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:;'#¡1';, ¡.:.ri]l t l t I PROGRAM 437: THE AIR FORCE'S FIRST I ANTISATELLITE SYSTEM T by I Dr. Wayne R. Austerman I I I I t Air Force Space Command Office of History t April 1991 I I I I (This page is Unclassified)

** * * * * I '*r:fr*:r ExllEÞ*x* I tl¡ FI r SECURITY NOTICE (U) This volume is classified SECRET by multiple sources to conform to I the classification of the information contained in the sourõe documents. It contains info_rmation affecting_the national defense of the united states. Handle according to tÏe provisions of DOD 5200.1.R and AFR 205-1. Provide the utmost securiti T and restrict distribution and dissemination of its contents on a stdct ',need-to'- know" basis. Records supporting this derivative classífication are listed in the I notes. -. -(U)fo achieve production efficienry with word processing equipment, the overali classification of the narrative chapters I through lv and the nòtès to those I chapters have been ma¡ked SECRET. The pages cóntaining CONFIDENTIAL information are pages xidv, 12 and 13" The pages cóntaining SECRET I information are pages 9, 19-28,34-36,38-48, and 53-64. (U) Special notarion which appears in this volume is: NOT t REIÆASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONAI-S (NF) or (NOFORN), pgs 9 and 46. T Ð eCLtq-sS 2,,=tE_¿ -- á /'r'4y 7/ I F¿t+ .rzEr/e"4/ : ,,-+F5FAç¿: cà-24 7/- Ò1/ I I

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I FOREWORD t - (U) This monograph was pu-blished following Dr Austerman,s departure from the AFspAcEcorú riistory öffice. sornoeaiüríg or irre ;iiÀtr;i;;i;;;ït T has been accomplished, but it hãs not been artered in-any fundañrental;;;. =

t1-),=.t-,1 I /. t lÍdrÀ A. IÇ^n RobERT rr¡. xrpp ü f Chiel Office of Historv t HQ AFSPACECOM/HO I t I t I I I I I I v I *r:ß:rr,r ¡r UNCLASSIFIED *** **** I -.".,Ìt" PREFACE

(U) This monograph .docu¡rents the background, development, test, deployment, and operation of the usAF s, first operãtionat' antisateiliæ .it"-, Program 437, f¡om its origin in the week folôwing sputnik in 1957 to-ìì; retirement n 1975. Essentially cobbed _.together frãm'a variety or technologies, it was valuable moie as a politiåt response to a future threat"*istinã thafi as a w. ar fighting weapori system. Still, from it thè Air Force gainea vatuaute expertise .in operating a space The tactical unit i,hich Program -wegpon. 437 remained for yèars the fi¡st and only "blue suit,' o.g"nirutioå"ñ;;t"d ìn ihã space launch business.

study was prepared . *^_ , ^(U_)_ Ihis in large part from documents in the AFSPAcEcoM and Air Force-system's space Systems Division ttirio.y ãr"rri"å.. Fr.om-lheil pglsonal involvement in the prolram the foilowing in¿i"i¿uãì1 p.ã"r¿Ëä \flggb_¡e_insiClt: Cotonel T. G. Atcorn lUSar, net), Cãtonet j. R. i;;;ã (US.A!. Ret), Lieutgnanr Colo_Tel penni¡ Èagan,'Cotoíet p. n. ¡actson Ret), peterson_(U_SAF, úSeh, Coionel R. B. Ret), Cñ4Sgt A. J. Stotle¡ OSAF, nàó,;,i Colonel J. W. Yocum (USAF; ReÐ.

Vlr t !¡ TABLE OF CONTENTS I I Program 437: '[he Air Force's First Antisatellite !l Page TITLE PAGE i SECURITY NOTICE PAGE . iii I FOREWORD PREFACE vii TABLE OF CONTENTS .... ix CHRONOLOGY .... .': I 1 CI{APTER I - Sputnik and the Reluctant ASAT Notes, Chap L ... 15 I CHAPTER II - Program 437's Development aûd Operational Testing 19 Notes, Chap II 29 CHAPTER III - On Active Service 33 I 49 Notes, Chap III CI{APTER fV - Program 437AP and Other Derivatives 53 ll Notes, Chap IV . . . 65 CONCLUSION 69 Notes, Conclusion 7L APPENDICES r I-Photographs .... t3 tr - Summary of Thor Launches from Johnston Isiand, t962-1975 93 I - Program 437 Alternate Payload Launches 95 III /437 IV - Historical Background of Johnston Island . 97 GLOSSARY 103 t INDEX 707 I I I T

; I it jì: ' ,., l.ì ì'i i,! i tI t n.t CHRONOLOGY 04 Oct 57 (U)' USSR launched the fi¡st artificial earth satellite, Sputnik The United States was ala¡med by the Soviet triumph and rl pondered the significance of a potential military threat from space. :r 03 Nov 57 (U) USSR launched a second earth satellite, an 1'120-pound craft carrying a canine passenger. Premier Khrushchev boasted that aircraft had been rendered obsolete as weapons systems. r I, the first American satellite, Iaunched from Cape 31 Jan 58 (U) Explorer I Canaveral, Florida. 26 Mar 58 (U)' President Eisenhower released the report- o-f the-President's .science Advisory Committee (PSAC) at a White.House press I conference. It disparaged military importance of space operations. I 18 Aug 58 (U)' President Eisenhower endorsed a National Security Co.uncil Report which advocated an immediate need for military communications, weather, and reconnaissance satellites.

I o¡bit. 12 Apr 6I (U) The Soviet Union placed the first man in earth

18 Aug 61 (U) General l-aurence S. Kuter, NORAD commander, publicly t declared that recent Soviet space operations had advanced the need for an effective Ame¡ican antisatellite weaPon t system (ASAT). 09 Feb 62 I- Nr Force Systems Command (AFSC) issued Advanced Development Objective 40 (ADO 40), which called fo¡ I research and development geared toward producing an ASAT system.

I 28 Jw 62 A The DOD Di¡ector of Defense Research and Engineering " ' challenged the value of the USAF s proposed satellite inspection vehicle, citing lack ofintelligence on Soviet orbital I bombardment capabilities. 12 Sep 62 6Û-' Preliminary development program for a nuclear-armed ASAT I derived fróm ADO 40 was presented to Secretary of the Air T xi

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Force Zuckert. He was critical of the proposed use of a t nuclear warhead, but orde¡ed that a fully documented version -t of the plan be presented for his review as soon as possible. I 08 Feb 63 Secretary Z:uckert officially designated the proposed ASAT @ L system as Program 437. I 20Mar 63 of Staff, to ensure that Program 437 received "top priority" among his servicels space projects. ;

15 Apr 63 (U) Headquarters AFSC issued orders creating the 6595th Test Squadron at VandenberC AFB, California, to oversee I development of Program 437. 01 May 63 fi President Kennedy instructed the Department of Defense I to develop an ASAT system "at the earliest practicable time." 27 Jm63 S Secretary of Defense Robe¡t S. McNamara reviewed planning I for Program 437 and declared that he wanted the capability "to initiate the destruction of a satellite by a telephone call." I 15 Nov 63 (U) The 6569th Test Squadron deactivated. The unit was immediately reactivâted as the 10th Aerospace Defense Squadron (ADS), a êomponent of the 9th Aerospace Defense I Force, commanded by Colonel Charles Minihan.

14 Feb 64 {$ A Douglas Aircraft Co¡poration contractor crew staged the first Program 43T test launching of a Thor booster frbm t Johnston Isla¡d i¡ the Pacific. 01 Mar 64 .{Þ Second research and development launch from Johnston I Island. Ë 05 Mar 64 {D Air Defense Command (ADC) and Space Systems Division ll (SSD) of AFSC co-authored an operations plan for Program 437. I 19 Apr 64 ;Ç Planned third research and development launch cancell'ed due to a faulty LOX valve. r 27 Apr 64 $ Third research and development launch from Johnston Island. 28}llfay 64 {s First launch from Johnston Island by Air Force personnei. I xii *,rr.**** ***,¡*r* l dhru I

Ç 29 May 64 ll Program 437 granted,Initial Operational Capability status.

10 Jun 64 Ð Second Thor ASAT joined the first on the alert pads at program Johnston Island. 437 rated as fully operatìonal. 20 Sep 64 (U) P.residentJohnsonpublicly disclosed the existérrcã of prograrn 437 in a speech at Sacramento, Califo¡nia. 16 Nov 64 Ç Firs! Progrgm 437 Combat Training Launch (CTL) conducted. (These exercises were also rãfe¡¡ed to as Crew Evaluarion l-aunches (CELs).)

05 Apr 65 .$ Second Program 437 CTL. :ït:

07 Dec 65 Ç First Program 4374p launch.

17 Jan 65 Q Second Program 437Ap launch.

12 Mar 66 fD Third Program 437Ap launch.

02 Jul 66 I A Program 4374P mission launch in support of a NASA requirement failed.

30 Nov 66 fi H^eadquarters USAF announced termination of program 437AP. Jan 67 ,0i (U) 10 ADS redesignated as,the 10th Air Defense Group (ADG), with two,squadrons (25 ADS and 24th Support) unde¡ its command.

Mar 67 '11 ç lDC issued a Required Operational Capabitity (ROC) request fo¡ a new satellite interceptor system. 3A Mar 67 $ Third Program 437 CfL. 25 May 67 (U) -419$ Support Squadron of rhe Srraregic Air Command (SAC) deactivated and merged wirh rh;i¡ Adc. ¿Õ ¡eo oð t Thor on Launch Fmplacement #1 at Johnston Island rated norroperational due to hydrocarbon contamination of a subsystem. Booster replaðed by 29 March.

13 May 68 fr Fourth Program 437 CfLaborted due to a lockup guidance malfunction.

14 May 68 {F Fourth Program 437 CÍL successful.

xiii r¡**¡¡,¡,r* €nlËEL **¡** * r¡* ,¡rtr*tr. æt[G¡IË r:r'¡¡*** + 21 Nov 68 p) Fifth Program 437 C'lL successful; + 22Mar 69 p) Turbo-pump failure on one of the alert Thors reduced Program 437 to a C-3 status until 2 April. + 08 Sep 69 (@ Headquarters USAF Program Change Decision Z-9-107 directed termination of Program 437 at the end of FY 73. + 27 Mar 70 6Ð Sixth Program 437 CTL conducted as part of the ADC exe¡cise ARI-BERG'TERROR 70-7. * 04 May 70 @ Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard directed USAF to phase down Program 437 by the end of that fiscal year. + 10 Oct 70 @ Continental Ai¡ Defense Command (CONAD) placed Program 437 on a 30-day recall status. + 31 Dec 70 (U) 10 ADG redesignated as the 10 ADS. n1

79 Aug72 (U) Hurricane Celeste caused substantial damage JI to facilities on ;¡1i Johnston Island.

10 Aug 74 @ USAF Program Management Directive (pMD) 30-0 5002 + (1) /124I F terminated Program 437 as an independent activity and consolidated it under the Thor Missile Launch Support Program. * 01 Apr 75 S) Program 437 officialty deactivared. + * +t + .t .) I I + + + xlv t**x**,i æ|¡F|FfË **¡r¡(,¡*,r +

* ü :l ¡***rt* ***'¡r*)ß -¡lES FI CIIAPTER I i Sputnik and the Reluctant ASAT (U) (U) On 4 October 1957 , the Soviet Union launched a basketball-sized metal r sphere into orbit around the Earth, and the United States received the greatest shock to its national psyche since Pearl Harbor. Reaction ranged from open anxiety to unruffled complaêency. Democratic Senator Henry M. Jackson of I Washington called it "a week of shame and danger," whiie the New York Times warned that "rockets capable of performing the satellite feat must be assumed capable of delivering atomic and hydrogen bombs many thousands of miles." Yet, rl Clarence Randall, Presidential Special Assistant for Foreign Affairs, casually dismissed Sputnik as a "silly bauble," while Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson advised, "Nobody is going to drop anything down on you from a satellite while you rl are asleep, so don't. worry about it." In his fi¡st post-Sputnik press conference, President Eisenhower declared, "Now, so far as the satellite is concerned, that does rl not raise-my apprehensions one iota."1 (U) While attempting to,calm public fears. by downplaying the Russian achievement, American civilian and military leaders were nevertheless genuinely rt concerned by what it portended. Two months before, on 26 August, the Soviets had announced their acquisition of a workable inte¡continental ballistic missile (ICBM). The 55-6 rocket had a ¡ange of 3,500 nautical miles, and with proper basing it could reach all of Europe and the northeastem part of the United States:2 I The Eisenhower administration publicly questioned the truth of the Soviet claim to such a weapon and dismissed it as a crude prototype, whiie affirming that a corresponding American weapon system was making good progress toward I operational deployment. Sputnik I seemed. to belie those assurances, while demonstrating that Soviet rocketry had advanced fu¡ther than most people in the Free Wo¡ld had anticipated. It also made it nearly impossible for .the American I govenìmelt to keep its concerns over the Soviet advances confined to internal discussions. What had earlie¡ been regarded as a distant, slightly fantastic area of pure speculation had now become a volatile political issue.t On 3 November 1957, r the Russians surpassed their first triumph by orbiting Sputnik II, an 1120-pound craft that carried a canine passenger. Premier NiiUnited States Army's resident GeÌman rocket expert, Dr Wernher von Braun, r noted the grim impiications of a sateilite bombardment system in mid-December testimony before the Senate Preparedness Committee and warned the nation could be in "mortal danger" should the Soviets acquire such a capability.s + (U) President Eisenhower was .orr."*ed about the Soviet Union's apparent progress, but remained skeptical.of any immediate threat. He accepted the view t of his scientific advisers,.who denigrated the basic concept of orbital weapon systems. Eisenhower did not link satellites to military power per se, and this disassociation manifested itself in his conception of the American space program \,veapons t as a whole. The veteran soldie¡ did not want to see in space. In his 9 October 1957 press con-ference on Sputnik he had closed his rema¡ks by stressing that "Outer Space shaìl be used only for peaceful, not military purposes."u t

'¡Ii (U) This determined idealism had already ensured that the Soviets ivould orbit the first earth satellite. On 26 May 1953, Eisenlower had endorsed the t.t ,.'i ,,,.Í National Secudty Council's (NSC) approval of a proposal to launch a satellite during the planned.International Geophysical Year of 1957-58. Two conditions were attached to the White House's support of the project: (1) the peaceful ; purposes of the satellite must be emphasized, and (2) no missiie designed for military purposes could be. utilized as a launch vehicle for the satellite. ,.Also, research on the satellite program was not to be allowed to interfere with any fùture r Department of Defense (DOD) missile programs. Although the DOD would be tasked with suppo¡ting the launching of the satellite, its payload would be totally scientific in nature. Necessiry would eventually fôrce a change in the "no military I.t boosters" proviso, but in the spring of 1953 it was judged irrevoeable.T

(U) Eisenhowerrs rejection of military hardware handicapped the satellite t I effort from the start, for it excluded use of such potential boosters as the Air Fo¡ce's Atlas ICBM or the Army's Jupiter IRBM. While the troubled Vanguard program rocket lurched along as the nation's designated satellite lifter, the Army's rI rocketry effort forged ahead. In September 1956, a Jupiter C made a successful lift-off, flight, and reentry on the Atlantic Missile Range, demonstrating that a ifi" workable launch vehicle already existed. Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald M. fiir: r ì,;,;, Quarles later estimated that the Army could have put a satellite aloft as much as ii two years ahead of time had it been given free rein. As it was, the Defense Department continued to shun using the Army's booster, and come October. 1957, I Sputnik ¡oared aloft. Two months later Vanguard exploded and burned,on its launching pad as the world watched. Not until January 1958 was the Army alkjwed to mate its Jupiter with a satellite and send it into orbit. Even then, P¡esident I Eisenhowe¡ rejected the martial-sounding "Top Kick" appeltation for the satellite, calling it instead "Explorer I."E This method of entering space may have been clumsy and wasteful of both time and treasure, but it largely presewed the national ¡ ideal of a cosmos untainted by weapons. Having resisted any military connection with the satellite effort until forced to do so by the press of events, Eisenhower and I I his advisors also sought to minimize its potential when agitation began for a well- defined milil¿ry mission in space.t

(U) Suspicious of what he saw as the miiitary's endless appetite fo¡ new systems and missions, Eisenlowe¡ reiied upon the strategic and technoiogical acumen of his civilian counselors. Chief among t}rem on space-related mattertwas the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC). Founded during the Truman years, PSAC acquired new in-fluence and importance after Sputnik. D¡ James R. Killian, Jr., PSAC Chairman, was also named First Special Assistant for Science 'i..t:-j and Technology on Eisenlowe¡'s staff. Aside f¡om their advisory role to the President, Killian and PSAC membe¡s also influenced a number of important organizational changes: the transformation of the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics (NACA) into the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA); the creation of a highlevel position of Directo¡ of Dèfense Resea¡ch and Engileerilg (DDR&E) in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and the qeation of the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) in rhe same office.,o

(U) PSAC and President Eisenhowe¡'s attitudes towa¡d space as a theater of military operations were expressed during a press conference on 26 March 1958, when Eisenhower. ¡eleased a committee document "Introduction to Outer Space', inlan attempt to "clear up some of the cunent fears and fantasies tharsfutni[ frad engendered." In discussing the potential use of satellites as orbital bomb carriers, the_ PSAC pape¡ dismissed them as "clumsy and ineffective ways of doing a job.i' Although this analysis overlooked the obvious military value of communicationjänd reconnaissance satellites, it did effectively reaffirm the administration's desi¡ê to avoid extending the arms race into a new arena of costly competition between the two: superpov/ers. PSAC members believed that they had a duty to ',ridicule'.the occasional wild-blue-yonder proposals by a few Air Fo¡ce'officers for the exploitalion of space for military pu¡poses." Given the prevailing attitudes in rhe white House, it was not surprising that the earliest attempts to field an antisatellite system met with no success.

fU) The Ajr Force took an understandably more aggressive view of space. A as January 1948, General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Vice Chief of Staff, iisued a nnli¡r¡",-ty cfqfpvnøñt Ihar cfâtzaã nr'+ }ri¡ ¡^*.i^^t. \,r.!rrrr^l-:'- +^tu -^.-^-^:L:t:e.rçJpurròluur¡.y rura^- uçvçrupurBr^--^l^--.-- an earth satellite and to !'determine the military worth of the vehicle." Althóueñ the Ai¡.Force had,no.formally sanctioned spac-e program for the next decade,"it anticip.¿ted dominating such. an effort. Air Force ipace policy at the time. of Sputnik was rooted in four main assumptions: (1) a muihrooming:space,technology was required to support such a program, and that in tu¡n de¡nânded extensiiê research and. development efforts; (2) since it claimed everything above the earth's surface was its operational medium, the Air Force would'enjoy an inherent right to exercise the dominant role in space operations; (3) for thé sake of ciariry-in strategic planning, it was vital to define the Air Fo¡ce mission in space operatiöns; and (4) space would become increasingly more critical for the miiitary r.*ri¡¿ of the united states.1z Although the Eiseiliöwer Administration seemedîot inbline¿ to permit development of a military space program of any appreciable size, the Air ***r** glEl|I rr¡r¡¡¡*+* * 4 rl Force realized that it must keep its options open and well-defined, for future administrations might not share current attitudes. In the meantime, it faced continuing frustration in attempting to expand its role in the infant space program; J and challenges from the Army, whose Ballistic Missile Agency wanted fulI control of the space natlonal _effort on the strength of its successi:l rocket booster program, and the Navy, who also sought a larger role in space. + (U) Some of the turmoil abated on 7.February 1958 when Neil McElroy, the new Secretary of Defense, established the Advanced. Research Projects Agency * (ARPA). Created over the protests of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Housê Armed Services Committee, ARP-A. was intended to quash interservice rivalries by taking control of DOD's proposed space programs. McElroy gave its chief, Roy W. Johnson, broacl powers to function above the level of the competing service chiefs. + He would manage the advanced scientific projects through theiT research and development phases. ARPA utilized the individual services' technical and prosuremelt offices for spending, but possessed its own budget and negotiated + directly with conlractors when necessary. By 1 May atl DOD space projeðts were - ,.$J under its control, and by latç June it had assumed responsibility for à11 Air Force 'sl and Army ballistic missile defense projects, with the eiceptioni of Nike-Zeus and + the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS).1"

_ (U) While the DOD was rnoving ro organize better its space efforrs, + President Eisenïower ¡ernained ambivalent about the American spaòe program,s future course. Whiie he opposed creation of a Department of Space, feaiing¡it would assign_ priority to satellites, he wanted . emphasis piaced òn the, existìng + Tuti,ury missile programs as necessary tools of deteirence.- Although Eisenhowei desired.to keep the existing space program from being.miiitarizpd, ,aithe.same. tirne * he wanted to_-'þut talent, etc, into crash programs outside the .Defense establishment.l'tt P.ublic and governmenfal pressure fõr a major independent space grganization continued to mount, and in an,early February-1958 ca-binet, meåting Vice President Richa¡d Nixon warned Eisenhowér aI that demands. for it would onli increase. The space program. had to feature a strong civilian component, and thÉ scientific community would ally with the Democ¡ãts in demanding that it be ü provided. convinced, Eisenhower. sent an April message to congreis requesting creation of a National Aeronautics and Spãce Administration lNaSai. Th; proposed biìl would give NASA control of all space activities, "excepi those ihat tbe President determined were primarily assocíatèd w.ith national defênse.', Thus, on * 20^ J,¡ly, when the bill became public law, the American space program was officially partitioned into military and civilian segments. The imþetús for an expanded military role increased at once.16 + (U) On 3 July, the National Securiry Council submirted a policy sratemenr on gìlter space to the President. It noted that soviet superiority in ast¡onautics would be unfavorable to the united srates. The NSC stresied the ímmediate needs + for weather, communications, and reconnaissance satellites. '"The notion of space systems _providing .support for operational forces received the beginnings of ligfr, level official sanction in this NSC sanction," noted a RAND Corpõration study ãf + + * il *trr**,¡ ffif *:¡t'¡:r:t¡t '5 the evolvìng space effort. Eisen-hower officially endo¡sed the NSC report on 18 August 1958, and thereby established a dual civilia¡ and military space policy that has endured to the present time. A littie more than six years later the Ai¡ Force would field a rocket-borne nuclear weapon capabie of destroying an orbiting enemy satellite.tT

(U) Perhaps anticipating pro$ess in the military space sphere, the previous January the OSD had required all three services to list their proposed space projects for its review. The Ai¡'Force had cited twenty-six systems or subsystems it deemed essential to national. security. Among them was a satellite interceptor. An antisateliite weapons system had been under Air Research and Development Command (ARDC) study as early as 1956, and Soviet advances since then had convinced the Ai¡ Force that such a system was needed as soon as possible. ARPA assumed responsibility for the antisatellite (ASAT) study while retaining ARDC as project supervisor. Although the PSAC had earlier discounted the use of satellites as bomb carriers, space weapons theorists like von Braun, former Wehrmacht rocketry expert . Major General Walter Dornberger, and Lieutenant General James M. Gavin, forecast the development of a Soviet orbital bombardment capability in the near future. To thern the .obvious best response would be to acquire an inspection and destruction capability before a Soviet device became operational.lô From their official statements it seemed the Soviets considered o¡bitaÌ bombs not only viable weapons, but also useful counterweights against American influence overseas. They deliberately linked the issues of nuclear weapons deployment in space to American ove¡seas bases. In response to Eíiênhower's proposals on a¡ms control, P¡emie¡ Nikolai Bulganin declared:

'.;i.':r i' One cannot fáil to see that in raising the question of bann-ing the use of cosmic space for military purposes, the United States is making an attempt, through a ban on the intercontinental ballistic rocket, to . ward off a,nuclear retaliatory blow through cosmic space while maintaining its numerous military bases on foreign territories intended for attacking the Soviet Union and the peaceful states f¡iendly to it with nuclear weapons.tt rr--r--_j_ --rr--¡ f-- n--- -L - --t--L:^_ ^¡ 4L- :----,^ :- ^---^r .DUrBAIIII.I (;¿llreu rur SU(;U ¿ SUrt¡UUrl Ur UrË PrUUrËrU. A5 WUUrU lrr.SurË ur EqUAr .measure the security of the U.S.A, the Soviet Union and all other. states. This would be served by such a measure as the banning of the use of cosmic space for 'bases military purposes with the simultaneous eliminàtion of foreign on the territories of other countries, first and foremost in the te¡ritories of Europe, the Middle East and North Africa." This Soviet offer of an empty pledge not to orbit nuclea¡ weapons in exchange for the withdrawal of American forces f¡om all overseas bases was repeated in November 1.958 before the United Nations Gene¡al Assembly when diplomat Valerian Zortn tied the issue to progress on arms control.20

(U) In August 1959, the Air Fo¡ce Ballistic Missile Division (AFBMb) issued a preliminary development plan for a Satellite Intercept and Inspection

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System (SAINT). The plan called for development of several different system + configurations: unmanned and ground-launched, unmanned and airlaunched, and manned. This broad proposal r,vas reduced to one system by the Air Staff due to the high cost of developing multiple systems; and it requested a revised plan to + demonstrate the feasibility of a ground-launched, unmamed orbital vehicle featuring rendezvous and inspection capabilities.2l + (U) The conception of SAINT took place against a broader background of organizational change. That spring Headquarters USAF had assigned the rl Directorate of Advanced Technolog¡r (established in July 1958 under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Development) to coordinate within the Air Staff all USAF space activities, incÌuding those in support of ARPA and NASA. In June ARPA recommended a Mercury Task Force to assist NASA in its manned orbital + program, and the Secretary of Defense proposed a reassignment of responsibilities among the services fo¡ such satellite programs as MIDAS and Sentry.' The Army * and Navy supported the task force concept and also proposed the c¡eation of a Defense Astronautical Agency to control space systems fielded by the DOD. The Air Force was adamantly., opposed on all counts.22 Tlte service's stubborn a adherence to its own goals paid off that September when Secretary McElroy killed both the proposed Mercury Task Force and the Defense Astronautical Agency. He then reversed previous poliry and reassigned the military space progiam from aI ARPA s control to that of the three services. MIDAS and Sentrv rèveited to the Air Force, along with Project Discoverer."'?3

(U) aI By February 1960, the Air Staff had carefully reviewed the problems of space defense, and the SAINT program in particular, before forwarding its recommendations to the Secretary of the Air Force. ..Eariy in April.the.Ai¡ Force * requested approlf to construct a prototype SAINT demonstrãtion system as .a I supplement to ARPA studies funded by the Air Force; By,mid-June,Di york had given his consent to a . demonstration of engineering feasibility. Work on the prototype SAINT was to be restricted to development, not flightiesting, of critical * subsystems. Total support of the program would be driwn frorn- Air Force re-sou¡ces.'". To.satlsfy York's requirements a ¡evised SAINT plan was offered for official rwiew ìn_July., At tbat time Unclersecretary of thè Air Force Joseph + Char.fk directed that all ¡eferences to .a 'tkill" capabilrty in the system be excisËd, rêstricting the technical effort to inspection capabilities only. This action was in response to the President's "Space for Peace" program. The plan, retitled Satellite Inspectic'n (but + System retaining the "SAINT" acrònym), wenì to OSD in Jr-rly, and received approval I month later.25 +

' (u) (Missile * . MrDAS Defense Ala¡m system) and sentry were, respectivel¡ missile rvarning and photographic recon¡aissaice satellite programs conceived irthe 1958-59 perioã. I

qÐ Pro,ject Discoverer was ¡¡ R&D - --_" satellite which pe¡formed space research in support of the ¡* MIDAS and Sentry programs and for future man-in-space projects. aI + 7

(u) Although approved, the sAINT program sti[ treaded on uncertain ground. Many saw any move toward deployinf even defensive space *.;;;; :yf:Ts as. dangerously provocarive. Oìr it óecember 1959, d, C"oigð-Ë. Kistiakowsky, a PSAC member and Dr Killian's successor as the president,s science-Advisor, had attended a meeting of the Harvard Law school Fo-Ã. 'ir," topic of discussion was ourer o=ne of the participr"t., c"ã.g" Èåìår""i, deiive¡ed an- -space. intense, if muddlèd, speech on the'dangeis or'militaiizing spãcË. Feldman, a former chief counsel to ihe House select cr-ommitt.. on o"t"", iïã." and a subsequent member '¡-, . j of .the American delegation to tlrl ù"it"ã-ñ;i;, adv.ocated the right of peaceful passage fo¡ alr satãilites, but attacked t¡" ui.-or '.' nxrrtary reconnaissance satellites. In the next breath he emphasized the critical ,i. ri d_qnger the nation faced f¡om soviet orbital bombardment systems. d,'s-lssir* Kistiakowsþ's rebuual rhat such weapons i.pro.iiãáì. ini ,il;üi;;;? critics 1very lighry such as Feldman seizing rpon- the SArNT"prágram was cause for geîuine concern in both the oSD and thè Air Force. Higtrtfeducated luñ";,"i;in;à ill-informed and anxiety-prone about the p.ospect"oÉ space weaponrv. and exDert scientists remained disdainful of any potentiaÍ soviet space threat ¿.iñii;i ..the. American military,s moves to,cõunter it.26 """d

(u) A little , more than a month after his discussion at Harvard, -D^r Kistiakowsþ_clashed--. with Richard Morse, a special Assistant ro the s.c."ln* or rne Army to¡ Research and Deveropment. Morse hoped to upstage both the Aii lgil.g-ild",h" Soviets by modiSing ìhe Nike-zeus abrrl ,yrt"* T; ;h;iã"*" satellrtes lrom the Armv's testing base on Kwajalein Isiand in the pacific. Kistiakowsþ recalled in úis memoi¡s:

emphasized my unalterable, opposition to the project which he I rned ou ln a memo to me, of shooting down a sateliite, because once we had downed our own satellite, aãd of cou¡se maáe much to_do about it, the Soviets could easily shoot down one of thei¡ o*r, ouài the Sovietter¡itory, accuse us of doing it, and make u tig p"bfi;ir"å ot tt, which would then give them an excuse for shootìí! down oui reconnaissance satellites.

Although SAINT had been redueed to an insnectinn r,-¿r¡ral,ili¡., +L^ -..L^r^ :r ,^,ï,r_o_re.rq1ytgu¡:'l;lqyñ;;;";*ilrï's;äåä'i;i;;'ir,iå^ñ1,, ^^ flousel,r^':j:i.:f as carrytng unacceptable risks.,,

(u) The issue unexpectedly arose again on 3 February 1960, when the white House rearnecl ot the appearance of an unidentified. but presumabrv Soviet sarellrte in -barth orbit. when Kistiakowsþ was querieá on thi matter ór orli.i"i policy. toward "9nemy'r satellites, he admitied theie was none as vet. Two davs later he met with Gordon presideît Gray, Special^National Assistant to the fo¡ Securi'rv Aff3i¡s' to. prepaxe for -thar däy's security òá"r.il Ã""ii"î ;ã-äli anticipated discussion of rhe mystery satellite. Kisíiakowsky cautione? ì¡ãt.ã provocative threats about destroying satellites which overflew a-"ri.ã, t.ün"* should be voiced, lest they give ihe-soviets an excuse to int.rr... *it¡ À;rËi lË ttr,.r*,¡ cËErp tr*¡¡*** 8 E reconnaissance satellite operations. During the subsequent NSC meeting Undersecretary Charyk introduced the Ai¡ Force's plans fo¡ a satellite intelceptol T (presumably SÁINT| and emphasized that it was.designed p¡¡ely to intercept and inspect, anã not to destroy. Kistiakowsþ again voiced his opposition to the development of any sort oi satellite-killer, and President Elsenhower ¡upported government, seem-ed I him. Given such iesistance at the highest levels of the it entirely possible that SAINT might never advance beyond the planning stage.'"

remained reluctant to field such a syslem, the I¡ (U) While the administration '1' Soviet's continued to develop an orbital weapon carrier. By January 1960, Premier "in Nikita Khrushchev was boasting to the Supreme Soviet that he had the hatching Ë stage . . . a fantastic weapon." By that point the Soviets had conf¡onted two major technical problems which required solution before a workable orbital bombardment system could be deployed: first, the satellite must be made to deorbit and reenter tLe atmosphere, and secondly, a large warhead must be developed and tested for I use in the system, since an orbital weapon was inherently less accurate tharr a¡ trCBM, and iequired a more powerful wãrhead to assure the target's destruction.2s ."ì;, The successful recovery of Sputnik V, a Vostok-class deo¡bital satellite, in August I 1.960 seemed to solve the problem of wa¡head reentry. The massive space capsule could just as easily have been brought down in North Ameríca as in the USSR, and bearing a lethal payload as well. Soviet physicists we-re hard at work on the task I of providing a high-yield warhead for such a system.3o (U) Eisenhower and Kistiakowsþ realized the implicit potential of Soviet T space flights for military purposes, but found,themselves severely constrained',in their choice of options for countering any future deployments of Soviet military space systems. The,highty effective:but potentially.wlnerable IJ-2 reconnaissance I airc¡aft was near,ing the end of its operational usefulness for such missions over hostile territory, as would be painfully demonstrated in May 1960 when the Soviets brought one down over Sve¡dlosk. The United States,would soon be vitally I dependent upon reconnaissance satellites for timely strategic intelligence. It could not afford to give the Soviets any excuses to interfere with those precious assets. Premie¡ Khrushchev would subsequently issue a public. warning that American E "espionage" sateliites could be "paralyzed and rebuffed." The testing and deployment. of an American system such as SAINT could conceiv_ably elicit a violent Soviet response against the vulnerable intelligence satellites.'' I (U) Eisenhower was probably relieved to hand the entire problem over to his young successor in January 1961. John F: Kemedy's election had hinged in t part upon his criticism of the Republicans for allegedly permitting the Soviets to seize a lead in the missile ¡ace. Once in office, however, the new administratiòn followed a sirnila¡ course of restraint. Although Kennedy and Secretary of Defense I Robert S. McNamara acknowledged the legitimacy of military space concerns, they were. reluctant to grant the Air Force a free rein in developing its stable of projects.'2 T t t I rrrrtrrl T tfiÈ+$ 9

T (U) Like Eisenhower, Kennedy did not want to be drawn into an expensive and potentially destabilizing race for rnilitary supremacy in space. In his inaugural addrèss he called upon the Soviet Union to "let both sides seek to invoke the I wonders of science instead of its terrors. Together let us explore the stars, conquer the deserts, eradicate disease." In March 1961, he responded to a Congressional inquiry'my on the space program's direction by answering, "It is not ûow nor has it ever F beèn intention to subordinate the activities of NASA to those of the Department of Defense." Although SAINT remained in active reseatch, and the Ai¡ Force Dyna-Soar space bomber program was in development, NASA was to remain the nation's primary space agency, and all military projects would rÌ accordingly be kept on a tight rein.1 :'l I into @F) Despite Kennedy's reluctance to see the arms race extended F space, the Air Force continued to covet an effective ASAT capability. That same Ma¡ch the Ai¡ Defense Command issued a formal Qualitative Operational Requirement (QOR) for a Satellite Interceptor System (SIS). The document I included interception, outlined an operational mission for the system that inspection, and determination if an unknown satellite was hostile. "Upon determination that an unknown satellite is in fact'hostile, the neutralization, I destruction and/or de-orbiting of same will be accomplished." Whatever fo¡m such I a, system might evehtually assume, the Air Defense Command had issued an unequivocal statement of operational necessity for it in that first winter of the I the Kennedy presidency. Befo¡e his tragically brief span in office was completed, nation would have â less sophisticatðd bui stitl lethal satellite negation capability.'z ir American military space progam, Keruredy was still hostage to the sweep of events, 'a¡d his thinking about space receivèd sober ¡eassessment in the wake of another T stunning Soviet triumph. Ot 12 April 1961, Major Yuri Gagarin orbited the Earth in Vostok I and safely retumed to the Soviet Union. ."It was the sputnik crisis all over again except that there'"vas now a space agency," remarked one scholar. The ; Soviet accomplishment moved Kennedy to assign to NASA a manned lunar landing mission to be carried out before the end of the decade. It also meant the Russians had completely mastered the problem of making an orbital vehicle reenter the ¡ atmosphere upon command and impact in a predetermined area. When Vostok II carrieri Major Gherman Titov into orbit the foiiowing nugust, the Soviets deliberately chose to emphasize the flight's military implications. Both Tass and F Krasnava Zvezda openly linked the Vostoks with a bomb delivery capability. At a celebratory meeting in Moscow, Khrushchev boasted, "We placed Gagarin and Titov in spacei and we can replace them with bombs which can be diverted to any place on earth."3 +r .. (U) By early 1.961, Unde¡ Secretary of the Air Force Charyk had estabüshed I a working group to study the total Air Force space program. Simultaneously, planning was underway to consolidate SAINT goals of interception and inspection with the NASA Mercury II (Gemini) program objectives of docking and transfer I of astonauts. A tentative proposal for a joint NASA/USAF program was frai'irêd, rffä|F I *** * * **.iFIE. * * *,¡*,t't * 10 + but SAINT continued to develop independently as prescribed in the 1.960 plan, with e;ipectations pegged to a first lau-nch in July 1963.36 + (U) Although the April 1961 creation of Air Force Systems Command (AFSC) and its subordinated Ballistic Systems Division and Space Systems Division expedited progress on such systems as SAINT, a dearth of funding and the new + administrationls caution prevented the Ai¡ Force from rnoving as quickly as it felt necessary. The proposed SAINT/Gemini merger foundered because of conflicting military and scientific needs. . SAINT suwived as a program, but controversy * erupted over the greater military role in space in the wake of the Vostoks' flights. Ten of Titov's seventeen orbits had taken him over North America, prompting General Laurence S. Kuter, NORAD commander, to state: "This had advanced the era of a requirement for an anti-satellite weapons system which + can deal with

I an armed enemy satellite."3' I

I (U) The Kennedy administration found itself heavy + under c¡iticism from l!:: ': opponents of its space policy. Robert Hotz, editor of Aviation Week and Space .;-... it:,' Technolog,r¿, scored the goye rment in a September 1961 editorial for substituting 1,". , the "vague and less urgent demands of pure scientific research fo¡ the vital urgency + . required for development of new military weapons." Hotz argued that "if the rnilitary role in this program is defined as merely using its already substantial * facilities and capability in space technology to support a program limited to civil I scientific goals, we shall indeed face serious trouble as the chalienge of Soviet military space becomes more apparent and Russian capabilities approach rhe operational phase." Ten days later T¡evor.Gardner, a former Assistant Secretary + of the Air Force for Research and Development, addressed a meeting of the Air Force Association and pointed out that,it was well within the cur¡ent. Soviet capability to begin o¡biting nuclear weapons. His criticisms of national,space policy + were seconded at the meeting by Walter Dornberger and General Bernard Schriever of the Air Force. T'I (U) Schriever persisted in his public agitation for an expanded military space mission, delivering appeals in counterpoint to the surprise Soviet tests of multi- É megaton \¡/eapons that September and October. On Columbus Day 1961, he told I a rneeting of the American Rocket Society that such weapons could easily be orbited by cuÍent Soviet launch vehicles and insisted thar it was "artificial" to !ì: sepa¡ate peaceful and military aI research in space.3e His criticisms stung the administration, and it replied the following evening when Vice President LyncÌon, B. Johnson addressed the rocket sociery. "We are developing the peaceful uses of

outer space from choice," said Johnson, "but a1 we are working on the military u_ses of outer space from necessity. The diffe¡ence is basic, not superficial. And it is permanent and not temporary.'r Johnson's message was clear. Prudent members of the military would no longer publicty challenge official space polìcy. "In this I lr manner the curtain rang down . . . \Mith the miJitary silenced and a peaceful expression _stamped on the face of the national space program," noted Robert Salkeld in War and Space.' r *****,r,*{ll¡lÈ ***:ri*+,ß t

r11 * * * t t * r {ll¡¡ÉË, * ¡È r* * ¡¡ * 11

(U) While SAINT limped along in secret development and the Air Defense Command continued to request a satellite interceptor, President Kennedy repeatedly emphasized his desire to keep space demilitarized. In an October address to the United Nations General Assembly, he called for agreements banning nucle ',veapons form space. As the new year opened, a growing skepticism of Soviet capabilities took hold within the Defense Department, and the standing policy of downplaying the military space program deepened. In late March 1962, the Air Force requested additional funding to support more test launches for SAINT and a boost to the FY 63 funding for the program. Both requests were i l-,' re¡'ected, and on 28 June the Director of Defense Research and Engineering officially challenged SAINTs value, citing the lack of hard intelligence on Soviei o¡bital bombs. The program remained intact, but the¡e was still no sense of a clearly defined need or ¡ole fo¡ such a system in the DOD's strategic vision.o'

(U) In September President Kennedy reemphasized the administration's position on the utilization of space in a speech at Rice University, during which he declared that "we have vowed that we shall not see space filled with weapons of .mass destruction but with instruments of knowledge.and understanding." Deputy Secretary of.Defense Roswell Gilpatric commented about the same time that "an anns race in space will not contribute to our security. I can think of no greater stimulus for a Soviet thermonuclea¡ arms effort in space than a United States commitment .to such a program. This we will not do." From the public pronouncements made by its spokesmen, it seemed that the Kennedy administration believed that a decla¡ation of national abstention and deemphasis en dsfgnsive syste-ms to oppose such weapons would elicit a spirit of reciplocity from the Soviets.az

(U) This policy of reliance upon Soviet fo¡bearance received a jolting shock that October as the Cuban Missile Crisis erupted. With Soviet intermediatè range ballistic rnissiles and jet bombers based in Cuba ro outflank North America,s eaily warning systems, it seemed entirely possible that the Russians might also opt to loft nuclea¡ weapons into orbit to gain an added edge over the Americans' dete¡rent forces. Ironically, the fi¡st test of an American ASAT occu¡red, quite unintentionally, that month as the Ak Force and the Atomic Energy Commission

(U) Meanwhile, the official Soviet publications discussed the legal and strategic ¡amifications of ASAT systems. A volume on space law published in 1962 r**llt* gæ :t¡i*'¡t*t r I t2 I foreign Dosed a lesal case for satellite destruction, arguing that the overilights_ of L-.;;;;;;"; slacecraft viotated soviet nationalsovereignry. In such i.nstance¡ its airspace agalnst such- I to defend the aggrieved naiion had an "indisputable" _right il;.1-;t. Another official pubtication, Military Strategy, P{nled a^ picture of American designs'in space, and a subsequent, ed_ition.of the same the timely._ detection ot enemy I võiume"nni"iii"" called for "corresponding means assuring lyOJ' soace eoui'ment and its iapid destruction or neutralization." ln f ebruary ö;fñ;lçfft;t Vl¿i"ourú an¡ounced the formation of a special ASAT division Force), designated as the protivo Komisecheskaya I ãr1î"¡vgsrr_a¡y (Air Defense ffi(4gÑ cosrnic Attack), lnicn was to be equippeg.with."special õ ."rnrp.ì sãtelite fighters and oíher flfng apparatus armed with rockets and lpperatus."oo I radio-elóctronic

(U) Even though the Soviets were pressing for an announced ASAT the Americaî SAINT program coniinued to call for a demonstration of I capabiùW1 ãrürtãlìíip".tton capability only.'Nõplans for an op^erational systemhad yet been ã"otåue¿"^tut rhat d'id noidetér the other services from proposing their own pet i'. . .l - ÁdaT projects. The Navy.campaigned for q system- (called Early Spring) dertved I iã- tfi" Éolaris submariíìè-iaunctrl¿ bailistic missile program, but it died in the of its experimentaì stase. The Army'Cïled placed great hope on an adaptation Ñit.-Z."ut"fá".ninn .{BM system. Piogram 505, it posited a modified missile which I corrld reactr out fór 1,200 miles to kJJl satellites ãt an altitude of 200 miles, with ãpãtãtio"¡ deploynent of the systern-possible.as.e:tly o.t 1967' InMay.19.62,, i'..r.tury McNämära approved t"he Nike-Zeus ASAT testing. program, 3ld \ii"iÌ t ¡ónun both White Sänds Missile Range, New Mexico, and on Kwajalein Atoll "í :, I (U) As SAINT lurched along toward a dimly see-n horizon, Air Fò¡9,e phnneìs ixamined the need for a-successor system with a direct-ascent kill iapability. The problem was that there was still confusion in the DOD over the I ÃSeT coicept. In June, DDR&E's Dr Harold Brown had quashed ".riit"expansion of the SAINT launch testing.ploglam, saying that there.was no need for an early system capability for satellite inspection or negation, and rglterating th¿t t a strictly- R&D basis.''+" 'ttrii p.'ogiu- should próceed only at anìrderly PT-e ón rilhilË nräwn was calling for restrãint, Secretary McNamara was exhorting,the Air Force to ',get on with i-he SAINT program," having noted an anticipated Soviet t ASAT capãbility and the resultant need for the United States to be able to warn, "If you shäot doïn one of ours we will shoot down one ofyours.". A perplexed Air Foice Chief of Staff, General Curtis LeMay, pointed out these inconsistencies to ¿ t secretary ztcker| that July, prior to the cuban Missile-crisis,. and ¿sked. fbr clearer siatement of priorities. Aware that Brown had earlie-r endo¡sed the.Ar-r-nY's ASAT testing p.ogtát t, the_ Air Force may have hoped to force a compreherisive I review of the èntiie issue.oT €.By this time the increasingly problem-plagued SAINT was viewed with was therefore I declining'enihusiasm even by its Aii Folce patrons. The Air Staff receptivã when AFSC issued-Advancéd Devèlopment Objective 40, "Anti-Satellite *r.***,** ** I SÇþ****i t FI 73 !l¡ 1962 in response to ADC's previously stated need for an I Program," on 9 February ASAT capability. On 12 September, a prelirninary plan for the program was I forwarded to Secretary Zuckert. He was c¡itical of the system's proposed destruction capability, which depended upon a nuclear warhead mounted atop a Tho¡ IRBM booster launched f¡om Johnston Island in the Pacific Ocean. Air t Force Systems Command projected a series of fou¡ test launches occurring over the course of a year to make the system operational against satellites at any inclination and altitudes up to 900 nauiical miles. An estimated $25 million would be I required for development costs aûd procurement of six operational Tho¡s. Zuckert ordered a fully documented version of the plan be subrnitted to him as soon as I possible.ou (U) By mid-December, Zuckert had reviewed the plan. OSD informed him that "some version of your proposal (the Thor ASAT) appears to be the fastest way of obtaining an increased capability on range and altitude beyond that which will |l be available f¡om the Nike-Zeus installation on Kwajalein (Program 505).' A .l revised Space Systems. Division plan was forwarded to DDR&E s Brown on 6 February 1963, and on 12,April he,approved it. The tentative Thor development t program was 'lirnited to a fou¡-Iaunch feasibility demonstration slated for early .1964. Although Brown initially approved $6 million in FY 63 and $11 million in FY 64 funds for the effort, this sum was subsequently adjusted by OSD to total |l ,$16 million from the FY budget only.o'

I (U) By February L963, Secretary Z:uckert had officially designated the effórt F as "Program 437," and just over a week later, on 15 February, the DOD directed the Air Force to prepare for an "operational standby capability foilowing the intercept demonst¡ation." A new operational concept plan was quickly drafted and I submitted ro Ztrckefi, who quickly accepted it.' In a memo to the Chief of Staff I he remarked: F I have just reviewed Program 437 and wish to reemphasize the fact that development of an operational capability to negate satellites has top priority among defense programs. Action must be taken, ts tlerefore, to insure that the necessary resources are allocated to ¡ì-rù\- LU ËXPËUILC gUUUUçt Ul^î LL-lnç rçòç¿1rsr1,--^^-^l- inlu--l uçYçluPllrçllll^--^t^--^-¿ , demonstrations: and the establishment of an emergency ope¡ational T capabrllty." (U) Zuckert's new-found enthusiasm for the ASAT system may have been T rooted in a change of attitude in the White House about the necessity fo¡ such'a weapon, for in early }ú.ay 1963, President Kennedy directed the DOD to develóp an ASAT system "at the earliest practicable time." The precise reasons fo¡ the T administrations's abrupt change of heart on the ASAT issue ¡emain unknown, and there r as apparently some lingering reluctance felt by Secretary McNamara even after the White House consented to the fielding of Program 437. I-ate in 1963, as work proceeded on the project, McNamará-attended a meeting that was intended t to review the need fo¡ (and political sensitivity of) Program 437. Colonel Harry E. F tI I ti +*:r,r!r {Elf. *rt t rtr 14

Evans, Chief, Research and Development Division, J-5, was present from the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Also attending were Dr B¡own of DDR&E, Under Secretary of Stâte g. 4lsxis J6hnson, and Edward R" Murrow, Director of the U.S. Information Agency.st

. (U) Secretary McNamara remained concerned with what he felt was the extreme political sensitivity of the nuclear-armed ASAT system. "By that time the JCS had stated a requirement for a military capability to destroy a bomb in orbit, should one be placed there by the Soviets," ¡ecalled Colonel (later Major General) Harry L. Evans in 1986. "Most of the civilian leadership of both the State and Defense Depa¡tments were very nervous about even having a program of research or development fo¡ something like 437,let alone the prospect of having such a system operationally ready and manned by 'blue suiters.' Certainly the aspect of detonating a nuclear weapon in space was politically unattractive to them."s2

(U) The participants weighed the pros and cons of the system's technical feasibility and political utility at great length, but "afte¡ considerable discussion it was appa¡ent that most of those present were against such a political liability," noted Evans. The issue seemed decided until, "at that point, Ed Murrow, heretofore quiet and puffing on his ever-present cigarette, made the following statement (essentially), 'If the Soviets place a bomb in orbit and threaten us and if this administration has refused to develop a capability to destroy it in orbit, you will see the first impeachment proceeding of an American President since A¡drew Johnson.'"s3

' (U) At least two minutes passed in total silence following Murrow's warning, and then Secretary McNama¡a was reported to.have testily. remarked, 'rWelllr it doesn't cost much, and the JCS want it, so let's approv e 437.". Tlne contextr of McNamara's remarks, as related by Evans, indicate that while in concept the pro$aûÌ was seen as a political menace by the OSD, there was also tacit agreement that not having it might, under certain circumstances, mean politicai suicide. That the fate of Program 437 was stiil being debated at least six months after it was approved by DDR&E, and in the wake of President Kennedy's admonition to the DOD to field an operational ASAT quickly, seemed to indicate the project was still viewed with deep apprehension. The irony was that within a year the same administration would be holding up Program 437 to public view as proof of its prescience in defense matters. By that time, an obscu¡e little spit of coral in the Pacific would have become the home of the Free World's only operational ASAT system and the culmination of an effort that had unfolded with surprising speed and efficiency once the dete¡mination had been made to lel it proceed.to +*¡¡tt.r *r**¡¡)¡:r E ÇT I 15 NOTES I (All Notes are Unclassified) Chaoter I

L. Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower the President (New Yorlq 1984), pp 426-30; Eugene M. Emme' I Between anq the Shuttjg:-.New "Presiåents and Space,'i ia Frederick C. Dura¡t lll, ed., Sputnik Perspectives on Arirerican Astronautics (Sal Diego, 1981), pp 19-22; Herbert York, Race tq OÞli.ign: ÃTãEãouof. vi"* òf th" À.-t Ru"" Ñew York, 1970), pp 106-08; Willian H. Schauer,IhgBsllis! I New York, 1976), p 44; Cass Schictle, ) the Eighties (Washington, D.C., 1983), pp 45-47; Robert Salkeld, War and Snace (Englewood Clitts' New Jersey, 1970), pp 131-35; Robert G. Mason, ed., !IEL!¡-.$!gçs (Alexandria' Virginia, 1983), pp 1214; William E. Burrows, Deen Black I (New York, 1988), pp 88-90.

2. Robert P. Berman and Job¡ C. Bai

i t 8. rbid.

I 9. Ambrose, Eisenhowe¡ the President. p 458. t f0. Ibid.; James R. Killia4 Jr., Assistant to the President for Science and Technolog¡ (Cambridge, Massachusetts, L917), pp r Ausenstein. Evolution. oo 7L-L2. 1.1. Killian, Soutnik. pp lD, 123'24, L23,296'97. I 12. Lee Bowen, "The Th¡eshold of Space: The Air Force in the National Space Program' 1945-1959" (Washington, D.C., 1960), pp 76-17. r| 13. Ibid.; Ambrose, op 423-291AuÃenstein, Eyqlglig!, pp 10-1.1. 14, Ausenstein. Evolution. DD 11-14.

; 15. Killiarq Soutnik, pp 129-39; Schictle, National Soace P¡oqram. pp 50-54; Ambrose, Eisenhower the President- oo 458-59.

16. Ambrose, Else¡hpweli¡s-Eres{þû, pp a58-59' ; l ¡,*** r( * * ¡æ ¡t***:r ¡¡ ¡r I ; * r * *rr r dl¡lFxr * r ri ¡rr t 76

17. Augenstein, Evolution, p 12.

18. Augenstein, Evolution, pp 12-14; Bowen, "The Tb¡eshold of Space," pp 78-22i Max Rosenberg, "Tle Air Force in Space, 1959-L960" (Washington, D.C.: 1962) pp ¿10-41; Salkeld, Wa¡ and Space, pp L22-24; James M. Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Age (New York, 1958), pp 16-77,224.

19. Salkeld, Wa¡ and Peace. pp 16-17.

20. Ibid., pp L23-24.

21. Rosenberg, "The Ai¡ Fo¡ce in Space," p 41.

22. Augenstein, Evolution, pp 1.1-15.

23. rbid.

24. Rosenberg, "The Air Force in Space," pp 4L-42; Curtis Peebles, Battle for Soace (New york, 1es3), pp 99-102.

25. Rosenberg, '"The Ai¡ Force in Space," pp 41-42.

26. Kistiakowsþ, A Scienti (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1976), pp 195-96. n. Ibid., pp 229-30.

28. Ibid, pp 239-q,245-46.

29. Salkeld, Wa¡ and Soace. pp 12Ar25,137-38,

30. Ibid. i ;: 31. Kistiakowsþ, A Scientist, pp 245,333-36;Schauer, Politics, p,16.

32. Enme, "Presidents a-ud Space," pp 50-51.

33. rbid.

14. lpt (S-1.{F/_D_PC-L OADR), Headquarters Air Defense CommantJ, eualitative Operational Requireme¡t (QOR) for a Satellite Interceptor System, 23 Mar 61.

35, Em_me,-"Presidents and Space," pp 50-51; Salkeld, War and Space, pp 724-25; peebles, Battle for Spacg,61-62.

36. Carl Berger, "The Ai¡ Force in Space, Fiscal Year 1962,, flVashington, D.C.: 1966) pp 94-95.

37. "Russian over North America Rekindles Anti-satellite Need," NORAD News service, No. 11 (1g August 1961).

38. Robert Hotz, "The Military in Space Role-I,' Aviation Week and Space Technoloev, September 11, 1961, p 1; Russell{ãwkes,'tHighntio;ry1\a@ and Space Technoloqv. October 9, 1961, p 30i Salkeld, War and Soace. pp 1a0-a1.

39. Salkeld, War and Snace. o 'I44. I +r*,¡*¡*!* ¡n¡tf' '¡**a,¡a¡ t 77 40. rbid.

41. Ibid.; AFSC History Office, "SSD Data Book, July-December L962, Prr:t II: Space Programs," I pp 23-25. t 42. Salkeld, Wa¡ and Soace, p 1,14. 43. Peebles, Battle for Space, pp 85, 152; Paul Stares, The Militarization of Snace. U.S. Policv. 1945-1984 (Ithaca, New York, 1985), pp 108, 127; Samuel Glasstone and PhTip J. Dolan (eds.), The Effects of Nuclear Weapons (Washingtotr, D.C.,7972), pp a5-47;522-23; ChlckHansen, U.S. Nuclear I Weaoons: The Secret History (Adington, Texas, 1988), pp 84, 86, 117. rl 44. Peebles, Battle for Soace, p 96. 45. Ibid., pp 81-83,96-97iBerger,"The Air Force in Space, Fiscal Year 1962," pp 93-96; Kistiakowsky, A Scientist, p 413. I 46.Berger, "The Ai¡ Force in Space, Fiscal Year L967," pp 95-96. rl 47. rbid. 48. Stares, pp 120-22; (C/OADR) Hist of -Air Defense Command, Jul-Dec 1964, Vol I, pp 32-36.

I 49. Gerald T. Cantwell, "The Ai¡ Force in Space, Fiscal Year L963" flMashfurgton D.C., 1965), pp 77-73. t 50. rbid. 51. Stares, The Milita¡ization of Soace, pp 120-21 Ltr (U), Maj Gen Harry L. Evans, USAF, Ret, to I Dr.rJr'ayae R. Austerma¡, History Offìce, HQ USAF Space Command, 14 February 1986. 52. Ltr (U), Eva¡s to Austerman. . t 53. Ibid. f 54. rbid. rl f T I T I :ê rl,: -,,;., 'ai ' FI *rrrr**{Iür )¡****** n 19 CIIAPTER TI

I Program 437 Development and Operationai Testing (U)

I (U) Cancellation of the t¡oubled SAINT program in December 1962 lrcft Prggram 437 as the Air Force's only space weapons system. The original Adv-anced D-evelopment Objective (ADO-40), issued by the service in February rl 1962, had called fo¡ the "demonstration of the technical feasibility of developing â non-orbital collision-course satellite interceptor system capabie of destioylng satellites in an early time period." Although an ai¡craft-launched system *as- noi t excluded from conside¡ation, AFSC realized that speed of devèlopment ancj deployment were the prime considerations in the program; and in its preliminary plan, submitted to Secretary Zuckerr. in September 1962, it opted to use the provei Thor LV-2D booster as the launch vehicle. Thor was a known quantity and readily r - available in sufficient numbe¡s following its withdrawal from Europe that year.1 t S The operatio_nal plan approved by Z¡¡ckert called for a. dual launch pad complex on Johnston Island to be.used for. demonstration, training, and operatiónal missions. The missiles and support facilities were to- be löcated at t Vandenberg AFB, California. Threè missiles were to be ready for airlift to the island if the need arose for a mission. If deployed to the island, two of the boosters would be counted-down simultaneously, thus providing a backup in case I the primary missile failed to launch successfully. Anticipãted reaðtion time-from the. receipt of the aie¡t orde¡-to launching was two weeks, although subsequent planning called fo¡ a limit of no more than three days for deplotnnent upon reieipt T of warning.2 . @ Some ìnternal Ai¡- Force argument regarding cont¡ol of the program 437 I marked the early stages of the project, but ADC was soon designatjd as the resource l manager, and commander in chief continental Ai¡ Defense command received operational control.3 wrile the technical concepts and lines of authority I were being defined, people and hardwa¡e were brought together. Colonel euentii RieOe. the Svstem Prosram f)irector worked under-"--"'Þ"" tioht ti¡np nnncir¡intc 'Fhraa or four. years'lormal work had to be compressed into-less than eighteen months. As early as 20 March 1963, Secretary Zrckert had di¡ected the úSAF Chief of I to. Staff ensure that. P¡o gam,437 received "top priority among defense programs" by mlking certaiû that AFSC received the necèssary reiources-to expeditè relearch and _development demonstrations and to establish an emergerñy operational I lapability. Brockway McMilian, the Air Force Assistant Secretary for Research and Development, directed that Program 437 rcceive a DX priority (in effect a downward-di¡ected ; Presidential level priority autho¡ization for the aôquisition of confractor-supplied materials), and instructed the System Staff Officê to "bring proble.ms -requiring top level assistance to the attention of the Secretar! immediately for resolution." After years of reluctance to field an operational I ASAT system, it must now be hu¡ried into operation. IF atr**rr ái¡tniF **r**r* n ZO :il @ On 20 April:l96^3, Headquarters AFSC created the 6595th Test Squadron at Vandenberg AFB, Catifornia.^-Assigaed,to the 6595th Aer"qp;;i;;; Wl.g,;" squadron was authorized 18 office¡i and 135 airmen for tire task of ;;il;g t frogr.am 431 operational yl"v sAC veterans of the Thor ptogru"r *.t" ãrurt.o into _the new unit, while ADC èventuatly contribured p"troi"ãi *r,ã r,ãã *"rïã¿ on the BOMARC missile program a few years earriår. SACs +¡botn s"oï*t I leuadron, which had earrièr tiained Royai Air Force Thãr mrrir" ..é* iiji, former guise as the 392d Missile Training squadron, was also dedicated to for a¡sc support of the ASAT project. In adðitio; to personner, sAC was orde.eã1o I provide AFSC wirh the maintenance building *¿ po¿ 7 of the r¡o. tau'c¡ complex. at vandenberg for program 437 Meanwhile, -Telephone usel ¡r tucrr¡iitan na¿ arranged fo¡ Bell Laboratories to herp with the guiào*" I system. Atomic -irt . Energy commission cooperatioh was arso obtained]" anrJ it I tle Alb.ugyïque-based ï:i1g:g l9l, Sandìa Corporation ro rr"rf .ánu.ìt ìrr" reentry vehlcle to an ASAT configuration.s I T Colonel l*:, , , € .Riepe had the enthusiastic support of his superiors, but he would need every bit of energy and enthusiasm thaiËe courd mustei 1.. to .nio." i¡Àt I the program stayed on schedule. Initial plalling called for an ;a".ì.à ãpãriir,lrä by a.lqradron nîg::î, :ii,,"1,"-11 oÌ rzs rñen, including tr,iãã l"rã.À-.rä, jl^_v-,u:,q:ob".lC AFB, with a caretaker ?11:11:: -onty con-iingent manning the I ,onlr,rgn rsrand srte. upon alert notification, two crews and tie miss e svítems deproyed :vout"d gg to the isrand. Two weeks wouid be needed from arert to räunch. I::91*:ll: ,t"-procurement of four Thor nrissrei to ,rppãìi-i-rrã';;*Ë;ã;; I anc testrng pnase_of the program, anothe¡ sixteen were to be acquired from stocks returned to the united states from Great Britain fo[owing têi-i""iiã"-ãi"t.r* IRBM. basing proe'am in rhar counrry. AFSC ;;;ld ;E;.,il;;, iäir;. I': the operationar 1r-ai1 squadron. Baseã upon r"..i;t; fi;;;i l,til ñì;'dl"iiï;,ji;"äà 1963, the schedure calrèd for the ri¡st .oï¡oi i."ãìr*;;;;;í";"'ä#"r""i;i1ì 1964, foltowed by. three more ar approximately ,¡r *."^t"låä")àlil "'r-afiTl operatronar caDabilirv I was srûred 1964, with fuil operationar capouiliry ii,ó following october. for-\fay Éunding required f;,h;;;";;;îas estimated at $55 miilion through Fiscal Year 1967.d r This schedure @ was ambitious enough, but time became an even mo¡e urgent concern on 27 lune.r1hqn Se¡re1qV ñ4cNamara reviewed tf," pf._r'"îã his unhappiness I !!ir+ :p.::T.d wirh the schedulé. He calted tte plonnàa ieuã,io.rti,nJ or ¡wo weeks 10r the ooerational system unacceptabre. l McNamara wantecr the ;, ,, capabiliry to "initiate deitruction or ine satellite-úi'o t.r.pr,on. cail.,, under such conditions total response time wourri be about r-írl.i"'" ¡i*r.î"r.ãø"r, # I more than rwerve hours. afrer receipr of the arerr Ariúo"gh'; ö;iåri; and Engineering l9¡eÏcl representåtiv.pt.r.niot the".ã";. meetiog poinred out rhar target position computation arbne required I thirty_-six hours or,a¿ä't*cùng accurate position b;f-. predictions could bè supptiediMcNamara was stilt aoamãniirràt response time be reduced to the barest mioi-o-.t I I

; I **rltl* Sf,'F tt.¡¡,¡'t'¡ r¡ 2t @ On 21 August, AFSC published a revised plan for Program 437 Phase II. The new concept called fo¡ a squadron to be based at Vandenberg AFB \Mith I permanently assigned support personnel. Technical personnel would be sent on temporary duty to Johnston Isiand on a 90-day rotational cycie to provide a quick reaction time. Total squadron strength was 468 persomel: 79 on the island and I 389 at Vimdenberg. At any given time, 108 of 389 squadron members based at Vandenberg would be TDY to the island. The squadron s inventory was to consist of six missiles: two operationally ready at Johnston Island and four in back-up t status at Vandenberg. The system wouid be operated by ADC under the control of CONAD. After the initial combat readiness launch, three combat training launches per year were authorized to maintain crew proficiency. Initial operational I capability was still planned for May 1964. Equipment includecl 16 launch vehicles (4 for war reserve stockpiling and 12 for training launches); 21 guidance packages; 19 payload assemblies; and 22 warheads. The need for reduced reaction time t inc¡eased 437's cost to $57.277 million through Fiscal Year L967. By the end of 1963 the DOD had approved this operational concept, but ¡educed the numbe¡ of I boosters to be acquired from 16 to 8.o @ The publication and subsequent DOD approval of the revised plan for the operational system clarified matters considerably for Colonel Riepe's I management team. The system consisted of ¡vo launch-ready Thors on Johnston Island with full support facilities and equipment. The essential mission training and support facilities would ¡emain at Vandenberg. Target position data would be I provided by ADC's Space Detection and T¡acking System (SPADATS). The island launch complex and essential support facilities we¡e to be comprised of two launch emplacements with related equipment, including the requisite check-out trailers and T vans. Additionally, there would be a ground guidance station, payload command detonation system, Iaunch control center, direction and targeting centers, and support equipment. Mission safety equipment, payload storage facilities, fuel I storage, a communications cente¡, and general support facilities were also slated fo¡ construction. Conside¡able work had yet to be undertaken to prepare Johnston Island fo¡ Program 437. Although the small island had been the site of earlie¡ nuciear test activities, few facilities remained. Consequently, funds was added to the t FY 63 and 64 defense budgets lengthen the island's to existing runway and to I eniarge its size by 270 zcres of dredged coral.s

I (9 At a 20 September 1963 meeting of the Designated Sysrems Management Group for the program, Colonel Riepe recommended early release of logistic suppoft funds fo¡ the effort, ear\' JCS approval of the comrnand and t control procedu¡es for the system, and early installation of a communications cable linking Hawaii and Johnston Is.land. Secretary Ztckefi concur¡ed and directed that action be taken on Riepe's requests with the JCS, while the Air Staff coordinated T reguirements for the cable rvith the Deferue Communications Agency.to

@ By 13 November, Douglas Aircraft Company had published the Phasq I ll Flight Tést Plan, which had as its gbjeètr¡e demonstration of the feasibility and I,t capability of the system to negate a satelliie by launching a missile within a II rrrrr*r sEERËl' rrr*tr* 22

restricted time frame, guiding it through vernier engine cutoff, delivering the payload to a preselected time-space point, and arming and firing the warhead at the appropriate time. The plan called for four launches. The first three were intenãed to demonstrate the prograrn's feasibility, while the fourth was to demonstrate system capability.ll -Ð Th" program evolved swiftly. By 15 November, the organization and training effort had succeeded so well that the 6595th Test Squad¡on was inactivated and immediately reactivated as the 10th Aerospace .Defense Squadron, a component of Air Defense Command's 9th Aerospace Division. Commanded by Colonel Charles E. Minihan, the unit bore the distinction of being the only "blue suit" space launch organization in the Air Force. The pace of training at Vandenberg was hectic, but there were morale-boosting compensations. Chief Master Sergeant A. J. Stotler, NCOIC, Standardization, Training, and Analysis for the squadron, recailed that "all the office¡s and airmen assigned to the 10th ADS were very professional and a very select group." Their training was conducted by r:1",ïrl Air Tr:aining Command's Field Training Detachment 5305 and SAC's 4300th t... Support Squadron. Stotler remembered with pride that he and Colonel Minihan i were the first squadron members to be rated as Senio¡ Missilemen. No badges for the rating were available at the Vandenberg Base Exchange, so "Colonel Mínihan gave me two brigadier general's stars and I had the mechanical maintenance shop fabricate two Senior Missilemen badges by attaching a star to the top of the Missileman badge. Since we were an ADC squadron tenant on the SAC base (Vandenberg), our status as Senior Missilemen became well known and perhaps created some jealousy among our SAC friends."'z

(U) At L^os Angeles Air Force Station (I-AAFS), Major John R. Barnard was assigned to ADC's liaison office and acted for Colonel Minihan in dealings with Ballistic Missile DiviSion's Program 437 System Prógram Office. He recall'ed that Program 437 elicited a "very positive feeling. At no time did we feel that it couldn't be done or that we were spinning ou¡ wheels doing it." There was some perception of the political concerns hedging the use of a nuclear weapon against a ta¡get in space, but the issue "never posed a problem in administering the program . . . no equivocation about implementing policy." The biggest problem, in Barnard's view, was the multiplicity of contractors involved, and the difficulties involved in coordinating their efforts. He also preceived that AFSC had a proprietary interest in the space mission and was eager to keep space operations ii:j:It: as its exclusive preserve. Aside f¡om organizational rivalries which occasionally I :' ,r''. produced tensions, the liaison officer felt that the military side'of the effort was outstanding. "The positive attitude on the. pa¡t of the Air Defense folks was superb," he emphasized. "Everybody was just set on 'GO.' People didn't mi.nd overtime wo¡k. Overtime wo¡k was a rule rathe¡ than the exception. They went out of their way to contribute . . . . Everybody felt that they were pioneers in space."t3

Ø The tight schedule for getting Program 437 operational put a great deal of stress on those responsible for its management, but the project also avoided "''-'.åF 23 many problems because it was not blazing any new trails. Colonei Riepe later rema¡ked:14

There is no new technology in the 437 program. Actually it is drawn from equipments developed on other ¡esea¡ch and development and operational programs, and from the junþile residue left ove¡ from them. The Thor, the guidance system, the warhead and its fusing, were all drawn from other developed systems or from systems in research and development test. In 437, as in all development and acquisition programs, the SPO's [System Project Officer] job was to see that everything needed-facilities, the equipment, and the people--were on location, on schedule, and within the funding allocated. Our biggest problems we¡e associated with ... the Seqetary of Defense directive that tìe system would be operational in June of 1964. We found ourselves implementing plans for the operational phase before funding had been received on the R&D program. The first .man \ as put into training ..before the R&D .engineering .had .been started.

In concept Program 437 was simple, Colonel Riepe thought a good analogy would be to compare it to a skeet shoot on a global basis, yet the satellite interceptor system was complex when one considered all of the equipment which had to be pulied together and made to perform with unusual precision. Target sateil"ites orbited at great speeds. Possible orbits and inclinations could vary greatly,-änd thus sophisticated tracking equipment, analogous to the skeet shooter's eyes and brain, was required to assist in the prediction of a target satellite's future position. The tracking and computing system had to predict an interception point near Johnston Island at least 12 hours in advance, v/ith an accuracy of three nautical miìes along the orbital path and a mile and a half across its t¡ack. The system had if .ì to be ready to launch within a critical five second time frame in order to intercept ,f:. ì successfuIly and destroy a target satellite. "The most significant thing about the 'whole program was the precision of it," boasted a veteran; "437 had a launch window of plus or minus one second." In contrast, the late¡ Apollo missions had a launch window of four to five minutes. "We had no margin for error," st¡essed a former detachment commande¡ of the l.Oth Aerospace Defense Squadron.'"

GTne challenge was to achieve the.proper unity of effort among the disparate organizations involved. Colonel Riepe's Program 437 team coordinated the contributions of Air Defense Command, Air Force Logistics Commahd, Military Air Transport Sewice, Air Training Command, Space Systems Division and Electronic Systems Division of Air Force Systems Command, Holmes ahd Narve¡ contractors, Douglas Aircraft Corporation, Bell Telephone låbo¡atory, Univac Corporation, Sandia Corporation, and Joint Task Force 8, the tri-service organization charged with oversight of Johnston Island.'6 At the end of 1.963, the Riepe Team's efforts encouraged Assislant Secretary McMillan to sent a meng.;:!o the USAF'Chief of Staff in wþich he cha¡acterized as "highly satisfactory" the management of the program to date, whicit had: *r*r.*1* Étr| rr'rrr*t 24

permitted timely accomplishment of a very satisfactory and comprehensive response to the Secretary of Defe¡se direction . . . . Extraordinary efforts have been required. Problems have been met in an imaginative and timely manner. Diligence and talent have been demonstrated to an unusual extent, and app¡opriate. recognition should be given.tT

@ During the early week of 1964, plans and programs were drafted to meet the tight schedule requirements for demonst¡ation and turnover of the system to ADC. Space Systems Division and ADC officers joined in writing an operations plan, published on 5 March. By that time, the issue of transferring logistics support from Space Systems Division to the San Bernadino Air Materiel A¡ea of the Air I I Force Logistics Command had also arisen. This event was scheduled for mid- Ma¡ which meant the booster, Aerospace Ground Equipment (ACE), and other l facfities vsere to be given to ADC within four months. This left little time for an ' r'lri: orderly transition of support from AFSC to AFLC. The two commands coìlaborated in reviewing a þroposed transition plan to determine if the necessary 'È ,*, actions could in fact be accomplished within the time available. By 10 Aprit, the ilî*;r i transition agreement had bden reviewed and forwa¡ded to AFSC headquarters. It provided for functional support responsibilities, excepting Engineering and Confìguration Management, to be transferred by 6 June 1964. Engineering and Configuration Management shifted ftom Space Systems Division to San Be¡nãdino Air Materiel Area on the last day of July.l8 . @ While the two commands still reviewed the logistics support turnover qþn AFIC dmfted a "Demonstration, Turnover and Acceptance Plan" to give ADC and AFLC a means for determining and certifying that Program 437 operationa-l acquisition had been accomplished; that the ASAT system and the tactical unit operating it were operationally ready; and ihat the systèm would have adequate logistical support. The plan detailed the requirements and specific procedures necessary to demonstrate, evaluate, and clarifli complete operátional lveqpgns system attainment to include hardware, personnel, procedures, and facilities to be acquired by the Air Force. The demonstration launch was scheduled-for- ?_8 Muy and,.the Initial Operational Capability status was to be achieved the following day."

Obviously, the reliabìlity of the equipment and the efficìency the f:!n:l . -@ . of launch crews were critical to mission success, but equally so was the accu¡acy, of the target data computed and submitted to the launch site by the sensors ãnd, altendant_ computers that had acquired the target, t¡acked it, analyzed its orbital. characteristics, and caleulated the optimum time and position for iis interceptiôn. The Space Detection and Tracking System held the key to Program 437, s acciracy. It had been created in the wake of Sputnik when the military services atlied with the civilian scientific community to field a wo¡ldwìde array of space cameras and radars to find and track all detectable objects orbiting the earth. Tracking data from these sensors was transmitted to the NORAD SPADATS Center wñere a Hæ 25

+ catalog of space objects was maintained. At the Center the orbital elements of any space object-computers deemed hostile could be calculated to yt"^!d harget data and then fed F iàto the at the Johnston Island launch site.'o (U) The geographical location of Johnston Island imposed ce¡tain lr operational constraints. The LV-2D Tho¡ booster had an altitude of 700 nautical miles and a horizontal range of 1500 nautical miles. From the island it couid engage only those satellites whose orbital parameters brought them within that T relatively limited zone of engagement. An alum¡us of the program later remarked that "the technicai achievement of 437 was in the. development of the SPACETRACK [USAF portion of SPADATS] orbit determination and targeting H programs that provided the accurate prediction of the target satellite." The SPACETRACK Center accomplished all predicting, targeting, and guidance and sent to Johnston Island missile computer at least six to twelve hours before launch. Ë The Thor missiie, already a proven booster, was "an excellent choice because it provided lift-off control with a half-second, 360. degrees of .launch direction freedom (keel up or down flight), and in-flight pitch and burn time control." This control extended only to the predicted point, for the¡e was no target,tracking in the H intercept area. "The total system had. a reasonable probability that it could achieve a point in space at the predicted time within the lethal envelope of a one megaton weapon (for orbits above the high drag altitudes, but within missile range)." H Launches were always planned to permit the Baker-Nunn space camera sited on the island to photograph the interception. The Program 437 system would achieve high accuracy; during one interception the miss distance was estimated at only forty H mete¡s.21

-@ Program 437's dependence upon SPACETRACK however, meant that H it,was limited to engaging only those targets whose iaunches could be detected, tracked, and' orbital paths analyzed by that array of senso¡s and automatic data- processing equipment. With the limitations of the system extant in 1964, it was H quite possible that a satellite could be launched into orbit without ever being detectèd and t¡acked by SPACETRACK. As one Program 437 member recalled:" r The launch site location did not provide for accurate orbit dete¡mination of a newly launched Soviet satellite, and passage within ]+ . the targetingreûvelopebefore the.satellite,had overflownthe.US...... The targets were always chosen f¡om those above the high drag . altitudes because we.did not.have enough accurate tracker coverage around the wo¡ld to predict orbits accurately in the high drag , H a1titudesbelow250mileSa1titude.SincetheSovietphotobirdsfly below these altitudes, its not clear that we ever had much meaningful capability. What we had was the development of o¡bit determination f software . . . and a political statement. A NORAD analysis of SPACETRACK.effectiveness in 1965 revealed that'gaps in its coverage seriously affected the acquisition of targets for potential +I launch southeastward Program 437 missions. The analysis determined that any + "_"_"._4 + rr***rr tf,lFf****.tt*t r 26 Ë from the Soviet complex at Tyuratam on inclinations of less than 57' or frorn 65o to 80o would not pass through SPACETRACK coverage until after the vehicle's Ë first pass over North America. At that time the selsor at Dyarbakir, Turke^y, was the only one capable of detecting southeastward launches from Tyuratam.'" S Even if launches made from Tyuratam or any other Soviet complex r could be detected and tracked immediately prior to the satellite's first passage over the United States, the system still required six to twelve hours in which to compute accurate targeting data. By that time the satellite would have passed over the F United States enough times for it to accomplish ani mission of bombardment, ¡econnaissance, navigation, or communications. Since it employed a nuclear warhead, Program 437 no doubt would be used only in the event of a full-scale I thermonucle war; and it was likely such a conflict would have passed through a decisive pbase well befo¡e the ASAT could be brought into play. So from its very inception, Program 437's practical utility for deterring (or waging) a nuclea¡ war I chief lay as a political statement that the 1 was framed in dubious terms. Its value I United States was prepared to utilize space \,veaponry if the situation required it ,l !.,#ul to take such action.2o i it¿:: . I ;' 1-..::,,.1' | ,,., @ It *as not for thé:military staffs managing Program 437 to debate the circumstances under which the system might be used; their mission was simply to I ensure that Program 437 became operational on schedule and within the preordained technical limitations of the subsystems which comprised it. In theory it may bave seemed a relatively simple matter of utilizing proven' hardware" to I perform the mission within the permissible time frame; but in practice the trairiing and preparations at Vandenberg and on Johnston Island proved a challenge to the energy, technical expertise, and managerial skills of, all involved. A Thor missile .l was made available for two-shift training at Vandenberg, where fulI-time ':!:.'i instruction had been underway for members of the 10'.ADs'since October 1963. The squadron rnembe¡s joked that in their case the aðron1,rn "ADS" meant "All ;I Day Saturday and A-ll Day Sunday" as the tempo of training accelerated in 1964. .].:',): l By that time the contractor and sewice personnel on the island had conducted the fi¡st of over a dozen system evaluation exercises designed to assure the reliability and efficiency of the targeting system.2s r

@ As time for the first scheduled demonstration launch approached, ï!,4;" I trouble appeared on the pad. When the payload was mated to the launch vehicle, .:: ' ' a chronic radio frequency interfeience (RFI) problem resulted. Each time the ,+' payioad telemetry was activated the guidance system experienced interfereñce. I Colonel Riepe directed the launch site to stand down fo¡ six weeks and flx- the problem. Although the Douglas-scheduled initial launch date of 3 January wasìnot met, the probiem was thoroughly analyzed and corrected in timely fashion"'?E ..The I Douglas launch crew then rescheduled its fi¡st "shoot" for the night of 14 February L964, and, anticipation grew keener with each passing day. When the launch date finally arrived, spectato¡s on the island saw two Thors rear above their launch pads as plumes of condensation from the Supêr-chilled liquid oxygen in their tanks T cu¡led in billows around the white shafts of the missiles. The reserve missile was I I n coutrted down alongside the primary one as a guarantee against failure' The proceedèd smoothly, and the p_ripary ignited orr countdorpn .miss49 -schedule. There had been no launches from Johnston Island since Novembe¡ 1962, and the Thor's roaring engine sent the nesting seabirds screaming aloft from their nearby rookeries. Missité Numbe r 299 /59-2a20 climbed steadily into the night sky' its telemetry and ground guidance data indicating a normal flight path to the.intercept point. The Thór hrrtléd.onward, climbïng and then arcing to meet an jnte.rcep^tion i:ii þoint at an altitude, of 540 nautical miles and a laû€e of 443 nautical miles form iohnston Island on an. azimuth of.290". A Transit 2A rocket body was scheduled space and time as it pursued its 564 by 336 nautical to sweep past,that,point in ..j mile oibif at an inclination of:66.'7". Minutes later the simulated warhead passed close enough to the target to be considered a successful interception. On Johnston -Dougias Island the launch crew and engineers were jubilant, while Colonel Riepe was vastly relieved-. Program 437 had made history; it still remained for it to be made operational." Ð The.second research and development.flight by:another. contractor crew .was scË-eduled for.2,Ma¡ch. Once again.the two'missile. procedure was followed. Five and a half hours.. prior to,launch time instruments 'malfunctioned on the primary missile and proþct officials had to replace the payloa_d in a åurried one llour and twenty minutes. Meanwhile, the payload aboard the backup booster picked up the cóuntdown without any problems. When the Pad Two payload had been replaced, the te¡minal countdown phase began, but was disrupted whgn q time¡. malfunciioned at the monitor console, automatically imposing a techiical hold on the process. Douglas contractòr personnel discovered they could not readily identify and cor¡ect tle problem, which led to a decision to "scrub" the'Pad Two missile. The terminal countdown proceeded.on the backup booster, and, on the night of 1 March the second Thor hurled itself into the sþ in a iaunch and , intercèpt .that:v¡s¡er just flawed enough to demonstrate the system's effectiveness. The main engine cutoff (MECO) occured 4.6L seconds early for some undetermined reason, and the guidance displayed a slight error in cross range' although it remained within the system miss distance criteria. A¡m and burst commãnds we¡e successfully transmitted and a miss distance "within spherical error probable (SEP) of 3.4 nautical miles was obtained." Douglas engineers decfared . ihat flexibility had been effectively demonstrated. Although the second launch had not,been as.imooth as,the first, all test objectives were "met and the operationwas rated a complete success.2s 8l The first two Program 437 launches completed almost all Phase I-test objectiíes, excepting validation of operations f¡om Pad Two. The Air Force was content io "sùnd- down" the launch program and incorporate hardware modifications that would bring the system into full operational (Phase II) configuration. The first Phase II launch was then scheduled for 19 April.. Combat Crew-e of the 10 ADS was ai¡lifted to Johnston Island to monito¡ activities of the Douglas contractor crew. Optimism over the prograrn s progress resulted.''in cancéilation of the fourth reseãrçh and deYçlqpment launch and its rescheduling, for late May, as a completely "blue-suit'i opeiation for the 10 ADS crew." t+***** IIFß *rt*:rtr I Zg T

ÉÐ The tbird missile from Johnston Island was ready for launching on 19 April as anticipated" The countdown proceeded normaily and the engine ¡ ignited, but the main liquid oxygen valve failed to open and the flight was aborted. A post-mortem conducted by Douglas engineers determined that a defective valve required replacement along with a set of four-way pneumatic valves. The I replacement parts were airlifted to the atoll from California, arriving the afternoon of 20 April. They were installed and checked for proper operation by 0900 the following morning. The countdown began that afternoon, culminating in a , ,,' successful third launch. Personnel of the 10 ADS observed, monitored, and ,iÉfi assisted with the sequence of pre-launch and launch activities.3o il Ç The officers and airmen ol the fledgling launch c¡ew had been training at an accelerated pace for months before being,,,sent to the atoll, and their participation in the 21. April launch had merely ùlietted their expectations for I executing the next missile "shoot" on their own. The Thor program vete¡ans among them had participated in IRBM launches against ; surface range targets, but using "1¡;rþ the missile like a precision weapon in a celestial bird-shoot was something new and I i¡l1 , {i-:r, exciting. The Douglas launòh crew might have been able to look upon its launches as simply paid exercises, but the men of the 10 ADS knew that bn some future occasion they might be called upo-n to send a nuclear-tipped Thor aloft against an t enemy satellite in deadly earnest.st ê Visiting dignitaries crowded rJohnston Island as the 28 May launch date I arrived. Among them wâs Lieutenant General He¡bert B. Thatcher, ADC commander, there to see if his command was going to acquire a truly operational weapon system. As before, the countdown sequence proceeded smoothly, but the S'tl missile's exhaust flames burned through a verniei engine actuator cable upon ..,.:1'|:t launch, throwing the vehicle off course by fifty miles.es it missed the intercepiion point. The launch crew was understandably chagrined at the failure, but General Thatcher concurred with the findings ofa post-operational critique which ruled that ;! a defective booster and not the c¡ew's launch procedures was at fault. The next day 29 May, General Thatcher declared that the 10 ADS and its weapon system had t achieved Initial Operatiònal Capability. Iæss than seven years aftèr thè first artificial earth satellite had been placed in orbit, the USAF achieved the capabiliry ¿1ì:1. to negate such spacecraft if the necessity ever arose. The Soviet Union had issued ':4¡ . vague boasts about an ASAT system as 1960, t early as but in the last days of May ,t\i.¡i':- 1964 the United üli States had made it a reality. The Ai¡ Defense Command was now in the business of space wa¡fare. Program 437 would'never carry out the mission for which it was designed, that did not diminish its significance. Like all other T weapons in the American arsenal, it was an expression.of the Clausewitzian maxim: "War is a eontinuation of politics by other means." Program 437's most significant mission would be exeflrted not in space but in the arena of Ame¡ican domestic T politics.32 I I t TI .*r*trr.-FE.**rl¡l** Il 29 I NOTES F (All Notes are tlnclassified) I ChaDter II

1. For discussions of, the Thor and its overseas deployment see Jr¡lian Ha¡tt; The Mightv Thor: Missile I Stri{9 Force. The USAF. iq B¡itain Sincp in.Readiness. (l.,Iew.York,:1961)¡ passim; Robert Jackon, j94&G"o¿o4 rS36); pp 93-98í,rqZ.:William. R: .Van Cleave; 'The U.S.. Strategic Triad," in James E. i oo-à", fr., ed, thâ ÙS war'vachine (New York, 1978), p 60; Norman Polmar, ed, Strategiç Air Command. Þeoole. Aircraft:'and Missilès (,{nnapolis,.1979), pp219-20iLtr '(U), Col Philip R' Jackson, USef n"t, to Dt Wayne R. Austerman, History Office, HQ USAF Space Command, Feb 7. 1963'

2. Meno (S/DECL OADR), Eugene M. Zuckert, Office of the Secretary, Department of the Air + of Force, to Chief of Staf! USÁF, "nogram 4!1," Mar 2ß, 1963; Paul B. Stares, The Militarization Soace US Policv. 1945-1984 (Ithaca, New York' 1985), pp 120-22. * .l H. Hayes, Jr., HQ AFSC to HQ ADC (Lt Gen Robert 3. Ltr (S/DECL OADR), Lt Gen Howell -M. Lee), lÈrbgram 437," n Feb 63; L1¡ 157ot"t OADR), Maj'GenJohn K. Hestei; Asst Vice Chief of '15 . Stafi' HQ-USAF,' to AFSC, "Early'satellite Intercept 'Capability, Program 437," Feb 63; Ltr il (S/DECL OADR), Maj Gen John K. Hester, Asst Vice Chief of Staff, HQ USAF, to-ADC' 'ìDesignation of Usêr for Þrogram 437," 15 Jul 63; Hist (S/DECL OADR) HQ.Space Systems Division, AFSC, Vol 2 (Narrative), Jan-Dec 1.963, pp 65-70. Despite the Air Staffs ruling.in the matter, AFSC * continued to tùe a p.opiieto.ial iot"test in Pro8¡am 437 which extended beyond its operational debut' A¡ ADC liaison officer with A¡SC Ballistic Missile Division i¡ the L9ó3-65 period recalled that AFSC's open jealousy of ADC's in-heritance of a space mission worked against Program 437's rapid turtrover to thè user comma¡d. "They would have liked to keep space as their preserve," he.remarked Ë in a 1986 iûtervie\'¿. Another vetera¡ of service with the 2IADS and 10 ADG during the 1966-68 period recalled that. there was. an obvious sense of reluctance.a¡d resentment, displayed..by AFSC pérsônnel with.whom.he had, dèali¡ç duri.ng'the cou¡se of his tour' "They were alwayq,tryi¡g to i¡terfe¡e with our operation, give us advice, etc," he noted' Intvws (U), author with Col John R' B, Peterson; USAF, Ret,30 Sep 86. H Barnard, USAF Ret; Í Sep 8ó,.and.Col.Richa¡d .

4. Hist (S/DECL OADR), HQ Space Systems Division, AFSC, Vol 2 (Narrative)' Jan-Dec 1963, p 70; Ltr (S/DECL OADR) Brockway McMillan, Undersecretary of the Ai¡ Force (Research and !l Development), to Deputy Chief of Staff, Resea¡ch ald Development, HQ USAF, "Program 437," 2.4 l¡dar 63. ñ ¡.ì 1ô¿<\ ra. f,, ueratq l. Lanlweu, ¡.Ilg ¡r'u ¡.ufçÞ ¡¡¡ oPdLc, r rùrd.r ¡ ('.r¡ .r.:tuJ \rvdù4¡¡tsLurt' v.v, !¿wJ), v- tL, t I Meno (S/DECL OADR), Secretary Zuckert to Chief of Staff, USAF, "Prog¡am 437," 20 il'.fa,r 63;Ltr rManpower (U), Hi). Space 'Systemi. Divisiod; (AFSC) to AFSC (SCOR);, ,Requirements for the 4ai trogran tøissile Launch Squadron," 22 illar 63; Special Order.G-43.(U), HQ A¡SC,,15 APr 63; Lti (S/DECL OADR), Brig.Gen Richa¡d D. Curtin, Dir.of .Advanced Engioeering, HQ USAF, to r': AFSC, "Prog¡am 4T7," I Apr 63; Memo for Record (S/DECL OADR), Lt Gen.Robertlvf. Lee, Commander, ADC, "Program 437," 30 Apr 63; Memo (S/DECL OADR), Brockway McMillan, Asst rl Secretary of the Ai¡ Foìce (Research and Developmeut), to Dep Chief of Staff, Resêarch and Development, "Program 437," 23 ll'lar 63; Ltr (U), SMSgt Howard D. Riddle, USAF, Ret' to Dr Wayne R. Austerman, History Office, HQ USAF Space Command, 14 Jan 86.

rl 6. Hist (S/DECL OADR); HQ Space Systems Division, AFSC, Jan-Dec 1963, Vol 2, Narrative, p 71.

7. Ibid.; Ltr (S/DECL OADR), Maj Gen Richa¡d D. Curtin, Dir of Development, DCS[e.¡e-a1ch ll and Dwelopirent, to HQ AFSC, "Program 437 Operational Phase," 5 Jul 63; Memo (S/DECL

x x r,***TÐftr.* *x.x.*xr. ll l i ; +rr¡a'rtt ffi *tr*r,¡,¡ 30

OADR) "Minutes of Meeting-Brielìag for Secretary McNâmara on Satellite Detection, Inspection and Negation, by Joha t hitmarq DDR&E (Ð)," n Jun 63; Stares, The Milita¡ization of Soacg p 122.

8. Hist (S/DECL OADR), HQ Space Systems Division, AFSC, Ja¡-Dec 1963, Vol 2, Narrative, pp 72-73.

9. James Trainor, "Non-Nuclea-r Anti-Satellite System in Making"Missiles and Rockets (11 May 6a), pp 12-13; Stares, The Militarization of Space. p 123; Hist (S/DECL OADR), HQ ,+i¡ Defense Comma¡d Jul-Dec 64 pp 40-58. .

10. Hist (S/DECL OADR), HQ Space Systems Division, AFSC, Jan-Dec 1963, Vol 2, Narrative, p 73.

11. Ibid.

12. Ltr (U), CMSgt A. J. Stotler, USAF Ret, to Dr Wayne R. Austerman, History Office, HQ USAF ,Blue-Suit' Space Command, 17 Sep 86; MSgt Eric G. Lemmon, "10th AERODS: Only Alt Space Launch Organization Carries Motto 'Beware Aggressor' as Mission," Mesa Missilier,2ß Oct 79,pp 4-5.

13. Interview (U), Dr Wayue R. Austernan with Col John R, Barnard, USAF Ret, 17 Sep 86; Ltr (U), Col Philip R. Jackson, USA¡ Ret, to Dr Wayne R. Austerma.n, 7 Feb 86. li. . 14. Film (S/DECL OADR), '?rogram 437 Satellite Interceptor System (SAVPIN Filar No. FR-4444 #1j).

15. lbid; Intvw (U), author with Col Troy G. Alcorn (USAI, Ret), 17 Sep 86.

16. Filrn (S/DECL OADR) "Program 437 Satellite Interceptor System" (SAVPIN Fifn No. FR-444A #1j).

1]. |!emo (S/DECL OADR), Brockway McMillan, Uudersecretary of the Air Force, to CSAF, "Satellite Interception," 9 Dec 63.

18. Hist (S/DECL OADR), HO Space Systens Division, A¡156, ¡--Oec 1964, Vol II, Narrarive, pp n-37,31-32.

19. rbid.

20. Fiìm (S/DECL OADR) "Progran 437 satellite Interceptor system"; Stares, The Milita¡ization of Spaggi 131-13j Lt¡ {Enclosure (S/DECL OADR), RÁDN{ ÂX* L. need,-õUer orTtuff, ord to CINCAD,-p_p 'SPACETRACK i a¡d SPASUR Systen CaoabilitiesCapabilities to AccuireAcquire DataDara to FulfilFulfit . . . ,,' 26 Feb 65; Ltr (S/DECL OADR),R), Brig Gen Stebbi¡s W. G¡iffith, HeHQ NORAD, DCS/Intellieence,DCS/Intelligence, toro Dir,rJlr, rJu\,DIA, "SPACETRACKòr,.\LE r K,q,Utr System and SI,ASURSPASUR System CapabrlitiesCapabilitiesCapat . . .,", ,,' 19 Apr 65; Ltr (S/DECL OADR), Col Merle M..Zene,437 System program Direcior, ro ADC (ÁDLPW-S/LI Col RutteÐ,Rutter), "4tAP_"4374P System Capability,"xry," 17 Jun 65; DraftDraÌt ManìlscriptManuscripr (S/DECL OADR), Dr Perryperry Jamieson, "The Space Detection and TrackinsTracking System,Svstem- 1957-1984,"i History Office, He USAF Spacè 9ogggld, 1984, pp_ 1-35; Ltr (U), Col Philip R. Jackson, USAF Ret, ro'Dr Wa).ne R. Austeriran, l_Igb_8!i!tl w/atch (S/DECL OADR), Maj Gen I. Funk, Commander, AFSC; to ADC (ADCS); "SPADATS Support of Program 437," 15 Apr ó3.

21. Ltr (U), Col Philip R. Jackon, USAF Ret, to Dr Wayne R. Austerman, 7 Feb g6.

22. rbid- 31

l-11(!/-o¡!r- O-4D¡), Brig Gen Stebbi¡s Vr'. þ . criffirh, HQ NORAD, DCS/Inreiligence ro Dir, D-IA "SPACETRACK System a¡d SPASUR System Capabilities to Acquire óata to-Fulfill . . . ,; 19 Apr 65.

24. Ibid.; Ltr (U), Col Philip R. Jackson, USAF Ret, to Dr Wal.ne R. Austerman, 7 Feb 68.

25. Film (S/DECL OADR) 'P¡og¡am 437 Sarellire Inrercepror Sysrem."

26. rbid.

2:7, Bìrefug Paper (U), TSgt.Eric G. Lemmon, 10 ADS, "summary of Thor Missile Launches from Jgbnstor'.hland,' 19 Mar 76; FiLn (S/DECL OADR), "Program 437 Sateltite Intercept System;,, Stares,

Historical Division, Jan-Dec 64, Vol II, Narrative, p 33.

28. Hist (S/DECL OADR), HQ Space Systems Division, Hisro¡ical Division, Jan-Dec 64, Vol II, Narrative, pp 33-34.

29. rbid.

30. Ibid., pp 34-35.

31,. I,bid.; Stares, . The lvfilitarizatlon of Soace, p 123; Hist (S/DECL OADR), He Space Sysrems Divisior, Historic¿l Division, Jan-Dec 6a, Vol II, Narrative, ip 59-60; Gerald 1. Can¡vell, .fire air Force in Space, Fiscal Yea¡ 1964" (Washìngton, D.C., 1967),-pp 60-61.

32. Hist (S/DECL OADR), HQ Ai¡ Defense Command, Jul-Dec 64, Vol I, Narrarive, pp 59-60.

*r,**x,*r,[k ******* .2 T *r****rff rtr:r**,¡ ! J.' CHAPTER Itr

T On Active Service (U)

T (U) In the surtme¡ of ß64, Senato¡ Barry M. Goldwater, who won the Republican Party's presidential nomjnation, made national defense a key issue of his campaign and accused President Johnson of having neglected it. Johnson, in h turn, emphasized his opponent's reputation for imprudent bellicosity while stressing his own dedication to a well-armed, vigilant, but prudent, nation which woulã "never negotiate out of fear, but should never fear to negotiate," as his martvred predecessor had phrased it. The Democratic administration's cancellation oi the I Sþbolt air-to-ground missile system in late 1962, followed by its more recent throttling of the RS-70 strategic bomber program, gave the Republicans ample evidence to sustain their charges of a neglected military establisñment. Johnson I counterattacked by publicizing. several heretofo¡e, classified,military systems as a means of disproving such allegations.', Durìng .a 20 ,september spèeci delivered F from the steps of the California state capitoi building in Sac¡airento, Johnson unveiled the existence of an Over-the-Horizon long-range radar system, which he depicted as another guarantor against surprise attack, and two antisâtellite weapons systgms: The first ,.vas the US Army's Kwajalein-based Nike-Zeus experimêntal tr antiballistic missile system, which Secretary of Defense McNamara had ãuthorized for use in an alternate ASAT mode. The other system was the USAF,s b¡ace of Tho¡ ASATs on Johnston Isiand. By these ¡evelations, "Johnston ¡efuted this It potentially damaging charge," asserted Cu¡tis Peebles in Battle for Space. ',It was now common knowledge that the US could destroy enemy sateilitea of whateve¡ descriptions." Or so it seemed.2

I (U) Johnson's assu¡anóes aside, the nation still lacked a comprehensive ASAT c?pabilitl. The Nike-Zeus system could theoretically destroi satellites at an I altitude of 200 miles, and on several occasions test launches of the missile had succeeded in inte¡cepting real and theoretical targets at altitudes as high as 151 miles; bg1 its range was clearly inferior to that oi Prograrn 437, and al early as June 1963 Sec¡etary McNamara had lnformed the Arnv thet he cnnsirle¡ed the I system to be redundant ìn Iight of Program 437's projected superior.capabilities. Thus the Nike-Zeus was nothing mo¡e than an inierim experimentai system, I destined fo¡ cancellation in 1966.3 (U) Program 437 had achieved Initial Operational Capability nearly four I months prior to Johnson's public disclosure of its existence, bui the system wâs still struggling to reach a state of assu¡ed reliability, and its future wai anything but certain as events in Southeast * Asia increasingly demanded the attention of the nationis politic¿l and military leadership. Although in March 1963, Secretary of the Ai¡ Force Zuckert had identified Program 437 as a ',top priority', item, event! in the + Gulf of Tonkin had muted that assurance by August 1964.a + * * * * * * :É-È¡-ÈÞ* x * * ¡ * * !i +*rrrrr SÛiilEÞ+***rrr t 34 T program € The Ai¡ Force had fielded 437 tn an efficient manner, but obstacles stül remained in the path of its bécoming a proven and reliable element of the deter¡ent force. 10 I The ADs had maintaiied one missile on full alert at Johnston Island since 29 May 1964. Full operational capability *ur u..or¿.ì to t_!e u{! on 10 June, when a second rhor jõined the firsi missiie on arert status. on 16 November came the_first combat I iiainir:g l¿unch (cil-), conducteà by combat crew c of the 10 ADS, one of three crewirotating tô t¡e íéun¿ site. r¡i was to have been the first of three such launches schedutãd annually to m;intain crew proficiency, according to original planning. The 16 I Novemb"t un¿ luutr.h -uà :: interception exercise was successful, bufsubseqúent evenis indicate¿ it *o"ià the last one for much longer than either the squadron or the Air Defenie command cared to contemplate. In December 1963, ADC had learned I that the Department of Defense had ¡educed the original procu¡ement of sixteen Thár boosters to eight, and these were expected to iustain operations through t¡" of Fiscal Year L967. since a minimum of four missiieiwas required i; ;;trt"i;"nl I the system in operational readiness (wo at Johnston Island arrd r., .. /'¡l ¡r" in r.."*"'at vanderberg AFB), only four were refr for ground training and +r:"*f ,; crl- ;t*.t;¿;. Ã second CTL conducted on-S-April very ãccurately plaãed a dummy *o, lr"o¿ I within 0.89 naurical rniles of 'the-target, ì,:'rl,."l. and inactive'Tiansit 2-A s;i;ní", ñi-À; redu.ced rhe crl- stocþile;,'to ¡võ missiles. It was difficult to see iloou prohcrenry .r.* could be maintaine-d with ody two,launches between April 19ó5 and T ! !¿ly t967. colonet Minihan framed the dilemma in the starkestlãiiruìáãrr* "437 must improve or die!"u 'i¡ I - Ð colonel Minihan and his superiors did not feel he was over-dramatizins the situation, for no sooner had progiam 437 rcached rul ofãLiion"iðöäiil; than the 10 ADS's mission was fragrñented and.its resourcès diverted to oir,ä. -ö I The_ 5 April 1965 launch was fáted to be the fast forrnalfy úË,*.i.ã "rìT. conducted until 31 March 1967. For nearly rwo years the usAi's ãJíãpliãuãr"l ASAT^unit wouid. be engaged in secondary misiions which undermií.d'it. a¡liiw I to perform program its primary mission. Although 437 wourd ¿1" iã1ïä"í years yet, by 1965 it was already undergoing ã metamorphosis "ãifroÁ .;;;;;;'. system to an experimental project whose combat capabiliÇ woulo ne or seconiarv I lmporrance' lt must have been a difficult period for those who had labored ha¡á :îj:.l"l1y_T:q:t_"{on¿l sarellite-kilter, oniy to find their .ff"ri, f."ri;;r.d j";;;; tne system approached fruition.o I factors program . @several stuntecr 437's growth. The rack of boosters courd rÌav€ lgel.reqediedDeen.remeored byDy thethe. Septem6erSeptembe¡ !ay,9 1965 DãpartmentDepartment of Defense-.,erense ;ñ;.;;;ìp¡ocurement autnonzatron Lvr ' t tor r,-{rçs'si\teen additional.Tho¡siruur Llot¿l.l l nors forror ulLCTL use lromfrom FyFYt y 196619óó196i throueh FyFY as ìt l?|t:-by¡ gr¡e{ 9ut, only. rhree mo¡e CTrs *"." .ondr,cì"ã ùy ih; 10"'Abi before- they ended with a finil raunch on 27 March 1970:-l;-r,iä;;r.ü ir6i I (LE) II was diverred ro support anorher I*yI'an ^E_lti"cement -irrø"ãi'p*tïi aovanced 43'l test program. _ This was" l.qgru* 437Ap, a photographic reconnaissance variant of th-eASAT syslem which po-ssessed simiúritiôs t"if;;-ítix. bo¡n SAINT project (See Chapter t IV).? r

rr' I t 35 @ Program 4374P did offer some usefr:l training for the 1.0 ADS and its supporting units. Its mission required the same ievels of expertise needed in the I antisatellite launches, and in a photographic sortie the Thor's payload had to come much close¡ to the target than was necessary in a nuclear interception and destruction mission. Even so, the 437 AP effo¡t unavoidably degraded the unit's I ability to perform its ASAT mission, for the dive¡sion of a launch pad to support the photographic missions meant that the dual countdown procedure could no longer be followed for the ASAT launches without either entirely canceling a I conflicting scheduled 4374P mission or hurriedly exchanging its payload for a nuclear warhead. LE II on Johnston Island was devoted to the 4374P effort from April 1965 through its conclusion in July 1966. If during that period the 10 ADS I had been tasked with a genuine ASAT mission, its execution conceivably could have been seriously hampered if not totally obstructed by the presence of a Program 4374P Thor on the second launching pad. This potentiality had been I undersco¡ed in a JuIy 1964 reliability assessment study conducted by the Douglas Aircraft Corporation. The contractor concluded that "overall integrated system reliability. is.70 percent for a single missile countdown and 80 percent for.a dual I missile countdown." Although the presence of .the second missile . increased the odds of a successful launch by. only ten pe¡cent, that could conceivably. speii the t diffe¡ence between failure and success in a "real-world" operation.s .fiþ In between its achievement of Full Operational Capability in June 1964 I and its first 4374P launch in December 1966, the ASAT program was involved in I some relatively minor modifications and upgrades to its equipment. The project office at AFSC's Space Systems Division completed some modifications -to the sfstem and acquired both ipare parts and additional operational handbooks for the I crews. A second ground station was constructed on the atoll. As early as the spring of 1965, ADC had begun planning to replace the original ground guidance system (GGS), which used a Bell Telephone I-aboratories radar and Athena computer, with a new Titan radar and Univac 6428 computer. The upgrade was t required to give the system a 360 degree coverage of the area surrounding Johnston Island, instead of the 210 degree coverage provided by the original GGS. Work also progressed on modification of the warhead fuzing and detonator time¡ in the t oa.,load- so that the existins "line-of-sisht" ¡estrictio¡_ for eonmand detonation eor- d -- -^o_-- --_---_------be elimi¡ated to allow "ove¡ the horizon" interceptions to be made.t I fi By the end of 1964, almost all Program 437 funds had been spent. Contract overruns, outstanding contract changes notifications, and other contractuâl actions dealing with changes and modifications thus c¡eated some minor funding I problems for the project office. At year's end, it reported it needed $1,038,414 more. The additión of the +374p mission at the Secietary of Defense's directioh assured that the program would remain funded to maintain operational capability. I It was already gaining some notoriety within the Department of Defense, for on 15 July 1964, the Joitrt Chiefs of Staff visited NORAD/CONAD Headquarters in Colo¡ado Springs, where they received' a special briefing on the command's two I operational ASAT systems (Nike-Zeus and Pfogram 437). CONAD had assumed the JCS-assigned mission of defense against space systems, and the briefing I I ,r***,*'** g||çþ )¡¡*¡r**** t |trriÙt¡¡lF r***¡rr 36

discussed "an intelligence deficiency of major importance to NORAD/CONAD-ouI inadequate capability to determine the mission of foreign space vehicles." The eventual appearance of Program 4374P in operational service promised to alleviate that handicap in the command's ASAT operations, but until then informed guesswor!- had to suffice for the identification of potentially dangerous foreign satellítes.to

Life and Work on Johnson Island (U)

(U) The personnel on Johnston Island faced several inacctive periods between the CTL of 5 April 1965 and the assumption of Program 4374P testing on 7 December 1965. Then followed anothe¡ suspension of launch operations between the last 4374P test on 2 July 1966 and the first of the resumed series of CTLs on 31 March 1967. Although maintenance and modification efforts served to occupy much of their time, and nonlaunch countdorrrrt exercises could always be conducted, the men were eontinually confronted with the salient fact of thei¡ ';:,:;:, isolation from civilization for three months at a time. Thus rhe quality of life on the little atoll came to assume"great importance.ll Although both Air Mic¡onesia :..:- : and Continental Airlines made refueling stops on the atoll during their Honolulu- Kwajalein Island flights under government charters, they sewed mainly to emphasize the resident's sense of being poised "on the drop edge of yonder.t",

(U) Johnston Island enjoyed a temperate climate for most of the year. The,. average mean temperature registered 79.3 degrees Fahrenheit, with meân rainfall., measuring a little over twenty-six inches per annum. The wind blew steadily from the east at 78-24 knots, which meant that the cooling breeze was also laden w.ith particles of sand and coral dust, giving it a rasping edge when it gusted. At timed the very pleasantness and predictability of the weather bècame gratingly monotonous to men accustomed to the change of seasons back on the mainland. The dearth of greenery, ubiquitous coral grit, and the featu¡eless loom of the horizon on all sides bore down heavily upon some men. Twenty years later an officer recalled that his overvihelming impression of the Pacific baie was one of "the total barren bleakness of the island . . . the coral, the glare, the heat and the wind."t'

(U) Few seriòus health problems developed. During three weeks in August the wind t¡pically died down to somnolent calm and the heat became oppressive, but the use of salt tablets and prudent avoidance of over-exposure tò'the sun curtailed any threat of heat exhaustion. standa¡d attire for mosi officers and men consisted of a khaki service blouse and Army-issue tropical shorts. Footgeai was....., limited to sandals or canvas-topped shoes. This ensemble was comfortabie, but it. , also exposed its wearers to thé àtoll's sole major endemic health problem:' coral' infection. Any cut or abrasion, however minor, was quickly invaded by the airborne particles of grit aûd became infected. The abrasive coral dust alsó affected the delicate equipment associated with the launch missions. Filte¡s and protective covers were a necessity, and preventive maintenance went on continuously to' safeguard against the damage or destruction of instruments and equipment.ln I

F r t* ¡È + *,¡ f!fffp.* * * * * * r 5t Fl

(U) Rodents presented a potential health menace, but they were kept under ¡ control by the pack of cats that had mysteriously populated the atoll with the coming of the Americans. The felines also provided the island's twin official mascots: the Siamese cats named Sam and Pete. Sam resided with the JTF-8 t island commander, while .Pete was qua¡tered with the 24th Support Squadron. Both cats had been neutered to help prevent over-breeding, but they remained I aggressive ¡atters.tt (U) A variety of dive¡sions'helped sustain island morale. As always, living quarters and food were important attitudinal determinants. In the program's early months crews were quartered in tents, but by the late 1960s senior officers rated I bungalow-sty1e quarters, while their subordinates had one or two-man rooms in modlern doimitory*tyle BOQs. Enlisted billets initially consisted of open bay- type barracks, but later 'Ve were housed in more refined facilities," recalled an I NCO, "which might be classified as luxurious by some (two-man rooms connected by'a bathro_om). These facilities were. new ât the'time of ,occupancy:by 10th ADS t personnel."'" (U) The food in the contractor-operated dining facilities was "excellent, plentiful and contained variety. Friday night dinner usually consisted of Alaskan F King Crab," noted one program veteran. "The¡e was a New York Steak night, as well as a P¡ime Rib night each week. I do not recall anyone complaining about the food at Johnston Island, either while on cre'"v duty or during the maintenance and recertification periods at Vaûdenberg." Liquor was readily available in the I service clubs, and although weekend parties among the troops could become a little raucous at times, there was no problem with. excessive drinking among the miiita¡y I persomel.lt (U) More strenuous activities also filled leisure time. Jogging was popular, and several circuits of the island could be made within an hour's run by a man in I reasonably good physical condition. Tennis courts vied fo¡ patrons along with a bowiing alley and a minuscule two-hole golf course, which was expanded to nine Itr holes early in 1967. Handball and racquetball coufts were also available. An island softball league provided keen competition. Games were invariably popular, if for.no.other reason than the f¡ee hotdogs.and ten,cent bee¡s that were available I to the spectators.ls (U) No television reception was possible on the island, and commercial radio reception f¡om Hawaii was poor. A resident A¡med Forces Radio and Television +. Service station attempted to provide entertairÌment, and occasionally USO groups would be flown in f¡om Hawaii for performances. Mai¡land entertainment usually took the form of films provided for screening -in the isiand's 500-seat outdoor + ponchos theater. It invariably ¡ained each night during the showing, and were quickiy donned as the audience sat th¡ough the downpour in determined pursriit + of diversion. Unfortunately, the cinematic fare rarely merited rapt attention, for the units based in the Republic of Viet Nam received top prioriry for the films +r r. *****¡ÞffEÞ ** ¡i.¡* ¡¡lll¡Í tr!¡,¡*r* ¡æFI,¡r'¡*,¡'rr "I 38 t available, and thus the troops on Johnston Island received such memorable productions as "Biþ the Kid vs. Dracula" and "Winnie the Pooh."ls I (U) The ocean of course was the primary source of recreation. Shell collecting attracted some enthusiasts, and the men competed to see who could spot ald- salvage large glass t the spherical floats that were often lost from Japanèse fishing nets and washed ashore on the atoll. The island's lagoon teemei with moray eels and the University of Hawaii paid a bounty of a ãollar per foot to Jl support one of its marine biological research Þrograms. Catching these ill- tempered creatures was a profitable if slightly hazardous pastime. Thosé not caring to don scuba gear could go shark-fishing from the shõre or boats. Fish werè abundant_in the lagoon and ranged from I four to slr feet in length, although occasional ten-foote¡s we¡e seen. There we¡e no shark attacks made againlt swimmers during Program 437's tenure on the island, but óve¡ a thousand õf the finned predators were caught by fishermen.2o I

(U) the allure of the dining halls' choice viands palled, 1ìJ:t,- - Jvheryver or the range of spare time diversions seeined limited, the islanders still had their justifiable priãe I in being-the Air Forcet ohly completely "blue suit" space launch ïrganization to sustain their morale. with the cornpletion of the last program 437Ãp launch in Juty 1966, the organization rededicated itself to the originãl ASAT mission. t

@ an eigtrt-month launch hiatus followed the final 437Ap operation of 2 Julv 1966_. During that period, training exercises for the ASAT system kept p"rro*Jl I - confídent andproficient in their duties. The upgrade of ground guida'ncè facilities also continued through this period. A simila¡ initallation was to-be constructed at Vandenberg AFB for t¡aining and support of the program. A request for $18g,000 E ln_gmeJgelE funds to construct thè Johnston islaãd facility *us approu.d on 8 March. 1966, and pe-rsomel began_training at the Univac fáctory ttie following July as_plans were confirmed for the vandenberg station. A Bu¡eaú of the Budgei I study challenging the irrìminent need for it halted work abruptly at the base in July, and as a result the original plan c¿lling for joint occupancybf the facility by ADõ and AFSC was changed to provide 'scheduledADc with its own ground guidance-station at I the base, with occupancy for late 1968. cãnstruciion of the station proceeded unhindered, and it was completed by the end of the year.2t t .8 Tylgry g1_idgge station brought problems with it. Acceptance.and testing of GGS-2 (Building 990) was h.amþered by chronic radio frequency interference between the ground station and tÍre launch empla.".o.ntí. I Representatives of the Sac¡amento Air Materiel A¡ea (SMAMA) Field Management Team attempted to. correct the problem, but to no avail. TÉe ADC finally agreed to, accept the facility on 28 February 1967, with the problem'stil1 I unsolved and without a demonstration launch to tesiits capabilities. This was done on the condition that SMAMA agree to correct the deficiêncies in the station after t¡ansfer occurred." I I t * **t*** + * ¡¡ ¡¡ * )¡ F -gi*it¡:!¡= '¡ 39 þ By that time ADC had succeeded in winning an allotment of eighteen I @ additional Thors to support the CTL requirements through 1971, although half of F them were already earniarked fo¡ use as target vehicles to suppo¡t the Army's ABM program. The third CTL (and first since April 1965) was originally scheduled I for 20 February 1967, but the radio frequency problem with the ground guidance T station forced it to be ¡escheduled for 30 March. It coincided with the ADC Exercise SQUANTO TERROR 67-1.4, which brought the ASAT system into a I simulated wartime operation for the fi¡st time. The launch proceeded flawlessly as schêduled, with the simulated warhead passing within 2.019 nautical miles of the I a range 900 miles. This tat1et, a piece of American orbital debris engaged at of launch demonstrated both the crew's proficiency and the now reliable guidance I station.23 G) On 1 January 1967 the 10 ADS was redesignated as a group, with two subordinate units reporting to it: the 25 ADS at Vandenberg AFB, and the 24th I Support Squadron on Johnston Island. The 25 ADS was divided into three Combat I-aunch. Crews,.which rotated to.the island.fromrthe.mainland.on ninety-day tours.2o I fhe achievement, of group status presumed the unit.would assume an additional mission. On l April 1967, the unit became responsible fo¡ the,Bu¡ne¡ II satellite Iaunch program previously conducted by the 4300th Support Squadron (SAC).' That unit was deactivated on 25 May 1967, and its personnel were absorbed by the F 10 ADG. The 10 ADG's unit crest bore the image of a scorpion with its stingered tail posed to strike, and the motto: "Beware Aggressor," but as 1967 faded to"iard l 1968 the lethality of the scorpion's Thor-tipped tail became increasingly dubioüs." æ ln 1967 Progrlm 437 conf¡onted two threats to its continued operational siatus: the diversion of the Johnston Island launch facilities to support another major research and development mission for a sister service, and the ASAT I system's apparent impotence in the face of a new Soviet space weapons system. In September 1967, ADC was queried on a DOD proposal to use Johnston Island I as a launch site fo¡ the Tho¡ IRBMs and Minuteman ICBMs employed as target vehicles for the US Army's experimental Nike-X ABM system on Kwajalein Island. The initial phase of the test support_p¡ogram called for 40 Thor launches, to be ts followed by the ICBM launch phase.'o @ By Iate October, the test support plan had been reduced to the point I where it appeared the launches .would be conducted. and supported by the contracto¡, with the first . twenty-nìne IRBM and ICBM launches slated from Johnston Island in July-August 1970. Subsequent launches were to continue at two I or three every three months into Fiscal Year 1973. 'Ihe prospective contractors:for

I the effort, Boeing, McDonnell-Douglas, and Thompson-Ramo-Wooldridge, we¡e to

I '.@ The Burner II was a.n upper-stage rocket engine mounted on the Thor to launch DMSP satellites iato polar orbit. All of the 10 ADG Bumrcr II launches were conducted at Va¡denberg. Tìe last such launih occu¡red on 6 June 1979. The Eurner II-DMSP effort was then transferred to the 394th ICBM Test and Maintenance Squadron (SAC). (Interview, âuthor with Mr Joe Donahue, I Historian, 1st Stratcgic Aerospace Division, Vandenberg AFB, California, 25 November 1987.) I ** * * * *t-^qfu ** *'* ¡i(,¡* ''. rrrrr.¡l¡|ElESl ':rrrrr.r t.{: 40 ; submit their bids by the close of May 1968. DOD required ADC to srând ready to suqport the tït project, despite the crippling effect itwould likely have upon thê ASAT mission.'?T I

@ Despite the distraction posed by the Nike-X support requirement, the Air Staff authorized ADC to conduct fou¡ future Program 437 CTTra one in FY 1968, t two in FY 1969, and the last in FY 1970. This was obviously far short of the three CTL's per year (one per crew) called for in the o-riginal training plans to maintain crew proficiency. There were no additional launches f¡om Johnston Island durins rrl 1967, but the next CTL was scheduled for February 1968.'?8

(U) The conduct of a successful CTL every month for a year would not have I been sufficient to make Program 437 an effective response to the new Soviet threat that appeared in 7967: the Fractional Orbit Bombardment System (FOBS). Based upo:r a third-generation ICBM booster, the SS-9 "Scarp," this weapons system made I its first publie appearance in Moscow during the May Day parade of 1965, at ,¡/hich "r3ji¡ time it was described as possessing "an orbital weapons application." The booster appgared again 9uring a celebration that November and was again identified as an t "orbital rocket."2s

(U) Despite American protests that such a system defied the 1963 United I Nations ban against stationing \,veapons of mass destruction in space, the Soviets began long-range sub-orbital testing of their FOBS hardware laË in 1965. There a 17 September 1966 orbital launch, which ended in failure, as did a second.test t shot on 2 November 1966. An intensive ninelaunch test program followed in January through Octobe¡ 1967. In all, fifteen FOBS launðheJ were conducted within a four-year period, most oc^curring in 1967, after,which American intelligenie ¡ated the system as operational.3o 'l (U) None of the Soviet FOBS launches passed over the continental United .I states and thus were not openly provocative, but there could be no mistake the soviets had achieved the capability to bomb the earth frorn space. The operational dggloyme¡1 p! a FOBS system by the end of 1967 (theie were an isrimated t eig_hteen FOBS launchers emplaced at the Tyurâtam launch complex) was doubly g_alling since the soviets had signed the January 1967 united Naiioís' ,potrsot"d "Treaty of Principles Governing the Activities of states in the Exploration and use ! of Outer Space". It specifically banned the placing in orbit "around the Earth any o_bjects carrying nuclear weapons or any other weapons of mass destruction."3l Whether legal or not, the Soviet FOBS had depl,oyed a system "capable of I delivering strategic weapons against-us territory by utiiizing A¡tarctic trajecto.ries to launch a surprise attack against us command and controi strategic airfields ánd thus disrup.t its retailatory stiike. Atthough the us developmenl of a saiellite- based missile warning system, slated t for deployment in the eãrþ 1970s, promised y^apry of such an attack, the nation lackàd the means to deitroy them. These 1967 developments placed Program 437 in an uncomfortable position. As a direct ascent interc_e_ption r weapon it could not bercharged with consiituting a violatiôn of either the United Nations General Assembly Resolution of 1gø1, nor the I I h rr¡ rt¡r ¡¡ sffiæ *tùt¡¡¡¡t R 4l subsequent 7967 treaty, for its nuclear warhead would never enter orbit. Stilt, the I fact that it would catry a nuclear warhead into space had given the Soviets FI ammunition for charges that the United States was taitrting the cos¡nos with weapons of mass destruction, while at the same time it provided them a useful propaganda smoke sc¡een to shield their development and deployment of FOBS.32

I Program 431 clearly could not counter FOBS weapon. 7967 $ the In the system still lacked the ability to compute accurate interception data for targets in the "high drag areas'l below approximately 250 miles altitude, which was where the FOBS capsules traveled, nor could Program 437 engage any. launches from I Tyuratam on inclinations of less than 57' or from 65" to 80'. The typical FOBS mission directed against American targets would be launched on an inclination of from 49.5'to 50o, so Program 437's island location bar¡ed it from intercepting any I FOBS mission di¡ected against the United States. Program 437 became anaiogous to France's Maginot Line. Both were fully capable of destroying any target that came within their range, but their fixed emplacements rendered them useless II against attackers approaching f¡om the flanks or rear.t'

(S Program:437's accelerating, decline. in importance was marked by ADC's I 17 March 1967 issuance of a Required Operational Capability (ROC) request for a new satellite interceptor system. Citing the USSR's evident intention to "pursue I a military space p¡ogram to achieve strategic superiority in space and thereby disrupt the dete¡rent balance afforded by current USAFy'USSR weaponry.r and f9r9es," the command petitioned the Air Staff for a "dynamic, well-planned'sþace defe¡se system capable of meeting space threats" in the light of Þrogram 437,s I "limited effectiveness against a nonmaneuverable, identified hostile thieat.,' : The ROC"called for "a coorbital interceptor . . . (to) accomplish inspection, negâtion and damage assessment against a more sophisticated threat. Negation by such an I inlerceptor would permit greater flexibility and control and be less costli in terms of nuclear effects." Although Air Defense Command would never receive its non- nuciear coo¡bital ASAT system, its very request fo¡ such a weapon was an index I to its growing disenchantment with Program 437's limited capabilities.,o S For fourteen months, from March 1967 untii May 1968, the launch ^ ^-- - I çurpraçcruEuls--1^ -4_ s tuuu suen¡ on J onnslon rslano. I ne comDat crews ano malntenance personnel continued thei¡ 90-day: rotations to and from the niainland, but the ASAT d¡ill launchings were held 'in abeyance. Dúring that period the 10 ADG I crews at Vandenberg conducted three Burner Ilrlaunches; but for the men on the atoll it was a frustrating time. The 25 ADS launch c¡ews and assisting personnel from the 24th Suppoft Squadron operated under rhe aegis of CONAD Operãtion + O¡der 301C-67, which defined three Satellite Alert Conditions (SATCONs):,, SATCON 3-- Normal ¡eadiness condition with ¡eaction ll time of more than 24 hours with two I missiles in readiness. + ****r**Yff-Ë \ ***r'r*r + T r t * t ¡ t t-*a¡ËËE r r'¡ t t'. i 42 I SATCON 2-- Advanced alert condition '¡¡ith reaction time for both missiles of five hours. I SATCON 1-- Advanced alert condition i¡r which missiles are prepared for terminal countdown and I terminai count is initiated. CINCONAD, the JCS, or higher command authority could declare SATCON 2 I o¡ 3. SATCON 1 could be declared only by the JCS or higher authority. The order to eûgage a satellite would be directed by the President and issued by the JCS.35 I @ Continental Ai¡ Defense Command's operations plan provided for fiyg types of System- Readiness Exercises: I-live launch, Il-dual wet countdown with loading 'and missile' I simulated launch, III--one dual propellant one dry tv-walk/talk-through exercise, and V-special exe¡cise requested by a component command to meet á component requirement. A number of such exercises, other than Type I, were conducted during the year. Air Defense Command orders I ri"i,'lri directirig the conduct of such orders were relayed--to the 10 ADG by its parent organization, the 9th Aerospace Defense Division.'o I Éú As 1968 opened, the Johnston Island site continued normal routine operations. In January, guidance.personnel from Combat C,rew B of the 25 ADS bègan an extensive training progrãm under the guidance of their counterpartE.ifl I Combat Crew A, as they prepared to tåke over ground guidance stations from tþe departing crew. The installation and checkout procedures for GGS-1 were completed, and it was accepted as an operational facility by Headquarters I Aerospace Defense Command in Ma¡ch. Located in Building 100, this stationls acceptance completed the two-year program of modernization and expansion of ground guidance systems. Coupled with Station 2, which had entered operation I éarly in L967, it provided the cap_abiiiry to guide a launch on any desired azimuth with a 360 degree coverage "fan."' t @ Despite the long-anticipated improvements to the site's guidance capability, the planned February CTL was delayed when the missiles on both launch emplacements had to be replaced, reducing the system to a one-míssile I ,r-!fi1:,::: capability for a time. On 28 February, maintenance personnel discovered that the .r:ì:-ì 'ilìir,jj pneumatic plumbing leading from the storage tank to the launch vehicle .was contaminated with hydrocarbon. The missile on LE-l was declared non- t operational on. 29 February. LF-z remained on emergency operational status. LE-1 decontamination was completed and the missile was replaced on 29 Marçh. It was then determined that the missile on LE-2 had suffered rust corrosion. 'It I was replaced, and the launch emplacement was restored to full operational capabiliry by 21 April.3' T é{ With the equipment_problems corrected, the launch personnel were free to conóentrate on preparing for the rescheduled CTL, slated for 13 May. During I t I

lq 43 il (LOX) the interim rust was discove¡ed on a valve in the Liquid Orygen facility, a testament to the ravaging effects of the salt aìr upon virtually every piece of metal ir that suffered prolonged exposure to it. Cleaning and decontamination of the facility tasted from 6 April until 9 June, when the production of the fuel component could be safely resumed. The CTL, however, was not affected. I Combat Crew C ¡elieved the B contingent on 30 April after completing the normal required transition exercises. The new cre"r¡ immediately concentrated upon the rapidly approaching CTL. On 13. May, the. launch. was aborted at T-90 seconds I due to a lockup guidance malfunction. The fault was conected in short order and resumed permit successful launching of missile No. 58-2316 I the countdown to a from LE-L early on the fourteenth. The target satellite, a Thor-Agena rocket I body, had been in orbit since 1964. The launch proceeded smoothÌy, and the mock warhead registered a radial miss distance of 2.33 kilometers for a successful interception. The JCS and National Military Command Center integrated the launch into another on-going exercise that lent an added sense of urgency and I realism.3s I ' (U) BV the autumn of .1968, Program 437,had. settled:into a well=established routine. Both Thors.were.kept continuously ready during each crew's 90-day tour. Keeping the guidance systeûrs calibrated and supplied with the proper targeting data was the biggest challenge. Exe¡cises were continually conducted to test both h thê personnel and equiprnent by feeding target data to the missiles' guidance systems to ensure that they remained functional. Colonel Richa¡d B. Peterso , a 25 ADS combat crew commander, described the mo¡a1e and motivatiqn of his men I in a later ¡ecollection: The exercises sustained their (the crews') motivation. Stressing the fact .. that the job had to be done with perfection by everyone . . . . We were I given a mission and we performed it--certainly 99Vo. Each and every launch and exercise was a matte¡ of pride in your people . . . . Every one felt that there was a definite mission to perform . . . . There was I tremendous pride in the organizatíon . . .. The only totally blue-suit ts people in the space business.€ (U) Colonel John R. Barnard, also a c¡ew commander during the same.period, shared Peterson's rnemories of a unit imbued with a sense of .cspri!.de corps.which I generated a 'Very positive feeling" among all the islande¡s: At no time did we feel that it couldn't be done or that we were spinning ... our wheels doing it . . . . Everyone was impressed by the secrecy of it -: I and really hyped up, but the procedures were pretty routine by then . . . . Everybody felt that they were pioneers in space . . . . As far as I was * concerned we were the ffust military people in space witå an operational mission , . . . We had hand picked troops and they were the best.a'

(U) If the Program 437 C'fl,s had by this time become routine, they still I att¡acted great interest in certain quarte¡s. Both a 24th Support Squadron :\ * r,*x * {,*JEl¡¡¡¡|r * *,Ì¡*,¡ t+ 'Ì* *!¡rr,t*)¡ **,¡)¡*!rt I ffi 44 I commander uñ a 25 ADS combat crew leader recalled that during at least two Iaunches soviet submarines and surface vessels were observed *ltrriri t"" m .r or t the aloll, as.they moûitored- the -American operations. They made no attempt to interfe¡e with the launches, but their interestln the proceqdings was obvious. 'such sig!1ings of soviet vessels would be noted until the ïery end o.'f the program in the L970s.42 I

(U).Lur.king Soviet submarlng¡ may have furnished a diverting topic of conversation in the island's dining halls, I but ofgreater concern to the meä sewicing tle w91e lingering effects of an ear[èr ]!o_rs. -the American operation on the atol]. on 26 July 1962, a nuclea¡ warhead-laden Thor, being prepa¡ed for launchins as part of the FISHBOWL high I altitude nuclear test seriés, explocted and burned" on LE-1 as the result of a LoX valve malfunction during tire taunch sequence. The warhead casing ruptured, and radioactive materiãl . ¡,vas scattered over the emplacement, necessitating. a massive cleanup I to render the facility usable again. Throughout Pr ogram 437's occupancy isrand, - of ìhe the empracement îas :iiif monitored- for a potential radiaiion hazard. Tlte 24th supþort Squadron maintained a th¡ee-man crew charged exclusivery with ctrect

.:, -* D..¡lil. the system's performance ;'fi.¿?, -. ê superior to date, the long winding down t of -Progrrm 437 ¡Élll1,', effectively began in 1969. There were to be no ïaunches" matle arolÌ *9. lh" du.ring.rhûr.year. lor at the srart of ß69 it was apparent rhat rhe lhor bo¡sters urilized by both program 437 and the GoLLEGË'I_AUNCHER- t rJurner ll operations were I dwindling resource. Aside from those alreadv earmarked in support of those nvo miìsions, only six remained in ttre úiÃÉ inventory. Jgnuary it was decided -_In that fou¡ óf them wourd be ailãtteã-õ : Program 437 and two to the satellite launch effo¡t at vandenberg. r¡"r" ,.ráui.". would probably supqort both efforts through cy rg7z, but tñereafter it ;;rd become necessa^ry to_ tregin using.the "lo¡g.ta*nk" variants of the Tho.. AD¿ b"gu; ¡ drafting plans for that eventuarity, as we as for an emergency program 437 capability at vandenberg for use inthe event some natural catait¡ofr,. .ri'ppr.o ti,. x******- ***:i*xrx I nál t H

I 45

TI launch complex on Johnston Island. Both proposals ¡emained $rbject to final Air t Staff review and approval.ot S) During the interim, the troops marked time and tried to keep their skills honed as the Thors stood ready on the island. At 00152 on 22 March 1969, the ; system was reduced to C-3 readiness status when one of the missiles was decla¡ed MOCP (Missile out of Commission, Parts) due to a failed turbo-pump. The system regained C-1 status at 15002 on 2 April when a back-up Thor was airlifted to the ; atoll from Vandenberg AFB and the ailing booster ¡eturned to the mainland for 'I repair, Although sufficient boosters r¡r'ere still available to support the program for several more years, the Air Staff had decided to begin personnel reductions. By ; year's end the Directorate of Operations, HQ USAF, had directed

. . . a reduction of 124 personnel spaces . . . from within Program 437 resources to be effective in FY 2/70. This ¡eduction was effected by I elirninating approximately one-third of the assigned missile guidance . , personnel from ,the rotational launch .crews, assigning the .remâining * guidance technicians in a PCS status to eithe¡ Vandenberg AFB or . Johnston Island units and reducing the number of security police assigned : to the Johnston. Island unit. This latter action was made possible by ; maintaining the operational Thor missiles at Johnston in a de-mated .¡ 'configuration (nuclear payload not installed on the missiles) thereby reducing the requirements for stringent physical security of the launch' t pad areas. These actions will result in an annual savings of $400,000, but will not reduce the operational response or posture of the Program 437 Sateltite Interceptor System .... Program Change Decision Z-9-107, 8 September 1969, terminates Program 437 at the end of FY 73. A IIt reclama to this decision is not planned at this time."6 € The program's future grew more dim during late February 1970 as the F consequence of a meeting between Sec¡etary of the Air Force Seamans and Under Secretary Mcl-ucas. During that meeting, and subsequent ones with the Air Staff and other concerned agencies, the possibility of upgrading Program 437 to provide a new ASAT system was discussed, and AFSC was directed to prepare a technical I development plan by August 1970. Yet before that work could be car¡ied further, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard issued a 4 May 197O.directive. th:it the I . Air Force phase down Program 431 by The end of the fiscal.year. 'Packa¡d based his decision on the perceived likelihood that the nation would never neêd the system's sewices. As a substitute for Program 437, Packard requested the- Air I Force and Army to develop low-cost technolory programs for the creation of non- nuclear ASAT systems. In addition, since there seemed to be no urgent need for the 437 system, he specified that it would not be required to stand continuous alert status and that its satellite acquisition and identification functions could be I performed by other systems. Under Secretary Mclucas subsequently offered such I an austere system as a candidate for the non-nuclear ASAT mission."' I * * ¡r ¡r ¡*'r'l ffi * *,*** * * I r'!rrr.! _+Ëq:tr *t*:rtüt Ë 46 F (-læ Although its days \¡r'ere numbered, Program 437 remained viable within its inherent operational constraints; and there was some compgnsation. rn that the system waí being relieved from supporting the Nike-X ABM testing : progam, which would havé absorbed much of its effort and resources during the yeals 1970-73. System personnel remained at a high state of readiness as they þrepared for the-Air Dèfense Command exercise ARLBERG TERROR 70-7' : wliih would see the 10 ADG conduct a live launch from Johnston Island on 7il March 1970. The mission was to certify the telemetry subsystem, which had been modified to a new frequency in the S-Band as required by AFM 100-318, and t to provide combat crerr lraining and data for'weapon system p^erformance asséssment. Missile lift-off occurred at 07372 and interception of the target satellite was achieved following 670 seconds of flight at 902.7 nautical miles slant T range and 508.4 nautical miles altitude. The mission objectives were successfully meiand the miss distance was computed at only 1.1 nautical rnile, well within the 3 nautical mile kill radius of the syitem's nuclear warhead.ou I Ð It was a superb performance for a moribund system that had not been month later, the launch crew ..J$ie operationally exercised since May 1968. Iæss than a I Defense :...1:::È wãs catled upon again as Jö.lrnston Island supported testing related to the anid Program (see Chapter IV). The Thor '',rid,: Subsystem Development Demonstration launðh was designed to dèmonst¡ate both combat crew proficiency and feasibility 'of envi¡onment to detect, t using a lóng wave inJra¡ed sensor in an exo-atmospheric acquire, track, and discriminate in track between tvio objects. The 25 April countdown and launch were routine, but problems arose with the -experimental : payload and the primary mission test objeCtives were not achíeved.ae ;i

live launches, the Johnston Island c¡e*s were @'under After the long hiatus from : suddenf the spoilight again. During the week of 26 April through 2 May, the 25 ADS underwent an ADC Operational Readiness Inspection and Capability Inspection carried out by an ADC Inspector General Team. The unit satisfactorily demonstrated its capability to perform the ASAT mission, but was accorded a C-3 t rating because only one missile was on alert status in the wake of the 25 April launch.so t Ë No doubt the 10 ADG could still perform its mission, but circumstances marked Program 437's . , ..i...,i beyond its control had eroded its capabilities and clearly Island, program .::,11i¿f-i future course. Because of personnel reductions on Johnston I managers were obliged to downgradç the launch emplacements to a lower'level of "i,^-,..*: security priority. Consequently, both warheads were demated from their missiles f.!r: and placed in secu¡e storage elsewhere on the island. The necessity to remate the t two warheads to their boosters prior 10 beginning a launch countdown increased I the tótat system rea¿tion time from five to eleven hours by November 1969..:lThe eleven hour lead-time required for execution of the ASAT mission was 'also I dependent upon such factors as the scheduling of the launch emplaeement for support of other missions. No matter how keen the skills and enthusiasm of the crews might remain, the program was entering an unavoidable period of decline.st I I #l¡tssa* I F 47

F b¡lsy' O.n (5) Despite the program's bleak outlooh the launch crews ¡emained Z+ Sepíemtér there wasã launch supporting the Pefense Atomic Support A-gency's (DASA) High Altitude Program (HÁP). The HAP-was a part_of-the Nalional payloads Ii Þrogram designed to flight-test DASA Ñuclear Te-st Readiness preparatory to demonstrating thè agency's capability to resume atmospheric testing I in t'he errent of a suspensionãf the nuclear test ban then in effect. The September launch made it neceisary for CINCONAD to authorize downtime for LE-2 during the period of L7 May thiough 23 June in order to perform necess¿ry modifications for ihe DASA suppórt mission. The launch was a milestone, for it marked the last I such operation tó be mounted ftom Johnston Isiand by a Program 437 crew' The launch^ emplacements would remain silent until two final launches in^September and November 7975. By that time Program 437 was only a memory'" II S On 31 December 1970 the 10 ADG was redesignated the 10 ADS, while tne iqín and 25th ADS were inactivated and redesignated as Detachment L, 10.ADS. This change was a consequence of. Secretary Packa¡d's May decision t-o year's,.end' On 30.:September the Joint Chiefs begin,þhasing do*nthe -aprogram.by I -Staff ,CONAD/ADC request to rescind the 24-hour alert of had-: approved F requirement foiÞrogram 437. CONAD then placed.the ASAT system on a 30-day ¡ecãll status as of 10 October. The launch crews returned to Vandenberg AFB and the nuclear wa¡heads were placed in storage at Nellis AFB, Nevada. A small caretaker detachment of military and contracto¡ personnel remained on Johnston I maintain the launch complex. During the inte¡im the ground guìdance Island to station was de?ctivated, both missilès were shipped back to Vandenberg, the I-OX * sto¡age tanks were drained, and.the launch facility power supply was draw_n from the cóntractor-operated system instead of the customary generator vans. "In sum, pieces- the 43'7 system-the retained the same capability but, to put the together, expanded reaction time,'i the L4th Aerospace Force history noted. For all tr - präctical purposes the phase-down and the reduction of Program.431 to a tr iheoreticai 30i-day recall iapability ìvere the ASAT effo¡ts deathknell.s3 ÉÐ The 1970 exodus from the atoll ma¡ked Program 437's recessional, but it ¡emaìned for the capricious elements of the ocean to strike the greatest blow + aocincr irc fnrrrrnes vìt su-stained- Hurricane Celeste descended upon Johnston IJland on L9 August as the storm's center passed within nineteen miles of the atoll base, whose personnel had. already been.evacuated to Hawaii. High winds and raging tides pbunded the island, doing substantial damage to compute¡ e_qqipment r anã óther facilities. Local repair efforts proved unsuccessful, and by iate September the 10 ADS was requesting aid from the Warne¡.Robins Air-M-ateriel Arèa (WRAMA) for depot level maintenance and repair tasks. VryIV4C r represêntatives were dispaiched by WRAMÁ' arriving on site on 7 Decembeî. The Program 437 system was ¡emoued from service the iollowing day'so

+ Despite the downgrading of the ASAT system and its deferred return to {9) operâtiônal itatus in the w-ake of the hur¡icane, the 10 ADS continued its 'ASAT nission, although the 30-day lead time required to ¡eactivate even a system in good + repair was obvñusty unrealistíc for wa¡time operations. In addition, ADC funding + *r(¡.**¡r* EE¡p*******

* t*+*rr*f,Eã. *,¡,*,r ¡r r I t 48 I 'prevented c_onstraints the squadron from deploying to Johnston Island for an operational Readiness Inspection, so the unit was êxempted from that requirement during 1972. By I that time the squadron was increasinþþ preoccupied with other launch missions staged from vandenberg. Not until 20 March 1973 was the Program 437 system restored to c-l statui. That rating was more of a formality than an actual assessment system's I of the existing praclical utility, for on 1 Junê Pacific Air Forces concluded a memorandum of ãgreement for the transfer of its host-management responsibilities on Johnston Atoll to the Defense Nuclear T Agency, to be effective on 1 July 1973.5s

S The change in stewardship of the atoll simply marked another milestone along the path to the system's demise, still scheduleà ior Fiscal yea¡ 1974. Loath T to. gr^u" ev^en a marginal P-p ASA-T capabiiity, Air Defense Command petitioned the Air staff on 28 Augusr to permit retention ôf the mission,capability while achieving equivalent financial sa1lgs. The staff replied on 2 ñovem6er directing thä I {i_r c-ontinuing phase-out of Program 437, but retention of the ASAT capabiliry"to a legree. "as long,as ADC maintained a Thor missile launch capability än Joñnston Island'" The degree to rvhich the ASAT capability would be mäintained was T ¡Lr.,eIl contingent _upon the suppg¡r re_quirements of the óefense systems Application ltog.uq National Nucleai rest Readiness program, and the u.s. army 3år"gouio Tar.get Evaluation Program, all of which made ãemands upon the 10 Abs u"T tttó t atoll launch facility.56

. Ð E¡¡en this grudging reprieve fo¡ the comr,nand's ASAT mission rias t t]ye1tery{.by the pe-nding 1, Jiuli tgT4 retirement of the program 437 warhe;ds ;i Air staff direction. Not until 2 July, the day after their scheäuled .eti."-ent, ãi¿ the Air staff advise ADc that the warheäds courd be retained u, poii ãî ãn I operational Program 'r:l 437 until 1 April-(pol\4), 1975. This was in line with itr" usa¡' P¡ogram objectives Memorandum Fy 75-79, which dictated .o,,,p-t.t" plrgfe-gg! of the sysrem in the fourth quarier of Fiscar year rg74. on r0 Auzust t 1974, USAF Program Management birective (pMD) 30-0 sooz ùjtdlílï terminated Program 437 (on paper) and established th" Thor vrdiíé ru"n.r., lqppgt Program to take irs place, thus allowing the 10 ADS to keep u .iriãuoi t A AT capability while it lave primary support to-numerous other launih activities. The nuclear warheads were finallv reiired ãuring the first two weeks of April 1975. The Program 437 system was officially retired oñ 1 April. A]though ttre ,]Åte- t ai I long since ceased beìng an operational reality, coroner John w."yocuni, ro ani commander during the period of its demise, was convinced, in retfospeci, that his crews could have revived Program 437 for use if need be: "Ít *as obuìous that the T emphasis on the mission had been decreased considerably . . . at the ru-. ti-" there was still.a capabiliry there that was a dererrent." Even ttrough rrågia--ìJi was officially interred by the Air staff on 1 April 1975, the Sovie-ts coniinued to keep.a t wary,eye on Johnston Isrand. Both thì september and November 1971 launches made from there in support of the Ballistiå Missile Defense Ta¡set Test Program were reputedly monitored by a soviet submarine *tricl surfaceã wi-tnin I sight of rhe atoll. The ASAT vererans of the 10 ADS could have asked- ---for ---no finer compliment to their skills than that vessel's inquisitive presence.si- t t T T 49 t NOTES (ALL Notes are Unclassified) !l Chaoter rrl 1. Curtis Peebles, !êjdg-bl$paçç (\ew Yorl 1983), pp 88,90.

2. Ibid., p 90; Walter A. McDougall, . . . the Heavgns and the Ea¡lh (NeJv Yo¡!, 198a), 398-'100; I -nn Paù B. Slares, The Militarization of Space U.S. Policv. 1945-1984 (Ithaca, New York' 1985), pp 92-96.

3. Peebles, pp 82-85. || EsIdç-bLS!êçs, pp 96, 162,24r. I 4. Ibid., p 88; Stares, f!e-![!!¡4!¿4¡!e¡-9!.$psse,

5. Peebles, Battle for Soace, pp 90-91; Stares, The Militarization of Soace, pp L23-24;Hist (S/DECL F OADR), Ai¡ Defeose eommãd, Jul-Dec 64, Vol I, Narrative, pp 60-61. ,i 6. Briefrng Paper (U), TSgt Eric G. Lemmon, 10 ADS, "Summary of Thor Missìle. Launches from T Johnston Èh¡d," 1.9 Ma¡ 76; Sta¡es, The Militarization of Soacc,pp 123-23; Gerald T' Canwell, "The Ai¡ Force in Space, Fiscal Yea¡ 1965" (Washington, D.C'' 1968), pp 25-30. t 7. Hist (S/DECL OADR), Air Defense Comman{ Jan-Jun ó6, Vol I, Narratile, pp 60-61. I 8. Briefing Paper (U), TSgt Eric G. Lemmon, 10 ADS, "Sumnary of Thor Missile Launches f¡om Johmton lìhnd," 19 Mar 7o; trlsg (S/DECL OADR), ADC to SBAMA, 052110z'.Mar 65, subj: F Program 437 Reliability." 9. Hist (S/DECL OADR), Space Systems Division, .la.n'Dec 64, Vol II, Narrative, pp 30-35.

10. Ltr (S/DECL OADR) Brig Gen Stebbin W. GriInth, Dcs/Intelligence, HQ NORAD,_ to F Commandèi, USe¡ Air Defênse eommand, ATTN'ADLPlv (Lt Col H. S' Stees), "NORAD Briefing on Dete¡mination of the Missiot of SpaceVehicles," 1 Dec 64; Hist (S/DECL OADR), Space Systems F Division, Jan-Dec 64, Vol II, Narrative, pp 30-35. 11. "History of Johnston Atoll (Special Reissue)," The Breeze, XVII, No. 283, Thursda¡ December 14;1967; InFlv (U), author with Col Richard B. Peterson, USAF Rel,30 Sep 86. I 12. inww ('U), author with Coi Troy G. Aicorn, USAF Re¡., 2ó Aug Eó' I 13. Ibid.; Intwv (U), author with'Col Job.u R. Ba¡nard, USAF Ret, 17 Sep 86. 14. Alcorn intvw (U), 26 Aug 86.

ú. fbid.; Ltr (U), CMSgt A. J. Stotler, USAF Ret, to D¡ Wayne R. Austerman, History Otfice, HQ I USAF Space Command, 28 Feb 86. 16. Ltr (U), CMSgt A. J, Stotler, USAF Ret, to Dr Wayne R. Austerman, History Office, HQ USAF I Space Comma.nd, 28 Feb 86. 17. Ibid.; Bamard Intvw (1.f , 17 Sep 86. I 18. Alco¡n Inrvw (U),'2ß N)g Í]6i Barna¡d Intvw (U)' 17 Sep 86. I ****l*rdlËtr *rt**'¡t 50

19. Alcorn Intvw (U), 2ß Aug 86.

20. Alcorn Intrav (U),26 Aug 86.

21. Hist (S/DECL OADR), Ai¡ Defense Comma.nd, Ja-n-Jun 67, pp 34L-52.

n. IbtA.

23. rbid.

24. Ibid.; MSgt Eric G. Lemnon, "10th AERODS: Ouly AII 'Blue-Suit' Space Lauach Organization Caries Motto "Bewa¡e Agg¡essor' as Mission," Mesa Missilier. '26 Oct 79, pp 4-5,

25. Lemmon, '10th AERODS,' pp 4-5; Inflr# (U), author with Mr Joe Donahue, Historian, 1st Strategic Aerospace Division, Vandenberg AFB CA, 25 Nov 87.

261 Hist (S/DECL OADR), Ai¡ Defense Command, Jan-Jun 67, pp lz8-49; Hist (S/DECL OADR), Ai¡ Defense Command, Jul-Dec 67, pp 294-97. i, 27. Hist (S/DECL OADR), AirDefense Comnand, JuI-Dec 6Z pp 29+97. 'irïL¿Ï';¡¡ 28. rbid.

29. Peebles, Battle for Soace, pp 62-73,75; Raymond L. Garthoff, "Banning the Bomb in Oute¡ Space," International Security (Winter 1980-81), pp 25-36i Stares, The Militarization ofSoace, pp 92-93,99-100; Douglas Hart, The Encvclonedia of Soviet Spacecraft (New York: Bison Books, L987), pp 49-50. .

30. Hart, The Encvclopedia of Soviet Soacecraft. pp 49-50; Gerald T. Cartwell, "The Ai¡ Force in Space Fiscal Yeat 1967" (Washington, D.C., 1970), Part II, pp Z7-%.

31. Garthoff, "Banning the Bomb in Outer Space," pp 37-44; Stares, The Militarization of Soace,, pp 99-105.

32. Peebles, Battle for Soace, p 65; Hart, The Enc.vclo¡edia of Sovièt Soacecraft, p 49.

33. Ltr (U), Col Philip R. Jackson, USAF Ret, to Dr Wayne R. Austerman, History Office, HQ USAF Space Command, 7 Feb,86; Hist (S/DECL OADR), Air Defense Command, Jan-Jun 67, pp 352-54; Hist (S/DECL OADR), Air Defense Command, Jul-Dec 67, pp 297-98i Gèrald T. Cantwéli, "The Ai¡ Force in Space Fiscal Yea¡ 1968" (Washington, D.C., 1970), Part II, pp 1-8.

34. Report (S/DECL OADR), Headquarters Air Defense Command, "Required Operational Capability (ROC) for Satellite Intercepror Systcm (U)," 17 Mar 67, pp 2-4i Cantwell, ,'The Air Forcc in Space, Fiscal Year 1967," p ï:çt+3. 10. l

35. Hist (S/DECL OADR), Continental Ai¡ Delense Command, 1968, pp 116-17.

36. rbid.

37. Hist (S/DECL OADR), 10th Aerospace Defense Group (ADC), Period Ending 30 Jun 68, Sec lI, pp 2A-28.

38. Ibid; Hist (S/DECL OADR), 10th Aerospace Defense Group (ADC), Period Ending 30 Jun ó8, Sec I.

* ** *:*:r,r €ñÈÉt.***'.r

* 3e. lbi4. ri ¡10. Intvw (U), author with Col Richard B. Peterson, USAF Ret, 30 Sep 86. 41.. Barnard Inww (U), 17 Sep 86. r 42. Pete¡soo Innw (LJ), 30 SeP 8ó; Alcorn Intvw (U), 2ó Aug 86. 43. Ibid.; Barna¡d Intùv (U), 17 Sep 86; Briefing Paper (U), TSgt Eric G. Lemmon, 10tl APS' "Summary of Thor Miss e Launches fiom Johnston'Islaqd," 19 Mar 76; Chuck Hã¡sen, U.S Nuclear * (Arlingtotr, Texas, 1988), pp 86-87.

,14. Hist (S/DECL OADR), 10th Aerospace Defense Group (ADC), Period Ending 31 De c 68, Sec II.

T Dcfense Command, Fiscal Year L969, pp 452-55. 45. Hist (S/DECL OADR) Aerospace

46. Hist (S/DECL OADR), HQ USAF, Directorate of Operations, 1 Ja¡ 30 Jun 69, p 42i7; Hist t (S/DECL OADR), HQ USAF, Dhectorate of Operations, l Jul-31 Dec 69' p 392. 47. ;Workilg Paper,(S/DECL OADR); Deputy Secretary of Defense.David Packard, "Anti-Satellite System," 4 May 70; Hist (S/DECL OADR), Aerospace. Defense .Command, Fiscal Year 1970, pp F 342-52. Note: On 1 Feb 70 the 24th Support Squadron of the 10 ADG was reorganized as the 24 ADS. rr 48., . Rprt (S/DECL OADR), Deputy Chief of Staff/Evaluation, HQ 14th A€rospace For-ce, "Program 437 System Evaluation Report for Combat Evaluation Launch Arlberg Terror 70-7 (U),' lMày 70; Hist (S/DECL OADR), Aerospace Defense Command, Fiscal Yea¡ 1970, pp 343-44. t 49. Jacob Neufeld, "The Ai¡ Force in Space, 1970-1974" (Washington, D.C.,11976), pp 42'43; Jacob Neufeld, "The Ai¡ Force i.u Space, L969-L970' (Washi¡gton, D.C.' L9TZ), pp 30-31.

50. Hist (S/DECL OADR), HQ USAF, Directorate of Operations, 1 Jan-30 Jun 70' p 397. H' 51. Ltr (S/DECL OADR), Lt Gen A.rthur C. Agan, CINCAD, to 14 Aerosp Force (14 CCR), "Demating of Program 437 Payloads (U)," 7 Nov 69; Hist (S/DECL OADR), 14th Aerospace Force, Ë 1 Jul-30 Jr¡n 71, pp 60-63.

52. Hist (S/DECL OADR), 14th Aerospace Force, l Jul 70-30 Jun 7L, pp 64-67; Hist (S/DECL t OADR) HQ USAF, Directoratc of Opcrations, 1 Jan-30 Jun 70, p 397. 53. Hist (S/DECL OADR), HQ CONAD Command, 1970, pp 9-101.

54. Hist (S/DECL OADR), HQ USAF, Directorate of Operations, 1 Jul-31 Dcc 7r, p 4ó3; !q1t1l])' + Col W. A. Arnold, Jr., "Prôgram 437 Damage.Assessment; Hurricane Celeste," n d.; Hist (S/DECL OADR); Aerospace Defense Command, L Jul 72-30 Jw 73,pp L92-95;Peebles, Ëal[.!e :for Spaçg, p-94; Stares, .T!çl4iIla¡izs.tj.QuqiSlaçs, pp 211--02. Note: The l Jan 71 downgrading of the 10 ADG to H a squadiòn and the concu¡renC disbanãing of the 24th ard ãth ADS reflected the declining fortunes of Program 437' Hist (S/DECL OADR)' HQ USAF, Directorate of operations, 1 Jan-30 Jun 71, pp 79-80. + 55. Hist (S/DECL OADR), HQ USAF, Di¡ectorate of Operations, 1 Jan-30 Jun ?, pp L23:?-i ryPj (S/DEC' OADR), Headqúarters CONAD Command ,1972,pp 126-27; Hist (S/DECL OADR)' HQ Directorate of Operations, 1 Jan-30 Jun 73, pp 149-52. Ë USAF, + * * * * * ¡ i..-*Ð,*'t * i( ¡t'* * + rrr***r rrrr!rrt : wÐ 52 I 56. Hist (S/DECL OADR), CONAD/Aerospace Defense Comrna.nd, 1 Jan 73-30 h:t 74, pp 4L45, L68-'17,244.

S?. Hist (S/DECL OADR), CONAD/Aerospace yea¡ t 44.¡ Defense Command, Fiscal 1975. oo 10a-06; Msg (s/DEcL oADR), csAF/xoo ro ADCTcc,3tzzrozJat 75, suti: "p¡oeram 437 (tJ\i' 1.1:qi-vqECL 9ADR) Dir Mar Mgr, McCreilan AFB cAlMMR to AFLC/MMADTXOX/MMä. 1823552 Mat 75, Subj: ''p437, Thor Missile Lauch Suppoiti Hisr (S/DECL OeOnl, HO' Uiee. I Directorate of Operarions, t Jan-30 Jun 75, pp æS-'09; Hist (SióECL OeOnl,"ffiJ UõÀf., Directolate of Operarions, 1 Jul-31-Dec 75, p 2,t4iIntwv (ù¡, authoì with Col Joho W.'iÃ;, ú¡ÀË Ret, 21 Jan 85; Intvw (S), author with Lt COI Oennis Eagai, He USAF Space Con nan¿, ZO bci Sj. I I t I I I I I t t t t I

r**:i!r. )r x dËÉff * *** *** t t n . *r***'r* sgç¡Eç *¡r'r**** n 53 t CIIAPTER IV Program 437 AP and Other Derivatives (U) T . (? ft" basic.Program 437 system si¡ed an intriguing variant, which initially promised to give the united states Air Force a unique means of acoui¡ino T r-ntelligence about soviet spacecraft design and ãüäi"ur"i;"iiài of them while in orbit. Program 437Ap (Altemate""polutËi payload) "i" was roored in Advanced Development Objective (ADO) No. 18, issued in Aþril 1.960, which stated the need for a satellite inspector-killer vehicle to be derivéd from program TI 706' thc satellite Inspector system, which subsequently became the sAINT proþct.' I By .1962, however, sAINT came under scrutiny becáuse it was not .orrJff"ótiu. and at year's end ir was terminated. On lZ May i963, AFSa dir*r"d ih;¡;;; F systems Division to initiate a Program 437 definition study that would deteririne the practicality of assuming the saielLite inspection capabìiíty originaily posit"ã ø, i. SAINT., . É) Egly in 1964, the Space Systems Division began work on an alte¡nare payload package for the ASAT systém. on 11 May cõntract negotiations were approved fo¡ modification of rhe sLV-2 Thor booster änd design ofihe "X, paytoàd I it was to c-ar-ry for the 4374P missions. Five days later a system program di¡éctive was issued fo¡ a 1 June implementation with ihe ¡eleasé of a'Geîera1 Electric I Co¡porationcontractforastudyandanalysisoftheprogram program . ..P .Py .{yryr_r, the. 4374P System Office (SpO) had been I established in AFSC, following the closúre, on 27 ñ4ay, of the origi"arÉtogrãro-aãz sPo I in the wake of continéntal Ai¡ Defense command,s deãlaration"that the \,vas--operational. system Headquarters usAF made it clear to AFSC that the new program office was to study.and .evaluate the proposed system, but no op"ioiiónor I system would be aurhorized until a thorough-anãlysis oi a teiting progiu- iãrìt I had been completed.o I ÉD In mid-Auøtst Snace Svçternc T-lir¡icinn c,rlrmi++-t ô D-^^-^* .rL^--- ",ñi; "Ë¿ Prop osàr' statine_ t¡æ Ëiã!':ail' isi x"- ; ;;, *';ä; îi, ;å ir* ïfi åli: on to Program 706, with a stated capabiiity" of photographing enemy ,ot"llito.-rt rt I was to be launched f¡om Johnston Island atop a rño¿ìtied mo. "uoort"r.' . Program Proposal provided -cþnge an adcritionat $14.7M in fundin.s to the basic I Program 437 effort via a reprogramming of available funds.s . Sil frory Augu! through October, Space Systems Division sought contractors for the 4374P project and identified their spécific a¡eas of *o¡k. flL Atomc-Energy commission finished its wo¡k as the design construction asencv for I the.project in August, while General Electric, Dougras Äit..urt, w"ri.-"Èi".tii., univac, and the sandia corporation f¡amed anã submitted'*ott stutã-Lnti. General I Electric received a contract on L0 september, and a work or¿e¡ tò Douglas Airc¡aft followed two days later.6 I *** * x * *-fi1ê. *,¡***:r x . rrrr*r*ãnl$*.¡Ê*r*, F J+aÀ I

__ - É On 28 Octobe¡,4FSC, ADC, and AFLC exchanged a Memorandum of u"nd-er,standing (Y9ul on program 437Ap which outrined tñ. uÃi. *rpo*i-¡iùii., I in.supporting _91,:u:n 9onuland the proþct. AFSC was to provide the payload, w*n engmeenng and management bonducted by space systems División. Air Defense command's 10 ADS was to furnish test Iãunch iacilities on Johnston t Island, while AFLC was to manage support of the system.T program fr" evolved swiftly.- By 17 February 1965, vehicle testing and T a¡qemþly.F were underway, and a month läte¡ the system test plan, svstem test objectives, and target ava ab ity program documentation *"r. .o-ptJt.o, oró"g with a site acrivarion manual and thé finar contract with Dougras fu;;;;ü^;y I fina.l ?? ap:.t the system resr plan had been published, an¿ oi jfvfãu-ð.""ia Electric successtully mared the payroad both mËchanica[i *ã ;r..;ri.Jíu.-B;;" end of June, about ail of the-$i4.7M had been léNt-ir;ã *;.1" T Gene¡al Elecrric, anorher $3.4M to Dougras "*p..ía.àialr.ru¡t,' ---'--$5,öô0ï"ðäi¿iu corporatíon, and the balance to other minor óntractorr.ã t l4 Meanwhile' ola-nning proceeded f6¡ i¡51rìrati6¡ of ground equipment on Johnston Istand. Twb tq1 gi¡itex teretyp" .ir*iif ou.*p equlpment, and new secure communications facilitiei were eármarked fór the Ë"r'.r?ã-tå ¡ippãn I both 4374P and other AFSC-¡erated progtu-i. Th. .orrt.u"t was awa¡ded Ir.rternational to relephone and reregraph/keäog, which began instailation operations armed at meet¡ng a completion date.of 30 September 1Þ65.s I .-,. _Ø I-n April, the SPO. issued a complete development plan for program 437AP, which outlined its objectives and th'e -"tt á¿, by which rhey were to be I achieved. Its basic aim was to demonstrare tr,e l,rea.i¡ilíry intellEence photos of orbiting objects using u noo_oi¡itaìä.;;.p;il;;;'t;ïi'iì;"fäi,riij"*ì".¡åål 437AP payload was to be 99mptêtely inteichangeabte øÛ, tfr.'ftãi Éñ;;;, ;;ì was to include an aft bulkheäd, a ipacer r s"cíon, a modified c"""rur-ÊË.t.-ù Mark II nonrecoverabre re-entryvehicle, an¿ an-H-¡oe r";;;;"i-.;;;ry"";hi.Ë carrying twin cameras in "cruar iotary" conf.igurarion, an ailied .áotioïìoi.yr't"ä ptanning '"nà T equipment. caileä for u p.ogro* of tou. ,.searót oeveropmentiig l:!-":*g. flighrs prove to the system's operational uïitiry. ny rs aprif Þao li at Johnsron Isrand had been prepaied for thä alternate paylôad missionl R.iù;;i crews had been assured t that lts ftights would not io-ofli.t witn trre- operational437missionsschedu]edfoitheadjacentPacl-Ijõ-- ãr.eaov

Five 4374P test vehicres were prosram. t .. . e on contract fo¡ the incìrrdíno nne developmenr rest vehicte. During rhe tasr three ;";iil;ii'9;"5, ,h¿;;;ïå;"*"";; test vehicle was delivered to Johniton Isrand and alr pr.-¡ig¡ì t.ri, *.;ä;Ë;;ä satisfactorily. Two of the four flight testve¡icres t *e"eìo î¡" istunJ ttD;;;ñ;; a¡d the contractor had turnishe? the four r¡ãt ú*rt".r.rn. .o-i,r"tó-¿ãzïij system was in place by then and checked out for operatio""l i.rii"!.''i-' t

ï I F E r¡t+t.¡5f;Éf*; a**,¡*tt 55

($ By the time it stood ready for its initiai test flight, Program 437AP,was ready tò'undertake a mission even more complex than that of Program 437; It deplôyed ever more sophisticated equipment to perform a precise function within evèn mo¡e demanding operational constraints' The Thor booster's expendable payload was configuied something like an oil drum with a bullet-shaped iuperstructure added to one end. The payload vehicle contained an index camera ani a primary panoramic camera housed within its protective carapace, with a clamshèll door that opened to permit photography of the target vehicle once interception had been made. The exposed film was taken up on cassettes l.ìoused in the iecovery capsule, which was ejected from the main payload vehicle during re-entry into the atmosphere. The ejected capsule then deployed a parachxte at a pre-determinecl altitude ancl was recovered in micl-air by a specially configured C-130 airc¡aft operating from Hickam AFB, Hawaii. Acquisition, targeting, and guidance support were essentially thè same as fo¡ the ASAT mission, but the photo-reconnaissance missions demanded supremely precise data computations and flawless system performance to achieve their objectives of obtai+ing usable photographs following close-range rendezvous with the target vehicle.t2

ë The 437 AP had seve¡al limitations. Its booster propulsion limited intercept altitude ¡anges to within approximately 725 miles above the earth. Accuracy was degraded at extreme range due to the ballistic trajectory and increased time of flight. The system could not react quickly to unforeseen circumstances, because at least forty-eight hours were required to ensure proper support from þe capsule recovery forces and to properly position the payload telemetry ai¡c¡aft. System reaction time was thus so constrained as to permit execution only of missions scheduled well in advance. The vehicle's launch azimuth was also restricted due to the limitations of the ground guidance system and safety requirements. Launch azimuths were limited to 320 degrees clockwise to 355 degrees, and 145 degrees clockwise to 175 degrees by the extant ground guidance capability on Johnston Island arid the intercept geometry. The target had to be illuminated by direct sunlight, and crossing angles in relation to it had to register 45 degrees or less due to the relative velocity constraints between the target and interceptor vehicle. A minimum of 160 seconds was required after booster separation for stabilization and orientation of the payload. A¡ added ¡estriction ¡-^- t^... +--i^^+^-i^" +^ ñ?Ãi'Àñ+ ùlçI¡lu¡çu-L^--^) Lrurlr rçql¡¡¡çu-^^..:-^r ¡(.,YY 4uérç---l^ ¡vçur¡J-^^-+-, u(¡Jvvr y¡vfv¡¡! ^4',1^4âyqj¡vqu destruction. Maximum range was fixed at approximately 800 nautical miles. Although the Thor booste¡ could loft the payload to 725 miles altitude, the practical ma,ximum altitude for interception was 400 nautical miles. Minimum intercept altitude required was roughly 100 nautical miles.'3

@ Target selection obviously affected launch scheduling and reaction time. There was a dual-t¡ack system of target designation for the program. In the first case, the JCS periodically sent an approved priority listing of targets to CONAD. It indicated those targets to be photographed during a specified period. Missions were prescheduled af intervals õr times compatible with the system's availability. The second target designation procedure saw the JCS direct CONAD to expedite engagement of a specific object. This ta¡get was conceivably an object recently *¡*r*rrf,l¡r *,¡iú*r* t 56 ,t launched o¡ one whose imminent launching r,vas anticipated. In such a case, mission priority was upgraded to ensure promlt and timeþ t.u.ti* rro-^uãtrrìi" launch contingent and the mjssion suppôrt elements. ;

During ,@ periods of increased alert, two missiles with 437Ap payloads we¡e to be brought to a T-rninus-8-hour status while the Thors, basicã5Ãr pãvräãå, I y:r"_g:pipd ca[ed for rhe sysrem ro be able to .f,""g. a raurcn or ,(Plaqrngprogram -iríio;Jià, a baslc. 437 warhead payl0ad within twervð hou¡s of the oecrslon to- execute.) During the alert period, intercept points were evaluated, I taigeting data refined, and þidance and miision ,utåty' p.o."our", Augmentation crews and a reserve missile with poyloaa *"." ."uàrll-iå.""tr""iã¿. deployment ro Johnston Isran

@.operationar contror and mission planning for arternate payroad exercises were conducted by the CONAD Space Dófense C"enter. Recovèd r;;;;;^;;;; I turnished by the 6594th AeTspacà Recovery corüãr c.oup unã"r-å;;;;,ü;;ì control of CINCONAD. FiÈn processing ,upport came' from ilrË Fo;;;; Technolory Division of AFSC. rn" w.rtË.n i'"ri n"î". ;;;;;;-,"i"";:1ti; I ai¡c¡aft. The JCS direcred al launches an¿ coNad ;;;;iËã ihJ- iitä;ä1 points were selected ro provide maximum ,yrt". .n aiu;;;;iñ;1h;'#Ji"*. politicat, s.afery, a¡d ..coiery li-iioiiå"i.; rr'. i.r.tiàtry ai¡craft was requirecr t to be on-station at rhe time of interception to provide thl data required f"r';;;;;ã film-deveropmenr and post-mission assessmènt data. prioriry ið;;ñt, fixed ;;"í;¿';;. at the JCS lever or higler, and, oo.. .ò.-iti.d, those elements I 'western of rhe Test Ranse reouiredfor missioo support-re-aiíed under cñòõñAD;; operational controi.tt Ii the unfo¡run"t. i"'.,i,i"óf äp.i-u.y system marfunction during the countdown preparation (and if adequat" ti-e ,.main.d), the backuo I missile and its payload ïeie counted down and iuun.¡.ã-on i-r,ãî;¿ ä,göïí I t q *tr**rlâF¡hÊE>rr*¡*t

I T 57 If not, the system was recycled for anothe¡ mission within tçventy-four hou¡s. D'uring the postlaunch period the 1q ADS began refurbishment of thé launch pad, I 'The while. a replacement missile and 437Ap payioad were -a^s ai¡lifted to the site. remaining missile reverted to aiert slatus directed by CINCONAD.To

t Following processing.and . analysis of rhe recovered mission film by the AFSC-^^g Foreign Technology Division at wright-patterson AFB, ohio, an iníerim "quicklook" report was forwarded to coNAD and ADC via ihe A¡med Fo¡ces t courier Service. The intelligence community ¡eceived detailed reports as well.2' Mission data was collected ul A!ç a1d AFLC for posr-mission anålysis following formats similar to rhose rendered in the basic progìam 437 missioní. Additional t specialized 4374P data includecl all payload vehiclJ telemetry (includins -the relemerrv data from the telemetry aircraft), and priats from both index"and main cameras. A^ccuracy of target vehicle interception, effective recovery of the film I capsule, swift processing of the film, and accurate interpretation of ihe imases ir yielded were the key elements of a successful 437Ap miìsion. As 1965 dreüto a ciose, the.alternate paylo-ad program ¡eceived its fi¡st test in the execution of evàry t phase of its mission profile.22

:fl[On 7 December at 1929 MST the 10 ADS launched Thor, missile r Numbe¡ J8-2299 sþward on an interception azimurh of 153 , trre ri¡ii oiiã"i planned R&D tests. The target was SpADATS object Number 613, an expended Atlas Agena lo.f:!^bo^dJ: Interception occur¡ed-g.1g minutes ari"r ruui'cl.rinì, t tollowlng nominal lift-off, booster separation, flight path assumption, and payioaä operation. The camera-bearing I capsule registeied'a miss ¿isianc¿ u"lué ãr-.io nautical from the programmeã -miles stand-õff distance of 3.2 nautical ,rii"r. Ãì T payload functions were performed normally up to separation except for film cutting and sealing operations. Thei¡ failure was'academic, howeuei, ,i".; lh;-ü;; capsule r as never recovered.23

lr - € Under normal circumstances following target intercept, the payload vehicle.would have begun a rotation_sequence. seþaration of the i.""try u'"tii.i"i the¡mal cover would ensue, permittirig deptoyment of the otog"e âno -ài" F parachutes. The drogue chute's deplãymônt- was also designeä to pull the recove¡abie capsuie fiee of the heat shì-eld, The capsule housed-the film cassette, telemetry, beacon, and a flashing light.2a Telemetry and beacon .ont".t *iitr ti-tì F reentry vehicle \¡/ere to be established by the surfaie Recovery unit at 1940 Msr (approximately three minures after targét intercept). signals were ."c"lu"cr uy trr. unit until 1943 MST, but the Johnston Island télemetr! did not validate reéntry F vehicle_ separation. Thereafter, neither the surface noi the ae¡ial recovery uniti were able to acquire signals from the reentry vehicle. cont¡ails and smokä were h srgntecl by both recovery aircraft and a helicopter at 1945 MST in an a¡ea some thirty miles no¡th of the nominal im_ pact_ p,oùt., It appeared that the recovery parachute.had failed to deploy properþ andihe subsequãnt water impact destroyeá the. subsequent ^capsule." data analysis by-shórt-circuit space syitems Division indicated ihe malfunction was caused by a momentary in the in-flight disconnect +. cable between the payload and recovery vehicles. After squib firing-to provide in- IF r * *** **.,eiÈfr *,¡*:r x** trrr*rr 6ã!gÞ t**t*** il 58 ¡

fligbt etectrical disconnectior¡ the recovery vehicle cable terminal flew back against its own harness, causing cable damage. The momentary short circuit causeã the I recovery vehicle programmer to reset, which precluded physical separation of the payload and recovery vehicles. Although the design deficiency could be corrected prior to the second launch, the date for it had to be rescheduled from t 28 December 1965 to 17 January L966. During the interim, physical protection was devised for the in-flight discorurect cable qnd power-supply redundancy was provided to the recovery vehicle prograruner.26 I Éfne next two missions were flawless. The second of fou¡ 4374p R&D launches was targeted against SPADATS Object Numb er 922, another Atlas Agena rocket body. Launch prepârâtions I proceeded satisfactorily until the deteriorãting weather conditions in the recovery area forced a cancellation of the operation oñ the scheduled launch date. The rescheduled event was set for 18 January, with the rarget being anorher Atlas Agena rocket I body.27 At 1111 MST the Thôr left the launching pad and successfully intercepted the target. In a smooth-flowing sequ€nce of events the film canister was recovered and the exposed film extracteã for development and analysis. The test went so well I that high confidence reigned as-the preparations for the thi¡d launch in the series proceedéd. The third payioad vehicle arrived on the island on 9 February and a simulated countdown oioát""n qys þtï ensu¡ed that both the vehicle and payload were ready for the mission. I The 12 March launch again ma¡ked the succesìfuÌ performance of all research and {evet9l.men1 p-asibility demonstration objectives. The results were so encouraging tbat colonel Merle M. Zeine, sSD Progiam Director, recommended cancellaiioí I of the fou¡th launch a¡d use of the remaining payioad either as part of the proposed operational syste-m to - or support- a¡ótlêr project. Boìh Systems Command and the Air Staff concur¡ed.2r I ^ - Ê_P.ogram 437 þP thus entered a brief period of limbo awaiting approval of the follow-on plan for development and operations. Arthough. itïas" soott t assigned an opemtional mission, iesults fell shôrt of expectations.- The National Aeronautics and space Administration (NASA) had Iaunched its orbitins Astronomical obsewatory I (oAo-I) on 8 April 19'66. The craft assumed a nearl! I perfect 500 nautical mile circula¡ o¡bit, buì an apparent power failure on thá second day of operations had crippled it. NASA asked the-Ai¡ Force to use rhe fourth.437AP payload to photograph the ailing vehicle, and on 17 April He uSAF I agreed. A successfui simulated countdown eniued on 18 June, uerirying that both booster and. payload were.primed fo¡ the mission. The launch occuried-as plannecl on 2 July, but an electrical short in the system diverted the vehicle from its I programmed orbit. The camera could not acquire the target and consequentlv ph^otographed only the void of spaòe, transforming the mlssion into whàt onÉ official account desc¡ibed as "an ignominious failurã.,'rs t . ($Despite this failu¡e, the program offiee still had high hopes for 437Ap. - ^. Plgfirgr on the operational preriminary system package praniolrowed to both the ¡ 1Fl9..g¿ Air Sraff; they còunted on-thê R&D lauñchès' demonstrarion of the ïeasrbllrty of a photographic satellite inspection to sell the program. It already had I t F I 59 F the strong --support of both operational commanders and the intelligence T community."' i S Even befo¡e the initial R&D flight, the Air Force had studied the possibility of mounting photographic reconnaissance missions against Soviet T satellites. As eariy as Octobe¡ 1964, General John K. Gerhart, CINCONAD, had I urged the JCS to look beyond Program 437 AP 1o allocate both a mission and funds for systems that would "assure that CONAD's requírements for a co-orbital satellite t inspector will be met on a timely basis." In September 1965, CONAD and AFSC urged using one of the upcoming launches to photograph a Soviet space vehicle. These proposed flights, nicknamed "Stone Marten," held the potential for yielding valuable intelligence data on Soviet spacecraft, albeit at some political risk should F the Soviets discove¡ the covert camera work and decide to make an issue of it in the United Nations. The existing system would set a valuable precedent for follow- F on systems performing simila¡ missions if it succeeded in producing useful ¡ intelligence on ea¡th orbiting Soviet space vehicles. Thus Program 4374P was probably viewed as being more valuable as a seedbearer for future missions and F systems to execute them than as an operational system in its own right.tt S) Interest in directing the system against Soviet targets remained keen, and in March 1966 CINCONAD requested that the fourth 4374P R&D launch be l. scheduled for 6 April against a Soviet space vehicle. The Air Staff favored it, but recognizing the sensitivity of such an undertaking it sought the approval ofboth the JCS and the United States Intelligence Board. In April, both agencies disapproved F employing 4374P against any foreign target. However, recognizing that a changing situation might require such a capability in the future, the intelligence community recommended acquisition of a 437AP operational standby capability. "Specifically, the recommendation is for an inventory of approximately five vehicles plus the i. minimum additional quantity required for proficiency launch training and product improvement testing," noted the Air Staff advisory to AFSC, which also requested F a new plan to provide the required capability. The Air Staff wanted provisions made for two tlpes of photographic system improvements. These entailed: "those to refine the present capability which could be retrofitted with relative ease into the initial system hardware, and those more significant developments which lend F ihemseives io testing as 'piggybacks' aboard 437 AP vehicies."32 F @ Although optimism over both an emerging mission and improved technology for its execution would ultimately prove ill-founded, in 1966 the alternate payload variant of Program 437 held promise of an enduring future. By late April, both ADC and A-FSC had tentatively agreed to ten 437 AP launches I during the 1967-69 period, at an additional cost of $24.3 million. Unlike the original ASAT concept, which had been approved with deep reservations by the Defense Department's civilian leadership, the reconnaissance/intelligence capability I promised by 431AP and its derivatives initially earned wa¡mer support. In a memorandum to Secretary of Defense McNamara, Secretary of the Air Force Harold Brown cited the intelligence community's request for such an enïanced I capability, characterized current capabilities in the area as poor, and forecast "the I ******¡.#¡¡lFl *'** ¡t* ** F ++**'rr r ¡¡ r * rf,fFl;Ê:¡,¡ '¡ 60 I distinct possibility of a future requirement for its use."'3 But despite such support, the 437 AP effort ran afoui of political and diplomatic considerations. The United t States Intelligence Board recommended that launches from Johnston Island were inadvisable, for P¡esident Johnson had already publicly ¡efe¡¡ed to it as an "antisatellite base," and the Soviets were certain lo rcalize it if one of their space t vehicles was the target of a 437 AP launch. Not wishing to jeopardize any follow- on prograû¡, the Board suggested the Air Force conside¡ launching such missions from a CONUS site not previously linked to the ASAT program. This I complication was not welcomed, since the costs of duplicating another operational 4374P site would be prohibitive. Whatever the ultimate reason, the Ai¡ Staff decided against the photo-reconnaissance derivative of the basic system. On I 30 November 1966, HQ USAF informed the program office that the plan for a standby 4374P capability had been disapproved, "thus terminating the program." Obviously, the¡e had been a change of heart about the system's practical utility ! among people at the highest levels in the Department of Defense.3o

S Yet anothe¡ proposal, one to modify the basic 437 systerq also came to naught. By the spring of 1966, Air Defense Command was pressing for I modification of the system to 'þermit the weapon system (and potential follow- on systems) to operate in .an electronic countemeasures (ECM) environment." The command fea¡ed I that existing Soviet elect¡onic warfare technolog¡r would negate the weapon system's operational capability, and said that such negation efforts must already have been directed against it. The modification proposal submitted by ADC on22 lune 1966 noted that field tests at Vandenberg AFB had t already proved the ground equipment was vulnerable to ECM. The booster control and payload cont¡ol devices were also theoretically wlnerable, since an extremely Iow false command signal to these control systems could defeat the mission. This I was particularly disquieting because there had been several instances of 437 system interference which exhibited ECM characteristics. The ADC proposal emphasized the continuing nature of the threat, noting that "historically, elect¡onic counter- I countermeasures (ECCM) have not been incorporated into new systems soon enough. A Program 437 EW capability must be funded, researched, and developed as soon as possible."3s By 2 September the proposal had been reviewed ànd t disapproved by HQ USAF on the grounds pending "further definition of the threat in conjunction with the remote site and total 431 capability . . . ;' Air Defense Command attempted at least a partial response to the ECM threat by providing a I recognition and analysis capability on Johnston Island, which could provide info¡mation indicating the presence of such activity prior to a launching.36 I ÉÐ The ASAT mission inspired other variations. Both ARPA and the Air Force had studied non-nuclear satellite negation methods well before the decision to develop the nuclear Program 437 of an operational ASAT. Conventional and I even non-explosive kinetic-kill warheads were considered as well as co-o¡bital or direct ascetrt interceptions based upon radar or infrared ranging methods. As early as 7 February 1963, Harold Brown had earmarked $10 million in the 1964 budget I fo¡ Air Force research on a conventional-wa¡head ASAT system. This followed ARPA s own $12 million expenditure on the same type of system. By that summer, I I q * rr*¡rr '¡ €¡È¡pg**r*,*, rl 61 Brown was urging program the service to use 437 as thebasis of its futu¡e ¡esearch Il on advanced guidance and conventional-kill methods. The Aû ro."" *"Jvîa¿ its own ideas on what constiruted rhe best ,u.."ir* ,;Þ;g.;;;ãt*Ttìí ;^ Program 893, which envisioned rhe use of modified Minuîeman II ICÈMs as j1"-t_r:--T1," plgCron wrs squelched, ho*e,re., in necernUer 196t, ;;", T r\sslsrant11,-..I1:lk secretary of the Air Fo¡ce for Resea¡ch and Development Bróckway McMillan informed the cbief of Staff that approvJ of a separate foilow-on svsrem was very t unlikely, and rbar such resea¡ch s¡ôul¿ ue rini

922 was ,'a , , Q-Program intended to demonst¡ate termjnal homins vehicle I capable of interception and non-nuclear kill of exo_aim"rih;;i;;il;;ËiPÄä;; ::,:::.:l,l:{1f!:q.'-'j:'lupon precise guidance ¿ata ¿erive¿}io; iil;îp*"ä;i. Program 437, and the accurare compurarion of thát databy rn€:It^,"T:11L:yppo¡ted computer complex I _on Johnston Island. once launihed, the radio_suideä Dooster was commanded to fall away as the infrared homing vehicle searchËd for, acquired, and homed on the target.'As the homing vehicle came within ranse of F the targered sarellite or reentryiehicle its wa¡head"*;iJ d.;;;. ;;ä;ü%;- like projectiles into the targetf

I program office planaed ,-,_ , Qft. eight demonstration launches from Johnston ïlTi_,llT,Tere designed to demonstrate sateltite interception while the rest to inrercept re-enrry vehicles launched from Vandenberg aFe. À i:::.rll:rg.dmonth pi**"î development program was anricipared at a cosr of $25.6 millio; tD -tvoð alone to cover I additionar construction and modification of exìsting raunch I ***¡r*** ÉSf *x***+* I rr*t:¡r* eIEffi '¡¡¡r'¡rr t 62 I facilities on Johnston Island. The entire four-year development and demonsi¡ation phase of the effort was expected to cost $57.33 million, with the first launch planned for late Ma¡ch 1969. From the start the program was assured very little I of that money. On 5 June, when Phase II work began, only $1.8 million was a1q]gble fu¡d the program's _to^ starr and keep it on schedule until mid-July, when additional funding would be required.o' I

Fl The initial increment of funding might just as well have been saved, fo¡ the program was doomed by the Defense Department's growing indifference to the I 'War. ASAT issue, corlFled with the financial demands of the Viet ñam A_lso, on 18 september 1967 secretary of Defense McNamara an¡ounced the decision to deploy the Army's $5 billion Sentinel anti-ballistic missile defense system. This I decision reaily marked the cancellation of program 922, arthottgh thé decision to termjrate it was nor officially made until 3 Fèbruary 1968. õther cont¡ibuting ll1oll.*.1. the appearance oï the Soviet F¡actionar óbitar Bombar¿-ãnlsvii.ri ¡ (FoBs) threat and ,the recognition by the upper echelons of the Defense Department that the long-wãve infraied techiology (LWIR) derir.d-E;; Program.-922 might be put to more effective immediãte use in ballistic missile I defense."'

- _ - @'By the close of 1967, Program 922 was in serious trouble, and thus the t 3 February 1968 cancellation order from the Di¡ector of Defense ilesearch and E-ngineering came a-ç no surprise. Portions of program 922 continued in the guise of a minimum basic technològy program -Dubbedto explorã elements of potential u¿fie to I the sentinel and Nike-X progams. the Defense Subsystem Deveiopment and^Demonsrration Program (DSSDD), the project was intenâed to demoristrate the feasibility ofapplfing_a throttleabte, liquid-fuéiled rocket mutrenuerabte engirl, t spinning rod warhead, LWIR guidance system, and small miss distance intercef,tion capability to the Army ABM programs.o3 I ÉÐ DSDD received $1 million in USAF funding f¡om the Fiscal year 1969 budget and $9 million more came f¡om Army funds. ,Áõ described in oeuetop-eni Di¡ective No. 135, issued on 21_ Ma¡ch 19óg, the technology and design o.uárãp"à I for P.rogram 92) were to be advanced to "airow not onry iatellit" ¿"it*"tiå" Luì rnissile interceprion as well."s Despite its new lease on iife, the oson àeiirãtive of Program 43] _b_egan its career with some degree of funding uncertainty. In Sep-rember 1968, I Headquarters usAF indicated thãt $r0M was altcated to. ósoo tn t]sga] year 1969 with $20M to follow in 1970. That amounr was subsequenrly cut t_q $.n.e mirion,.but the aggregate still seemed sufficient to support dem'onstrátion flight.test ofa vehicle/payload combination t capable of searching for, acquiriìg, and tracking an incoming reentry vehicle under si¡nulated intercep-tion'coniitioíi. À second phase was planned to demonstrate the feasibility of usine LWIR suidance and conventional warheads to I intercept and destroy balliétic missiie r."otryîr,i.r.i during their mid-course trajectories. The first iest launching *", pË;;J fo; December 1969, with a second to follow in May 1970.. t t I I I ¡ t r r ì{iltlÈFr¡ r I ¡¡ I * * 63

Alth-ough , , É the funding did prove adequate to support assembly, testing, and-delivery of a rest vehicre to Johnston Island du.ing thå'fi;; h"I¡;îil."r ;;". 1969, the initiat test la¡nch was defer¡ed. ]]rt Fr"d;;ä7i;;ï1r"*. conducted two mock DSDD iaunch exercises during the"inte.i., *iri.ü i*är.¿ wo¡ldwide coordinarion targer rracking and tñring of rh;' countdown. .of ta;;;i--u.îi.r" McDonnell D.ouglas an¿ ùfV, the program contractors, then ggginy-*. prepa¡ations for the ìemonst¡ation'launch tuä occurrJ ån- iå ior¡t 1970'. wirh a specific mission ro "demonsrrat" trr" .opãuiliry pävi""¿-r"rri.r" (PLV) ðiii,. system to sea¡ch for, acquire, and r¡ack a targËt undér conditiois ri-uiåtììg using LWIR ilr9.j.pl technology,,''the Tho¡ LV_2ö vehicle lifted off the pad at 13.66 minures afrer the raunching-of a Minureman rI/M;;[-rL"."ì,yî.rri.r5iä,n Vande.nberg AFB. The target võhicle *o, progrr,nrí.d to impact ir'tf,.,l.i't" Kwajalein.Arott, but probìems deveroped aboa'r¿ t¡ot¡ uer,i.rå!. rüå "t reentry vehicle u-i;;;;år,, ¡emained rocked to thè booste¡'s ttrta stage un1il iË."i.y, Thor booste¡ *i,iiää" vibrated excessively and the cutoff occu¡red too soon. -ui".n!in" 6.01 seconds lhe payload vehicle s.eparated f¡om th-e Thor, ür;;.'l-y gas system rhrusters fi¡ed as it diã .so. Thirry-eight secónds "lää?irr"".äì¿iåpui"tiåï-it. payload vehicte and the boosrer colided. pienîa¿ this incideni,ãi"rt"', to tã..'r"ï"r the mission, the shrourts over the senso.s also-ioife¿ to retract,'rä tî,ìiîàîf¿ targe t acquisition und", ány .ir.uãriãn..r. lronicatry, othË;;;hi.i" P:"f^:l:lt.Jpayroacl subsystems l.no. functioned wel despite the coilision, I"nái'e .,,ãìioiru timing targer io vehicre tracking tunctions, wirilã the--- '-'l"un.länà'.".iñã"'ri;äíg;, indicated the validity of the iystem .on."ft.ã *"*F#"nË'Hå'å'Jîïj:"*fJ,".'.'lt".r"î.jri?Btti1.E.î:"Hä,ir"äi:Jj in trouble even befo¡e the failed"raun.rt. r"i" a"ri"..y of the test payloads contracror -ìiJ bv the had deraved the..raunch. bv- five montht^i;'b"..mber irtil Àõ¡i, producing a $2.6 milrion äTiï'i, tunang ãeficífoiisiõ. 1969, rhe Air Force had appeated to the Army_ Barïs¡c tvtisiite ó.i.nr"-ng*.y f", tu;ãi;; ,;;p;;, bur ABMDA had advisedihat a singre ,*t nigrri*ã"r;.g;i;'ry'il äö;ï".irii;, the program, provided that it was sutcessful,,iirh support for a second flishr beino contingenr upon thar resulr. .Thus the faitu¡e rh;ã?-Àp;i ig;ïäT";fffi#å On 26 May._1970 "¡ lL"._lrl':".!togram. _ H.;dq";;i.;, U'Se¡ oroeiJ;;"-;.*;; acuon Io termlnate the program.,'., - r The €f demise of DSDD marked the end of efforts to devise a system program fotow-o¡ derived from the 43?-technorogy, and the entire an operational ;;"..piJüãià"ä ASAT svstem soon fel out of fäo¡. There was n u.iái fietd a pr-oject known ott.-oîlà as oerense r4 *Àr.rr".f¡ì,1..r" tä¿,Ë'""ìJ,i:iä' åi Program 437, the DSDD pro^gram, and project-b;;; Aporio's Lunaî E"curii-on-ú;ä"i; (LEM) engine to form un asier;d;r,, ioãËïì ruppor, from the office of ill_Seggrqy of Defense led to its cancåliæi", ir-iirä r¿i'o¡ rSió.--r"b;ä|J; i971' RcA submiued an unsolicited_propora to-ãã*rop ;.ãår¡rtJ-åt"iiiiå interceptor,"which . "ñ;ä; was designed .o dóteci-;;à-u.rii trrå p..;;;;;; weapons aboard orbital vehicles, but it was rejecied as'being ;iÃpiå.ü."i expensive, - and overly optimistic in ierms of sche¿utË. g ,orlv'iSiï, v ";'Äi.-Ë;;; ttrtrr*4lH¡P**trtt¡' T 64 I study conducted at the DDR&E's request had concluded that although a non- nu9l9,ar satellite interceptor was weII wiihin the current range of technotãgy, it .'ilas pointle-ss to pußue such a capability unless tll-e office of thã secretary I of"Íjefense was willing to deploy an operationàl system.4

@Given the inherent limitations of the Joh¡ston Island-based rho¡ booster I as a carrier for any satellite inspection or negation system, it was just as well-that effort followeg, on the heels of piogram 43ZeÞ, 1o-¡najor trogiam-¡esourceé i)2, l, tn" DSDD. _The 'þiggybacking" of these prograrú upon rhe.srim oi the I .".*qti"g Program 437 ASAT system simþly served io diminish that asset,s arready limit_ed capabilities. The pursuit of new missions would have further undeicui its capabilities to perform the basic mission while offering no markecl advantage in the I execution of new missions. Had anothe¡ booster with ionger .ung. ond"u rnor. flexible basin_g optinn been adopted for rhe new systems, tttËy migrri rrãre ¡oàìæ¿ merit,.b.ut p.rogram some adapting 437 to serve ás the nucléus o"t an ápeiatiãnat T conventional ASAT or satellite inspection system was much Iike fitting a ielescopic, infrared sight and a flash suppresior ro a muzzleloaaing tifl" und-.Ç"cti'g ìï to be an effective s{pe¡t weapón in a modern war. At thiir best tnese'"tolioï-in" I systems promised little more than a further extrapolation of limited capabilities via technical ingenuity from an already outmoded räsource base. r I r t t rI

rI

TI ****r**4f¡b[. ******,r It .¡rr+¡¡r ffiR'-r****** 65

NOTES

(All Notes are Unclassified) Chaoter IV

1. Hist (S/DECL OADR), Space Systems Division, Jan_Jun 65, p 21. 2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.- o 22.

4. tbid.

5. rbid.

6. Ibid., p 23.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid., pp 2j-24.

9. Ibid., pp 2zt-25.

10. Ibid.

11. Hist (S/DECL OADR), Space Sysrems Division, Jrf_Dec 65, pp 30_,t0. 12. Lti w/atch (S/DECL O"D^g_9",ryi:r-I1:p-J:,-?i, Aerospace weapons, ssD (ssuro), "Séction 5 of rrofám psi;p "f He ADC. to +:? Ap ö;j,ãäli os. 13. rbid. I 14. rbid. 15. rbid. I 16. rbid. t 17. rbid. 18. rbid. I 19. tbid. 20. rbid.

I 21. lh!d. I 22. Ibid. I I ¡rrrrr'¡ ft¡t**t*r. F 66 T (S/O.EC! OADR), Maj Gen Paut T. Preuss, Depury Chief plans, ]:. ^I-1i of Staff, He ADC, to ADCCS, et. al.. "Program 437 A¡ (U),' 10 Dec 65. T 24. Ltr {atch (S/DECL OADR), Col A¡nold C. Mctæan, Deputy Chief of Staff, Evaluation, 9 ADF, to (obscured), "(u) Interim Performance Report for sRT 3¿2 (437 Ap Mission Number r),; 14 Dec 65. I 4. lptl (S/DECL OADR), Col Merle M. Zeine, Director, 437 Systems progran Office, to SSUJP-434, "Ma,nagement Srrmmary, RCS:13-AFSC-R," 10 Dec 65.

paul preuss, I (S/DECL_OADB! plars, ?{. Ltr Mgj Gen T. Deputy Chief of StaÍf, ro ADCCS, et. al., "Program 437 AP_S-tatus (U)," 2lDec 65; Rprt (S/DECLOADR), Col Merte M.2ene,Direciîr, ql Sysrem Program Officc, to SSUJp-439,.,,Manìgcment Summary, R-ÒS: ß_aFSC-R 32,. li Dec 6l; Hisr (S/DECL OADR), Space Systems Division,lul-Dec 65, pp 39-4t. I

(S/D.EC,! OADR), l4ai Gen-Paul T. ?reuss, Depury Chief of Sraff, pla¡s, He ADC, to ?7: lljl jan-65; 4D99S, sf_¡l- 'program 437 Ap^ R-&D.Launch (U)," 11 Ltr (S/DECL Oabn¡, Vá¡ Cen Paul T. P_reuss, Depury Chief of Staff, plans, HO'A¡C, to ADCCS, eì.'a1., "erogru- t ìá'Zãï f.rt ({.I)," 14 Jan 65.

Lk (U) Col H. E. parson-s, pla_ns, ?{. _Assista¡r lepury Chief of Staff, He ADC, ro ADCCS, t 437_4¡ (U),1 1.9 Jan_ós; Lrr (S/DEC-LOADR), Maj paul preuss, lPtg-e1p .progran Gen r. oËpury Cntàr or 9!qf! Plq"r. HQ ADC, to ADCCS, eL-aL, ,í¡Z Àp nAp Launch i'vrä oSì U, (S/DECL preuss, ej,; O.A.DR), tvtaj Cen f3r! T. oepity Chief of Staff, pla¡s, HO Àóô, to aoCõð, aL. AP.(U)," 14 Mar päut preuss, "r. * iProCr,am^^!37 65; Maj Gen T. ôepury Chiif of Sturi, nÃi, ¡rO t ADc,toAcCR,et'al..'Program437AP.lbifdl.AunchResultjp),''úMar65.

29. Hist (S/DECL OADR), Space Sysrems Division, Ja¡-Jun ó6, Vol II, Narrarive, pp 18_19; Ltr (s/DEcL I oADR),1{aj.c9n lg-{ I,¡1"*o oepury ólief of stu( n-., ho aric,ið"aobõð, 31, "Prosam 437 Ap Mission_(U)i !8 May 6ó; itr (sToecl Oeón¡, C;l H-. E. p;s;rs.;;lalr"t. Depu_ty. C_hief of Staft ?lans, He enC, to (CpSD), CINCONAb 'progíam 432I_auactr 6ry¡ Z fun OO; Ltr (S/DEC-! OADR), Col Wilto-n Earle, Direcror _H. oiAeroíface úeapo"., nO a¡b, íL eOïnC, I "Progra-n 437 AP Launch re,' z ru_L{,^l.rr (S/DEçL OADR), Mai c"n þuJ r. piLu...õ"oury çhi{_o.f slag,-!lq's, Ha ÀDô, ro ADCbs, ei. ;r. , "y,osru", +íi * fúj,; ãl"r oi; ä, O_ADR), r- ptans, iióÈcl Col H. Parsons, Assisranr D-epury Chief of3ta.ff H'O'ÁoC, to ÁõCôi, .t. ol., 437_AP (U)," 8 Jul 66; Ltr (S/DECL OADR), Maj Gen Éaul T. nr"úrr, o"pucy-ðt I _Prg-gip Ët or s-ta.f!_Pla¡s, HQ ADc, ro ADccs, e!:Îi., "progr_am 43í ep 1u¡,' zo r,r_r ø; u, iþÉCl o-Àon¡, Col H. E. Pa¡sons, Assistant Depury Chief of Srafl pla¡s, He ¿bC, to ¡¡iCS, gruà a3l AP (U),' 4 At:g 66. "r'"i,-,ià I l0 Q/PF9^L OADR), Col David B. Tudor, Vice Commarder, 9th Aerospace Defense Division, to AD_LPW-S^ï: (col Johnson )1 "(u) Ground Guidarce sration Effecriveness btudy," zr aug oC; ur (I/PE_C_L.qAD. \4ajGen O. J. Rirtand, Deputy Commander for Space, HO aÉéc,i" üõ ú'san I ^R), !a{\Dr. Maj Gcn Curtis), "program a37 (ap)," 9 Apr 65; Lrr w/atcËs (SiDECL OAbR). ùoi C"n Paul T. Preuss, Deputy Chief ot Sraff, plans, He ADC, to Cfi.riCiNAD fCl¡nj.'lòO'Nep for Prograrn 43lil^gl^q':!ig,al l.SI1T"lt !a¡1c.he¡ 1s-Nr, ogcr OADR),, zqSep 6i; M.g (S/DECL 04 R), SSD ro ADC, 0906052 Nov.6å Subj: ',prògram 437;" M.g t ts¡oÉCl õ¡iblij, nO 9 ADD to ssD, 2415302 Nov 65, Subj; Avairabiliry oisoviei Targets'for Ëoìr'iur. úiJv-pãäo- 437 AP."

,(U) t illil"-î Q/DICL OADR), G_en John IC Gerhart, CINCONAD, to JCS, Sateflite Inspecrion,,, (o!s:T9g) gct 64; Memo (S/DEC! OADR), Cot Merte M.Z,e..e,437 Svitim'program Diåcror, ro (AD_LPw-s/Lt 4Dc_ Col Rurrer), "437 ep System Capabitiry,' 17 Íun 65iMemo 1sþeCr-õÃóir¡, of AcrospaËe weápons, ro CrrA-s, Cir'A, "rrip Report, I S,"] Jl.u-o IIg*g¿ 19!i1c_Dir:cJor wastungton, D.C., 1 Dec 65," 2 Dec 65; Lrr (S/DECL OADR), Maj Gen paul T. preuss, Deiuty öU.f

**¡r :r,l,r,¡ ffu* *** * ** t I I 67

SJgt Pla¡s, HQ ADC, ro ADCCS, er. ,,program t 9I al.. 437 Ap R&D Launch (LÐ,,, 28 Mar 66: Ltr .(s/DEcL.94¡Sl,__cot u. r. rarson5,frfr¡iLö"p"ry ch"r!il"n, erä.ììíöðòi,ä_1, "Program 437 Ap (u)," 4 A,e66; Msg ('/DECL oaoñ¡,-c-sarì" ¿isð,îäü'îNü"u,sJiÍbj, t ' . . . for Possible Use by program 437 ÀÞ.,' (S/DECL parsons, ]2a OADR), Col_H. E. Assista¡t Depury Cbief of pta.ns, ADCCS,^L1r- Staff, He ADC. to et. al.. 'Propsam 437A'_(JJ),', ¡r v", ø; lt Brig p. Assista¡t 1yóÞè!-oalR), Gen Leo Geary, It for Recon¡aissa¡ce. hcs/Risea¡ch an¿ ij"""l"iå""t, nO uSaÉ,io nîSëõuS-ó, ,rãñ""_ 0!_437-+\ program," u.apl ø;iiislõËc*r_-õöäj:ë;iiî u. parsons, Assisranr Deourv chicr ; of Staff, Plars, He ADC, tò a¡ccs,'st-atrr-s."-'',isã-AiiC"ì#;;ö]iäöö,"uä"', -'" I føe^ng-(S/OeCL OADR), Secrctary of the Air Fo¡cc Harold Brown ro Robert]:., Sccretary of Dcfcnse S. McNamara,"program a3TArrcrnate payload iÀpjli"ià-uy c.p"úì'irri1Ë:ö_:jirj,:jr"r;;6. t 3+a (S/DECL OADR), Col H. E. parsons, plans, Acrilg Depury Chicf of Sraft ADCCS,^L¡1 et. ¿r., ,'proqrams He ADC. ro 43j Ap/gn p¡," â: r.ro""OO;-hìü 1S7oeCl OÁónf-sprä.i"r.iJ., Division, Jul'Dec 06, vol l, Narrarivå, pp roo-bl cliäii. Yea¡ -- -' ö-Jãíiir"-'"' aì, ffiä;"s;.",'iìäl h t966" (Washingron, n.C., 1OOS¡, zO-i.' -- i þ 35' Ltr (s/DEcL .ADR)' Ho ADC, to ADLDC, "AFR 57-4 crass proposal Capabiliry v, Modfication for . . . F for Program 437," ZZ Jw 6ß. 36' Msg (S/DECL OADR). GSAF ro AÐc,02203L2 sep 66; Subj: ',AFR 57-4 Proposal . . . for Prosram'¿tt:-Lt class v Modificarion fSU OÈ'Cl-óe¡ñi,'ð"i ü'n. Ebbeler, Chief, Space Defcnse Division, Direcrorut.-of o"","rioo., E'O ADc,i;*A;ip"#:i';go+ Ir (ADLPv/-s Concerning 43? sysrem (U) I Ltr, 24 Ausø¡,' s S"p ø; i-l ri.-õt*"rlï¡""iøi T ìq¿s-iôsa Grhää, rv"î"vi7ri, isls), pp t?s_26. 37. Stares, The Militarization of Space, p 12g.

38. Ibid.; Curtis Pecbles. Battte_folÞeçq york, (New 1983), pp_92_9-3; Hisr (S/DECL OADR), Headquarrers, Spa"e aoa iz;ssit" s-[iËËõrg;r-il* Ir Neureld, "rhe Air iiir¡,rsií¡,'r tu os_æ r* 20, pp 86_87: Jaco.b Force in snace, ,es-rozorçw*-li"gìã', ölðíiôza, ãõ-3iëe;åã "The Ai¡ Force in Space, FiscìI year ip î. ö;;ä'"ïì lq6'(*;hin$o;,õlõ., ìöZil, p,'t rr, pp L1-12; Hist oADR), Space Systems Division, r f-_gd.¡_ ø,i;öl_rr.'"'" lSToeCl tI i 39. Hist (S/DECL OADR), Spacc Sysrcms Division, l Jan_30 Jun ó7, p 99.

40. Ibid., p 100.

F 4-1. tbrd-

,,rhc p 12e; Gerard r. cantwcil, Ai¡ Force ¡ î';",î*::,Yea¡ 1968" (Washington,Ili,l'!li,,t i-l¡g ",|,'ÞU.r, in Spacc, Fiscar O.C., UZq ruit tt, þp rr-rZ. 43. Cantwell, "The I Ai¡ Force in Space Fiscal year 196g,,, pa¡t II, pp 1I-12. Hcadquarters, I i';r äJÌlSiftnno**ä) Space and Missile Systems organizarion (sAMSo), 45. rbid. t 46. Ibid., pp 87-88.

I ** *****¡*.*:r:Ì I *:r,r ¡r ¡*+*tr!é;Hr r¡r*,3s:r I ,t ,The 47. Jacob Neufeld, Air Force_ 1970-197a,, þ-^Sq19e. (Washi.ogton, D.D., L976), pp 4Z-43i Jacob Neufeld, 'The Air Force in Space, fSOS_ilZò,, pp ¡OS1. t ,18. Neufeld, "The Air Force in Space, tg70-1g74,, Þp 4344. I t I T I I I t t t t I t I t

¡ ¡' ¡¡*t¡* LINC[-ASSIFIED *rt** ** 69

Conclusion (U)

(u) The curious and program _ rengthy career of 437 resulted-or-tlã lrom a fateful confuence of morives of rhe^-riritary_-an¿ civil'ian teaoerstrip Department. D;i;;" In the early 1960s, the úSAF *r, A;e¡ to consåfidat" ìL as the pre-eminent l"iitià, nr'itary*servrge in spáce uy ã.prãytng a weapon system w-ould which operate there. The DoD's civiliän reaáeisriip, *ñil" it r.are¿ ä.."i;;;ïi;" of the arms race, aìso wished_ to avoia potitiãaity ilotivated .i,áig"r-ii,Àiîirào compromised nationar securiry by nor guarding ugíinii oggt"ssi"" irJr",jåi!. ïåìr, accepted the nucrear asAT ãs ã regiettabte"büt oÀ...ru.y expedient to be used only in the most dì¡e circumstances.

Program , .(.U) 437 did whar it was designed to do, but it was not permitterj to. do.it for long. After 18 months devotion tå i¡.ii pri."ry _ir;ì;;ñ;"Jd;;îi;" Island launchers were diverred ro work o" .*p"ti*åìiul-itu,-ng r*ø"irïi tiï";;;."ry";; while ostensiverv maintaining tlleir eser miirion. ^of consequenrry suffered. The program hãd been sch"eduled iot u -ioiÅu- three launches'a vear to maintain crew proficienry, yer a shorrage mrssrons,..and -no i¿åiril;, tunding cuts prevented "aúñ;;;,;h"äìi"*,iåir'ãimo.e thaí six t"r".rrÀiìnrärËiäiüi," system's lifetime.

q) Those who made . - the. system work could be proud of their achievement. cosr, 11"".,*t1"_.,ty -inor they bónt existing tããf,""f"gy to rhe service of a new and created a svstem ''ussron ¡eliable and effective witñin the rimit, oì irr-ir¡"."it gperational constraints. All we¡e *.il ã**" ãi im li'åjtations. coroner Richard B. Peterson, form-er flight commander an¿ D"ñi; C;tr;ander for Operations, 10rh Aerospace Defense Grouo, recafled ttre syiterí *ái innouat¡u" in that it was the only one the nation hao ió inrerceprip"i.-"äiri.r*i "... *. courd k¡ock one down' þutl rhat's alr we ¿d. . I -courd i Jo it courd ever be deproved widelv enough to be an effective_ we"Fo" "ói-irtì* _ Ð"t"; 'r" A";ìñ;r" f;.--ã; i#;i'.iï thought the svstem.would o.irv æ'uiåã under di¡e pióiåã"tr*,'ã"jtil searchi:il* went on for a substitute: ". . . the continuous ¡od warhead applications that were in the milr . . . ¡tor1 we weie ìot accurate enough""ã to ",¡ái use conventional warheads."2 coloner r¡oy'G. al.ã.n, iót*"t commander of t_he 24th support Squadron, emphasized ttr_at nrogramìaï'l :.' . opened the door ro the use of high explosive warheads. [but] As ;?;;p"; .yri.*'it *u. qr"iii*àirr; ""' (U) The nuclear ASAT wæ, in fact, developed and deployed in the knowledge that its operational use ri,o"lo rü otrrv ãìrtrov its soviet rarset bur :"":]9ll lllp'obabliþ.crippr" óti'"iräiJ*, r'i*ärí"i-'r",, *ii,r', oI several thousand miles. As "uã.ve.a¡iy as 195g, the û.S. to,i learne'd,hrG;nì;;;"'iå¿i,.ri could be damased bv contacr with ¡adiation'tioppã¿ *itrrio rh; ili;î;;;ü; field; and 1962 n ulrr artuae il.i"i r"il ääiiä¡*,on rsrand had damased severat satellites and-sent a.disruprive purìî"r earthbound electronic circuity as iar o*uy as Ha.*ãii-"r.iìrääöi,"äiäääiil"1üåå!il I 70 T (u). . cancellarion came due to a variety of facto¡s. The vietnam war took an increæingþ larger share^of Jh"_$I Force úudget, and space p."t;ro, ilff"red. American credence in the soviet union's *ruruí."i tt at it i"teï¿é¿-r ñ;;rtn; T provisions of the 1963 United Nations Resolurion fS++ o; ihe ;S;;tññg;; þapons of Mass Destruction in space," and the ,rrbr.qu.nt rsoz uniteã-¡{aäoni 'Treaty of Principres Governing tirê eciivities of states in Exproration;;d I outer space," ùill also seem to have reduced the necessity for any^ASAT, *lr a nuclear armed one in a light of dubious regality. É"i ¡ãã tr*i" i*o;;rh"îå" ""riir" Vietnam War nor increased óptimis- ou., Soïeiiot."tio*ì"ìpã.., l;;;;;:; t would still have encounrered â steadily decrining number of rhor bú;t*: ;il ih; soviefs increasing preference.fo.r pracing their rät.lliiã, in o.tits u"yáïã'rh.;;;; of the Johnston Isrand site. _with ìhe phäsedown oioferations o. ¡i,r,"r,o" lìi"rä I in 1970,.the _system's credibiliry decrined rapidry. Th'e reconst¡uction of facilities damaged by Hurricane Cetestsin tgi'wasËro,ípt"J *àiã by ,h.;;i.ö;i;i other tesr programs there than by au urgency to get the eSÁt bact il ;;;;;ã;;. I (u) we are Ieft with the recolrection of program 437 as a flawed which system managed ro serve as. a parrial and brief unr*Ëi to the problem oi;í;iù;; I interception. Ar íts worsr. it.was a .*d;;.õ;;iìi-it"a .ífãuiñ,y,;ì it was the vanguard iffirl,, of the Air Force's effo:rtí i" ð-t"r¿ the shierd of deter¡ence into space, and a_brighr examplg of the AmiricanirJi of ingenuiÇ;;Ji;i;;il;; t extemporization from the knowledge and ¡esources ãn hand. r t rT I rt I

****r.*¡r |i UNCI-ASSIFIED '****x* I T n 'Ì7 I NOTES (AJl Notes are Unclassified) t Conclusion 1. Intvw (tI), author with Col Richa¡d B. pererson, USAF Ret,30 Sep g6. I 2. Intvw (U), author wirh Col Joh¡ R. Barnard, USAF Ret, 17 Sep g6. I 3. Intvw (U) author with Col Troy G. Alcorn, USAF Ret, 26 Aug 86. I

******* UNcLASSi FI tD ******* .1.,

APPTNDIX I (Alì portions of this Appendix are Unclassified)

Photographs

Page

Thor Number 58-2282 75

Night Launch of a Program 437 Thor from .11 Johnston Island .

Aerial View of Johnston Island Prior to Program 437 Occupancy 79

Aeriel View of Johnston Island After Activation of Program 437 81

Major Troy G. Alcorn and Pete 83

Lieutenant Colonel Robert Ebey and Major Troy G. Alcorn 85

Personnel of. the 24th Support Squadron 87

Program 437 Anglers 89

The "Rim Rats" of the 10 ADS 91

******* UNcLASS IFI ED *******

t

iL:¡EE1::1-i:j'-{¡?'l . 1i'r;i"' lr ' .l: r1 I iÈ-1-l . ;:. ': : I 'ii!;+:";,. '. I IT I ir rili¡¡,t¡:, ::ç :tr''.þr ia;i.;iìr..::'¡.|:.1 i,.,r.ä.::]j¡: tit I I I rt Thor Number 58-2282 sits on Launch Pad 6 at Vandenberg AFB, Caìjfornia. This booster was not part of Program 437. it was Iaunched by 10 ADS + personnel ìn support of the Burner ll program on 29 June I967. + (Photo Courtesy of Coìoneì Troy Aìcorn)

¡ E I I T

¡ T ¡ T I T

Night launch of a Program 437 Thor from Johnston Island (Photo Courtesy of Coìoneì Troy Aìcorn) -i, ,-,.i TII I! t¡

An aerial view of Johnston Island taken prior to the expansion program required to support Program 437 (Photo Courtesy of Colonel Troy Alcorn) ,,1 :iii:ri IIIIIIIIII!Ir

An aeri al view of Johnston Island taken after the activation of Program 437 (Photo courtesy of Coìonel Troy Alcorn)

o2

Major Troy G. Aìcorn, commander of the 24th Support Squadron, poses wìth Pete, one of the two Siamese cats who served as official Johnston Island mascots (Photo courtesy of Colonel Troy Alcorn) 'l.i! ' .tr, 7., ì4 üllttü-r-Ë

j :'' .1 ,": ';.I :.. $ I :: ¡ ',. ,l . ,': .r: i ,,:.i:¡:t: . i mN,çGffi, ì,¡ :;',,' ':: ; ,.:ì:liir:,il ,-,,¿Ê¡¡ t;"Ë

Lieutenant Colonel Robert tbey, l0 ADS (center) and Major Troy G. Aìcorn, 24th Support Squadron (ri9ht) eicort an unìden1ifjed VIp to the Johnston island ìaunch complex, circa November, 1966 (Photo courtesy of Coìoneì Troy Aìcorn)

UIIITilT

, r1..:. _:.: ". . . I i '._ "'¡, 1 :;i:iri, i:j'{r;:f:.:. t,::ri : ìr il ;.,iì, ::..r.¡.:itr.-,.;]r.'l l .:.'..,..'l'i.it,ì.::

f,-, -l-::t ji

-{@

Personnel of the 24th Support Squadron pose before the Lìquìd Nitrogen Storage tank on Johnston Island (Photo courtesy of Coloneì Troy Alcorn) :r. ''t'.'li, :,:.-.¡ìi:i:ifj1..l, '''' t r; _: rI_I-I_IITTII"III.'

Program 437 anglers pose with their catch of sharks on Johnston I sl and (Photo courtesy of Colone'ì Troy Aìcorn) - ii-rg .:,"Í_, .1..it! : ;¡,i. ti jl: - . -1t' III rrr!!t

"de.Få

.t -l' ¡;''ì,,. ;#'"

4.11.11, l::ri:irt . :lr'::r . j'{E¡ ilil ì..ì: i :!rir;i .t. j.l. ì '*tili¡ :.:t-r l ':'ir.,:;'l :.1.I,:.

The "Rim Rats" of the 10 ADS, one of Johnston Island's many softbaìì teams (Photo courtesy of Coìoneì Troy Alcorn) è

1 APPENDIX II

(Uncì assi fi ed)

Summary of Thor Launches from Johnston Isìand, 1962-1975

Launch Launch No. Seri al No. Empl acement Crew Zuì u Date Pro.iect Remarks

I 177 /58-2288 I DACO 02 ì{ay 62 Fishbowl Tigerfi sh ,+ t+ ,É ¡+ ¡* 2 199/58- 2310 I DACO 04 Jun 62 Fishbowl Bl uegi i ì ¡+ *,È *¡t ¡+ 3 193/58-2304 DACO * :+ * I 20 Jun 62 Fishbowl Starf i sh ¡+ q 4 l9s/s8- 2306 I DACO 09 Jul 62 Fishbowl Starfish (400 km) z c) c) r{ tr Þ 5 180/58-2291 I DACO 26 Ju1 Fishbowl Bl ueg ** Þ t¡¡ 62 i lì (n v) (â H H Þtl 6 156/58-2267 2 DACO 16 Oct 62 Fishbowl Bluegill.*** H ll tlH c, 7 141/s7 -2649 I DACO 26 Ocl 62 Fishbowl Bluegiìl (50 km) U * ,È ¡Ê I 226/s9-2347 2 DACO 0l Nov 62 Fi shbowl Kìngfish (95 km) ¡f *+ *!+ 9 299/59..2420 * ¡+ I DACO 14 Feb 64 437 Demo (Dougì as crew) r+ * ¡+ 10 209/58.-2320 I USAF 01 l4ar 64 437 Demo Swi tchover

l1 290/s9..241t 2 USAF 2l Apr 64 437 Turnover CTL (Doug1 as crew wi th observer USAF crew)

12 227 /59..2348 2 CC-A 28 May 64 437 cTL **** (Appendix II continued)

t4 155/58-2266 Z CC_B 05 Apr 65 43t CTL

t5 188/58-2299 Z CC-B 07 Dec 65 437 437Ap

16 242/59-2363 Z CC-B lB Jan 66 437 ' 43iAp

77 196/58-230T Z CC-C t2 Mar 66 437 4g7[p * 18 289/59-2410 * * Z CC-A 02 Juì 66 43t 437Ap r¡ *}F ,t ¡¡ 19 168/58-2279 ri t CC-A 3l Har 67 43t CTL r+ * t+ r+ ¡+ 20 205/58-2316 I CC-C 14 May 68 CTL 43t d o z H 21 252/59-2g73 I CC-B Z0 Nov 68 43T CTL r) Þ (n F øt Ø 22 152/58-2263 r cc-A zT nar (/¡ H 70 437 S-Band Test trr H H t4, 23 225/59-2346 2 CC_A 24 Apr t0 SDp H H SDp I'j U 24 271/59-2392 È, :+ CC-C 24 Sep 70 HAp HAp ,+ * ¡È * r+ * 25 201/58-2312 Z USAF t9 Sep 75 BMDTTP DG_5 rt *,f * * * 26 274/59-2395 Z USAF 06 Nov 75 BMDTTP DG_3 * NOTE: All dates cited are Zuìu and may differ from local time dates. * starfish was **._.Bluegiìì_Primeblown at T+60 secondi at 30,000 feet due to iñiiãniritv. burned on the raunching páa due to main Lox;;i;; m;ìfunctionìng and fai ling to ful ìy open. ****iii. 9lg.g!ìI Double Prime was blown at T+ seconds due to loss of actuator pot voìtage. 437 CTL was aborted due to fìames burning VE actuator ci¡lã, ii,]iirs short-circúit. (Compiìed by Technicaì Sergeant E.ic G. Lemmoñ, lO ADS, fS Virctr'fõioj

II ITI rIIII rrr trr I ir APPENDIX TII (Uncìassified)

Program 437 / 437 Launches ^P Launch Lì ftoff Ballistic Sl ant Ground Code 9 Payl oad System Date Time Flt Time Range Al t Range Azj muth Mi ss Mi ss Mi ss I Zuì u) Sec (km) ( km) (deq ) (m) (m) {m)

14 Feb 64 07 47 369 1390 820 ¡+ 1000 295 2060 1466 1120 * r+ tÈ 0l Mar 64 064 0 rË * 649 l02l 674 933 187 630 4084 4040 r+ * rÊ * ¡+ rÈ 21 Apr 64 0615 597 )+ 1080 778 682 208 4780 2284 4580 * d q 28 l4ay 64 0732 Fai I ure 1291 932 833 269 210 Fai I ure z o o Ø 16 Nov 64 06 57 538 1642 1148 1084 290 23,g2 2817 4806 F Ø ø¡ H U) rt 05 Apr 65 0720 379 I 515 826 It97 267 532 780 H H 754 E td H U 07 Dec 65 0228 328 1528 487 1398 153 502 2133 1670 f.l * U ,+ 66 * * l8 Jan 181t 232 1019 4s9 I 150 163 80 975 1035 r+ ¡1. * ,Ë * 12 Har 66 370 ¡+ * 0042 1661 472 1540 t76 I19 1278 1365 * * * 02 Jul 66 2053 457 t773 802 1493 150 317 2172 2313

3l Har 67 0644 304 1442 484 13t2 109 uu9 3183 2861

14 May 68 0705 297 lz57 823 897 290 t94 1707 1753

20 Nov 68 0708 38r 133 7 1158 600 298 213 293 475

27 l4ar 70 0737 512 1672 lo74 1189 338 LLÕ 2262 2256 :' : "rll: rr: iir ii; ,1 ¡ ******* UNCLASSIFI ED ******* 97

T APPENDIX IV

Historical Background of Johnston Island (U)

(U) Johnston Island, the site of Program 437's operationaì base, had a long h'istory of obscurìty by the time it became host to the US Air Force's nascent ASAT effort in the early 1960s. Characterized by one unhappy visitor as a p'l ace with "no other va'l ue than of location," and dìsmissed by another modern wayfarer as "little more than a line of surf and sand and coral ," the isìand was actualìy part of an atoll comprìsed of four such spits of coral --Johnston, Sand, Akau, and Hìkìna islands- -surrounded by a partially submerged reef. The atoll breaks the ìong swells of the Pacjfjc at Latitude 16" 44'32" North and Longìtude 169" 30' 59" l,lest, 725 miles west-southwest of Hawaiì, and is technical ly classified as part of the Hawaiian Island chain. Johnston Island is the 'l argest of the four, orìgina1 ìy extending little more than a thousand yards and rising a scant forty=four feet above sea ìevel. Typìcal of the treeless island atolls of the region, ìt lacks drinking water and boasts only a thin layer of topsoìl to support the sparse growth of grass and herbs. Sand crabs, rats, and screaming legions of gu11s and frigate birds were its onìy permanent residents for centuries before the first turopeans set foot upon it. The island enjoys an average temperature of 79.3, with the prevaiì ing wìnds blowing from the east at 18-24 knots. Mean rainfal.l measures' 26.11 inches per year.

(U) The atolì may have been first gl ìmpsed by the crews of Spanish vessels saìling west from Mexico to the Phìl ippines in the late 1500s, aìthough no records have been found to substantiate such a sìghting. The Polynesians certainìy knew of the barren landfall Iong before then, and smalì groups of them had apparentìy been jn transient residence upon it at vari ous ti mes , (U) The first white men to chart the atoll's exìstence were probabìy Dutch marìners. In 1598 Captain Jacob Hahu sailed from Rotterdam with three ships to attempt a passage of the Pacific to Japan. One vessel was seìzed by the Portuguese 'in the Moluccas. By that time Mahu had died of disease, and command of the surviving vessels passed to a Captain Huydecoper. 0n 27 November 1599, these shìps departed an island off the Chilean coast on a direct course for Japan. Sevenal months later the Hooe and Charitv "fell in with certain islands in l6 degrees north, the inhabitants of which were man-eaters. " Huydecoper shied away from contact t,lith the cannìba] s; but eight sajlors deserted from one of the ships in a pinnace and fled to the atoll, where they presumably fell victims to the jnhabitants. (U) Huydecoper sailed on for more norther'ly latitudes. The Charitv disappeared after ìosing sight of the Hooe in rough weather, but the latter vessel reached Japan jn April 1690 and there chief pilot }{illiam Adams recorded the earlier ìsland sighting in two letters that have survived to document the expedition's ordeal and possibìe discovery of the soon to be forgotten atol I .

******* UNcLASSI Fi ED ******* ******* UNCLASSIFIED ******* 98 T

(u) For t -- the next 200 years the rittle coir of rand remained unknown to al I but the birds as Európean navigators probea othár qü¿.;;it ;î';h. Pacific.^ 0n 2 September r796, an Américan'brig, the s.liv, rìn aãroun¿ on a reef in the vicinitv of Johnston Island, buï the vil!ãi;s rós-ñäii;r¿ I precise position of it once t'he crew extricated t¡,'" tronl:^1..*f .tl: iáilv the obstacle. In 1803-the Russian_navigator Krusenstern was s aTT-i ng near the when -in island his ìookouts spied lärge frocks of -¡irài t¡. I distance, he but was unabre to discerri any neaiby-the land mass. r.*.nrtð.n carefuììy noted the incide.nt ìn h_i_s log, iut uy nexi *orninfr.,ì;-;ñìp was well to the north of the atoll, añá it reïained unct,a"f"J] t Johnston . -(u) Isrand was officia|ry discovered on 14 December 1807 when _captaìn charles Johnston of the Biitisn s¡ip eprryariii-iðùro';i*å ygly t91-istands,.havìng a dangerous reef to the eästwarã ofJh.r,-in¿ i¡. I exceeding four-mires in extent, positìon 'un0¡e_not " at a he computed at 16' 53' North and r69' 3I' l,lest. Dubbed both iohnston .n¿-cäiÀ"iili, Island in the wake of i_ts -discovery, the Targest spit of lanl wås t subsequentiy recorded on Admìrarty chäits with iis sisders in tnì itäii chain and was thus oranted a iermanent cartographic- i¿entüv."--Ån American naval officer", Lieutenarit ¡.-¡r. i¡roots of the Fenimore coooer, ìater survev Johnsron I i;i,: Ísrand, ¡ui nii rrtãi-ãi ir arorsããïfiffiiõiî. i nterest. ":í.., __.-^, l!]ì D..ades,passed and only the occasional whaler or China_bound I passed near the atoll. There was nothing T:Iîl3lyriran0ìngs' there to invilã and the seabirds r,rere reft in immaculate ísoration a, ti,ãy wheeled above the corar ìn search of ristr or iquaboi.¿ irìiã'i^.ä'L.riã, I below their foraoino ovres. -Il y.r. tt. f..i.n.. or targó núm6åii'ãr those birds and t-he áiãiates or úoiñìg;iiu'rïrri.n¿ military technoìogy th_at conspired to make Johnston rsran"a a-liãiï oï lòïeted ;.iãùi:äËi"Ë; mid-century. t (_u) several . mirlennia of avian resÍdency"oi on the atolr had deposited !pl:_j-l gu.no, upon the coral foundationi t-ne ;;;;' i;1".;;:""'i;; I pnospnares and ammonium fertil compounds found in guano made it a rilÀ izer. The ammoniurn nitrate extractì¿ iroit it also forme¿- a tãv element in the manufacture of sunpowJ.r-ãnã-.i¡À. .rpr.ñ.."."'ä,"irili whaìing vessels I returned to pïri wi*, ã.iounis-anO oi'rðã..i-ìr'ö;;i;;; islands that boasted rich_guano deposi[s; ìn t856 tfre ùnite¿ iiåiåi congress passed the Guano Aät, wnich empowereJAmerican citiieniio-ðiãim unoccupied islands in the ¡.ame. of thein country for i¡ä ;r;p;;;-.;;;;i;; r guano. Fortv-e'ight pacific isrands were eventuartv-ciri-mãã- *¿äi"iüå auspices of the Guano Act. t,liiliam parker,s sJn rrañcisco-¡.ì.ã Þãciiì'i cgllpyv was,orsa.nized to dominate t¡e tra¿e, a;d in 1g¡õ-ih.'f;rm;; 9l:ll suÞsrantiar I rrrsr shiDment. of guano (fifty tons) was extracted fiom Johnston Island. parker had .i,rp.tiììòr"'t.or Hawaiì, ring Kamehameha IV of who also clairned possess.ioñ oi inä atóll. ThË isìu;;;;;.:*d ;; dispute. unt_ir. r8eg, when Americaì innãiãtìái'Tr ráw.il-iorirf ääliiriä I companyls claim to the guano beds. (u) - For most of the late tg00s and ear]y r990s the atoil rav I negìected and forgotten agaìn as the far poir.i;i;nr";; the Philippines ii.¡.. nì*.r'i å.'å cîm*an¿ed"ìmeii..r- i't...rt'.-' Ät uest the ator seemed ******* ******* I UNcLASSIFIED I ï . ******* UNcLASSIFIED ***** 99

I notable majnly as a hazard to navigatìon. Early on the morning of 2 December 1889, the whaler J. A. Howland ran aground on the reef, ripping a gaping hole in its hul1.. The ship began taking on water.and I a iànding party put ashore on Johnston Island to prepare for off-loading of the vessel's suppì ies and the rest of the crew. Panìc erupted as the men entered the lifeboats, and fightìng followed among them. One seaman dìed ìn the melee, but the rest made ìt safely ashore. Two days later I the vessel broke up and sank. 0n their third day ashore the castaways spotted a sail on the horizon and sent a boat off ìn a desperate attempt tô intercept the passing shìp. Through incredibly good ìuck, it overtook T a sister whaìer, the Abram Baker, which rescued the entire company. (U) The next recorded visit to the atoll came in late December 1892 when the schooner Ebon and the whaler Cal'i fornia encountered each other I there. The two crews paused to celebrate Christmas on the island with singing and dancing on the beach and a feast assembled from the lagoon's I ri ch supp'l i es of fi sh . (U) In the early 1920s both Johnston and nearby Sand Island were designated as bird sanctuaries by order of President l'larren G.. Harding, I whose administration was characterized more by financial and ethical foul play than by any enduring contribution to ornithoìogy' From that time onward the atoll hosted periodic visits of Smithsonian Institution staff I members who compiìed data on seabird migration habits. (U) The rising imperiaì ambitions of Japan during the 1920s and ''30s compelled the United States to reassess its position in the Pacific I .as the Japanese busiìy fortified their island mandates in the Harshalls and Marianas while casting covetous eyes eastward at the American possessions ìn the region. In 1934 Pan Amerjcan Airways began its trans- i Pacific air service from San Francjsco to Hong Kong via Hawaij. Johnston Island was by-passed on the western leg of the run as the giant cì ippers f'lew a direct route from Honolulu to Hìdway and Wake Island for refueling t stops. The US Navy exhibìted greater interest in the advantages offered by the atoll's jocation. In October i936, Admiraì Ernest J. King dispatched four seaplane squadrons and their tenders from Pearl Harbor to reconnoiter the smalI islands to the west wjth an eye to adopting them I as forward bases. King was partìcularly interested in Johnston Island' for he beljeved that it mìght be valuable as a site from which to extend the American warnìng perìmeter for Pearl Harbor. An advance party t dynamìted a channel through the reef, whìch permitted the tenders to take anchorage whjle the aìrcraft operated from the lagoon. t (U) King's plans for an advanced scoutÍng base network were 'l argeìy neglected folìowing his reassignment from the Pacific. Not untii l'4arch 194I did Rear Admiral P.N.L. Bellinger, Commander, Naval Base Ajr Defense Force, Pearl Harbor, continue ihe program of improvements on the island. t Bel linger anticipated a possìb1e strike against Pearl Harbor by Japanese aircraft carriers in the event of war, and saw Johnston Island as an I jdeal base for staging aeri al patrols against such a threat. (U) By 0ctober 1941, Admiraì Husband E. Kjmmel , Pâcìfic Fleet Commander, had posted a small force of i62 US Marines to garrìson the I ******* ******* il UNcLASSI FI ED . ******* UNCLASSIFIED ******* 100 I 'island. E There were still no aircraft regularly based on the atoll to mount.routine.patrols. A shortage of suitãble pianes and confliili wii¡ q..Jented a siandins re.connaìssance effori r"õm-uäì.g mounreo:Iiilils.::Fd-u],..r 1rom elther Johnston Island or Midway. They couìd not have t averted the disaster of 7 December_1941, even if scoutiig uniir ¡ü uËån based on_ those islands, for Admirar str.ite iorcË ippiõu.ñ.¿-ìi, target .Nagúmo's from the distant north-nortlrwest, weil beyond the-'Ëinæ oï -"iñv t aircraft that could have been based on Mìdway or johnston i.i.'ù.- (U)_4s pBy . it a patrol wing of aircraft was dispatched to Johnston -was,pear I Island from Harbor ove-r the weekend or ãs-J0 ¡ro".iriäî'ìö+i. This action resulted in those valuable aircraft escaping oestructioñ ìn the attack that came a week later. lronìcally, -ñ¿;i.;, aircraft.flying ít ú.i-,n from Johnston Island that almost compounded the damãqe t inflicted upon Amerìcan navat forces by Nagumo,s sir;;i;; ;;;0.""'-ð, 8 December Lieutenant commander G. T. Mundõrfr, .ormân¿ôi ãr-'p.trðr squadron-vP-2I, was frving a berated scouting patioì bac[ iã H*uiì-i.ã, T l!: .l9ll,wh,en, he spotted the ships of a t'aók force rhat ¡.J-i.iriiã¿ H_arbor_pri0r.to the Japanese attack of the precedinq I?fT ,f9alt rdenrj.fying dav. I]:l9f9nly it as part of Naguno,s f1eet, Mundorff mãáe DomDrng runs against a cruis-er, destroyei, and the aircraft .ar"iã" lI Lex!lgton' which was one_ of onry'three präcìåui American .uiri.ir-in iii PacifÍc iñ" at that time. Fortunaiely alr'of Mundìrff,s bombs nirrã¿ ïr,.ï" tarsets, and the Lexinqtoj surv.ived to heìp iot¿ i¡ã-änã;;' .ti.y"jrr I later criticar ¡afileìl-rnit nìghï t-¡ã únàã"it.ndabry nervous on Johnston Island alerted.the "iñ;;;;i"¿iplräràmarines 'I neãrbv tasr rorce to ;; anding on the atbll, which proveà io ¡ã ã iå1., .,arr. r . . (!t) 0n 15 December a Jap-anese submarine surfaced beyond and shetled. garrison the reef the briskly ror à iew mìnutes ¡eiorã";î;põï;s';;i ¡ to sea again. A few days later the ¡omuaràmånt was reDeãt-êd in lit¿o rashion with no casuartiei. and ritfie ;';.öË"iiiíi.iä uoån'it; defenders. The leathernecks broadcair;ã-;;;ih.;-üð;r'i;;;;i;;'.t¿;ì.1 31 ;i;;r';; December, but they had_ good reason'¡o*r tã ¡Ë'ì..uour, for the natural t of rhä, atol i atiraãiãã *iËn¿ly-ãå¿ rneyiîl:y::lgln_t, ..*y i.i:Ëår' .i spa*ed and probed against each other in the opËnìng monüs ó¡-iõ+ã. 0n 9 January 1942 the Jaianese su¡mariné l_ls-iìsdt.¿ fh.-fe¡¡õisn-jrå as they crúised T l:I_-::,.g!r SoO milei norir,ã.rr of the atoll. The su'marlne was unabìe to close the range for a torpedo attack-,'¡ut i¡ð sighting did serve to draw prowlìng enËrv'ru¡*"ind;.;.t i";;'t;;"r;;; approaches to Pearr Harbor as they-soughi thã Àmerican carrier. t (U) Two days Iater anotherjt .submarine, the l_6, slipped a torpedo jllg !h. carrier saratoga as steamed 270 mires northea!ï or-¡ãrrn!i",., t rsrano. rhe Japanese onì.y damaged the vessei, action which was with¿rawn irom for repairs, but.fhey mì-stakenìy assumed that they ñ;i;i;.;i ;ä and destroyed the L.exinqton.- This fancied fü,,rpt ¡uãyälif,ä-co;;ü;;;; sense of overconfidence which Japanese t led the ib ¿isa'siã"-äi Mìä;;;-;ü; folì owing June.

(U) Durino January 1942 the gamìson on Johnston T -Admiraì Island was reinforced, for the ne"w C¡i.ì oi ¡l.uai ordered Admiral .-King, O¡;..ú;;;, h;; chester Nìmiii, rirr.r;s-iui.eiior, to ensure that both ******* ******* I UNcLASSIFIED T I ******* UNCLASSIFiED ******* I 101

I Midway and the atoll were secured against en e-my seizure. Their concern ôuãi-in. outposts was well-founded, for_ on 14 January Admiral .Isoroku i.fr;ilt., ioit*¿." of Japan's Combined F1-eet, Ôrdered his staff to study I iñä-iã.ii¡ìiìty of seiziñg both isjands for use as stag.ing areas ìn-an ãïi.ùii-on tt"w.li. Yamañoto's chief of staff responded -with.q pl3n iãiiìrS tor ine Japanese to occupy both.Hidway and Johnston.Isìand by.the ããri u 'ru*r.i is à'preluae to añ-attack on Hawa'i j that was expected.to I i.i.Ë fn. bf the American fleet to stand and fìght in a deci.sive ¡ãtii.-tt'rf"i*nants woul¿ en¿ in its annihilation. "The Japane.se considered iirðse-isJin¿s of such importance to the United States that inevitabìy the I iäiiãr would either reáct to the attacks or attempt.to.recapture the .ì iiin¿t,'; wrote Gordon Prange in Miracle at Midwav. "This would bring å¡årI-ï¡. ìong-sought decisive engaænrent betvreen the Japanese and I American fl eets. " (U) The early Japanese plans envisioned a June 1942 descent upon Midway, iollowed by an August ieizure of Johnston Island and an invasion I Dool bomber raid on Japan- in Apri.l äi-flãiåiì. The cãrrier-úased ittle ' iolloweO by the Japanese repulse in the Battìe of the Coral Sea in May àictaied tñat they'must seizä the ìnitiative agaìn in the Central Pacific Mì and Joh¡ston I Uv- rnleittting Yañamoto's offensive. Thus dway -Island p""rñi;J to Ëecome the twin hìnges upon which the course of the Pacific war would P i vot. I proceeded apace' (U) As the Japanese planning and preparations Admiraì i'limìtz enjoied the'rare advantale of being able to. read the enemy/s communicatiòns due to his team of expert codebreakers' l.rh' I ideniified Midway as the initial objective of the anticipated enemy óiiänriu., despiie a Washington-based naval ìnte1ììgence. e.stimate that i.i ãCi.¿ iohnston Island aõ the objective. Luckily Nimitz opted to I ¡ãl iãu. his own staff,s estimaté and disposed his forces to counter the iñrust against Midway. Had Nimitz arrayed.his carriers to await a strike ai Johnsi,on Island the results could have been disastrous for the United it.t.s. The Japanese ìanding force could have easiìy. gained a lodgement I swing east and south to interpose on Midway, freeing Nagumo's Carriers to tttemselväi betwee-n. thã American carriers and Pearl Harbor. Spruance and Èì ãi.ner, Nimitz's tacticaj commanders, would probably h.ave been forced I to-iighf aga'inst a poised and alerùed enemy force enjoying.a marked iup."räiitV in shìps' and aircraft. Johnston Island conceivably couìd l ñilã Uecotná the grave marker for the American Pacific Fleet in June 1942. (U) Johnston Island played no d.irect role in the climatic action off Miàwáy, and the atoll iemáined a temporary stop-ov_e' for patroì and i.unïiõiiåiicratt until the spring of i943,.when small detachments of I pV-t UórU.ri were posted there and at Midway to ioðfinãe¿ Ventura p.trii iiaäe reqular anti-submarine patroìs. By then the war had passed__on to ããñíã, ãï,-su.n places as the Solomons, New_.Guìnea, and the atolls. of I iãiãwâ inO t.lufiri in the distant Gilberts. Those who were stationed on iðirñiion lsiánd had on'ty the boredom and the sand crabs to battle. Johnston Island, aìon-g with Ãiïil;ùõi; iénõuã¿ irom the combat zone' jn I i,iårrããi fi¡] ,-.nd R.lryra Island, was still regarded as a vital link the sea line of communications to Australia.

******* I ******* UNcLASSI F I ED t ******* UNCLASSIFIED ******* 102 "l

(U) Followino ;l - the wa¡,s the atol.l became just backwater asain. rn lsai';;ìtìiäry_e¡d another oceanic transferred to the Air_For.ä,_Juiy ïurisdiction over it was iuiiliät'öíi.Ë found equa.ì ty for the barren lumos of and-Uy-îf.,!' litile use maturing ,- ,lr*.r of 1956 p1 ans were t to reduce ltr" qser^coril presence oñ tïJ i!¡uno That had changed uv lgse, 'ti'i'=rr',i.ra_r to caretaker status. hJ;e-väT,' ., Iation was readied rtrrton in support' or i seiies #'r,iöñ_ultitude for î.lr.l. nuclear ureapons I (U) By t96Z Joint. Task Force .rganization, had tight (JTF_8) a tri_servjce taken. ctrarge'ri'ù; ;;;iï and a major t upgrade was in Droqre.., to preiãre'it"ii tiiiite facilities round of tests. Jihnston headquarters for a new irrån¿iåt ióon"ìriuno.t.d with personnel equipment as a massive construction ãrro.î'.'rïnq.d and very soon the sojt of -b.;i;;'i¡in"'àouue¿the face of the atorl I dredging and crushinq .o¿ãã-näw-ir"ù"ü'tñ."i.i.nd.^.l.and "* in sjze ., .0..i been a 500-foot runwiv,.e.ven_tuully-ipinnää'lb,bqq. r,rhat hao oris.iñãi iy .bjllets,-'ãrr.,."r,r..t. The popútation was measured in the- hundreds I äs warehouses, workshops joined the new launch.*trõi 'i*iíltirr,that and the coarse grass and ,.n¿v rrrrrå.rr.'";i sprouted up..rong taunching pads that I iork revolved aroúnd thè ru""e ¡Tilï-än-i¡Ë'irriï,L,i western I the Thor IRBr'rs side to receive thar were used tó rJii ih;'i;ri weapons several hundred miles for detonatioï.- ro a.rtjtudes of (U) By lgOg I two nuclear test serjes had been successfulìy *om the isrand' rn the HARDTÀdi-r;;;;;; conducted megaton i"ä iirn-.rtitude bursts in the ranse were set oii i;ì;;';;ir.,.ty,';i the ato'. device, code_named TEAK, in'i,nl'inu., The firsr t over the azure shield .was_detrrãt.j t958 at 252, 000 feer o¡ t¡. piðiii';."îh.,¿åä, desisnared exploded at 14I,000 feet on rz nugust."'-rn"ìËä"rurr." oRANGE. was came the FISHBoHL test series, :ñ,wiiåf, and fall of 1962 weapons were j,iry,'rö';å i"råäãt I ããtona-ieï on s ä6 õiî;.0?":'o.r:n;;.rrfi3i:fli::: (U) These final tests oroved intere;ljnS for a variety Ii'.i,;åi';lrr:i,;:::.1:iÄ' of reasons I !1,.1, n ü,Ë." or ra I u ?:1..îl"llÎ.lli::":lr.i';i-Ë.;ö;;;'ìåi:nil.. i:.Ìlï. ] î':J. f".;:.: :j j:ä1f{l'::^1n:T, ät ;" i res i n #, ;;: ; I ff : :ì ; î I ;j*. i:i : ï::: li ot'Ji'::,:l o,Ëi, ,l:,i [3,,ùi j1.,il,¡#lfij:{:ti:i ''. "l if jläio,,oJ'' lt'i 1r}ijir_.,,,!i+xi:iiåii,'B.iii,l':ii':?'rj;l;i: i 51å t 9nd-Departmentllå.0åJ.llfi.li.;i';"1:,.".Ut":lr,{:"1i1,_.I of rnãrgy r.ó0.i, v rr¡qvrrsLrL shot triggere¿ Irurse errêct_(EMP) frorn a ti'. iiìi'' vv JÜ' rrrYJ _1962 test street ljghtsI jshts at varjous - t5crres-co-nnecteO loopri"oiIoops) of t varior.u!I.Î|r""'3,v_vqu¡ur¡J *t;l:: -(series-cóne.t.¿.island oìsrancedjstance goi ull rheLf¡e HawajjanHawal tan island of oii"ri"åt"åOahu, õfof somesomp onn Inlì.-r.,^.,?11!i:l: ¡¡v¡¡¡ y, vu¡,u 9l ,i at a rha'hundreds,that ,hundreds, ofor n,,..,ri'i li:i¡"t?:t,q^::I9,:¿s¡u . ,.. . . lt was ãir;-;;rlr;;.;also reported c,rcujt burqjã- .i1etn!".i ãiå"ti,li"ijii breakers in oã,jl ill1r,::-lr:lllg¡ r¡¡cJ wclej:i;".'.'".l.ii:'il'?lilfl ?,.gii,, I upeneo' " ;ffiProgram i],ll#',f 437 had:å';lno"*;¿ìir+"r future.'i0.,'åx'"T'lT managers oi soo¿iåI' effects^lhe. w¡en therne practpracti i calc a r ut i I tvi urev-ôvåi uitËå íl ty ^r"å^tor^lt-t^1ll',h-q*. ¡ t¡. îJ¡i1i- iri".i¿:i1i..,i,,åiiir.ii{,il: I t

******* UNcLASSIFiED ******* I t I ******* UNCLASSIFIED ******* 103

GLOSSARY

(Al l Portions are Unclassified)

ABM Antiball istic Missile

ABMDA Army Ballistic Missile Defense Agency

ADC Air Defense Command/Aero sp ace Defense Command

ADG Aerospace Defense Gro uP

ADO Advanced Devel opment 0b j ect'i ve

ADS Aerospace Defense Squadron

ADSO Aìr Defense System Office

AERODS Aerospace Defense Squadron (see ADS)

AFLC Air Force Logistìcs Command

AFRTS Armed Forces Radio and Television Service

AFSC Air Force Systems Command

,AP Alternate Progran

ARDC Air Research and Development Command (see AFSC)

ARPA Advanced Research Projects Agency

ASAT Antisatellite

BMD Ballistic Missile Division (of ARDC/AFSC)

B!',!DTTP Bal I i sti c Mi ssi I e Defense Target Test Program

BHTl,lS Ball istic Mjssile Early llarning System

a rt Combat Eval uati on Launch

CONAD Continental Air Defense Command

CTL Combat Training Launch

DASA Defense Atomic SuPPort Agency

DDRAE Director Defense Research and Engineering

Defense III Proposed ASAT system derived from Program 437' DSDD, and

******* uNcLASSI FI ED ******* ******* ******* UNCLASSIFIED ,l 104 ;l the Apoììo Lunar Excursion Module. DEI,I Di stant Earìy Warnì ng I DMSP Defense Meteoroì ogi cal Satell ite Program

DNA Defense Nucl ear Agency I DOD Department of Defense I DSDD Defense Subsystem Development and Demonstration Program DSP Defense Support Program I FOBS Fracti onal Orbit Bombardment System

GGS Ground Guidance System I GOR General 0perational Requ i rernent t HAP High Al tì tude Program ICBl4 I nte rcont i nental Ball istic Mi ssi le I INSSCC Interim National Space Survei lIance Control Center I RBl'| Intermedi åte Range Ballistic I'lissi'le I JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff I LE Launch tmpl acenrent LOX Liquid Oxygen I LTV Li ng -Temco -Vought Ll,lIR Long t|ave I nfrared I HECO Þlai n Engì ne Cut-off

MOCP Missile Out of tommission--Parts I MST Mountai n Standard Ti me I NASA Natjonal Aeronautics and Space Adminìstration NCOIC Non-Commissj oned 0fficer in Charge I NORAD North Anerican Air Defense Command/North American Aerospace Defense Command I NSC Natj onal Security Counc i l

******* ******* I uNcLASSIFIED I I ; -f ******* UN.LASSIFIED ******* i05 n oA0 orb.iting Astronomical observatory oSD | Offjce of the Secretary of Defense PLV payload Vehic.le

I PMD program Management Directive

POM Program Objectives Hemoranda t l |i'ÍiñT,:'i'l.lI3l3'iÊ,1'oT system derived from the t|i3fli.T.'i3o;,ProPoseduseofmodjfiedM'ìnuteman proposed Program 922 - conventjonal ASAT system derived from progi^am 437. t president,s .. PSAC Science Advisory Committee I pTDp preliminary Technical Development p.l an R&D Research and I DeveloPment RF Radio Frequency t ROC Required Operational Capabiììty SAC Strategic Air Cornmand

I SAINT Satellite Intercept and Inspection system I¡ SATCON Satellìte Alert Condition SEp Spherical Error probab.le t spAUArS Space I Detectjon and Tracking System SPASUR Space Survei li ance System I sPo system program office Ir SSD Space Systems Division luY Temporary Duty I uso united services organizatjon I ******* UNcLASSIFI ED ******* t

******* UNCLASSIFIED ******* 107

INDEX

(Aì l portions of thjs Index are Uncl assÍ fi ed)

9 Aerospace Defense Divìsìon, 42 Akau isl and, 97 9 Aerospace Dìvìsion, 22 Aì corn, Troy, 44, 69 10 Aerospace Defense Group, 39* American Rocket Socì ety, l0 ftnt, 42, 44, 46, 47, 69 ARLBERG TERROR 70-7 exercise, 46 10 Aerospace Defense Squadron, Armed Forces Radio and 22, 23, 26, 27, 28, 34, 3s, Television Servìce,37 37, 39, 47, 47, 48, 54, 59 Army Ballistjc Missile Defense 14 Aerospace Force, 47 Agency, 63 24 Aerospace Defense Squadron, Athena Computer,35 47 Atl antis Missile Range, 2 24 Support Squadron, 37, 39, 43, Atl as missìIe, 2 44,69 Atomic Energy Commi ss ion, 11, 25 Aerospace Defense Squadron, 20,53 39, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 47 Avi ati on l,leek and Soace 392 Missj le TrainÍng Squadron Techno loqv, l0 (sAc), 20 394 ICBM Test and Maintenance B Squadron (SAC), 39* ftnt Baker-Nunn camera, 25 4300 Support Squadron (SAC), 20, Ball i stic Missile Agency (USA), 22,39 4 6595 Aerospace Test 14ing, 20 Ball istic Missile Defense Target 6595 Test Squadron (AFSC), 20, Test Program, 48 z2 BalIistic Missile Early l,üarning System,4 A Bell Teìephone Laboratories, 20, Abram Baker (shi p), 99 23, 35 Adams, l.lilìiam,97 Beììinger, P.N.L., 99 Advanced Deveì opment Objecti ve Bernard, John, 22, 43 No. 18, 53 Boeing Company, 39 Advanced Deveì opment BOMARC missile, 20 Objective 40, l2-I3, 19 Brown, Haroìd, 12, 73, 74, Advanced Research Projects 59, 60, 61 Agency,3,4,5,6 Bu lgan in, Ni koì ai , 5 Air Defense Command, 9, ll, 13, Burner Ii, 39, 39* ftnt, 4l 79, 20, ?1, 23, 24, 29, 33, 35, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 44, c 46, 48, 54, 57, 60 Californja (ship), 99 Air Force Ballistìc Hìssile Chari tv (sh ip) , 97 Divìsion,5, 10 Charyk, Joseph,6,8,9 Air Force Logìstìcs Command, 23, COLLEGE LAUNCHER-Burner II 54,57 ôperat i ons, 44 Air Force Systems Command, 10' Combat Trai ni ng Launches 19, 20, 21, ??, 23, 24, 53' (Program 437), 34-48 54' 58i 59 Continental Air Defense Command Air l'ficronesia, 36 (C0NAD), t9, 27, 35, 36, 42, Air Research and Deveìopment 47, 53, 55, 57, 59 Command,5 Conti nental Ai rl ines. 36 Air Training Command, 23 Cornwall is (ship), 98

******* UNcLASSIFIED ******* ******* UNCLASSIFItD ******* 108 1l ;f Cuban Missile Crisjs, 11, 1Z Fore ign Technol ogy Division (AFSC), 56, 57 D Fracti onal Orbi t Bombardment Defense Astronautical Agency, 6 System, 40, 41, 62 I Deferse Atornic Support Ãgeniy, 47 lr Defe,nse Commun i cat ì ons Agency, Gagarin, Yuri , 9 21 Gai ther Report, 1-2 Defense Nucl ear Agency, 4g Gardner, Trevor, 10 Defense Subsystem-Deväi opment Gavin, James l,l., 5 and Demonstration program, General tl ectri c Corporatì on, I 62-64 53, 54 Defense Systems Appì i catì on Gerhart, John, 59 Program,4S G iì patri c, Roswel I Defense , 1I I III project, 63 Goì dwater, Barry, á3 Deputy Chief of Staff, Gray, Gordon, Development 7 _ (Hq USAF), 6 Guano Act, 98 Desi gnated Systems Man agement I Group,21 H Detachment Aerospace l, l0 HARDTACK nucl ear tests, 102 Defense Squadron, 47 Hickam AFB, 55 t Director of Defense Research and Hi k ,-.' ina Isìand,97 !¡9ineerin9,3, ll, lZ, Hones and Narver, 62-63, 23 64 Hope (ship), 97 Di rectorate of Advanced I Hotz, Robert, 10 (Hq _..^_Tecln-o logy USAF) , 6 House Armed Servi ces Committee, DMSP_ (Defense Meteoroì ogì caì 4 Satel _ l ite Program) , 39* ftnt House Select Committee I uornberger, on Outer l,Jalter, 5. 10 Space, 7 Dougìas Aircraft Company, 21, 23 Hurricane Cel este, 47. 70 Dougl as rcraft Corþorãti _Ai on, Huydecoper, 97 I 26, 27, 28, 35, 53, 54 Dyarbakir (Turkey), 26 I Internatj onal Geophysicaì year E 1957-58,2 I Ebron (ship), 99 Internati onal Teì ephone and Eise.nho_wer, Dujght D.,I, Z,3, Teìegraph/Kellog,54 4, 5, g, g I El ectroni c Systems Divisjon J (AFSC), 23 n._¡pul_a¡A (ship), Evans, Harvey l3-14 !+ ee E., Johnson, Al exi s, 14 Exerc_jse SQUANTO TERROR t 67-14, Jackson, Henry I'1. , l 39 Johnson, Lyndon, tO, Expl orer satel j 33, 60 I I ite, Johnson, Roy l,J., 4 Johnston-Isjand, 13, ZO, Zl ,23, I F 2!, 25, 26, 27,34, 3s, Fel dman, George, 7 36-48 oass i m, 97- fg¡j[Qrc-eqeplì^ (ship), 102 98 Joint Task Force, 8, 23 I lield Training Detachrnent (Arc), 5305 Joint Task Force Eióht, lOz 22 ,loìnt Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 2l FISHBOIIL (nucì ear tests), 44, Joint-Chiefs of Staff,'35,' 102 42, I 43, 55, 56, 59 Jupì ter missiìe, 2 ******* UNcLASSIFIED ******* I I ******* ****r** ã UNCLASSIFIED 109 fl K Nati onal Ñuclear Test Readiness Kennedy, John F., 8, 9, 10, 11, Program,47,48 13 National Secunity Council, ?, 4, I Khrushchev, Nikita, 1, 8, 9 5, 7 Kiìlian, James R., 3, 7 Nelìis AFB, 47 K'immel , Husband, 99 New York Ti mes, I King, Ernest J., 99 Njke-X ABM, 39, 40, 46 i K ing Kamehameka IV, 98 Nike-Zeus, 4, 7, 13, 35, 37, 6l Kistiakowsky, George, 7, I Nimitz, Chester, 100, 10i Krusenstern,9S N ixon, Rìchard,4 i Kuter, Laurence, 101 Kwajaieìn Island, 7, 13, 33 0 Orbì ti ng Astronomi cal L 0bservatory, 58 t LeMay, Curtì s, 12 Over-the - Hori zon radar, 33 Lexi nqton (ship), i00 Lì ng-Temco Vought Astronauti cs P I Di vi si on, Hughes Aircraft Packard, David, 45 Corporation, 61, 63 Parker, tliìliam,98 Peebl es, Curtis,33 I M Peterson, Ri chard, 69 ltlagì not Line, 4l Peterson, Richard, 43 Mahu, Jacob,97 Pol arj s (mi ssi I e) , 61 I'lcDonnel l Dougl as, 61, 63 Prange, Gordon, 101 I McDonnel I -Dougì as Corporation, Prelìminary Techn i cal 39 Deve lopment Pl an, 61 McEìroy, Neil, 4, 6 Pres i dent' s Science Advisory I McLucas, John, 45 Commi ttee, 3, 5 McMiìlan, Brockway, 79, 20, ?3, Project Di scoverer, 6 6t PV-1 Ventura, 101 I McNamara, Robert 8, 13, 14, 20, 33, 39, 59, 62 a Mercury Task Force, 6 Quales, Donald M., 2 Ìtlercury I I, 9 t MIDAS (Missiìe DetectÍon Alarm R System), 6 Radio Corporatjon of America, 63 l'lil itary Air Transport Service, RAND Corporation, 4-5 23 I RandajI, Clarence, 1 Mi nì han, Char'l es, 22, 34 Riepe, M¡ /-,: r ì Quentin, I9, 20, ?1, 23, |.rtlluLsflrdll-..+^--- \ t t>5¡^-: tts,/,^ ol 26, ?7 Miracìe at Midway (book), 101 RS-70,33 I Morse, Richard,7 Mundorff, G. T., 100 S Murow, Edward, l4 Sacramento Air Materiel Area, 38 I Salkeld, Robert, 10 .N Sa'ì lv (shìp), 98 National Adv i sory Commjttee on San Bernadino Air Material Area I Aeronautics,3 (AFLC), 24 Nati onal Aeronautics and Space Sandia Corporation, 20, 23, 53, Administration, 3, 4, 6, 9, 54 58 Sand Isì and, 97 I Natìonal Mìì ìtary Command Saratoga (shìp), t00 Center, 43

I ******* UNcLASSI FI ED ******* l ******* UNCLASSIFIED ******* 110 I

Sate'll ite Alert Conditions, Uni ted States Intel I i qence I 41-42 Board, 59, 60 Satel I ite Intercept and Univac Corporati on, 23, 53 Inspecti on Systern (SAINT), g, g, 'lg Univac 642 B compuier, 35, 3g, I 5_--6, 7, t0, il, 12; 47 Satel- I jte Interceptor (SAINÌ), University of Hawai i , 38 53 U. S. Safeguard Target Satel I i te Interceptor System, _Army -4g I 9 Eval uatj on Program, Schri ever, Bernard, l0 U-2 (aircraft), I - Seamans, Robert, 45 Senate Preparedness Committee, 2 V t Sentry ( sate lì i program) te , 6 Vandenberg AFB, 19, ZO, 22, Skyboì t, 33 Zl, Sovìet jcatjons ?9, 1!, 38, 3e, 45, 47', 56', _publ on space, 60, II-12 61, 63 t Vandenberg, Hoyt S., 3 Space, Air Force poì icy Vanguard regardjng,3-4 rocket, 2 von Braun, l,lernher, 2. 5 Space Defense Center (CONAD), 56 I Vostok I, 9 Spac-e Detection and Tracki n(¡' Vostok II, 9 System, 21, 24, Zs "Space for Peace" prograrn,6 t,l I Space, Air Force pôìjðy Warner Robins Air Matenieì Area, regarding,3-4 47 Spage- Systems Division, lO, 13, l,lestern El ectri c Corporati 23, 24, 35, 53, 54,'57 on, 53 t Western Test Range, 56 SPACETRACK, 25, 26 Sputnì k, American reaction to, Y 1-2 Yamamoto, Isoroku, l0I I Sputnik I, 1, 2, 3 Sputnik Yocum, John, 48 II, I York, Herbert, 6 Sputnik V, 8 SS-9 Scarp, 40 r z STARFISH (nucì ear test). tl Zeine, Merle,58 Stotler, A. J., Zz Zori n, Vaì er.i an, 5 System Program Offi ce I Zuckert, Eugene, I3, 19, 21, 33 (Program 437), ZZ T I Thatcher, Herbert, Zg I

Thor LV-2D (booster) Ig, 25 j , lhor l"l ssi I e Launch Support I rrogram, 48 Titov, Gherman, 9 Transit 2A, Zl , 34 I Tyuratam (Soviet Union), 26, 40

U United Nations, 40, 70 t

******* UNcLASS I FI ED ******* I I