88 Hazell Waller Oates Wallace Hanney Managing the Coalition

88 Hazell Waller Oates Wallace Hanney Managing the Coalition

HowMa did the coalition workN as a government?agi Robert Hazell andN Peter WallerG review its internalT workingsH andE effectiveness, C while JonathanO Oatesali and William WallaceT reflectI on aspectsON of how Liberal Democrats functioned as part of it, and Matthew Hanney analyses how the party itself was managed. The Lib Dems and the workings of government: success or failure? Professor Robert Hazell and Peter Waller he Constitution Unit at detail not so much at the political I was not at all sure how the UCL carries out research success – or otherwise – of the coa- coalition would work or even into a wide range of politi- lition but at how it was operating in whether it would work. But it T 1 cal issues, largely focused on West- practice. has been far better than anyone minster and Whitehall and the links So what did we learn from that would have expected. between the two. Immediately research? The first thing to say is after the 2010 election, we were that the vast majority of those we One Tory minister commented to given permission by the then cabi- interviewed thought that the coali- us: net secretary to interview in depth tion was working well. This was the a wide range of Whitehall offi- general verdict not only of ministers Team work is stronger because cials, ministers and special advisers from both coalition parties but also of the coalition. The fact that to consider how the coalition was from Whitehall officials and various we had to discuss what we operating in practice. We were very third parties. One comment from a wanted to do, what the other well placed, therefore, to look in senior official was typical: party wished to do – or indeed 46 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 HowMa did the coalition workN as a government?agi Robert Hazell andN Peter WallerG review its internalT workingsH andE effectiveness, C while JonathanO Oatesali and William WallaceT reflectI on aspectsON of how Liberal Democrats functioned as part of it, and Matthew Hanney analyses how the party itself was managed. whether there were other One aspect before their narrow party Lib Dems, it is tempting to think options – made it much better. interests. that we must have been deceiving of that which • The fact that there was a coali- ourselves in painting such a posi- And a Lib Dem minister told us: tion meant that Whitehall had tive picture of the coalition’s first has been to change many of its inter- twenty months. But we do not The team of ministers in our nal rules and practices – and think that we were deceived. The department works together well little com- in practice this meant moving first two years of the coalition were on a day-to-day basis in a con- back towards a more rational by any standards a period of con- structive spirit … the good rela- mented on form of decision-making. Sofa siderable success. The programme tionship is at the heart of how it government and pre-cooked for government – which our work is all working. – but which deals were replaced by more suggested contained more Lib Dem stands to the formal committee discus- manifesto commitments than were As we dug deeper into the reasons sions and much bending over drawn from the Tory manifesto – why the story was so positive, we Liberal Dem- backwards to ensure that the was a very ambitious document but isolated a number of factors: perspectives of both parties in almost all its proposals had been • Prior expectations – especially ocrats’ credit the coalition were recognised. implemented by 2012. Government from civil servants – of the The fact that the programme was as crisis-free as governments coalition were that it would – is the fact for government was a detailed, ever can be and there was a good be unstable, fractious and con- practical document and had degree of respect amongst both stantly slowed down by inter- that the Lib replaced the woolly aspirations parties for each other and their role nal disputes. Many officials of the typical party manifestos, in making the coalition work. The had lived through the infight- Dem min- gave Whitehall much greater fact that the 2015 voters re-elected ing of the Labour govern- clarity from the new govern- the majority coalition partner to ment, especially between the isters, and ment than they had been used govern on its own suggested they Blairites and the Brownites, to. Special machinery was set were far from dissatisfied with the and assumed a coalition would cabinet min- up to resolve disputes between performance of the government in be even worse. The fact that the parties but in practice sel- the preceding five years. it was harmonious came as an isters in par- dom had to be used. One aspect of that which has enormous relief. • The coalition felt, both in been little commented on – but • Both political partners felt ticular, were Whitehall and Westminster, which stands to the Liberal Demo- proud of their role in forming more ‘grown-up’ in that it was crats’ credit – is the fact that the Lib the coalition and were deter- clearly of impossible to claim, as single- Dem ministers, and cabinet min- mined to make it a success. The equal calibre party governments often do, isters in particular, were clearly of Tories were delighted to have that there was only one pos- equal calibre to their Tory part- found a way back into govern- to their Tory sible answer to any question. ners. Yet this was certainly not ment even though they lacked The principle of collective a given. As in most professions a majority; and were clearly partners. responsibility remained so that – and politics is a legitimate pro- patting themselves on the back decisions, once taken, were fession in this context – the cream at their magnanimity in shar- supported by both parties. But tends to rise to the top so it might ing power. The Lib Dems were no one was pretending that be expected that the most capable delighted simply to be in gov- there had not had to be com- and ambitious politicians would ernment, and they were deter- promises in reaching an agreed be found in the parties most likely mined to show that a coalition position. to be in government. For a small was a perfectly viable basis Our research was concluded at the party to have people of sufficient for exercising political power. beginning of 2012, less than two calibre to fill twenty-three min- Both parties could claim with years into the new government. So isterial posts, including five cabi- good cause that they were writing now in 2015, in the after- net ministers, was thus a genuine putting the national interest math of a nightmare election for the stretch. But at no point in the five Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 47 MANagiNG THE COaliTION years of the coalition was it argued First, was the original decision The prob- Tories rather successfully presented in Whitehall, the media or else- to spread the Lib Dem ministerial themselves as still being very much where that the Lib Dems lacked the allocation thinly the right one? lem that cre- in power but on many fronts being necessary talent. Looking back, it Conventional academic wisdom held back by a failure by the Lib seems already that a team includ- from across many democracies ated for the Dems to agree to anything they ing Clegg, Cable, Huhne, Davey, is that the junior coalition part- were proposing. The obvious Lib Alexander, Laws and Webb will be ner does badly in the subsequent Lib Dems, Dem successes seemed to date back seen as something of a golden age election. But could the Lib Dems’ to much earlier in the parliament, for the party. chances of success have been however, and there was no similar sense of a So starting from that benign improved by taking all the min- Lib Dem agenda being obstructed picture at the end of 2011, why did isterial seats in a limited number was that by the Tories – apart from the high- it all go so horribly wrong in 2015, of departments, rather than hav- profile examples of the AV ref- with all but Clegg of that genera- ing a single minister in almost all they came erendum defeat, and withdrawal tion of leaders swept away by the departments? Under this scenario increasingly of the plans for Lords reform fol- electorate? Well, from the admit- Nick Clegg might have become lowing a major rebellion by Tory tedly narrow perspective of our Home Secretary or Education Sec- to be seen backbenchers. focus on Whitehall, it arguably retary, and the department clearly But generating new policy ideas never did go wrong. Against so identified as a Lib Dem depart- as ‘in office in government is never easy, and it many of the expectations of the ment. The Lib Dems would have was particularly difficult for the Lib political commentariat in 2010, the been able to point to achieve- but not in Dems, given how thinly stretched coalition survived for a full five- ments in that area as clear Lib Dem they were across all government year term, and would have done achievements, making it harder for power’. The departments. Outnumbered by the so even without the backing of the Tories in 2015 to present most Tories by a ratio of five to one, they the Fixed Term Parliaments Act successful Lib Dem ideas as Tory Tories rather were forced to devote far more of of 2011.

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