly political effects. a great reluctance for Algeria to get involved in any If we are talking about better partnerships with other country in the region outside its borders. Can countries, those partnerships depend on an intelligence you confirm that is the case? Or is there a possibility relationship that has to be kept relatively separate and that that might change over time? a diplomatic relationship which can be beefed up, but Professor Clarke: The essence of how you put it, Mr it also can be bolstered by a better technical Gapes, is correct. Suffering the civil war in the 1990s, relationship on military issues. There is a way of and well before that, gave the Algerian Government a playing our military card in a new, post-Afghanistan very tough-minded attitude towards its independence situation more assertively than we did in the past. and sovereignty of action. That is why in the In Amenas case the outside world could talk all it liked Q79 Mike Gapes: On the intelligence question, about the need to negotiate; there was no way that Algeria’s human rights record is not necessarily one Government were going to wait and talk to terrorists that we would be happy with. I know that we have who had invaded the plant. They were going to make got a memorandum of understanding and various a tough response whatever the outside world said, and other things, but how much further can we go in co- almost whatever the consequences. That was to be operating with Algeria on these issues? expected. Professor Clarke: In the case of Algeria, I would say: Having said that, if there was a silver lining to that not very far until we get more assurances and crisis it is that the Algerians show some signs of demonstrated behaviour. Algeria is one of those thinking afresh about their relationship with other countries in which we do have difficulties. As I European powers. I think there are some openings for mentioned before, precisely because of the a new beginning with other countries. I think the viciousness of the civil war that they went through in Prime Minister was right to say what he did in Algeria the ’90s, the Algerian Government takes a very tough- about our relationship with that country. There are minded attitude towards dissent and any elements of some possibilities but we should accept that France is insurgency. first port of call for the Algerians. That is traditionally The idea of a partnership with Algeria is a nice the case and remains so. Nevertheless, that does not aspiration, but those assurances and behaviour would mean to say that we cannot complement French policy need to be demonstrated in very practical ways for it with a more forward-leaning policy towards to be politically acceptable to us. Whereas, for relationships with the Government in Algiers. instance, greater partnerships with our friends in the Gulf or with our friends in Jordan, for instance, are Q76 Mike Gapes: But is it not also the case that the far more meaningful and seem to have made some French-Algerian relationship is a difficult and progress. complicated one? Given their history, the Algerians might welcome a relationship with Britain almost to Q80 Rory Stewart: One of the fundamental reduce the reliance on the French because of all the problems we have been reporting on in this historical baggage. Committee over the last three years is the sense that Professor Clarke: Yes, but in terms of our relationship there is a real lack of knowledge. We are facing a with Paris we should handle that very carefully. crisis in terms of UK expertise in political reporting: a lack of people who spend a long time in these Q77 Mike Gapes: I agree. countries and really understand them. We are Professor Clarke: There is scope for greater beginning to replace that with a cadre of instant involvement but it ought to be managed in a very joint experts who talk about ungoverned space and London-Paris framework. existential threats. How many people in the UK foreign policy community—the Army, the Foreign Q78 Mike Gapes: What do you think, in practice, the Office and the think tanks—do you think genuinely Foreign Secretary’s remarks at RUSI mean in terms of have a profound a knowledge of Mali and its culture, the day to day future relationship? Is there anything history and languages or, indeed, any way of practical that we could put forward at this stage? combining that with a deep sense of the UK’s Professor Clarke: The Foreign Secretary spoke strategic interests? eloquently, as he always does, about the need for new Professor Clarke: I would not like to put a figure on partnerships so that we can approach counter- it, but it is only a handful. We are not talking about a terrorism in a more internationalist way. Every large community who talk to each other all the time. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:45] Job: 036016 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o002_MP FAC 25 06 13 (3) corrected.xml

Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 21

25 June 2013 Professor Michael Clarke

There are individual, professional experts who are If I can just add to that, I should say that there is one often hidden away in institutions that are not part of other element of threat, which is not normally referred government, and there are people in government who to but that we are certainly doing a lot more work on can duck in and out of these issues, but I agree that in my institute, which is the threat to our interests our level of expertise on regions outside Europe, the abroad—so British interests, governmental Mediterranean and the Levant is not great. organisations, British companies and British-related companies. British citizens working in these countries Q81 Rory Stewart: That brings us on to the Prime are at significantly greater threat, in the past couple of Minister’s confident statement on 21 January that we years, of kidnap and murder than they were before. face a large and existential threat in the UK from The absolute numbers of these occurrences are small extremists. Do you think that extremists in the but the growth in the incidence is fairly dramatic. Maghreb and the Sahel pose an existential threat to UK security? Q84 Rory Stewart: I have two final points. In the Professor Clarke: At the moment, only in an indirect late 1990s and early 2000s we were told that there way. Most of the extremists in whom we are interested was a very significant threat from Algerian terrorists are drawn at the moment towards Syria, because that to the United Kingdom. That appears not to have is glamorous, and, partly, to the horn of Africa. That materialised, or else not to be very strong at the is a very indirect threat, in the sense that some of moment. Why is that? Why were we wrong about that those people may regard the United Kingdom, other and what do we do about it? West European countries and the United States as Professor Clarke: I do not think that we were entirely legitimate targets for the campaigns that they have wrong about that. Kamel Bourgass was an Algerian conducted in other parts of the world. It is indirect. who was behind the ricin plot, if you remember, which There is another version of indirect threat, which is was an attempt—a very badly put together one, that when people go to fight in a jihad—in a war— because these characters seemed to be making yoghurt say in the Levant, it may serve to radicalise some of more than ricin—to produce ricin in north London and the communities that exist back in western Europe. smear it on door handles in the Jewish areas of That too is indirect. Golders Green and Finsbury, and also take it on the By and large, with people who went to fight in tube. Their intention was to infect as many Jewish Afghanistan and Iraq, we used to worry that they commuters as they possibly could. Their intentions would come back to western Europe with training, were absolutely evil, although their incompetence was weapons and motivation. In reality, very few did. what most striking about the ricin case. But their Dozens went, and a trickle of threes and fours came leader was an Algerian, Kamel Bourgass. back; they were fairly easily monitored. That process We have not been completely free of Algerian has not happened in previous conflicts. We don’t know influence on some of the terrorists and the plots that whether that is going to be repeated here, but it may we have been engaged with, but it has been marginal be. to the incidence of terrorism. That has really come through Pakistan since 2002 and 2003. Q82 Rory Stewart: To come back from the Levant specifically to Mali and the Maghreb, what does Q85 Rory Stewart: And is the fact that it is marginal somebody like the Prime Minister mean when he says a tribute to the amazing work of our security services? that he thinks that specifically Mali and the Maghreb Or was the threat perhaps not so high in the first pose an existential threat to UK security? What is an place? existential threat? What sequence of events is he Professor Clarke: I do not think the threat was as high envisaging there? in the first place; that is certainly true. On the eve of Professor Clarke: I cannot speak for the Prime 2004–05, the security services believed that they had Minister, but my sense of the existential threat that he pretty good information about all of the North African was speaking about was the threat of growing glamour communities in Britain. They believed that their and, as it were, the power of imitation: a jihadist capacities and their motivation were quite low but campaign is carried on in three or four places in the then they got worried that they did not know enough world, simultaneously, usually for local reasons, and about the South Asian communities, particularly the that has the effect of helping radicalise some of our Pakistani community, and that lack was made alienated youth in this country. That is one version of manifest in 2005 with the 7/7 bombings. the existential threat. We relied a lot on French intelligence, which was very good on Algerian issues for obvious reasons. We Q83 Rory Stewart: Surely existential means seemed to get a lot of good information from French specifically a threat to the very existence of our intelligence which allowed us to head off one or two country? It is not just a threat, but an existential threat. plots that were Algerian related or Algerian based. But Professor Clarke: I do not take the word “existential” I would not disagree with your essential contention to mean the existence of our country; I take it to mean that the threat from Algerian terrorism in the early that it is there in the very context in which we speak, ’90s was not great. whether we like it or not: it is existential in the sense that it is always there. In that respect, jihadism is a Q86 Rory Stewart: Finally, on the UK’s policy generational phenomenon; in so far as we should towards the West African diaspora community, are we worry about it, it is in the context of world politics for doing enough to counter radicalisation here in the the foreseeable future. It is existential in that sense. UK? cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:45] Job: 036016 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o002_MP FAC 25 06 13 (3) corrected.xml

Ev 22 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

25 June 2013 Professor Michael Clarke

Professor Clarke: I can only give a general work together. None of the North African impression on that. My impression is that we are not communities do. They have better relations with their because we do not have enough resource of the right European partners than they do with each other, which sort devoted to it. Whereas I think we are making is one of the reasons why it is very difficult to some headway on the South Asian community now, articulate a sensible regional policy for the whole of genuinely so, I don’t think we are doing as much with North Africa. You have to have a policy in relation to the West African community. But I cannot give you each individual state. So it is a matter of intensive chapter and verse on that. bilateralism, rather than regional multilateralism.

Q87 Chair: Final question, Professor Clarke. We Q88 Chair: If you look at countries of the region: have been talking about Algeria. Next door we have Mauritania is broke; Western Sahara is annexed; Morocco and they don’t talk to each other because Morocco is not talking to Algeria; Tunisia is 50:50; of a row about Western Sahara. We have heard from and Libya is still a mess. So there is no surprise that witnesses and when we were in the region that if the there is a bit of a lack of a regional policy at the two countries worked more closely together they moment. would be more effective. Is that a fair comment? Professor Clarke: Precisely. Professor Clarke: Absolutely fair. The Moroccans have a lot to offer in all sorts of ways: economically, Q89 Chair: Professor Clarke, thank you very much technically and in terms of their understanding of the indeed. As ever, you were very clear and forthcoming. politics of the North African region. But they do not

Examination of Witness

Witness: Sir Richard Gozney, former UK High Commissioner to Nigeria and former UK Permanent Representative to the Economic Community of West African States, gave evidence.

Q90 Chair: I welcome Sir Richard Gozney, the Obasanjo. He was from the south but appealed to the former UK High Commissioner to Nigeria and former north. Then the north thought it was going to be their UK Permanent Representative to the Economic turn after eight years and people in that country tend Community of West African States, better known as to think in terms of the “turns” of the regions. They ECOWAS. Sir Richard, thank you very much for chose, and the populace duly elected, Yar’Adua, a finding the time to come along. We have a vote in the former northern governor, but the poor man was House at 4 o’clock, so we will endeavour to finish the already ill and died within a year or so. His deputy session by then. You obviously have a lot of was not only from the south, but from the far south, knowledge about Nigeria and the region. You have the Delta. That was the first time that any President, spoken in the past about the northern alienation, which or vice-president, of Nigeria had come from the far you referred to in some evidence you gave us. Is that south, the delta, and he is the man who is still in due to religious superiority or a difference of a charge now. significant component in the north? So, if you tot up the years since ’98, the north have Sir Richard Gozney: I think that it is less about only had their chap, or one of their chaps—who, under religious superiority than about economic inferiority the informal Nigerian system, could be expected to and I do not mean that in a mental state but actually see the north right—for only about a year in all that in the physical state and actual wealth, and the period. And that, in combination with the other distribution of wealth in that country. Nigeria is a factors, gives a sense of alienation. I would put it as country obviously with a good deal of money from oil being more economic than religious. and gas. Most of the money tends to sit in the south; that is where the commerce is. So the northerners are under the federal arrangements they have in Nigeria; Q91 Chair: Is it surprising that this has not erupted they are genuinely federal arrangements in Nigeria, on a larger scale in recent years? We see the outcomes with each state of the north, like all the 36 states of of the presidential election; we see the religious and the country, getting a cut of about half of the federal ethnic differences that you have been talking about. money. The south gets more, because that is where the Does it surprise you that the protests have not been oil is, and the economic activity is overwhelmingly in more emphatic? the south. The north is also much drier and much Sir Richard Gozney: Yes. I think most people are poorer as a result, in terms of subsistence agriculture. surprised that Nigerians have not protested a great So people feel that the geography and the climate have deal more about their circumstances for several disadvantaged the north. decades, but particularly in this period when protests That has been compounded by the recent politics. have been more easily permitted, because they are, as Nigeria became democratic again in ’98, and their you would expect in a democracy. There is a large elections are variable, but they have held them and number of, I suppose, 20 to 25-year-olds—maybe a they have got through to the end of their two times bit beyond that—who are not only without work and four-year cycle for the first time ever in that country. have not had much education but whose own They had as their first president a former general but estimates of their future prospects are probably even a man who was elected as a civilian—General worse than they really are. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:45] Job: 036016 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o002_MP FAC 25 06 13 (3) corrected.xml

Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 23

25 June 2013 Sir Richard Gozney

That makes those people pretty biddable to anyone Q95 Mr Roy: Yes, but I am talking about anyone who has got $2 a head in their pocket and wants to from this country or any western country going create trouble. I say that not lightly. We saw that over— situation repeatedly in Kaduna and in Kano, two of Sir Richard Gozney: I’m not sure you need that. I the big cities of the north—they are directly north of think there are enough Nigerians who can do it, but Abuja. So, if you want to create trouble, it is very they are not being paid to do it, because the federal easy to do so, because there is this disaffected youth. budget tends to get a bit thinned out before it reaches Well, we have seen it in recent years around the where it is meant to be going, and the state budgets, Middle East and now in Brazil, but these are not which I think cover primary and secondary people who have got a political campaign to wage, or education—not tertiary; that is the federal—tend to a political cause to further. They are poor, they feel get thinned out, too. So the money available for doing they haven’t got much chance and for $2 they will this is not great. The schools are there. The children, take it on, even though the consequences to them may as is the case everywhere in the countries that one be very serious. visits in that part of the world, are desperate for the education. Q92 Mr Roy: In relation to education in the north, We did send VSOs up there—quite a few VSOs were specifically female education, could you elaborate on there—and if we can still do that, that’s fine. A lot of how the United Kingdom, for example, might help to Kenyan and Ugandan VSOs—VSOs recruited in bring about more or better education for females? Kenya and Uganda—were working there, which is Sir Richard Gozney: Yes. I mean, I expect the quite interesting. They have challenges, because in Department for International Development is doing some places they are not expecting a fellow black those things, although I haven’t been keeping up with face—to put it crudely—to turn up to teach them it for the past six years, since I left. It was putting a when they’ve applied for a British volunteer, but they great emphasis on education, especially on women’s were very successful in doing this, and that may be a education, and I expect it is still the same. If you look slightly easier way of doing it. A Ugandan or a around the whole of West Africa and down the Kenyan is not such an obvious target in northern western side of Africa, the contrasts in figures for Nigeria as the others. So there are people you can use women’s literacy are very striking; I had a reason to if you run out of Nigerians, but I think it would be a look at this the other day, well before I was contacted while before you did. about coming along here. It is mostly the Francophone countries that have had poor literacy among women, Q96 Mr Roy: Let’s keep to northern Nigeria. In and the Francophone countries in general have a much terms of keeping Nigeria together and keeping violent lower growth rate at the moment. It is a big jump to extremism at bay, do you see the application of Sharia move from women’s literacy to the economic growth law, for example, in the north as part of the solution rate, but I do make that jump. I do think there is a or as part of the problem? link, because if a woman has been to school herself Sir Richard Gozney: I left Nigeria feeling much more and starts having children and having girls, she will that it was part of the solution than when I went there, make a much bigger struggle to get those girls into because I went there, like a lot of people, quite school—I am talking not about university, but about sceptical about Sharia law. I went there after four primary schooling—so that they have basic literacy. years in Indonesia, the biggest Muslim country in the The figure for northern Nigeria is comparable to that world, where Sharia law was not being applied except for some of the Francophones, and that is not good in very restricted circumstances geographically and company to keep. What can we do about that? There politically. It took the wife of the chief justice, who are plenty of very articulate, capable, educated was herself a firebrand human rights lawyer of some Nigerians who can do the job for us. You don’t have international reputation, to check me on this. Maryam to send British nationals up into the north, which is— Uwais said, “Now you just be careful, you westerners, before you dismiss Sharia law. Often in the past, Q93 Mr Roy: Is that because it would be too before Sharia courts were set up, a woman who got sensitive to— divorced in the north got nothing. Her husband was Sir Richard Gozney: I think that at the moment, after responsible for bringing up the children, and she the kidnappings that have happened in the north—a walked away with nothing. Sharia law provides for poor British engineer was killed up there—the risks her to get one third of the husband’s estate, and that are probably difficult to manage. But there are—we is much better than it was.” This comes from someone were working with them seven or eight years ago—a who is not a traditionalist Muslim or anything like lot of well educated Nigerians who genuinely care that. So from then on I started looking at it differently, about people who are much less well educated. DFID and when DFID, again, were helping to set up were using them then and they could use them now; Sharia—not so much courts; that was the job of the they probably are. That would be the agency I would Government, obviously—family arbitration and use. You don’t have to send someone up with a couple family reconciliation units, they were proving, of Land Rovers full of— although it was fairly early days, remarkably successful. The Sharia law and courts are quite Q94 Mr Roy: So you would not recommend direct quick—relatively quick—but the civil courts are very assistance. slow in that country. You are more likely to have Sir Richard Gozney: Well, this is direct assistance, in passed the point of caring by the time the case that we are paying for it. comes through. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:45] Job: 036016 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o002_MP FAC 25 06 13 (3) corrected.xml

Ev 24 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

25 June 2013 Sir Richard Gozney

Q97 Mr Roy: Is there not a danger, though, that an Government to see their role as perhaps promoting anti-Christian climate could be built up because of the population control in any way in Nigeria? increasing use of Sharia law in courts and suchlike Sir Richard Gozney: No, and if someone had and that some Christians would feel as though they suggested it, I would have been very sceptical, were a threat? because I do not think that we, as outsiders— Sir Richard Gozney: I see exactly what you mean. I Europeans—are the agents to spread that message. It don’t believe myself that the use of Sharia law in civil needs to be done by somebody else. Seven or eight and family cases engenders any political Islamic years ago, Nigerians did not have a hang-up about movement. If you start using it with criminal cases, it Britain; they had got well past that state. They had is rather different; they were very few and far been independent for nearly 50 years—45 years- between, and when they gave harsh sentences, they plus—and where there was reason to blame were almost always overturned by the Sharia appeal Governments for their ills, they have blamed court, so the results were okay on that—it is a themselves, not Britain. That is unlike situations` 20 different issue. On the civil and family side, no, I do years earlier, in parts of the continent where people not think it has a political effect. It did not then. were much closer to the time of independence and where Britain tended to get the stick. That was Q98 Mark Hendrick: Sir Richard, when you were completely absent. Notwithstanding that they blame High Commissioner did you get the impression that themselves and not us, I still think that it would be the Nigerian Government were concerned about not only a brave person, but a foolhardy person who population growth in particular and the effects of it? went in from this country with that message. Many Sir Richard Gozney: No. I think it is one of the people would say that it needs to be given. I would contrasts between parts of Africa I know and parts of not argue against that, but it needs a third-party to Asia I know. There is not the same concern—I did not do it. find it in East Africa, southern Africa or West Africa—that a net population growth of 2%-plus, Q101 Chair: Sir Richard, it is the British which a number of those countries face, makes Government’s policy to meet the unmet demand for economic growth per capita so much harder. We have contraception throughout sub-Saharan Africa at the seen dramatic changes in India and in Indonesia, moment, for the very simple reason that no country, which I know well, of the birth rate coming down. apart from a few oil-rich states, have got themselves They are still growing population-wise, but not at the out of poverty without first stabilising their levels of 2%-plus rate that is still the case, I think, in much of population growth. When the person you were talking sub-Saharan Africa. I raised it once in a private to raised their eyebrows and thought you were mad, meeting with the ECOWAS Secretary-General, Mr was that out of ignorance or because having a large Chambas, a former Ghanaian Foreign Minister, for population meant more culturally than economically? whom I have a lot of time, and he looked at me as if Sir Richard Gozney: There is a strong cultural factor I was Malthus reincarnated, so I did not raise it again. and I think he thought that I was being patronising. Q102 Andrew Rosindell: Q99 Mark Hendrick: Has there not been any Good afternoon, Sir Richard. It is very good to see you. I shall ask a attempt whatsoever to relate population growth to general point about Nigeria and Britain’s relationship political radicalisation perhaps? with Nigeria. How much do you think that the Sir Richard Gozney: Sorry—population growth led to problems that Nigeria faces, in terms of the different political radicalisation? regions of Nigeria and the current ethnic divide, might Mark Hendrick: To correlate the population growth have been avoided had it not been for a helter-skelter with political radicalisation, because the economic rush of decolonisation—if things had been condition of the people who make up that population decolonised at a slower rate, and if more care and is pretty poor for the reasons you said earlier. attention had been given to the boundaries and respect Sir Richard Gozney: No, I do not think there has for the different regions and different ethnic make-up, been, and that is partly because the South, where rather than the rush that took place? How much of people are doing much better, also has very high this could have been avoided had we thought more population growth. It is not particularly Islamic and is carefully about it at the time? not part of Muslim Nigeria. It does not distinguish Sir Richard Gozney: I am afraid that it would not Muslim Nigeria from the non-Muslim South. There have changed things much. The Nigerians were held was one fellow, a Muslim in the South and a wealthy back for three years—Ghana got independence in fellow, who came up to me and congratulated me on 1957, and Nigeria was not until 1960—because they the British education system, having put 16 of his could not agree between the regions—the West, the children, all of whom he paid for, through the system. East and the North—as to what the federal I said, “Well, that’s very good. You’re keeping British constitution was and how it should work. They felt invisible exports going almost singlehandedly.” He rather cross, because they were much the biggest said, “Don’t worry, I have another nine still to go.” I population in the region, to have been beaten by the am afraid that there is no correlation, because there is old Gold Coast and Ghana. not really much of a debate. If we had slowed down, it would have made very little difference, unless we had been prepared to negotiate Q100 Mark Hendrick: When you were High the break-up of Nigeria into a number of countries— Commissioner, was there any attempt by the UK at least three, but possibly four or five. At that point, cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:45] Job: 036016 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o002_MP FAC 25 06 13 (3) corrected.xml

Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 25

25 June 2013 Sir Richard Gozney there had been no break-up of sub-Saharan countries What had been some very good educational since the second world war; there have been only two establishments—you still get doctors all over the since. It was certainly off limits to suggest it, and it United States who were trained in Ibadan medical would not have been welcome within the country. But faculty—fell away, as did all the other bits of that is hypothetical. infrastructure you need. I think that that is the only way one could have Oil was being developed, and the money flowing from reduced the ethnic differences, which are very oil was so much greater than the money flowing from marked, very strong and still play far too big a role in any competitive manufacturing firm’s exports for the the politics of Nigeria. Nigeria is not unique like that. region that the brighter graduates went to the oil I lived in Kenya years ago, where the division industry and have been there ever since. You have a between the two biggest ethnic groups there played a number of professions that are well paid and are not huge role—I think it still does—in politics. But it is corrupt that provide services to the oil industry, you very striking in Nigeria. have the oil industry itself, then you have a huge gap. For a country of 160 million people there is very little Q103 Andrew Rosindell: But had we been prepared manufacturing, there is virtually no mining and there to review the old colonial boundaries and look at other is not much commercial agriculture—a little, but not options, could it have made some difference, or would a great deal. The sources of economic activity that it really not have been realistic at the time? might fill in the middle are pretty few and far between. Sir Richard Gozney: I don’t think it would have been I am sure if my Nigerian friends were here they would realistic in terms of how the Nigerians would have argue the toss on some of that, but I do not think they reacted. Who knows what certain Nigerians would would argue qualitatively. have said in 1958 or 1959? But I suspect that they would each have said, “No. We want the country as it Q106 Sir Menzies Campbell: Is that gap capable of is”, with an eye to, in turn, ruling the whole lot from being filled, and if it is not filled what are the themselves in their own group. There were elaborate consequences? arrangements set in place so that it did rotate. It all Sir Richard Gozney: I think it is capable of being broke down, which led to the Biafra war of the late filled, but it is probably not going to be led by the 1960s, but the serious effort was made there, so that centre—by the federal Government. It will probably each region in turn could be in charge of the federal be led by the states. If a particular state has a Government. I don’t think it would have worked. particularly good governor—it matters hugely who is elected governor—and he or she knows they have a Q104 Sir Menzies Campbell: Just a comment. When four-year run at it with a good chance of the following independence is in the air, it is very difficult to resist four years afterwards, they can make quite a that, if you are the colonial power that is committed difference. However, they have to be much more to implement it. Is that not so? disciplined, and they have to push gently aside the Sir Richard Gozney: Yes. Absolutely. people who helped them get that governorship, who will expect to be repaid. That goes even for the best; Q105 Sir Menzies Campbell: May I ask a general there are some very good governors as well as the question? This is a country that is relatively stable, extremely corrupt governors that the country has and has a federal system of government, which I think known. It is a labour of love, and there are lots of you have rather interestingly described as being setbacks on the way. However, I suspect that if it is centripetal. It is rich in resources. It appears, on the done, it will be at that level. face of it, to have a moderate achievement in After the election—not the last election, but the 2007 education. That being so, how is it that this election—the head of DFID, the head of the World dispossessed generation, which is susceptible to Bank and I identified half a dozen states where we persuasion, has grown up? In particular, is it because, thought the newly elected governors could begin to as you have described in a rather elegant way, the make a substantial change. We went together to pay budgets get thinned out and that corruption stands in our respects to them and to say that DFID, the World the way of the kind of economic development that Bank and the British Government in general were would be much more advantageous to the population prepared to make a special effort in those states. What as a whole rather than a relatively small number of we did six years ago might not be replicable today, people? but it is the sort of thing that stands the most chance Sir Richard Gozney: Yes. I think a lot of it is due to of making a difference, in terms of what outsiders do. corruption. I think that corruption greatly increased The penalties for governors who get it wrong are from the start of independence by the phenomenon becoming a bit more apparent. There are four oil- that Mr Rosindell spoke about—the regions. If you producing states in the Niger delta, and the governors are a Yoruba from western Nigeria—thinking back 50 take a disproportionate share of the royalties, if they years—and your group has the federal power in its are being corrupt. They take a slice of the royalties hands for a certain amount of time, you presume that before the rest of the money is divided up around the when that power moves to the East or to the North, country. When one of them got arrested in London they will feather their nest. You may be wrong, but under the 2002 anti-corruption legislation, which that will be the assumption. Therefore you would be means that corrupt activity anywhere becomes an doing your own region a disservice if you didn’t make offence here when the money is put through the the most of your turn. That got under the skin of that British banking system, it was a great surprise—a country pretty early on—late ’60s; within 10 years. huge shock. Unfortunately, he was let out on bail. The cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:45] Job: 036016 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o002_MP FAC 25 06 13 (3) corrected.xml

Ev 26 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

25 June 2013 Sir Richard Gozney magistrate thought £1 million would deter him; but there is a president from a very different background that was pocket money for him, and off he went. so there is probably less push from the top of the A few years later, we got another one—the worst of country that has the most troops as potential. the lot—by extraditing him from Dubai, and he is now serving a long prison sentence. People notice that, and Q109 Mike Gapes: How does Nigeria see itself in that helps too. Effective use of anti-corruption terms of the region and regional security? Does it see legislation in this country with Nigerians, many of itself as the big player with everybody else helping it whom have property and assets and make frequent or, because of its own internal problems, particularly visits to this country, is strong. On a number of visits in the recent period, are the Nigerians more reluctant back to London during my three and a half years in than they were? Nigeria I went first to the Metropolitan police before Sir Richard Gozney: I don’t think they look to other even checking in with the Foreign Office. countries to help them. They certainly did not when I Chair: How revealing. was there. I think they are willing to do what they can when a request comes up. It applied in Darfur. I think Q107 Mike Gapes: Can I go back to the security they may have gone to Somalia. I am not sure about issues in the region? You know ECOWAS very well that. because when you were the high commissioner you were also the permanent representative of the UK to Q110 Mike Gapes: They are also in Mali. the ECOWAS organisation in Abuja. Can you give us Sir Richard Gozney: And they are also in Mali. But your assessment of the effectiveness of ECOWAS for it is a more a question of, “There is an obvious need regional security, as well as for the other issues it has here. If we don’t put up a battalion who will? So we to deal with? Do you think it has been an effective must put up one or two.” There is a willingness to do body, or is it becoming an effective body? that but I don’t think it forms part of a concept of how Chair: Sir Richard, before you answer that question, the countries knit together militarily. I have just been told that the vote may be a few minutes before four. Q111 Rory Stewart: Welcome. Where do we in the Sir Richard Gozney: ECOWAS has shown itself to be West tend to get Boko Haram wrong? What sort of very effective, sometimes to the surprise of its own clichés do you encounter from amateur foreign policy members, when serious things have happened. It sent watchers looking at it? What is your sense of where off a force called ECOMOG to either Liberia or Sierra our instincts may be wrong in thinking about Boko Leone—I think probably Liberia. It made all the Haram? difference. They mounted that themselves. There was Sir Richard Gozney: Probably the distinctive no UN or EU support or anything and that was good. Nigerian factor in something like Boko Haram is the But like a lot of regional organisations, they react to fact that money will play a large part. I suspect that a crisis rather than to day-to-day strains. money plays a large part in the motivation of people In terms of training up troops, the Ghanaians and the who join. Money plays a large part in almost Senegalese have good reputations internationally. The everything in Nigeria. Unless you go and get money Nigerians have played a certain amount of one way or another yourself no one else is going to international peacekeeping just because they have a look after you or your family. It is very stark in that lot of soldiers. Seven or eight years ago we put quite country. I do not suggest that there were not extreme a lot of money into an ECOWAS training centre for Islamists, with the aim of a caliphate, among some of officers just outside Abuja. We had to pay for virtually the people originally, but most of that early activity, everything because whatever they promised, the which began before I left, of beating up police stations money tended not to appear, but it was cheap at the and other instances of the federal Government was price. It linked with the Kofi Annan centre in Ghana because they could get some money and some and was producing some better fruits in terms of weapons out of it. Maybe there were a few leaders knowing about the essence of peacekeeping. Yes, they who were ideologically and religiously motivated, but can do it but they don’t do it very often. I would be surprised if there were many.

Q108 Mike Gapes: What about Mali? There was Q112 Rory Stewart: What do you think of the obviously a plan that there was going to be an African Nigerian Government’s military response to Boko force there. In the end the insurgency happened and Haram? What are the risks in it? the French had to go in. Do you think that lessons Sir Richard Gozney: I don’t think my reaction to their have been learned from that? response is very different from anywhere else in the Sir Richard Gozney: I do not know. I have not been world. Unless there is a political solution in people’s back to West Africa recently. In my day the president, back pockets, military action at best and if well done who was elected democratically within the limits of will only hold the line a bit until people sit down and what that word means in Nigeria, was an ex-general. talk and come to a wider solution. When I went to him quietly about Darfur, saying that the peacekeeping force in Sudan was very strapped Q113 Rory Stewart: Broadly speaking, how worried and could the Nigerians find two more battalions, he are you by this phenomenon? Is it something that you said, “Yes”, straight off. When I went to see the chief see as a great tragedy—something that is going to of general staff he said, “I’m not sure about two. We dominate Nigeria and sub-Saharan Africa for the next will find one but I am not sure the second one is quite 20 or 30 years? Or do you think it is controllable? up to it.” But that was a slightly different era. Now Where would you put it on a scale of one to 10 if you cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:45] Job: 036016 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o002_MP FAC 25 06 13 (3) corrected.xml

Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 27

25 June 2013 Sir Richard Gozney were reporting back from Nigeria? How much should circle. That is a bit harsh, but there are a lot of we be worried about this? extremely clever, thoughtful, metropolitan people. I Sir Richard Gozney: I am going to give you an would regard them not just as bi-national—as people answer that is too easy, though I do think it is right. who hop over to London all the time—but as bi- Anybody who gives you a confident answer to that cultural. They think through London—it is mostly question is flying by the seat of their pants. I do not London—or British eyes as well as Nigerian eyes. We think there is an answer; I would be surprised if need to listen more to them, use them and encourage anybody had an answer to that now. It is a fairly new them. phenomenon that has developed, and it is not clear whether it is a lot of thugs taking advantage of Q115 Chair: As the UK’s representative to something that may have started for slightly different ECOWAS, how much of your time did that take up? reasons, or what would be a deep change for Sir Richard Gozney: Little, because there was not Nigeria—a Taliban-style commitment to a radically much to discuss. I went along to talk to Mr Chambas different sort of Government in the north. and others when there was something to discuss. We have been used for years to reading about violent criminality in the Niger delta. Almost all of it was Q116 Chair: Did they have plenary sessions? driven just by money. There was little sense of Sir Richard Gozney: At that time, I don’t think they righting human rights wrongs there. There were some did. If there were, they were not such that I would notable exceptions. Ken Saro-Wiwa, who was have given up a morning to go along. That is because executed by the military Government, and now his you could predict what would be said. There is a real son are powerful exceptions, and I can think of a language difficulty in ECOWAS. Relatively few of the number of people I knew, including priests and others, Anglophone representatives—perhaps some of the who were also exceptions. However, most people in more sophisticated Nigerians and Ghanaians—speak the Niger delta struggle were there for the loot, to put French, and surprisingly few of the sophisticated it crudely. I suspect that there is more of that than we people from Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso or Cameroon believe in the north. Therefore, you cannot predict speak good enough English. They did not seem to use how it runs; it depends where the balance of them in those they sent to Nigeria. There were a calculation lies. number of Francophone representatives I met who really struggled in English. In a highly articulate Q114 Rory Stewart: Finally, with the Division bell country such as Nigeria it does not work. We need about to ring, what is your sense and instinct for how people who can keep their end up and take on the British commentators have tended to get Nigeria debate. wrong? Where do you wince when you read newspaper or think-tank reports on Nigeria? What is Q117 Chair: In English. your sense of the sorts of misleading prejudices or Sir Richard Gozney: In English, because that is the assumptions people bring to Nigeria? language in which that country works. It was a bit Sir Richard Gozney: I think it is to underestimate the stacked up against the organisation. There was not a Nigerians. They are much more self-confident and, Liberia-type or Mali-type crisis when I was there. If therefore, when educated and experienced, much more there had been, I think it would have been the Foreign assertive in a positive sense than many people I have Ministers who piled in and, if necessary, the Heads of met, visited, seen and lived among in other parts of State, because foreign affairs are too important and the continent. I think it is because they were never sensitive to leave in the hands of mere functionaries heavily colonised. There were no outside white in that part of the world. farmers and no Asian traders in that part of the world. Chair: The bell has not gone yet. Has anyone got any There is more scope within Nigeria to debate these more questions? No. Sir Richard, thank you very things and, if someone provides the tinderbox, to help much indeed. That is much appreciated. You were solve these things, but the political class and very forthcoming, helpful, direct and useful to us. leadership relies so much on money politics that it is Thank you. very difficult to get real action from them at a Sitting suspended for Divisions in the House. sufficient level. On resuming— They all have huge debts to repay once they get into office and then it becomes a vicious self-perpetuating

Examination of Witness

Witness: Virginia Comolli, Research Associate for Transnational Threats, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, gave evidence.

Q118 Chair: Ms Comolli, I am so sorry that you Kano”. In it, you wrote about the impoverished have been kept waiting. A number of my colleagues Islamic north and the wealthier Christian south. Is that seem to be dribbling back, but as we are quorate, we the right way of describing the differences? Is the will make a start. sense of alienation about economics, or is it wider May I thank you very much for coming along? We than that? have been looking at your book, “The lost boys of cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:45] Job: 036016 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o002_MP FAC 25 06 13 (3) corrected.xml

Ev 28 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

25 June 2013 Virginia Comolli

Virginia Comolli: First, thank you for inviting me Q119 Rory Stewart: My apologies for being late. here today. We often talk about Nigeria in terms of a Before we go on to Boko Haram’s objectives and country with a very marked north-south divide, command structure, can you—in broad terms, for an meaning, as you mentioned, a poor Muslim north and amateur audience—tell us the difference between the a wealthier Christian south. Without overdoing that objectives of Boko Haram and those of, for example, characterisation, there are some strong indicators that the Taliban? support that thesis. They are to do with economics, Virginia Comolli: At the very beginning when Boko social issues and religion, and also political and Haram emerged, their nickname was the Nigerian historical roots. Taliban. This was because they were living in a very Some of the previous speakers alluded to the issue of isolated community. They did not want any contact education. Nigeria is the No. 1 country in the world with other Muslims and they aspired to the societal for out-of-school children; one in three kids is out of model of the Taliban—a strict Salafist model—as the school and most of them are in the north. In fact, 70% way to go, and that is why they did not want to mix of the northern population is illiterate, so that is a with other people, even within the Muslim strong indicator of pointing at the poorer situation in community. They were even displaying the Afghan the north. Also, 73% of the northern population lives flag, and the first base that they created was actually in poverty and 27% of the population in the south called Afghanistan. This was in Yobe state, close to lives in poverty, so you can see this huge disparity. the Niger border. Earlier, Sir Richard mentioned the unwritten rule that Boko Haram did not have any links with the Taliban, was put in place post-independence whereby Muslim but they aspired to become like them. Over time, and and Christian candidates would rotate for the especially after 2009 when Mohammed Yusuf died, presidency. That is also something that has created the movement became more radical and violent. some friction between the north and the south, Mohammed Yusuf was the original leader who was a especially when President Jonathan took over after charismatic preacher, but also fairly moderate in President Yar’Adua suddenly died during his first relative terms. He was killed in police custody, so his term. death was an extrajudicial killing and it was a source But there are also some historical roots. Starting from of great debate. When his deputy, Abubakar Shekau, the early 19th century with the Sokoto jihad, Islam took over, he gave the movement a much more radical spread across northern Nigeria. When the Brits arrived and violent imprint. He has been quoted as saying that in northern Nigeria in 1902–03, they found a very he really enjoys killing human beings in the same way divided country. They could not really see many signs he enjoys killing chickens and rams. He was a radical of modernity in the north because it had been person who tried in his speeches to align the insulated; there were very few Christians living in the movement with the struggle of fighters in Iraq, in north, and those who were there lived in very Yemen or in Somalia and so on. He really tried to segregated communities and did not have much access connect—at least from a rhetorical point of view— to political or social life. Acknowledging the power Boko Haram with the broader Islamist ideology. of the existing Islamic Administration at the time, the British decided to adopt a system of indirect rule Q120 Rory Stewart: Within the organisation, is there whereby the existing Administration carried on, a vigorous debate between different clerics? Are there almost as if nothing had changed, and Sharia law different interpretations of Islam or different theories remained in place until the end of the colonial era. on how to proceed? Also, to what extent are you Great emphasis was given to the north. The north was describing what is essentially a half-secret the most important and more powerful part of the organisation? How easy is it for you to gain direct country. But then, when independence came, because access to these figures and militia? the north had been so isolated, there was little Virginia Comolli: Gathering information, especially modernity there. And because there were so few when it comes to security matters in the context of graduates in the north, very few jobs were given to Nigeria, is in general very hard. If we look at the northerners in the post-colonial administration in the recent statements made by the Government and at the federal government. The Igbo ethnic group in same time the videos issued by Boko Haram, we see a particular covered the most prominent positions contrasting narrative. Also, the Nigerian press is often within government. unreliable. Sometimes they just quote verbatim the It was at that time that the northern leaders started Government’s press releases. Access that is given to to feel threatened. They really feared that the more foreign journalists is limited, and we can talk about traditional Islamic way of life was under threat. This that problem. sentiment at the time—I do not mean to bore you with I base my knowledge on open source information a history lesson here, but I want to highlight this— online, but I have visited northern Nigeria. I have is what has also driven the various Islamic extremist conducted interviews with Government people; movements that have emerged from the ’70s onwards. people from religious communities, both Christian I also say that to say that Boko Haram is not a and Muslim; local NGOs; academics; the military; and completely new movement. It is not the first Islamic also the common citizens. extremist movement to emerge in northern Nigeria. We had the Izala movement, the Maitatsine, the al- Q121 Rory Stewart: It is a little like trying to Muhajiroun, the Muslim Brotherhood—so many describe the Taliban or al-Qaeda. It is an illegal others have emerged with more or less the same fighting group, so there are serious problems of ideology and motivated by the same drivers. knowledge and access. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:45] Job: 036016 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o002_MP FAC 25 06 13 (3) corrected.xml

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Virginia Comolli: Yes, absolutely. Unfortunately, I did groups, including al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, not have access to Boko Haram members directly and it also has a much more sophisticated approach when I went there, but I did speak to a Nigerian and is more involved in kidnappings of foreigners, journalist who has been dealing with them for a long which is really an AQ tactic; with one exception, that time. He had managed in the past to interview the is not something that Boko Haram have really turned original leader, Mohammed Yusuf. He visited his to. house and he had a discussion with him, but that was a different era. Yusuf was an educated, well-mannered, Q124 Rory Stewart: Normally when we deal with charismatic person. Very few people communicate this kind of group we tend to use words and phrases with the new leader, Abubakar Shekau, even within like political settlement, reconciliation and regional the Boko Haram movement. The structure is a loose, solution. Is that broadly your sense of what we should cell-based structure and the command and control is be doing, or what the Nigerian Government should be very loose, so he deals only with certain cells’ doing, in relation to this? commanders who then pass on the message. Virginia Comolli: Personally I am very sceptical of the approach adopted by the Nigerian Government. Q122 Rory Stewart: Is it strongly ethnically driven? From the beginning, the Government’s approach has Is there a clear core of an ethnic membership? been a militarised one; since 2004 they have deployed Virginia Comolli: Within Boko Haram, the two joint taskforces, consisting of elements of all the predominant ethnic groups are the Hausa-Fulani and armed forces, the intelligence services, the police, the Kanuri. Shekau himself is a Kanuri. There have immigration, customs and so on. They declared a state been some tensions there. It has been very hard to of emergency this year in three states in the north; a verify, but it looks like the top leadership is composed state of emergency had already been put in place in of Kanuri people, which has led to some tensions other states last year. Then, of course, as we all know, within the movement itself. Also, the Hausa-Fulani— they launched a big military deployment this year, the other ethnic group—felt they had been mistreated with a total of 8,000 troops being sent to the north. on a number of occasions. That is the largest deployment since the civil war. It In addition to that, it looks like that all the men who is a very serious military endeavour. have been sent on suicide missions belong to the In parallel to that, in the past they have attempted Hausa-Fulani ethnic group. So orders came that only some negotiations. They have not been very the people from that ethnic group would become successful, mainly because it is very hard to find a suicide attackers. That of course has not gone down partner with whom to negotiate. Some people very well among the membership. claiming to represent Boko Haram said they were willing to enter into negotiation with the Government Q123 Rory Stewart: Is your sense that their central only to be dismissed a couple of days later by objective is to create an Islamic state in Nigeria? In Abubakar Shekau saying, “No, these people don’t other words, are they still like the Taliban to some represent us. We don’t want to negotiate with the extent, in that their basic concerns are domestic—they Government.” want Sharia law and that kind of thing—or do you Similarly, there was discussion of an amnesty. An think that this is a genuinely international movement amnesty commission was established in April, so that has links to other extremist groups in the region there is a group of people who are now going around and is engaged in some big international jihad? and talking to various community leaders and decision Virginia Comolli: I think the answer to that is makers, and trying to establish whether there is a multifold. In the main, Boko Haram remains an possibility of an amnesty for some Boko Haram inward looking movement that is focused on the members. The process is running parallel with the Nigerian state, and it wants to expand Sharia law across the country. Having said that, they also have state of emergency. It is itself a source of friction links with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and with because people will say that the Government are Somalia. When I talk about links, I am not talking sending contrasting messages. You try in a way to about a great ideological partnership; I am talking destroy the movement militarily but, on the other more at a tactical level. AQIM and al-Shabaab have hand, you are still saying that you are willing to provided training and money to Boko Haram, so there negotiate to pardon some of the others. have been some links for a few years now. However, I would definitely say that Boko Haram is the junior Q125 Mr Roy: Do you think that the recent state of partner in that relationship. Also, Boko Haram has emergency in the north-east is for the better or for never been recognised by the al-Qaeda core. the worse? They have also established contact in Mali, and Boko Virginia Comolli: I think the situation had reached a Haram fighters have been fighting along with the point where the integrity of the state was under threat. groups in northern Mali. They have made ties with For the first time, President Jonathan conceded this AQIM and also with the Movement for Unity and spring that there were parts, especially in Borno State, Jihad in West Africa and with Ansar Dine. However, where local officials had to run away. The Nigerian what I think should be more concerning when we are flag had to be removed, and the Boko Haram flag talking about the more regional approach is not so replaced it. It was very serious when the territorial much Boko Haram proper as the Ansaru offshoot— integrity of the state was at risk. The situation was so the splinter group. Ansaru seems to have a much bad that military intervention at that point was broader ideology. It has closer links to those other inevitable. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:45] Job: 036016 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o002_MP FAC 25 06 13 (3) corrected.xml

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However, I think that it is a short-term solution. Other the year. It is not very clear how that happened. It underlying grievances are not officially voiced by the may have happened out of luck—they were stealing a movement, but I think that they are there and appeal car on the road and then found this other van full of to a broad number of people, who are poor and foreigners and decided to kidnap them. It probably unemployed. Unless the grievances to do with does not mean a change in the strategy of Boko unemployment, lack of opportunities, education and Haram. So I think that the kidnapping is also a big so on are addressed, no military operation will have difference between the two. solved the problem for good. They will do only what previous military operations have done in Nigeria, Q129 Chair: Do Ansaru pose a threat to Nigeria, or which was to suppress the movement temporarily. The indeed to British interests in either Nigeria or this movement, whatever it is called at a given time in country? history, goes underground for a few years, regroups Virginia Comolli: I believe that they are a threat to and then re-emerges, with a slightly different name, British interests in the region, but neither Ansaru or but with more or less the same ideology. Boko Haram pose any threat to the UK directly. However, by attacking foreign workers in the region, Q126 Mr Roy: Do you think the United Kingdom they certainly pose a threat there. From the point of should take a view not only on the state of emergency, view of the Nigerian Government, again, they are a but on the amnesty that is running at the moment? Or threat because of the attacks that they carry out. For should the United Kingdom just stay well away? instance, Ansaru attacked a convoy of Nigerian Virginia Comolli: I am not sure. I do find the amnesty soldiers bound for Mali a few months ago, so yes, issue very controversial, especially based on the they certainly are a threat. previous history of Nigeria vis-à-vis amnesty, referring to the Niger Delta groups. The Niger Delta Q130 Chair: The Nigerian diaspora living here is groups were given amnesty by Yar’ Adua in 20075. surprisingly large. Are you aware of any signs of What it meant in practice is that, since then, the radicalisation? country has been held hostage by those groups that Virginia Comolli: No, I have not heard anything to receive up to $500 per month, per person, per fighter. that effect. You are quite right: I believe that there It is a lot of money given that the average salary is are more than 500,000 Nigerians living in the UK, between $120 and $130 a month for average people. predominantly in south London. However, they Last year, there were already some delays in the belong primarily to the Yoruba and Igbo ethnic monthly payments and the movements, such as the groups, and to a lesser extent the Edo, all of which movement for emancipation of the Niger Delta, said, are predominantly Christian and from the south. The “Well, if we don’t receive the money, we will start other thing that I would say is that less than 9% of the attacking oil infrastructure again.” Mindful of that Nigerians living in the UK are Muslim, and the bulk experience, which was a very expensive experience of the Nigerians living here are well educated for the Nigerian Government and not that successful, professionals who do not really present a threat linked given that a couple of attacks on oil infrastructures to Boko Haram or Ansaru at all. have taken place over the past 12 months, applying the amnesty to the North would not be a very easy Q131 Chair: I have to be careful here, because this solution. is sub judice, but I want to talk about the Woolwich attack. The two protagonists who it is alleged Q127 Mr Roy: Should the UK encourage, discourage murdered Drummer Lee Rigby are both of Nigerian or just stay away? extraction. Do you think that there is any significance Virginia Comolli: I think it should stay away on this. in that? Do you think that it feeds back to the unrest It makes your job easier. that is going on in Nigeria at the moment? We can talk generally, rather than about the particular case. Q128 Chair: Ansaru, which I understand means the Virginia Comolli: I really don’t think so. I do not see Vanguard for the Protection of Muslims in Black the connection. These are two men who were born in Africa, is a breakaway from Boko Haram. How would this country and grew up here. I do not think that it is you define the differences between the two at all related to Boko Haram. organisations? Virginia Comolli: The main difference is that Ansaru Q132 Rory Stewart: What is your sense of how we has broader, international connections and more get Nigeria wrong? When you hear people in Britain sophisticated tactics, especially as a result of the talk about Nigeria, generally speaking, what sort of closer partnership or links with more senior Islamist mistakes do policy makers—perhaps the Foreign groups, such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. It Office or Parliament—make? has also ideologically a more sophisticated way of Virginia Comolli: I’m not sure. There is a lot of talk looking at their struggle. They look back at the old about corruption, which unfortunately is not a key figures within the Islamic tradition of West Africa mistake. It is pretty rampant, and I saw some very so, from that point of view, they are much more clear examples when I was there. One mistake, if I sophisticated. The difference is also that they kidnap may call it that, is this: there is quite a lot of aid going foreigners, which is something that Boko Haram does into Nigeria—I met with the British Council and not do. Of course, there was the kidnapping of the DFID operating there—but what I think is missing French family in Cameroon by Boko Haram earlier in is greater oversight once the money is delivered to 5 Note by witness: Amnesty was granted in 2009 the recipient. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:45] Job: 036016 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o002_MP FAC 25 06 13 (3) corrected.xml

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For instance, I interviewed a private company that the desire at this point, to carry out attacks in the UK runs development projects for DFID, USAID, and so or anywhere else outside West Africa. on, and they gave me loads of examples of how they have seen, in their daily work, how people in the local Q137 Mark Hendrick: If they could establish communities can blatantly steal the money. They themselves in Nigeria more strongly than they are come up with programmes to help women to improve established at the moment, do you feel that in the their job opportunities, so the local partnert comes up future they will try and perhaps take over Nigeria as with a list of all the women that will take part in the a whole, or do you think that they are perhaps just programme—over 100 women. The company that I interested in certain parts of Nigeria where they feel met goes to deliver the training course and there only that they should be established and where they can set 40 actual women; the other names were just made up up their own mini-state, as such? so that the local partners could get the money for the Virginia Comolli: At least in their rhetoric, they will training of 100 women. always state that their ultimate goal is to Islamise the That is just a small example, but there are so many whole of Nigeria, but I don’t think that that could ever others of that sort. I know that it is easier said than happen; I don’t think the Nigerian Government would done, but it would help if there was greater monitoring ever allow that to happen. But, yes, I think that would of that sort of thing. I also spoke to some health remain their stated goal. workers. Money had been delivered to provide vaccinations for children. This aid organisation went Q138 Mark Hendrick: Do you think their goal is to visit the community where the vaccines were mainly ideological, in the sense that they want to supposed to be administered, and only 30% of the establish a Muslim state as such, or is it partly children had in their blood any sign that any economic—born of poverty—whereby the south has vaccination had ever taken place. The other money got the oil and the wealth and they perhaps want to just disappeared. see that wealth redistributed? If that is the case, is there any scope whatsoever for coming to some Q133 Mark Hendrick: You mentioned that less than agreement or some accommodation with the south, 9% of the 500,000 people of Nigerian origin in this such that the wealth is spread and they could live country are Muslim. Are you not aware, or do you not harmoniously? believe, that any of them would be radicalised in the Virginia Comolli: Neither Ansaru nor Boko Haram way that Pakistanis may be or people from other parts have ever mentioned poverty in their statements as of the world that have got serious terrorism problems one of the drivers of their movements. However, my may be? personal opinion is that poverty plays a big role in Virginia Comolli: I agree—you only need one person recruiting members for the group. Boko Haram in to be radicalised to commit some violence. There is particular has shown the ability to spread southward. also the issue of lone wolves; that comes to mind. Even in Lagos a few weeks ago, there was the What I want to say is that, from what I have read and discovery of a large amount of weapons that were from my private conversations with branches of the believed to be connected to a plan for attacks by Boko UK Government, there does not seem to be an Haram; they were planning on carrying out attacks at indication that people from within the Nigerian the international airport at Lagos. If those attacks had diaspora in this country have had any connections happened, that would have had a tremendous impact, with Boko Haram or Ansaru. and also a political impact; it would further inflame this north-south divide that I mentioned earlier. Q134 Mark Hendrick: So there is no history that is So, yes, they are trying to move south, but I don’t known of? think they are fooling themselves in thinking that they Virginia Comolli: No, and also there is no history of could successfully spread to the Niger delta. That is Boko Haram recruiting anyone from outside West because of those movements and those fighters that Africa. They do have within the organisation members are still present in the Niger delta—the ones that are from Chad, Niger and Cameroon—that is from the now receiving the amnesty payment. Indeed, some of very beginning of the organisation—but no one from those groups have already made it clear in some pretty outside West Africa. major statements that they would not tolerate any Boko Haram infiltration in the south and that they are Q135 Mark Hendrick: How about Ansaru? ready to take up arms if that was ever attempted. Virginia Comolli: They also have regional membership, primarily Nigerian, although they also Q139 Mr Roy: Can I ask a general question about include other members from other countries, but still Nigeria’s position in relation to the global drug trade within West Africa. and human trafficking? Where would you put it? Virginia Comolli: The Nigerians have really Q136 Mark Hendrick: They seem to be more pioneered organised crime in Africa. It is the other broadly aligned with al-Qaeda and are not just locally area, actually, that I work on; one is extremism, and focused like Boko Haram. the other one is drugs and organised crime in West Virginia Comolli: Yes, that is why I think they are a Africa. So the Nigerians, especially over the past few regional threat rather than being a national threat in years, have become much more independent when it Nigeria, as Boko Haram is. But again I think that they comes to drug trafficking, especially of cocaine are only capable to operate within the West African coming from Latin America through West Africa into region. I don’t think they have the capability, or even Europe. 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American cartels; they are actually controlling their moving their goods northwards and have to transit own trade. They have operatives based in South through areas that are controlled by al-Qaeda in the America, in places such as Venezuela and Brazil. Islamic Maghreb and others. So it is very likely that, They have operatives based in consumer receiving in order to be allowed to transit through those markets. So they control all the phases of trafficking. territories, they have had to pay a fee to AQIM. Of course, they are involved in lots of other forms of However, some more recent assessments that I have criminality, including smuggling of migrants, and we come across say that these days AQIM is much more have oil theft in the south. We have increasingly the involved in this trade and they ask the traffickers to problem of maritime piracy in West Africa, which has pay them between 10% and 15% of the value of now reached the levels—in terms of numbers—of cocaine to facilitate the trade. piracy off the coast of Somalia, even though the two Also in West Africa there is Hezbollah, which is types of piracy are very different. In Somalia, the involved in both the cocaine trade and the heroin pirates tended to be more sophisticated, while in West trade. They are really making use of the previous Africa piracy is really to do with stealing oil. extensive Lebanese community that is present in West Africa, and also in South America in the case of Q140 Mr Roy: Is there a correlation between human cocaine trafficking. So part of that money also goes trafficking, the global drug trade and terrorism? into Hezbollah. Virginia Comolli: There is. The nexus between crime Chair: Thank you very much indeed. You have ended and terrorism has been discussed quite a lot, in up our afternoon rather nicely and given us a different particular in the context of the Sahel and Mali. angle on it. So, thank you very much for coming along Unfortunately, there is a great lack of hard evidence and please convey our best wishes to everybody else to do with this. There is a lot of anecdotal evidence, at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. especially when it comes to traffickers who are Virginia Comolli: Thank you very much. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [SO] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:46] Job: 036016 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o003_MP FAC 8 10 13 (3).xml

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Tuesday 8 October 2013

Members present: Richard Ottaway (Chair)

Mr John Baron Mr Frank Roy Mike Gapes Sir John Stanley Mark Hendrick Rory Stewart Sandra Osborne ______

Examination of Witnesses

Witnesses: Lynne Featherstone, Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Department for International Development, Susanna Moorehead, Director, Western and Southern Africa, Department for International Development, and Mark Bowman, Director-General, Humanitarian, Security, Conflict and International Finance, Department for International Development, gave evidence.

Q141 Chair: I welcome members of the public to the hope, what are you going to do except take the money third evidence session of the Committee’s inquiry into and start fighting? the UK’s response to extremism and political instability in North and West Africa. We felt it was Q143 Chair: You have produced a number of important to hear from DFID, given the evidence that publications, including Building Stability Overseas has emerged so far about the apparent link between and Working Effectively in Conflict-affected and poverty and lack of opportunity and extremism in the Fragile Situations—this is before your time, developing world, and about the region’s rapid Minister— population growth, which some experts consider may Lynne Featherstone: I was going to say that. pose a threat to fragile states in the region. The session Chair: But certainly during this Parliament. Do they also affords the first opportunity of this Parliament for address that particular aspect? the Committee to ask DFID about how it integrates its Lynne Featherstone: Yes, they do. DFID has been development work with the UK Government’s foreign scaling up its work in fragile and conflict-affected policy and security goals, particularly in North and states. In the area you are interested in, which would West Africa. be Nigeria, Libya, Sierra Leone, Mali and the wider I welcome the Parliamentary Under-Secretary at Sahel, we spend about 30% of our official DFID, Lynne Featherstone, and her colleagues, Mark development aid in that way—supporting those Bowman, director general, humanitarian, security, countries, dealing with the drivers of instability. conflict and international finance, and Susanna Building Stability Overseas, which was FCO, MOD Moorehead, director, West and Southern Africa, and ourselves, is a cross-Government effort to address Department for International Development. I welcome all those drivers, whether they are developmental, all of you here today. political or economic. Minister, thank you very much for coming; it is much appreciated that you should find the time. Could I start Q144 Chair: Do you have many joint meetings with with a fairly general question about whether DFID the Foreign Office on this? sees tackling extremism and instability in the Lynne Featherstone: Yes, we have lots of joint developing world as one of its core roles? meetings with the Foreign Office, if not personally Lynne Featherstone: Yes, it does, but obviously in then certainly at official levels. Other Ministers are involved more than myself, in particular the Minister a DFID sort of manner. You rightly said, Chair, that of State and the Secretary of State. extremism and terrorism occur because of those issues Chair: We will probably come back to that in a that DFID is so good at dealing with—poverty, minute. hunger, disease, lack of education, lack of jobs, no civil society voice, no proper institutions, poor Q145 Sir John Stanley: My experience as a trustee governance, those sorts of thing. Therefore, our core of ActionAid for 10 years and ministerially is that you business is, by its very nature, development, and deliver aid via Governments at your peril, and the development is soft power in terms of building only certain way of ensuring aid gets into the right stability overseas. hands is to deliver it directly to the communities that you seek to serve. What is the Government’s policy Q142 Chair: So you accept that poverty, disease and on the extent to which it will or will not deliver aid the other things that you listed are causes of to Government agencies in this geographical area in extremism? particular? Lynne Featherstone: I think they are very often Lynne Featherstone: Nigeria is a good example. Not linked, because if you go over to the Sahel or Mali a penny goes through general budget support to the and there is no employment, no hope, no voice, no Government, because the Nigerian Government is nothing, and someone offers you money to join perhaps not as transparent and reliable as our own. We them—I think there is a natural correlation between work through NGOs and occasionally sector support, those two things. If you are a young man with no but in Nigeria it tends to be with tried and tested cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:46] Job: 036016 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o003_MP FAC 8 10 13 (3).xml

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8 October 2013 Lynne Featherstone, Susanna Moorehead and Mark Bowman implementation partners who we know will deliver on as, in many respects, a Damocles’ sword to achieve the ground. Government reform? Ultimately, the best way of Some of the work we do is around technical assistance helping people in Nigeria is ensuring better or capacity building. As you say, things do not always government. go where they should, but in a country where you are Lynne Featherstone: Indeed, but as I am explaining, trying to get to the point of being able to leave, part we do not put money through the Government per se, of our job is to try to build in, because we have great through budget support, so that is not a direct threat expertise and respected world leaders, the technical we can make. However, we are working in I think six assistance such as audit trails, public finance or 11 focus states, where we do great work. Of course, committees, the rigour of institutionalised government we use the leverage we have through our programmes and transparency that can deliver, but it is a bit of a to influence the Nigerian Government and any hard job in that area. Government we work with, and that is why I talk of soft power. There do come points at which we decide Q146 Sir John Stanley: So you do sometimes give not to continue to support one form of funding or aid to Government bodies, and you just judge it on a another, but we have a long history with Nigeria and case-by-case basis. Is that right? we hope to double our trade with Nigeria. We have Lynne Featherstone: In that area we do not actually Ministers going in both directions all the time, and we give any budget support per se. All cases are have a very productive relationship, but you have to examined and a decision is made according to our four accept that we are working in an imperfect world, and guiding principles about whether we can put in budget some parts of that world are more imperfect than support or it is more appropriate to do it through others, and among them is Nigeria. another agency. In this area, it is almost always through implementing partners, or, in the Sahel and Q149 Mr Roy: In these dangerous times, it is Mali, we work through the big institutions such as the imperative—indeed, it is commendable—that DFID’s EU and the World Bank, who are on the ground. budget is increasing, even as the FCO’s budget is declining. Should DFID become more expressly Q147 Mr Baron: A very quick question. You orientated towards achieving the United Kingdom mentioned Nigeria, and you correctly mentioned the Government’s foreign policy goals, or should it link between poverty and extremism. Corruption is a continue to focus on poverty alleviation as its key factor in Nigeria: 70% of the population live absolutely core priority? Should you make up the below the poverty line of about £1.30 a day, yet we weight in foreign policy goals? know it is immensely rich in natural resources. Does Lynne Featherstone: Sorry, what was the first half of there ever come a point in DFID’s calculations where your question? it says, “Look, we need to do much more to get Mr Roy: You have an increase in budget against a Governments to clean up their act before we put aid declining Foreign Office budget. Should you therefore in,” given that in this Government alone the aid make up for that loss, or should you keep to your budget to Nigeria is approaching £1 billion in the last core policy? three or four years. Lynne Featherstone: No, I think there is great Lynne Featherstone: That is correct: this year it is 1 strength in what DFID does. It is one of our £275,000 . Of course, you are right. In Nigeria it is tremendously powerful weapons—probably not the oil, and the revenues obviously are helpful to some right choice of word—in the countries in which we degree, but the revenue that is actually delivered in work. It gives us access and a seat at the table in a way public service is something like 0.55 cents per person. we would have in no other way. In terms of poverty Clearly, it is not going where it should. alleviation, I was recently in northern Nigeria looking DFID assesses all the time, and we are very careful at the education programmes—I think your with taxpayers’ money, for obvious reasons. We have Committee went there recently. That work is long regular reviews, assessments and milestones for all the term, but if you ultimately want to support a country money so we can assess where things are and that to move on in development terms, you have to do they are not going wrong. We do take decisions to the ground work on poverty: that includes water and suspend aid in all its forms at various times, but sanitation, disease, education and livelihoods. In some because we are not putting any through the ways, that is a very simple equation, but it is the most Government of Nigeria—unlike, say, Uganda, where profound in the work DFID does. we have just suspended budget support—there is Mark Bowman: May I add a reflection on that? I nothing to suspend. In those instances, we would answer the question in terms of there being a reprogramme. greater overlap between objectives now. If you look at the statistics, you see that the majority of poor Q148 Mr Baron: You have put £1 billion into a people now live in conflict-affected states; that is country where 70% of people live below the poverty certainly the trend. Those are the countries that have line, and you admitted you are not going via made the least progress towards the MDGs. In those Government agencies. What are this Government countries, there is a clear overlap between doing to put more pressure on those Government development objectives and broader security agencies? Does there ever come a point—if you do objectives, simply for the reason that DFID as an not mind me saying so, Minister, I do not think you organisation is focused on development and bringing quite answered the question—when you hold the aid people out of extreme poverty, but that is impossible 1 DFID correction: Witness meant to say £275 million without addressing some of the issues around stability, cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:46] Job: 036016 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o003_MP FAC 8 10 13 (3).xml

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8 October 2013 Lynne Featherstone, Susanna Moorehead and Mark Bowman security, corruption and the rule of law. The Lynne Featherstone: That is difficult, because we are requirement is for parts of Government to work instructed by very rigid rules from the OECD on what together and for DFID to recognise that we have clear can be described as overseas development aid. They objectives, but that they overlap with other are very specific, so what we can do is not strictly a Government objectives. direct alternative or an operation that would deal with security per se. An example is that we can train police Q150 Sandra Osborne: Could I ask about the on, say, community policing or gender-based issues criteria for giving bilateral aid? In a 2011 report called and those sort of things, but we cannot train the Working Effectively in Fragile and Conflict-Affected military. There are very precise OECD rules, which States, the International Development Committee was we can supply to the Committee if you wish, about critical because DFID had not clarified the extent to what counts as overseas development aid or not. They which security interests were a relevant criterion. are very strict rules so, in a sense, we are working Does the fact that a country is perceived as vulnerable with colleagues on where development work actually to extremism constituting a potential threat to the UK has an effect and an impact on the security of a make it more or less likely that DFID would give situation, but we cannot do direct work with the bilateral support? military or on security because of those rules. Lynne Featherstone: It is not, as far as I am aware, Mark Bowman: The OECD DAC rules are one of the actual criteria—the four principles. exceptionally clear: terms expenditure only counts as However, we work very closely in co-operation across ODA if its primary purpose is the economic Whitehall and work with our colleagues in the FCO development and welfare of the recipient country. and the MOD, and there would be discussions about Lynne Featherstone: There is quite a clear division the likely repercussions on the UK if we were not to of labour, if you like. work in a country. A range of considerations is taken into account in terms of why we work in some Q153 Mark Hendrick: China is a major investor and countries and not others, but basically, 21 of the 28 donor in Africa, obviously providing a great deal of countries in which our work is focused are the poorest economic help and support. Do you see a big role for and most marginalised countries in the world. China as a potential partner in combating insecurity and terrorism? Q151 Sandra Osborne: But if a security threat is a Lynne Featherstone: Potential, yes. I see potential in criterion, should that not be explicitly stated in your China as a partner. I am trying; I have asked to get aims and objectives? more involved, if you like, with China. China has Lynne Featherstone: It is not an explicit objective of been setting up a Department of Development for the DFID, but it may be something that, with colleagues, first time, and I hope to go and see that as soon as is thought to be useful. If for an example you take possible. I don’t know if it is up and running yet. Is Mali and the Sahel, where we do not have an office, it, Susanna? because that is not a country with which we have a Susanna Moorehead: It is in its infancy, but yes. bilateral relationship, clearly the security risks there Lynne Featherstone: You are absolutely right, Mr made us decide that we wanted to do development Hendrick, that China is a significant investor— work and to build in some resilience—in my view, particularly in Africa, which is my patch. We come that is one of the best ways of working in those from a very different place from China, particularly areas—but in those instances, we had to work through on issues about human rights. I do not know whether multilateral agencies, because we are not on the this is anecdotal or not, but a president of one African ground bilaterally. It is not absolute or explicit; each case is judged case-by-case. Do you want to add to country, when we asked about his human rights in that, Susanna? order to invest, said, “Well, I’ll get China to do it. They do not ask these questions.” Susanna Moorehead: The criterion for investment in a country is primarily poverty, but as Mark said, you I see the potential, but I think it may be a challenging increasingly see an overlap between poverty and role. However, China is so big, I do not think it can insecurity. Our starting point is the per capita income, be ignored—and the world is changing a bit at the say, of a particular country, and if there is an moment, so maybe there is an opportunity there. additional security threat, that is part of our engagement. However, if you look at a country such Q154 Mark Hendrick: I recall that when the as Syria, for example, we were not involved there Olympics were in China in 2008, every African leader until recently, but now we have one of the largest who went to Beijing for the Olympics had a half-hour humanitarian operations ever launched, because there meeting with either the president or the prime is clearly an immediate need. We would not think of minister. They value their relationship with Africa to having long-term engagement in a wealthier country, the extent that they want to develop it, because of because our resources are deemed to be for poverty natural resources, clearly—but they also do not attach reduction. the strings that we do to aid. Lynne Featherstone: Exactly. Q152 Sandra Osborne: Do you think that it would enhance public credibility here—with the taxpayer— Q155 Mark Hendrick: Do you think the fact that we if it was clearer or more transparent that the DFID attach strings in the way that we do makes things more budget is making a contribution towards protecting difficult for us? Do you see any possibility of working their own security? with the Chinese, rather than them just getting on with cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:46] Job: 036016 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o003_MP FAC 8 10 13 (3).xml

Ev 36 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

8 October 2013 Lynne Featherstone, Susanna Moorehead and Mark Bowman it on their own, as they seem to be doing in so many Vatican at the other. I would add LGBT rights, countries at the moment? because where women are oppressed, generally Lynne Featherstone: I think you are right; we need homosexuals do even worse. So I think there is an to be talking to them. I think we are more stringent, ideological battle. but it is a funny thing. At one level, in some of the However, given the practicalities of development in countries that DFID works in, there is a desire to do the poorest and most marginalised countries, the way things right and properly, and that totally contravenes to deal with it is often as we do—educating girls, the idea that the elite is running off with all the bringing access to health or water, sanitation, resources. You go to some parts of Africa, and almost microfinance, whatever—which actually benefits the every building or road there has been built by the whole community. Where we work holistically, in Chinese. But you are absolutely right; we need to be communities and with religious leaders who are part talking to them. We come from very different places, of our work generally in sub-Saharan Africa—you but I still think that that is work we need to do. They cannot really work there without them—it can be a are so important in the development world. force for good, but that is not against the extremist Susanna Moorehead: Certainly not in every country, ideology that you are phrasing. but a number of our offices have conversations increasingly with the Chinese. I would not want to Q159 Mike Gapes: Does DFID monitor the extent give you the impression that the Chinese are part of to which extremist groups are spreading within sub- the traditional donor group, but there is a recognition Saharan Africa, or is that role left to the FCO? of the need to have conversations. Similarly with the Lynne Featherstone: I asked Susanna that question Indians, they have set up a development agency within only this morning. There is some information, but not their Foreign Affairs Ministry, and they are keen to as much as we would like. discuss with us how and whether we can collaborate. Notwithstanding what the Minister says, they have Q160 Mike Gapes: Is that mainly led by the FCO, different criteria of what success looks like. rather than DFID? Susanna Moorehead: It is principally the FCO, but Q156 Mike Gapes: Do you think that DFID is we work everywhere, particularly in very fragile involved in an ideological battle in sub-Saharan Africa countries, and we have extremely close links. for the rights of women and girls to get education, for human rights and for democratic values? Q161 Mike Gapes: There are countries with a Lynne Featherstone: Whether we are or not, the significant DFID presence, but there might not be reality is that if you educate a girl, you solve most of much of an FCO presence. You have people in the the other problems along with it, whether it is rights- remote areas and are in touch with the NGOs on the based or not. We are rights-based, and there are really ground, so you might have more information. no two ways about that. If you educate a girl, you Susanna Moorehead: Indeed, and if we do, we share know that you get fewer children and that you space that with our Foreign Office colleagues. But in out children, and if you empower women to work, you northern Mali, for example, we do not have as much get the village—look, this Committee is more information as we should have; we have more than we experienced than me in most of these things. did six months ago, but we could do with a lot more. Lynne Featherstone: What the connections are and Q157 Mike Gapes: May I press you? Other countries so on. are investing significant sums in parts of sub-Saharan Africa that do not have that agenda. We can name Q162 Chair: Turning to the issue of population Saudi Arabia, Qatar or Iran, and we can talk about growth, do you accept that this region has some of the religious organisations that come out of more extreme highest population growth in the world? forms of Islamism from India. Do you think that a Lynne Featherstone: Of course I do—that is factual. battle for hearts and minds is going on in sub-Saharan Africa and that we have that ideological conflict? Q163 Chair: We are also seeing in the region some Lynne Featherstone: There is quite a battle on a of the highest levels of insecurity and instability in the number of fronts, with extreme Islamist focus versus world. Do you think that there is a correlation between more traditional western values, if that is what you are the two? getting at. Lynne Featherstone: Inevitably, when you have such huge population growth, it is poverty that it really Q158 Mike Gapes: I am not talking about western goes hand in hand with—there is the correlation with values; I am talking about democratic values— the extremism, rather than simply large families. In a universal values, if you like. way, it is one of the big issues for North and West Lynne Featherstone: I was phrasing it perhaps in Africa—those countries have phenomenal growth, terms of how it is seen in other parts of the world. I growth we can only wish for, but their population think you are absolutely right. Personally, I think there growth, at something like 2.5%, means that everything is a schism in the world, and it often reveals itself in else stagnates and they cannot really advance. women’s rights. Right now, there is quite a move to DFID’s approach to that is really about giving, roll back the hard-won rights that women have particularly to women and girls, choice, voice and achieved in the world—for example, on sexual or control over their own lives. Where that is given, and reproductive health. You have this extreme Islamist it is really on sexual and reproductive health issues, arc, but bookended by Russia at one end and the women actually choose to use it, on the whole, and to cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:46] Job: 036016 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o003_MP FAC 8 10 13 (3).xml

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8 October 2013 Lynne Featherstone, Susanna Moorehead and Mark Bowman space their children and therefore to have fewer. We drive down population growth, as we have seen in the know that as families get less poor, or richer, they in developed world. turn have fewer children, and that is something to be worked on. Q169 Chair: I agree with all that. If we do not We are also working in countries where death stalks address that and population growth stays high, do you most big families and where your only guarantee in think instability can be removed with high old age is having a bigger family—that is one thing population growth? we are up against. Population growth is of course an Susanna Moorehead: If you do nothing else, it will issue, but there can never be coercion or population be very difficult. control per se, because that would be unethical. However, we do want to promote well-being and a Q170 Chair: What is the DFID target on family benign cycle. planning for the region? Lynne Featherstone: I do not have that in my head. Q164 Chair: In truth, it is not a question of coercion Susanna Moorehead: I do not think I do, either. or control; women want contraception, but they Lynne Featherstone: Can we supply that to the cannot get it. Committee? Lynne Featherstone: Indeed. We are doing our best, working with numerous partners, to deliver it in numerous countries in Africa. I myself have not been Q171 Chair: Yes, please do. I presume the policy set in this part of the world, but the last time I was in out in the family planning summit of last year still Uganda I went to an outpost—to a contraceptive day, stands. which had been put out on the radio, in conjunction Lynne Featherstone: Yes, and I am going to the next with Marie Stopes. It was in the middle of nowhere, one in Ethiopia in November. as many of these places are. As we arrived, there was a mile-long queue of women who had come from all Q172 Chair: I was invited, but unfortunately cannot parts of the area to queue for contraceptive health. make it. Lynne Featherstone: I will give them your best Q165 Chair: So a voluntary family planning wishes. programme would be successful, inherently. Do you agree that, were we able to stabilise the levels of Q173 Chair: Can I just clarify the targets of DFID population growth, it would go some way towards on family planning? You published a paper called, stabilising insecurity in the region? Choices for women: planned pregnancies, safe births Lynne Featherstone: I do not know that I could be and healthy newborns in December 2012, which was that direct about it— updated on the website in March 2013. On one page Chair: You have just gone one way— it says that DFID is committed to helping at least 24 Lynne Featherstone: Poverty causes it, rather than million girls and women use modern methods of there being a direct correlation. family planning, but on the next page it says 10 million. I imagine that 24 million is the correct figure. Q166 Chair: If we eliminate poverty— Susanna Moorehead: It is, yes. Lynne Featherstone: And poverty to security, so it is an indirect link, yes. Q174 Chair: Thank you. Are you coming across any barriers in the acceptance of family planning? You Q167 Chair: So, you can see a chain of causation were talking about the queues. between stabilising population growth and— Lynne Featherstone: Yes. Lynne Featherstone: I do not have the evidence in front of me that suggests there is a direct link, but I Q175 Chair: Are the barriers religious? can see that if you have a lot of people with no food Lynne Featherstone: Yes, to an extent. and no education, you are likely to get instability. Susanna Moorehead: Religious, social and cultural. Lynne Featherstone: There is a whole range of Q168 Chair: What would be the consequences of reasons to keep women down. stabilising population growth? Lynne Featherstone: The population growth would eventually come down. Q176 Chair: You seem to have reservations about Susanna Moorehead: I do not think that in and of the UNFPA. Have you thought about seeking itself, stabilising population would be enough to alternative partners? ensure security. High population growth, if that can be Susanna Moorehead: We use a number of different productively employed, can also be very stabilising. If partners to deliver family planning services, people realised that it is better to invest in peace and depending on the country. Some of them come prosperity than fighting, population growth could be a through the private sector and some of them through stabilising factor in its own right. other UN agencies. The real question is whether there are jobs for the young population to do and whether there are Q177 Chair: Do you think the UNFPA is not up to institutions to make sure that people are educated, the mark at the moment? have health care and have electricity. It is a broader Lynne Featherstone: I would like to encourage them question of economic development that is likely to to be stronger in some aspects. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:46] Job: 036016 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o003_MP FAC 8 10 13 (3).xml

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8 October 2013 Lynne Featherstone, Susanna Moorehead and Mark Bowman

Q178 Mr Baron: We briefly touched on corruption very important issues on which we have a fine balance in places like Nigeria and how that is inhibiting the to hold the ring. work of DFID. The answer seems to be that we do not route aid through Government Departments. I Q179 Mr Baron: Moving on, you talked about the suggest that your own expectations as a Department re-programming of projects, that DFID is trying to are not great—quite low, in fact—and you expect a work in the north to give girls an education and so high failure rate with regard to many of your projects. forth. What about the almajiris, these boys who are You say yourself in your annual report—correct me if sent north and detached from their parents? We are I am wrong—that Nigeria is off track in achieving the talking perhaps about some millions. It is quite a scale millennium development goals. Given our discussion of a problem and a fertile ground for extremists. What today, do you think there is a case for changing tactics, more is DFID going to do about that? given that corruption does seem to be inhibiting your Lynne Featherstone: We work with religious leaders work? in the main religions and in the cults, and with Lynne Featherstone: All these things are judged as charismatic preachers. That is the only way to access we go along, in and of themselves. First, it is very these boys. In our schools programme, the ESSPIN, difficult when you are trying to, in a sense, change the we also fund state schools, which are ginormous, and nature of something that has been so fundamental in state education within the religious, koranic schooling. that country, where the way of life has been around I visited both when I was there. In that way, we hope corruption, an informal tax system and so on and so that, because you are learning something that is forth. We do a lot of work to try to change that basic, communal and having access to core subjects, that in unhelpful formula. We do a lot of work, say, on EITI its own right will begin to unite. in the extractives sector and things like that to try to What is dangerous is when there is no connection left get them to understand that transparency and signing between the religious world and the rest of the up to these things give them international kudos and functioning local communities. Through our efforts on status. That is one way of doing it. education there, we are bringing those two worlds We are always trying to leverage better. An example together. Also, we are working with religious leaders is that I went to see a new sovereign bank in—Nigeria to make it inclusive. was it? Someone is going to have to help me with this— Q180 Rory Stewart: The £128 million that you will Susanna Moorehead: I am not sure. be spending over the next three years in Mali and western Sahel—how does it break down? What kind Lynne Featherstone: Forget that. What I would say of staffing levels do you have at present on the is that we judge it all of the time. If you are saying, ground? “Should we be tougher? Should we be stronger all the Lynne Featherstone: If you want staffing levels, I time?” it is not that easy to re-programme some of our have to turn to, who actually lived in Mali for four programmes. I would argue that our programmes in years. She also has the details of the programmes. northern Nigeria in particular, which is the particularly Susanna Moorehead: Yes, the £128 million is a unstable part of Nigeria, help to deliver a situation regional programme, and we were very keen when where we have some traction. For example—this isn’t that was allocated not to say how much would go to directly on your question—when I was there, having particular countries. Part of the reason for that was been to the north, I was able in a meeting with Vice- that an awful lot of resources were being given by the President Sambo to push him on some of the human international community to Mali, and we felt that if rights abuses in the north. It gives you the ability to Mali got all the resources, the instability would, rather say things that you cannot normally say if you are like water, go to the point of least resistance in the working in the country, and trying to encourage the very fragile neighbouring countries, so we have things you want. purposefully kept it flexible. I am more in favour of soft power, but you have to We are not planning to have a bilateral programme in have a stick as well. I appreciate what you are saying, that part of the world, so those resources will be spent but the balance is very difficult. DFID does withdraw via multilateral agencies in which we are either a and stop development aid at times, so that even if shareholder or a member state, such as through the we are not doing it in Nigeria, they must know what World Bank, some UN agencies and possibly in happened in Rwanda and what we have just done in collaboration with other bilateral donors. Uganda. It is not as though we never use the stick to say, “Enough is enough. You have broken one of our Q181 Rory Stewart: I have to interrupt, because I partnership principles. We cannot go on with you.” am afraid that we are rather short of time. To put it in Nigeria is a complex country. You have this very blunt, simple language, are you essentially giving boomtown at one end, with huge population growth this money to the World Bank and other multilateral and huge rates of poverty. It is tackling something agencies to spend in accordance with various very complex. I do not have a simple answer for you. programmes that are not currently specified? Maybe we should be tougher, but I don’t know what Susanna Moorehead: No. The £128 million is an that would look like. allocation that is then broken down in specific Chair: We have a statement on Syria in the House in programmatic agreements with the World Bank, such 15 minutes. as a social protection scheme that the World Bank is Lynne Featherstone: I know. I want to hear it too. I in the process of setting up and which we have was just trying to think that through, because these are endorsed as a shareholder and board member of the cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:46] Job: 036016 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o003_MP FAC 8 10 13 (3).xml

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8 October 2013 Lynne Featherstone, Susanna Moorehead and Mark Bowman

World Bank. In that instance we will make sure that probably three, if not four. On the development the programme can cover a wider area than would resilience side, there are two people. otherwise have been the case. Q187 Rory Stewart: So you have eight full-time Q182 Rory Stewart: When did you announce this DFID staff members currently based in Mali? Or is money? How much of the money have you so far it two? spent, as opposed to committed? Susanna Moorehead: No, sorry. There are two in Susanna Moorehead: I think the announcement was Mali. The rest are in London. They are not working on made in May. Mali full time; they are working on the wider Sahel. Lynne Featherstone: It was 15 May at the high-level conference on development in Mali. Q188 Rory Stewart: So you have two DFID staff members in Mali? Q183 Rory Stewart: How much of the money has Susanna Moorehead: Yes. been spent so far? Susanna Moorehead: I would have to get back to you Q189 Rory Stewart: What are their tour lengths? on the precise amount. It is not very much. Susanna Moorehead: I think the one in the embassy Lynne Featherstone: The conference itself generated is for a year at the moment, but that can be renewed. $4.2 billion, of which our contribution was £128 The one in the EU I would have to check, but I think million. it is probably longer than that. Susanna Moorehead: This is an allocation over a three-year period. Q190 Rory Stewart: In terms of the programmes that you are planning to pursue, to what extent have Q184 Rory Stewart: Presumably the reason why you you taken on board the lessons of the failure of the cannot provide any details is because these DFID programmes on governance and civil society in multilateral programmes have not yet been fully Iraq and Afghanistan in your approach to a fragile developed or specified; they are still at the state in Mali? development stage. Chair: I have to adjourn in three minutes’ time. Susanna Moorehead: No, I just do not have them to Susanna Moorehead: The short answer is that we hand. In order to facilitate programming, we make an have. The circumstances in Afghanistan and Iraq are allocation. Obviously, humanitarian aid is disbursed very different from Mali. We regularly learn the very quickly. I will have to get back to you on the lessons from our engagement in fragile states, figures, but that is where the highest spend has been. including those where we believe that our engagement On the longer-term resilience programming, which is has been extremely successful, such as Sierra Leone. this £128 million, it will be programmed over the The single greatest message that we take away is that course of the next three years. we need to stay engaged. We need to be prepared to take risks because there is no blueprint for what works Q185 Rory Stewart: I would be very grateful if you in these places. We need to work with others, be they could send us a note specifically defining exactly how bilateral or multilateral, in the most effective manner. much has been spent to date, how much you expect Lynne Featherstone: I would just conclude that these to be spent within the next 12 months and exactly how are the toughest places in the world to work, and we it is allocated between the different programmes. are trying to do the most difficult things. Believe me, Susanna Moorehead: With pleasure. we learned the lessons but not everything is replicable from one country to another. We must stay engaged Q186 Rory Stewart: How many Mali specialists do because these are very dangerous areas in the world you have in your team? for us. Susanna Moorehead: We have two people in Mali. Chair: Minister, thank you very much indeed. I found One is based in the embassy and one is currently that particularly useful and I am grateful to you and based in the EU. On the humanitarian side, we have both of your colleagues. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [SE] Processed: [17-03-2014 15:53] Job: 036016 Unit: PG04 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o004_MP FAC 11.11.13 corrected.xml

Ev 40 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

Monday 11 November 2013

Members present: Richard Ottaway (Chair)

Mr John Baron Andrew Rosindell Ann Clwyd Mr Frank Roy Mark Hendrick Sir John Stanley Sandra Osborne ______

Examination of Witnesses

Witnesses: Rt Hon Hugh Robertson MP, Minister of State, Samantha Job, Head of North Africa Department, Tim Morris, Head, Sahel Taskforce and Whitehall Sahel Co-ordinator, and Simon Shercliff, Head of Counter- Terrorism Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, gave evidence.

Q191 Chair: This is the fourth and final evidence Office. We have always enjoyed a good relationship session of the Committee’s inquiry into the UK’s with Ministers so far, and we welcome you. As you response to extremism and political instability in know, we are talking about North and West Africa. North and West Africa. Mr Simmonds and Mr The western Sahel’s problems seem to be deep rooted Robertson, as you know, this meeting was stood over and large scale, but our diplomatic footprint in the from a couple of weeks ago. The Committee has been region is rather light. What is the UK’s unique selling sitting here waiting since half-past 4 and we all left point in the region, and what do you think is the best the Chamber to be here to meet you. We were contribution that we could make to the western Sahel? expecting to start the evidence session 12 minutes ago. Hugh Robertson: Mr Chairman, may I start by I understand, Mr Simmonds, you have to leave in 13 thanking you for your welcome, and by reiterating my minutes’ time. Therefore, we have reached the apology? As a new Minister appearing in front of a conclusion it is probably best that you slip off now. Committee as august as this one, I can assure you that We would like to recall you very soon, in the next couple of weeks. In view of the fact that this is now the very last thing you would wish to do is to be late the second time this has happened, we would like to for your first hearing, so my apologies for any lean on your diary secretary, to find a slot some time misunderstanding that may have been caused. I also in the next week or so—not the rest of this week, but apologise in advance if, used to the brilliance of my the week after. predecessor, you find me leaning on my officials more Mark Simmonds: If that is the Committee’s wish, Mr than you are probably used to. Ottaway, I am very happy to co-operate. I have to You said in your opening remarks that you had to leave to catch a plane. I had understood that we would defer this meeting for a couple of weeks. My hope begin the session when the Foreign Secretary’s had been to make my first visit to the region during statement finished, so I apologise if there has been any that week, but I was unable to do so because of the confusion with the Committee. vote on High Speed 2, so I am sitting here in front of Chair: There has clearly been confusion about this. you, not only as a new Minister, but as one who has We had assumed that you were going to leave the not yet made a ministerial visit to the region. I have Chamber in time to be here. to be honest and say that with the exception of four Hugh Robertson: If we have caused any offence let days playing cricket in Morocco for the Lords and me apologise unconditionally straight away, but, Commons some seven years ago, I have not visited likewise, I got a similar message that you were happy the region myself either, despite having travelled to wait until the Foreign Secretary had sat down, so extensively across the world during my time in the that members of the Committee could ask questions Army. So I hope that you will not mind, as I say, if I and take part in the debate. If that was wrong I am lean on my officials more than would be the case, or very sorry for that, but that was the message we got. than I hope will be the case in subsequent hearings. I am sorry. The United Kingdom has a range of important Chair: There has obviously been a crossed wire somewhere. Anyway, Mr Simmonds, as it is now 11 strategic issues in the area. First and foremost are our minutes until you have to leave, I suggest you go now. commercial interests, which are extensive across Mr Robertson, I understand you have to go at half- North and West Africa. I think we have a greater past 5 anyway. interest in the stability of the whole region, which sits Hugh Robertson: No; I think in the circumstances, on the doorstep of Europe and is one in which we Mr Chairman, the very least I can do at this point is have invested enormous hope and goodwill in the to sit here until you wish to get rid of me. aftermath of the Arab Spring. We would want to encourage countries and Governments in the region to Q192 Chair: Fine. If you don’t mind, Mr Simmonds, become more democratic, to make use of the we will get you back as soon as possible. opportunities provided by the Arab Spring and to Mr Robertson, can we start on a cheerier note and move closer to a democratic system of government. I welcome you to the Committee for the first time and think there are many reasons why this country would congratulate you on your appointment to the Foreign want to engage in that part of the world. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [17-03-2014 15:53] Job: 036016 Unit: PG04 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o004_MP FAC 11.11.13 corrected.xml

Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 41

11 November 2013 Rt Hon Hugh Robertson MP, Samantha Job, Tim Morris and Simon Shercliff

Q193 Chair: Are you satisfied that you have enough complications. The way in which we are approaching people on the ground, particularly with the specialist it—this was due to be at the core of my visit a couple knowledge? How do you balance the rotation policies of weeks ago—is to do two things. The first is to get with the need to have an institutional memory on what a proper political process on track, to strengthen the is going on down there? Government and the institutions of Government, and Hugh Robertson: All I can tell you is that I have only to ensure that the country again becomes properly been in the Foreign Office for a month, and I spent governable, while at the same time trying to do all we one week of that in the Middle East last week, but can—you will appreciate the importance of this, given prior to that, I went through a process of being briefed, your military background—to stabilise the security first on counter-terrorism, and then on the Middle East situation, because that will give ongoing confidence and North Africa. I have not detected any lack of to many of those political developments. institutional knowledge. Clearly, tours may or may not be shorter than was the case beforehand, but there is definitely a pool of diplomats who have a great and Q196 Mr Baron: May I move us briefly on to Mali, long-standing understanding of the area. At the risk of Minister? Again, perhaps, if one was being embarrassing those sitting on either side of me, uncharitable, it is an example of where we appeared coming into this new, I have been very impressed by to be somewhat unsighted of the speed of the quality of the briefing I have received and the developments, if not the developments themselves. To amount of institutional knowledge the Foreign Office what extent was the situation in Mali foreseeable? possesses. More importantly, what can we do to try to make sure going forward that we do not repeat the error—if the Q194 Chair: The Prime Minister said that he wants FCO is willing to admit that an error was made? to avoid doubling up with France in North and West Hugh Robertson: Shall I provide you with a little bit Africa, yet a lot of francophone countries are saying of context, and then hand over to Tim, who is the to us that they actually would not mind seeing more country expert? Mali is not one of mine, even in my of the UK down there. How are you going to beginner status. We see time and again, looking across approach that? the totality of my brief, that you can be very aware of Hugh Robertson: There is a balance. I see from the many of the terrorist threats—much of the problem in notes that we have embassies and high commissions Mali was caused by terrorists and by al-Qaeda in 14 countries in North and West Africa, which is a elements—but the moment at which they become pretty fair start. As you correctly say, there are areas critical is quite a difficult moment to judge. Again, where France is arguably in the lead, but in those that is something you would understand as well as I cases, the important thing is that we work very closely do. Often, there isn’t a day in a month and a year with the French, as we managed to do very when suddenly something moves from being a vague successfully in Mali, and I have every confidence that threat to being an extant threat, and a look at the that will give us the sort of result we need. history of the past 10 years would prove that. It can be difficult to characterise it in precisely those terms. Q195 Mr Baron: Minister, welcome. The Committee I might hand over to Tim at that point. is concerned about the extent to which the UK seems Tim Morris: Thank you, Minister. May I say a quick to be unsighted with regards to events, particularly in word about a subject that you and the Committee may Libya and Mali. I think it fair to say that the collapse wish to return to with Mr Simmonds? It is certainly of the Gaddafi regime has had three consequences true that the international community was surprised relevant to the inquiry: the arms proliferation, Tuareg by the speed of the collapse in Mali in 2012—the coup militias going into Mali, and Libya’s increasing use as d'état. There had been a great level of belief in the a jihadist base. To what extent did the FCO consider President of Mali. This was not a country in which the those as potential consequences of our intervention? UK was particularly involved at the time for historical If it did not, why not? What lessons can we learn reasons. In the months leading up to the military going forward so that we do not repeat the failure? action in January, which came from the terrorist Hugh Robertson: In terms of the intervention in uprising, there had been a prediction that something Mali? was going quite badly wrong, including in that Mr Baron: No, Libya. Government. That was the reason for the appointment Hugh Robertson: That is something on which I may by the Prime Minister of his special representative and be able to throw some light, not least because I was due to go there a couple of weeks ago. I don’t think the reason for the international community coming anyone would pretend anything other than that the together, including in New York in the Security situation in Libya is a cause for concern at the Council before the end of 2012. moment. Clearly, there were very specific reasons for The actual uprising was in January 2013. It was a the UK’s intervention, not least to prevent a massacre surprise, because there wasn’t the expectation that the that was about to happen. I don’t think any of us terrorists would show themselves in the way they did. would have rested particularly easily if we hadn’t The situation escalated quickly, it was not predicted stepped in to prevent that. by the international community early enough and, in Clearly, trying to re-form and regroup a state that was retrospect, some misjudgments were made by the basically based on a series of tribal allegiances, with international community about the viability of Mali. one particularly dominant leader at the top of it, is That was not really a process in which the UK was going to be a process that will present some involved. We had just opened up an embassy in 2010. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [17-03-2014 15:53] Job: 036016 Unit: PG04 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o004_MP FAC 11.11.13 corrected.xml

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11 November 2013 Rt Hon Hugh Robertson MP, Samantha Job, Tim Morris and Simon Shercliff

Q197 Mr Baron: I take your point, but can I just would tell you that we opened an embassy in Mali in bring us back to something the Minister said? One about 2010, so we are beginning to pick this up. Also, fully accepts that you cannot decide or predict today as you correctly mentioned, we are very sighted of the when a crisis becomes a crisis. Having said that, you need to get more linguists properly trained. There is a can reduce the chances of being surprised. A common process. We have 38 French and Arabic speakers thread between Libya and Mali is that we seem to across North and West Africa, and we have a further have been completely unsighted. Algeria’s Prime 19 staff currently enrolled in French classes and Minister Sellal said that the toppling of Gaddafi made another 18 in Arabic classes. So there is a recognition insurgency and terrorism 50 times worse in the region. that, as the threat changes, the skill set we need to Can I suggest to you—coming back to something the meet that threat has therefore changed as well, and Chairman led off with—that there seems to a blind that work is being undertaken. spot on many of these areas? Why is that the case? Are we talking here about a lack of resources, or Q199 Sir John Stanley: As your near constituency within the resources envelope is there something more neighbour, Minister, may I personally welcome you to we can do? For example, we have heard about rotation your important new responsibilities? between posts: you build up an element of expertise; Minister, I did not feel that you really addressed the you are then sent on to another desk, and you lose central thrust of John Baron’s question, which was: quite a bit of expertise in a region. Is that something has the Foreign Office actually learned anything from the FCO should be looking at again in light of what the intervention in Libya in particular? Would you has happened recently—and that is before we even get agree there is a considerable parallel between the on to talking about soft power initiatives and cutting situation the Foreign Office faced in Libya and the back the BBC Arabic Service at a time when the situation it faced under the previous Government in whole Arab Spring was blowing up? But focus just on Kosovo? In both, there was an imperative the FCO, if you will. What can we do better that we humanitarian need to intervene to prevent substantial are not doing at the moment, given the enormous bloodshed, and my own view is that we were right lessons from Libya and Mali? I am afraid the answer, to respond to that imperative. But was it not wholly “We cannot predict an exact day when a crisis foreseeable in both instances that that military becomes a crisis” is not good enough. intervention would create a power vacuum and, unless Hugh Robertson: Well, I’m sorry if you don’t think international steps were taken to stabilise the country it is, but Mali is a country in which we have not in question, something like near-anarchy would result, traditionally had huge oversight. I think you see that as indeed has happened in Libya? across the counter-terrorism brief, actually; one of the Does the Foreign Office accept that, if we are going to challenges with the new breed of terrorism that we make military interventions to address an imperative have seen for the past decade is trying to get real short-term humanitarian need, it is essential that we oversight of exactly what is happening. This is very recognise that that may almost certainly involve a difficult stuff to read and they’re getting—I’m not sure long-term commitment? That is the case in Kosovo, that this Committee is the place to go into all the where NATO is still deployed, where there is a mechanisms that we use to read that; but it is very substantial EU effort and where we have achieved, clear, if the Committee is able to get a briefing from over a substantial period of years, considerable and the people who do this, that this is an increasingly impressive long-term political stability. Does the difficult science. Mobile telephones—they’re getting Foreign Office feel that that is a lesson to be learned, wise to security on mobile telephones and all the other or do you feel there are any lessons to be learned at ways of communicating, so it is not easy to do that. all from what has happened in Libya? As the nature of the threat we face and the challenges Hugh Robertson: Thank you for your kind words of we face changes, can we do more? Yes, we can. I welcome. In the many years we have known each think the Prime Minister’s initiative in earmarking this other, I don’t think I have ever been a quarter of an part of the world as one that needs extra attention is a hour late for anything I have done with you. recognition of that. So I suspect that the actual answer Do I feel that the Foreign Office doesn’t have is somewhere between what you’re suggesting and anything to learn? No, I absolutely do not feel that. I probably what I tried to at the beginning. worked in Sarajevo, Bosnia for the Foreign Office for a couple of years in the mid-1990s, and I know from Q198 Mr Baron: Very briefly, though, one accepts my time there that every time the Foreign Office is the Prime Minister’s initiative, but let us just talk involved in operations of any sort there is a very about the FCO for a second. Is there anything more considerable “lessons learned” process, which will the FCO can do when it comes to postings, rotation, undoubtedly be the case in Libya. I clearly wasn’t a time spent in the region and building up expertise, Foreign Office Minister when those decisions were including language expertise? I know the language taken, but I would be absolutely amazed if they were school is opening, but I’m talking about this particular not taken with a very hard-headed appreciation of the area—because whichever way we want to paint it, we fact that it was an imperfect situation. were unsighted and consequences are flowing from I suspect that people knew there was a very that. What more can the FCO do, rather than there just considerable danger of intervening in the way that we being a promise that the Prime Minister will give this did, not least because, as you correctly said, it is a area a higher priority? lesson we have learned on many previous occasions. Hugh Robertson: There are a number of things we I think everyone would have realised that, if we can do. I am sure that if Mr Simmonds were here, he intervened in the way we did, there was a danger of cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [17-03-2014 15:53] Job: 036016 Unit: PG04 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o004_MP FAC 11.11.13 corrected.xml

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11 November 2013 Rt Hon Hugh Robertson MP, Samantha Job, Tim Morris and Simon Shercliff this happening. You do what you can to mitigate it, the time, what was really bothering us about North- but ultimately you have to decide whether the West Africa actually wasn’t directed at us. humanitarian and security situations at the time are more pressing than the longer-term risk that you very Q201 Ann Clwyd: DFID has told us that it has two correctly identify. As always—and you will know this Sahel-based staff in the area. Given the amount of aid from your long ministerial career—it is a balance of that is being disbursed, that is a very small number of judgment. staff, I would have thought, to supervise the use of that aid. Q200 Ann Clwyd: I find it extraordinary that the Tim Morris: This is for DFID to say, but it is not a international community allowed itself to be bilateral programme; the investments being made are bamboozled in that way. I think the writing was going through multilateral agencies. The figure of two clearly on the wall, and £128 million in aid is a lot of has been an increase from zero very recently, but you money. I wonder whether lessons were learned. I have are right: it is looking at how it can best monitor the heard many times in this Committee that lessons have disbursement of that aid, which is itself a part of a been learned, but I wonder whether they have been. huge commitment. The European Commission has Are we reviewing our approach to other countries that announced €5 billion in the proposed EDF 11, coming might be in the same category as Mali, such as down the track, for the Sahel countries, so there are Ethiopia and Rwanda? I would have thought that, as some very substantial resources going into the region. a result of lessons being learned, we might be looking But you are absolutely right with those figures. very closely at those two countries. Tim Morris: I would draw a distinction between Mali Q202 Chair: Minister, I’m just going to interrupt and other instances. That was an area where terrorists with an admin point. You said that you could go on were implanted, which is something we had known beyond half-past 5. So that you can plan your diary about for several years. As we mentioned a moment and colleagues here can plan theirs as well, are you ago, the speed of the Government’s decay—the happy to stay here until 6? international community believed the Government Hugh Robertson: Yes. I think that’s the least I can do had a strong hold on power—was a surprise. That in the circumstances. process was monitored very closely by large embassies of partner countries that, in a sense, did not Q203 Chair: Thank you. We will draw stumps at 6 spot it. That was not us, because we were not there at and see where we have got to. the time, but it is a very interesting and very special Continuing on the DFID point, we have had evidence case. that one of the root causes of the problems is unsustainable population growth in the region. There It is perhaps difficult to draw an exact parallel with are now, in the Sahel, hundreds of millions of young what has happened in Mali, which is something we men and women living in an economic wasteland with need to study closely. We are trying to analyse exactly no economic prospects whatever. Whereas DFID takes what happened and why the terrorists were able to this seriously, there doesn’t seem to be much sign that prosper, to implant themselves and to join criminal the Foreign Office has addressed this point. Has the and other elements to perpetrate armed aggression. Sahel Task Force assessed the impact of population There are links between that and the experiences of growth? other countries, but there is something very special Tim Morris: It is a huge factor. Let me try to describe about that. For some months we have tried to work the way we are trying to process that, because we do with the international community and partners to think not, in the Foreign Office, have a programme about how we can build real stability in that part of the coping with demography. What we are trying to look world—not just individual interventions, but working forward to or to analyse in the future is the scale of against some of the drivers of instability. That will be the potential problem and how the very fact of a project for a number of years, but there are demographic change is going to put further pressure considerable lessons to learn from it, and very on migration and illegal migration—how it itself risks special ones. being a source of instability in the region. It is an Simon Shercliff: Our interest in Mali was very much immensely serious factor among a number of factors. sparked by the growth of AQIM and the terrorist It links, of course, into the economic development problem in Mali. While it was growing dramatically agenda and the huge task there is in the region to from 2009 up until last year, it was not directed at us provide economic futures for the people of the region. as such, but it was still a big phenomenon; it was Put simply, we very much have it on our minds and growing very quickly. As the earlier conversation see it as a contributory factor to the risks developing pointed out, we did not have a large footprint in the in the region. country—there wasn’t an awful lot of UK interest inside Mali itself—so our work, which is now being Q204 Chair: You mention Government policy. You moved forward quicker by the Prime Minister’s G8 will, of course, recall that last year the Prime Minister agenda, was very much to try to join up with other addressed a summit on population growth. It is very countries that did have greater footprints in the region, much Government policy at the moment. You also such as France in Mali and other countries throughout mentioned the migratory patterns. There is now fairly this bit of North-West Africa, so that we could share strong evidence that these people are beginning to our interests and share the burden of doing something walk—they are walking across the Sahara desert, about it. In terms of the Mali question you raised, at coming into the North African countries, and the boat cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [17-03-2014 15:53] Job: 036016 Unit: PG04 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o004_MP FAC 11.11.13 corrected.xml

Ev 44 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

11 November 2013 Rt Hon Hugh Robertson MP, Samantha Job, Tim Morris and Simon Shercliff that sank off Lampedusa is arguably just the tip of the Hugh Robertson: I think it is fair to say at the iceberg. Do you consider this is a risk, which you moment that the bigger worry is what is happening in should pay greater consideration to? Syria. At this precise moment, there is no sense or Hugh Robertson: It is a risk that is going to warrant intelligence to suggest that what is happening in West greater consideration. There is an EU taskforce, at the and North Africa is about to pose a direct security risk moment, on the Mediterranean, that has just been to this country; but it is fair to say that we remain formed up. It is due to report to the Home Affairs extremely vigilant on it. That is not to say that if at Council in early December, around the 5th or the 6th, some stage in the future this goes the wrong way, that and will then form a set of actions, we hope, for the might not be the case—but it isn’t currently. presidency thereafter. So absolutely it is very much an emerging issue, and one that we take seriously. Q210 Chair: I gather some of the migrants in the Lampedusa boat were from Somalia, which, if it Q205 Chair: What is the policy likely to be? Is it hasn’t come across your radar, is going to do so to try to resist migration, or is it how to cope with pretty soon. migration—and do you work with the Home Office Simon Shercliff: There is a much greater and longer- on this? running problem of the Somalian diaspora here in the Hugh Robertson: We do, and I don’t yet know the UK, of course, as there has been with Afghanistan and answer to that question, because the policy is still Pakistan over the years. In terms of the problem that undetermined. you have just highlighted, there is a reality that we deal with in those two parts of the world in particular. Q206 Chair: It has not been decided yet. There is a sharp, urgent increase in problems, as the Hugh Robertson: It has not yet been decided, no. It Minister referred to, with a Syrian-related diaspora, is due to come up at the joint Home Affairs Council but as yet there has been no evidence that we have on 5 and 6 December, and the presidency will report come across of individuals who are natives of the back to the European Council on 19 and 20 December. North-West African region turning themselves into a diaspora-related problem here in the UK. Q207 Chair: Perhaps you could, as soon as possible Chair: Fair enough. Let us hope it stays that way. after that, let us have a note in answer to the question Samantha Job: One of the things that we are talking of which way the policy is going. about to the countries of North Africa bilaterally is Hugh Robertson: I will absolutely do that, and will the risk to them of their nationals being radicalised or undertake to do it more promptly than I made my going to Syria and then coming back. Again, they are appearance today. not targeting the UK, but the Committee is looking at Chair: I think you have apologised enough now. stability in the region, and that is something that we Samantha Job: There are some aspects of the are very alive to as well. migration issue that we perhaps can comment on. One is that we are working with some of the countries in Q211 Sandra Osborne: There are numerous terrorist North Africa on economic opportunities for the groups in North and West Africa, and in your growing population, to encourage regional co- submission you say that they are not capable of posing operation economically. That is a big challenge in this a threat to or taking action against the UK at the part of the world. We want there to be social and moment. Can you expand on that? Is it that they are economic opportunities for those populations, so that incapable or do they just not see the UK as a target? they do not move, but also so that they are not prone Hugh Robertson: I will set the scene and then hand to being talked into a different route, shall we say, and over to Simon Shercliff. There are a number of a radicalisation-type agenda. terrorist groups active in the region, and you will no Specifically on Libya, which is the situation where doubt have seen lists of them in the course of this Lampedusa came from, we are working through the inquiry. As we said in answer to the previous question, EU—the Border Assistance Mission—and with the our assessment at the moment is not that these are Libyans, bilaterally, to help them with some of the not serious and capable groups—clearly they are—but border challenges. The No. 2 in the EU Border their activities are, at the moment, more likely to be Assistance Mission is a Brit and there are three other confined to the area that you are investigating, rather Brits in that team as well, so we are working with than them looking to export terrorism to the United them bilaterally on their specific issues, as well as Kingdom, where the main threat at the moment comes generally on border issues across the region. from Syria. Simon may want to add to that. Simon Shercliff: That is spot on. The way in which Q208 Chair: I am pleased to hear that, but would we word the CONTEST strategy talks about the direct you agree that the problem does not lie just in how to threat to the UK and the threat to UK interests. What handle it in the port in Libya, in Tripoli? It is way we have seen in North-West Africa is very much the back in the Sahel, the origin of the problem. latter—a real threat to UK interests that has The diaspora, when it gets here: is there any sign that manifested itself, for example, in the In Amenas anyone has picked up that this is causing problems by attack and also unfortunately in a few cases of British their bringing their culture here into the UK? citizens being kidnapped in that region once they are Hugh Robertson: Are you asking about that in terms there. That is clear—UK interests are under threat of security? while they are out there in the region. But, as the Minister said and with the same caveat as my last Q209 Chair: Yes, and from a CT point of view. answer, so far we have not seen anything that gives cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [17-03-2014 15:53] Job: 036016 Unit: PG04 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o004_MP FAC 11.11.13 corrected.xml

Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 45

11 November 2013 Rt Hon Hugh Robertson MP, Samantha Job, Tim Morris and Simon Shercliff rise to concern that that is being exported to direct that funding is not being used for aid and educational attack here in this country. development in that part of the world; it is being used in particular to radicalise young men. Q212 Sandra Osborne: In relation to Mali, there I suspect that lying behind your question is the seems to be some evidence that this has provided an recognition that there are regimes that, if they are not opportunity for these groups to link up more often funding this directly, are funding it through proxies. than they did in the past, and we know that Boko Nobody should be in any doubt at all that many of Haram, for example, was originally purely an internal these groups are relatively well financed by those sorts group, but they have taken more of an interest of activities and the proceeds of crime, as well as the internationally in terms of links with al-Qaeda. If there other things that happen in a sparsely populated and was evidence of that, would you change your largely lawless region. assessment? Hugh Robertson: Perhaps I might give that a bit of Q214 Sandra Osborne: So what can the context. I remember when I was a young soldier in Government do about it? Northern Ireland in the mid to late ’80s, as part of the Hugh Robertson: A very good start is what the Prime training, they used to take you into the whole creation Minister did at the G8 summit, which was to try to get of a terror network across Europe, and that was at a international agreement not to pay kidnap for ransom time when there were very definite links between demands. I think we were all enormously encouraged many of the European terror groups—it was when Sir that that was one of the outputs of Lough Erne. Both John Stanley was a Minister, I think. here and everywhere else, I urge everyone who signed The concept of a terror network in the way that you up to that to keep to it. It is not in anyone’s interest are talking about is, in itself, not new. The way that to break the consortium. they do it clearly evolves as the years go by. Frankly, in a sense, it would be surprising if that were not Q215 Mr Baron: May I put the focus a little more on happening. That might almost be as worrying as the development aid and the battle for hearts and minds in fact that we know that it is. the region? It feels as though there is a bit of a soft These are quite fluid organisations. Some of them power battle going on here, and I am not sure that the grow and the threat increases, and others recede. It is West has the upper hand at the moment. What work a process in constant flux and in any event people talk is the FCO doing on tracking extremist groups in the about al-Qaeda as a franchise operation at the best of region? We have had a DFID official say to us that times. It is absolutely inevitable both that the that is now the responsibility, as far as they are capabilities of these various groups will change and concerned, of the FCO. What work is being done on that their ability to co-operate and integrate with each the efficacy of the aid going in? other will change—at some times, they will be closer A pattern seems to be developing where a lot of these together and at others they will be further apart. extremist groups are not just preaching, but providing The critical thing is to come back to the message that services that the state is failing to provide, and that is we gave you a few moments ago—at this precise a powerful incentive to listen to what they have to say. moment in time, we do not believe that that capability We can either try to close these centres down, whether provides a threat to the UK mainland. That is not to they are mosques, madrassahs or whatever, or we have say that in future it may not develop in that way: let to be more clever and spend the money more wisely, us hope it doesn’t. competing and hitting hard where we see we can get Simon Shercliff: As a rider to that, I should add that value for money in getting our message across. we frequently talk about the likes of al-Qaeda, the What work has the FCO done on that, and what work Islamic Maghreb, Boko Haram—they are familiar will it do to counteract this powerful combination of terms now. In 2009, they were not part of the lexicon extremist teaching linked to the provision of services, here: then we talked a lot about al-Qaeda in the FATA which for many countries simply does not exist at in Pakistan and in the Arabian peninsula. This is an ground level? example of what the Minister was saying—it Simon Shercliff: The problem, of course, is not fluctuates a lot over quite short periods of time. unique to North-West Africa and is fairly standard. We look at failed states, or safe havens, as part of the Q213 Sandra Osborne: Also there is an increase in old lexicon— mosques and madrassahs in this area, which are teaching radical forms of Islam. Do you have any idea Q216 Mr Baron: Sure. But our Report is on this where the money is coming from to fund these? Is it region. from individuals or certain Governments? Do you Simon Shercliff: Sure. Learning from previous have concerns that some of the jihadist groups are experience, we have started to talk about our holistic being bankrolled by certain individuals or effort in North-West Africa—this is across Governments? Government and not just the FCO—where all of our Hugh Robertson: Let me start by saying that it is a attention has, frankly, been piqued by terrorism and very good question. One of the reasons why the the kidnap problem, which the Minister outlined. The initiative on kidnap for ransom was picked up by the solution is definitely not a uniquely counter-terrorism Prime Minister as a key thing to come out of last solution set; it is the full range of soft power, as you year’s G8 was a perception that al-Qaeda had put it, going right across the spectrum. It is absolutely benefited from that particular strand to the tune of paramount that we are joined up properly with DFID about £40 million. That is one form of funding, and in looking at the development and economic side. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [17-03-2014 15:53] Job: 036016 Unit: PG04 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o004_MP FAC 11.11.13 corrected.xml

Ev 46 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

11 November 2013 Rt Hon Hugh Robertson MP, Samantha Job, Tim Morris and Simon Shercliff

On the extremism side, we first need to understand the there are always three main pillars, I know—of problem. As we have been talking about hitherto, it is security and the particular interventions we can do not a part of the world in which we have great long under a security pillar, state-building and resilience. deep roots. We, along with the French, the Americans When you get to the resilience end of the spectrum, and other allies, have put an awful lot of effort over this is pure development: the question of reinforcing the past few years into getting to grips with the nature the region so that it can withstand future shocks, of the problem, where the extremism is being whether those are natural disasters or conflict preached and how the radicalisation is happening. disasters. But the state-building core is crucial. Then, once we are confident about what it is we are The point about that is that we need to position dealing with, it becomes a burden-sharing exercise: ourselves where we are participating in the working out which country or which partner country international debate and helping design the in the region, or which western country ally, is best interventions. I think we feel that if we rush too placed to do something about it. For us, we would be quickly into solutions, we will be doing them on our working quite closely in Nigeria, for example, with own. There could be a quite limited number of fellow the Nigerian Government on a holistic governmental partners, as only a quite limited number of countries countering-violent-extremism strategy. are active on this theme—North European countries, for example—where we can tie up and get some Q217 Mr Baron: When we visited AFRICOM in thinking and planning into that system and move Stuttgart, as you would expect, the Americans gave us forward. that line about getting to know the area and all the rest There is one particular opportunity for this, which is of it. They described it, quite graphically, as having to the development of a UN integrated strategy for the drain the swamp, shooting the crocodiles closest to Sahel. That has been announced by the UN Secretary- the boat first. We all know what that means, but their General, and the headlines and the main themes are comment was that while we all appreciate the problem set out. It is quite well co-ordinated with the World in trying to drain the swamp, on the medium to long- Bank and the European Union and, as you know, the term basis, to take away the support for these UN Secretary-General has just been in the region. We extremists at ground level—whether through relief of see that as an opportunity to feed in thinking and poverty or whatever—there does not seem to be much analysis to try to get the rationale around those co-ordination between Governments or foreign interventions right. Ministries. We know that if we select just one subject to go in Even within the FCO, there was talk that there was on—some aspect of state building—it may or may not not a clear view. We vaguely know what the issue is, be successful, but it will be operating on its own. but no concrete steps are in place. That brings me There needs to be a careful and very serious process back to my earlier question on the specific measures of harnessing the substantial funds that are going into taking place within the FCO. There is very little the region, mainly through multilateral organisations, evidence of that. Can you put our minds at rest? in some really powerful interventions. Tim Morris: May I explain something of what we are Hugh Robertson: There is one final thing that will doing at the moment? We would hope to keep your help in the understanding of that. I will be brief. Committee in close touch with this as we move Clearly, a lot of work goes on with our allies, the EU forward. We are trying to design an approach to North and the UN. I do not know whether you have come and West Africa, which we flagged up in the original across the Global Counterterrorism Forum, which was papers which we gave to the Committee, that goes created in September 2011 by the US. It has 31 very much to the heart of what you and my colleague different members, including all the G8. It exists said: to address instability and insecurity, we need not precisely to tackle these issues. Encouragingly, the just to take security measures, but to build. Sahel working group, which has been a part of this, is The point about co-ordination is absolutely vital. chaired by Canada and, crucially, Algeria. Quite a lot What has happened so far in the Sahel has been a lack of this work is going on. of co-ordination and the expenditure of vast sums of money with, to put it politely, fairly limited results. Q218 Mr Roy: Minister, in the drugs trade in West We absolutely agree with the objective you outlined. Africa, the street value of a tonne of cocaine exceeds If people are building up alternative governance the military budget of most West African countries, systems, what we need to do, as the international and it is estimated that 18 tonnes of cocaine reach that community, in support of the region—because we area. The FCO submission concedes that it has no idea cannot impose that from outside—is build up about the actual routes used by the criminals, even governance and state institutions so that there is a though 18 tonnes is a pretty substantial weight of functioning alternative in what is, after all, a region drugs. where Islam is very moderate; the introduction of this The one thing we do know is that most of it comes in extremism is a completely alien concept. There needs by sea, especially to Guinea Bissau. We heard from to be a slow and well co-ordinated process of Nigeria that there was a great deal of worry that not building up. enough was being done by the international On what we are actually doing, there is a strategic community to stop the drugs landing in the first place. approach across the Ministries here. Our taskforce co- What would you say to those people who say that the ordinates Whitehall on this, particularly with DFID, international community is not doing enough. What the Security Committee, the MOD and the Home can it do? Office family. We are looking at three main pillars— Tim Morris: May I try to answer that? cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [17-03-2014 15:53] Job: 036016 Unit: PG04 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o004_MP FAC 11.11.13 corrected.xml

Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 47

11 November 2013 Rt Hon Hugh Robertson MP, Samantha Job, Tim Morris and Simon Shercliff

Q219 Chair: Mr Morris, may I ask you to keep your to that the Tuareg in Mali and the current regional answer short? disputes in Nigeria, and there is a lot that can be done Tim Morris: Part of the answer lies in better to stabilise the area, particularly the Western Sahara, international co-operation. A lot of our efforts are in by brokering resolutions to some of those working with the UN and our European partners to disagreements. strengthen the enforcement operations in that part of Hugh Robertson: Absolutely. I couldn’t agree more. the world. There are still analytical gaps. Evidence As I suspect you know better than me, Ambassador exists about where some of the routes are, but it Ross is active in the region at the moment. He is in remains a considerable task. We have that as one of the process of trying to bring about the basis for a our main activities, which we are discussing with our political agreement that will lead to a settlement on Home Office colleagues. Western Sahara. We support his activities 100%, and Hugh Robertson: To give you a sense of the flavour we will be giving him every assistance that he needs. behind this, when I had my initial briefing—I have only had one thus far on the Sahel region—one of the Q223 Chair: I am encouraged by that answer. I hope first things I was told was that this remains an area there will be a similar drive on some of the other with multifarious trade routes going both East-West regional differences, even though they are outside and West-West, North-South and South-North. You your particular area of responsibility. are absolutely right—it is an area of very considerable I do not know whether you saw reports of an interview criminality, much of it driven by drugs. Guinea Bissau with the Chief of the Defence Staff that was published is not a state in a good state of repair, and there is a in The Times on Monday last week. He spoke about a lot of work to be done on that. There is no doubt that new role for the Army in training armies in various that is funding terrorism, extremism and so on. countries across the region. Was he flying a kite? Was Samantha Job: Very quickly, one specific thing we he authorised? Is it a new policy? If it is a new policy, have commissioned and are about to get the result on wouldn’t it be better made at the Dispatch Box by is a joint analysis of conflict and instability across the the Secretary of State for Defence, rather than in the region, which is looking exactly at routes and how columns of The Times? goods, people and arms are moved across the region. Hugh Robertson: I have not read the article myself, We want to get our analysis right as we put our but we have discussed it extensively in the office. I policies in place. happen to know the new Chief of the Defence Staff. His remarks should be seen in the context of a number Q220 Mr Roy: Minister, on hostage taking—you of things. First, the top end of the Ministry of Defence will not need a briefing on this one—you will know is quite exercised by what happens to the armed forces as a politician that the declaration at the G8 summit post-Afghanistan. There has clearly been a decade or at Lough Erne earlier this year included a statement so of deployment, and now they are coming home. that said unequivocally that it rejected paying off There is always a worry that it is not good for the ransoms to terrorists. Are you confident that all G8 Army, the Navy and the Air Force to sit around at members are adhering to that commitment? If you are home underemployed. Many of the best brains at the not, what do you propose to do about it? top of the Ministry of Defence are looking at how we Hugh Robertson: The answer to your question is that might use the armed forces in the years ahead. all members of the G8 signed up to the declaration. Secondly, the British armed forces have an We would, of course, expect that all our international unparalleled reputation for excellence in training. You partners would keep their obligations as signed up at only have to look at the reputation that our officer a G8 summit. If you might be asking that question in training colleges, the higher command and staff course reference to events in the last week or so, the French and other things enjoy to realise the benefit that other have indeed stated that they did not pay any ransom countries can gain from all of that. to seal the release of those hostages. Thirdly, of course, the Chief of the Defence Staff is not flying a kite at all. We are already doing an Q221 Mr Roy: You will bear Lough Erne in mind, enormous amount of that work. As you are very well Minister? aware, there are a number of Libyan soldiers, who Hugh Robertson: I can absolutely give you that will form part of the basis of the new Libyan armed assurance. As you might have guessed from the 10 forces, who we hope to train at Bassingbourn in the years that I spent in the Army, I really do not believe early part of next year. I have just come back from that paying hostage money to terrorists does anything the Middle East, and it is clear that our security other than encourage them to do it time and again. integration with countries such as Jordan and many The money they receive is simply used to fund more others across the region, where we provide expertise terrorism and more extremism. If you are asking me for training and other things, is long-established and whether I will be urging everyone to whom I speak to very deep. adhere to the agreements made at Lough Erne, the If you are asking me whether, in the post-Afghanistan answer is that, absolutely, I will. period when there will be more capacity in the armed services, I see us using them to provide the training Q222 Chair: The Western Sahel is a region with a expertise and, let’s face it, standards that we all lot of unstable countries, but two countries that are associate with the British armed forces to better stable are Algeria and Morocco, yet they do not talk military and security capabilities in the region, to each other because of a disagreement about Western assuming the conditions are right, the answer is that, Sahara, which is a regional political grievance. Add absolutely, I do. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [17-03-2014 15:53] Job: 036016 Unit: PG04 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o004_MP FAC 11.11.13 corrected.xml

Ev 48 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

11 November 2013 Rt Hon Hugh Robertson MP, Samantha Job, Tim Morris and Simon Shercliff

Q224 Chair: We are well aware of a small amount leaders of last year’s coup appear to have been of help, but we are not aware of a large amount of rewarded, rather than punished, for their actions, help. Is it FCO policy to expand the effort there? which include alleged human rights abuses. Do you Hugh Robertson: I am going to do the trick of think that undermines the good work of the EU slightly rephrasing your question. Is it FCO policy training mission, and if so, can anything be done that, where appropriate, we should use our armed about it? forces to help build capacity in countries in North and Tim Morris: Could I take up your first point? The West Africa? Yes, it is. Sierra Leone does not lie in British contribution to the training mission has been my area of responsibility—it is part of Mr very significant. Although there were only 37 troops, Simmonds’s brief—but that is a place in which we they made a disproportionate contribution, and on the have done this successfully. We are in the process of civilian side there is an adviser on preventing sexual doing it in Libya. Where the conditions are right I can violence. see us doing more of it in the future. Does that answer On the point about rewarding the coup leaders, we see your question? it as being the other way round. The coup leaders are now firmly out of the picture. There have been free Q225 Chair: It does. I realise the question was not and fair democratic elections for the president, and very refined. What I am pressing at is, what is the there are further legislative elections, as you know, plan? You talk about FCO policy, and we talk about coming up in a few weeks’ time. We believe the Government policy. process is moving in the right direction, but it is a Hugh Robertson: Absolutely—fair enough. Sorry for very fragile state that will need a lot of help. I should causing any confusion. The FCO policy is to carry out also name-check the UN mission, MINUSMA. our commitments in the countries to which we have given them, most notably Libya. Do we have plans to Q229 Mark Hendrick: They have come in further expand it beyond that at this precise moment afterwards. Are you referring to the retribution in as I sit here being interviewed by you? No, we don’t. Bamako against some of those involved in the coup Do I foresee that that might happen at some stage in when you say it is the other way round? the future? Yes, I do. Tim Morris: There has been considerable confusion within the political establishment in Mali in terms of Q226 Chair: Thank you. Perhaps we ought to write turning against the coup leaders. That is undoubtedly to the Secretary of State for Defence about that. Do the case. They are sidelining them, we hope. you think that Operation Serval in Mali was a good example of how joint co-operation can quickly bring about a resolution to regional conflicts? Q230 Mark Hendrick: So would you say that the Hugh Robertson: Yes, I do. I am not an expert in the newly formed General Sanogo is now on the back operation itself, because I have only had a month and foot? Mali is not one of my countries. It was an operation Tim Morris: Yes. that the French led because of their expertise and history in the area. Absolutely, the role we played in Q231 Sir John Stanley: At the recent autumn supporting them was the right thing to do. plenary of the NATO parliamentary assembly, in the defence committee we had a presentation from the Q227 Mark Hendrick: Could you give us a report French three-star general who was in command in on the EU training mission in Mali? Is 15 months Mali. To me, the most striking feature of his long enough to turn the Malian army into an effective presentation was the photographs that he showed as fighting force? Do you anticipate the French army to what the French troops found in the areas where having to stay longer than intended in Mali, and do they had overrun, eventually, the militant insurgents. you think the UK will be needed there again at any He showed their enormous arms dumps and enormous time in the future? degree of military sophistication, logistical back-up Tim Morris: This subject is being discussed at the and so on. I put it to you: is not one of the key lessons moment, so I can’t definitively say. However, it is fair to be learned, by the British Government, the French to say that we fully expect one further rotation. Our Government, the American Government and others, Ministers are insistent on the need for an exit strategy, that we are in danger of persistently underestimating because without one the training mission in Mali not only the tenacity of these militant insurgents but could stay there for a considerable period of time. The their military capability and the sophistication of their need will remain, and there is a discussion about how military operation? to transition the mission to something that is more Hugh Robertson: The answer to that, Sir John, is yes. involved in training and inspiring good training— As an example, during the initial briefing I had on training trainers—than the current format. But the Libya, I think I was told that there were reckoned to presence of European troops on the ground has been be some 400 arms dumps around Libya, of which the seen as a successful stabilisation measure. Government has control of about 25%. Those are not small quantities of arms and munitions. You add to Q228 Mark Hendrick: It has been successful while that the ability of insurgents, through kidnap for they have been there on the ground, but the French ransom and other things, to raise sums of money like are pulling out gradually and our presence was quite £40 million, and in a market that is over-supplied minimal. EUTM is working to instil respect for human where there is a lot of kit available you can absolutely rights in the Malian army. At the same time, the see the dangers that you have graphically outlined. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [17-03-2014 15:53] Job: 036016 Unit: PG04 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o004_MP FAC 11.11.13 corrected.xml

Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 49

11 November 2013 Rt Hon Hugh Robertson MP, Samantha Job, Tim Morris and Simon Shercliff

I have to say—it gives me no particular pleasure to the provision of digital technology. Would you agree say this—that I would have been much more surprised with that? if you had said the opposite, namely that the general Simon Shercliff: Absolutely. This is a core problem. had been surprised at how badly equipped they were. The size of the problem is immense, obviously. It is a I would have expected, given the conditions that we huge region. There are huge desertified borders, often know exist in that part of the world, for them to be not actually demarcated in any sensible way, and, as very well equipped and very well resourced. we mentioned earlier, ancient trade routes, used either That is not a new problem; I remember when I was a for licit or illicit reasons, criss-cross the whole region. soldier working with the Foreign Office in Bosnia in The context is that this is not an easy problem to 1994, we were constantly surprised by both the quality crack. That said, there are the things that you of the weaponry and the sheer quantities of it that mentioned—building up the capacities of partner were flowing through very quickly. Once the countries in the region to have the basics in border Americans started illicitly supplying the Bosnian control systems, including digital controls, databases Muslims, you could very quickly see that the of people tracking back and forth, basic scanning mujaheddin brigades based around Mostar got a lot of equipment, and that sort of thing. We are involved brand new equipment that, I dare say, did not stay in with that bilaterally and also through the Global Bosnia or get destroyed at the end of that conflict. Counterterrorism Forum that the Minister mentioned.

Q232 Mr Roy: Minister, on new multilateral and Q236 Mr Roy: Specifically on border training and regional relationships, your written submission refers digital technology, for example, could that be to the FCO being in the process of formulating a new provided within a development aid package? Is that Government approach to North and West Africa that how you see that being given—in a package? “transcends the standard bilateral approach”. Can you Simon Shercliff: We are going to have to get back to outline for the Committee what you mean by that? you on that, if you don’t mind. Tim Morris: What we are trying to express is that Mr Roy: That’s fine. I understand. everything we will be trying to do in this region will Hugh Robertson: From what I know—I am going to be done with partners and it will be done through the recesses of my mind—quite a lot of the technology multilateral organisations. That is not just a reflection that you use to do this is quite complicated too. of resource and our own history; it is a reflection of Therefore, I do not know off the top of my head the complexity of the problems, and the risks there whether we can export that technology, even before are that if the international community goes in with we get into the question of whether we do. Indeed, in different interventions, it will cause confusion and terms of beam technology—people cutting a beam, actual damage. and all the rest of the technology that is used to do this sort of work—I am not quite sure where that is. Q233 Mr Roy: I understand that, but who will be the Rather than having a guess, I think the best thing is key partners? to find out and write to you. Tim Morris: To start with, the countries of the region Samantha Job: What we can say is that we are and the regional organisations, which themselves are working bilaterally with the countries affected on fractured and need a lot of support, ECOWAS, the border security, and encouraging them to work with Arab Maghreb Union, the United Nations and the big each other. Tunisia and Algeria are co-operating, IFIs, particularly the World Bank, which needs to which is a new development and a welcome one. We work closely together with the United Nations. In have done a lot in Libya on border security and will terms of outside allies of ours, we would certainly say continue to do so. We actually have an embedded that we were working closely with the French, the border security adviser. We have aviation security Americans and Canadians and a group of North projects in more than one of the countries in the European countries who have quite a deep historical region. We have a regional aviation security adviser, involvement in the Sahel, and who have done a regional conflicts adviser, and a regional CT adviser. projects—countries like Germany, the Danes and the Dutch, who have carried out projects for a number of Q237 Mr Roy: But presumably the poorer countries years and who are quite familiar with the way the cannot afford it. That is the bottom line. politics work. Samantha Job: But some of it is technical and, as you say, some of it is equipment. Q234 Mr Roy: But you are confident that, even Chair: And then, of course, there is the arms export though those people have been there for many years, control aspect. Last question—Andrew Rosindell. this will be a new approach. Andrew Rosindell: I apologise for my lateness in Tim Morris: Yes, we have that discussion with them. attending. That discussion is going on with them, and the United Hugh Robertson: There is no need to worry. Nations strategy should be a rallying point for them. Q238 Andrew Rosindell: I would like to talk about Q235 Mr Roy: My last question is on border the situation with the Nigerian military. We went to security. The Committee has been told that one of the Abuja as part of our visit there in September and met most practical things that the United Kingdom or the General Bello, who told us about Boko Haram and the EU could do to address the instability is to help poor appalling atrocities that are taking place in that Sahelian countries to manage their land borders country. One of the things that we picked up was the through training for border guards, for example, or disappointment from Nigeria, which is a cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [17-03-2014 15:53] Job: 036016 Unit: PG04 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o004_MP FAC 11.11.13 corrected.xml

Ev 50 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

11 November 2013 Rt Hon Hugh Robertson MP, Samantha Job, Tim Morris and Simon Shercliff

Commonwealth country and one with which we have North Africa bit and my colleague Mark Simmonds had many years of close connections, that we have not does— been able to assist them very much over this appalling Chair: Mark Simmonds is coming back. issue. Will the Minister please explain to the Hugh Robertson: So, without sticking him right in Committee why we cannot do more? Whatever the frame, you will have the opportunity to ask him hurdles there may be, surely it is better that we should that question when he comes back in front of you. help Nigeria defeat these appalling people and the However, the question that you have just posed is a terrorism that is going on in that country than it is to very fair one, and I answer it from the perspective— be too hung up on every detail of human rights. as much as anything—not of being a Foreign Office Simon Shercliff: Yes, you are absolutely right. Minister at the moment but of having been a soldier Priority No. 1 here is to help the Nigerians defeat this who took part in counter-terrorism operations in the raging insurgency that is going on inside their own 10 years that I was in the Army. You are right—we borders, simply because we have a direct UK national are dealing, particularly these days, with a group of security risk that we need to manage there. So that people who have an extraordinarily extreme ideology interest is very clear, but as the Foreign Secretary laid and who wish to destroy the sort of society that we out in his speech of 14 February this year on value very much in this country. If we defeat them by countering terrorism overseas, what we cannot do, and applying the same tactics to them as they apply to cannot afford to do as one of the leading proponents everybody else, that very quickly makes the problem of this, is to blindly go into these alliances with come back in some other form. So, by far the best countries that are wilfully and openly transgressing way of dealing with them is, yes, to deal with them international human rights norms. That is something robustly, but to deal with them by using the rules and that our democracy doesn’t stand for. the norms that we accept in this country. We cannot afford to be, for example, handing over I think that we have seen time and time again that as intelligence on Nigerian terrorists for the Nigerians soon as we lower our standards and resort to lesser then to go and find the people and hang them up by standards in terms of defeating terrorism, it very their toenails. That would not wash in our system; we quickly comes back to bite us. So, in just the same hold ourselves to higher standards than that. So we way that it is totally unacceptable for a young Marine assist the Nigerians to go round the place and find the to shoot a terrorist in Afghanistan, it is absolutely terrorists, because that is very much in our national unacceptable for us to deploy tactics in defeating interest, and at the same time—from the top level of terrorists that we would not expect of ourselves. political exhortation to the practical capacity building Chair: Minister, thank you very much. We have level—we continually exhort them to do their work covered all the ground we wanted that is to do with while maintaining international standards of human you, so we won’t be recalling you, as it were, you’ll rights. You can’t do one without the other. be relieved to hear. I also thank your colleagues— Ms Job, Mr Shercliff and Mr Morris, thank you very Q239 Andrew Rosindell: Could I ask the Minister much indeed. this: does he think that the defeat of global terrorism, Hugh Robertson: Mr Chairman, may I just finish— which has no respect whatsoever for any form of apart from thanking my colleagues, as you have done, human rights, takes lesser priority than actually and indeed you—by apologising, once again? I’m upholding every idealistic view of what human rights afraid that I did get a message as we sat down on the ought to be? We have talked about “hanging up by Bench that you had put this sitting back until after the toenails”, but when you’re defeating terrorism should statement was over. I meant absolutely no offence. I we not understand that sometimes you have to take can assure you that, as a Minister appearing in front very firm action to fight these people to defeat them? of you for the first time, the very last thing that I Hugh Robertson: Just to give a bit of context, you wanted to do was to turn up late and annoy you all were looking at me slightly hopefully during the before I had even started. So, once again, my answer to the last question— apologies. Chair: Stuff happens. Thank you very much for Q240 coming. Andrew Rosindell: It is really a political question. Hugh Robertson: Indeed, and I should probably explain that I am not the Minister for Nigeria. I do the cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [SO] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:47] Job: 036016 Unit: PG05 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o005_MP HC 56-v Extremism (N and W Africa) Corrected.xml

Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 51

Tuesday 3 December 2013

Members present: Richard Ottaway (Chair)

Mr John Baron Andrew Rosindell Mike Gapes Mr Frank Roy Mark Hendrick Rory Stewart Sandra Osborne ______

Examination of Witnesses

Witnesses: Mark Simmonds MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Tim Morris, Head, Sahel Task Force and Whitehall Sahel Co-ordinator, and Catherine Inglehearn, Deputy Head of Africa Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, gave evidence.

Q241 Chair: I welcome witnesses to this session of Q243 Chair: I agree with you. Do you think that it the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, which is the is a question of beefing up existing regional and fifth and final evidence session for the Committee’s institutional structures, or does it need a fresh inquiry into the UK’s response to extremism and approach? political instability in North and West Africa. It is with Mark Simmonds: The regional structures need to be pleasure that I invite Mr Mark Simmonds, the bolstered, but so do all the other frameworks that will Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign be used, we hope, to create lasting security and Office, and his two colleagues, Tim Morris, head of stability in the region. Of course it varies from the Sahel Task Force and Whitehall Sahel individual country to individual country. What might Coordinator, and Catherine Inglehearn, Deputy Head be appropriate for Mali is not necessarily the same as of East and West Africa Department. May I give a would be appropriate for finding a satisfactory warm welcome to you both and to you, Minister. resolution to the ongoing challenges in Libya, for Is there anything you want to say by way of an example. There needs to be a very sophisticated opening remark, Minister, because I have a fairly approach. general first question? While you are absolutely right, Mr Ottaway, to Mark Simmonds: We have been trying to organise highlight some of the key aspects that range across all this for some time, so shall we proceed with the of the countries in the Sahel region, there are also questions? I am very pleased to be here at the issues that cannot be resolved by the regional Committee. organisations alone. I will highlight one example, which is the significant amount of organised crime and trafficking that takes place through the Sahel Q242 Chair: And we are very pleased to see you region—not only narcotics, although that is a here. significant part. Clearly, multilateral organisations and Minister, the Western Sahel is the front line against multilateral co-operation and co-ordination will play a extremism and instability. We have poverty, weak significant role in resolving that, if we are to be government, poor border control, sectarian tension, successful. organised crime and unsustainable population growth; what do you think should be the international Q244 Chair: Are you satisfied that we have the right community’s single biggest priority if it wants to amount of resources allocated towards beefing up make the region safer and more stable? these regional and multilateral institutions? I note that Mark Simmonds: It is very difficult and very we do not have embassies in Mauritania, Niger, Chad challenging to hone all those complex and or Burkina Faso. Is there a case for reviewing this? multifaceted challenges that the Sahel region faces— Mark Simmonds: As you will be aware, Mr Ottaway, Chair: We will be coming back to them individually. we keep our diplomatic missions under constant Mark Simmonds: To synthesise them down to one review. Certainly, one of the things that the coalition particular, overriding and important priority is Government have done through the Network Shift is difficult, but for me the overriding driving force to increase the amount of embassies and high behind what happened in Mali and in the Sahel region commissions around the world. As you are aware, is the fact that there are limited and weak institutional some new missions have been opened in Africa. We governance structures in many of these countries, opened our embassy in Mali back in 2010, which I which are generically described as in the Sahel region. think gives us traction and an ability to understand in That has to be a key priority both for bilateral more detail what is going on in this particular region. relationships between the UK and other countries and We have more than 1,000 people in this part of Africa, for regional solutions—the role played by ECOWAS many of whom are very knowledgeable and have and the North African organisations, as well as the particular language expertise, both French and multilateral organisations—so as to ensure that there Arabic—certainly with the opening of the language is governance, and that people feel connected to school. There are other issues that you are aware of, government structures as a way of airing and with the new academy to build diplomatic excellence resolving their grievances. and the new African cadre that is being put in place cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:47] Job: 036016 Unit: PG05 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o005_MP HC 56-v Extremism (N and W Africa) Corrected.xml

Ev 52 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

3 December 2013 Mark Simmonds MP, Tim Morris and Catherine Inglehearn to pull people from within the Foreign Office who Q247 Andrew Rosindell: Following on from that, have African experience in this particular part of based on the fact that many of the countries that Africa—so when a crisis blows up we can pull people potentially have the ingredients for terrorism to evolve in as and when necessary. in those countries have links to Britain through the Of course we keep things under constant review, but Commonwealth—countries such as Nigeria, where we also have the relevant expertise, particularly to pull there is already a serious problem, and others, where together the North and West Africa strategy document there could be in the years ahead—what are the that we have done, but also to make sure that we Government doing now to work with some of those follow through and exchange thoughts and ideas with countries and their Governments to pre-empt the other key bilateral partners, who perhaps have more spread of terrorism, particularly with countries in the historic residence in and understanding of this part Commonwealth, with whom we have so much of Africa. historical linkage and so many things in common? Mark Simmonds: You ask a very good question. We Q245 Chair: The French and the USA put a lot in have a significant programme of providing support. If there at the moment. Is there any angle that we have the Committee is interested, I could provide a detailed that differentiates ourselves from them? breakdown country by country on exactly what we Mark Simmonds: I think we have particular areas of are doing. expertise that we can disseminate to our key bilateral Chair: That would be helpful. allies. They are in key areas of counter-terrorism— Mark Simmonds: That would inform the Report, building capacity in counter-terrorism—as well as particularly because it relates to West Africa and the some of the excellent work that the Department for Sahel region—whether it be providing support International Development is doing, not just in Mali through the Ministry of Defence to build capacity in but across the Sahel region, to resolve conflict, build Sierra Leone; assisting the Nigerian authorities with post-conflict stability and create democratic counter-terrorism and to ensure that judicial processes institutions. I think there are key areas in which we are in place to be able to try people properly on the have expertise and which we can lend to a bigger, basis of the rule of law; or training the Malian armed multilateral framework. forces through the European Union Training Mission to ensure that ultimately they are capable of providing security and stability themselves domestically rather Q246 Andrew Rosindell: Good afternoon, Minister. than relying on outside assistance. In my view, that Clearly, terrorism in Africa is not static; it finds the will take some time to deliver in practice, as will weak countries to embed itself within. Do the British infusing all the time in that training the importance of Government have a long-term strategic plan on this? human rights and humanitarian law so that we try to Are we looking at countries that are potential havens stop some of the atrocities that you will no doubt have for terrorists and working with those countries to heard about. prevent the spread of these kinds of evils? So we provide significant support. Certainly in Mark Simmonds: You are absolutely right, Mr Nigeria, in a whole range of areas, we are helping to Rosindell. There is a growing anxiety about the way build capacity in the Nigerian state, not just in the in which those involved in terrorism of this type can armed forces, but assisting in other areas as well—for cross traditional geopolitical boundaries. They are example, the national crime agency and making sure much more transient and have a much greater ability that aviation security and safety are in place for the to move quickly than has perhaps been the case in the Ministry of Transport. Colleagues from HMRC are past, and they make contact with each other. involved in trying to make sure that the appropriate One of the key aspects that the coalition Government tax is paid in the appropriate place, as well as a whole put into place when they came into power was what range of other issues. DFID and the Foreign Office is generically called the “building stability overseas” are also heavily involved. strategy, which details and analyses through a whole range of information sources, trying to predict where Q248 Andrew Rosindell: On Nigeria, we were there problems would occur. Obviously, trying to predict in September and one concern that was raised with us where terrorists will appear is a key part of trying to by those in the Nigerian armed forces who are fighting establish whether a country is going to be stable in terrorism was that there is a restriction on what the the future, with the idea of, once that prediction has British armed forces can do to assist the Nigerian been made, putting in place prevention strategies to armed forces, due to human rights concerns, in stop that country tipping over in the way that we saw tackling Boko Haram. If there are obstacles, what is in Mali. being done to overcome them so that we can assist the With what happened in Northern Mali, while we Nigerian authorities in tackling that appalling terrorist predicted the Tuareg challenges quite accurately, it group, which is destroying that country? took everyone in the international community by Mark Simmonds: In Nigeria, we do not provide any surprise, particularly the speed with which the Tuareg “boots-on-the-ground” support for dealing with the rebellion in the North turned into a coup in the capital, terrorist insurgency in the Northern part of Nigeria. which was then followed by the jihadist-supporting What we do provide is training for the Nigerian Tuaregs coming down through Mali. Even those military, primarily back in the UK, for middle-ranking countries that have a far bigger footprint than we did and junior-ranking officers, as well as helping to build in Mali at the time failed to predict the speed with counter-terrorism capacity in the way that I described which the situation developed. a moment ago. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:47] Job: 036016 Unit: PG05 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o005_MP HC 56-v Extremism (N and W Africa) Corrected.xml

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3 December 2013 Mark Simmonds MP, Tim Morris and Catherine Inglehearn

I want to draw a distinction, if I may, between two Mark Simmonds: But DFID does get involved in different aspects of what you are referring to. Clearly some of the funding of the human rights work that I some of the atrocities that Boko Haram have been referred to earlier—more than £900 million.1 Some committing in the North of Nigeria are appalling, and of the other countries that you referred to would have have caused the deaths of both Christians and to meet certain human rights standards and obligations Muslims—indeed, they have killed more Muslims that we hold dearly in this country to enable us to than they have Christians. I sometimes hear it said participate and engage with them. For example, we that this is a religious conflict, but in my view that is engage heavily with the Kenyans on human rights not true; it is mainly about economics, often under a standards, and where those standards are not applied, veil of religion. Then there is the normal impact of it creates big challenges for us. One of the things that conflict. So you may have seen, Mr Ottaway, a report we have been working on with the new Somalian in the Herald-Tribune this morning of a Boko Haram Government—another example that you gave—is attack on a military base in the North of Nigeria, in how we can enable them to meet our human rights which it is estimated that approximately 25 Boko requirements, particularly in relation to those who Haram fighters were killed. That, of course, was in the may be detained or incarcerated in prisons. normal course of conflict, with the Nigerian security forces trying to protect a Nigerian asset. Q251 Mike Gapes: But is there not an argument that, That is one aspect. The second aspect where human given that we have perhaps a more consistent rights and the rule of law is very important is what approach, we could do more than we are currently happens if one or several Boko Haram terrorists are doing? The Nigerian military clearly have all kinds of captured or suspects are picked up and put in issues, problems and difficulties. As I understand it, detention. If someone is in detention, it is important they have only 80,000 military personnel in a country that the Nigerian Government or the Nigerian that is huge in terms of its geography. It also has a authorities apply what we would understand as the much bigger population than we have. The quality of rule of law, ensuring that there are no extra-judicial the training and equipment is quite poor, so is there killings and that people are not tortured in detention. not an argument that we should be doing far more to You will be aware from Amnesty and other human make them more effective than they currently are in their struggle against Boko Haram and others? rights organisations that in their view, that is not Mark Simmonds: We are doing quite a lot. Perhaps I always the case. It is incumbent on us as the UK can outline it very briefly. The UK is using its Government to make sure that we lobby the Nigerian expertise to strengthen the ability to deal with counter- Government, as indeed we do privately, to ensure that terrorism. We are providing judicial training. We are they comply with international human rights providing advice on CT strategies, legal frameworks, obligations in the context that I have just outlined. crisis management, bomb scene management, and anti-terrorist finance training to make sure that they Q249 Mike Gapes: We have, as a country, a huge can follow the money. We are also providing bilateral interest in Nigeria. We have large numbers of assistance to the Office of the National Security British Nigerians and we have some significant Adviser. We are providing training to the police, the economic, educational, and other links, as well as military and the judiciary. DFID runs a large historic links. Isn’t there a problem that for perfectly stabilisation reconciliation programme in Nigeria. I understandable reasons—you referred to detention, have seen myself, particularly in Northern Nigeria, human rights and so on—we are doing less to support some of the work that is being been done to try to Nigeria than we are doing to provide training and bring the religious communities together. Ultimately, assistance to some other countries? For example, I stability and security is the only way to resolve this. understand that we are helping Mali, Kenya, So we are doing a great deal already in terms of Afghanistan and even Libya with training, but we are supporting the Nigerian Government in trying to not helping Nigeria because of the concerns you have ensure that they get control of the situation in the expressed. Is there not a danger that, potentially, the North. Nigerian military will go somewhere else and get I would quickly add that in my view, there are other support and training from countries that might have strategies that need to run alongside the military less human rights standards than we do? strategy in Northern Nigeria. That is only one part of Mark Simmonds: First, you are absolutely right to the solution. There have to be economic and highlight the importance and significance of the developmental strategies as well to ensure there is a bilateral relationship. Not only are there significant complete solution, because there is no doubt that part links, but there is a large Nigerian diaspora based in of the problem is the lack of economic hope, the United Kingdom. There are 40,000 UK citizens economic aspiration, social mobility and opportunity. living in Nigeria. We have substantial business That needs to be tackled as a fundamental part of the interests there in terms of oil, gas and other solution. extractives, and also other businesses as well. I do not accept the premise of your question, if I may Q252 Mike Gapes: I agree with that, but is not the say so, that we do not do enough in Nigeria. DFID, issue here that we have a very effective military and for example— we could be doing far more? The Nigerian officers and others come through the British military training Q250 Mike Gapes: I am talking about military 1 FCO have pointed out that this figure is total spend, and not training, not DFID. just on Human Rights work. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:47] Job: 036016 Unit: PG05 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o005_MP HC 56-v Extremism (N and W Africa) Corrected.xml

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3 December 2013 Mark Simmonds MP, Tim Morris and Catherine Inglehearn system, but we are deterred because of concerns that Mark Simmonds: I certainly don’t say it is easy. Nor we will have perhaps reputational damage by do I think that there are not examples or lessons that association. Can we not do more? Could you have a could be learnt from elsewhere, be that Iraq, word with your colleagues in the MOD, so that they Afghanistan or Somalia. But what I detect recently, realise the importance of doing more in this area? and certainly since the jihadists came into Northern Mark Simmonds: I will certainly pass on your views, Mali and Operation Serval, is that there is a renewed Mr Gapes, because it is in the interests of all of us to determination among the international community to remove terrorism where it exists, but I reiterate that I do everything possible to try to resolve what is a think the United Kingdom is doing a lot to help the multifaceted challenge in this part of Africa to build Nigerians build capacity for a whole range of areas at both stable and secure states, but also to enable them the moment. to participate in the international trading mechanisms Chair: I think we have got that. If you would like to in a legitimate way. I don’t think there has necessarily elaborate on that point, perhaps you could drop us been the focus in some of the countries in the Sahel a line. region to build Government capacity to enable them, for example, to deal with potential increases in Q253 Rory Stewart: Minister, you have spoken a revenue streams that may come into their exchequer great deal about your belief in governance, capacity and that they can spend on their people. building and stakeholding as a long-term response to the problems of instability in the region. Could you Q255 Rory Stewart: Minister, to take a concrete tell us how you would objectively measure success example just off the Sahel, which would be the or failure? Central African Republic: you have said in the past Mark Simmonds: I think there are several issues to that you are worried about the situation. Laurent highlight here. One of the most interesting dinners I Fabius has described it as a breeding ground for have had since I have been doing this job was when I extremism. But so far the only thing the UK met representatives of Northern Malian civil society. Government have really done about this instability— It was a dinner hosted by the Danes at the African it would seem to tick a lot of the boxes of the other Union conference. I asked the Tuareg leaders who kinds of issues and countries you are worried about— were there why the Tuareg and jihadists both came to is to commit a very small, £5 million-worth of be part of this insurgency in Northern Mali. The independent development aid and to support a response I got was that there were no mechanisms by resolution in the United Nations. If we are serious which the respective communities in the Northern part about these things, what are we proposing to do in the of Mali could air their grievances. There were no Central African Republic? governance structures. Mark Simmonds: Regarding the Central African So I think the easy response would be to say that if Republic, the Development Secretary announced on the successors of the Committee today and my 30 November that the figure would go from £5 million successor in five or 10 years’ time are having this to £15 million. We are extremely concerned about the discussion about problems in Northern Mali or breakdown of law and order and the human rights elsewhere in the Sahel region, then the international abuses that are taking place. We are in discussions community will not have been successful. If we can with our partners, both at a bilateral and a multilateral build resilient, stable, secure states—ultimately that level, and I am hopeful that a United Nations Security has to come from within but with the support of the Council resolution will probably be passed later on international community—that provides the best this week. measure of success. The progress that has been made I have discussed the situation in the CAR with the on the other side of Africa in Somalia in the last 15 commissioner for the Peace and Security Council of months is good testament to what can be done when the African Union. I think there is a feeling at the there is international focus backed up by moment that the African Union should be responsible determination and sufficient resourcing. One of the for regional troop deployment, supported by the challenges I feel that needs to be looked at, French, and we have been asked by the French particularly as it relates to Mali, is that a huge amount whether we would provide assistance and logistical of developmental finance has gone in over the last 10 support. While I cannot go into the detail of that today, or 15 years with minimal impact. what I can say is that I anticipate that the Secretary of State for Defence will be making an announcement Q254 Rory Stewart: Your objective is resilient, shortly. stable, secure states. A lot of research suggests that your capacity to build those things is very dependent Q256 Rory Stewart: You said to the Chairman that on variables such as GDP per capita, literacy and we had thousands of people in the region with poverty. It is quite difficult to do this in a vacuum. We expertise. have really struggled to build a resilient, stable, secure Mark Simmonds: Yes, 1,000. state in Iraq which has huge advantages such as Rory Stewart: Can you tell us how you measure that thousands of dollars’ GDP per capita and literacy rates expertise? How many of them have passed operation- at about 92%. What is it that makes you think that we extensive examinations in the languages? How can should be able to do it in countries with GDPs per you have an objective measure of their deep-country capita of hundreds of dollars, where the literacy rates expertise? are at about 50% and where our diplomatic presence Mark Simmonds: As you will know, we have on the ground is minimal? refocused and will be re-energising and reopening the cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:47] Job: 036016 Unit: PG05 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o005_MP HC 56-v Extremism (N and W Africa) Corrected.xml

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3 December 2013 Mark Simmonds MP, Tim Morris and Catherine Inglehearn language school, which is a key element in this part speaking countries of the North and West Africa of the world. We have made sure that the FCO’s region—are in the region. I have not got the exact diplomatic excellence initiative is working to raise the numbers on how many of the 25 are in the breakdown skill sets of staff language skills throughout the of the Sahel, but I can certainly provide you with that. organisation at the FCO, and to make sure that the Chair: Minister, I hope you will be able to help me speaker positions across North and West Africa—of in the next few minutes. We have only about 12 which 29 are French and nine are Arabic—are minutes left and we have three groups of questions. actually filled by people with the requisite speaking skills. Q261 Mark Hendrick: Minister, you mentioned the We are also trying to upgrade those speaking skills, success you felt we had had in East Africa; in Somalia so if somebody has French to GCSE level, we can in particular. Obviously, that has taken a good number raise those skills up to degree level or indeed higher, of years and resulted in thousands and thousands of to make sure that the requisite language skills are in deaths. The relative stability we see at the moment is post; and to make sure that this cadre of people back very hard won. Advantages are such that you have got in the Foreign Office who have worked in Africa and the African Union based in Addis Ababa, and have the requisite language skills are there to ensure countries such as Ethiopia neighbouring Somalia. that the skill sets they learnt are not lost in the system, There has been a lot going in to find stability in but are still there to pull on as and when required. Somalia. In West Africa, the FCO is obviously on a much Q257 Rory Stewart: So of the 1,000 people that we steeper learning curve. You said earlier that you are talking about, how many of them can currently predicted that the Tuareg will be challenging in speak any relevant language apart from French? Northern Mali, but you did not realise that they would Mark Simmonds: I do not have the breakdown of go on so quickly to Bamako. It would seem that the figures but of course, of those 1,000, some will be UK in particular has not had a close eye on it and has local staff anyway so they will speak the local and left it very much to the French. Obviously, we cannot relevant language. I could certainly provide you with keep our eyes on everything, but are there any lessons the specific language skills that relate to the specific we can learn from that? Should the UK and the rest posts, but it would take too long for me to reel them of Europe look to share more of the diplomatic and off now. intelligence burden in francophone Africa with France, rather than thinking it is just a French Q258 Rory Stewart: Minister, would I be correct in responsibility? saying that, of that 1,000, if you actually break it Mark Simmonds: Yes, I think there are lessons to down to UK-based staff, the real answer to the learn. I will briefly rattle through them. I think the question of how many people there are currently on evidence of what has happened in Somalia is the the ground in that region who have deep-area significant contribution that Africans have made, with expertise would probably be less than half a dozen? AMISOM being in Somalia but supported by the UK Mark Simmonds: No, you wouldn’t. I think, of the 38 and others, with training and financing to enable them language posts—29 French and nine Arabic—25 are to do the job. That is one lesson that could be learned. already operational, and certainly all those who would The second lesson is that there needs to be greater go into those slots in the next rotation will meet the international co-operation and co-ordination, perhaps language criteria because of the upgrading of the on exchanging intelligence, but also on potentially language skills, and because of those who are in the monitoring cross-border movements. I know that is pipeline. something you got into on a previous occasion with Mr Robertson. You will be aware that some work is Q259 Rory Stewart: So the answer is, of 1,000 UK- being done on that to monitor movements where based staff, about 29. possible. Mark Simmonds: Well, they are the heads of post or I also think that not just the UK but our allies at a other senior posts in those 14 missions which require multilateral level need to co-ordinate our efforts specific language skills. You mustn’t forget, Mr perhaps to a far greater extent than in the past. Of Stewart, that of those 1,000, not all of them are course, while those involved in terrorism and those Foreign and Commonwealth Office. There will be involved in organised crime have separate ambitions, people in there from HMRC, the Department for where those combinations come together and those Transport and the crime agencies. Of course, they tend interests align, I don’t think the international to be there for a point in time to deal with a particular community has done enough in the past to unwind project, so it is not necessarily as important for them that and tackle them separately. to have the language skills we are talking about as it is for the Foreign Office. Q262 Mark Hendrick: What is the FCO doing and what has it done to make changes in staffing, training Q260 Rory Stewart: Finally, to clarify the point, and administration to deal with the environment you how many of those 29 people are actually in the Sahel have just described? region, as opposed to being spread throughout the rest Mark Simmonds: Obviously, we have put a team of West Africa? together to put the North and West Africa strategy Mark Simmonds: It depends how you define the together. We are holding discussions in great detail Sahel region. I would argue that, of the 14 posts, 10— with our allies, at both bilateral and multilateral level. all 10 heads of post who cover the non-English We have a whole addition of new people who have cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:47] Job: 036016 Unit: PG05 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o005_MP HC 56-v Extremism (N and W Africa) Corrected.xml

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3 December 2013 Mark Simmonds MP, Tim Morris and Catherine Inglehearn gone into the area. In Mali, we have got two people Salafist theology into parts, although certainly not in post. We also have a number of people who are everywhere. I can assure you that the Foreign and allied to the EU training mission as well as the UN Commonwealth Office takes the challenge very deployment there. There are UK people embedded in seriously. It is a priority in terms of trying both to those organisations. In Mauritania, we have a UK understand the surrounding complexities and to citizen in the EU structures there,2 and we have provide support to the more moderate Muslims who 3 people in Niger, Burkina Faso, Senegal and Chad, live in Mali and elsewhere in the Sahel region, in so I think we are now getting to grips with the order to enable them to ensure that their traditional challenges faced by the Sahel region. We will way of life and religion can continue. therefore ensure that we have a much greater From the discussions I have had, in both Mali and understanding, and that we are able to react far faster Northern Nigeria, that is exactly what they want us to than not just the UK but the whole of the international do—to prioritise their own moderate form of Islam. community did in failing to predict what happened in However, it is immensely complicated and the Northern Mali. influences tend to come from outside the region, particularly from the Gulf. Of course, with modern Q263 Mark Hendrick: On predicting what day technology and the greater transience of happened, if you recall, a significant amount of populations, people and individuals, it is much more development aid was flowing into Mali. Do you difficult to control than we might think from the accept that the way that aid was dispersed before the surface. coup ultimately made Mali a less stable and secure country? If so, do you agree that it should be for the FCO and not just DFID to monitor how well Q265 Mark Hendrick: As I am sure you are well development programmes are aligning with foreign aware, China is doing a great deal to develop many policy objectives? of the countries in Africa. The aid and support given Mark Simmonds: DFID and the FCO work very tends to be different from ours, in that there are no closely together anyway, but of course, most of the strings attached in terms of governance and the way DFID support going into the Sahel region and into projects are managed. What might the FCO be doing Mali has historically gone through multilateral in that direction—if anything at all—to try to get the organisations, not though bilateral relationships. Chinese more involved in sharing the burden of If I could refer to the point I made before, it is true to security and stability for West Africa in particular, but say that there weren’t sufficient outcomes from the also elsewhere? development funding money that had been put into Mark Simmonds: I shall make three or four quick Mali before the events earlier this year. That is points, if I may. The Chinese model tends to be not something the international community is very aware gifts, but soft loans. China tends to build a stadium or of—making sure that the outcomes are very focused, a road and requires the money to be paid back over a but also that there is a fair spread of the resource period of years at a very low interest rate. That is not allocation throughout the whole country, not just in quite the same sort of model as ours, but I think that the Southern part. I have been to Timbuktu in the Chinese engagement in Africa has been positive, both North and have spoken to civil society representatives in terms of building and developing infrastructure and there, and they told me that even now, they feel as an active and hungry market for many of the goods, detached from what is happening in Bamako. That is not just extractives, that emanate from Africa. part of the important reconciliation process that the I also think that the Chinese are much more engaged new President has set in train. and willing to participate in joint ventures, and there are already some very good examples of that, such as Q264 Mark Hendrick: If we look at our rivals in in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, where Africa, particularly the Salafists, they are spreading the Chinese have built a road using JCB equipment to their arguments, ideas and ideology across West do it and using our expertise in environmental impact Africa and bringing their own targeted development assessments to ensure that the road is built in an assistance. When we asked the FCO about that last environmentally friendly way. There is growing month, Simon Shercliff, the head of counter-terrorism, capacity and enthusiasm for cross-country said that they were still “getting to grips” with the engagement. problem and working towards a joint strategy with You are absolutely right on China’s participation in international partners. Is there not a need for more urgency on the issue? As you said yourself, with what security, Mr Hendrick. China is beginning to is happening in Mali and what we have heard about participate in peacekeeping, for example, which I see Boko Haram in Nigeria, things are getting worse, not as a growing trend. Certainly from the discussions that better. I have had with the Chinese, they are keen to Mark Simmonds: The point you make is right, Mr participate and play a role in ensuring security and Hendrick. Certainly, the majority of Muslims in the stability, and China contributes to that security and Sahel region are historically more Sufi and moderate stability. in their views. External influence has brought the Chair: Minister, I gather that you have to be at the DUP debate at 4 o’clock. Is that right? 2 Note from FCO: The UK’s Head of Mauritania is based in Mark Simmonds: the EU office, but does not work for the EU It is. 3 Note from FCO: These are all Honorary Consuls, rather than Chair: There are 14 minutes to go, and you have UK based officials travel time, too. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:47] Job: 036016 Unit: PG05 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o005_MP HC 56-v Extremism (N and W Africa) Corrected.xml

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3 December 2013 Mark Simmonds MP, Tim Morris and Catherine Inglehearn

Q266 Mr Roy: I have some specific questions. First, Sahel region. I am sure that you will be aware—some would the UK support supplying non-lethal equipment of the Committee went to Africa to see it—of the to armies in fragile African countries and using the work that the Americans are doing. Certainly from European development fund for any such purchases? the conversations I have had with them, my opposite Mark Simmonds: That is a very difficult question to numbers in the White House and the State House are answer simplistically and generically. Each case very engaged, and indeed exercised, by what is would have to be looked at on its merits. As you are happening in some parts of Africa. very well aware, we have a sophisticated and thorough export licence regime. Anything that is potentially Q272 Mr Baron: Minister, I am tail-end Charlie with challenging, depending on exactly where it is going the questions. I know that you have to be somewhere and the purpose of its use, has to come up for by 4 o’clock, but I hope you have time for a couple ministerial approval. There is a very detailed more minutes. If not, say so. mechanism to ensure that— Mark Simmonds: I don’t know what the time is. Mr Baron: It is exactly 10 to 4. Q267 Mr Roy: Is that a yes or a no? Mark Simmonds: I am happy to. Mark Simmonds: It is neither. The question cannot be answered yes or no, because the answer depends on Q273 Mr Baron: May I pick up where you left off, where it is going and exactly what sort of equipment on AFRICOM? The Committee visited AFRICOM in you are talking about. Stuttgart. The Americans would describe the situation as they see it as trying to shoot the crocodiles in the Q268 Mr Roy: Secondly, would the UK Government swamp. They know that the long-term solution when be willing to explore the precise parameters of the it comes to terrorism is to drain the swamp, but their OECD criteria on development aid to determine the job is to shoot the crocodiles closest to the boat. They sort of security link that aid could provide—for were concerned, however, about the lack of example, on border management? Could border international co-ordination on the issue at hand. management come out of development aid? Various countries are taking different initiatives, but Mark Simmonds: My understanding is that that was there is a lack of co-ordination generally, from the raised when my ministerial colleague, Mr Robertson, West in particular, on how to deal with the issue. Do was before the Committee, and I think a letter has you share that concern? If not, can you point the been sent to the Committee clarifying that. My Committee to areas where good co-ordination is understanding is that we think it probably can do. The taking place and having an effect on the ground? letter is here, and I do not know whether— Mark Simmonds: There are very good examples of significant co-operation and co-ordination in terms of Q269 Mr Roy: It was not a total clarification, having an impact on the ground. The most obvious Minister. It was kind of grey, which is why I am example, again, is on the other side of the continent asking. in Somalia, where international co-ordination—both Mark Simmonds: I am very happy to go back and at the UN on the multilateral level and with the region; provide further speedy, expeditious clarification. I referred to AMISOM earlier—has made significant positive progress. There are also examples elsewhere Q270 Mr Roy: That would be fantastic. Thirdly, in Africa that I could give you, on the development should the UK or the EU be seeking to support the side, where there has been greater development co- setting up of an African stand-by force by the African operation and co-ordination to make sure that there is Union and offering assistance to that force? no unnecessary duplication and that important areas Mark Simmonds: That is something that I have do not fall between respective donors. discussed with the African Union Commissioners, and Should there be and could there be greater co- they are keen to develop it. They are not yet ready to ordination? Of course. Certainly one of the other come to talk to countries such as the UK about how challenges, to skip for a moment to another part of we might assist building capacity, but I certainly Africa, is in the eastern part of the Democratic believe that African problems should ultimately have Republic of the Congo. One of the main reasons why African solutions. I see having an AU rapid reaction conflict has consistently reoccurred is that the force, with AU countries participating in troop international development community has not co- deployment, as potentially a significant step in that ordinated as perhaps it should. Certainly, under the direction. auspices of the new UN special envoy, Mary Robinson, and the new determination of the DRC’s Q271 Mr Roy: One more point on US Prime Minister Matata, there is a serious effort going disengagement. Do you perceive the US as in to make sure that is not replicated. disengaging from involvement in African security and defence? If so, what consequence does that have for Q274 Mr Baron: You have correctly highlighted our engagement with Africa? some of the good that has taken place, but also some Mark Simmonds: No, I don’t see that. I would say of the examples of where improvements are required. the reverse, actually. I think that there is significant This will be my final question, as I know we are all and growing understanding and engagement on the short of time. Can I put it to you that, actually, it is far importance of the United States participating both in too little and far too piecemeal, given the geography bilateral relationships and as part of multilateral involved, the number of countries and different solutions. Nowhere is that more prevalent than in the peoples, tribes and so forth, and the economic and cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:47] Job: 036016 Unit: PG05 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/036016/036016_o005_MP HC 56-v Extremism (N and W Africa) Corrected.xml

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3 December 2013 Mark Simmonds MP, Tim Morris and Catherine Inglehearn social challenges faced by the region generally? What Do I think there should be greater co-ordination and is needed is a step change in co-ordination from the co-operation in specific examples? Yes, I think that is West, looking at everything from socio-economic a fair criticism, but we are certainly doing what we policies, as you rightly highlighted, to the fact that can to ensure that at the UN and in other multilateral many Governments lack infrastructure in their organisations—as well as regional organisations in countries, which does not help. We need a step change Africa that are going to continue to grow in in our approach, and certainly in our co-ordination, importance in terms of finding satisfactory solutions and there is very little evidence on the ground of that to some of these conflict areas, but which will become taking place, or indeed cognisance of the fact that it even more important to becoming regional trade is required. blocs—they have the capacity both to be able to Mark Simmonds: These are very complex, deliver humanitarian aid and resilience and to address multifaceted environments. Where I think we in the the drivers of conflict and instability. UK have reason to be proud is the fact that we have led the way in assisting and trying to co-ordinate Q275 Chair: Minister, it is 3.55 pm, so I think you donor co-ordination and the co-ordination required in had better go. Thank you very much indeed. We have the way that you described, but we have also led from cut the last few questions a bit tight. If we think of the front. One example is the Prime Minister at the anything—if you do not mind—we may reserve the G8 and his emphasis on the tax, trade and right to drop you a line with further questions. transparency agenda and on co-ordination at the G8 Mark Simmonds: Of course. level on non-payment of ransoms to terrorists, which Chair: If you think of anything else, please drop us a not only provide an incentive for further kidnapping, line. Thank you very much for your help, and that of but fund terrorist activities. All G8 leaders have your two colleagues. signed up to that, and hopefully it will continue over the next period. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [SO] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:47] Job: 036016 Unit: PG06

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Written evidence

Written evidence from Paul Rogers, Department of Peace Studies, Bradford University Summary Points — Radical Islamism in North and West Africa can be usefully analysed in the context of the wider al- Qaida movement. — The movement is far less structured as a hierarchical entity than a decade ago, but the idea of Islam under attack and needing violent purification remains potent. — The main region of current contraction for the movement is Afghanistan/Pakistan and the main region of expansion is Syria/Iraq. — North and West Africa, and particularly Nigeria, has the potential to become a further region of expansion. — Countering this should avoid a ready recourse to military responses and requires an understanding of the narrative embraced by Jihadists.

Introduction 1. In relation to extremism in North and West Africa, most recent attention has been on Mali and the French military intervention, but the issue of Islamist radicalism in northern Mali is one aspect of several developments across the region. These include low level but ongoing Islamist paramilitary activity in Algeria, a recent and substantial rise in such activity in Libya, and low level activity in Niger and Mauretania. Far more significant is the continued increase in activity by Boko Haram in northern Nigeria which is nationalist in orientation but has a loosely associated movement, Anasaru, which has transnational aspirations. 2. Moreover, all of these movements should also be seen in the context of the wider al-Qaida movement and its strong transnational perspective. While this movement was regarded until last year as being in serious retreat, this assumption should be treated with caution. Al-Qaida may no longer be a closely structured and integrated organisation but the idea is very much alive and retains a potency that may not be fully recognised.

The al-Qaida Context 3. The movement originally developed in the late 1980s among committed jihadists who had gone to the aid of the Mujahidin in Afghanistan in their rebellion against the Soviet occupiers. The expulsion of the Soviets and the subsequent collapse of the USSR were seen by some of the leadership as proof that a profoundly religious conviction was powerful enough to defeat a superpower. Al-Qaida then evolved into a transnational vision that superseded the more nationalist outlook of the Mujahidin and by the late 1990s was a transnational movement with some focus on bin Laden, Zawahiri and a small core centred once more in Afghanistan. 4. It had become an unusual eschatologically-orientated violent revolutionary movement opposing the many unacceptable Middle Eastern regimes of the “near enemy”, as well as Zionism and its backer—the “far enemy” of the United States. Common cause was also made with other Islamist movements whether in Chechnya, Kashmir, the Southern Philippines or Indonesia, but the key underlying factors were a puritanical religious underpinning and a timescale measured in many decades if not a century since it was rooted in an outlook that went beyond this earthly life. This is crucial to understanding the potency of the idea and makes al-Qaida a very unusual revolutionary movement. 5. Following 9/11, a vigorous and initially successful war on terror deteriorated into two hugely costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Both could be seen by al-Qaida supporters as proof that Islam was under attack. Over the period 2001–6 al-Qaida affiliates were active in staging attacks in many countries including Indonesia, Egypt, Jordan, Kenya, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Tunisia, Turkey, Morocco, Spain and the UK, as well as sustained violence in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. By the end of the decade, though, a combination of much- strengthened security measures in western states and intensive drone and Special Forces attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan had done much to degrade the al-Qaida movement. By 2010 there was a developing consensus among counter-terrorism analysts that al-Qaida was rapidly diminishing as a transnational threat.

The Al-Qaida Movement Now 6. This idea of a diminished movement has been undermined by recent developments in a number of countries. 7. Nigeria: Boko Haram continues to constitute a major threat to the Nigerian state, and the government responds primarily by the use of force. The activities of the Nigerian military have been particularly harsh, the recent killing of scores of civilians in the village of Baga being one example. There is little evidence that this approach is having a negative impact on support for the movement and while Boko Haram is primarily focused on the state, its offshoot, Anasaru, has a much broader transnational outlook which is closer to the al-Qaida vision. Ansaru’s recent kidnapping and killing of foreign workers has focused attention on what may be a trend towards making the whole of the Boko Haram movement more transnational. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:47] Job: 036016 Unit: PG06

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8. Mali: There was some expectation that the French intervention would lead to a period of quiet during the hot season, with the confrontation developing later in the year, but in scarcely reported developments French and Chadian forces faced unexpected resistance from jihadist paramilitaries in February. Chadian troops lost 24 killed and around 50 wounded on a single day (22 February). Paramilitaries even infiltrated the town of Gao, there was a suicide bomb attack in Kidal, attacks in Timbuktu and a number of harassing attacks that contrast strongly with an expectation of jihadist paramilitaries restricted to a few remote mountainous areas. While French forces are remaining in the country, Chad is progressively withdrawing its forces and there are concerns about the competence of the Mali Army and of troops from other ECOWAS states.

9. Libya: One impact of the Mali intervention has been to encourage some Jihadist paramilitaries to return to Libya where they appear to be boosting Islamist paramilitaries that were severely controlled under the Gaddafi regime but have regained influence in the period of insecurity that has followed the termination of that regime.

10. Yemen and East Africa: Drone and Special Forces operations continue in Yemen but al-Qaida affiliates still control territory. In Somalia there has been some African Union success in expelling Islamists from Mogadishu, and Kenya troops control the southern border, but many parts of rural Somalia are untouched and remain in Islamist control. Meanwhile the “Swahili coast” of Kenya and Northern Tanzania retains a potential for violence as Islamist elements capitalise on a perception of marginalisation.

11. Syria and Iraq: In the context of Jihadist evolution, Syria and Iraq should now be taken together. In Syria the importance of the Jihadist paramilitary groups continues to grow. They tend to be more determined, more coordinated and more competent in urban insurgency, with a significant minority having previous combat experience, often against US forces in Iraq. Because of support from Iran, the Assad regime may last some time yet, possibly through this year. This gives even more time for Jihadist elements within the rebellion to consolidate their influence so that if the regime does fall they will have considerable power.

12. In Iraq, two related elements are important. One is that there have been numerous mass protests by Sunnis against the Shi’a-dominated Malaki government. These have been near-daily occurrences, especially in Anbar Province and have been hardly covered in the western media. In parallel with this has been an upsurge in violent paramilitary actions against the government by Jihadists embracing the al-Qaida vision. The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) is a coalition of many of these groups which have collectively targeted government officials, police and security forces and Shi’a communities. The ISI regards Sunni politicians as having sold out to the Malaki regime. Significantly, some of the members within the coalition have very close links with the Syrian Islamist rebels, so that there is a seamless trans-border connection. The Syria-Iraq connection is probably the strongest current expression of the al-Qaida vision.

13. Elsewhere, and in addition to these major foci, the Caucasus region of southern Russia continues to experience the impact of the Caucasus Emirate insurgency and causes particular concern for the organisers on the forthcoming 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi. Islamist elements are active in other countries and there are regular arrests and trials of Islamists in some western countries, most notably France and the UK.

Overview—Motivations and Potential

14. Four aspects of the current evolution of Islamist paramilitaries are worth brief assessment in relation to developments in West and North Africa: — Distinctions may be made between orientations that are primarily nationalistic and state-centred, and those with a transnational orientation. The former include groups in Afghanistan, Somalia and Mali and Boko Haram in Nigeria, and the latter include Ansaru in Nigeria and elements in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Al-Qaida in Pakistan may be very limited in its capabilities and there have been arguments that the various offshoots and franchises are purely nationalistic but this is by no means the case— transnational elements continue and may even be intensifying. — The new social media were hugely important in propagandising the al-Qaida mission in the early 2000s, and remain important now. Would-be supporters across the world have continuing and ready access to information from all the zones of conflict listed above. What is crucial here is that the idea of a global struggle has become embedded within a small minority over the past decade and can be visualised even with reference to individual conflicts that are primarily state-centred. Thus suppression of Boko Haram may be an internal Nigerian matter but can be seen world-wide as one more example of the suppression of Islam. — The weight of opinion among counter-terror analysts is that there is little in the way of a causal link between poverty, marginalisation and Jihadist radicalisation. Recent analysis tends to challenge this and there is a strong case that while abject poverty alone may not inevitably be a factor, relative deprivation and marginalisation most certainly can be. This is certainly the case with Boko Haram in Nigeria and is also relevant among elements in Northern Mali. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:47] Job: 036016 Unit: PG06

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— World-wide patterns of economic growth over the past four decades have produced substantial increases in GDP but also a concentration of wealth in a minority of the population across the global south, but there is now a majority population benefiting from educational improvements and therefore knowledgeable of its own relative marginalisation. Revolts from the Margins is a term being used to characterise this dynamic and two of several expositions of this phenomenon are particularly significant. One is the element of radical Islam that benefits from this resentment and anger, and the other is the neo-Maoist movement as witnessed in Nepal and the Philippines but even more notably in the Naxalite rebellion in India. One has an eschatological dimension and the other does not. Which of these will be seen in the long-term as the more significant is not yet clear, but both should be seen, at least in part, as representing revolts from the margins.

The Impact of the War on Terror 15. From a western perspective, the response to the 9/11 atrocities involved an absolutely necessary war against al-Qaida and its Taliban hosts. More controversially this came to encompass regime termination in Iraq and, more recently, there has been regime termination in Libya. It is accepted that the response has not turned out as anticipated. Outcomes have included: — A 7-year war in Iraq resulting in an unstable and troubled country under heavier Iranian influence than before. — A 13-year war in Afghanistan with an uncertain outcome. — Over 200,000 people killed and 7.8 million refugees from the two conflicts. — An unstable post-conflict Libya. — Islamist activity in many countries including, most notably, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, Mali and Nigeria. — A major internal conflict in Syria with potential for a serious regional impact. 16. Nevertheless, there is still the view that there have been few major attacks in western countries, even though the United States and its allies have suffered well over 6,000 deaths and at least 30,000 serious injuries to their military, as well as incurring costs in the trillions of dollars. With all its problems, the war is still deemed to have been necessary 17. From an Islamist perspective the view is rather different. Its motivation rests on a combination of a perceived need to radically purify Islam and a perception of Islam under attack. The latter is greatly aided by what are seen as violent and persistent western attacks against Islamic states, combined with continuing support for unacceptable regimes such as the House of Saud and Israel, making it essential that western dominance be resisted. 18. What is perhaps most important, and often least recognised, is that new social media and 24-hour TV news channels, make it possible for any actions in any one part of the Islamic world to be presented as yet further proof of a crusader conspiracy against Islam, with this powerful narrative persistently supported by apparently disparate events. Thus an armed drone strike in Pakistan, a Nigerian Army massacre of villagers, plans for a new US drone base in Niger or joint US/Israeli military operations are all seen as part of a wider pattern of western oppression, persistently spread through the new social media.

Policy Relevance 19. While al-Qaida as a movement may be diminished, as an idea it retains considerable potency. Its enduring strength lies partly as a means of responding to marginalisation and seeking purification of Islam but also by being reactive through violent opposition to western intervention. Such intervention might be seen in the west as entirely reasonable and proper. Indeed it may be seen as essential for western security, requiring military responses, yet the use of considerable military force over the past decade has not been as successful as anticipated. 20. In relation specifically to North and West Africa, it may be of value to pay more attention to the impact of military interventions on radicalisation within the region and among Diaspora communities in the West. It may, in particular, be useful to understand how radicalisation may relate to the impact of military interventions, especially with regard to the rapid spread of images and propaganda via new social media. 21. Given that the most significant Islamist element in the region is not to be found in Mali but in the Boko Haram/Ansaru complex in Nigeria, the UK might seek to use its influence with the Nigerian government to limit the current policy of reacting to the movement with considerable military force. 22. Finally, given the problems arising from the “boots on the ground” occupations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the current military direction is towards what has been termed “remote control” with a far greater emphasis on armed drones, Special Forces and privatised military companies. It is not clear that this will be any more successful than the approaches of the last decade or more. Paul Rogers is Professor of Peace Studies at Bradford University and a frequent contributor to www.opendemocracy.net. He is a regular lecturer at defence colleges, including the Royal College of Defence cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:47] Job: 036016 Unit: PG06

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Studies and has previously given written and oral evidence to Select Committees on Foreign Affairs and Defence. 30 April 2013

Written evidence from Jon Marks 1. Summary — This evidence seeks to put the Malian intervention into a regional focus, discussing the role of key stakeholders in the region, with emphasis on Algeria. — The Tiguentourine gas plant attack, and the prime minister’s robust response, has potentially launched a new relationship between Britain and Algeria, and other players in the region, for which clear policy terms should be aticulated. — The collapse of the Malian state, problems of communication with Algeria and shifting trends in regional instability pose a range of questions with ramifications for British development policy, intelligence- gathering and regional diplomacy.

Introduction 2. I would like to thank the Committee for this opportunity to submit evidence on this important subject. Having followed events in North Africa for more than three decades, I feel it is very necessary for parliament to scrutinise questions of extremism and political instability in North and West Africa, during a period when the British government has made commitments to bringing stability to Mali and consolidating regional relationship, notably with Algeria. 3. My professional life has been focused on understanding North African politics and economics. I first arrived in Algeria in 1980 (as a teacher), subsequently studied the country and taught its history, before working as a journalist and consultant in the Maghreb region (since 1984). My work is now carried out as an Associate Fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), specialising in North Africa, and as chairman of Cross-border Information Ltd, a business intelligence company specialising in Africa and the Middle East, with a significant research practise and publishing record in the Maghreb. 4. Any inquiry into extremism and stability in North and West Africa is bound to focus on the collapse in 2012 of the Malian state, the occupation of northern Mali by jihadist groups and the subsequent French-led intervention. The mid-January attack on the BP/Statoil-operated Tiguentourine gas plant at In Aménas in south- eastern Algeria, various kidnappings and other events pitting jihadist groups and other non-state actors (NSAs) against the forces of established states show that this is a wider regional issue, with major potential repercussions for the region’s diverse countries, the African state order and also the United Kingdom and its European neighbours. 5. The potential that the ‘spectacular’ Tiguentourine attack could be replicated, and the impact that such an event would have on Algeria and its hydrocarbons sector, as well as any implications it might have for domestic UK energy security, are important issues, as are wider questions of partnership with Algeria and other regional governments.

State Failure and Fragility: Mali 6. The chain of events that catapulted the Sahara/Sahel region to the global front page in January 2013 followed a build-up of tensions, focused on the collapse of the Malian state and occupation of northern Mali by an alliance of Islamist groups: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar Dine and Mujao. They had been building up their strength in the region, aided by an inflow of arms and men from the fallout of the Libyan revolution and other regional conflicts. These violent NSAs exploited the vacuum created by political crisis in Mali following Captain Amadou Sanogo’s coup d’état in March 2012 and the failure of its military to maintain national security. 7. These events involve a cast of players who are familiar to Sahara/Sahel watchers, including Al-Qaeda affiliates, Touareg rebels, the region’s former colonial power France and the Algerian military/security establishment. They are set in an environment where fast-growing but poverty-prone populations—in a region now suffering the negative impacts of climate change and decades of poor governance—have increasingly turned to violence against their rulers (the case for Boko Haram in Nigeria, and Touareg groups in Mali and Niger). However, the perspectives, personnel and methods of operation of each of these actors are subject to subtle (and not so subtle) changes that took policy-makers and strategic planners by surprise as events unfolded during January. 8. Long praised as a rare state in the region that had maintained democratic institutions since the early 1990s, Mali’s internal crises proved more acute than most analysis predicted. Despite increased training support from France, the United States and other partners, the Malian military was unfit for purpose; hopes that it could be strengthened and hold back the jihadist advances in the north while an Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) force was assembled proved over-optimistic. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:47] Job: 036016 Unit: PG06

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France and Alleged ‘Neo-Colonial’ Impulses 9. Critics have suggested that the French intervention marked a modern expression of the ‘neo-colonialist’ tradition, with Paris acting to protect its own interests (known since the Gaullist period as ‘Franceafrique’). Indeed, some critics have suggested that Mali is a new theatre in the ‘global war on terror’ (some adding that it is ‘really about oil’). This narrative does not work in this case. The Mali economy does not produce a drop of crude; some oil exploration companies that had entered in recent years pulled out well before the jihadists moved in. Mali has gold and other mineral reserves, but protecting these did not cause the intervention. Rather, it was intended to avert a catastrophic situation in which emboldened jihadists seemed poised to attack Bamako. 10. Given its large migrant population, there were fears in Paris that this challenge could find expression in violence on the French mainland. In a post-election reappraisal of regional threats, President François Hollande had already raised Mali to a priority of its security policy (to a greater extent than the previous Sarkozy administration). France was ready to act when Malian military resistance to the Islamist insurgency folded. French troops were available for a speedy intervention, being based across the region. However, the response seems to have reflected a new policy approach in Paris (rather than a classic Franceafrique reflex), to which the British government gave speedy and appropriate support.

Other Stakeholders had Lost Control 11. Other key players in the region had also lost control of events, notably the Algerian military/security establishment, which remains a key element in that country’s power elite, widely known as les décideurs or le pouvoir (‘the powers that be’). 12. The Algerian military intelligence service, the Department du Renseignment et de la Sécurité (DRS), its commander Lieutenant-General Mohammed Mediène (known as ‘Tewfik’) and his senior officers, including external intelligence chief Major-General Rachid Laâlali (known as ‘Attafi’), have long exerted influence over Mali and other Sahel states. This has led to claims that the DRS had cultivated jihadist elements—including Mokhtar Belmokhtar (MBM)—as ‘assets’ in their efforts to control the region. The DRS has significant links to the region south of Algeria, but it has probably never been fully in control, and with the Tiguentourine gas plant attack was forced into reacting to ‘blowback’ from conflicts elsewhere in the region.

Short-Term Policy Questions 13. The Malian intervention raises a number of questions, including the following: (1) The extent to which France and the Ecowas force need more intense (or less) support from western partners—specifically the UK—to achieve the aim of eradicating the Jihadist alliance in Mali and its neighbours, and to put in place more long-term security and development structures that will stop these NSAs simply moving into other fragile jurisdictions. (2) The extent to which the intelligence available is sufficient to make balanced, credible judgements that will allow us to shape policy. Western intelligence on the region has been found rather wanting. (3) How the UK can best benchmark progress and failure in this conflict, to support proactive (rather than knee-jerk) policy responses.

Longer Term Policy Questions 14. Other questions that should test policy-makers include: (4) reinforcing fragile and repairing failed states—the development community, governments and commentariat have, in the last decade, gained a deeper understanding of the dynamics and risks associated with the emergence of ‘failed states’. Considerable resources have been put into rebuilding failed states and strengthening ‘fragile states’—a process in which the UK has played a leadership role in articulating policy and allocating resources to the Department for International Development and Foreign and Commonwealth Office. But analysis of the Malian crisis suggests a reappraisal of policies towards military training, aid programmes and international alliances is required; and (5) how to work with regional partners—the need for western intervention in Mali says much about the limits of purely regional initiatives. France felt constrained to intervene after the planned Ecowas force failed to materialise, while Algeria was unable to control events in Mali, and suffered ‘blowback’ with a major terrorist ‘spectacular’ on its territory.

Dealing with Algeria 15. Algeria is arguably the most powerful player in the Sahel, with a regime rooted in a military/security tradition, and a body of diplomatic and ‘securocrat’ expertise at dealing with the region. These strengths in January led the Prime Minister, David Cameron, to announce that the authorities in Algiers were partners of choice in tackling crisis in the Sahel. 16. Algeria itself has come into the firing line of a fast-moving Sahara/Sahel conflict, with a radical Islamist khatiba (battalion), Al-Mouakioune Bi Dam (The Blood Signatories), attacking the Tiguentourine gas plant on cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:47] Job: 036016 Unit: PG06

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16–20 January. There is not room here to go into great detail, however it is necessary to recapitulate on some elements: — the ambitious attack could only have taken place against the wider context of burgeoning conflict in the Saharan/Sahel region. Even during the 1990s conflict that pitted the Algerian state against radical Islamists, the southern ‘hydrocarbons fortress’ was largely untouched. Levels of security in Algeria have reduced since then, but In Aménas was still a challenging target; MBM, who commanded to attack, had built his reputation by attacking softer targets; — the assault on In Aménas seems to have been a predominantly Algerian (or rather North African) affair, even if events in Mali provided a political narrative to initially help to explain the attack. The attackers’ knowledge and penetration of the facility suggests the attack was planned well before the French intervention in Mali. Militant groups had been stepping up their attacks against Algerian targets over the last year (for example, attacking a police barracks in Tamanrasset). MBM’s group had placed drivers and other employees into the complex months before; — Al-Mouakioune Bi Dam was created only recently by erstwhile AQIM leader and trans-Sahel smuggler MBM, whose ‘business model’ has been based on taking hostages for ransom (for example, the 2003 kidnapping of 32 German and Austrian tourists). MBM needed resources and kudos having split (in time-honoured fashion of fusion and fission) from rival leaders in the AQIM setup in Mali. But at least part of the group that attacked In Aménas were equipped as suicide bombers, which points to a different kind of ‘spectacular’ being planned, which might have destroyed the plant; — the attackers were initially successful because of lax security, but once events were under way the Algerian military reacted quickly and ruthlessly. This contributed to the high number of deaths. While Japan, the UK and other western governments emphasised the priority of a ‘duty of care’ towards foreign workers—favouring negotiation and, as an ultimate resort, targeted special forces activity—the Algerians were focused on reasserting their authority as emphatically as possible. After their initial shock, partner governments seem to have understood this uncomfortable fact; and — Algeria will continue to insist that it takes a lead in reinforcing its national security (resisting any foreign security operations within Algeria) and that its voice is heard in regional counsels.

British Response 17. David Cameron’s statements on Algeria have focused on security co-operation. Mr Cameron’s commitment to intensified co-operation was shown on 30 January, when he paid the first visit to Algeria by a UK premier since independence in 1962. (Not even Margaret Thatcher visited after the Algerian authorities found her son, Mark, when he was lost in the desert during the 1982 Paris-Dakar rally. Queen Elizabeth did visit, in October 1980). 18. While hard security considerations have dominated the debate, other forms of security are also at stake. The contribution that Algerian gas makes to the European energy balance is considerable; its exports are an important element in the French, Italian and Spanish fuel supply, and add to other importers ability to diversify their suppliers. Supplies of Algerian gas in the UK and other European grids serves to diminish the EU’s heavy dependence on Russian gas. (This is a strategic issue as was highlighted by the Europe-wide fallout from Moscow’s decision in 2009 to cut off gas supplies to Ukraine.) 19. There has not previously been a major challenge to Algerian gas supply, although the potential threat is of concern to strategic planners across the EU. Were jihadist activity to cut supply lines—or, more subtly, to influence the thinking of major European companies, changing their orientations towards their sources of supply—this would be of considerable consequence.

Algeria: a Complex Partner 20. Algeria is an important country that the UK needs to engage on as many fronts as possible. But it is not an easy ally. While Mr Cameron and other leaders have decided to align their policy with President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, it is necessary to ask questions about Algeria’s command and compliance structures, which influence its suitability as a key strategic partner. 21. While the human rights situation has improved during President Bouteflika’s mandate (from 1998), Algeria remains something of a troubled polity. Despite displaying the trappings of a modern democracy— with an elected president, parliament and local administrations, and (in formal terms) and independent judiciary and other structures—critical decision-making remains in the hands of unelected power-brokers, les décideurs. Most narratives proposed by analysts to explain how Algerian policy-making works, and why a course of action may be followed, take into account the décideur factor to explain outcomes. A form of ‘Deep State’ operates with decision-making—including the In Aménas crisis response—being handled in power centres dominated by the military/security establishment (le pouvoir). 22. Mr Bouteflika (who is ageing and prone to illness) was absent as the In Aménas crisis unfolded; other civilian government officials seemed unable to give Western governments the answers they required. This may be explained by the lack of a government structure that was able to answer questions from Downing Street and others about a military operation run by Algerian security officials. To borrow Henry Kissinger’s formula, cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:47] Job: 036016 Unit: PG06

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Western officials did not know who to call—or among officials in Algiers, how to answer the calls they received. 23. This seems to have been a universal problem: British ambassador Martin Roper leads one of the most proactive and dynamic embassies in Algiers, so there is no question of the UK representation not having the necessary formal political contacts. It is the opacity of the Algerian system that is in question.

Hard Security and Asymmetric Warfare 24. A narrative has developed in which Mali and Algeria fit into a wider regional crisis in an ‘arc of instability’ stretching from Sudan and Somalia to Mauritania and the Atlantic Coast. There is some substance to this, given the range of conflicts, the fragility of established polities, the strength of new actors and the region’s economic, demographic and environmental weaknesses. 25. It is in this unpromising terrain that the prime minister warned the House of Commons on 21 January that Britain was engaged in a “generational struggle” against terrorism. In response to this, there needed to be a “patient, intelligent but tough approach” to defeat terrorism and ensure national security. However, this tough talking begs the question of the extent to which Algeria and the Sahel pose a direct security threat to the UK. 26. More events like the Tiguentourine gas plant incident would directly impact on Britons, given the number of UK companies and citizens operating in the Algerian energy sector. Since Tiguentourine there has been a basically harmless, ‘conventional’ mortar attack on an Algerian pipeline, which had no impact on operations and exports, but little more. With increased security being put in place around key gas installations, there is no immediate security crisis in Algeria—although there are suggestions of ‘blowback’ elsewhere from jihadists push out of Mali, such as in Libya. 27. The Algerian jihadist movement is now very small; violent Islamism in Algeria, as in other countries, has been on the wane and shows no signs of a major revival. Were the jihadist campaign to maintain its pre- Mali intervention momentum it is possible the conflict might have spread north, and some ‘asymmetric warfare’ might still follow, with the potential for targeting expatriate populations. But so far there has been no sign of this.

Saharan Violence on UK Streets 28. Could these developments in the Sahara/Sahel bring new terrorist activity to British streets? Given the nature of asymmetric warfare, an outgunned enemy might turn to terrorist attacks to gain parity with its much more conventionally powerful foe. 29. There are precedents, going back to the 1990s conflict, for Algerians to have been organising in the UK, and this has included suspects being held on alleged terrorist offences. However, it should be noted that the 7/ 7 attacks had no North African input, and efforts to prosecute other alleged terrorist activity have proved extremely difficult to conclude. In the 2005 ricin conspiracy trial, only one of several Algerian defendants was convicted, Kamel Bourgass, who had earlier been convicted of murdering a police officer, when a flat in Manchester was raided in January 2003.

Recommendations and Questions 30. Sahara/Sahel turbulence is an issue that British policy-makers cannot ignore, but any larger commitment will require a clear understanding of the partners involved, as well as the issues, to feed into policy decisions that fall under a range of headings, from intelligence-gathering to mitigating climate change. Some of these issues are rounded up below. 31. Each country should be weighed on its own merits—the ‘arc of instability’ narrative gives a region-wide narrative, and as noted below, jihadist recruitment is across borders, but this should not obscure the marked differences between each national polity: policy should continue to be made on a country-by-country basis if serious mistakes are to be avoided. 32. A concerted effort to engage with Algeria requires closer understanding of is power structures—while Algeria has so far avoided an ‘Arab Spring’ uprising, widespread remains apparent across the country. Decision-makers need to assess the extent to which the UK should commit to new arrangements with the government. Engagement with this major player is essential, but some forms of commitment may be less prudent. 33. Understanding how Jihadist activity in the region has evolved is essential—recent events show important shifts in these groups’ make up, aims and support base; we need to know our current and future ‘enemy’. Most intelligence suggests that jihadist groups were strengthened by fallout from the overthrow of Muammar Qadhafi in Libya; the subsequent flow of arms and men may not have been decisive, but neither is it a negligible factor. The majority of fighters at In Aménas came from Libya and Tunisia, not Algeria or Mali. 34. The UK and its various partners need a clear understanding of the limits to Britain’s commitment to become a guarantor of North and West African security—domestic security agencies have monitored and acted against the Islamist underground for two decades; UK diplomats have promoted relations with large potential cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:47] Job: 036016 Unit: PG06

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markets, led by Algeria. But our projection of resources and understanding of the region have so far been limited, meaning a bigger commitment requires considerable scaling up. 35. A reappraisal of policies towards training and other military co-operation is required—given that Mali collapsed and Algeria specifically wants material support. 36. Policy-makers should reflect on the potentials and limits for regional alliances—to what extent can we count of Ecowas, the African Union and other bodies to lead in containing threats? How can these partners be strengthened to avoid the need for direct Western intervention? 29 April 2013

Written evidence from Raffaello Pantucci and Luke Gribben, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) 1. The threat of North African terrorism to UK interests at home and overseas is not new to the British Security and Intelligence Agencies (SIA). Recent events, however, have highlighted how the threat has evolved and in particular how this threat might express itself back to the United Kingdom or as a threat to national interests abroad. 2. As the more general threat from Al-Qa’ida terrorism has disaggregated and diversified, the particular menace from North and West African has developed into a higher profile priority. All of this poses a problem for the SIA who have limited resources that had focused on other parts of the globe. 3. With North Africa in particular, the Prime Minister staked out a particular rhetoric in the wake of the terrorist incident at In Amenas when he told parliament ‘we face a large and existential terrorist threat from a group of extremists based in different parts of the world who want to do the biggest possible amount of damage to our interests and way of life.... those extremists thrive when they have ungoverned spaces in which they can exist, build and plan.’i But what exactly is the threat to the United Kingdom from networks in North Africa that have so far not presented a clear and present danger to British domestic interests? Moreover, how does this feed into the larger picture of the terrorist threat faced by the country?

The Threat Back Home 4. In the years immediately after 11 September 2001, British security forces were less concerned about the threat from South Asia than about Algerian terrorist networks operating or present in the UK in cities like London, Manchester and Birmingham. 5. This concern was premised on an expectation that these networks were closely aligned to Al-Qa’ida ideologically and that individuals from these groups had formative experience and expertise from undertaking jihad in Afghanistan and/or Bosnia. As such, British security services were monitoring a number of North Africans living in the UK, including Amar Makhlulif—also known as Abu Doha—Rachid Ramda and Rabah Kadre. Abu Doha was believed to be a key figure in a network of plots that stretched across Europe, North America and as far as the Khalden training camp in Afghanistan. He was also connected to fellow Algerian Ahmed Ressam who was intercepted on 14 December 1999, headed from Canada to detonate a device at Los AngelesInternationalAirport to mark the millennium. Abu Doha also knew Rachid Ramda and Rabah Kadre, both of whom were extradited to France where they were convicted for their involvement in terror plots in France with links to Algerian networks.ii 6. All of these men used to frequent the community established by Abu Hamza Al-Masri at the Finsbury Park Mosque in North London. This was a place where Al-Qa’ida-linked recruiters would operate and which Kamel Bourgass used as a postal address and photocopy shop for his poison recipes. Linked to a broader network of Algerians, Bourgass went on to murder DC Stephen Oake and was convicted of plotting to carry out a terrorist incident involving ricin. Whether he was directly connected to Al-Qa’ida remains unclear, though it is evident that he was involved in Algerian networks that had supported fighters from the Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA) and the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC). Whilst his ultimate targets and aims—and even, possibly, his name—have never been definitely clarified, the plot and the network around him seemed to indicate that the threat to the UK from Al-Qa’ida networks was most likely to emanate from the North African community that gravitated around Abu Hamza’s Finsbury Park Mosque. 7. Beyond Algerians, post-2001 the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), another North African group, were certainly part of the UK threat environment as were other Islamist organizations with their roots in Algeria and Tunisia (En Nada for example). However, threats did not appear to materialize from these groups in the same way as from the Algerian community. 8. This profile was turned on its head when just over a year after Stephen Oake’s murder, when a cell known by their police codename ‘Crevice’, was arrested as part of a plot within the UK. They hailed mostly (though not exclusively) from second-generation Southern Asian backgrounds, and had close connections to British extremist groups like Al-Muhajiroun, as well as to Abu Hamza’s Finsbury Park Mosque. Operation Crevice and a number of cells connected to it highlighted the way in which elements mostly from Britain’s South Asian community had made connections directly to Al-Qa’ida. While the connection was not exclusively South Asian cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:47] Job: 036016 Unit: PG06

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by any means, they constituted the largest group involved in the networks in the UK and the connection to Afghanistan and Pakistan became an intelligence focus.

Diversification 9. As time has passed the threat has adapted. As Jonathan Evans, the director-general of the Security Service put it last June, ‘whereas a few years ago 75% of the priority casework addressed by my Service had some sort of Pakistan and/or Afghanistan dimension, thanks to our efforts and those of our international partners that figure has reduced and now stands at less than 50%. We appear to be moving from a period of deep and focused threat to one where the threat is less monolithic but wider. Al-Qa’ida affiliates in Yemen, Somalia and the Sahel have become more dangerous as Al-Qa’ida in Pakistan has declined and we see increasing levels of co-operation between Al-Qa’ida groups in various parts of the world.’iii 10. The nature of these foreign battlefields and their draw to Britons has also changed. The numbers may be small, but the flow of Western individuals drawn to participate in fighting abroad has continued unabated. In the case of North Africa and the Sahel in particular, it is not clear how many British citizens have traveled to the fight there. There is already one reported instance of a young Briton trying to walk across the Sahara from Mauritania to Mali, and it is unlikely that he is the only one.iv In Libya, a number of British residents and nationals of Libyan descent returned to fight alongside the rebels, though most seemed drawn by a nationalist, rather than a jihadist, narrative. And it is likely that some vestige of the previous connection between Algeria and groups in the UK continues to exist. But so far, none of this has translated into a direct threat of terrorism in the UK. 11. The most prominent international terrorist network in North Africa, Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), has singled out the UK for direct punishment in its rhetoric only a few times. These threats have for the most part been connected to Abu Qatada—also known as Omar Mahmoud Othman—the radical cleric currently in British detention facing extradition to Jordan for his alleged role in terrorist plots in the country.v On 22 January 2009, for example, an AQIM cell snatched a group of tourists that included British national Edwin Dyer, and while Swiss and German nationals taken with Dyer were eventually released, Dyer was brutally executed in late May 2009 after the group made repeated statements demanding the British government pay a ransom and release Abu Qatada. In April 2012, the group repeated this request when they demanded Britain release the cleric and send him to an ‘Arab Spring’ country in exchange for Stephen Malcolm, a dual British-South African national who was snatched by the group in November 2011. 12. In contrast, France has some fifteen nationals currently being held by various groups in the Sahel,vi alongside an unspecified number of nationals or residents fighting alongside the various Islamist networks operating in the region. On 5 February, French security forces arrested four people on the outskirts of Paris for their association with a network sending fighters to join AQIM. The four were linked to Cedric Lobo, a twenty- seven-year old social worker arrested in Niamey, Niger for trying to join the fighters in Timbuktu. This was merely one in a number of investigations the French are undertaking as they try to get a handle on the connections between North African jihadists and other networks at home. 13. However, while there are networks in North Africa with tentacles back in Europe, it is not currently clear that these groups have either the capacity or intention to use them to launch attacks. In fact, the far more likely impact might continue to revolve around regional incidents in which foreigners are targeted as a means of gaining attention and as reprisals for Western involvement in northern Mali. These are not likely to be on the scale of In Amenas, but more along the lines of kidnappings or the targeting of Western corporate interests. Of particular concern in this regard are Mali’s neighbours Niger and Mauritania. Niger in particular appears to be in the cross-hairs with a number of alarming incidents of late, including the double suicide attack in late May in which bombers targeted a military base in Agadez and a French run (the company Areva) uranium mine in Arlit, killing 21 people. The attack was claimed by the potentially resurrected MokhtarBelmokhtar’s ‘Signed in Blood Battalion’ that was also responsible for the In Amenas incident.vii 14. Moreover, following the 2011 intervention in Libya, a new area of instability has opened up with a growing menace also posed by training camps in the lawless southern parts of the country. A further threat is apparent in Benghazi, where Western interests have been repeatedly targeted, including the assault on the British ambassador in June 2012 and the death of the American ambassador Christopher Stevens in September 2012. These particular dangers have resulted in the issuance of a number of alerts by the Foreign Office advising against travel to the city by British nationals. 15. But potential regional repercussions may stretch beyond the immediate borders of Mali and the Sahel. There have been reports of Nigerian extremists training at camps in Timbuktu, and Boko Haram leader, AbubakarShekaku, was believed to have been spotted in Gao in mid-January. Reflecting potential concern from this link, in January, France issued an alert to its citizens in northern Nigeria and those living around Abuja fearing potential reprisals for French action in Mali. Again, there is potential evidence that the Boko Haram link may have stretched into Niger with a recent incident at a prison in Niamey allegedly involving Boko Haram prisoners who were trying to escape and had managed to arm themselves with guns.viii 16. Indeed, the connection between Nigerian Islamists and Sahel-based groups seems to be more than occasional, and in December 2011 a group calling itself ‘Al-Qa’ida in the Land Beyond the Sahel’—a group that seems likely to have been a precursor of sorts of the Boko Haram splinter group Ansaru—claimed to be cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:47] Job: 036016 Unit: PG06

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holding British national Chris McManus who had been snatched in Birnin-Kebbi, northwest Nigeria. In March 2012, British Special Forces mounted an assault to save Mr McManus and fellow hostage Italian national Franco Lamolinara, an incident that ended with the deaths of numerous captors including the two Europeans. This sort of kidnapping was repeated again in February 2013, when a group of British, Italian, Greek and Lebanese nationals were snatched from a construction site in northwestern Nigeria, and then soon after the seizing of a French family of seven in northern Cameroon. The first incident was believed to be linked to Ansaru, with the group claiming responsibility and who later executed the prisoners on the basis of a claimed visible British support for the government in Nigeria. Responsibility for the second incident remains unclear though appears to fall to elements close to Boko Haram, and the group was ultimately released unharmed in April 2013, two months after their abduction. The danger to such individuals and companies is clearly going to increase in the near future in the broader region, though again, this keeps the threat at a regional, rather than international level. 17. The resolution of these two kidnappings highlights the particular danger, however, from groups that are espousing a globalist jihadist rhetoric. While Boko Haram appears willing to have negotiated the release of the group, Ansaru chose instead to execute its hostages. This poses a serious consideration for governments and companies operating in the region. Hostage negotiations that can be concluded peacefully, involving exchanges of money or something else, are one issue. If on the other hand, as it increasingly seems likely with Ansaru, the group is seeking to make a point—then the insurance costs and willingness of individuals to work in areas where the group is active will increase. Fortunately, thus far incidents of kidnapping by such groups remain relatively few in number, however, this shift in methodology requires close attention given the potential implication to foreign interests investing money and materiel into the region.

Recommendations 18. While the prime minister may have struck a dramatic tone when he spoke of ‘existential’ and ‘generational’ struggle, the underlying problems have long tails. A pragmatic British counter-terrorism response needs to focus on a number of aspects that strike the balance between protecting national interest and political realities at home. The British public—and most other Western publics and governments—will no longer support long-term heavy military engagement in foreign nations from where the direct threat to their country seems opaque. The result must be a light-footprint approach focused on training to develop local capacity and on understanding how the threat is set to develop. In the longer term, this would involve a clear focused on stabilization and development that will help resolve age-old regional disputes, and in turn reduce the space available for Islamist groups to move in.ix 19. More practically and immediately, such an approach should seek to.

Strengthen and Develop Local Links The Prime Minister’s visit to Algeria and Libya is an example of how this approach should work in practice: developing strong links to local security forces and bolstering their capacity to address domestic issues through the provision of training and equipment. Going forwards, training future leadership cadres in regional militaries will have the added bonus of allowing for the early development of strong local contacts.

Help Foster Stronger Regional Connections and Develop Border Security 20. The lessons of In Amenas and the subsequent incidents that have been seen across the region is that terrorist networks in this region are highly mobile and adaptable, and are able to slip back and forth across porous borders. Helping foster greater regional co-operation and interaction is therefore essential in countering these groups’ ability to act. Developing regional confidence-building measures and brokering regular interactions between regional security forces will help cross-border governmental relationships develop into effective counter-terrorist tools.

Improve British Regional Intelligence Capacity 21. British foreign intelligence capacity, and in particular defence intelligence, has been shrunk in recent years. This poses a problem when the armed forces are asked to deploy in previously uncovered parts of the world. Developing and maintaining this capacity across the board in at-risk regions will be crucial in identifying future threats, as well as understanding them better when incidents occur. How DIS and other SIA collaborate in sharing intelligence and pre-empting threats is also a point to consider

Develop a Deeper Understanding of the Threat These Groups Pose and How They Connect Together 22. International terrorism is no longer the monolith it was in the period immediately after 11 September 2001. In order to continue to counter it, it is crucial that we understand the various groups and sub-groups involved, their nature and aims, their complexity and how they relate to, and communicate with, each other. By better understanding these relationships, it will also be easier to develop counter-strategies that focus on identifying fissures between groups and ways of pulling them apart. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:47] Job: 036016 Unit: PG06

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Recognising the role of local communities 23. The growing priority and focus placed upon North and West Africa in counter-terrorism terms requires a parallel push in Prevent terms. Prevent—the forward looking aspect of counter-terrorism that seeks to stop people from adopting radical narratives—policy will play a key role in ensuring that Britain’s North and West African communities understand British foreign policy in the region and feel that their views in turn are being heard and understood. If engaged with positively, they can play a key role in protecting Britain’s interests. Without robust counter-narrative work and effective CT-informed community policing, there is a risk that the issue of the ‘home grown’ South Asian terrorism of 2005 onwards will be witnessed again in the North and West African community. 24. Yet all of this presents a further potential long-term problem: that of how the UK should balance a strategy of encouraging local people to deal with local problems whilst guaranteeing that human rights and due process are observed (support for which governments might undermine efforts at engaging with local communities in the UK). The foreign secretary highlighted this problem during a speech at RUSI on 14 February 2013, observing that alliances of convenience based on a common threat perception can lead to political backlash that can also inflame the very narrative they seek to address. The answer to this is unclear, and is likely to be found in a pragmatic approach that ensures that certain red lines are not crossed by British authorities, while also recognising that allies using methods that Britain may disapprove of may end up turning up information that helps to address the threat. As such, efforts should be made to train local authorities in improving their methods and agencies should be proactive in advancing this perspective; simply cutting off contact is not a workable response.

Conclusion 25. The time in which threats abroad could be seen as detached from threats at home has passed. Terrorist networks in North Africa may have difficulty reaching Britain’s streets, but the potential for such groups to threaten British nationals and interests overseas is high, and the intent to strike in the UK continues to lurk in the background of their rhetoric. The region is rich in energy and other commodities that make it a key target for a range of groups. Regional instability is set to result in upward pressure on energy prices and other commodities sourced from the region, something that will have a direct economic impact on the UK. 26. The British government’s current response focuses on intelligence co-operation and local capacity- building as a means of countering the threat posed by such groups. However, countries in the region have very different abilities to address such problems at present. The reality is that groups like AQIM, Ansar Dine, Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), Signed in Blood Battalion,Ansaru and Boko Haram operate in a territory that is almost the size of Europe. Groups in northern Mali in particular have strong smuggling and nomadic traditions, making them adept at slipping back and forth across porous desert borders. None of this is new to foreign security services, which have increasingly come to view AQIM as a criminal- terrorist network focused on drugs and smuggling rather than on perpetrating international terrorist attacks. 27. Furthermore, nations in the Sahel in particular lack the capacity to implement long-term strategies to counter the underlying issues that facilitate recruitment into terrorist groups. Establishing ‘Prevent’ and ‘Combating Violent Extremism’-style programmes in these countries will be important, but is something that is currently hard to envisage. The focus at present is on countering immediate threats, and clamping down on emerging crises, rather than on a long-term vision for dealing with national issues whose roots are deep. 28. The threat to the UK remains offshore. However, it is not impossible, for example, to imagine a group or individual deciding, without direction, to launch an attack within British borders, or elsewhere within Europe with links to the region. Fed off a diet of grim images from Mali, radical messages online and a perception that the British government is complicit in the deaths of Muslims abroad, a group or individual might decide to launch a lone actor-style operation. But there are many potential sources of motivation for such an incident, and this would not necessarily have to be linked to North Africa. 29. Additional to this, the danger exists that British jihadists may start to see the region as an alternate battlefield where they can receive training. There is already some evidence of this shift at least in notional terms. In a plot disrupted in April 2012 in Luton—a group who later pled guilty to plotting to carry out a terrorist attack and training—spoke in January 2011 of potentially going to join al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) as an alternative to going to Pakistan. The group were ultimately able to make some connections in Pakistan, but had they not, the Sahel may have been an alternative for them. While Syria currently offers a more tempting and active battlefield for aspirant British jihadists, given the ongoing British connections to Libya and opportunities offered in the broader Sahel, it is possible that more individuals may choose this path. 30. It is also possible that groups in North Africa decide to launch an incident themselves, or that their networks come to be directed by individuals with a more aggressively anti-Western agenda. Again, both scenarios are possible, but the absence, so far, of any evidence of plotting, or indeed of anything more than rhetorical intent against the West, suggests that, at present, this threat seems distant. This might abruptly change in the future, but the tipping point is hard to judge in every case. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:47] Job: 036016 Unit: PG06

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31. If the dynamics of conflict and instability continues, flow of refugees from the area also may provide AQIM or other groups with an opportunity to send operatives to Europe and the UK. 32. More likely, trouble will continue to brew in North Africa, with the periodic targeting of foreign interests continuing to be used as a means to attract attention, as well as to punish the West for its involvement in Mali and elsewhere. That the problem remains regional does not preclude the need for a response, however, as simply ignoring it will not make it go away and indeed will simply store up problems that will need to be confronted later. The current impasse faced by Europe is the direct result both of years of neglect of the problem, and of the fall of a number of authoritarian regimes in North Africa. To step back from North and West Africa now could provide an opportunity for Al-Qa’ida affiliates to establish themselves in a region closer to Europe than ever before.

Notes i David Cameron to parliament, 18 January 2013, , accessed 26 February 2013. ii These men were not the only ones; others included DjamelBeghal and KamelDaoudi, a pair who belonged to London’s Algerian community before they were extradited to France (from Dubai and London respectively), where they were convicted for their roles in planning an attack on the American Embassy in Paris. iii Jonathan Evans, Address at the Lord Mayor’s Annual Defence and Security Lecture, Mansion House, City of London, 25 June 2012. iv v Within this context it is worth noting that Abu Qatada used to boast to British intelligence services of his hold over Britain’s radical Algerian community. He claimed to be able to rein in any potentially negative repercussions that might occur as a result of the extradition of Rashid Ramda. See Special Immigration Appeals Commission, AQ v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Open judgment before the Honorable Mr Justice Collins, [2004] UKSIAC 15/2002, 8 March 2004. vi Lori Hinnant, ‘Why Are So Many French Held by al-Qaida?’,Associated Press, 21 February 2013. vii http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-22654584 viii http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/niger-official-boko-haram-prisoners-tried-to-escape-from- niamey-jail-killed-2-guards/2013/06/02/6b25b6b8-cb78–11e2–8573–3baeea6a2647_story.html ix This is apart from the Prime Minister’s recent statements about increasing the volume of DfID’s budget that is used for peace and stability operations. 16 July 2013

Written evidence from Richard Gozney British High Commissioner to Nigeria between 2004 and 2007

Before appearing before you on 25 June your Clerk suggested that I might put a few thoughts on paper to try to show my starting point when looking at Nigeria and the recent upsurge in terrorism.

Centrifugal Forces At least three centrifugal forces have long threatened to divide Nigerians: 1. A population twice that of any other sub-Saharan country which encourages some regions of Nigeria to believe that they have critical mass to go it alone. 2. Strong cultural differences, most markedly between the: — South-West Nigeria of the Yoruba and related peoples who are Protestant, Evangelical Christian and Muslim; and the — South-East Nigeria of the Ibo people, largely Catholic, and of the Niger Delta peoples; and the — Northern Nigeria of the largely Muslim, Hausa speaking, peoples. Most Southerners and Northerners have no common language other than English (if that).

3. Parallel economic contrasts between regions which are often more important than the religious differences: — The South-West is home too much of Nigeria’s industry & commerce and to the country’s main port, Lagos. Rain is plentiful, for yams and other crops; — the South-East is home to the oil & gas of the Niger Delta. Also with plentiful rain; and cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:47] Job: 036016 Unit: PG06

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— the North has fewer commercial resources and is dry. Because Nigeria’s infrastructure is poor, with bone-shaking roads and no working railways, Northerners’ products have to be high value and low volume to be worth sending to markets in the South or overseas: specialised agricultural products including certain vegetable oils and high quality leather, for example. Minerals in the North are only commercially exploitable if of very high value, such as some limited gold.

Holding Nigeria Together

Observers often ask how the country has held together for over 50 years since independence, unlike Sudan or Ethiopia. Among the reasons which struck me were: — A sense of Nigerian nationhood and natural pride which I found stronger than in some countries of Eastern and Southern Africa. Nigerians enjoy making fun of themselves and deprecating aspects of modern Nigeria but outsiders should not be misled: they can do so just because they are proud and self-confident. Nigerians have more self-confidence, I think, than most Eastern or Southern Africans; — Deep scars of the civil war of the late 1960s, when the South-East tried to break away as Biafra. The lessons seem to have imbued the two generations brought up in the 45 years since the civil war. For example the splendid ‘Half a Yellow Sun’, set in the civil war and a best-selling novel in the UK 5 or 6 years ago, was written by a young novelist, Chimamanda Ngozi Adeche, born years after the time of ‘Biafra’. — A genuinely federal constitution. Royalties from oil & gas, which dominate the budget and loom large in the economy as a whole, are split (roughly 50:50 I think, but I cannot remember the figure) between the Federal Government and the 36 States of the Federation. The 4 States of the Niger Delta where the oil and gas is extracted take a preferential share and the rest is divided 36 ways. The 36 State Governors and their State Assemblies have complete control of their shares and the State Governors are immune from prosecution during their tenure, to reduce the risk of central interference or intimidation.

Why is Northern Nigeria Home to More Alienation?

The three centripetal forces, of Nigerian nationhood, the lesson of ‘Biafra’ and the devolution of oil and gas royalties, seem weaker in Northern Nigeria. The lesson of ‘Biafra’ and the source of the oil and gas royalties are more remote, literally. The sense of Nigerian nationhood is weaker in the North, I suspect, because the Northerners see themselves as their own nation or nations with their own royal families. Even in colonial times the North was more a Northern Nigerian Protectorate than a colony. When the Emirs of Kano and Zaria escorted HRH The Prince of Wales around Kano and Kaduna, two principal Northern cities, in 2006, spectators lined the roads 5 or 6 deep, showing an interest and affection for their own and British royalty which I doubt they would ever have shown a Nigerian President or other civil authority from the North or South of the country.

Recent history has compounded this sense of Northern Nigerian separateness, and of the North’s deprivation. Northern industry such as the big textile factories employing thousands in Kaduna could not compete with cheap Chinese textiles smuggles into Nigeria despite protectionist measures. Almost all the factories have closed. Unemployed and disillusioned 20-something year olds were for hire for a few dollars to anyone wanting to stir trouble.

Consistently high crude oil prices magnified the larger royalties of the 4 Niger Delta States, and the shameless and public corruption in those 4 States, over which the Federal Government was powerless. Meanwhile Northern States, with smaller budgets, struggled to finance schools and clinics.

In the North-East State of Borno and its capital, Maiduguri, a history of radicalism and of ‘cleansing the temple’ has been apparent for 200 years, when a movement from Borno swept aside Emirs and Sultans across the North who were judged impious and un-Islamic. By 2007, (when I finished as British High Commissioner), the group which became Boko Haram was troublesome, targeting Police Stations and other institutions of the Federal Government deemed corrupt and unjust, but not foreigners. In 2007 Algerian Islamists had yet to take the name ‘Al Qaida in the Magreb’, and were more or less confined to the Magreb, with only tentative signs of occasionally crossing the desert to support terrorist training in the Sahel.

Nigeria has been democratic for the last 15 years, albeit with elections of variable rectitude. The first democratic President, Obasanjo, was a Southerner quite well respected in the North. His successor was a Northerner but soon died of liver disease. Many Northerners felt short changed when ‘their President’ was then substituted, constitutionally, by a Southerner: the Vice-President from the Niger Delta, President Goodluck Jonathan. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:47] Job: 036016 Unit: PG06

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What could the UK, France, the US and Others do? It is not for a retired diplomat to make policy recommendations. But some features seem worth highlighting: — All of Nigeria suffers poor public services but in the North there are fewer sources of private sector or community funding for schools or clinics. Girls’ education, especially, suffers and too few Northern women are literate. An educated mother generally ensures that her daughters go to school, at least for a few years. The standards of civil society are raised for all. — Sharia Courts offer an attractive alternative to Nigeria’s sclerotic secular court system, for family and civil law matters. But they cannot substitute for the Police Force which is Federal and often dysfunctional. Police corruption was illustrated in 2005 or 2006 when the excellent Head of the Anti-Corruption Commission showed the President the personal bank statement of the National Police Chief. The Police Chief resigned immediately and the press was full of the £5 million or so in his account. The Anti-Corruption Chief said privately “It wasn’t £5 million; it was £20 million, but I’ll leak that to the media in stages.” The Police Chief was convicted and had some £75 million of personal assets confiscated. — So championing the more honest State Governors and good Heads of Education, the Anti-Corruption Commission, and a Finance Minister who was brilliant and who has now returned to the job, is a strategy which brings results, albeit more slowly than the upright Nigerians and we would like to see. — In modestly educated Muslim communities, whether Northern Nigeria or Eastern Indonesia, the Islamist narrative sells better than in more widely educated communities such as among the Yoruba Muslims of Southern Nigeria or Muslim Javanese of Central Indonesia. Western countries which have their own Muslim communities and Muslim public figures, such as the UK and France, can ask those figures to help to explain their motives for engagement in Northern Nigeria, as an antidote to Wahhabist or Iranian propaganda. 21 June 2013

Supplementary written evidence from the Department for International Development The Department undertook to clarify to the Committee on several points. In order, these are: 1. Aid to Nigeria. The correct figure for our aid contribution to Nigeria this year is £275 million, not the £275,000 stated. 2. On reproductive health: — DFID has no specific regional targets on reproductive health for geographical regions of the world. Instead we have global commitments. In countries where we have an established bilateral presence and programmes on reproductive health, these will often be translated into specific programme results that we will work to achieve. DFID ‘core funding’ contributions to important partner organisations, such as UNFPA, will also contribute to those global commitments. — On the two figures for our commitment (numbers of women we will help with family planning), both are right. The DFID commitment is 10 million by 2015 and 24 million by 2020. The first figure was our original Framework for Results commitment, and the latter our London summit goal. The press release in the link is inaccurate because it misses off “by 2020”. 3. On Rory Stewart MP’s questions about our Sahel work: The £128 million that you will be spending over the next three years in Mali and western Sahel—how does it break down? — This pledge referred to £110 million for a longer term resilience programme, and £18 million for humanitarian. To date, we have spent £9,473,315 under the humanitarian programme. Over the next 12 months we will spend: — Humanitarian: £8,526,685 (the remainder of the £18 million for NGOs) and any additional humanitarian funding; — Resilience: this is currently in design, to be divided between: — £60 million/3 years for NGOs to build resilience to climate change in the Sahel; in design. Small funds will contribute to design costs. We expect the main programme to start in summer 2014. — £50 million/3 years for social protection through the World Bank, in design. A programme start date has not been set yet. What kind of staffing levels do you have at present on the ground? — DFID currently has two posts in Mali—a development counsellor post based at the British Embassy and a seconded conflict adviser working for the EU Delegation. The EU secondment is for 2 years and began in July. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:47] Job: 036016 Unit: PG06

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— The Embassy post is a short term arrangement, established after the May conference, which will continue until the end of December. We are currently considering options for a longer term posting to the Embassy in Bamako to be put in place from the beginning of the next financial year (April 2014). — In DFID headquarters there are a number of staff who work on the Sahel—two full time (on humanitarian); 3 who spend at least 50% of their time on Sahel-related policy and programmes; and 4 other staff providing specific specialist sectoral advice to our programming work in the technical areas of resilience and conflict prevention. 25 November 2013

Written evidence from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Introduction 1. North and West Africa is a region which offers opportunities, not least for trade and investment, but is also of increasing concern. Instability, terrorism, and organised crime create threats to western and UK interests, and if left unchecked, potentially to Europe and the UK. Tackling this will require major regional and international investment across the political, security and development spheres, in support of continuing engagement by the countries of the region. The FCO is coordinating a new strategic approach across Government to address the threats to and from the region. 2. This evidence has been coordinated by the FCO Sahel Task Force which works closely with the Department for International Development (DFID), the Ministry of Defence (MoD), the Home Office, and the Prime Minister’s Special Envoy for the Sahel, the Rt. Hon. Stephen O’Brien MP.

Background: North and West Africa 3. Recent trends and events have demonstrated the profound links between North Africa and West Africa. These ancient tribal, cultural, and trading links have until recently been largely ignored or forgotten by the outside world, but political instability, natural disasters and crime and terrorism at the heart of the region have focussed international attention. Simultaneously, radical political change in North Africa and political and security challenges in West Africa have demonstrated that regional threats and challenges are linked across often ill-defined borders, requiring a coordinated response. 4. The current crisis derives from events in the Sahel as well as tensions in the North and South, particularly Libya and Nigeria. The international community has mainly concentrated on the terrorist threat. Although this is moveable, we can identify three current areas of activity: Mali, Libya, and Nigeria. In Mali, the 2012 coup d’état enabled a terrorist advance which was later stopped and dispersed by the French-led military intervention in 2013. Part of the terrorist activity was apparently facilitated by returning Tuareg mercenaries from Libya, while the French intervention is likely to have driven at least some of them back into eastern Libya. Nigerian extremist groups have proven links with Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQ-M) and other Mali-based terrorists, and we must be concerned about the potential for more regional cooperation. These groups threaten the wider region and our interests. 5. The embedding of terrorist and criminal threats derives from multiple factors, all of which need addressing by the region and the international community. Though these apply variously to sub-regions (for example, the North is considerably wealthier) they are all elements which drive instability, exacerbate humanitarian and human rights problems and entrench poverty. Briefly, they are: — Poverty and lack of economic and human development. — Poor governance or failing states. — Corruption and criminal activity, including by ruling elites. 6. These conditions favour the arrival and embedding of extremist and criminal groups. Our policies are designed to increase the effort against them.

UK Interests in North and West Africa 7. Historically, UK interests in North and West Africa have been concentrated in coastal West Africa, accompanied by good relations with Francophone North Africa. After WWII (which brought military engagement in North Africa and the involvement of West African troops) and the subsequent, sometimes violent, decolonisation of the region, our relations settled to a steady building of trade and political relationships with the new governments. Other than the difficult relationship with Libya, most were largely positive. Our relations with former colonies were especially warm and deepened by diaspora links. 8. In the last years of the twentieth century our relations with North Africa developed, though at an uneven pace, driven by local conditions (most dramatically the conflict in Algeria) and the opening up of others (eg Morocco). Trade has gradually increased in North Africa and has grown more swiftly in West Africa. The events and trends which are shaping our new thinking have been: cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:47] Job: 036016 Unit: PG06

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— The Arab Spring; — The emergence of terrorist threats from Mali, Nigeria, and Libya; and — Growing economic opportunity in sub-Saharan Africa. 9. This is leading to a new approach, currently under discussion, the headlines of which we will share with the Committee. Its security focus means it does not cover all UK interests, but directly addresses the issues covered by the Committee’s inquiry. 10. Our current interests in the North and West Africa region are broadly: — Investments, primarily in the extractive industries; — Trade with developing markets, some growing more strongly than others; — British nationals (particularly working for UK and international operations on and offshore); — British tourists across the region; — Development (Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Liberia) and humanitarian (mainly the Sahel) contributions; and — Our political influence-building through diplomacy, the Arab Partnership Fund in North Africa and capacity-building programmes in both North and West Africa.

HMG Resources in North and West Africa 11. The UK currently has Embassies/High Commissions in the following countries in North and West Africa: Algeria Mali Gambia Morocco Ghana Nigeria Guinea Senegal Côte d’Ivoire Sierra Leone Liberia Tunisia Libya 12. We re-opened our Embassy in Mali in 2010, and have recently re-opened UK Embassies in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire as part of our wider network shift. We also employ a UK-based Political Officer in Nouakchott, Mauritania, and locally-engaged member of staff in Niamey, Niger. 13. The FCO engages bilaterally and regionally through our network of posts, and through regional conflict and counter-terrorism advisers. Other Government Departments are also engaged: — The Home Office, with SOCA, the Metropolitan Police Service, HMRC, the Crown Prosecution Service and the Department for Transport, focus on organised crime, terrorism, migration, aviation security and narcotics; — The MoD pursues defence engagement and provides military training; — DFID has major bilateral programmes in Nigeria, Ghana and Sierra Leone, and has made a substantial humanitarian contribution to the Sahel (£30million in 2013). It has a smaller presence in North Africa supporting political and economic reform through the Arab Partnership; — UKTI is represented in Nigeria, Ghana and across the Maghreb; and — The Prime Minister has appointed the Rt. Hon. Stephen O’Brien MP as his Special Envoy for the Sahel. 14. In addition to the direct costs of supporting our Embassies, several funds support our work in the region. These are principally: — The Conflict Pool (in 2012/13 £8.5m in North Africa and £7.68m for West Africa); — Arab Partnership (in 2012–13 approximately £6.6m in North Africa); and — Bilateral Programme Budgets, run by each post (eg £80,000 for Nigeria in 2012–13 and £35,000 for Morocco). 15. The map at Annex B demonstrates the UK’s coverage in the region, and our aid commitment.

Threats 16. We are increasingly concerned by the threats posed to the UK and our interests in the region, following the 2011 Arab Spring and evidence of an increasing threat from terrorism. Our main concerns, grouped under the subjects of concern to the Committee, are as follows:

Extremism 17. We do not believe that any terrorist group in the region is currently capable of attacking the UK mainland, but these groups do pose a threat to Western interests in the region and to regional stability. Northern Mali- based groups such as AQ-M, the Movement for the Unity of Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA), and Mokhtar cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:47] Job: 036016 Unit: PG06

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Belmokhtar’s Masked Battalion, which recently conducted the In Amenas attacks in Algeria, are likely to have been degraded by French military action. But the threat has not been eradicated entirely, and has probably been displaced around the region. Boko Haram and Ansaru continue to threaten the stability of northern Nigeria, carrying out attacks on state institutions and local populations, and have recently kidnapped Westerners. Other terrorist groups in Tunisia and Libya pose a local threat, and we believe there has been interaction between Islamist movements around the region. 18. We are currently building our analysis of the roots and drivers of terrorism. It is true that key groups have become radicalised and that subgroups and individuals can also self-radicalise (as in the 2011 Casablanca bombing). There is abundant evidence of the jihadist narrative identifying local, regional and international grievances. But it also appears that some recruits are motivated by financial gain: a monthly salary of $400 for a young unemployed Malian is a real incentive. And there is a complex link between criminality and terrorism. A direct link between the regional drugs trade and terrorism is not easily proven, but the presence and opportunity of widespread criminality is. Groups such as MUJWA appear to combine extremist and criminal elements. 19. The development of extremist views in northern Mali posed a risk that the area would provide a base from which terrorist groups could expand. In the past 30 years an Islamic revival in northern Nigeria has been accompanied by the emergence of several extremist movements. Extreme interpretations of Islam are fairly alien and unwelcome concepts in West Africa, but extremist groups across the region have sometimes won supporters by offering services which the state has failed to provide.

Political Instability 20. The Arab Spring has been succeeded by post-revolutionary fragility as political powers test their influence. The young and radically-minded see socio-economic challenges and the debate about the relationship between Islam and the state as particular priorities. Initially, most sections of society had high hopes for democratic politics as the forum through which to articulate their frustration. If this fails to deliver change swiftly enough, there remains a danger—particularly in Libya—that armed groups and vigilantes will try to assert control. To the south, instability is more extreme. Many countries have had multiple coups d’état and suffer from corrupt elites with no popular legitimacy. The challenge of building good governance and popular legitimacy is critical. Without this, there is a vacuum that terrorists can exploit. This is to an extent what has happened in Mali. 21. There is also a risk of instability spreading from Mali, particularly if displaced terrorist groups are able to gain footholds. Fragile neighbours such as Niger and Mauritania are especially vulnerable. To the south the gravest threat would be the undermining of Nigeria and their containment of Boko Haram and Ansaru. State failure anywhere in the region would incapacitate our democracy and governance objectives and severely damage our economic interests.

Gangsterism and Organised Crime 22. Crime is both a driver for the region’s problems and a result of lack of governance. Even without its links to terrorism, illicit trafficking is a major threat to the stability of regional governments. Conversely, weak states such as Guinea-Bissau create an environment where all criminality, including terrorism, can flourish. 23. Endemic corruption and weak law enforcement make West Africa a significant transit region for Latin American cocaine destined for the UK. The UNODC estimates that 18–30 tonnes are trafficked through Guinea- Bissau alone each year—roughly equivalent to the estimated size of the annual UK market (25–30 tonnes). Cannabis resin and tobacco are also trafficked through the Sahel in large quantities. Nigeria offers a base for organised crime including fraud (mass-marketing fraud is assessed as costing the UK £340m in 2012), cyber- crime and money-laundering. Beyond the direct impact on the UK homeland, crime in West Africa affects our wider interests, undermining democracy, governance and the rule of law and generating wider instability. This is complicated by weak regional willingness and capacity to address the issues, and by a lack of information, particularly on the routes and connections used by criminals.

Piracy 24. Maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea threatens our economic interests, UK nationals, international freedom of trade and the security of regional energy supplies, as well as facilitating the smuggling of drugs, weapons and people. Attacks in the Gulf of Guinea are now more violent than those seen in the Indian Ocean and increasing in frequency.

Weapons Proliferation 25. State fragility has caused weapons proliferation across the region for some time. In particular, the security vacuum during and after the 2011 Libyan revolution released a flow of armed, trained soldiers into the region. Corruption is also a problem, with weapons sold to terrorists in northern Mali by corrupt individuals in the Malian Armed Forces. This contributes to regional instability, and undermines global initiatives like the Arms Trade Treaty. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:47] Job: 036016 Unit: PG06

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Threats to the People of the Region 26. We have an obligation as a leading donor. There is a significant humanitarian need across the Sahel. In particular, there is a pressing need to build resilience against natural disaster so that future food crises can be averted, and to address issues of post-conflict instability. DFID takes a leading role in both areas.

Human Rights 27. Our human rights concerns vary across the region, though we are especially concerned about freedom of speech, women’s rights, LGBT rights and the death penalty, and country-specific challenges such as post- conflict stabilisation in Libya and reconciliation in Mali.

Our Approach to North and West Africa 28. On 22 January 2013, the National Security Council tasked the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to lead a new, cross-Government approach to North and West Africa with the following objective: “To achieve a safer, more stable and more prosperous North and West Africa that does not provide a base for serious threats to UK interests by disrupting, degrading and isolating terrorist networks and addressing the drivers of instability.” 29. The approach we are discussing will be based around three pillars—security, developmental, and political—and will aim to: — shape international thinking on an integrated and coordinated security and development approach to the region, mindful of their diverse needs; — encourage a new way of thinking about North and West Africa within the UK Government that adds to and transcends the standard bilateral approach; — Demonstrate clear examples of bilateral and regional impact achieved by UK activity including, in time, examples of greater regional cooperation; — Increase awareness of cross-border threats, both internationally and regionally, bringing greater regional coherence to international engagement.

Security 30. On counter-terrorism, we will continue to build bilateral partnerships in the region and work with international partners and organisations, for example on improving aviation security; conducting and sharing assessments with close allies to allow us to coordinate counter-terrorism activity; focusing at Lough Erne on the G8’s ability to analyse and tackle the drivers of instability in North and West Africa; and pressing for international consensus on not paying ransoms to terrorists. 31. On religious extremism, we support in northern Nigeria a DFID programme which aims to address the socio-economic drivers of radicalisation in six key states. In Mali we are pressing for action by the National Commission for Dialogue and Reconciliation, who aim to overcome religious and ethnic divides. And regionally, we are planning work to understand attitudes towards extremism across North and West Africa and identify vulnerable and priority communities. 32. On organised crime, the FCO offers a platform for UK government partners in their deployments to the region. A SOCA Regional Manager based in Accra acts as EU Regional Coordinator for the 30+ EU liaison offices in the region. We are supporting G8 action and in June and November this year the Home Office will be hosting two G8 expert meetings on organised crime in West Africa. 33. On maritime security, we offer a platform for SOCA’s work with other EU member states in operating the Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre in Lisbon, and contribute to the EU-funded Seaport Cooperation Programme. We are also supporting G8 action and hosted a G8+ experts meeting on the Gulf of Guinea on 30 April, with a follow-up meeting in November 2013. 34. On proliferation, we are assisting the Libyan authorities in securing borders and recovering weapons, and stepping up our work with regional partners to reduce the risk of a successful MANPADS attack. 35. Regional connections are key. We will work with regional and international allies, bilateral and multilateral, focusing on information-sharing and using our influence in organisations such as the EU and UN to shape international approaches. We will also encourage improvements in regional countries’ traditionally weak coordination of security activities, particularly on organised crime. For example, we will continue to support US attempts to encourage more joint working among Sahelian governments, including through its “Flintlock” exercise, which brings together the Mali, Niger and Mauritania militaries for extensive training.

Development 36. Development does not fall directly within the scope of this inquiry, but is at the heart of the Government’s approach to dealing with the drivers of instability. 60% of the countries in the region are classified as fragile or conflict-affected, and the Sahel is the world’s poorest region. The immediate humanitarian challenge is to cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:47] Job: 036016 Unit: PG06

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address short-term and emergency needs in the Sahel. Longer-term, challenges range from developing stable and integrated economies to improving governance, security and accountability. The UK has already made major financial contributions to the Sahel region (approximately £600 million in FY 2012/13) and will remain a strong partner.

Political 37. Political and diplomatic engagement is central to the UK’s work to build a more functional and secure region. Political fragility has long characterised West Africa, and needs sustained engagement. Although recent trends towards political stability and economic growth are positive, coups d’état and stalled elections remain a concern. In North Africa, the Arab Spring has prompted unprecedented political change, opening up new opportunities (and challenges) for the UK. We will: — Promote good governance, democracy, rule of law and human rights, working through our network of posts, by direct contact between governments, and through major multilateral institutions. Our activities range from support for civil society organisations through the FCO-DFID Arab Partnership Fund, to Crown Prosecution Service projects designed to improve rule of law, and promoting dialogue and reconciliation in conflict-affected states such as Mali. — Promote regional cooperation and leadership within organisations such as the AU, ECOWAS and the Arab-Maghreb Union. We already engage with some—for example through a British Military Liaison Officer to ECOWAS—but we intend to look at deepening the UK’s engagement with others. We will also encourage international financial institutions to take a more coherent approach to the region and take a more systematic approach to seconding experts to help build capacity. — Take an international leadership role in conflict and security issues, using our position as a Permanent Member of the United Nations Security Council, our membership of the European Union and our governorship of International Financial Institutions and other international bodies proactively to promote conflict prevention and regional cooperation. We are taking an active role on Mali and promoting progress through contacts and participation with our allies and regional partners.

Prosperity 38. While our new approach is security and stability-led, we are also active on trade and investment, recognising that economic opportunity will be the long-term driver of growth, stability and development. North and West Africa contains two of the fastest growing economies (Ghana and Nigeria) and Africa’s wealthiest sub-region (North Africa). We retain a focus on UK commercial opportunities across the region—for example, agreeing a communiqué with Nigeria aiming to double bilateral trade to £8 billion by 2014. We have also established a West Africa Regional Prosperity Network which, working with the UKTI office in Ghana, harnesses the efforts of FCO prosperity officers in six West African posts.

Lessons Learned and Risks 39. This is a short selection of lessons and risks prompted by the Committee’s terms of reference. We will brief in more depth as required.

Mali 40. It is still early to draw conclusions from the Mali crisis. Nevertheless the international community misjudged the nature of the Government of Amadou Toumani Touré in Mali, which until early 2012 was held up as an example of stability. That Government had in fact been permitting the establishment of terrorists and had wasted aid money. 41. It was evident that without the terrorists’ advance there would have been a long and risky process of getting African troops onto the ground. There was willing regional support but a lack of capacity, and international contributions would probably have been slow to materialise. The French intervention was necessary and we were right to offer immediate support and to concentrate on logistical assistance. Cooperation was highly effective. Our contribution was valued and in proportion to both our interest in the challenge and our level of expertise in the region. 42. Our activity on Mali and the need for an international approach to the Sahel appears to be welcome both in the region and among partners. It is clear that in order to have impact the UK will need to continue to work through multilateral institutions (particularly the EU and UN), with our strategic partners (particularly the US and France), and with countries in the region to exploit our own particular areas of expertise. The process of dialogue, reconciliation and long-term stabilisation and development has just begun and presents a range of challenges.

Risks to the Stability of the Region 43. These are substantial. A number of countries across the region were fragile before recent events in Mali. Further conflict in the Sahel risks prompting major flows of refugees and illegal migrants, and could create cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:47] Job: 036016 Unit: PG06

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permissive environments for terrorists and organised criminals. There is a risk of asymmetrical terrorist attack across the region, including to our interests and our citizens.

Risk of “Blowback” 44. Increased UK involvement in the region brings an inevitable risk that the UK and our interests will increasingly become a target of those that oppose Western policy. As our involvement increases, our risk of exposure to terrorist acts also increases. Nevertheless we judge that this is outweighed by the importance of tackling the growing threat to Europe and the UK of terrorist groups being allowed to establish footholds from which to train, recruit and mount attacks. The UK would in any case have been high on the list of AQ-M targets, regardless of our involvement in Mali. 45. We have yet to see any significant “blowback” as a result of UK involvement in the French intervention in Mali. This is partly due to our limited footprint in the Sahel region and partly to the fact that our involvement in the intervention occurred as part of a coordinated international effort. 46. Some commentators have linked recent events such as the attacks on the In Amenas gas facility in eastern Algeria and the French Embassy in Tripoli to the French intervention in Mali. The complexity of the In Amenas attack would have required planning to have begun well before the French intervention in Mali, although it remains possible that a link will be established with the attack in Tripoli. 47. There is no doubt, however, that North and West Africa, particularly the Sahel region, is undergoing a period of flux and instability. Porous borders, conflict and fragile states mean that the movement of people, weapons and ideologies will flourish. Our understanding of the regional dynamics is evolving in parallel. We will continue to share our understanding of this emerging picture with the Committee. 10 May 2013 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:47] Job: 036016 Unit: PG06

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Ev 80 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence NIGERIA GDP: $244.1bn Populaon: 160.3m UK Diaspora: 190,000 GDP Per Capita: $1,522 Human Development 156th Index: 0.46; UK High Commission: Abuja DA: Yes UK Aid 206,194 (£000s): 10th Oil Reserves (2012); (bbl): 37.2bn Gas Reserves (m³): 5.11tn 9th (2012); UK Exports: £2,298.3m LIBYA GDP: $35.7bn Populaon: 6.5m UK Diaspora: 16,000 GDP Per Capita: $5,510 Human Development 64th Index: 0.76; UK Embassy: Tripoli SeniorDA: Brish Military Representave UK Aid 13,813 (£000s): 9th Oil Reserves (2012); (bbl): 47.1bn Gas Reserves (m³): (2012); 22nd 1.495tn UK Exports: £130.6m GHANA (hidden) (hidden) GHANA GDP: $38.4bn Populaon: 24.3m UK Diaspora: 100,000 GDP Per Capita: $1,580 Human Development 135 Index: 0.54; UK Embassy: Accra DA: Yes UK Aid 81,000 (£000s): Oil Reserves (bbl): N/A Gas Reserves (m³): N/A UK Exports: £702.9 TUNISIA TUNISIA GDP: $46.0bn Populaon: 10.7m UK Diaspora: 6,000 Per GDP Capita: $4,317 Human Development 94th Index: 0.7; UK Embassy: Tunis DA: No UK Aid 6,150 (£000s): 52nd Oil Reserves (2012); (bbl): 425m Gas Reserves (m³): 65.13bn 56th (2012); UK Exports: £228.3m se locaon of places or features. This map should not be considered an authority on be considered an authority should not map This features. locaon se of places or SIERRA LEONE GDP: $2.9bn Populaon: 6m UK Diaspora:20,000 GDP Per Capita: $496 Human Development 180 Index: 0.34; UK Embassy: Freetown DA: Yes UK Aid 312,000 (£000s): Oil Reserves (bbl): N/A Gas Reserves (m³): N/A UK Exports: £110.3 ALGERIA GDP: $197.9bn Populaon: 36.0m UK Diaspora: 22,000 Per GDP Capita: $5,503 Human Development 96th Index: 0.74; UK Embassy: Algiers DA: Yes UK Aid 1,533 (£000s): 16th Oil Reserves (2012); (bbl): 12.2bn Gas Reserves (m³): (2012); 11th 4.502tn UK Exports: £1,011.1m rposes only and it should not be used for determining the preci the determining for used be should not it only and rposes the deliminaon deliminaon the internaonal of boundaries spelling the or of place and feature names. MOROCCO GDP: $99.3bn Populaon: 32.2m UK Diaspora: 21,000 GDP Per Capita: $3,084 Human Development 130th Index: 0.58; UK Embassy: Rabat DA: Yes UK Aid 3,659 (£000s): 98th (2012); Oil Reserves (bbl): 680,000 Gas Reserves (m³): (2012); 97th 1.444tn UK Exports: £880.3m MAURITANIA GDP: $4.2bn Populaon: 3.5m UK Diaspora: N/A GDP Per Capita: $1,185 Human Development 159th Index: 0.45; UK Embassy: No DA: No UK Aid 904 (£000s): 84th Oil Reserves (bbl): 20bn (2012); Gas Reserves (m³): (2012); 99th 28.32tn UK Exports: £26.1m MALI GDP: $10.6bn Populaon: 15.9m UK Diaspora: N/A GDP Per Capita: $669 Human Development 175th Index: 0.36; No DA: Embassy: Bamako UK UK Aid 13,000 (£000s): N/A Oil Reserves (bbl): (2012); 0 Gas Reserves (m³): 0 N/A (2012); UK Exports: £12.6m Users should should Users note that this map has been designed for briefing pu North and West Africa: North and West Resources, Population, and UK Interests

Letter from the Chairman to the Rt Hon William Hague First Secretary of State, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

In Amenas Hostage Crisis

Earlier this month I met British survivors of January’s hostage crisis at the Tiguentourine gas facility near In Amenas, Algeria, along with close family members of two UK citizens killed during the crisis, at a private meeting here at the Parliament. The Committee had agreed to this informal meeting being held in relation to our current inquiry into extremism and political instability in North and West Africa.

As a result of the meeting, I am writing to you with a request for information on the following matters. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:47] Job: 036016 Unit: PG06

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Coroner’s inquest and role of Algerian authorities Members of the group spoke of their frustration at the slow pace of the West Sussex Coroner’s inquest, which has been suspended until well into next year, apparently because of a lack of evidence. A major cause for the delay appears to be that Met officers acting on behalf of the Coroner have not been allowed by the Algerian judicial authorities to gather evidence at Tiguentourine. According to the group, this is despite Algerian Prime Minister Sellal giving assurances to the Prime Minister that Algeria would not stand in the way of the UK carrying out its own investigations into the crisis. The autonomy of the Algerian legal system must of course be respected. But I would be grateful if you could confirm whether the Algerian authorities are co-operating with the UK in its investigations into the crisis. If there have been hold-ups, I would be grateful if you could explain how the UK Government proposes to resolve these.

Provision of travel advice to and by UK companies Members of the group also expressed concerns that UK workers at Tiguentourine had not been made expressly aware of FCO travel advice about Algeria, including revised advice issued in the weeks leading up to the crisis. They considered it especially important that workers be alerted to the most up-to-date advice, given the very remote and enclosed nature of the site and the importance of allowing workers there to reach an informed view about their personal safety and security, and whether to remain there. It would be helpful if you could clarify what advice the FCO provided to BP in Algeria prior to 16 January 2013, whether this was provided with the expectation that it would be shared with UK workers and, if so, whether to the best of your knowledge, BP passed this information on to workers within their care. In connection with this matter, I am pleased to note the Written Ministerial Statement of 18 July on providing information about terrorism threats to British businesses overseas. I expect that this would be welcomed by survivors, and by relatives of those killed at In Amenas, as an important part of the process of learning lessons from that traumatic event. I also expect they would wish to seek clarification as to what steps the Government will take to encourage or require British businesses to pass on any such advice to all UK citizens working for them, whether or not they have a formal contract of employment with the business or are instead contractors who rely on the business to pass on information about their working environment. I would be grateful for a response on this point. It would also be helpful if you could expand on what the statement means when it says that FCO travel advice will, in future, include “more contextual information about terrorism threats”. I would be grateful for a response by 27 August. 31 July 2013

Letter from the Rt Hon William Hague First Secretary of State, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Thank you for your letter of 31 July about the attack on the In Amenas gas plant in January this year. Alistair Burt, Minister for the Middle East and North Africa, has discussed many of the issues raised in your letter with several of the bereaved families and survivors in person or by letter. On 24 July, he sent an update to those Members who have contacted the FCO on behalf of affected constituents, which also covered many of these points. I have drawn on that letter here, but would be happy to provide you with a copy of the original as well if that would be helpful.

Coroner’s Inquest and Role of Algerian Authorities I fully appreciate the families’ frustration at not knowing what happened to their loved ones. I hope the investigation into the attack, which is rightly being led by the Algerian authorities, will ultimately answer their questions. However I should stress that this is a complicated case for any jurisdiction, and a full and proper investigation will inevitably take time to complete. You raise concerns about lack of co-operation from the Algerian authorities. This is their investigation and, as you rightly note, we cannot interfere in their judicial processes. However, we remain in frequent contact with them and they have assured us that they will share as much information as they can when it is appropriate to do so. Alistair Burt last spoke to the Algerian Foreign Minister about the investigation on 1 July, and the Metropolitan Police investigators have visited Algeria several times, most recently in May. Our Ambassador and his staff in Algiers are in frequent contact with the Algerian investigators and Ministry of Justice, and our Pro Consul speaks to the investigating judge weekly. All in all, I am satisfied that we have good contact with the right people, and are being given as much information as we can expect at an early stage of a complex investigation. You linked the Algerian investigation to the timing of the Coroner’s inquest, which is, of course, a matter for the Coroner to decide. I understand that, while the continuing Algerian investigation is one factor, there are also other considerations. The investigating team in the Metropolitan Police Counter-Terrorism Command are gathering evidence and witness statements from a number of third country nationals for the Coroner’s inquest. As you will know, nationals of nine states were killed in the attack, and nationals of more countries were cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:47] Job: 036016 Unit: PG06

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involved, therefore this will take time. Furthermore, requests for evidence and statements for the purposes of an inquest do not fall within the scope of Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties, where those apply. Therefore, the investigating team has limited scope to insist on compliance with their requests or set deadlines for response. We are supporting their efforts by urging responses through diplomatic channels where appropriate, but we are ultimately in the hands of the authorities concerned.

Provision of Travel Advice to and by UK Companies At the time of the In Amenas attack, our Travel Advice for Algeria had warned for some time that terrorists were active in the country and likely to target Western interests. It advised against all but essential travel to areas close to the Libyan border, and extreme vigilance in the area around In Amenas. I enclose a copy of the Advice, as it stood on 16 January, for your information. That information was available to BP (and its employees), as it was to all members of the public, on our website. I do not know whether they read it, or informed their employees of its content. To my knowledge, BP did not ask us for specific advice on the terrorist threat in Algeria, nor did we hold any specific information which would have warranted us contacting them proactively. The update made to the Algeria Travel Advice two days before the attack was a contextual change, noting that the French intervention in Mali might provoke retaliatory attacks across the region. We made this same change, at the same time, to the Travel Advice for all countries in North and West Africa where there is a terrorist threat. It was not a specific threat to Algeria, and did not change our overall assessment of the level of the threat from terrorism in Algeria. We will only actively inform organisations or individuals of a threat or Travel Advice change where there is specific information that directly affects them. However, we encourage individuals and organisations to sign up to receive email alerts if they wish to be notified of every change to a particular country’s Travel Advice. We also publicise significant changes on social media and through warden networks.

Industry Engagement As you have seen from my Written Ministerial Statement, we are working closely with industry to make clear what we can and cannot do for them, and how we will work with them in a crisis. We discussed lessons with BP immediately after In Amenas. Alistair Burt has hosted two roundtable discussions with wider industry representatives to discuss how we can keep each other informed and better co-ordinate our crisis response mechanisms. FCO officials have already participated in two companies’ crisis exercises as part of the follow- up from those discussions. We intend to continue this engagement to ensure we are all better informed of each others’ practices and priorities. We have also been made aware of the issues affecting contractors, and subcontractors , of main employers. We are continuing to give prominence in our discussions with industry to this point, and the vital importance of sharing information fully. We are also addressing the perception that Travel Advice is just for tourists. We are encouraging companies to use it to guide their security planning and, especially, to ensure employees and contractors have seen it. We cannot force them to do this, but any individual is, of course, free to check the advice and raise it with their employer if they wish to do so. The contextual information that we will add to Travel Advice will expand on the headline points advising the public on the terrorist threat. It is intended to give more information about where the threat comes from and why we consider it might affect travellers to that country. We are looking to broaden our efforts to include all organisations employing British Nationals in areas with a high threat of terrorism. As well as the extractive industry, this includes NGOs and media organisations, and covers areas of the Middle East and South Asia, as well as North and West Africa. Our objective is to increase the security of British Nationals working for foreign-based organisations, as well as UK employers, and we are therefore working with G8 partners to develop a coherent international approach. I hope this letter covers the points you raise in sufficient detail. Alistair Burt and I are, of course, willing to provide any further information we can to assist Committee’s work on this important area. 22 August 2013

Supplementary written evidence from the Rt Hon Hugh Robertson, Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office During my 11 November evidence session to the Foreign Affairs Committee, on Extremism and Political Instability in North and West Africa, I agreed to write to Committee members with further information in two areas. You asked about our policy on migration. I have undertaken to inform the Committee on this issue as soon as the EU Home Affairs Council on 5 and 6 December and the European Council on 19 and 20 December have met. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:47] Job: 036016 Unit: PG06

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Mr Frank Roy MP asked about UK support on border security/management and, specifically, whether border training and digital technology could be provided within a development aid package, and whether this is how I see it being given.

We look for the most appropriate way to fund and deliver projects; all capacity-building programmes are assessed on a case-by-case basis. Providing border training and digital technology as part of a development aid package would depend on whether the activity was eligible as Overseas Development Aid (ODA)—against the OECD definition: — is a flow to a country or territory on the OECD DAC list of ODA recipients, or to a multilateral development institution; — is provided by official agencies; — is concessional in character; and — is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective.

In addition, any border management support designed to directly combat terrorism is not reportable as ODA, as it generally targets perceived threats to donor, as much as to recipient countries, rather than focusing on the economic and social development of the recipient. The financing of military equipment or services would also generally be excluded from ODA reporting.

A range of digital technologies can be used to aid border operations including detection of document fraud, improving the ability of local authorities to identify and disrupt threats to border security and the accurate recording of traveller information.

The UK’s current activity in the region is focused on reducing the risk to aviation and coordinating regional efforts on border management. The UK delivers aviation security projects in a number of priority countries to increase protective security for carriers with direct flights to the UK. This includes maintaining levels of assurance on passenger and cargo checks in line with international regulations, increasing physical protection at airports and mitigating the risk from Man Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS) attacks. This is carried out through a combination of security training of airport personnel, and delivery of screening equipment and hardware. On border management, the UK has provided equipment and training in key locations to strengthen security practices.

As an example, we are assisting the Libyan authorities with their border management. A UK Border Security Adviser is working with Defence and Interior Ministries on capacity-building, including wide-area surveillance training for border guards. UK experts have been seconded to key positions within EUBAM (EU Border Assistance Mission) in order to promote UK objectives and strengthen Libyan border and aviation security regimes. We are also funding two capacity-building projects to reduce the risk posed to civil aviation from MANPADs and build sustainable aviation security capacity. We are working with the Libyan Government to help it regain control and manage the Qadhafi era stockpiles of unsecured arms and ammunition.

All my very best wishes, 22 November 2013

Supplementary written evidence from Mark Simmonds MP, Minister for Africa

During my 3 December evidence session to the Foreign Affairs Committee Inquiry on Extremism and Political Instability in North and West Africa, I agreed to write to Committee members with further information on some areas of interest. This information is attached to this letter, as follows: — Annex A: in response to Mr Rosindell’s question 247 and Mr Gapes’ question 252, I attach further details of the counter-terrorism support which we provide in North and West Africa, particularly in Nigeria. — Annex B: in response to Mr Stewart’s questions 256 and 260, I attach a breakdown of the language skills of FCO staff in North and West Africa. — Annex C: in response to Mr Roy’s question 269, I attach a clarification of the information provided in my colleague Mr Robertson’s recent letter to the Committee on UK support on border security/ management, and whether this could be provided within a development aid package. For ease of reference, the original letter is also attached at Annex D.

Mr Robertson has also undertaken to inform the Committee on UK policy on migration following the meetings of the EU Home Affairs Council (5 and 6 December) and the European Council (19 and 20 December). 17 December 2013 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:47] Job: 036016 Unit: PG06

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Annex A HMG COUNTER-TERRORISM ACTIVITY IN NORTH AND WEST AFRICA I promised to provide the Committee with further details of the counter-terrorism (CT) support which we provide in North and West Africa. Our CT efforts are focused on countries where there is a threat to the UK. Our global CT fund for 2013–14 has a budget of £30 million, of which we spend 14% in N&W Africa. These funds support activity to build CT capacity in areas such as developing strategy and legal frameworks; aviation security; border management; and work to counter the ideology that drives violent extremism. For operational and security reasons we cannot provide in-depth detail on all our projects. However, this note aims to provide as much detail as possible, focusing on Nigeria and North Africa, as the main targets of our bilateral CT work in the region. In addition, the work we carry out through multilateral partners, and our worldwide programmes which include N&W Africa, are listed below. Beyond our formal CT work, we and partners across government also carry out a wide range of related programmes which support our CT activities. For example, DFID’s work in the Sahel to build stronger, more accountable states and increase the resilience of vulnerable communities will reduce the ability of terrorist groups to recruit and radicalise, and it will help legitimate governments to have control over their territory. We also carry out a range of conflict prevention work, with around £15m allocated to N&W Africa in 2013–14 through the tri-departmental Conflict Pool. This covers both security-related activity, such as the International Security Advisory Team in Sierra Leone; and governance and human rights activity including Ghana, Guinea- Bissau and Mali. We are also working to tackle organised crime, for example through the FCO Africa Drugs and Crime Fund, which allocated £318, 000 in 2013–14 to projects building law enforcement capacity in West Africa. If the Committee would find it useful, my officials can provide further information on this.

Nigeria Nigeria is our key bilateral CT partner in the region, and our work there covers a range of areas. The Department for International Development (DFID) has allocated over £900m from 2011 to 2015, mostly focused on the north of Nigeria, focusing on poverty reduction, health and education. This recognises the need to adopt a long-term approach that tackles the drivers of violent extremism such as lack of governance and poverty. It also aims to help develop skills and jobs, provide better access to justice and reduce conflict. DFID is also looking at options for improving human rights compliance, especially amongst the military and police. Some of this work is already underway, including DFID’s “Justice for All” programme (£12.1m 2013–14) and the National Security and Reconciliation Programme (£4.5m 2013–14). DFID are working closely with the MOD and FCO to expand this work. We are also cooperating closely with a range of Nigerian security-focused institutions on countering the threat from Boko Haram and Ansaru. In terms of practical training and capacity-building, we are working closely with the Office of the Nigerian National Security Adviser (ONSA) and specifically the National Security Adviser, Lt Col Sambo Dasuki. The UK’s Deputy National Security Adviser, Oliver Robbins, remains closely engaged with the Nigerian NSA, as do a number of senior FCO and MoD officials. Central to our cooperation is a training programme to help the Nigerian authorities investigate, arrest, try and sentence terrorists in a human rights compliant manner. We have allocated £1.6m to this programme in 2013–14, as well as a dedicated team of UK experts. We have also provided crisis management training for the ONSA, using the COBR model and delivered through the Cabinet Office. An SO15 Police Attaché, based in Abuja, has provided advice and practical training to the Nigerians on managing hostage crises. The Police Attaché is leading a training team who are delivering a forensics-focused bomb scene management programme costing £50,000. And we are delivering an anti- terrorist finance training package to the Nigerian Government. A British Military Advisory Training Team is based in Abuja and focuses on military to military cooperation and training, offering a range of training courses for the Nigerian military. £1m has been identified to enable a personnel uplift from two to seven in 2014–15; the FCO, MOD and DFID are looking at further options to increase its capacity, covering a range of areas, including human rights-compliant work in conflict environments, education and skills training, and possibly peacekeeping and maritime security. We also seek to work with and through international partners. FCO officials have lobbied the EEAS and member states to allow the release of a portion of the €600m Sahel Security and Development fund (17% UK- funded) to Nigeria. In the summer, the EU’s FAC agreed to the release of an initial tranche of €15m to the ONSA for a range of CT-focused projects.

North Africa Since the revolution in Libya, we have provided significant support to help Libya re-establish security within its borders. Most recently, the Prime Minister announced at the G8 summit that we would provide training to 2000 Libyan soldiers. We are also working with the Libyan government on aviation and border security and helping to prevent the proliferation of weapons. However, the lack of capacity in the Libyan government and security challenges on the ground limit the level of CT support that we can provide. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:47] Job: 036016 Unit: PG06

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Algeria is also a key regional partner. In January 2013, the Prime Minister announced the launch of a strategic security partnership with the Algerian Government. The first meeting was held in London in April 2013 to discuss closer cooperation and the lessons of In Amenas. This partnership will help us to work more effectively with the Algerian government during future crises.

Multilateral Where we have a more limited diplomatic footprint or interests, we focus on coordinating efforts with international allies and multilateral organisations. This often covers multiple countries, and so is listed according to partners: — Allies: We supported the French-led intervention in Mali with logistical and surveillance assets and intelligence-sharing. We continue to deepen our regional CT cooperation with the French and the USA, particularly in the areas of border security and aviation. — EU: The EU delivers significant assistance to the regional security sector, especially through the Instrument for Stability. This supports a number of regional capacity-building programmes focused on law enforcement, judicial capability, and border security. The largest programme of €7m includes support to the Sahel Security College in Niamey. Following the international intervention in Mali, we have worked closely with the EU Training Force in Mali, contributing military personnel and civilian experts (through the Preventing Sexual Violence Initiative). We provide four people to the EU CSDP mission in Libya focused on border management. — GCTF: We are part of the Global Counterterrorism Forum, which was created in September 2011 by the US as a delivery-focused multilateral counterterrorism agency. It consists of 31 members, including all G8 members. The Sahel working group is chaired by Canada and Algeria. It focuses on coordinating civilian CT capacity in the region. This includes work to counter violent extremism, rule of law capacity-building and border security. Members of the working group have volunteered to coordinate CT activity in each country in the region. The UK leads coordination in Nigeria. — UN: We have used CT funds to provide counter-IED training to the Malian armed forces, which has been delivered by MINUSMA (the UK Peacekeeping Mission in Mali). We have also provided C- IED training to Nepalese troops deploying to MINUSMA. — G8: The Prime Minister made Kidnap for Ransom (KfR) and CT in North and West Africa priorities for the UK’s G8 Presidency. At the Lough Erne G8 Summit, G8 Leaders unequivocally rejected the payment of ransoms to terrorists, and agreed on the need to better coordinate international CT effort in the region.

Thematic CT Work The Foreign Secretary announced our approach to CT overseas in a speech to RUSI in February 2013. We deliver CT Rule of Law programmes in countries where there is both a threat to the United Kingdom’s security, and weaknesses that give rise to concerns about the country’s ability to conduct counter-terrorism investigations and prosecutions in a human-rights compliant manner. They are designed to focus on working with police, prosecutors, judges and prison authorities to build their capacity to investigate, detain, prosecute and convict terrorists based on respect for human rights and the rule of law. Some of our worldwide CT programmes operate in North and West Africa. This includes Aviation and border security. The UK delivers Aviation Security projects in priority countries across the region to increase protective security for carriers with direct flights to the UK. This includes maintaining levels of assurance on passenger and cargo checks, increasing physical protection at airports and mitigating the risk from Man Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPAD) attacks. This is carried out through a combination of security training of airport personnel and delivery of screening equipment and hardware. A Regional Aviation Security Liaison Officer (RASLO) covering N&W Africa is based in Rabat; an additional RASLO to be based in Lagos is being recruited, and will seek to improve aviation security regimes in liaison with Nigerian authorities. We also conduct and share assessments with close allies on a broad range of capacity-building projects in the region and are stepping up our work with regional partners to reduce the risk of a successful MANPADS attack. We are assisting the Libyan authorities with their border management.

Annex B FCO SPEAKER SLOTS IN NORTH AND WEST AFRICA UK-based Country Post Language Confidence Operational Extensive Total headcount Algeria Algiers French 1 3 1 5 9 Côte d’Ivoire Abidjan - 0 1 0 1 * Egypt Cairo Arabic 0 6 1 7 19 Alexandria 0 0 0 0 * Gambia Banjul - 0 0 0 0 * cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:47] Job: 036016 Unit: PG06

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UK-based Country Post Language Confidence Operational Extensive Total headcount Ghana Accra French 0 3 1 4 8 Guinea Conkary French 0 0 1 1 * Liberia Monrovia - 0 0 0 0 * Libya Tripoli 1 Arabic; 1 Arabic & French 0 2 0 2 14 Mali (inc Bamako French Niger) 0 0 1 1 * Morocco (inc Rabat French 0 7 1 8 9 Mauritania) Casablanca 0 0 1 1 * Nouakchott 0 1 0 1 * Nigeria Abuja French 0 2 0 2 25 Lagos 0 0 0 0 8 Senegal Dakar French 0 2 0 2 * Sierra Leone Freetown French 1 0 0 1 7 Tunisia Tunis French 1 0 1 2 7 3 27 8 38 118

*—Less than five UK-based staff

Notes — All speaker slots are for UK-based staff. There are 38 in total; 29 French, 8 Arabic, and 1 joint Arabic and French. — These figures denote only job slots with formal language requirements, not the wider language skills which staff around the region have. — Some slots based in English-speaking countries carry language requirements to enable staff to cover non- English speaking countries where we have no permanent diplomatic presence. For example, staff in Accra cover Benin, Togo and Burkina Faso. — As the FCO Permanent Under-Secretary explained to the FAC on 26 November, we have had some difficulties in providing consistent figures on the number of speaker slots in our network. We have committed to continue to improve our information management, and to provide you with information on numbers of speaker slots at regular intervals. The information included here is the best that was available as of 30 November 2013, but as with our figures for speaker slots globally, may change slightly over coming months.

Annex C

CLARIFICATION ON AID AND BORDER MANAGEMENT

During the evidence session, Mr Frank Roy MP asked for clarification on UK support to border management/ security and, specifically, whether the UK Government would be willing to explore the precise parameters of the OECD criteria on development aid to determine if border management could come out of development aid.

My Rt Hon Friend Mr. Robertson MP wrote to the committee on this matter on 22 November (attached at Annex D). I have provided further clarification below.

As Mr. Robertson’s letter outlined, the UK Government considers that border management work could be funded within OECD parameters as long as: — it is for the benefit of a country or territory on the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) list of Overseas Development Aid (ODA) recipients, or to a multilateral development institution; — it is provided by official agencies; is concessional in character; and — it is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of countries as its main objective.

The OECD criteria are therefore not a barrier to ODA spend on border management projects. The UK government constantly works to find the most effective and appropriate way to resource its overseas projects. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:47] Job: 036016 Unit: PG06

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Annex D LETTER TO THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, FROM THE RT HON HUGH ROBERTSON, DATED 22 NOVEMBER, PROVIDING FURTHER INFORMATION ON MIGRATION POLICY AND UK SUPPORT ON BORDER SECURITY/MANAGMENT During my 11 November evidence session to the Foreign Affairs Committee, on Extremism and Political Instability in North and West Africa, I agreed to write to Committee members with further information in two areas. You asked about our policy on migration. I have undertaken to inform the Committee on this issue as soon as the EU Home Affairs Council on 5 and 6 December and the European Council on 19 and 20 December have met. Mr Frank Roy MP asked about UK support on border security/management and, specifically, whether border training and digital technology could be provided within a development aid package, and whether this is how I see it being given. We look for the most appropriate way to fund and deliver projects; all capacity-building programmes are assessed on a case-by-case basis. Providing border training and digital technology as part of a development aid package would depend on whether the activity was eligible as Overseas Development Aid (ODA)—against the OECD definition: — is a flow to a country or territory on the OECD DAC list of ODA recipients, or to a multilateral development institution; — is provided by official agencies; — is concessional in character; and — is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective. In addition, any border management support designed to directly combat terrorism is not reportable as ODA, as it generally targets perceived threats to donor, as much as to recipient countries, rather than focusing on the economic and social development of the recipient. The financing of military equipment or services would also generally be excluded from ODA reporting. A range of digital technologies can be used to aid border operations including detection of document fraud, improving the ability of local authorities to identify and disrupt threats to border security and the accurate recording of traveller information. The UK’s current activity in the region is focused on reducing the risk to aviation and coordinating regional efforts on border management. The UK delivers aviation security projects in a number of priority countries to increase protective security for carriers with direct flights to the UK. This includes maintaining levels of assurance on passenger and cargo checks in line with international regulations, increasing physical protection at airports and mitigating the risk from Man Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS) attacks. This is carried out through a combination of security training of airport personnel, and delivery of screening equipment and hardware. On border management, the UK has provided equipment and training in key locations to strengthen security practices. As an example, we are assisting the Libyan authorities with their border management. A UK Border Security Adviser is working with Defence and Interior Ministries on capacity-building, including wide-area surveillance training for border guards. UK experts have been seconded to key positions within EUBAM (EU Border Assistance Mission) in order to promote UK objectives and strengthen Libyan border and aviation security regimes. We are also funding two capacity-building projects to reduce the risk posed to civil aviation from MANPADs and build sustainable aviation security capacity. We are working with the Libyan Government to help it regain control and manage the Qadhafi era stockpiles of unsecured arms and ammunition. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:47] Job: 036016 Unit: PG06

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Further Supplementary written evidence from Rt Hon Hugh Robertson MP, Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office During my 11 November evidence session to the Foreign Affairs Committee, on Extremism and Political Instability in North and West Africa, I agreed to write to Committee members with further information on UK policy on migration. The EU Task Force Mediterranean (TFM) was set up following the Lampedusa tragedy, to help ensure such accidents could not happen again. A Commission Communication, which sets out the proposed EU response based on the work of the TFM, was considered at the Justice and Home Affairs Council in Brussels on 5 December, and it was discussed and welcomed at the December European Council. We believe a collective EU approach is the best means of addressing such a difficult problem. The UK broadly supports the comprehensive series of measures contained in the Communication (attached). These measures focus on practical co-operation with the countries of the Southern Mediterranean, to prevent migrants from undertaking such dangerous crossings, and to enhance protection in the region for those requiring it, as well as preventative action in countries of transit and origin further afield. The UK is already engaged in some of the Task Force proposals. For example, we participate in the European Asylum Support Office (EASO); and we contribute to Frontex operations. We would consider joining further operations in the Mediterranean if called upon to do so, in order to help save lives and to combat people- smuggling and the criminal gangs who facilitate it. The UK has been at the forefront of those countries who wish to focus attention on countries of origin and transit as a way of addressing the problem at source. A huge amount needs to be done, and we are assisting with capacity-building and good governance programmes in a number of countries in Africa. 20 January 2014

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and The Council on the work of the Task Force Mediterranean 1. Executive Summary On 3 October 2013, a boat with around 500 migrants sank off the coast of Lampedusa. The loss of human lives triggered a strong call for action from European leaders and European citizens. The Task Force Mediterranean (TFM) was set up following the JHA Council of 7–8 October 2013. Its establishment was welcomed at the October European Council. There, it was made clear that determined action should be taken in order to prevent deaths at sea and to prevent such human tragedies from happening again. This action would be targeted at the provision of protection, guided by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility with a strong external oriented component. In light of this, after the tragedy of Lampedusa, also the Foreign Affairs Council of 18 November discussed ways to strengthen political dialogue and cooperation with third countries. The European Parliament also adopted a resolution on this subject on the 23 of October.1 During the discussion at the meetings of the Task Force and on the basis of the mandate, it emerged that a comprehensive range of measures must be used following an integrated approach for the whole Mediterranean area, as the tragic events of Lampedusa are part of a long standing and comprehensive challenge. They include, among other areas: assistance and reinforced dialogue with countries of origin and transit in line with the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility; a renewed focus on resettlement and regional protection efforts; legal channels to safely access the European Union to be explored, as well as a general focus on increased resettlement efforts; the fight against trafficking and smuggling of human beings and criminal networks; ensuring a speedy and sustainable return of migrants in a humane and dignified manner; strengthening the management of the EU’s external borders; implementation of the recently adopted Eurosur Regulation; and the support to Member States facing pressure on their migration and asylum systems. The actions contained in this communication follow this holistic approach, while focusing on immediate and practical solutions that could complement ongoing activities in the whole of the Mediterranean in the short term. Five main areas of action emerged from the Task Force discussions with a wide geographical scope: from the countries of origin and transit, to prevent migrants from undertaking dangerous journeys, to the shores of the European Union: (1) Actions in cooperation with third countries; (2) Regional protection, resettlement and reinforced legal avenues to Europe;

1 European Parliament resolution of 23 October 2013 on migratory flows in the Mediterranean, with particular attention to the tragic events off Lampedusa (2013/2827(RSP)). cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:47] Job: 036016 Unit: PG06

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(3) Fight against trafficking, smuggling and organised crime; (4) Reinforced border surveillance contributing to enhancing maritime situational picture and to the protection and saving of lives of migrants in the Mediterranean; and (5) Assistance and solidarity with Member States dealing with high migration pressure. In line with the outcome of the October European Council it was confirmed during the Task Force meetings that immediate measures will need to be complemented by long-term initiatives, grounded on the best available research, aimed at addressing the root causes of migration (poverty, human rights violations, conflict, lack of economic opportunities, poor working conditions, unemployment, etc). Initiatives should be taken to reform the legal and administrative framework on migration and asylum in countries of transit. Any EU action must be seen in the wider political context of the EU relationship with respective partner countries and regions: it notably cannot be isolated from the European Neighbourhood Policy and from the external migration policy framework of the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM). These actions are by their nature linked to a longer- term dimension and are already included in the EU’s long-term strategies. They are also crucial to prevent the persons to undertake perilous journeys to Europe. All actions under this communication will have to be fully compliant with international human rights standards, including the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,2 the European Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, the principle of non-refoulement and the applicable EU acquis. When personal data are involved, particular care should be devoted to the full implementation of applicable provisions. This communication is presented for discussion at the Justice and Home Affairs Council of 5–6 December. The outcomes of the discussion will be presented by the Presidency to the European Council on 19–20 December. In the follow-up to this communication, appropriate consideration should be given to the resources and assets that could be made available, within the existing budget constraints, by all actors involved in order to implement the actions and achieve the overall objective of preventing tragedies such as Lampedusa from happening again in the future. The European Commission will regularly report to the Council and the European Parliament on progress made on the implementation of the TFM communication.

2. Process In producing this communication, the European Commission, as chair of the Task Force Mediterranean, organised two meetings of the TFM on 24 October and 20 November 2013. The European External Action Service and all Member States took part in those meetings together with the EU Agencies that have a direct stake in the process (EASO, Frontex, Europol, FRA, EMSA). Other entities have been consulted while developing the communication of the Task Force Mediterranean, including the Associated Countries, UNHCR, IOM, ICMPD, the Migration Policy Centre, the International Maritime Organisation, UNODC, and Interpol.3

3. Lines of Action The following lines of action have been developed by the Task Force Mediterranean:

(1) Actions in cooperation with third countries Actions in cooperation with third countries are one of the most effective ways to prevent persons from attempting to enter the EU through irregular channels, and put their life at risk by undertaking dangerous journeys towards Europe. Third countries are crucial partners in order to tackle the root causes of irregular migration, to monitor migration flows, to collect information and intelligence on routes and networks, to dismantle the smugglers’ and traffickers’ networks and to contribute to providing sustainable solutions to migratory flows across the Mediterranean. In the overall context of the EU external relations, it is crucial to continue to step up work and cooperation with countries of origin and transit on migration and development, including strengthening their capacities to manage mixed migration flows, and helping to ensure that their migration and asylum systems conform to international human rights standards. There is a need for increased, targeted political dialogue with countries of origin and transit, with the aim to foster confidence-building and positive engagement with partners on migration as a particularly sensitive issue on both sides The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) provides the framework for the dialogue and cooperation with all third countries while adopting a comprehensive approach to migration-related dialogues and cooperation. Political impetus is required to enhance GAMM effectiveness and impact and to ensure progress in dialogues on migration, mobility and security and negotiations of mobility partnerships. Future 2 Notably its Articles 2, 4, 18 and 19. 3 Whenever the role of such organizations is recognized in the text this is without prejudice to any financial decision that will be taken in the context of the implementation of the actions envisaged in the communication. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:47] Job: 036016 Unit: PG06

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action will continue to focus on European Neighbourhood countries, strategic partners as well as countries of origin and/or transit of specific interest, also in cooperation with relevant international organisations. Given the nature of migratory movements, transit countries along the Southern Mediterranean coasts will need to be given incentives to engage in cooperation concerning migrants who are not citizens of their countries. Therefore, a wider perspective needs to be applied and positive messaging on migration by the EU put forward. Relations with partner countries will also have to take into account the specific sensitivities and expectations of partner countries on the migration dossier, and their perception that the EU wishes to focus primarily on security-related aspects, readmission/return and the fight against irregular migration. In this context the proposed actions focus on activities to be strengthened or launched in the short term in order to achieve the aforementioned objectives, also by increasing the coordination between available EU and national instruments. Mobility Partnerships, information campaigns, diplomatic initiatives and capacity building are important components of this approach. The European External Action Service will be a crucial partner for the implementation of the actions envisaged in this section, while long-term and sustainable cooperation with third countries will be complementary to these more short- to medium term measures.

Actions Specific actions in transit countries 1.1 Due political attention by the Commission and Member States should be directed at signing and start implementing the recently concluded Mobility Partnership (MP) with Tunisia. Meanwhile, the implementation of the cooperation initiatives foreseen in the recently signed MP with Morocco should be continued, and support should be provided to the Moroccan authorities for the full implementation of the recommendations contained in the report of the National Council of Human Rights to establish a new migration and asylum policy. Furthermore, the negotiation of the Mobility Partnership with Jordan should start without delay, as a positive outcome of the Dialogue on migration, mobility and security initiated with this country in December 2012. The launching of new Dialogues on migration, mobility and security with additional Southern Mediterranean countries, notably with Egypt, Libya, Algeria and Lebanon is also a priority.4 The decision in that respect will be taken on the basis of a country-by-country specific assessment, notably by taking into consideration their respective capacity and willingness to improve their management of migration and asylum matters in line with international standards as well as to enhance their cooperation with the EU in these areas. Issues of concern relating to the rights of migrants and refugees should be systematically raised in political dialogues with third countries, as per the EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy (Action 14), and assistance offered with the development of properly functioning asylum and migration systems. Initiatives implemented by EU Agencies, such as EASO, FRA and Frontex as well as Member States, international organisations, and civil society aimed at building capacity in asylum, reception, migration and border management, can be an important element of the Mobility Partnerships. There should be a financial review for Mobility partnerships, in order to stimulate Member states to participate more actively in developing projects. Mobility Partnerships should also be used strategically to foster regional cooperation in the migratory field. 1.2 Dialogue on specific issues of concern will be promoted with selected countries of the North African and Sahel region to act more effectively in combating the smugglers’ and traffickers’ networks. Discussions should be held with the Tunisian authorities on measures aimed at stopping the provision of Tunisian boats to smugglers in Libya, including vessel registration and tracking for data exchange. Similar processes should be encouraged also in other Northern African states. In particular, Egyptian authorities should be encouraged to put more attention and to combat more effectively the activities of the traffickers of human beings in the Sinai region; Sudanese authorities should be invited to combat against the criminal organisations operating on their territory and facilitating the smuggling and trafficking of migrants and refugees from the Horn of Africa towards the Mediterranean region; Nigerian authorities should be engaged and assisted to better protecting their most vulnerable nationals to fall victims of the traffickers in human being. 1.3 Given the very unstable security and political situation and the limited institutional and administrative capacities, Libya is currently unable to counter the activities of the smugglers and traffickers. Therefore it constitutes the main transit and departure country of mixed migration flows in the central Mediterranean. In order to address this situation, the EU should continue to strengthen its comprehensive support to Libya by promoting its stabilisation, enhancing governance and security, and addressing radicalization, violent extremism and terrorism, as well as by addressing reports of human rights’ violations. Furthermore, an assistance of particular importance to promote the development of an integrated border management system will be provided 4 Assistance is under consideration to work with the Lebanese authorities on Integrated Border Management (IBM) to strengthen state institutions and improve inter-agency cooperation. In this context, the EU is also keen to promote a rights-based approach of IBM covering regular movement of people and goods, as well as the management of migratory flows. The EU is also currently considering options for support to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:47] Job: 036016 Unit: PG06

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by the ongoing EUBAM Mission as well as by the Sahara-Mediterranean project. In this framework Member States and Frontex should consider how to provide further support to these initiatives. In parallel, the EU will continue providing its assistance aimed at supporting the establishment in Libya of a migration management and asylum system that fully complies with international human rights standards. Considering that Libya is a recipient country of job-seeking migrants, to reduce irregular migration, a clear official procedure for processing job-seeking migrants is among the priorities of Ministry of Labour and should be supported. The EU will continue to engage with the Libyan authorities to address practices such as the indiscriminate detention of migrants, the mistreatment of migrants within and outside retention centres, and to improve the conditions within retention centres. Particular attention will be placed by the EU on the need by Libya to ensure respect of the rights of persons in need of international protection, to adopt legislation on asylum, to regularize the position of UNHCR in the country.5 The establishment of a network of liaison officers to fight irregular migration in Libya should be implemented as soon as the security situation allows. The Commission is committed to launch a Dialogue on Migration, Mobility and Security, in line with the GAMM, with the Libyan authorities as soon as the conditions allow. These actions are complemented by other EU projects and programmes in the security sector.

1.4 Turkish territory represents another important point of transit of irregular migration flows directed towards the EU both through the Thracian region and across the Mediterranean waters. While recognising the existing significant Turkish capacities and efforts to prevent this phenomenon, it is very important to continue dialogue and cooperation with the Turkish authorities, in view of further strengthening their capacities to dismantle the smugglers’ networks organising such irregular departures, to prevent the latter through an increased surveillance of its borders, to promptly exchange information with the interested EU Member States and to achieve the full implementation of the readmission agreement. The setting up of a network of liaison officers in Turkey, similar to the network envisaged for Libya will be important in this regard. In addition, it will be of key importance, for the EU, to continue assisting Turkey to develop its border, visa, migration and asylum management systems, in line with the EU standards which Turkey pursues as a candidate country.

1.5. Action with transit countries will have to be complemented by increased attention to countries of origin in Eastern and Western Africa through political dialogue and reinforced cooperation. Specific migration dialogues, demarches and reinforced engagement both at country-level and with regional partners, with implication of the respective EU Special Representatives, could play an important positive role. Cooperation will in parallel continue to contribute to improving socio-economic environment and related employment opportunities for citizens who may otherwise be pushed towards irregular migration. Support for a better management of migration at national and regional level should more effectively tackle trafficking and contribute to prosecuting traffickers and assisting victims. The EU should aim at fostering respect for the human rights of all migrants in partner countries and regions with a particular focus on vulnerable groups and the special rights of asylum seekers and refugees, using available tools and funds including specific human rights instruments. The EU should seek to prevent and address protracted refugee situations and strengthen protection of refugees and security in refugee camps (eg through the EU’s Instrument for Stability). In this context, support should also be given to innovative programmes.

Regional approaches

1.6 Information and awareness raising campaigns should be developed, mainly as part of broader EU actions on migration, with the intention to clearly communicate and raise awareness concerning the grave risks and dangers faced by migrants attempting to reach the EU through irregular channels, including the perils of irregular sea crossings and the threats posed by smugglers and traffickers.

Innovative approaches should be sought in order to reach as many potential migrants as possible in countries of origin, as well as in countries of transit, with a particular focus on African countries as well as relevant countries in the Middle East and Asia, building on previous EU and Member State initiatives.

The campaigns should also inform about channels available for legal migration. Information campaigns should also rely on diaspora networks and should be, mainly, developed in partnership with authorities of third Countries, international organizations, and NGOs.

In this framework the potential of the EU Immigration Portal shall be harnessed, alongside other methods for disseminating these messages.

1.7 The Seahorse Mediterranean network between EU Mediterranean Member States and North African countries will be established by 2015, following a public tender to be carried out in 2014. This network will allow the participating states to directly exchange factual information on incidents and patrols with each other 5 The Commission is considering a financial decision to implement a program of €10 million under ENPI (European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument) that will focus on improving the legal and institutional setup and capacities of the authorities responsible for migration and asylum management, in line with international standards and best practices to guarantee that migrants are treated with full respect of human rights and human dignity and in line with international standards guaranteeing international protection. A particular focus of the programme will be also on improving living conditions for migrants in retention facilities. It will do this by reviewing administrative procedures, improving services provided to migrants and facilitating their access to employment. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:47] Job: 036016 Unit: PG06

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in near-real time via satellite communication. On-going efforts should be reinforced to convince all other relevant countries, in North Africa (namely Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt) to participate in this network.6 1.8 The possible involvement of countries of departure in maritime surveillance operations should be discussed, within the Frontex and EUROSUR legal framework. This action should be complemented with dialogues and assistance aimed at encouraging and strengthening the capacities of the third countries to: (1) combat, at the point of origin, the networks smuggling human beings, and thus prevent immigrants from being endangered by the smugglers; (2) improve control of their land borders and coastlines; (3) establish mechanisms enabling the safe return of irregular migrants to the nearest and safest departure point. Whenever feasible and appropriate,7 the operational experiences gained by some Member States on joint patrolling in third countries’ territorial seas should be replicated. Furthermore the role of Frontex, within the limits of its mandate, in supporting the implementation of the aforementioned activities, in particular on capacity building, will be important. In this respect synergies should be established with other capacity building tools deployed by the EU in the North African region. 1.9 Based on the assessment of their existing capabilities and needs, the possibility of assisting in capacity building for search and rescue in the North African coastal states should be considered. 1.10 Exchange of strategically and tactical data between the EU Member States and African States should be improved. In this context the achievements of the Africa Frontex Intelligence Community network would be an example. Common risk analysis reports should be drawn up periodically. 1.11 Political dialogue and diplomatic initiatives, including joint demarches,8 should be developed using in a coordinated manner all the incentives and leverages available at the EU and Member States’ level, so as to enhance the capacity of the EU to successfully reach the objectives of the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, including the negotiations and full implementation of readmission agreements, the improvement of international protection systems, and the fight against smuggling and criminal networks. These initiatives should be initiated with main countries of transit and origin of irregular migration in Africa and Asia. In this context, avenues should be explored to take into account cooperation on these subjects as part of a wider incentive-based approach.9 The results of these efforts should be accompanied by a corresponding step up of Frontex coordinated operations in order to facilitate the return process. Also in this framework, measures should be developed with the relevant third countries allowing identification and re-documentation of returnees in a more efficient manner. In this effort, reinforced focus should be given to the main countries of origin of irregular migration. An increased acceptance of the EU laissez passer (standard travel document for expulsion purposes) could contribute to this effort. 1.12 A specific and comprehensive debate on migration (covering, inter alia, voluntary return, readmission, reintegration, reception, international protection, fighting smuggling and criminal networks, capacity building, human rights of migrants as well as the root causes for irregular migration) should be foreseen in view of the EU-Africa Summit in April 2014 and the fourth Euro—African Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development planned for the second half of 2014 (Rabat Process). The new generation of programmes for Euromed Migration and Euromed Police to be launched from 2014 should take due account of evaluations to become a more effective platform of dialogue and cooperation. Moreover, bilateral and relevant regional dialogues with countries in Sub Saharan Africa should be strengthened. In this context partner countries should be urged to adopt and implement national measures for integrated border management, against smugglers, also with the support of experts deployed by Member States and in line with best practices developed by UNODC where appropriate. 1.13 A dedicated programme, taking advantage of existing EU initiatives in this domain such as the EU- funded WAPIS programme (Western Africa Police Information System implemented by INTERPOL) could be envisaged to support the establishment of police cooperation and an AFRIPOL to help coordinate national police information and investigation capacities in Africa in, inter alia, the fight against trafficking in human beings and smuggling. Support by INTERPOL, UNODC and other relevant organisations could be instrumental in this regards. Such a programme should ensure synergies with the African Union Border Programme. 1.14 Quick and effective return of irregular migrants needs to be ensured, in a humane and dignified manner in full compliance with the EU Charter of Fundamental rights, the relevant EU acquis and international human rights standards, by promoting, when possible, voluntary returns. At certain conditions and as a complementary instrument, increased financial and technical assistance to support the social and economic reintegration of returnees as well as ensuring an effective system for non-voluntary return in cooperation with national authorities should be made available. When providing financial and technical assistance, particular care should 6 Also the ongoing Coast Guard Cooperation can present relevant opportunities to foster dialogue between the EU and North African countries. 7 Any action in this field should comply with fundamental rights, including the non-refoulement principle. 8 With the objective to increase coherence in external actions between the EU and national level, Heads of EU Delegation in countries of origin of stranded migrants should, where appropriate together with other EU Member States ambassadors, prepare joint demarches to the responsible national authorities. These demarches, should be prepared in coordination with the EEAS and the Commission and concerned Member States. 9 See for instance the implementation of readmission obligation of the ACP countries under the EU-ACP Partnership Agreement (Cotonou Agreement). cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:47] Job: 036016 Unit: PG06

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be placed not to create parallel structures to the ones of the third country concerned, and to avoid creating pull factors. Priority, when possible, should be given to returns to countries of origin rather than transit countries. 1.15 Cooperation/exchange of information and synergies will be developed between Member States, with the contribution of EU JHA agencies, other stakeholders (IOM, NGOs) on the content of the Assisted Voluntary Return programmes, including reintegration measures and initiatives taken by each Member State towards the countries of origin or transit to ensure a sustainable return of the irregular migrants. As from 2014, this cooperation will be developed in the context of the EMN.

(2) Regional Protection Programmes, Resettlement and reinforced legal ways to access Europe Resettlement is an important mean by which persons in need of protection can arrive safely to the European Union without going on hazardous journeys over the Mediterranean. The use of this instrument should therefore be encouraged alongside actions that improve access to self-reliance for refugees in third countries which are key precursor to a durable solution. More legal mobility opportunities for study and work should also be considered including by offering alternative avenues of entry to potential asylum-seekers. 2.1 To improve the situation of refugees at the local level it is necessary to set in place and strengthen Regional Protection Programmes (RPPs). Existing RPPs such as those in North Africa (Libya, Tunisia and Egypt) and the Horn of Africa (Kenya, Djibouti) should be reinforced and expanded so to include also other key countries in particular in the Sahel region. Furthermore, the EU is currently preparing a new Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPPs) for refugees in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq as part of a long- term response to the Syria crisis. New Regional Protection Programmes will need longer-term engagement and funding, if they are to be successful, both from the EU and the national level. Funding could be obtained only partially from the existing resources and financial instruments of the Asylum and Migration Fund. This needs to be complemented by other sources of funding from EU development assistance and Member States. Besides, the implementation of RPPs/RDPPs should be accompanied by strong political dialogue and advocacy efforts on refugee protection and protracted refugee situations with national authorities in third countries, including at regional level. RPPs should coordinate their regional and country specific components, and EU member States, EU delegations should play a crucial role in their planning and implementation. UNHCR, together with other international organizations, will be a key partner in this field while, when appropriate, NGOs should participate in their implementation. Where relevant, cooperation between EASO and targeted countries will be promoted focusing in particular on the fields of training and capacity building. In cooperation with international organizations (eg IOM) and NGOs, parallel initiatives should be launched to facilitate assisted voluntary return and reintegration of migrants stranded in North African countries to their countries of origin and to develop the capacity of countries to better manage return and reintegration.10 2.2 Member States are encouraged to increase their current commitment on resettlement as a long-term solution that contributes to preventing and addressing protracted refugee situations. In 2012, 4.930 persons were resettled to the Union by twelve Member States.11 While those already resettling should consider increasing their quotas, new resettling Member States should engage in order to increase the EU share of the worldwide resettlement commitment. In this context strategic use of resettlement through the Union Resettlement Programme is encouraged and will be supported by EU funding available under the Asylum and Migration Fund. 2.3 The Commission is prepared to organise, in cooperation with the UNHCR, a conference on resettlement of the most vulnerable refugees from Syria. The conference could take place in the first half of 2014 and encourage resettlement efforts both among EUMS and countries around the globe. 2.4 The Commission will explore further possibilities for protected entry in the EU in the context of the reflection on the future priorities in the Home Affairs area after the expiry of the Stockholm programme. These could notably include: (a) guidelines on a common approach to humanitarian permits/visas (b) feasibility study on possible joint processing of protection claims outside of the European Union without prejudice to the existing right of access to asylum procedures in the EU. EASO, FRA and Frontex and, where relevant, UNHCR, ILO or IOM, should be involved in the execution of these tasks. 2.5 The EU and its Member States should continue to explore further possibilities to open legal channels which give an opportunity for migrants to reach Europe in a regular manner. Such channels will also help to fight abuses and irregular migration. For instance the seasonal worker’s Directive, once implemented, will clarify the admission, grant a secure legal status in order to protect seasonal workers from exploitation and provide the first EU scheme on circular migration allowing migrants to come back in following years under 10 Migration Resource and Response Centres established by IOM in many countries along migration routes could be considered for replication in the Central and Eastern Mediterranean Routes. 11 Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Spain, France, Lithuania, The Netherlands, Portugal, Finland, Sweden, United Kingdom (source EUROSTAT). cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:47] Job: 036016 Unit: PG06

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certain conditions. The currently negotiated Directive on students, researchers and other groups could also make an important contribution with clear admission rules and status.

(3) Fight against trafficking, smuggling and organised crime12 International organized crime networks exploit the desire of migrants to achieve a better life. For this reason, the EU will take new, decisive steps to fight organised crime networks including smugglers’ networks, by building new initiatives in cooperation with Member States and well as third countries, Frontex, EUROPOL, EASO, and Interpol. These activities will first and foremost focus on the implementation and the strengthening of the priorities recently adopted by the JHA Council within the EU policy cycle on serious and organised international crime: irregular immigration, including smuggling, and trafficking in human beings (“THB”). Building on this, the EU will support further capacity-building programmes to address smuggling and trafficking in human beings in North Africa, key countries of origin and countries of first asylum. Training in third countries should support multidisciplinary cooperation, including law enforcement and the judiciary. The on-going reflections about the use of appropriate CSDP instruments in order to support the fight against criminal organisations in third countries will also have to be taken into account.

Actions 3.1 EUROPOL should strengthen on-going activities and coordinate relevant EU agencies in the field of smuggling of human beings and fight against organised crime.13 This could include setting up a team under the administrative and legal framework of the existing Analysis Work File Serious Organised Crime (AWF SOC), and in particular Focal Point (FP) Checkpoint, which deals with smuggling at Europol. 3.2 Two EMPACT operational actions plans on irregular migration and trafficking in human beings in the policy cycle framework, including smuggling, with the involvement of the Member States and EU Agencies will be decided in December 2013 and launched in January 2014. 3.3 A comprehensive EU plan should be developed, involving all interested parties on the fight against smuggling of migrants which incorporates a human rights dimension in compliance with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The strategy will include enhanced practical cooperation and exchange of information between Member States as well as with EU Agencies and deepened external cooperation with third countries and relevant regional and international organisations (eg UNODC).14 In this context the Immigration Liaison Officers present in the countries of origin and transit will play an important role. In this context Guidelines on different aspects related to the fight against smuggling could be developed both at EU and national level taking into account the work of the UN in this field. Already existing means of operational cooperation between the Member States and third countries such as liaison officers and joint operations should be used more effectively in the framework of COSI.15 3.5 The responsible national authorities of the affected Member States are encouraged to systematically make available relevant information, including personal data, to Europol for the purpose of supporting the fight against facilitators. Frontex and Europol should conclude without delay an operational agreement allowing for the exchange of personal data, for the purpose of supporting the fight against cross border criminal activities.16 3.6 In the framework of the EUROPOL inter agency coordination, EASO should run a pilot project with a Member State to learn more about smuggling and trafficking routes. 3.7 The EU should politically support the organisation of the regional conference under the auspices of the Joint Africa-EU strategy on trafficking and smuggling in 2014. 3.8 The Commission will carry out the evaluation and possible modification of the EU acquis on facilitating unauthorised entry, transit and residence, by reconciling effective fight against smuggling with the need to avoid criminalising humanitarian assistance. The international obligation concerning rescue of migrants in distress at sea should be recalled.17 12 While interrelated, human smuggling (eg facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit or residence) and trafficking in human beings should not be confused. In particular, trafficking involves the use of means mentioned in the trafficking definition (“by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person”) for the purpose of exploitation of the person, and does not requires the crossing of a border or physically transportation, as in the case of smuggling. 13 The mandate of EUROPOL is strengthened in this field in line with the ongoing revision of the EUROPOL regulation. 14 Information collected in this context could also be used to better detect better detect and prevent the travel of foreign fighters to either engage in jihad abroad (in particular Syria) or return. 15 These actions might need to be coordinated, if appropriate, with the on-going reflections on delivering concrete elements for a Communication on a European Maritime Security Strategy by early 2014. 16 When it is allowed by the EUROSUR Regulation data other than personal data should be made available by EUROPOL to EUROSUR. 17 In this context it is to be clarified from the outset that shipmasters remain bound to following orders issued by Rescue Coordinator Centres (RCCs) in accordance with international law. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:47] Job: 036016 Unit: PG06

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(4) Reinforced border surveillance contributing to enhancing maritime situational picture and to the protection and saving of lives of migrants in the Mediterranean Over the years, a number of tragedies have been witnessed in the Mediterranean, whereby several thousand people have lost their lives when trying to reach European shores. The efforts made by Member States in the region, at times also with the support of Frontex, are commendable and have led to the rescue of thousands of people. However, increased support and assistance to these Member States is necessary. The role of Frontex in coordinating operational cooperation between Member States in the Mediterranean is key to ensuring effective border control in the region, whilst contributing to ensuring protection of those in need and saving the lives of migrants. The European Council called for Frontex’s operations to be strengthened. This can be supported by improved information sharing on the situational picture in the Mediterranean through the opportunities offered by EUROSUR.

Actions 4.1 Frontex, together with relevant Member States, has enhanced its capacities to control Mediterranean maritime borders, which are the external borders of the European Union. For example, it has reinforced Joint Operation Hermes as of beginning of November, while taking due account of the possible changes in migratory movements due to seasonal aspects. This has been achieved through the additional funding provided in the context of the Lampedusa operation (an additional €7.9 million for Frontex’s 2013 budget). Building on this, the objective is to have a comprehensive and coordinated approach to border surveillance operations led by Frontex in the Mediterranean (from Cyprus to Spain), focusing on the main migratory routes, as of spring 2014 on the basis of a multi-stakeholder approach. The reinforcement of Frontex operations in 2014 should be further assessed based on the concept presented by Frontex to the Task Force.18 National border surveillance efforts should be fully coordinated with the operations undertaken by Frontex and altogether should constitute a European Patrols’ Network. Information on those national efforts—regardless of the authority undertaking them—should be shared through the EUROSUR network, via the national coordination centre of the Member State in question. This could also include stepping up of Member States’ operations following the example of the Italian initiative Mare Nostrum. These initiatives should be complementary and should be coordinated with Frontex operations.19 Reinforcement of Frontex-coordinated border surveillance operations by Member States’ airborne and naval military assets, when possible under national law and with those assets acting in a civilian law enforcement capacity, can also improve situational awareness and the capability for early detection of irregular migrants at sea, thus enabling more effective prevention of loss of life. Therefore such reinforcement should be encouraged within the overall legal framework of Frontex and EUROSUR Regulations which would apply to participating military assets. As referred to in paragraph 1.8, Frontex should strive to develop the participation of Mediterranean third countries to the extent possible. 4.2 The European Parliament and the Council are invited to accelerate their negotiations on the proposal for a Regulation establishing rules for the surveillance of the external sea borders in the context of operational cooperation coordinated by Frontex, with the aim of holding the first trialogue before the end of the year. 4.3 EASO’s role in the field of identification and screening of asylum seekers in mixed flows should be strengthened in partnership with Frontex and in full compliance with the respective mandates of the Agencies. 4.4 The European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) has become operational as of 2 December 2013 and its implementation and full use by Member States and Frontex will be monitored closely. Near real-time information exchange, regular intelligence sharing and close inter-agency cooperation at national and EU level are the key elements here. An essential role is also played by the use of modern surveillance technology, such as the fusion of data derived from ship reporting systems and satellite imagery. 4.5 On this basis, in the course of 2014, further improving interagency cooperation and information exchange in the framework of EUROSUR could be explored to enhance the national and European situational pictures.20 In line with the requirements of the EUROSUR Regulation this should also include the assistance of Member States’ naval vessels which are in any event present in the area.21 On-going efforts should be intensified to improve the monitoring of known departure points for irregular migration in the whole of the Mediterranean, including activities in ports and at coasts serving as hubs for irregular immigrants. The detection and tracking 18 Host Member States are invited to take appropriate measures in order to exempt participating Member States from paying VAT during joint operations to the extent possible. 19 Operations not covered by the Frontex regulation still have to be conducted in full compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights and in particular with the principle of non-refoulement. 20 These efforts could be complemented by the on-going works to establish a Common Information Sharing Environment for the EU maritime Domain. The Common Information Sharing Environment (CISE) which is currently being developed jointly by the European Commission and EU/EEA member states is also foreseen as the third phase of EUROSUR (COM (2008) 68). 21 The EUROSUR Regulation requires information on the position, status and type of military assets assisting a law enforcement mission is included in the national situational picture for EUROSUR. Access to this kind of information may be restricted on a need to know basis. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:47] Job: 036016 Unit: PG06

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of small boats will be pursued in the framework of EUROSUR with financial support from the future Copernicus programme as well as with test runs under on-going FP7 research projects such as Perseus, Closeye, Lobos and Sagres and with technical support and advice from the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre.22 In this context the situational picture in the Mediterranean should be enhanced by better utilising inter- agency cooperation. Based on the Service Level Agreement between Frontex and European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA)23 and the EU Satellite Centre24 more vessel positioning and Earth observation data should be generated for the critical areas. These and other relevant data for operations should be added to the different situational pictures of EUROSUR, including from naval assets. In the context of interagency cooperation (Frontex, Europol, EMSA) intelligence based information should be used as the basis for intensified surveillance efforts. 4.6 A call should be issued at the national level, where appropriate through a notice to mariners, urging shipmasters of merchant vessels and fishermen to comply with their obligations under international law (UNCLOS, SOLAS and SAR) to assist and report to the relevant authorities of the Member States any migrant boats in distress. This should be coupled with a public reassurance that they will always be allowed to disembark rapidly and, provided they are acting in good faith, would not face any negative legal consequences for providing such assistance. Such a call should be supported politically at the European level.

(5) Assistance and solidarity with Member States dealing with high migration pressure25 Responsibility and solidarity go hand in hand. Member States have the responsibility to invest and build up capacity to ensure a flexible and effective national systems of asylum, migration and reception in accordance with the EU acquis. This also includes building up capacity to manage a sudden and increased pressure. At the same time, assistance and solidarity play an important role in the overall context of alleviating pressure on Member States in the whole of the EU. The events off the shores of Lampedusa are in fact only part of a wider problem and assistance should target all Member States who are on the frontline in dealing with high migratory pressure. Therefore, Member States should transpose and implement the revised asylum acquis as a matter of priority and implement the approaches set out in Council Conclusions of March 2012, based on the Commission Communication on Intra-EU Solidarity. Member States should make use of support tools developed by EASO to this effect. Although already addressed under the fourth line of actions, it is to be noted that the Frontex coordinated Joint Operations also constitute a tangible sign of solidarity. Further practical cooperation initiatives can be developed to support Member States under pressure to manage their migratory flows and ensure a quick and proper assessment of asylum applications. EU funding can also help in this direction. In this framework, contingency planning should be strengthened in order to prevent crisis when possible and to manage emergencies when they happen.

Actions 5.1 The Commission is setting aside funding (including emergency funding) of up to €30m in support of IT, including for border surveillance operations under the Frontex mandate. For other Member States ca. €20 million have been allocated in order to address the growing pressure at the EU level and the subsequent insufficient national capacity. This funding will improve reception capacity, processing capacity, screening and registration capacity, as well as support border management activities. Funding should, when appropriate, be complemented by other operational activities such as the assistance offered by EASO and Frontex. Contingency planning and Crisis Management (under 5.3) play an important role in this regard. Countries particularly affected by an influx of migrants and asylum seekers may also request assistance as appropriate from the European Civil Protection Mechanism (EUCPM).26 5.2 Making use of the financial incentives offered by the future AMF, Member States should voluntarily commit to more intra-EU relocation of beneficiaries of international protection. EASO should play a coordination role in intra-EU relocation to make it faster and more efficient. Member States with a low migration pressure are particularly encouraged to show solidarity in this manner. International Organisations, such as UNHCR and IOM, can play an important role in this field. 5.3 Contingency planning and crisis management efforts at EU level should continue and should be broadened with the aim of taking action to build solid asylum and migration systems in Member States. These 22 In the longer term the satellite navigation system Galileo and the augmentation system Egnos (European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service) could also contribute to enhance the situational picture in the Mediterranean. 23 Signed in April 2013. 24 To be signed in early 2014. 25 Member States’ national programmes for the MFF 2014–2020, soon to be prepared and submitted, should also clearly reflect such priorities so that the necessary funding can be mobilised once the respective financing mechanisms are operational. 26 The Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) from DG ECHO facilitates the voluntary contributions in-kind or in skilled advice of experts from 32 Participating States to the Mechanism, including the EU Member States. Because of the voluntary nature of the EUCPM, it may only be regarded as a short-term stop-gap solution. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [17-03-2014 12:47] Job: 036016 Unit: PG06

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efforts should be based on an assessment done on the basis of the forecasts of trends analyses and other ad hoc statistical and analytical reports produced by EASO, Frontex, FRA and other organisation such as UNCHR, IOM and other actors and should be coordinated also with the EUCPM. In developing these contingency efforts, the Commission should include assessment reports on the situation in countries of origin, integrating as much as possible components of security, border management and migration flows.27 In order to make efficient contingency planning possible, Member States should provide data to EUROSTAT, EASO, Frontex and other relevant actors without delay, and should be ready to support additional data requirements that might be necessary for this purpose. 5.4 EASO should set up a first project on supported processing of asylum applications in Member States. This would allow a quicker and more efficient processing of asylum applications, relieving the asylum system of the responsible Member State without shifting responsibility for the examination of the asylum application and in full respect of the nationally applicable legal framework.

Printed in the United Kingdom by The Stationery Office Limited 03/2014 036016 19585 27 Mechanisms that might be considered could include the IOM Migration Crisis Operational Framework (MCOF) and the Migration Task Force on for the East African Migratory Route and North Africa. PEFC/16-33-622