A Comparative Analysis of George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump Administration Policies in Afghanistan
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City University of New York (CUNY) CUNY Academic Works All Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects 2-2020 The U.S. Approach to Peacebuilding in Afghanistan: A Comparative Analysis of George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump Administration Policies in Afghanistan Mohammad Rasouli The Graduate Center, City University of New York How does access to this work benefit ou?y Let us know! More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/3547 Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). Contact: [email protected] THE U.S. APPROACH TO PEACEBUILDING IN AFGHANISTAN A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF GEORGE W. BUSH, BARACK OBAMA, AND DONALD TRUMP ADMINISTRATION POLICIES IN AFGHANISTAN by MOHAMMAD RASOULI A master’s thesis submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Liberal Studies in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, The City University of New York 2020 © 2020 MOHAMMAD RASOULI All Rights Reserved ii The U.S. Approach to Peacebuilding in Afghanistan, A Comparative Analysis of George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump Administration Policies in Afghanistan by Mohammad Rasouli This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Liberal Studies in satisfaction of the thesis requirement for the degree of Master of Arts. Date Karen R. Miller Thesis Advisor Date Elizabeth Macaulay-Lewis Executive Officer THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK iii ABSTRACT The U.S. Approach to Peacebuilding in Afghanistan, A comparative analysis of George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump administration policies in Afghanistan by Mohammad Rasouli Advisor: Professor Karen Miller This research paper addresses the efforts of the U.S. to achieve some level of reconciliation with the Taliban after more than 18 years of war in Afghanistan. It deals with the history of U.S.- Taliban negotiations and the U.S. initiatives to engage with the Taliban, as well as outlining the challenges to these initiatives and determining how effective they have been. In addition, the prospects of the U.S.-Taliban peace talks are assessed. Since the 2001 U.S. intervention in Afghanistan, the first two U.S. administrations under consideration—those of George W. Bush and Barack Obama—justified intrusive interventions into the political, economic, and social affairs of Afghanistan under a “state-building” approach to address a combination of security and humanitarian challenges. The U.S. promoted state-building initiatives guided by a liberal peacebuilding ideology that were supposed to promote peace, democracy, and market-led development in the region. Two years after Trump came to office, his administration abandoned this state-building approach and hopes of a military victory over the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. The question of how to establish lasting peace in Afghanistan has also proven to be troublesome for the U.S. and the iv Afghans. The process of peace talks between the U.S. and the Taliban, which started in early 2018, has lacked transparency and a clear strategy. However, it seems that the U.S.-Taliban peace talks in Doha have started the beginning of an end to a supposedly “endless war” for the U.S. Nonetheless, this might not end the conflict within Afghanistan, as the U.S. peace deal with the Taliban is more likely to create the conditions for future civil war than a sustainable peace among Afghans. v ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to offer my sincerest thanks to my professor and thesis advisor Dr. Karen R. Miller for her valuable guidance and instructions throughout my studies at the Graduate Center, CUNY. I also would like to deeply thank Sadaf Ahmadi, Jawid Hamidi, Sayed Nadim, Mohamad Mustafa Naizai, Ahmad Haqparast, Dawod Hosaini, Mohammad Saber Mamozai, and Sayeed Mir Malak for giving me the opportunity to interview them and allowing me to use their insightful comments in my paper. This research would not have been possible without the support of the honorable people mentioned above. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract ............................................................................................................................................. iv Acknowledgments ............................................................................................................................ vi Table of Contents............................................................................................................................. vii Introduction .........................................................................................................................................1 Chapter One: Theoretical Framework for State-Building and Peace building in Afghanistan ...........3 1.1 The Bush Administration’s Strategy for Winning the “War on Terror” ................................4 1.2 Liberal/Democratic Peace Theory .........................................................................................7 1.3 The Evolution of the Concept of Peace ...............................................................................10 1.3.1 The Application of the Liberal Peace ............................................................................13 1.3.2 The Nature of the Afghan State .....................................................................................17 1.4 Conclusion ...........................................................................................................................18 Chapter Two: Peacebuilding Through Coercion ...............................................................................20 2.1.1 Bush’s “War on Terror” ....................................................................................................21 2.1.2 “Accelerating Success”: A Step Toward State-Building ................................................23 2.2.1 Obama’s “Good War” .......................................................................................................25 2.2.2 New Strategy: A Fragile Progress ..................................................................................26 2.2.3 The War in Afghanistan: A Black Hole .........................................................................29 2.3.1 Trump’s Strategy: Reversal or Continuity? .......................................................................31 2.3.2 Trump’s Least Bad Option .............................................................................................33 2.3.3 The Flaw in Trump’s Strategy ........................................................................................34 2.4 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................35 Chapter Three: Peacebuilding Through Dialogue ............................................................................37 3.1.1 Early Negotiation ...............................................................................................................40 3.1.2 The Afghan Government Reintegration Program ..........................................................42 3.2.1 Obama’s Peacemaking With the “Moderate Taliban” ......................................................43 3.2.2 U.S. Allies’ Pressure to Find a Political Solution ..........................................................45 3.2.3 The Peace Process: Pragmatism in Play ........................................................................46 3.3.1 Trump’s Peace Policy ........................................................................................................50 3.3.2 Trump’s Afghan Policy Debacle ...................................................................................52 3.4 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................53 Chapter Four: Conclusion ..................................................................................................................55 4.1 Interviews and Findings........................................................................................................58 vii 4.2 The U.S. Presence in Afghanistan .......................................................................................59 4.3 U.S. Peacebuilding in Afghanistan .......................................................................................61 4.4 The Future Prospects of the Afghanistan Conflict ...............................................................63 Bibliography ......................................................................................................................................66 viii INTRODUCTION The U.S. peacebuilding efforts in Afghanistan began after the fall of the Taliban regime in December 2001. When the U.S. military, its Western allies, and the Afghan Northern Alliance— the Taliban’s opposing party in the civil war—removed the Taliban regime from power, many Afghan technocrats and Western diplomats hoped to create a stable and representative government. However, establishing a Western-style democracy in a country that had undergone two decades of unrest was a daunting task, given the fact that Afghanistan’s economy is underdeveloped, several ethno-sectarian issues exist among different ethnicities, and most importantly, parallel sources of power to the government—the warlords—were empowered during the two decades of unrest and challenged the legitimacy of the central