Liberal Democrats in coalition: Europe

The coalition and Europe Tim Oliver

he recent vote to leave the European especially when in coalition with a Eurosceptical Union has reenergised Liberal Demo- Conservative Party. How then did the party suc- Tcrat commitment to the EU. In promis- ceed in managing the issue in government? Did ing to challenge the decision to leave, the party it balance or constrain Conservative Euroscepti- has found itself an issue that has helped it stand cism? Or were the demands of government such apart, appeal to large numbers of British voters, that the party was overwhelmed by events and and uphold a core party commitment to liberal inadvertently helped pave the way for the 2016 internationalism. The turmoil that now defines referendum? UK–EU relations (the settling of which will likely dominate the rest of this parliament) led to jus- tifiable quips that was only able Europe in the party’s worldview to last a year without and the Liberal If, as David Cameron once argued, Atlanticism Democrats. is in the DNA of the Conservative Party, then Europe, however, has not always been an easy the Liberal Democrats have Europe as a large issue for the party, either internally or externally, part of theirs. It has long been a core part of the

Journal of Liberal History 92 Autumn 2016 55 Liberal Democrats in coalition: Europe party’s liberal internationalist worldview. Vari- largely concluded that the balance of powers was ous parts of that worldview have shaped views about right. of the EU, not least the party’s commitment to However, the referendum lock merely fuelled international justice and anti-imperialism. The Conservative backbench demands for a referen- party’s localism and activist heart might be sus- dum of some kind. The Balance of Competences picious of the EU as a distant source of power, Review limited the case for a repatriation of pow- but the belief in federalism has helped locate the ers. To some extent this was a victory for the EU in a wider framework through which the Liberal Democrats, but the review was largely party believes the UK should be governed. Even buried by the Conservatives and overlooked by in relations with the USA, the party has seen the media. close US–European relations as essential to an Despite the detail of the coalition agreement, it outward looking, global liberal agenda. Being was to be events that largely defined how the two out of government at UK level between 1922 and coalition parties approached the issue of Europe. 2010 meant that some of these ideas have been And events in UK–EU relations were not neces- shaped more by idealism and protest than the sarily on the Liberal Democrats’, or indeed David realities of national government. Cameron’s, side. The need for further reform in The second, the the EU to tackle the Eurozone’s problems meant some form of treaty change or new arrangement Europe in the coalition government Balance of Com- was already on the cards as the coalition came into The coalition government came to power against office. This would inevitably run into a barrage of a long-standing backdrop of Britain as ‘an awk- petences Review, hostility in British politics where memories were ward partner’ in the EU. A late joiner, British still raw about the difficulties all parties had faced governments, political parties and public opinion was an evidence- over ratifying the Lisbon treaty in 2008. have rarely if ever appeared comfortable with the When proposals for a change to the Lisbon idea of European integration, preferring instead based review of Treaty were put forward in December 2011 to take a transactional view to relations. Rare has the full-range of in order to deal with ongoing problems in the been the British politician prepared to stand up Eurozone, the UK found itself out of sync with and make a full-blown case for Britain’s member- UK–EU relations. the rest of the EU thanks in no small part to ship of the EU. David Cameron’s failure to connect with other That unease could be seen in all of the UK’s Eventually com- European leaders. The result was his ‘veto’ of political parties, including to some extent the attempts to introduce an EU-wide fiscal com- Liberal Democrats. Tensions over the signing of prising thirty- pact. Cameron’s move was designed to protect the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 had left the party as the British interests, especially those of the City of only one of the main three UK parties to cam- two volumes and London. But his move sparked anger around the paign in the 2010 general election with a com- rest of the EU (which bypassed the UK and set mitment to holding an in/out referendum on 3,000 pages of up the fiscal compact as a separate treaty) and EU membership, albeit with the caveat that this analysis, it was a moment of jubilation amongst Conservative would happen the next time a British government backbenchers until they realised the veto had signed up for fundamental change in the relation- the most detailed actually achieved little. ship between the UK and the EU. It continued a It also strained relations with the Liberal Dem- tradition dating back to the party’s commitment study ever under- ocrats, with Nick Clegg eventually making clear in the 1990s to being the first to commit to hold- his anger at the outcome of Britain being left iso- ing a referendum on membership of the Euro. taken of the EU lated. Such was his anger that he shunned Cam- Despite concerns that the issue of Europe eron’s appearance before the Commons to explain would bring down the coalition, the coalition by a member the veto. Yet, while he might have objected to agreement provided a constructive basis of ideas how Cameron had got himself into the mess that that led to two outcomes. The first was the EU state. Intended to led to the ‘veto’, disagreement focused more on Referendum Act 2011 – a referendum lock to identify powers the flawed ways and means by which he had raised limit the transfer of further powers to the EU British objections than that Britain had objected without a national referendum. A commitment for repatriation, to proposals that were not in its interests. drawn primarily from the Conservative election Similar differences overshadowed the appoint- manifesto, it also met the Liberal Democrats’ own to the dismay of ment of Jean-Claude Juncker as the new Com- 2010 commitment to holding a referendum at the mission president following the 2014 European time of a major treaty change, albeit as an in/out some Conserva- Parliament elections. In the run-up to the 2014 referendum. European Parliament elections some of the par- The second, the Balance of Competences tives the study liament’s groups had named a ‘Spitzenkandidaten’ Review, was an evidence-based review of – top candidate – as their candidate for Commis- the full-range of UK–EU relations. Eventu- largely concluded sion president, the aim being to democratise the ally comprising thirty-two volumes and 3,000 that the balance process of filling the position. As the European pages of analysis, it was the most detailed study People’s Party’s (EPP) choice for Spitzenkandi- ever undertaken of the EU by a member state. of powers was daten, Juncker had the backing of Angela Merkel’s Intended to identify powers for repatriation, CDU. Cameron’s decision to withdraw the Con- to the dismay of some Conservatives the study about right. servatives from the EPP had long been criticised

56 Journal of Liberal History 92 Autumn 2016 Liberal Democrats in coalition: Europe as a move that might have met the demands of The decision to in seeing UKIP come top in the elections, mak- Eurosceptics in his own party but left him and ing them the first non-Conservative or Labour his party disconnected from the dominant cen- enter into coa- party since 1910 to win the most seats at a national tre-right group of parties in European politics, election. including the CDU. While no other UK party lition with the had bought into the Spitzenkandidaten idea, includ- ing the Liberal Democrats, Cameron’s opposi- Conservatives The referendum legacy tion to Juncker once again left him and the British inadvertently Throughout the period of coalition government government isolated in the EU. He was unable to one of the Liberal Democrats’ main claims to suc- call on the support of Angela Merkel who, despite helped set the cess was that they were able to constrain, or at her own doubts about both Juncker’s suitability least balance, the more extreme sides of the Con- and the Spitzenkandidaten idea, in the end decided UK on a course servative Party, not least when it came to Europe. to back him, leaving Cameron and the UK largely In doing so, however, they may have inadvert- isolated. towards the June ently played a part in setting the stage for the 2016 If Cameron was able to get away with such referendum. I say ‘in part’ because ultimately the flawed approaches then it might have owed some- 2016 referen- one person responsible for the referendum and thing to the way in which the Liberal Democrats dum. The party its outcome was David Cameron. And as we all were positioned in government. That the party know, the divisive nature of Europe in UK poli- spread itself too thinly is now a well-documented became the coali- tics long predates the 2010–15 coalition. The June critique of the coalition. When in September 2012 2016 result was also the product of a number of Jeremy Browne left the FCO and Nick Harvey tion’s explosive factors, including the somewhat lacklustre perfor- the MoD, it left only a few individuals such as mance by the Remain campaign and the seductive Nick Clegg, William Wallace and special advi- armour, protect- and misleading ‘nothing is true and everything is sor Monica Thurmond working overtime and possible’ approach of the Leave campaigns. more to keep on top of events and policies and to ing David Cam- Nevertheless, the decision to enter into coa- develop Liberal Democrat strategy. Some Con- lition with the Conservatives inadvertently servative ministers were accommodating, Wil- eron in particular helped set the UK on a course towards the June liam Hague in particular. The work of the few from a range of 2016 referendum. The party became the coali- Liberal Democrats in this area did deliver suc- tion’s explosive armour, protecting David Cam- cesses at the European level. So too did ministers unpopular deci- eron in particular from a range of unpopular in other departments, such as the Department for decisions. Amongst the most unpopular – with Business, Innovation and Skill and the Depart- sions. Amongst his own party especially – were his decisions ment of Energy and Climate Change, where over Europe. By bringing together a Liberal Liberal Democrat ministers successfully built the most unpop- Democrat party led by pragmatic pro-Europe- EU-wide coalitions for more ambitious EU action ans with a Conservative leadership of pragmatic on international climate and energy matters. But ular – with his Eurosceptics, Cameron was able to cope with the these few successes not only left the party fight- ideologically driven Eurosceptics on his back- ing to be heard, but also delivered a disparate and own party espe- benches by offering them concessions rather often underappreciated set of successes that were cially – were his than facing them head on. They were a group hard to combine into an effective campaigning that would not be appeased, driven as they were message. decisions over by anger at their party being in government Liberal Democrat objections over the ways with a pro-European party, worried by the rise and means of UK–EU relations, or their role con- Europe. of UKIP, and increasingly uneasy at the immi- straining or balancing the Eurosceptic side of the gration and sovereignty consequences of EU Conservatives therefore mattered little when it membership. Instead of offering concessions to came to public opinion. The 2014 European Par- the Liberal Democrats, Cameron was more con- liament elections saw the party campaign on a cerned with offering concessions to the extreme pro-European platform. In part a product of the side of his own party. party’s core beliefs, the position was also born The coalition therefore allowed Cameron from a desire to distinguish themselves from the to continue muddling through the problems other parties all of whom were offering mes- his party had long struggled with over Europe. sages of varying degrees of . The Instead of confronting and trying to solve them, result, however, saw the party’s MEPs reduced he was able to continue kicking the can down the from eleven to one. It was a crushing defeat, espe- road. The road ended spectacularly, not least for cially for Nick Clegg who had not only served Cameron himself, with the June 2016 referendum with many of the now former MEPs in Brussels, result. For the Liberal Democrats, the road ended but also debated UKIP’s Nigel Farage in the run- earlier in the disastrous 2015 general election. up to the elections. Hopes that the debate would repeat the success of Clegg’s appearance in the 2010 general election TV debates were dashed Alternative UK–EU relations? when they reinforced the widespread public hos- Would the course of UK–EU relations, and the tility to the party and Clegg in particular. It gave state of the Liberal Democrats, therefore have Farage another platform, playing a small part been fundamentally different had the party been

Journal of Liberal History 92 Autumn 2016 57 Liberal Democrats in coalition: Europe

able to enter into coalition with Labour in 2010 or changing EU alone would have lead to mounting 2015, or if there had been a minority Conservative pressure for a referendum at some point. There government in 2010? has always been a degree of party consensus – or While a Labour–Liberal Democrat coalition constraints – in managing UK foreign policy, might have been easier ideologically, when it including over Europe. The Liberal Democrats came to policy and managing day-to-day events time in government showed it can extend beyond UK–EU relations between London and Brussels the Conservatives and Labour. would likely have remained strained and some- what awkward. The ways and means by which Dr Tim Oliver is a Dahrendorf Fellow for Europe- relations would have been managed would have North American relations at the LSE and a Visiting been different, but the need to adapt Britain to a Scholar at NYU.

Commentary: former minister William Wallace

he greatest difficulty in assessing how America, not intervening on dossiers outside much Liberal Democrats in govern- those regions that touched on party interests. Tment from 2010 to 2015 influenced coali- Drafts of the EU referendum bill had reached tion policy on Europe is to judge how high were an advanced stage in the late summer of 2010 the obstacles to a constructive approach and how before I managed, as a junior ‘Lords minister much worse the drift of Conservative policy and whip’ with Jeremy’s office as my toehold would have been in a single-party government. within the FCO, to see them; we failed to chal- The absence of a constructive narrative from lenge the detailed content critically as it took the previous Labour government, from the 2003 shape. Within the Whitehall structure, however, invasion of Iraq onwards, had left public opin- first Chris Huhne and then led for the ion sceptical about European cooperation. There Liberal Democrats on the cabinet EU commit- was a wide gap between the realities of practical tee and sub-committee, for which we learned cooperation, in policing, foreign policy, defence, to coordinate our party approach in spite of our climate change, and other areas, and the parlia- departmental briefs. Ed actively promoted coali- mentary focus on the working time directive and tions of ‘like-minded’ governments on specific a handful of judgements by the two European issues, above all on climate change courts. Our small team of special advisors (SPADs) We started, therefore, with a range of obsta- also followed papers on EU issues closely, and cles to overcome. Cameron as prime minister alerted us to potential difficulties; SPADs are cared little about the EU or European politics, invaluable to ministers caught up with parlia- and often paid more attention to appeasing his ment, endless meetings, and party obligations. Europhobe wing than to weighing up where Our links with other Liberal parties within the Cameron as UK interests lay. The quip that he was an ‘essay EU, many of them also within government, also crisis’ prime minister seemed entirely accurate. gave us some advantages in terms of influence prime minister His preparation for the December 2011 summit and information. We could hold informal con- had been skimpy; he then pushed last-minute versations across borders that our Conservative cared little about demands at an unprepared European Council colleagues, lacking party links, could not; we the EU or Euro- without informing Nick Clegg as his deputy were occasionally asked by our Conservative col- or, it appeared, relevant ministers and officials. leagues to hold such conversations, and could help pean politics, I spoke to one Conservative minister over that to shape them as they continued. weekend who was as shaken by this unprepared But much of this was attempting to push Brit- and often paid mistake as I was. For European Councils after ish foreign policy uphill. The National Security that an official from Clegg’s office was added to Council, trumpeted by Cameron as bringing more attention the PM’s delegation, to assure at least some com- together the different elements of international munication of Cameron’s intentions. strategy, spent more time between 2010 and 2015 to appeasing his No. 10 ran European policy, with Osborne discussing ‘Gulf strategy’ than European strategy, in the Treasury actively contributing. William in spite of Nick Clegg’s efforts; selling arms to Europhobe wing Hague as Foreign Secretary opted out of many Arab monarchies attracted Conservative enthusi- than to weigh- EU dossiers, leaving the work to David Lid- asm, unlike cultivating European governments. I ington as Europe minister. Jeremy Browne as raised the potential instability in Ukraine and the ing up where UK the Lib Dem minister in the Foreign and Com- southern Caucasus in ministerial meetings well monwealth Office (FCO) plunged enthusiasti- before the crisis broke; but the foreign secretary’s interests lay. cally into his responsibilities in Asia and Latin priorities were elsewhere, and FCO expertise on

58 Journal of Liberal History 92 Autumn 2016 Liberal Democrats in coalition: Europe

Russia had been run down. Hammond as defence presented – though the deep reluctance of the In retrospect, secretary blocked our efforts to give some pub- to give in delayed the Free Move- licity to UK cooperation with other European ment paper for six months. The response of No. we should have countries in defence. We succeeded in persuad- 10 to this unwelcome outcome was to bury each ing the Ministry of Defence to invite ambassadors group of papers, six to eight every six months, briefed the media from other EU governments to visit the impres- by publishing them the day after parliament had more aggres- sive Joint Command Centre in Northwood, risen for the summer or for Christmas, allow- from which the EU’s Operation Atalanta (against ing Lidington and me to brief ambassadors from sively about the Somali piracy) was directed; but failed to per- other EU countries within the FCO but not to suade them to invite the British media, let alone encourage the domestic media to pick up the sceptical drift of offer visits to backbench MPs. Fox as Defence story. Secretary and then Hammond gave as little pub- In retrospect, we should have briefed the Conservative pol- licity as possible to the development of defence media more aggressively about the sceptical drift cooperation with the French; secrecy about Euro- of Conservative policy. That would of course icy. That would of pean defence cooperation was such that I once have had costs, in undermining the image of a watched a Conservative defence minister make a constructive coalition. And much of the media course have had disparaging remark about Belgian inactivity, to were not interested in positive European sto- costs, in under- be shocked by an FCO official noting that Belgian ries. I developed a good relationship with the aircraft were currently flying joint missions with Financial Times, but The Guardian did not appear mining the image the RAF over Libya. much more interested than ; and The Discussions began within Whitehall, and Telegraph was still spinning Boris Johnson-style of a construc- within the Conservative Party, about who we inaccuracies for Conservative MPs to lap up. It might support as the new president of the Com- would have helped us if Labour as the opposition tive coalition. mission, and who the government should nomi- had wished to pick up the story. I occasionally nate as the UK commissioner, over nine months briefed people close to Ed Miliband, on issues And much of the before the decisive European Council. We put from the Trident review to the EU balance of up several suggestions about preferred candi- competences exercise; the dispiriting answer was media were not dates for Commission president, aware that the usually that ‘we haven’t taken a decision about interested in pos- party groups within the European Parliament our position on that yet’, or ‘we’re still discuss- were floating the idea of party-nominated candi- ing it’. itive European dates; but No. 10, out of touch with the mood of Nick Clegg’s debate with Nigel Farage, in the the European Parliament because Cameron had 2014 Euro-election campaign, demonstrated the stories. withdrawn the Conservatives from the European handicaps under which we were struggling to People’s Party, and evidently not listening to any make our case, against an established narrative of hints from Conservative MEPs, did not respond. misrepresentation and the repeated refrain in the So, again, we arrived at a last-minute panic, with right-wing media that Anglo-Saxons were our Cameron trying to retrieve a situation the he and friends and continental Europeans our enemies. his advisers could and should have anticipated I put round a memo in the FCO in the summer months before. of 2012 on ‘Symbolic Diplomacy’, to argue the In the coalition agreement the Conserva- case for using joint ceremonies to visualise our tives insisted on including an extensive consul- historical and continuing links with allies and tation exercise on the ‘balance of competences’ partners; the French were particularly anxious to between the UK and the EU. They expected see the UK recognise their contributions in both companies, trade associations, lawyers and world wars, and the Poles in the Second World accountants, to list a range of powers that should War. But No. 10 did not want to challenge the be restored to UK sovereignty, to provide the Anglo-Saxon narrative of British identity, or the basis for Cameron’s re-negotiation. Thousands myth that Britain stood ‘alone’ and independent of responses flowed in over a two-year period, in the last war. The direction was set before the with supporting seminars and conferences, over- 2015 election for the flat-footed character of the seen by a ‘ministerial star chamber’ chaired by ‘Remain’ referendum campaign, for all that the David Lidington with myself and, until he was Liberal Democrats in government had attempted promoted, Greg Clark. The feedback, however, to hold back the tide. was overwhelmingly that the current balance suited UK interests well, in fields from transport William Wallace (Lord Wallace of Saltaire) is president to services to regulation of drugs. We fought of the Liberal Democrat History Group. He was a Lords Whitehall battles on the papers on free move- minister and whip in the coalition government, speaking ment of people and on civil justice, for which for the FCO throughout, the MoD from 2010 to 2012, the initial drafts from Theresa May’s and Chris and the Cabinet Office from 2012 to 2015. He joined the Grayling’s offices distorted the evidence to suit Liberal Party in 1960, fought five parliamentary elec- Eurosceptic prejudices. With active assistance tions, and joined the Lords in 1996. from LibDem SPADs who covered those depart- ments, we insisted on following the evidence

Journal of Liberal History 92 Autumn 2016 59 Liberal Democrats in coalition: Europe Commentary: critic Hannah Bettsworth

n an ideal world, a Liberal Democrat gov- frustrates many party members. This attitude ernment would have been at the forefront of manifested itself in a tendency to rebel against Ithe European Union, standing alongside our EU proposals and then complain about its deci- ALDE allies and defending the further develop- sions, when the UK could have had a substantial ment of the EU. We would have been a key voice impact and exercise real power if it deigned to in favour of free trade and a TTIP supporter – participate. showing that it is not a choice between Europe This would have been the difference between and the world, but that Britain could play a lead- what occurred under the coalition and a hypo- ing role on both stages. We would have used thetical Liberal Democrat government: we would the Ukraine crisis as impetus to reinforce and have begun with the intent to engage. Britain had improve the European Neighbourhood Policy, a reputation in Europe as the reluctant partygoer maintaining a principled common foreign policy who stood against the wall while everyone else that supported human rights and national self- interacted – we would have attempted to shake determination. A Liberal Democrat government that off. would not have instinctively opposed European In terms of the party’s positioning, the Bal- cooperation for short-term political gain in the ance of Competencies Review noted that the way that the Conservatives did. money allocated to the Department for Inter- Cameron’s veto We would not have held an In/Out referen- national Development (DFID) was often being dum – why should we, having opposed an inde- channelled into EU aid projects. It also noted exercise appears pendence referendum because it was damaging that this was giving Britain a wider reach than for Scotland to risk leaving the UK? However, if DFID had administered the projects itself – to be reflective of we would not have been an uncritical friend of for example, EU aid agencies had a wider global the wider British the EU – George Lyon, former Liberal Demo- office presence than Britain alone did. Perhaps crat MEP for Scotland, had substantial success in this is a combination of the two difficulties raised political attitude reforming the Common Agricultural Policy in in the original article – underappreciation of order to build a more market-oriented system. both the importance of the review and of some to the EU that We would have done more to ensure that the of our successes in government. An effective EU promoted free and fair trade globally – our message from the Better Together campaign in frustrated Nick international aid efforts are one of the things we the Scottish referendum was that DFID’s pres- can be proudest of during our time in govern- ence in East Kilbride showed how Scottish and Clegg so greatly, ment, but it is equally important that developing British partnerships could make positive change countries are allowed to compete on a level play- in developing countries worldwide. A simi- and still frustrates ing field. lar message in the EU campaign may have been many party mem- Sadly, we do not live in an ideal world, and in worthwhile in convincing Leave-leaning liber- that sense there was very little more that we could als to cast their vote to Remain. bers. This attitude have done to restrain the Conservatives’ Euro- To summarise, the referendum and its after- sceptic tendencies. The referendum lock was a math have been a useful recruiting tool because manifested itself necessary compromise – as the junior partner in they showed the public the scale of the challenge the coalition, we had to choose our battles. We we faced in coalition. In other words, people in a tendency to chose them correctly for the most part, prioritis- have learned the hard way that we did a good job ing education, development, and tax cuts for the of preventing Conservative Eurosceptism from rebel against EU poorest. The arguments over the coalition are damaging the UK’s prospects. A Liberal Demo- well rehearsed, but it was the best (as well as the crat majority government would, ideally, move proposals and only possible) course of action we were faced with towards an overtly Europhile posture and break then complain in 2010. Eurosceptic backbenchers would always political norms – both in foreign policy and at have been a challenge for a Lib Dem–Conserva- home. However, we knew that we did not live about its deci- tive agreement, and we dealt with that as well in an ideal world and therefore did all we could as we could. Including an In/Out referendum in to speak up for the EU within the political con- sions, when the the 2010 manifesto was a mistake – it gave UKIP straints we faced in 2010. material to use against us in the European elec- UK could have tions in 2014, and it implied that we thought a Hannah Bettsworth is a recent graduate from the Uni- Leave vote would have been an acceptable out- versity of Edinburgh in Spanish and Politics, and a for- had a substantial come even if we ourselves were opposed to it. mer co-chair of Liberal Youth Scotland. She has worked However, it was politically useful in bridging for the Department for International Development and impact and exer- the gap in opinion at the time of the coalition frequently participates in LYMEC (European Liberal cise real power agreement. Youth) activities. Cameron’s veto exercise appears to be reflec- if it deigned to tive of the wider British political attitude to the EU that frustrated Nick Clegg so greatly, and still participate.

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