HowMa did the coalition workn as a government?agi Robert Hazell andn Peter Wallerg review its internalt workingsh ande effectiveness, c while Jonathano Oatesali and William Wallacet reflecti on aspectson of how Liberal Democrats functioned as part of it, and Matthew Hanney analyses how the party itself was managed.

The Lib Dems and the workings of government: success or failure? Professor Robert Hazell and Peter Waller he Constitution Unit at detail not so much at the political I was not at all sure how the UCL carries out research success – or otherwise – of the coa- coalition would work or even into a wide range of politi- lition but at how it was operating in whether it would work. But it T 1 cal issues, largely focused on West- practice. has been far better than anyone minster and Whitehall and the links So what did we learn from that would have expected. between the two. Immediately research? The first thing to say is after the 2010 election, we were that the vast majority of those we One Tory minister commented to given permission by the then cabi- interviewed thought that the coali- us: net secretary to interview in depth tion was working well. This was the a wide range of Whitehall offi- general verdict not only of ministers Team work is stronger because cials, ministers and special advisers from both coalition parties but also of the coalition. The fact that to consider how the coalition was from Whitehall officials and various we had to discuss what we operating in practice. We were very third parties. One comment from a wanted to do, what the other well placed, therefore, to look in senior official was typical: party wished to do – or indeed

46 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 HowMa did the coalition workn as a government?agi Robert Hazell andn Peter Wallerg review its internalt workingsh ande effectiveness, c while Jonathano Oatesali and William Wallacet reflecti on aspectson of how Liberal Democrats functioned as part of it, and Matthew Hanney analyses how the party itself was managed.

whether there were other One aspect before their narrow party Lib Dems, it is tempting to think options – made it much better. interests. that we must have been deceiving of that which • The fact that there was a coali- ourselves in painting such a posi- And a Lib Dem minister told us: tion meant that Whitehall had tive picture of the coalition’s first has been to change many of its inter- twenty months. But we do not The team of ministers in our nal rules and practices – and think that we were deceived. The department works together well little com- in practice this meant moving first two years of the coalition were on a day-to-day basis in a con- back towards a more rational by any standards a period of con- structive spirit … the good rela- mented on form of decision-making. Sofa siderable success. The programme tionship is at the heart of how it government and pre-cooked for government – which our work is all working. – but which deals were replaced by more suggested contained more Lib Dem stands to the formal committee discus- manifesto commitments than were As we dug deeper into the reasons sions and much bending over drawn from the Tory manifesto – why the story was so positive, we Liberal Dem- backwards to ensure that the was a very ambitious document but isolated a number of factors: perspectives of both parties in almost all its proposals had been • Prior expectations – especially ocrats’ credit the coalition were recognised. implemented by 2012. Government from civil servants – of the The fact that the programme was as crisis-free as governments coalition were that it would – is the fact for government was a detailed, ever can be and there was a good be unstable, fractious and con- practical document and had degree of respect amongst both stantly slowed down by inter- that the Lib replaced the woolly aspirations parties for each other and their role nal disputes. Many officials of the typical party manifestos, in making the coalition work. The had lived through the infight- Dem min- gave Whitehall much greater fact that the 2015 voters re-elected ing of the Labour govern- clarity from the new govern- the majority coalition partner to ment, especially between the isters, and ment than they had been used govern on its own suggested they Blairites and the Brownites, to. Special machinery was set were far from dissatisfied with the and assumed a coalition would cabinet min- up to resolve disputes between performance of the government in be even worse. The fact that the parties but in practice sel- the preceding five years. it was harmonious came as an isters in par- dom had to be used. One aspect of that which has enormous relief. • The coalition felt, both in been little commented on – but • Both political partners felt ticular, were Whitehall and Westminster, which stands to the Liberal Demo- proud of their role in forming more ‘grown-up’ in that it was crats’ credit – is the fact that the Lib the coalition and were deter- clearly of impossible to claim, as single- Dem ministers, and cabinet min- mined to make it a success. The equal calibre party governments often do, isters in particular, were clearly of Tories were delighted to have that there was only one pos- equal calibre to their Tory part- found a way back into govern- to their Tory sible answer to any question. ners. Yet this was certainly not ment even though they lacked The principle of collective a given. As in most professions a majority; and were clearly partners. responsibility remained so that – and politics is a legitimate pro- patting themselves on the back decisions, once taken, were fession in this context – the cream at their magnanimity in shar- supported by both parties. But tends to rise to the top so it might ing power. The Lib Dems were no one was pretending that be expected that the most capable delighted simply to be in gov- there had not had to be com- and ambitious politicians would ernment, and they were deter- promises in reaching an agreed be found in the parties most likely mined to show that a coalition position. to be in government. For a small was a perfectly viable basis Our research was concluded at the party to have people of sufficient for exercising political power. beginning of 2012, less than two calibre to fill twenty-three min- Both parties could claim with years into the new government. So isterial posts, including five cabi- good cause that they were writing now in 2015, in the after- net ministers, was thus a genuine putting the national interest math of a nightmare election for the stretch. But at no point in the five

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 47 managing the coalition years of the coalition was it argued First, was the original decision The prob- Tories rather successfully presented in Whitehall, the media or else- to spread the Lib Dem ministerial themselves as still being very much where that the Lib Dems lacked the allocation thinly the right one? lem that cre- in power but on many fronts being necessary talent. Looking back, it Conventional academic wisdom held back by a failure by the Lib seems already that a team includ- from across many democracies ated for the Dems to agree to anything they ing Clegg, Cable, Huhne, Davey, is that the junior coalition part- were proposing. The obvious Lib Alexander, Laws and Webb will be ner does badly in the subsequent Lib Dems, Dem successes seemed to date back seen as something of a golden age election. But could the Lib Dems’ to much earlier in the parliament, for the party. chances of success have been however, and there was no similar sense of a So starting from that benign improved by taking all the min- Lib Dem agenda being obstructed picture at the end of 2011, why did isterial seats in a limited number was that by the Tories – apart from the high- it all go so horribly wrong in 2015, of departments, rather than hav- profile examples of the AV ref- with all but Clegg of that genera- ing a single minister in almost all they came erendum defeat, and withdrawal tion of leaders swept away by the departments? Under this scenario increasingly of the plans for Lords reform fol- electorate? Well, from the admit- might have become lowing a major rebellion by Tory tedly narrow perspective of our Home Secretary or Education Sec- to be seen backbenchers. focus on Whitehall, it arguably retary, and the department clearly But generating new policy ideas never did go wrong. Against so identified as a Lib Dem depart- as ‘in office in government is never easy, and it many of the expectations of the ment. The Lib Dems would have was particularly difficult for the Lib political commentariat in 2010, the been able to point to achieve- but not in Dems, given how thinly stretched coalition survived for a full five- ments in that area as clear Lib Dem they were across all government year term, and would have done achievements, making it harder for power’. The departments. Outnumbered by the so even without the backing of the Tories in 2015 to present most Tories by a ratio of five to one, they the Fixed Term Parliaments Act successful Lib Dem ideas as Tory Tories rather were forced to devote far more of of 2011. There were no great sto- achievements. their time and energy to blocking ries of chaos in Whitehall or of the Second, did the Lib Dems give successfully or modifying Tory policies than ministerial corridors degenerating up on government – and start cam- to generating their own. There is a into trench warfare. Liberal Dem- paigning for 2015 – too soon? It was presented long list of Tory policies that they ocrat ministers maintained com- certainly predictable from day one managed to moderate, but which mendable discipline. When there of the coalition that at some point themselves inevitably remained hidden from were stories of ministerial splits, the two parties involved would the electorate; and it is very diffi- they were mainly ‘blue on blue’, move from emphasising their abil- as still being cult to claim credit for something as demonstrated by the tensions ity to cooperate constructively that has not happened. between Ken Clarke and Theresa towards wanting to demonstrate to very much Moreover, the Lib Dems were May, or later the very public spat the electorate the issues on which in power arguably a victim of the coalition’s between Theresa May and Michael they disagreed. So there was bound overall success. By 2015, the per- Gove. to come a point where the two par- but on many ception – at least in England – was So most of the explanations ties would be reluctant to make that the country had been effec- of the 2015 election result lie else- decisions unless they were una- fronts being tively managed by the govern- where. The most obvious White- voidable, preferring to use points ment and was recovering steadily hall-focused example, which of disagreement as potential distin- held back by from the earlier recession. There we did cover to a degree in our guishing features between them in was no sense of the chaos and con- research, was the great student fees an election campaign. a failure by stant crisis that had characterised disaster, which led one of our inter- With the benefit of hindsight, the final few years of the previous viewees to say: however, that point arrived much the Lib Dems Labour government, during which earlier in the parliament than we Gordon Brown had been repeat- Whether or not it was the right had anticipated. By 2011–12, the to agree to edly attacked by his own cabinet decision we came to in the end programme for government had colleagues and ministers. The Lib is almost irrelevant. You know, largely been implemented and it anything Dems might ironically have done we broke a pledge, we’re hated was expected that there would be better in the 2015 election if there for it. another negotiation and a new pro- they were had been more internal strife in gramme announced for the second government so that the country But, as the comment makes clear, it half of the parliament, sometime proposing. was much keener for a change of was the pre-election pledge that did in 2012. Some attempts were made government overall and the Tories the damage, not the handling of the in that direction, but the two par- more vulnerable as a result. issue when in government – though ties never managed to recreate the This leads to our final assess- the Lib Dem failure to identify and momentum that had been given ment. In 2010, the Lib Dems had stick to a single narrative for the by the original programme for in reality only two choices, first to final decision undoubtedly exacer- government. Instead both parties form a coalition with the Tories bated the position.2 began increasingly to focus on their and second to let the Tories form But there are two Whitehall- points of difference more than their a minority government and to focused questions which it is worth common ground. seek to bring it down at a later raising in relation to the internal The problem that created for point. (We continue to believe workings of the coalition as they the Lib Dems, however, was that that a Labour–Lib Dem coalition might have had some impact on the they came increasingly to be seen was never a credible option at the 2015 outcome even if marginal. as ‘in office but not in power’.3 The time.)

48 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 managing the coalition

It was entirely predictable – and Imbalances of power: building a functioning was of course widely predicted – that the decision to enter the coali- coalition tion would lead to a bad result for the Jonathan Oates party in 2015, even if no one quite predicted how bad that outcome n Tuesday 12 May 2010, civil service had dealt with ‘Dep- might be. But there is little point in Nick Clegg and David uty Prime Ministers’ before – most a serious political party not seeking OCameron posed on the recently John Prescott and Michael power and little reason to think that doorstep of No. 10, co-leaders of Heseltine: they had been depart- the long-term outcome for the party the first peacetime coalition in sev- mental ministers and the title would have been any better had they enty years. For the first time in ‘Deputy Prime Minister’ a mere declined Cameron’s offer and waited half a century the government’s (if politically important) courtesy. for another opportunity. majority was dependent on two The role of Deputy Prime Minister So the decision to enter the coa- leaders in government, not one. in a coalition was a different affair. lition was entirely justified even if Notwithstanding the disparity in Every significant decision over the the result was to reduce the party parliamentary representation – 307 next five years would have to be to a level of Westminster represen- Conservative seats versus 57 Lib- jointly agreed by both leaders. Yet tation they have not had for fifty eral Democrat, the government’s there was a staggering failure to years. The Lib Dems were part of majority was now a binary matter. understand this, represented most five years of a coherent and com- If either of the parties did not agree starkly by the huge disparity in offi- petent government and can point to a policy, the government did not cial and political fire power in their to achievements that were distinc- have a majority for it. respective offices. tively Lib Dem achievements. The Yet behind the famous black Later that day, or the following, judgement of the electorate was door of No. 10, the institutions of the DPM got his first civil servant. harsh; the judgement of history government seemed almost oblivi- Sir Gus O’Donnell, then cabinet may prove kinder. The Lib Dems ous to this fact or to the respective secretary, seconded his principal strength of support for the parties private secretary to head up the Professor Robert Hazell is Profes- were part of in the country, where – of the total then non-existent Deputy Prime sor of Government and the Constitu- votes cast for the coalition parties – Minister’s Office. He was a highly tion at University College London, and five years of the Liberal Democrats had attracted able and dedicated civil serv- Director of the Constitution Unit in the 40 per cent and the Conservatives ant, who over the next few years School of Public Policy. The Unit has a coherent 60 per cent. worked with exceptional profes- published detailed reports on every aspect Despite briefings to the national sionalism and determination to of Britain’s constitutional reform pro- and compe- media about the preparedness of support the Deputy Prime Min- gramme. In 2011 he led a research team, tent govern- Whitehall for a hung parliament, ister, but he was in his early thir- including Peter Waller and Ben Yong, to no real thought had been given ties and massively outranked by his study how the UK’s new coalition gov- ment and even to such a mundane matter as No. 10 counterpart, the 50-year- ernment worked. Their book, The Pol- where the Deputy Prime Minister old Jeremy Heywood. Jeremy held itics of Coalition (Hart Publishing), can point would be located, let alone how his permanent secretary rank in the was published in June 2012. The same office would be staffed or how the Prime Minister’s Office and was a team then produced Special Advisers: to achieve- machinery of government would notable survivor of the inner cir- Who they are, what they do, and adapt. The truth is that for much of cle of previous administrations. He why they matter in 2014. ments that the civil service (but by no means had been Gordon Brown’s perma- all), the view seemed to be – as little nent secretary before taking on the Peter Waller left the civil service in 2008, were distinc- as possible. role for Cameron. He had also been having worked on a wide range of eco- As the door was pulled shut principal private secretary to Prime nomic issues over thirty years, largely at tively Lib behind the two party leaders, the Minister Tony Blair and before that the DTI. Peter was heavily involved in No. 10 operation hummed effi- to Tory chancellors of the excheq- the coalition government project, and the Dem achieve- ciently and immediately into uer, Norman Lamont and Kenneth project on special advisers, both of which action in support of the leader of Clarke. He was (of course) to go on led to published books to which he was a ments. The the Conservative Party. Mean- to be cabinet secretary – in short he significant contributor. while, his coalition counterpart was the Whitehall insiders’ insider. judgement was hastily ushered upstairs to You did not have to be an expert 1 Our research was published in one of the Downing Street state- in the politics of the civil service to a book, The Politics of Coalition, of the elec- rooms; with him, his then chief know that this imbalance between by Robert Hazell and Ben Yong torate was of staff (soon to be Scotland Sec- the PM and the DPM’s offices was (Hart Publishing, 2012): http:// retary), Danny Alexander and a massively to the DPM’s disadvan- www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/ harsh; the few members of party staff. There tage and that of effective coalition constitution-unit-news/080612 were no telephones, no computers, working. 2 Though a single narrative would judgement no support whatsoever – just a cup Over the next few months we never have been easy when the party of tea and a polite but bewildered became increasingly frustrated MPs managed to vote in three differ- of history welcome. by the lack of institutional sup- ent blocks in the Commons vote. Perhaps the problem was that, port for the DPM, which left our 3 A quote originally from Nor- may prove prior to 2010, the term ‘Deputy small team of special advisers not man Lamont about the Major Prime Minister’ had been used in only covering the whole gamut of government. kinder. a wholly different context. The government departments but also

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 49 managing the coalition having to do the jobs of officials office if the coalition was to func- the first year of the coalition. The who had not yet been appointed. tion effectively. The most urgent responsibility for those decisions It is worth remembering that at requirement was to appoint a senior is entirely with those of us who this stage the Deputy Prime Min- Whitehall insider to head up Nick’s were involved in making them. ister’s Office had a total of four spe- operation. We needed an opera- What is clear, however, is that the cial advisers responsible for policy, tor who could command not only environment in which they were who had to cover decisions across the respect of Whitehall depart- taken could hardly have been less every government department, as ments but also, where necessary, auspicious. well as supporting the DPM with their fear and who would have the It is difficult to know why the his specific responsibilities on con- weight to win the staff resources civil service was so insufficiently stitutional reform. Despite the we needed. Securing agreement prepared for the operation of a deluge of media attention, at the to this appointment and a broader coalition government. We took outset, the DPM had no civil ser- strengthening of the operation advantage of the knowledge and vice media team, no visits staff, and was a painful and drawn-out pro- experience of Jim Wallace, the for- only one supporting cess that ran through to the late mer Liberal Democrat deputy first him directly on media. No. 10 had Despite brief- autumn. One of the early chal- minister of Scotland (later advo- a whole press office that answered lenges was that no one would ever cate general and deputy leader of to the PM. ings to the say no to a proposal – it took me a the House of Lords) who provided These problems were only com- short while to realise that this did invaluable insight to our team prior pounded by the fact that the Liberal national not mean yes. But before long I had to the formation of the coalition Democrats immediately lost their appreciated that if I was to get any- and as a minister throughout the ‘Short money’ allocation, which media about thing done I had to understand the government. Whitehall could also had provided substantial financial TV programme Yes Minister as a have learnt much about coalitions support for the party’s parliamen- the prepar- documentary rather than a comedy. from their counterparts in Edin- tary policy team. Consequently, Inevitably, the pressure on both burgh and Cardiff, but such experi- we were stuck between a rock and edness of political and permanent civil serv- ence was, it seems, rather airily and a hard place, shut out of access to ants caused by the lack of staff sometimes disparagingly dismissed. the funds available to opposition Whitehall for resource, coupled with the desire Instead the preparation for the parties and denied proper political amongst some of the senior civil post-election period was focused support and access to civil service a hung par- service to avoid ‘a rival to No. 10’, on the role the civil service would information. created the worst possible circum- play in coalition negotiations (a job By the time I became Nick liament, no stances in which to take the criti- that the parties rightly decided was Clegg’s chief of staff in August, a cal decisions required at the start of one for them). As a result the actual modest civil service staff had been real thought the coalition. The special advisers job of the civil service – how it assembled. That it was too small had been and permanent civil servants who would support an elected coalition for the task was obvious but by no manned Nick’s office, did an amaz- administration – was damagingly means the biggest problem. It had given even to ing job and it is only due to their neglected and never really resolved. become clear by then that large huge dedication and the absurdly All this is not intended as a criti- parts of the civil service had hardly such a mun- long hours that they worked, that cism of individual civil servants. adapted to coalition at all and the coalition was able to function With a very few exceptions, the showed no signs of ever doing so. dane mat- at all. vast majority of people I worked Some senior civil servants appeared By January of 2011, we had sub- with were not only highly able, but incapable of understanding that if ter as where stantially strengthened the DPMO also extraordinarily hard work- a decision did not have clearance with a widely respected director ing and committed to delivering from both parties in government the Deputy general appointed to oversee the for the coalition. I do not write that it was not a decision. Some depart- operation, a beefed up and highly to spare anyone’s blushes or to sof- ments sought to obstruct access to Prime Min- able private office in place and the ten the criticism. I do so because information, sometimes with the establishment of a research and it is true and because, in the main, support of their secretaries of state. ister would analysis unit and a media team. Our the failure was one of institutional Decisions were announced that had political staff, however remained inertia and conservatism not of not been cleared. On one memora- be located, highly stretched and it was not individual will. The more I came to ble occasion, while discussing the until October of 2011, after a Her- see of the institution of the civil ser- infamous Beecroft ‘fire-at-will’ let alone culean struggle aided by a very vice, the more I realised how much proposals, a senior civil servant how his helpful report from the Institute for less it was than the sum of its parts. responded to my suggestion that Government, that we gained agree- I hope that the lessons of the last we drop further discussion – given office would ment for the appointment of a num- parliament lead to much better sup- there was no prospect of the pro- ber of multi-departmental special port for any future coalition from posal being agreed by the Deputy be staffed advisers. Whilst this eased the bur- its outset. But whether in support of Prime Minister – by saying: ‘Quite den a little, by then, the political die a coalition or a single party admin- frankly the Deputy Prime Minister or how the had probably been cast. istration, it is also critical that the does not have a veto’. I had to point Of course, even with a properly senior civil service (often aided by out to him gently that this Deputy machinery of resourced office and a political staff ministers) stops resisting necessary, Prime Minister very definitely did. who were not stretched beyond the radical and much overdue reform. It was clear to us early on that government laws of physics, there is no guaran- Only when it embraces reform will we urgently needed to strengthen tee that we would have made bet- the institution become as excel- the official and political side of our would adapt. ter or even different decisions in lent, effective and innovative as so

50 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 managing the coalition many of the brilliant individuals it deputy director of communications at It had through papers, and lost their abil- employs. 10 Downing Street and prior to that ity to strike a balance between coa- the Liberal Democrats’ director of elec- become lition and Conservative messages. Jonathan Oates was chief of staff to the tion communications for the 2010 general We wrestled with that balance, Deputy Prime Minister from August election. He was ennobled in the 2015 clear by then of course, having to ask Lib Dem 2010 to May 2015. He was previously dissolution honours. peers to support compromises that that large we had struck, painfully, behind the scenes. We also maintained the parts of the same party whips from our time in opposition, to hold our inde- A view from the edge: managing coalition civil service pendently minded group together; had hardly the Conservatives imitated us two in departments without full ministerial years later, as they discovered the representation adapted to difficulties of explaining coalition compromises to partisan peers. William Wallace coalition Neither Westminster nor ords ministers play sec- in my life as I did between 2010 and Whitehall adapted at all will- ondary roles in any govern- 2015. When you have got your head at all and ingly to coalition. In the Lords the Lment; ‘ministers in the Lords round the statement you have to Labour group was aggressively Whips Office’, who act as spokes- make at twenty-four hours’ notice, showed no tribal, bitterly convinced through- men for two to three departments and the draft paper you received on out the first year that we could not and are formally also whips, risk Friday afternoon and have to nego- signs of ever hold together, doing their utmost being marginal to policy-making, tiate with Conservative colleagues to prevent us from deviating an even in a single-party government. on Monday morning, there’s the doing so. inch from the duty ‘to speak for So my view of coalition was from journalist who phones you late the government’ as a whole, and the edge of government, work- at night and the outraged Lib Some senior protesting on any occasion that a ing my way in by demonstrating to Dem activist (and old friend) who distinct Liberal Democrat perspec- senior Conservatives that disputes demands that you explain why you civil servants tive was spelt out alongside the could be settled by talking to me have conceded to a Conservative Conservative view. We managed more easily than by carrying eve- proposal. In opposition you can appeared to develop a dual system, with Lib- rything up to the ‘Quad’. I started think; in government, you cope. eral Democrat ministers giving the in 2010 in the Foreign Office, my Since managing coalition means incapable of government line and nominated field of professional expertise, extra work and extra meetings, understand- backbench spokesmen giving a dif- where I was treated as a member of it became clear to Lindsay Nor- ferentiated party line. Backbench the ministerial team from the out- thover and me, after a few weeks ing that if rebellions were a tactic we could set; but I also covered the Ministry in office, that we could not cope use occasionally – at the risk of of Defence and, after a brief attach- with the pressures of Lords busi- a decision provoking Conservative rebel- ment to Education, the police and ness, learning our briefs, trying to lions against measures we had won; counter-terrorism aspects of the get upstream in the policy-making did not have though of course there was no way (the ‘national secu- process in the departments to which we could control our backbench- rity agenda’). When the mid-term we were attached, and keeping in clearance ers in the last resort! I learned over reshuffle came in 2012, I had just touch with our Liberal ministerial time how to modulate the way I put been made Lords spokesman for colleagues and the rest of our peers’ from both the coalition line across when at the the Cabinet Office – the only peer group. We asked for an additional despatch box or on the media, to attending their ministerial meet- two spokesmen, and gained one in parties in convey different degrees of enthusi- ings, so responsible for managing Sue Garden. Coalition formation asm or reservation. all the CO’s business (civil service had put Commons appointments government Learning coalition inside gov- management, the third sector, and first, so the three of us were unpaid, ernment was also painful, within political and constitutional reform) as were several of our Conservative it was not a a structure unused to institutional through the Lords. Nick Clegg Lords colleagues. compromises. Whitehall expected complimented me on how well I The best immediate decision decision. most incoming Liberal Democrats was coping, and asked me to carry our Lords group took was to main- to behave as junior ministers under on without a Commons minister tain our separate whips’ office when their secretaries of state – and most from now on in either the FCO we lost our opposition funding; secretaries of state wanted to take or the MoD. I said I could in no many of us made voluntary con- credit for everything positive that way manage to be the only Liberal tributions to keep it going in the came out of their department. Nick Democrat presence in three depart- early months, before we shaped a Harvey in Defence was clear from ments effectively, and recom- system of monthly contributions the outset that he was the Lib Dem mended that Sue Garden succeed from group members to fund it. minister, and fought to be shown me in Defence, given her familiar- The Conservatives closed their departmental papers across the ity with forces’ welfare and RAF party whips office and relied on the board. Jeremy Browne accepted his issues. Government Whips Office for sup- role as a junior FCO minister with- Government is high-pressure, port – but discovered that they had out understanding that his role was seven days a week; and coalition to struggle over weekends to keep also to safeguard Lib Dem interests, government increases the pres- in contact with their backbench- plunged into visits to Latin Amer- sure. I have never worked as hard ers at the same time as reading ica and Asia, and did not follow

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 51 managing the coalition papers on Europe and the Middle is the Conservative Party, with the The unsta- Danny Alexander sitting round East – the two most contentious Prime Minister wavering in the our kitchen table in Wandsworth areas between the parties on foreign middle, was both a problem and an ble coalition discussing how we prevent such a policy. It took me, as a marginal opportunity. With some Conserva- fiasco happening again. I learned player of uncertain status with- tive ministers we could work and that is the from this that using the media out an FCO private office, several exchange information easily, even to signal to your partners can be months to gain access to the drafts establish relations of friendship and Conserva- helpful; a Conservative colleague on the proposed EU bill, by which mutual trust. With others, active phoned me shortly after I had been time they were already in a shape suspicion of their intentions was tive Party, on TV, to discuss how to get out of that was difficult to challenge. the only sensible approach, even the hole the PM had dug. It didn’t Chris Huhne had nominated me when (like Michael Gove) person- with the hurt that he and other Conserva- for the Cabinet Sub-Committee on ally charming; Lindsay Northover Prime Min- tives learned that I had come close EU Affairs, which helped my cred- warned us all from the outset to be to resigning over this – only a mar- ibility and standing with officials wary of attempts to charm us while ister waver- ginal resignation, but nevertheless and Conservative ministers; an pressing forward with initiatives one that they understood would early visit to Brussels, during which which we could not accept. ing in the have registered Liberal Democrat the president of the Commission Coalition also requires active disapproval of the PM’s behaviour. addressed me as ‘Professor Wallace’ coordination. We failed to achieve middle, was The coalition agreement had in front of several Conservative this throughout the first year, with included, at Conservative insist- ministers, also helped (I had taught only occasional meetings of Liberal both a prob- ence, a commitment to exam- him twenty years earlier). It helped Democrat ministers. I went into ine the ‘balance of competences’ me further within the FCO that one cabinet committee meeting lem and an between the UK and the EU, Helen, my wife, had trained many with a clear sense of what our ‘side’ across a wide range of policy areas. of its senior officials when they first wanted to get across, only to have opportunity. They expected that a call for evi- entered the civil service, had taught that position undermined by a Lib dence from businesses, professional senior politicians and officials in Dem colleague uncritically reading With some associations and other stakehold- several other EU countries, and was out the departmental brief. After a ers would provide an agenda for recognised as one of the leading year we instituted regular weekly Conserva- repatriating powers from Brussels experts on European politics; there meetings – the cost of yet another to Westminster. I was the Liberal was one wonderful occasion when hour blocked out in our calendars tive minis- Democrat, with two Conserva- I was asked to phone the Finnish more than compensated for by the tive colleagues, on the ‘Ministerial prime minister (whom we had both chance to compare notes and share ters we could Star Chamber’ that oversaw a pro- taught) on behalf of No. 10. Nick tactics. We also learned in the first work and cess that produced some thirty-two Clegg strengthened my position year how crucial our Spads were: papers, in four groups, over two further by taking me with him on glancing through papers that might exchange years. The evidence that flowed visits to Paris and Berlin. not have crossed our desks, alert- in was overwhelmingly in favour William Hague was a collegiate ing us to policy initiatives before informa- of maintaining the current bal- secretary of state, who conducted we had heard about them, marking ance, even in a few cases of giv- his weekly meetings as an open their Conservative opposite num- tion easily, ing Brussels greater powers. No. discussion, in which I could flag bers as they advised their ministers. 10 responded by doing its best to up areas that our party found dif- We needed more than the handful even estab- bury the exercise, delaying the ficult. Theresa May was a tougher who, like the three of us as Lords publication of each group until the minister to deal with, but open to spokesmen, were stretched across lish relations day after parliament had risen for argument. I learned to place myself two to three departments each – the summer or for Christmas, and in her meetings directly in her line and gained useful reinforcements in of friend- doing its best to stop any of us brief- of sight, so that I could catch her the 2012 reshuffle. ing the domestic press. eye easily when I wanted to disa- Cameron’s mishandling of the ship and The officials who supported us gree; Lynne Featherstone often sat European Council meeting in were effectively professional and out of view at the side. Liam Fox December 2011 was a major cri- mutual trust. neutral throughout a politically was far easier to deal with than sis within the coalition – not only charged process, in which the paper Philip Hammond, his MoD suc- because Europe was one of the most With oth- on the free movement of people cessor, a loner who treated all his sensitive sources of disagreement. was delayed by over six months as junior ministers with disdain; The Prime Minister represents ers, active we fought Theresa May’s Spads to when Sue Garden succeeded me as the UK at these; but in a coalition suspicion of allow the document to reflect the Lords spokesman, it took her nearly he should have the wit to consult, evidence, and the first draft of the two months to get in to meet him. and the diplomatic skills to avoid their inten- paper on civil justice attempted When he transferred to the FCO excessively irritating his continen- a strong Eurosceptic tone unsup- he cancelled the weekly ministerial tal counterparts. Monica Allen, tions was the ported by any of the legal authori- meetings, to the dismay of Conser- our international affairs Spad, ties who had contributed. Lib Dem vatives as well as myself; I met him briefed me initially; Nick Clegg only sensible Spads watched my back in other only three times in his nine months then persuaded me, against my ini- departments effectively, and Helen as Foreign Secretary, though I con- tial inclinations as a bitterly dis- approach … provided expert advice; I circulated tinued to meet , pleased but junior player, to go on a critical memo around Whitehall the Europe minister, every week, television to voice our unease with before each negotiating meeting, and other junior ministers fre- Cameron’s behaviour; and Helen at the cost of several lost weekends, quently. The unstable coalition that and I ended the weekend with to spell out the areas where drafts

52 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 managing the coalition were not following the evidence on defence, in particular on the told us was how difficult it is for submitted. So the Conservatives Trident review. That was a dispir- the smaller partner in a coalition were left without an agenda for iting experience: I met with inde- to avoid that fate. In the fifth year repatriation. But the Liberal Dem- cision and unwillingness to play we should have paid more atten- ocrats did not attempt to counter multi-party politics. ‘We’re still tion to spelling out the underlying Conservative efforts to keep the discussing that’, or ‘the shadow differences between the coali- outcome out of the press; it was cabinet can’t agree’ were two of tion partners – in the hope that a not until the middle of the election the responses I got to suggestions largely hostile media might help campaign that The Observer devoted that Labour might like to give sup- us to get that message across. We a full page to the story. port to positions Liberal Democrats were locked in for too long to the There was no such formal pro- were pressing. mindset that we had to prove that cess to manage differences on Mid- We should have been spelling coalition can work, rather than dle Eastern policy. William Hague out the distinctiveness of the Lib- demonstrating how two differ- was robust on Israel–Palestine, eral Democrat philosophy that lay ent parties can negotiate. But the spelling out that the spread of set- behind the policies we were press- weight of scepticism from so much tlements across the West Bank ing – but that’s not easy to do in of the media, as well as the Labour would soon make a two-state nego- government, outside of party con- opposition, even after four years of tiation impossible. His colleagues ference speeches. Cameron him- coalition, still held us back. pursued closer political and com- self, and his No. 10 office, gave the mercial relations with the Sunni coalition little sense of direction. William Wallace (Lord Wallace of Gulf states, pushing arms sales and He seemed to be concerned with Saltaire) was a government whip and inviting further investment in the party management, letting oth- spokesman in the Lords from 2010 to UK. The National Security Coun- ers compete in defining the direc- 2015; from 2012 to 2015 he was the only cil spent more time in the coali- tion of policy. The hard truth may Liberal Democrat in the FCO and deal- tion’s first three years discussing be the message that we heard from ing with the departmental business of ‘Gulf strategy’ than European strat- our continental Liberal counter- the Cabinet Office. He was professor egy. Nick Clegg asked an informal parts, when after the first year we on international relations at the Lon- group of MPs and peers to review were invited to a seminar on how, don School of Economics until 2005; and policy towards to provide as the junior partner in a coalition, had earlier led the manifesto drafting him with advice; we met a range to avoid getting most of the blame group for both the 1979 and 1997 general of outside experts, and recom- and little of the credit. What they elections. mended that we should press for a more positive approach. Cameron later moved policy towards a more Israel-friendly approach, while Cameron maintaining an uncritical alliance How did the Liberal Democrats remain with the Gulf monarchies, accept- himself, and ing the Bahraini offer to pay for the united in the 2010–2015 parliament? And expansion of the British naval base his No. 10 were they right to? and agreeing to investigate (and potentially ban) the British affili- office, gave Matthew Hanney ates of the Muslim Brotherhood in response to a request from a Gulf the coalition hen the Liberal Dem- the final eight consecutive quar- prince. Saeeda Warsi’s resignation ocrats entered the coa- ters.3 Aside from the occasional was a response to that shift. But little sense Wlition government in squall from semi-detached peers, for Liberal Democrats, without a May 2015 predictions abounded and the ham-fisted and short- minister in Defence and with only of direction. that the party would not, and lived attempted coup against Nick myself monitoring developments indeed could not, last the course.1 Clegg’s leadership after the 2014 from within the FCO, our influ- He seemed to Many expected the party to split, elections, there was little open dis- ence was limited. or at least see a wave of high profile sent across the party over the five Could we have done more? be concerned defections. The precedents of 1886, years. Despite consistently poor Undoubtedly we could have played 1916 and 1931 offered historical bal- mid-term election results, there harder on occasions, and briefed with party last to this expectation. In short, was no serious attempt to suggest the press more aggressively. I cul- the expected strains of delivering leaving the coalition, and staying tivated some journalists for back- manage- significant austerity in conjunction in the government remained the ground briefings; but most weren’t ment, let- with the pressures junior parties in clear view of the party through- interested in the arcane policy areas coalition inevitably face, especially out.4 There were five main reasons I worked in. The balance between ting others in FPTP electoral systems, threat- this happened: the collective nature keeping the coalition together and ened to pull the party asunder. of the decision to enter govern- demonstrating our distinctiveness compete in Yet the Liberal Democrats ment, the economic circumstances was never easy to strike; both press entered the 2015 general election as of 2010, the policy achievements in and Labour were always looking defining the a united party. Over the five years government, the belief during the for signs that the coalition might no parliamentarian had defected to parliament that the 2015 election fail. I also tried to brief Miliband’s direction of another party;2 and whilst mem- could see a successful defence of a advisers from time to time about bership fell in the first few years majority of the constituencies, and coalition policies on Europe and policy. of the parliament, it increased for Nick Clegg’s leadership style.

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 53 managing the coalition

The first, and most significant it would be wise to have a special coalition with the Conservatives, factor, was the collective decision- conference anyway. from Labour and had taken diffi- making process that the party This was a crucial decision. And cult and often unpopular decisions engaged in before it entered the one for which those who pushed to clear up the financial mess their coalition. As leader and party presi- for it should take a considerable Labour predecessors left. dent, Nick Clegg and Ros Scott amount of credit. Equally impor- The party’s support for the fiscal ensured that this process not only tant was the decision that confer- mandate was tested twice at confer- adhered to the party’s then agreed ence debate the coalition agreement ence. The first time was at autumn procedure – the so called ‘triple- on a take it or leave it basis with conference 2012 when an amend- lock’ – but went beyond it. tricky issues, most notably tuition ment calling for the party to quit The background to this lay fees, being addressed in amend- the coalition’s agreed fiscal mandate with the choice of the negotiating ments to the motion for debate was overwhelmingly defeated.10 team of Danny Alexander, David rather than the agreement itself.6 The second time was a more closely Laws, Andrew Stunell and Chris The party After a full debate, with opponents contested vote with Nick Clegg Huhne. Whilst they regrettably of the agreement given a fair chance himself summating a motion and lacked demographic diversity, they had collec- to make their case – with rather seeing off amendments from the did represent a cross-section of the memorable props in Linda Jack’s Social Liberal Forum which sought party’s ideological spectrum. They tively agreed case7 – the special conference gave to unpick, albeit it with more also had between them experience an overwhelming endorsement8 of nuance than the amendment a year of negotiating the Labour–Liberal to enter the the coalition agreement. This rep- earlier, the fiscal mandate. The vote Democrat coalition in Scotland, resented a collective ‘dipping of was closer than previously, but numerous local government agree- government the hands in the blood’. The party still represented a clear win for the ments and extensive private-sector had collectively agreed to enter the leadership.11 negotiating experience. Despite the with all the government with all the inevita- So when this issue was put to eccentric suggestion from David ble challenges, trials and tribula- the test at conference the result was Steel that this team were ‘new and inevitable tions that would follow. This meant clear. The reasons for this can be younger colleagues who he [Clegg] that over the following five years, debated elsewhere, but the coali- could dominate’,5 this was not the challenges, nobody could sensibly or legiti- tion was notably more flexible in case. It was a negotiating team mately suggest that the decision had its approach to the fiscal mandate selected with careful consideration trials and been imposed from on high. It had than either its supporters or crit- given to ensuring it would be cred- not and the party knew that. ics would allow at the time – and ible to the wider party. tribulations The party also, albeit perhaps this was probably most evident in As David Laws has narrated in less overwhelmingly, accepted the the reversing of cuts to infrastruc- 22 Days in May, over the course of that would argument that the country faced ture spending. Whatever the rea- the five days after the 2010 general follow. This an economic crisis which required son for its support, as long as the election the party leadership and a stable government overseeing a party believed that the coalition negotiating team met extensively meant that programme of fiscal consolidation. government’s economic and fiscal not just with MPs and the Federal The brief version of this argument policy was broadly correct (whilst Executive, but also with peers and over the was that the books needed balanc- acknowledging that it could never representatives of the parliamen- ing and needed balancing as fairly inevitably be purely Liberal Demo- tary parties in Scotland, Wales following as possible, and the Liberal Demo- crat) it would make little sense for and Europe. The views expressed crats being – and remaining – in the party to fracture, or to seek new in these meetings were listened five years, government was the best way to leadership. to carefully and, where possible, guarantee this. The strong grip the Throughout the five years of woven into the coalition agree- nobody could executive holds versus the legisla- the coalition government there ment. And indeed, as David Laws ture on the budgetary process in were clear and identifiable Liberal articulates, the need to secure the sensibly or the UK9 meant that the influence Democrat policy wins. It can be support of the wider party was used Liberal Democrats wielded through argued that these were outweighed as leverage during negotiations, legitimately the so-called ‘quad’ budget nego- by obviously objectionable poli- most notably in relation to electoral tiation process was keenly felt, and cies, especially on welfare, but the reform. suggest that significantly greater than anything policy wins were indisputably hap- The result of this extensive that could have been achieved via pening. Some, such as increasing internal conversation was that the decision confidence and supply. the tax threshold and delivering when the proposed agreement was That the wider party was will- the pupil premium, were flagship put to a vote, only one member had been ing to agree to the tough choices policies which went from the front of the FE, David Rendel, voted imposed that implementing austerity page of the party’s manifesto to against, and no MP did (though a entailed would not have surprised become government policy. These few, including , from on any student of Liberal Democrats policies benefited millions across abstained.) Under the ‘triple-lock’ in local government. In authorities the country: to paraphrase an old procedure this was more than suf- high. It had across the country, from London slogan, everybody knew somebody ficient a mandate. However there boroughs such as Islington, Cam- who benefited from the tax thresh- was consensus amongst the collec- not and the den, Brent, Lambeth and South- old change. And every school gov- tive leadership of the party – the wark, to cities such as Liverpool, ernor, doubtless well-represented officers of the Federal Confer- party knew Leeds, Newcastle, Sheffield and in Liberal Democrat ranks, knew ence Committee, the FE and both Birmingham, Liberal Democrats the difference the pupil premium Ros Scott and Nick Clegg – that that. had taken power, sometimes also in made to their own school.12 Liberal

54 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 managing the coalition

Democrats could, and did, take then being able to make it happen Throughout that the line could be held, then pride in these policies. by talking directly to a party col- there would have been a more And just as important was deliv- league who is the responsible min- the five years determined attempt to rock the ering on issues that might, perhaps ister is of considerable importance. boat. After all, self-preservation is unfairly, be described as more niche Inevitably, and reasonably, of the coali- the most powerful of both human issues, such as equal marriage, end- given the result of the 2015 general and political instincts. ing child detention for immigration election, there has been no short- tion govern- Perhaps the most overlooked purposes, and legislating for 0.7 per age of critics of the campaign the reason why the Liberal Democrats cent of GDP to be spent on interna- party ran. However, in the years ment there remained together is the leader- tional development. Knowing that running up to the election, MPs, ship and party management skills Liberal Democrats were making key-seat candidates and their teams, were clear of Nick Clegg. Whilst he doubt- a difference in areas that the party and indeed the media, believed and identifi- less made mistakes – perhaps the had campaigned on for decades that the strategy constructed and greatest was on the so-called ‘secret persuaded many that remaining implemented by Ryan Coetzee and able Liberal courts’ issue – he also got a lot right. in government was worth it. And, gave the party a He committed significantly more importantly, this remained true decent shot of being strongly com- Democrat time to party management than throughout the parliament. An exit petitive in forty to fifty seats and any other party leader in govern- from the government after the 2014 of holding approximately thirty policy wins. ment. This is as it absolutely should elections would have seen Jo Swin- seats – and with them, potentially be in a party with such strong inter- son’s important work on shared the balance of power nationally. It can be nal democracy as the Liberal Dem- parental leave stopped by Conserv- Polling by both the party and Lord ocrats, but nonetheless the list of his ative ministers who fought tooth Ashcroft broadly bore this view argued that engagements is impressive. He was and nail against it. out, as did, crucially, both the East- one of the most regular attendees at In short, this might be described leigh by-election and local elections these were the Commons parliamentary party as the Alex Cole-Hamilton expla- in those constituencies. meetings, went regularly to the nation. He said after his defeat in Ultimately, this belief was outweighed Lords parliamentary party meet- the 2011 Scottish parliament elec- incorrect, and the results and polls ings, held monthly conference calls tions that ‘if my defeat tonight is gave the party false hope. How- by obviously with fellow leaders in Scotland, part payment so that no child will ever, it is reasonable to suggest that Wales, Europe and London, spoke spend another night in a deten- without the dramatic change in the objection- at countless conference fringes and tion centre then I accept it, with political landscape – on both sides receptions and spoke at numer- all my heart.’13 So compelling an of the border – brought about by able policies, ous fundraising events for key- argument was this that Nick Clegg the Scottish referendum, the party’s especially on seat candidates, as well as more ad quoted it in his 2011 autumn con- strategy might have proved rela- hoc personal touches such as many ference speech14 and again in his tively successful. This of course can welfare, but hand-written letters to members on 2015 resignation speech, fram- never be proved either way. The appropriate occasions and congrat- ing the wider argument as ‘we key point remains that the party’s the policy ulatory calls to council by-election will never know how many lives candidates in the seats where there winners. we changed for the better because was a reasonable prospect of suc- wins were After the disastrous local we had the courage to step up cess bought into the plan that Ryan election results of 2011, he was at a time of crisis. But we have Coetzee, Paddy Ashdown and the indisputably particularly assiduous in his com- done something that cannot be ‘wheelhouse’ proposed and imple- munications with party’s local undone. Because there can be no mented.17 They may have been happening. government base. He went to the doubt that we leave government wrong to do so, but that they did annual local government confer- with Britain a far stronger, fairer, was a huge factor in keeping the ence and met often with the Liberal greener and more liberal coun- party united. Democrat LGA executive; indeed, try than it was five years ago.’15 An Whilst Lib Dem HQ did have so regular were his trips to Local often overlooked element to policy some control of finances, which Government House that the Con- wins for the Liberal Democrats, at may have encouraged such buy in, servative leader of the LGA found it least in regards to the continued this was relatively limited and the easier to speak with him than with support that the leadership and support most candidates gave was . A similar pattern government enjoyed from MPs, largely genuine rather than feigned emerged in the devolved adminis- were constituency-specific wins or bought. This was also certainly trations where Conservative rep- that the coalition delivered. Both true for the campaign run for the resentatives suffered the repeated Nick Clegg and Danny Alexan- European elections in 2014 when frustration of finding their Lib- der were diligent, especially in the idea, if not the precise execu- eral Democrat counterparts better the second half of the parliament, tion, of running an aggressively informed on the actions of the UK in trying to meet these. The most pro-European campaign was gen- government, even in areas with obvious of these were road projects erally very positively received by Conservative ministers. such as the A303, A1 and King- candidates and the wider party. The scale of this commitment erswell bypass. It would be easy, Only a few of the critics of the would have been in vain if it were and understandable, to deride these electoral strategy can honestly a set of tick box exercises, but Nick as ‘pork barrelling’. But when you claim to have expressed their con- Clegg was adroit at listening – have been campaigning for years16 cerns before polling day. The fact with his customary good humour for a policy that would improve remains that, had there not been – to what members across the the lives of those you represent, a reasonable degree of confidence party said and then acting on it.18

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 55 managing the coalition

Numerous changes to government Perhaps the means that the hard questions and which consistently showed very policy, and the presentation of it, conversations that need to happen strong support for remaining in coa- stemmed from such conversations. most over- are free to be held in good faith and lition: http://www.libdemvoice.org/ These actions helped pull the party without rancour. category/ldv-members-poll. together by ensuring it had a stake looked rea- Finally, it is important to con- 5 http://www.theguardian.com/com- in government, as well as generat- sider that the electorate view politi- mentisfree/2015/may/11/nick-clegg- ing goodwill that could be called son why cal parties over the long term, not liberal-democrats-disaster-coalition. upon in tougher times. just one electoral cycle. For many 6 The text of the motion the Special the Liberal years the Liberal Democrats, and its Conference passed is here: http:// Democrats predecessor parties, were viewed, www.libdems.org.uk/special_con- Were the Liberal Democrats however unfairly, as not really ference_passes_building_a_fairer_ right to have been so united? remained being up to the tough job of gov- britain_in_government. This is an infinitely harder question erning. Fine to be given control of 7 Pink handcuffs! to answer, especially for those inti- together is local authorities, but not to play 8 Estimates vary as there was no need mately involved with the coalition in the Westminster big league (as for a count, but of the approximately government. But given the 2015 the leader- many voters saw it.) Such a view of 1,500 in the hall certainly no more general election result, it is a ques- the Liberal Democrats provided an than 50, and quite possibly fewer than tion that merits examination. The ship and inevitable glass ceiling on electoral 20, voted against the agreement. facile answer is that the result could performance in general elections. 9 Especially compared to say the US for not have been worse, so any alter- party man- The competency test that the example, for more see here: http:// native strategy – be it a change of electorate applies might be more blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/ leader or exit from the government agement that of Justice Stewart’s ‘I know it budgeting-in-the-uk-is-highly- – could hardly have delivered an when I see it’ rather than a scientific transparent-but-that-does-not- inferior result. This is an easy posi- skills of Nick formula. But it is a hugely impor- mean-that-budget-decisions-are- tion to take, but for three reasons it tant test. After the last five years carefully-scrutinized-nor-that-the- is incorrect. Clegg. Whilst the Liberal Democrats are now right-policy-judgements-are-made/. The first is that there is no clear equipped to pass it. Had the party 10 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ evidence that, once the collec- he doubt- broken ranks and turned in on uk-politics-19699655. tive decision to enter government itself then the public may well have 11 http://www.theguardian. had been taken and the subsequent less made taken an extremely dim view, not com/politics/2013/sep/16/ policy choices made, anything mistakes – just in 2015 but in any future gen- nick-clegg-lib-dems-austerity. else would have made a signifi- eral elections when it looked possi- 12 In England, and Kirsty Williams cant improvement to the party’s perhaps the ble we might form part of the next and her team also forced Labour in electoral standing. Nick Clegg administration. budget negotiations to deliver an was widely thought to have run greatest was So, perhaps not surprisingly, I equivalent in Wales. a competent election campaign, am in no doubt the party made the 13 https://twitter.com/Alex4Central/ performed well in the debates and on the so- right collective choice to hold its status/66336714939047936. indeed secured endorsements of nerve for five years. It was not easy 14 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ one form or another from almost called ‘secret and the price certainly was a high politics/liberaldemocrats/8778863/ every national newspaper. How- one, higher than almost anybody Lib-Dem-conference-2011-Nick- ever, the electoral consequences of courts’ issue expected and higher than the party Cleggs-speech-in-full.html. the unholy alliance of Scottish and deserved. It is wrong to suggest 15 http://www.libdems.org.uk/a-mes- English nationalism, stoked by the – he also got there was no alternative; there was, sage-from-nick-clegg-to-liberal- SNP and Tories, was liable to sweep but it was not one that would have democrat-members. away any Liberal Democrat leader, a lot right. He served the party well. 16 Or, as an extreme example, Alan campaign and message.19 Beith’s forty-year campaign to The second is that for the sur- committed Matthew Hanney was an adviser to improve the A1 which finally came to vival of political parties – especially Nick Clegg between 2006 and 2015. fruition under the coalition. smaller liberal parties – it is divi- significantly 17 For more on this, see http://www. sion, defections and splits which 1 Inter alia, http://www.theguardian. theguardian.com/politics/2015/ can prove fatal rather than poor more time to com/commentisfree/2010/may/03/ feb/17/inside-nick-clegg-lib-dem- electoral results per se.20 The Lib- party man- lib-dem-tory-coalition. general-election-campaign. eral Democrats in the aftermath of 2 Matthew Oakeshott left the party 18 For example, on tax incremental the 2015 general election are prov- agement 2014 to describe himself as a ‘non- financing, the need for city deals not ing a robust, and indeed grow- party Social Democrat’; perhaps the to be contingent on directly elected ing, party which held a relatively than any most senior Liberal Democrat to mayors and the timing of police and amicable leadership contest (cer- defect directly to another party was crime commissioner elections. tainly compared with Labour’s!) other party Richard Grayson (former Director 19 As argued further by Ryan Coetzee and showed a willingness to col- of Policy under Charles Kennedy here, http://www.theguardian.com/ lectively retain ownership of its leader in and parliamentary candidate), who commentisfree/2015/may/22/liberal- record in government. Tim Farron defected to Labour in 2013. democrats-opposition-labour-gov- has taken office without the stain government. 3 http://www.libdemvoice.org/45455- ernment. of disloyalty and inherits a party 45435.html. 20 For example recently the Australian that knows it can hang together in 4 The best, though imperfect meas- Democrats, Irish Progressive Demo- the toughest of times. The lack of ure of this, being the regular Liberal crats, and historically the splits in the bloodletting in the last parliament Democrat Voice members’ polling, Liberal Party of 1916 and 1931.

56 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015