Contrasting Russian and Chinese Perspectives on the Future of Asia
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Contrasting Russian and Chinese Perspectives on the Future of Asia Thesis submitted for Degree of PhD University of Glasgow October 1994 David Kerr, Institute of Russian and East European Studies, University of Glasgow (c) David Kerr, 1994 contents Contrasting Russian and Chinese Perspectives on the Future of Asia I Introduction Page 1 II Comparative historical perspectives Page 16 III Comparative ideological perspectives Page 46 IV Russian economic relations wi th Asia Page 73 V Chinese economic relations wi th Asia Page 163 VI Russian and Chinese political Page 268 perspectives on Asia VI I Conclusion Page 348 Statistical Appendices Page 366 and bibliography. Abstract The initial hypothesis of this research was that divergent reg iona 1 pe rspect ives on As ia- issues of security, political alignment and economic models- were a primary cause of the thirty-year Sino-Soviet Cold War. This implied that future stable relations between Russia and China would continue to be strongly influenced by the compatibility of their regional perspectives. Sustaining such compatibility would become increasingly complex, however, due to change within Asia itself, particularly with regard to Asia's emergence as one of the centres of the new global economy. Asian modernisation is significant for Russia and China not only in terms of domestic development as they abandon the command economy, but politically since the creation of a regional economy is being promoted as a means of neutralising the tensions in the region which arise from Asia's heterodox nature in terms of culture, ethnicity and social system. The cent ra1 chapt ers of the thes is are, therefore, concerned with comparing Russian and Chinese assessments of the Asian economy on several levels: Asia's place in their foreign economic relations in the reform era; Asia's role in their domestic development; and their assessment of the significance of the Asian economy as an economic model and as an emerging regional economy. These assessments are then set against Russian and Chinese perspectives on their role as Asian powers and their security and diplomatic relations in Asia. The conclusion of the paper is that Asia is rising in importance for both states, though not equally. Russia remains economically isolated from the most important processes of the Asian economy, though political and economic de-centralisation in Asiatic Russia raises the prospect of these region's re-orientation towards the Pac ific. The success of economi c reform inCh ina, conversely, owes a considerable amount to the degree to which China has participated in regional trade and investment flows, although this has also promoted domestic dislocation due to rapid changes in the patterns of distribution of economic output and population. The proposition that the imperative of economic modernisation has neutral ised the potential for regional con f1ict is found t0 be unproven. Economi cs can be as much a source of conflict between nations as politics or culture, and there remain many interests to be balanced if Asia is to emerge as an integrated economy of common purpose. Rather economic development has had its greatest impact on Asian regional relations by effecting a re- distribution of power between states. This is evident not only in the rise of China and Japan as powers capable of challenging and balancing the interests of the former superpowers but in the much broader distribution amongst other states. Russia and China do have complementary economic interests within Asia, but it is by promoting this greater equilibrium of power that economic development has contributed most to regional stability, including the Sino-Russian relationship. Abbreviations AFTA ASEAN Free Trade Area. APEC Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation conference. APR Asia Pacific Region. ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations. BAM Baikal Amur Mainline. CASS Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. CMEA Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. CPC Comunist Party of China. CPSU Commmuist Party of the Soviet Union. DPRK Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea. EAEG (C) East Asian Economic Group (Caucus). ESCAP (UN) Economic and Social Commission on Asia and the Pacific. FDI Foreign Direct Investment. FE Far East. FER Foreign Economic Relations. FEZ Free Economic Zone. FTC Foreign Trade Corporation. FTO Foreign Trade Organisation. FYP Five Year Plan. GLF Great Leap Forward. GVIAO Gross Value of Industrial and Agricultural Output. IMEMO Institute of World Economy and International Relations. LTSP Long Term State Programme (for the Complex Development of the Far East). MFT Ministry of Foreign Trade. MID Ministry of Foreign Affairs. MOFERT Minsitry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade. MNC Multinational Corporation. NAFTA North American Free Trade Area. NI National Income. NIC (E) Newly Industrialised Countries (Economies). PDRY Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen. PECC Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference. ROK Republic of Korea. SEATO Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation. SEZ Special Economic Zone. TFR Total Fertility Rate. TPC Territorial Production Complex. I Introduction: Issues and Definitions According to the joint communique issued at the Beijing summit of May 1989 between the Soviet Union and China "both sides expressed the unanimous opinion that the Soviet-Chinese summit signifies the normalisation of interstate relations between the Soviet Union and China." Future relations between the two states would be guided by the five principles of peaceful coexistence- non- aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, mutual respect for sove re i gnt y, equal it y and peaceful co- existence. Despite the fact that important differences still existed between the two sides at both state and party level, these pronouncements indicated how far the circumstances which sustained the 30 year Sino-Soviet Cold war had changed by the end of the 1980's. One way of analysing the causes of both Sino-Soviet host; 1it y, and t he subsequent rapprochement, is to compar e the i r re 1at ion s hip wit h the 0 the r pi v 0talon e 0 f the Cold War, that between the Soviet Union and the United States. In his essay 'The Long Peace', 1 John L. Gaddis has argued that, in the absence of a supra- national force capable of imposing authority on the international arena, stability in the post-war era arose from Soviet and US agreement to abide by a set of unofficial rules, which were the product of custom, precedent and mut ua 1 i nt erest . These were five-fold: respect for spheres of influence- no encroachment on 1 territory that the opponent considered essential to its economic or military security; avoidance of direct confrontation- despite the unprecedented level of military action since 1945, great care was taken to ensure that Soviet and us forces did not come into direct conflict; recognition of the qualitative difference that nuc 1ear weapons imposed upon re 1at ions between st at es; recognition of the legitimacy of the opposing leadership, while retaining the right to question that of the opposing system; a preference for predictability over rat i ona 1it y- t he accept ance of many anoma 1i es and irrationalities in the international order. The absence both individually and collectively of comparable rules in the Sino-Soviet relationship can be used to explain much of the instability in relations between the two states. Firstly, in the collective sense, the Soviet Union's willingness from the fifties on to abide by a set of rules which allowed so much to the advanced capitalist states, provided they did not challenge the national interests of the Soviet state itself, was unacceptable to the Chinese. This led to a shift in their perception of the aims of Soviet foreign policy from being engaged in support and expansion of the socialist world, to being primarily concerned with pursuing partial interests, including sustaining stability in the existing international order at the expense of change, particularly in the Third World. The rejection of the collective rules emerging in the 2 international system led to the isolation of the PRC during the sixties, a process linked to the domestic turmoil of the period. Equally important was the inability to work out comparable individual rules. Such rules should not be seen as being of equal importance, particularly at varying points in the history of the Sino-Soviet conflict. Thus both the denial of the legitimacy of the opposing political leadership and China's refusal to accept the changes that nuclear weapons had brought about in international relations were more significant in the initial stage of the conflict. This is also true of China's attempt to end the anomaly of the separation of Taiwan from the mainland by precipitate action. However, the two other factors behind the dispute- the inability to avoid direct confrontation and the unwillingness to afford each other legitimate spheres of influence- did not abate but rather increased in intensity. Direct confrontation was unavoidable given the proximity of the two states, the vulnerability of their mutual border and the dispute as to its proper demarcat ion. The des i re to deny each ot her support in Asia grew from competition for influence among the non- aligned in the fifties to the creation of outright political and military alliances aimed against the other. China's perception of its vulnerability on these issues at the beginning of the seventies was the primary motivating factor in bringing about the pivotal change in 3 the course of the Sino-Soviet conflict: the development of its strategic understanding with the US and Japan. It is not possible to characterise the Sino-Soviet conflict as being primarily a bi-lateral dispute before 1972 and a multilateral conflict thereafter. What is true is that the balance of factors sustaining the dispute changed from the former to the latter: China's perception of its vulnerability moved from the direct threat to that posed by what it deemed the Sovi et Uni on's pursu it of hegemonism in Asia.