ARI Projects

Arab Securitocracies and Security Sector Reform September

2012

After the Fall:

Security Sector Reform in post-Ben Ali

Derek Lutterbeck*

Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, Malta

Security sector reform (SSR) is a key concern in the current transformations which are sweeping across much of the . Given the crucial role security institutions have played in sustaining authoritarian regimes in the region, any transformation towards more democratic rule will necessarily also have to include a reform of these countries’ security sectors towards greater transparency, accountability and democratic control. This article explores the challenges and prospects of security sector reform in the first Arab country to have overthrown its autocratic leader, Tunisia. The main arguments advanced in this article are that the key SSR challenges in Tunisia since the fall of Ben Ali have been the reform of the country’s internal security apparatus and the judiciary, whereas military reforms are of limited importance. Even though in both of these areas actual reforms have been rather modest so far, and have focused more on purges rather than on structural transformations, Tunisia remains the most promising of all Arab countries which have toppled their long- standing leaders when it comes to achieving effective security sector reforms.

*Derek Lutterbeck is Deputy Director and Holder of the Swiss Chair at the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies (MEDAC) in Malta

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The popular upheavals which have swept heart of the protest movements. In practically across much of the Arab world since late all countries of the region security institutions 2010 have thus far led to the toppling of four have not only been key pillars of the authoritarian leaders: in both Tunisia and authoritarian regimes, but have also been Egypt, the countries’ long-standing widely perceived as oppressive, presidents, Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali and unaccountable and corrupt. Indeed, it is no Hosni Mubarak, stepped down (and the coincidence that the very event which sparked former fled the country), after several weeks the anti-regime uprising in Tunisia, from of massive anti-regime demonstrations, where it spread to the entire region, was an followed by the overthrow and killing of abuse committed by a police officer against Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi in mid-2011, and an ordinary citizen.1 the resignation of Yemen’s Abdullah Saleh a This article is divided as follows. It begins few months later. While the ultimate outcome with a few brief remarks on the concept of of these uprisings still remains unclear, the security sector reform and its relevance in the pro-reform movements in all Arab countries Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have called for greater political freedoms as region in general. It then turns to the case of well as economic opportunities, and the new Tunisia, describing the principal elements of leaderships which have come to power after the country’s security sector under the Ben the downfall of the autocrats have, at least Ali regime. This is followed by a discussion rhetorically, committed themselves to of main security sector reform efforts since establishing more democratic political the fall of the country’s leader. The main systems. arguments advanced in the following are that The aim of this article is to explore the the key SSR challenges in Tunisia in the post- challenges and prospects of security sector Ben Ali period have been the reform of the reform—commonly referred to as SSR—in country’s internal security apparatus and the the first Arab country to have overthrown its judiciary, whereas military reforms are of autocratic leader, Tunisia. While the Arab limited importance. Even though in both of uprisings have been driven by a range of both 1 On December 17 th , in the central Tunisian town of political and economic grievances, wide- Sidi Bouzid, the fruit vendor Mohamed Bouazi set spread dissatisfaction with abusive and himself on fire after his fruit cart was confiscated and he was harassed and humiliated by a (female) police unaccountable security forces has been at the officer.

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these areas actual reforms have been rather SSR is thus an at least partly normative modest so far, and have focused more on concept, as well as a key component of the purges rather than on structural democratization agenda. It is commonly transformations, Tunisia remains the most assumed that any transition towards promising of all Arab countries which have democracy would be incomplete if toppled their long-standing autocrats when it democratization does not also encompass a comes to achieving effective security sector country’s security institutions. Conversely, reforms. the prospects of reforming a country’s

security sector in the absence of a truly democratic system are considered to be Security Sector Reform in the MENA limited at best. While under a non-democratic region regime, security forces might be effective in Although a relatively recent concept, security providing security, and might even be rule- sector reform or SSR is now rather widely bound, democratic oversight of security used within both the security and forces presupposes the existence of at least development communities. Security sector some form of a democratic polity. reform is generally understood as a Another distinctive feature of the SSR transformation of security institutions towards concept is its holistic approach to the security greater democratic accountability and sector. Security sector reform comprises all transparency as well as effectiveness. From an relevant institutions as well as oversight SSR perspective, security institutions should bodies concerned with security provision. not only be effective and efficient in This includes police and other internal providing security for the country’s citizens security agencies, military and paramilitary but should also be controlled by and forces, intelligence services, courts, as well as accountable to democratically elected civilian institutions responsible for overseeing these authorities, and should act based on the rule agencies, such as ministries, parliaments and of law.2 civil society groups. The ultimate objective of SSR is that all agencies tasked with providing

security be subject and accountable to 2 See, e.g., Heiner Hänggi, “Conceptualising Security Sector Reform and Reconstruction”, in: Alan Bryden and Heiner Hänggi, Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector (Geneva: Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed forces, 2004), pp. 3-20.

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democratically legitimized civilian obstacle to political liberalization and authorities. 3 democratization in the region. 5

Turning to the MENA region more As a consequence, there have to date hardly specifically, it can be noted that it has long been any genuine, internally-driven security been seen as perhaps the most problematic sector reform activities undertaken in the region in the world when it comes to the MENA region. As noted in one recent prospects for security sector reform. Even overview, “no Arab country has embarked on, though in recent years, analysts have been let alone achieved, significant SSR” 6. While pointing to a “nascent debate” on SSR in the there have been a few instances of at least MENA region, as result of both internal and attempted reforms of security institutions in external pressures, at least until the current the region, these have all taken place in the uprisings, the Arab world seemed largely context of (western-led) international efforts exempt from general trends towards in countries emerging from conflict or democratization—of political systems in otherwise suffering from severe security general, as well as of security institutions deficits. Thus, in countries such as , more specifically.4 Not only has the MENA Palestine or Lebanon, certain—and in the case region had the world’s largest share of non- of Lebanon very limited—security sector democratic regimes, but in many countries of reform efforts have been carried out in the the region the security apparatus has been the framework of multilateral assistance principal instrument through which missions. 7 Even in these cases, however, the authoritarian regimes have maintained 5 themselves in power. Instead of ensuring the See, e.g., Eva Bellin, “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East. Exceptionalism in security of the state and its citizens, security Comparative Perspective”, Comparative Politics, vol. 36, no. 2 (2004), pp. 139-157; Steven A. Cook, Ruling forces have rather been concerned first and But Not Governing. The Military and Political foremost with securing the ruling regimes. Development in Egypt, Algeria and (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2007); Risa Brooks, Indeed, the robustness of the coercive Political-Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes , Adelphi Paper No. 324, International apparatus of Middle Eastern states has been Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998. seen by many as one of, if not the main 6 Yezid Sayigh, Security Sector Form in the Arab Region: Challenges to Developing an Indigenous Agenda , Arab Reform Initiative Thematic Papers No. 2, 3 Ibid. December 2007 , p. 15. 7 For an overview, see e.g., Andrew Rathmell et al., 4Arnold Luethold, “Security Sector Reform in the Arab Developing Iraq’s security sector: the Coalition Middle East: A Nascent Debate”, in: Alan Bryden and Provisional Authority’s experience (Santa Monica: Heiner Hänggi, op.cit ., pp. 93-120. Rand Corporation, 2005); Yezid Sayigh, Fixing Broken

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main focus has tended to be on strengthening comes to the role of security institutions has the effectiveness and operational capacity of been the (relatively) apolitical nature and security forces rather than on more limited political influence of the military in governance-related aspects, such as enhancing Tunisia. In contrast to most countries of the security institutions’ accountability and MENA region where the armed forces have transparency. 8 been one, if not the main pillar of the (authoritarian) regime, in Tunisia the military

never played an important political role, but The Tunisian security sector under Ben Ali was rather marginalized by the country’s The aim of this section is to describe the main leadership. Already at the moment of characteristics of the Tunisian security sector independence, the role of the Tunisian during Ben Ali’s reign. While comparable to military was different from that of most other many Arab countries, Tunisia under Ben Ali Arab states: whereas the first post- was a highly oppressive regime, of which the independence leaders of many Arab countries country’s security apparatus was a key came from the military, which often formed element, the Tunisian security sector also had the backbone of the post-independence its own distinctive features which set the regime, Tunisia’s first leader, Habib country off from other states of the MENA Bourgiba, was a lawyer, and did not allow a region. In the following three main elements prominent political role for the armed forces. of the Tunisian security sector are discussed: As a convinced Francophile, Bourgiba rather the armed forces, the police and the judicial sought to model Tunisia on French republican system. principles, at least in terms of a clear

separation between political and military power.9 Apolitical military The same policy of keeping the military away The most significant difference between from politics was followed by Bourgiba’s Tunisia and many other Arab states when it successor, Ben Ali, despite the fact that the

Windows, Security Sector Reform in Palestine, latter had a military background and held the Lebanon, and Yemen , Carnegie Papers No. 17, October 2009; Emilie El-Hokayem and Elena McGovern, Towards a more secure and stable Lebanon: Prospects 9 L. B. Ware, ‘The Role of the Tunisian Military in the Post- for Security Sector Reform , Henry L. Stimson Centre, Bourgiba Era’, Middle East Journal , vol. 39, no. 1, 1985, p. Washington, 2009. 37; L. B. Ware, Tunisia in the Post-Bourgiba Era. The Role of the Military in a Civil Arab Republic (Maxwell: AL: Air 8 Sayigh, op.cit ., p. 14. University Press, 1986), p. 47.

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rank of general. Tunisian military officers which does not meddle in politics.13 The who served under Ben Ali typically describe often-used term la grande muette (“the big him as an “anti-militarist” who tried to limit silent one”) to describe the Tunisian armed the political influence of the military as much forces highlights its discretion and non- as possible.10 While during the first years of interference in public affairs.

Ben Ali’s reign, the came to One notable institutional implication of the assume a somewhat more prominent role than ’ subjection to the under Bourgiba, and several military officers political leadership of the country has been were promoted to high-level positions by Ben the fact that, in contrast to many other Arab Ali, since the end of the 1980s the armed states, Tunisia has traditionally had a largely forces’ overall evolution has been civilianized ministry of defense. Whereas characterized by their depoliticization and most Arab states have either not had a 11 removal from the centre of political power. ministry of defense at all, or the defense This was done not only by forbidding any ministry has been a mere extension of the political activities by members of the armed armed forces lead by a military officer, in forces but also by purging officers suspected Tunisia the minister of defense, as well as the 12 of harboring political ambitions. The highest officials within the ministry, have Tunisian military is nowadays widely always been civilians. perceived as a largely apolitical—and Nevertheless, and comparable to most Arab professional—force, and it also views itself as countries, ultimate political power in Tunisia an inherently “republican” military whose has also been concentrated in the hands of the principal task it is to defend the country, and president, who has exercised effective control

10 over all important areas of policy-making, Author interview with former Tunisian military officers, , 18-19 April 2012. including the armed forces. Moreover, and 11 L.B. Ware, « Ben Ali’s Constitutional Coup in Tunisia », again as in almost all other Middle Eastern Middle East Journal , vol, 42, no. 4 (Autumn 1988), pp. 587- 601; Michel Camau and Vincent Geisser, Le syndrome states, the parliament in Tunisia has been autoritaire. Politique en Tunisie de Bourgiba à Ben Ali (Paris: Presses de Sciences Politiques, 2003), p. 211. practically powerless and not exercised any 12 The most significant of these purges is commonly significant influence over military (or any believed to have occurred in 2002, when 13 high ranking officers of the Tunisian Armed forces, other important) matters. Even though in including the Army Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Abdelaziz Skik, were killed in a helicopter crash. There have been widespread suspicions in Tunisia that Ben 13 Author interview with senior Tunisian military Ali was behind the accident, attempting to eliminate officers, Tunis, 18-19 April 2012. military officers considered insufficiently loyal.

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principle the Tunisian parliament had the practically any other country in the region. 15 power to approve the military budget and thus In contrast to all other North African states, exercise a certain oversight function over the Tunisia never engaged in any large-scale arms armed forces, in practice the parliament, purchases, relying mainly on surplus which in any case was entirely dominated by equipment donated by other countries, in members of Ben Ali’s RCD ( Rassemblement particular the US. 16 This too was very much constitutionnel démocratique ) party, merely resented among Tunisia’s military leadership; rubber stamped decisions taken by the “we were driven into beggardom by the Ben government. 14 It can thus be argued that in Ali regime”, complained one former high- Tunisia under Ben Ali (and Bourgiba) the ranking officer of the Tunisian armed military was subject to a form of civilian forces. 17 Moreover, due to a lack of resources control, albeit within the framework of an and investments, much of Tunisia’s military authoritarian regime. equipment is nowadays considered to be 18 The fact that the armed forces in Tunisia were largely obsolete. relatively marginalized by Ben Ali was also The absence of a strong link between the manifest in their small size, as well as armed forces and the Ben Ali regime has also Tunisia’s comparatively low level of military been manifest in their response to the anti- spending, at least by regional standards. With regime uprisings which erupted in December a mere 35,000 men, the Tunisian armed forces 2010. When the Tunisian military was called have been by far the smallest in North Africa. out to confront the rapidly swelling Even Libya, whose population is less than demonstrations, it practically sided with the half of Tunisia’s, had a military force more protesters against the regime. The army chief than double the size of its western neighbor. 15 All figures from International Institute for Strategic Similarly, defense spending has been Studies, Military Balance , recent years. comparatively very low in Tunisia, amounting 16 Anthony H. Cordesman and Aram Nerguizian, North to around 1.5% of GDP, which is well below African Military Balance. Force Developments & Regional Challenges, 7 December 2010. 17 Author interview with former Tunisian military officer, Tunis, 18 May 2012.

18 14 Author interview with senior Tunisian military US government analysts have estimated that as officers, Tunis, 18-19 April 2012. The powers of the much as 70% of Tunisia's military equipment is ageing and cannot be maintained with current levels of Tunisian parliament with regard to the armed forces military spending. See Janes Sentinel Security are regulated in Art. 28 and 30 of the (former) Assessment - North Africa , Tunisia (procurement), 9 Tunisian constitution. June 2011.

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of staff General Rachid Ammar reportedly not internal security system, thus practically only refused to order his troops to fire against bypassing his successive interior ministers.20 demonstrators, but has even been credited Describing the Tunisian internal security with ultimately pushing Ben Ali to leave the apparatus under Ben Ali is difficult due to its country.19 opacity and the fact that many of the laws and decrees regulating the organization and activities of the police have been kept Dominant police secret.21 Following the French model, Tunisia While the armed force were thus sidelined by has a dual police system comprising the Ben Ali, the Tunisian autocrat relied first and National Police ( Police or sûreté nationale ), foremost on the country’s internal security which operates mainly in larger cities, and the and intelligence apparatus as his power base (paramilitary) National Guard ( Garde and instrument for suppressing internal nationale) , which is responsible for rural dissent. Ben Ali’s own ascent to power is areas. In addition, there are other, more revealing in this respect. Even though specialized, law enforcement agencies which originally coming from the military, Ben Ali are attached to the Interior Ministry, such as made is career mainly within the Tunisian the Civil Protection Force (Protection civile ) police system. Before taking over the and the Prison Guard (Service des prisons et presidency (by removing Bourgiba from de la re-education ). However, the office), Ben Ali occupied the post of Director organization and responsibilities of these of National Security ( Directeur de la Sûreté different agencies have not been clearly Nationale ), which is the highest position delineated, as there has neither been a clear— within Tunisia’s police structures, and and publicly available—organigram of subsequently that of Interior Minister. Even Tunisia’s police forces, nor a legal document after Ben Ali assumed the presidency he maintained direct control over the country’s 20 Camau and Geisser , Le Syndrome autoritaire. Politique en Tunisie de Bourgiba à Ben Ali (Paris : Presses de Sciences Politiques, 2003), p. 203. 21 19 Derek Lutterbeck, Arab Uprisings and Armed Forces. The Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Between Openness and Resistance . SSR Paper no. 2, Forces (DCAF) has recently created a database on Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Tunisia’s security-related legislation. It shows that of Forces, October 2011, pp. 20-24. There is, however, the 1,700 legal texts in this area, a considerable still considerable debate in Tunisia about what exactly number have been kept secret (i.e. they have never happened on Ben Ali’s final day in power, and who been published). The database is accessible online at: ultimately pushed him to leave the country. http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr .

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clearly specifying their tasks.22 Accounts of enforcing the law was not very relevant for Tunisian police officers interviewed by this us.” 24 author suggest that the country’s internal There was a similar lack of transparency security system was generally characterized regarding the size of Tunisia’s police forces, by a high degree of arbitrariness, due to the as the Ben Ali regime never published any lack of a clear legal framework in most areas figures on the number of police officers in the of police work and organization, and as a country. Tunisia was commonly considered to result, by widespread cronyism and be one of the most heavily policed states in corruption, the principle of “blind obedience” the world, with estimates of human rights to the superior, as well as the constant organizations putting the number of interference of the President or individuals policemen at anywhere between 130,000 and close to him in the daily work of policemen, 25 200,000. This would have meant that while enforcing the law was of only Tunisia had a ratio of police officers to secondary importance.23 One former police inhabitants of between 1/50 to 1/76, which is officer described it as follows: “our activities three to four times higher than even the most were determined mainly by direct orders of densely policed countries in Europe. 26 While Ben Ali or members of important families; after the fall of Ben Ali, these figures turned out to be vastly exaggerated, the commonly held perception of such overwhelmingly large police forces is in itself telling. It highlights

22 that the police in Tunisia was seen as The most detailed and publicly available legal document on the organization of the interior ministry is Decree No. 84-1244 of 20 October 1984. However, 24 Author interview for former Tunisian police officer, under Ben Ali the decree was modified by several other decrees which have not been made public. See Tunis, 21 April 2012. A similar account has been given DCAF database (note 21) at: http://www.legislation- by a former National Guard officer, in: Tahar Ben securite.tn/fr . Youssef, Les snipers dans la révolution tunisienne et la 23 Author interview with Tunisian police officers, Tunis, reforme du system sécuritaire , Tunis, 2011. 19-20 April 2012. The principle of “blind obedience” is 25 The figure of 200,000 police officers has been also enshrined in the law. According to the Law on the suggested by Human Rights Watch. See “Dismantling General Status of Internal Security Forces (Law No. 82- the Machinery of Oppression”, Wall Street Journal , 70 of 6.8. 1982) the principal duty of police officers is 17.2.2011. The Tunisian Human Rights organization, Conseil National pour les Libertés en Tunisie, to obey orders of their superiors (Art. 46). Contrary to estimated the number of policemen at 130,000. See police codes of (most) liberal democratic states, the Conseil National pour les Libertés en Tunisie, Rapport law does not provide for any possibility of refusing to sur l’état des libertés en Tunisie , 15 March 2000. carry out orders in the event that these are 26 The most heavily policed country in Europe is Italy (manifestly) unlawful. with a ratio of 1/211.

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practically omnipresent, closely monitoring dissidents, in particular Islamists, or people the population, and suppressing any merely suspected of being opposed to the (potentially) suspicious activity. Moreover, in regime. 28 controlling the citizenry, the police was also While information on Tunisia’s police forces supported by a broad range of unofficial has been scarce, even less is known about the “informers”, in particular members of the country’s intelligence services. The country ruling RCD party, but also “ordinary” civil has several intelligence agencies, some of servants, professional associations, as well as which fall under the responsibility of the public and even some private companies. 27 Interior Ministry whereas others are attached As Ben Ali’s principal instrument of to the Ministry of Defense. However, there is repression, the police was certainly the most no publicly available information on these feared institution in Tunisia, and abuses bodies, and they seem to have operated in a committed by the police were widespread. As total legal void.29 One former high-ranking has been reported by numerous human rights police officer described the situation as organizations over the years, these have follows: “there have been no laws or included practices such as arbitrary arrests regulations on intelligence operations, and so and detention, harassment of political basically anyone could do whatever he opponents and anyone considered politically wanted”. 30 Moreover, in this area as well, it “suspicious”, as well as the regular use of has been commonly known that Tunisia’s torture and other forms of inhuman or intelligence agencies have been concerned degrading treatment. Especially in the name of the “fight against terrorism”, the Tunisian 28 See, e.g., Amnesty International, In the Name of Security. Routine Abuses in Tunisia , June 2008; Human police, and in particular the so-called Rights Watch, Universal Periodic Review of Tunisia , Directorate of State Security (Direction de la 6.4.2008; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of sûreté d’Etat ), or “political police”, has been human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism , Martin Scheinin, 28.12.2010; accused of using torture and of committing Conseil National pour les Libertés en Tunisie, Rapport other serious human rights violations, not sur l’état des libertés en Tunisie , 15 March 2000. 29 See Haykel Ben Mahfoudh, Jonas Loetscher and only against effectively dangerous individuals Arnold Luethold, La législation du secteur de la but also—or even primarily—against political sécurité en Tunisie: Index 1956 – 2011 , Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Geneva, Tunis, 2012, p. 81. 27 Beatrice Hibou, The Force of Obedience. The Political 30 Economy of Repression in Tunisia (Cambridge: Polity Author interview with former Tunisian police officer, Press, 2011), pp. 81-82. Tunis, 20 April 2012.

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first and foremost with fighting political system should be independent and operate opponents, and in particular (suspected) strictly on the basis of the rule of law. There Islamists, rather “real” terrorist suspects. 31 should thus be a clear separation between the judiciary and the other powers of the state, i.e. The intimate relationship between the police the legislative and executive powers, and the and the Ben Ali regime was also shown latter should not intervene in the workings of during the popular uprisings of late the courts. 2010/early 2011. Whereas the military, as argued above, practically took the side of the The Tunisian justice system under Ben Ali, protesters against the regime and refused to by contrast, was tightly controlled by the move against the demonstrators, the Tunisian executive power, i.e. the Presidency and the police have been accused of serious human Justice Ministry, and it was widely perceived rights violations, and in particular of using as rife with cronyism and corruption. Not disproportionate force in suppressing the anti- unlike the police, the judiciary was an regime uprising. According to UN estimates important pillar of Ben Ali’s authoritarian around 300 people were killed and more than regime, in that it served both to neutralize 700 injured during the protests, with the large political opponents and to secure the financial majority of victims assumed to have died interests of individuals close to the Tunisian from gun shots fired by the police. 32 president. The justice system played a key

role in sentencing dissidents, in particular suspected Islamists, to harsh prison sentences Instrumentalised justice system under the country’s sweeping anti-terrorism Another element of the Tunisian security legislation, and courts were also regularly sector which was thoroughly instrumentalised manipulated by big businessmen close to Ben by the Ben Ali regime is the judiciary. From Ali to protect their shoddy financial deals. 33 an SSR perspective, a country’s judicial The main institutional mechanism through

31 US Diplomatic cables published by Wikileaks which the regime exercised its control over describe Tunisian intelligence services ‘ “obsession” the judiciary was the Supreme Council of with fighting political opponents, and how this has hampered intelligence sharing efforts with western Magistrates ( Conseil supérieur de la countries, See US Embassy to Tunisia, “European magistrature ), which is its highest oversight envoys vent frustration with Tunisian government”, 11.12.2009 (Wikileaks - 09TUNIS901). body responsible for appointing, promoting

32 Human Rights Watch, “Tunisia: Hold Police 33 Accountable for Shootings”, Tunis, 29.1.2011. Hibou, op.cit ., pp. 116-123.

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and sanctioning of judges. While in a liberal the country’s dictator? As mentioned democratic states this would be an previously, the prospects of reforming a independent institution composed (mainly) of country’s security sector also crucially depend elected judges, the Tunisian Supreme Council on the nature of the political system more of Magistrates was entirely dominated by the broadly, and in particular the extent to which executive power. The Council was presided it is governed by democratic principles. Since by Ben Ali himself, and the majority of its the departure of Ben Ali, Tunisia has members were either members of the undertaken some significant steps towards government or nominated by the democratization, the most important of which government. 34 Moreover, the Tunisian has been the holding of the country’s first free President had the authority to appoint judges, elections in October 2011 at which a based on recommendations of the Council. 35 Constituent Assembly was elected. The Given that there have been no objective Constituent Assembly, whose main task is to criteria regulating the promotion of judges, draft a new Constitution, also put in place a their careers were entirely dependent on the new (interim) government under the extent to which they served the interests of leadership of the moderately Islamist party the regime, and judges who dared speak out Ennahda, which gained the largest share of against the country’s leadership were severely votes (41%). However, as Ennahda failed to punished. 36 achieve an absolute majority, it has formed a governing coalition—the so-called troika—

with two secular centre-left parties, CPR SSR challenges in the post-Ben Ali period (Congrès pour le République ) and Ettakatol. What have been the main security sector The elections were monitored by several reform challenges in Tunisia after the fall of international and non-governmental

34 Article 6 of Law No. 67-29 of 14.7.1967. organizations, and were widely perceived as having been fair and transparent. Even though 35 Article 10 of Law No. 67 of 14.7.1967. Tunisia cannot yet be described as 36 For a more detailed discussion of the lack of judicial independence in Tunisia, see Euro-Mediterranean “consolidated” democracy, and the nature of Human Rights Network, Tunisie – L’indépendance et the Tunisia’s future political system remains l’impartialité du système judiciare , Copenhagen, 2008 ; Tunisia Monitoring Group, Behind the Facade : How a unclear at this point, including the extent to Politicised Judiciary and Administrative Sanctions which its security sector will be subject to undermine Tunisian Human Rights , Report from the civilian and democratic oversight, it can 7th IFEX-TMG Mission to Tunisia, 9 June 2010.

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nevertheless be said to have successfully assuming a stronger internal role. Since the achieved its “transition” from authoritarian to downfall of the Tunisian dictator, the armed democratic rule. 37 forces have indeed become much more visible; during the first weeks after Ben Ali’s In the following the main SSR-related efforts overthrow, when the police largely in post-Ben Ali Tunisia are discussed, looking disappeared from the streets, security was again at three key elements of the country’s mainly provided by the military. security sector: the military, the police and the Subsequently, the army was also called out to judiciary. deal with the refugee crisis from neighboring

Libya, and to ensure public security during Military reform the parliamentary elections of October 2011.

Given the largely apolitical nature of the However, even though the military has Tunisian armed forces and its distance from remained present in the streets of Tunis and the former regime, military reform has elsewhere, and General Ammar has generally not been seen as an urgent need in practically achieved the status of a national the post-Ben Ali period. In the immediate hero in Tunisia, there have been no signs that aftermath of Ben Ali’s departure there were, the armed forces would seek a more however, some concerns that the Tunisian prominent domestic role. Indeed, both the military might be tempted to exploit the transition government and the military ensuing instability to its advantage by leadership have publicly declared that the armed forces were not interested in political 37 Alfred Stepan, “Tunisia’s Transition and the Twin Tolerations”, Journal of Democracy , vol. 23, no. 2 power, and that they would remain strictly (April 2012), pp. 98-103. Stepan lists the following four within the framework of the Tunisian criteria for a successful transition to democracy: (1) an 38 agreement on procedures to elect a government, (2) constitution. Notably, the relatively the election of a government through free and fair uncontroversial and apolitical nature of the elections, (3) the government’s de facto authority to generate new policies, and (4) the elected authorities’ Tunisian armed forces has also been manifest ability to rule without having to share power with in the fact that the only minister not to be other institutions, such as military or religious leaders. Tunisia can be said to fulfil all of these criteria. 38 « Apparition du Général Rachid Ammar place de la As for the nature of Tunisia’s future political system, Kasbah », Tunivision s, 24.1.2011 ; « De fausses the current governing coalition is divided, with informations qui portent préjudice à l’ordre public », Ennahda favouring a parliamentary system, and the La Presse , 6.5.2011, and « Tunisie : l’armée nationale other two parties preferring a mixed or semi- n’est pas intéressée par le pouvoir », Investir en presidential system. Tunisie , 10.5.2011.

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replaced throughout the transition period, and improve their precarious material situation, as even after Ennahda’s electoral victory in late the insufficiency of their current financial 2011, has been the minister of defense, and resources and equipment would become more that there has been no (significant) reshuffling apparent.40 of the military hierarchy since the departure While the armed forces have thus remained of Ben Ali.39 silent with respect to their position under the In line with their image as “la grande new Tunisian constitution, some retired muette ”, the Tunisian armed forces have military officers have expressed themselves themselves thus far not made any public on the topic, possibly acting as unofficial statements regarding their role under the spokesmen of the military.41 They have called future Tunisian Constitution. However, it can in particular for enshrining the role of the be assumed that they would be unlikely to armed forces in the Tunisian constitution, in oppose the establishment of civilian and order to prevent its instrumentalisation by the democratic control over the armed forces, political leadership, and for more consultation given the military’s inherently “republican” of the military on national defense and other self-understanding, and given that this would military issues. 42 One proposal put forward by hardly change its position within the Tunisian a former deputy chief of staff of the armed political system. As mentioned above, even forces has been to create consultative bodies under Ben Ali (and Bourgiba), the armed composed of high ranking military officers forces were subject to a form of civilian which would advise the political authorities control, even if this control was not democratic in nature. Indeed, the Tunisian military seems to view the establishment of 40 Author interview with DCAF representative in Tunis greater accountability and transparency vis-à- (by telephone), 2 July 2012. vis the civilian authorities also as a way to 41 « Boubaker Ben Kraiem », Maghreb Confidential , No. 988, 6.10.2011.

39 Throughout the transition period, Abdelkrim Zbidi 42 « Quelle place pour l’armée dans la constitution has held the post of minister of defense. Zbidi even tunisienne », Afkar, 30.3.2012 ; « Vers un rôle (briefly) occupied a ministerial post (minister of constitutionnel élevé de l’armée », Le Presse , health) under Ben Ali in 2001. General Ammar was 31.10.2011. The (former) Tunisian constitution promoted by the first transition government to the contains only three articles on the armed forces, post of Joint Chief of Staff of the Tunisian armed which stipulate the President’s powers to hire military forces for his role during the popular uprising, and has personnel (Art. 45) and to declare war (Art. 49), as remained in this position under the Ennahda-led well as his position as Supreme Commander of the government. Armed Forces (Art. 46).

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on military and national defense issues. 43 by offering higher wages. 45 Moreover, the While this would arguably imply a stronger salaries of professional military officers have implication of the military on decisions also been increased, as they have been related to national defense—compared to its considered too low by the transition sidelining under Ben Ali—the author of the government. 46 proposal has himself underscored that ultimate authority on these matters should be Police reform vested in the democratically elected civilian authorities, and that the armed forces would While military reform has thus not been a play a merely consultative role.44 major issue in Tunisia after the fall of Ben Ali, the opposite is true of the country’s It is also noteworthy that while security sector internal security system. Given the oppressive reforms in most states of the MENA region nature of the Tunisian police and its centrality would require a downsizing of the armed to the Ben Ali regime, reforming the forces, which are often overblown, and a country’s internal security apparatus has limitation of economic and other privileges of commonly been seen as one of the key the military establishment, in Tunisia challenges of the post-Ben Ali period. Both practically the opposite has been the case. As the initial transitional government under Béji mentioned previously, the Tunisian armed Caïd Essebsi and the Ennahda-led forces have been kept lean by the Ben Ali government have, at least in principle, regime, and their manpower has generally committed themselves to transforming the been considered too small to deal with the Tunisian police into a “republican” police challenges of the post-Ben Ali period. Efforts force which would serve the interests of the have thus been made by the transitional nation and its citizens rather than the regime government to attract more military recruits in power, and which should operate strictly on the basis of the rule of law. Moreover, the

43 Boubaker Benkraiem, “La spécifité de l’armée Tunisian government has also established tunisienne (II)”, La Presse , 15.10.2011. partnerships with international agencies such 44 Author interview with former Deputy Chief of Staff of Tunisian Armed Forces, Tunis, 19 April 2012. The first draft of the new Constitution which was 45 “L'armée tunisienne offre une prime au completed in August 2012 does, however, not contain recrutement », Magharebia , 16.6.2011. any specific regulations regarding the function or control of the Tunisian armed forces, apart from the 46 Author interview with Tunisian military officers, war-making powers of the president and the Tunis, 18-19 April 2012. parliament (Art. 50 of draft Constitution).

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as the Development Program by the first transitional government when it (UNDP) and Geneva Centre for Democratic nominated the politically independent Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) in the area magistrate Farhat Rajhi—commonly referred of internal security reform. to as “ Monsieur propre ” (“Mister Clean”)—to

International actors involved in this area the post of Interior Minister. However, Rajhi typically point out that reforming Tunisia’s was quickly confronted with fierce opposition police forces will require changes at at least from within the Interior Ministry: only a few three levels. First, at the legislative level, days after his appointment a mob of some there is a need to establish clearer regulations 2,000 – 3,000 youngsters invaded the Interior for practically all areas of police work and Ministry, threatening Rajhi, who reportedly 49 organization, as well as to abolish repressive only narrowly managed to escape. In laws of the former regime. 47 Second, at the response, Minister Rajhi, who blamed the attacks on supporters of the old regime within institutional level, reforms should focus on the Interior Ministry, sacked 42 high-level the establishment of greater transparency and officials from his ministry. 50 accountability of police forces. Finally, there Shortly is a need to change the “culture” of police thereafter, Rajhi also announced the forces from a culture of repression and abuse dissolution of the aforementioned “political with impunity to a culture of the rule of law police”, although observers, including 48 Tunisian police officers themselves, have and respect of citizens’ rights. Thus far, suggested that this has been a largely however, reforms of the Tunisian police have symbolic act, given that under Ben Ali remained rather limited, and events since the practically the entire Tunisian police acted as demise of Ben Ali have also shown the a “political police” in that a key task was to difficulties in transforming the country’s collect information on political opponents.51 internal security apparatus.

An initial impetus towards reforming 49 « Ben Ali’s Ghost Haunts the Interior Ministry », Tunisia’s internal security system was given Maghreb Confidential , No. 957, 1.2.2011, « Tunisie : le ministre de l'Intérieur déjoue une tentative de déstabilisation de l'État », Jeune Afrique , 2.2.2012. 47 An often-mentioned law in this regard is the Law on 50 “Farhat Rajhi, ministre de l’Intérieur dévoile une Public Meetings (No.69-4 of 24.1.1969), which gives dangereuse situation de défaillance sécuritaire dans le the authorities wide-ranging powers in forbidding and pays », Tunisia Watch , 2.2.2011. suppressing demonstrations. 51 Author interview with Tunisian police officers and 48 Author interview with DCAF representatives, Tunis, human rights activists, Tunis, 19-21 April. It is also 21 April 2012. noteworthy that no formal regulation on the dissolution of the political police has been issued by

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Rajhi’s reform efforts, however, came to a improve the public image of the police.54 rather abrupt halt when he was forced to step Under Interior Minister Essid, a white book down after a mere two months in office, on police reform was, however, drafted. The apparently as a result of both resistance within white book, which is entitled “Security and the Interior Ministry, and a lack of support development: towards security in the service from Tunisia’s interim prime minister Essebsi of democracy” (“sécurité et développement: for Rajhi’s reform efforts.52 Rajhi’s vers une sécurité au service de la replacement by Habib Essid, who held several démocratie” ), was intended as a roadmap for high-level positions under Ben Ali, including transforming the police from an instrument of within the Interior Ministry, seemed to authoritarian repression into an institution at suggest a backtracking on police reforms by the service of the citizens. It focuses on a the interim government. 53 number of aspects of police reform, including better training of police officers, the Apart from these dismissals of high-ranking introduction of a police code of ethics, greater officials (and the dissolution of the political transparency of police work, a clearer police), reforms of the country’s internal regulation of disciplinary measures, security forces by the first interim decentralization of the police, and a stronger government have been rather limited, and control and accountability of the country’s some changes have seemed more cosmetic in intelligence agencies. 55 nature. In late March 2011, for example a However, the white strategy aimed at improving communication book has never been made public, and none of between the police and the citizens, including its recommendations seem to have been 56 a facebook page, was launched, and a new implemented so far. Moreover, the current uniform was introduced in an effort to Ennahda-led government seems to regard it

54 the transition government, so that also from a legal « Consécration d’une nouvelle culture de l’action perspective the validity of the act remains unclear. See sécuritaire », Le Temps, 20.3.2011 ; « Déficit de “La fin de la police politique tunisienne: mythe ou communication à combler », Le Temps , 7.10.2011. The réalité?”, Nawaat, 7.5.2011. facebook page of the Interior Ministry can be found at : 52 “New twist in purge saga”, Maghreb Confidential , http://www.facebook.com/ministere.interieur.tunisie. No. 966, 31 March 2011; « Tunisie : Farhat Rajhi, le ministre de l'Intérieur « Monsieur propre" a été 55 « Le livre blanc sur la sécurité prône une sécurité au limogé », Jeune Afrique , 28.3.2011. service de la démocratie », TAP , 6.12.2011. 53 Habib Essid served as Chef de Cabinet of the Interior 56 Author interview with Tunisian police officers and Ministry from 1997 – 2000. interior Ministry officials, Tunis, 19-21 April 2012.

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largely as a product of the old regime, and is The massive overestimation of their numbers thus unlikely to give it much attention. 57 seems to have been mainly a consequence of Tunisian police officers’ excessively long It is also noteworthy that the challenge of working hours and very arduous working police reform in the post-Ben Ali period has conditions. According to interviews turned out to be of a somewhat different conducted with Tunisian policemen by this nature from what might have originally been author, police officers worked on overage 12 expected, in the sense that the commonly held or even more hours per day, whereby they perception of the Tunisian police as an typically fulfilled various functions, ranging oversized and all-powerful “Moloch” has from traffic police to public order tasks to proven somewhat misleading. While it is of monitoring political opponents, during the course true that the police served as Ben Ali’s same day. 60 main instrument of repression, the extent to In addition, police officers in which policemen themselves—at least below Tunisia were poorly paid, with an average the higher echelons—were oppressed and salary of around 230 USD per month, which exploited by the former regime has become was less than the wage of a bus driver, and increasingly clear, as they have begun to only around half of that of a lower-level bank 61 speak out about their working conditions employee. Thus, instead of downsizing the 58 police, the transition government rather during the Ben Ali period. The recruited an additional 10,000 police officers aforementioned estimates of the number of in an effort to relieve their workload, and policemen in Tunisia are telling in this policemen have also received a (modest) pay respect. Rather than counting 150,000 or even rise. 62 200,000 police officers, as was commonly assumed, the transition government discovered that the real number of policemen ministre de L’Intérieur dévoile une dangereuse 59 in Tunisia was much lower, around 50,000. situation de défaillance sécuritaire dans le pays », Tunisia Watch , 2.2.2011.

60 57 Querine Hanlon, “Security Sector Reform in Tunisia. Author interview with Tunisian police officers, Tunis, A Year after the Jasmine Revolution”, United States 18-21 April 2012. Institute of Peace Special Report , N. 304, March 2012; 61 « Quels salaires gagnent les Tunisiens ?», Business “Que de revers pour nos policiers !”, La Presse , News , 29.1.2010. 22.8.2012. 62 “Tunisie – Renforts de 10,000 policiers dans les 58 One such account is Tahar Ben Youssef, op.cit.. prochains mois (Intérieur)”, TAP , 24.9.2011 ; « La Tunisie augmente les salaires de la police », Kapitalis , 59 The figure of 50,000 was first announced by the 11.8.2011. interim Interior Minister Rajhi, see « Farhat Rajhi,

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Given their difficult working conditions, there example, has submitted its own roadmap for seems to have been wide-spread reforming the country’s internal security dissatisfaction among the Tunisian police, at system to the Interior Minister. The Union has least below its higher echelons, and little demanded in particular the establishment of a identification with the Ben Ali regime. As clearer legal framework for all aspects of recounted by one former National Guard police work, ranging from recruitment, officer: “the majority of policemen were very promotions, training, remuneration to the dissatisfied under Ben Ali, and they enforced carrying out of police operations, as well as orders against their convictions”. 63 Tunisian the drafting of a police code of ethics. 66 police officers’ anger with the former regime Another organization which represents mainly was expressed for the first time in public only the higher cadres of the Tunisian police, and a few days after Ben Ali’s departure, when which has also been a vocal actor in the police the first ever demonstration by policemen in reform debate is the Tunisian Association for Tunisia was held. Chanting “policiers a Citizens’ Police ( Association tunisienne opprimés, policiers sacrifiés” (“oppressed pour une police citoyenne ). One of the main policemen, sacrificed policemen") in front of demands of this organization has been to the transition government, policemen called enshrine the principle of police neutrality in for better working conditions, higher wages as the new Tunisian constitution, in order to well as the right to form unions. 64 The first prevent the police from being two police unions were indeed established in instrumentalised by the political leadership of the course of 2011, and they have themselves the country. 67 become vocal advocates of reforms of the While the initial transitional government has country’s security sector. 65 One of these thus not undertaken any major overhaul of the unions, the National Union of Tunisian country’s internal security system, the same Security Forces ( Union nationale des can thus far be said of the Ennahda-led syndicats des forces de sureté tunisienne ), for government which came to power in late

2011, despite the fact the many of its 63 Ben Youssef, op.cit ., p. 96 (author translation). 66 Union nationale des syndicats des forces de sureté 64 “La «Caravane de la libération» est arrivée à Tunis », tunisienne, « Reforme du secteur de la sécurité », Le Figaro , 23.1.2011 ; « Tunisie: des policiers undated document., « Proposals to reform the demandent à pouvoir former un syndicat », Le Nouvel security system » (in ), undated document. Observateur , 21.1.2011. 67 Author interview with Head of Association 65 “Pour son nouveau syndicat, la police tunisienne ne tunisienne pour une police citoyenne , Tunis, 20 April doit pas être le bouc émissaire », Afrik.com , 12.5.2011. 2012.

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members are former political prisoners and from within his ministry against efforts to have themselves experienced severe abuses at purge officials close to the former regime. the hands of the police. The Interior Minister When in January 2012 Lareyedh tried to sack Ali Larayedh, for example, spent 15 years in the Head of the so-called Intervention jail for his membership of the Ennahda Brigades ( Brigades d’intervention ), Moncef movement, ten of which in solitary Laajimi, who has been accused of issuing confinement, where he was tortured and orders to fire upon protesters during the anti- suffered other forms of serious regime uprising, as well as during the earlier mistreatment. 68 Gafsa revolt of 2008, several hundred of Laajimi’s supporters staged a sit-in in front of Unsurprisingly, the relationship between the Interior Ministry. 70 Interior Minister Lareyedh and his ministry In response, Larayedh has been an uneasy one, given that one of the backtracked considerably: instead of Interior Ministry’s main missions under Ben dismissing Laajimi, he promoted him to the Ali was to fight Islamist movements such as position of deputy chief of Cabinet within the 71 Ennahda. This became evident only shortly Interior Ministry. Moreover, it is commonly after Lareyedh took office when a video agreed among both police unions and human purportedly showing Larayedh having rights organizations in Tunisia that several homosexual intercourse while serving his Ben Ali cronies remain in important positions prison sentence was posted on YouTube and within the Interior Ministry, including at its 72 other sites. It is commonly believed that the highest levels. video was fabricated and released by Ben Ali loyalists within the Interior Ministry with the 70 « General Director of Security Units Moncef Laajimi aim of discrediting Lareyedh. 69 Moreover, is Dismissed”, Tunisia Live , 10.1.2012. 71 Larayedh, as well, has faced stiff resistance “Moncef Laajimi: « Je suis innocent du sang des Martyrs et mon passé en témoigne » Tunisie 68 “Portrait de Ali Larayedh, futur ministre de Numérique , 14.1.2012. l’Intérieur dans le Gouvernement de Jebali », Tunisie 72 Numérique , 20.12.2011. Author interview with Tunisian police officers and representatives of human rights organisations, Tunis, 69 “Release of Unauthenticated Prison-Sex Video Denounced in Defense of Tunisian Interior Minister”, 19-20 April 2012. The names most commonly Tunisia Live , 19.1.2012. It was a common practice of mentioned officials include Nabil Abid, who is Director the Ben Ali regime to discredit political opponents, of National Security ( Directeur de la Sûreté Nationale ) and in particular Islamists, through fabricated and thus No. 2 of the Interior Ministry, and Taoufik pornographic videos and by spreading rumours about Dimassi, the Head of Public Security ( Sûreté Publique ). their “abnormal” sexual behaviour. See Lise Garon, Le See also “Tunisie. La police s’insurge contre… le Silence Tunisien. Les alliances dangereuses au gouvernement”, Kapitalis , 6.9.2011 . Maghreb (Paris: Harmattan, 1998), pp. 224-225.

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Even more importantly, however, the decrees regulating the organization and Ennahada government has thus far not activities of the police have thus far been undertaken any broader, structural reforms of made public. Moreover, Tunisian civil rights the country’s internal security apparatus, nor activists argue that the involvement of civil set out a (publicly available) roadmap on how society in the reform process has generally such reforms would be achieved, even though declined under the Ennahda government Interior Minister Larayedh, too, has publicly compared to the first transition government, highlighted the need to bring Tunisia’s when there was at least a certain degree of internal security system in line with the exchange between the Interior Ministry and requirements of a democratic regime. 73 To be civil society organizations on security sector sure, there have been at least some reform issues.75 Finally, it should be noted improvements in the field of transparency, for that repressive laws of the previous regime, example. Apart from the aforementioned including for example, the Law on Public facebook page, the Interior Ministry has Meetings (Law No. 69-4 of 24.1.1969), which recently also launched an official webpage, gives the government far-reaching powers in although the information it provides remains forbidding and suppressing public gatherings, very rudimentary. 74 Moreover, Minister as well as the State of Emergency remain in Larayedh has regularly been called to testify place. 76 in front of the Constitutional Assembly on There are at least two possible explanations important events or developments related to for the Ennahda-led government’s cautious or the country’s internal security situation, hesitant approach to reforming the country’s suggesting at least an element of police apparatus so far. On the one hand, the parliamentary oversight and accountability in government might be wary that more far- this area. reaching reforms could lead to a Nevertheless, despite these improvements destabilization of the country’s internal transparency of the Interior Ministry remains security system, during a time in which limited. For example, none of the secret Tunisia is already going through a considerable degree of internal turmoil, and 73 See, e.g.,“Main de fer dans un gant de velours? », Le Temps , 9.3.2012. 75 74 “Reforming Tunisia’s Internal Security Apparatus”, Tunisia Live , 10.6.2012. http://www.tunisie.gov.tn/index.php?option=com_mi 76 Human Rights Watch, Tunisia’s Repressive Laws. The nisteres&Itemid=382&task=view&id=34&lang=french Reform Agenda , November 2011.

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the lack of security is a major concern among Ennahda government leaving the former the population. 77 As a consequence, the regime’s internal security apparatus largely Ennahda government has decided to proceed intact allows it to use Ben Ali’s “machinery” very slowly with security sector reforms, for its own purposes, while old regime figures pursing it more as a long-term objective.78 are able to maintain at least some of their former privileges. 79 On the other hand, a more negative explanation, which is not without plausibility, Whichever explanation is correct, the absence has been suggested by a number of of far-reaching reforms of the country’s stakeholders in Tunisia, including civil rights internal security system thus far seems to organizations and even the police unions. have been manifest in the behavior of the They argue that the Ennahda-led government Tunisian police since the downfall of the has entered into a kind of alliance or at least country’s dictator. As has been documented an accommodation with remnants of the old by both international and Tunisian civil rights regime within the Interior Ministry, which is organizations, human rights abuses to the advantage of both parties: for the committed by the police have continued on a considerable scale into the post-Ben Ali

77 Opinion polls conducted in Tunisia during the period. These have included in particular the transition period do not give a clear picture on the population’s perception of the country’s security use of disproportionate force in dispersing situation. According to polls carried out by the demonstrations, but also arbitrary arrests and International Republican Institute, there has been a clear improvement since the fall of Ben Ali: whereas in even torture seem to remain a common March 2011, 70% of respondents mentioned “internal security” as one of the country’s biggest problems, by 79 Author interview with representatives of Tunisian January 2012, the figure had dropped to 16%. See, police unions, as well as of Ligue Tunisienne des Droits International Republican Institute, “Survey of Tunisian de l’homme , and Centre de Justice Transitionelle , Public Opinion, 5-18 March 2011, and 24December, Tunis, 19-21 April, 2012. The role of the Tunisian 2011 - 6 January 2012, available at: businessman Kamel Eltaief, who was once almost http://digest.electionguide.org/2012/03/11/iri-survey- viewed as the country’s second president, until he fell on-tunisian-public-opinion/ . However, according to a out with Ben Ali after his marriage with Leila Trabelsi, poll conducted by SIGMA in April 2012, a majority is often seen as key in the post-Ben Ali period. Eltaief (57%) of respondents considered that the current has traditionally maintained close ties to the interior government has not been able to establish security ministry, and several current high-level officials are and stability in the country. See “Sondage – 100 jours said to be closely connected to Eltaief. See “Questions du Gouvernement Jebali – Chômage: C’est l’échec over Eltaief’s murky role”, Maghreb Confidential No. pour 85,8% des personnes interrogées », Direct Info , 971, 12.5.2011; “Abid seeks arrangement with 3.4.2012. Islamists”, Maghreb Confidential , No. 1019, 24.5.2012; 78 This explanation has been suggested, for example Sami Ben Abdalla, “Confidentiel: Le Rôle de Kamel by the International Crisis Group, see International Eltaief sous le government de Bej Caid Essebsi”, at: Crisis Group, Tunisie : lutter contre l’impunité, http://www.samibenabdallah.info/2012/04/17/confid restaurer la sécurité, Rapport Moyen-Orient/Afrique entiel-le-role-de-kamel-eltaief-sous-le-gouvernement- du Nord Report N°123, 9.5. 2012, p. 14-17. beji-caid-essebsi/ .

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practice.80 One widely publicized incident of Tunis. 82 The Ennahda government has a violent crackdown on a peaceful repeatedly stood accused of not doing enough demonstration occurred in early April 2012, to prevent such acts, even though it has when the Tunisian police forcefully verbally condemned them. Second, human intervened against a gathering rights organizations have denounced the commemorating “Martyrs’ Day” on avenue police for the increasing harassment of Bourgiba which—ironically—had been the women for “indecent” clothing or other main theatre of the . In the purportedly “immoral” behavior. This too has event, at least 15 demonstrators were been seen at least by some as indicative of wounded by security forces, and many have Ennhada’s efforts to instrumentalise the viewed the incident as a return to the practices police for its own purposes. 83 of the old regime.81 On the other hand, it would also be an Moreover, observers have also pointed to a exaggeration to argue that nothing has renewed bias, and even a political changed in the relationship between the police instrumentalisation, of police interventions and the citizenry since the fall of the former since Ennahda came to power. This has regime. Clearly, the Tunisian population has concerned in particular the seeming tolerance become (much) more assertive in dealing with by the police of violent acts committed by the police, and there is no longer the same radical Islamists (Salafists). Salafist-inspired degree of fear of the formerly all-powerful violence has generally been on the rise in the 82 The last event occurred in the context of the wide- post-Ben Ali period, involving, for example, spread outrage across the Arab world against the film “Innocence of Muslim”, an excerpt of which was attacks on restaurants selling alcohol, posted on Youtube. harassment of journalists and artists or, most 83 One widely publicised incident took place in September 2012, when a young woman was allegedly recently, an attack on the US Embassy in raped by three police officers. Even though the three police officers have subsequently been charged with rape, the Tunisian Interior Ministry has justified their behaviour arguing that they found the woman together with her fiancé in an “immoral position” in a 80 Fédération Internationale des ligues des droits de car. Moreover, the woman herself has subsequently l’homme, La Tunisie post Ben Ali face aux démons du been charged with committing “indecent behaviour”. passé : Transition démocratique et persistance de See “Tunisia: Woman allegedly raped by police faces violations graves des droits de l’homme , July 2011 ; prosecution”, Amnesty International, 27.9.2012; Amnesty International, « Tunisian authorities must investigate new torture allegations », 16.5.2012. “Tunisie : Ennahdha responsable des agressions policières contre les femmes?”, Jeune Afrique , 81 “Police clash with anti-government protesters in 27.9.2012. Central Tunis”, Reuters , 9.4.2012.

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police officer. One manifestation of this new years.86 The EU, as well, has long been attitude towards the police among the involved in justice reform projects in Tunisia, population can be seen in the considerable and in the aftermath of Ben Ali’s overthrow number of attacks against policemen which the EU has stepped up its activities in this have taken police in the post-Ben period, area.87 However, also in the field of judicial some of which with deadly consequences. reform achievements have thus far been rather According to statistics released by the modest, and not unlike police reforms, have Tunisian Interior Ministry, since the departure focused mainly on purges rather than on of Ben Ali fifteen policemen have died and structural reforms of the judiciary. almost 1,500 severely injured as a result of Since the departure of Ben Ali Tunisian aggressions committed against the police. 84 magistrates have also created their first ever union, the Union of Tunisian Magistrates (Syndicat des Magistrats Tunisiens ), which Judicial reform and transitional represents the interests of magistrates vis-à- justice vis the authorities, and which similarly to the Another important SSR challenge of the post- police unions, has became a vocal advocate of Ben Ali period has been the reform of the reforms of the judiciary, in particular of the country’s justice system. It is commonly principle of judicial independence. The most agreed that an independent judiciary which is important institutional change which would free of cronyism and corruption would be an be needed to strengthen the independence of essential element in Tunisia’s transition the Tunisian justice system and loosen the towards democracy, and both the Ennahda-led executive’s grip on the judiciary would be the government and Tunisian judges themselves reform of the aforementioned Supreme have declared the establishment of an Council of Magistrates. However, even independent judiciary as a key objective. 85 In though the Ennahda-led government has in contrast to the field of police reform, the principle agreed to replace the former Ennahda government has also laid out a Supreme Council of Magistrates with an relatively detailed roadmap covering various 86 Ministère de la Justice , Programme d’Action, 2012- aspects of judicial reform over the next four 2016 ; available at : http://www.e- justice.tn/fileadmin/fichiers_site_francais/actualites/P 84 “Que de revers pour nos policiers ! », Le Presse , rogramme_d_action_2012-2016.pdf . 22.8.2012. 87 In 2012, the EU launched an additional 15 million 85 « Tunisian judges call for reform », Magharebia , EUR programme aimed at modernizing the Tunisian 7.5.2012. justice system.

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independent institution, by mid-2012 such a able to defend their cases individually.90 body had still not been created. Thus, not unlike police reforms, reforms of the judiciary have thus far been largely On the other hand, the Ennahda government limited to purges rather than transformations has in some ways acted in manners of the system as such, and they have been reminiscent of the old regime in that is has carried out to a large extent unilaterally by the ordered a large number of transfers and executive power, thereby—ironically— dismissals of judges, reportedly without repeating the practices of the former regime. consultation of the magistrates concerned. Thus, according to the Tunisian observatory Linked to the issue of judicial reform has of the Independence of the Judiciary been the one of transitional justice, the (Observatoire tunisien de l'indépendance de objective of which is to redress human rights la justice ) between December 2011 and April violations by the former regime, both prior 2012, the government transferred 100 judges and during the popular uprising of late to new positions, whereby in the large 2011/early 2012. 91 Needless to say that majority of cases (70%), this was done without a truly independent judiciary, no without taking into account the views of the meaningful and credible prosecution of affected magistrates.88 Moreover, in late May crimes committed by the former regime 2012, the government sacked 81 judges who would be possible. Also in this regard, the were considered corrupt, again however Ennahada-led government has, at least in without notifying them in writing nor principle, declared its commitment to specifying the allegations against them. 89 achieving transitional justice, as evidenced in When in response to these dismissals the particular by the creation of a separate Union of Tunisian Magistrates declared a Ministry on Human Rights and Transitional general strike, the government however Justice, arguably the first of its kind. A decree agreed that the dismissed judges would be providing for compensation of the so-called

90 “Les magistrats tunisiens mettent fin à leur grève », Kapitalis , 30.5.2012.

91 For an overview of the issue of transitional justice in 88 “Rapport de l’Observatoire Tunisien pour Tunisia, see Maaike Voorhoeve, “Transitional justice in l’indépendance de la magistrature: Les craintes sont post-revolutionary Tunisia: what ‘justice’ means in the confirmées… », Realités , 10.5.2012 ; « La reforme est- Tunisian context of dealing with the past”, available elle mal barrée ? », La Presse , 5.5.2012. at: 89 “L’AMT, le SMT et l'Observatoire tunisien de http://brismes2012.files.wordpress.com/2012/03/ma l'indépendance de la justice condamnent la révocation aike-voorhoeve-transitional-justice-in-post- de 81 magistrats », Business News , 27.5.2012. revolutionary-tunisia.pdf .

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martyrs of the revolution (and their families), tortured and otherwise mistreated by the i.e. people killed or injured during the popular country’ security forces under Ben Ali’s uprising, has also been enacted, and a special reign, but torture victims of the former regime committee responsible for establishing an certainly number in the thousands.94 So far, official list of “martyrs” has been set up. In however, there has been only one significant May 2012 the committee submitted its final trial against officials for torture committed report, according to which 338 persons were during Ben Ali’s reign, the so called Baraket killed and 2,147 injured during the anti- Essahel case. This concerned an alleged coup regime uprising. 92 However, there have so far attempt in 1991 by army officers, who after only been very few trials against officials being arrested, were severely mistreated by considered responsible for the killings of Tunisian security officers. A number of high- demonstrators. In May 2012, two policemen level officials of the former regime have been received 20-year prison sentences for the sentenced for torturing the army officers, shooting of a protestor, and subsequently Ben including Ben Ali himself, the Interior Ali himself, as well as his last Interior Ministry at the time, Abdallah Kallel, and the Minister Rafik Belhaj Kacem, were sentenced then-Head of State Security, Mohamed Ali (Ben Ali in absentia) to 20 and 12 years Ganzoui. Notably, however, while Ben Ali respectively for complicity in the killings of received a five year prison sentence, the two demonstrators.93 others were jailed for merely two years, which given the severity of the crime, seems An even more daunting transitional justice like a rather lenient sentence.95 challenge will be to address the widespread human rights violations committed by Another important issue in the context of officials prior to the anti-regime uprising, transitional justice has been the disclosure of during Ben Ali’s more than 20 years in the archives of the “political police”, which power. It is not known how many people were 94 For the period 2003-2008 alone, the two Tunisian human rights organizations Association de lutte contre la torture en Tunisie and the Comité pour le respect 92 “La Comission Bouderbala présente son rapport des libertés et des droits de l’hommes en Tunisie have final: elle a recensé 338 morts et 2147 blessés”, documented more than 1250 torture victims under Leaders , 4.5.2012. the country’s anti-terror legisation. See Association de 93 lutte contre la torture en Tunisie et Comité pour le “Two Policemen Sentenced to 20 Years in Jail for respect des libertés et des droits de l’hommes en Killing Protester During Revolution”, Tunisia Live , Tunisie, La torture en Tunisie et la loi «antiterroriste» 1.5.2012; “Ben Ali : Prison à vie, Seriati – Friaa – du 10 décembre 2003 (Tunis/Paris, 2008). Laajimi : Acquittés, Rafik Haj Kacem : 12 ans de 95 Baraket Essahel affair : Tunisia ousted president prison”, Tunivisions , 14.6.2012. loses appeal », Middle East Online , 7.4.2012.

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could serve as documentary evidence for the about the Ennahda government’s true human rights violations committed by the commitment to achieving transitional justice. former regime. In November 2011, an international conference was held in Tunis Conclusions with the participation of both civil society organizations and the Tunisian Interior It seems clear that security sector reform is a Ministry, where experiences on how to deal key challenge in the current transformations with such archives of other countries which which are sweeping across much of the Arab have transited from authoritarian to world, or what is commonly referred to as the democratic rule were discussed. 96 Even Arab “spring” or “awakening”. Given the though the Ennahada government has crucial role security institutions have played underlined the importance of opening up the in sustaining authoritarian regimes in the archives of the political police in order to region, any transformation towards more shed light on the abuses committed by the democratic rule will necessarily also have to former regime, by mid-2012 the fate of these include these countries’ security sectors. archives remained unclear, and there has been Without bringing security forces under growing popular frustration about the civilian and democratic control and government’s lack of concrete measures in accountability, and subjecting them to the rule this area.97 Thus, while at least some steps of law, any progress towards democratization towards dealing with the human rights would be incomplete. violations committed by the former regime While this is true for all countries of the have been undertaken since the fall of Ben MENA region, the specific security sector Ali, also in this regard progress has been reform challenges differ considerably from rather slow, and civil rights organizations one country to the next. The discussion of the have increasingly expressed their doubts case of Tunisia suggests the main SSR challenge since the fall of the country’s

dictator have been the reform of its internal 96 “Tunisie : les archives de la police politique, un défi security system and the judiciary, while in pour la transition démocratique ? », Investir en Tunisie , 15.11.2011. contrast to most other countries of the region, 97 “Veut-on escamoter la justice transitionelle?”, Radio the need for military reforms in Tunisia seems Kalima , 10.5.2012; “Reforming Tunisia’s Internal Security Apparatus – Transitional Justice Left limited. Another specificity of the Tunisian Unfinished”, Tunisia Live , 10.6.2012. case is, arguably, that security sector reforms

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are not really about the downsizing of security security apparatus as well as of its judiciary, forces, as would be the case in many other possibly adds a further difficulty in achieving countries of the MENA region which have security sector reforms. overblown security establishments. :Neither These internal obstacles are certainly one of Tunisia’s military nor—at hindsight—even its the main reasons why security sector reforms police can be said to be oversized; on the in Tunisia have been slow so far. On the other contrary, they rather seem too small and hand, it can also be argued that the Ennahda- under-resourced to deal with current led government has thus far not yet challenges, and efforts have been made in the demonstrated a true commitment to reforming post-Ben Ali period to expand these forces. the country’s security apparatus. While Finally, the Tunisian example also highlights purges have been carried out both in the that SSR is not only about better protection of police and the judiciary, structural reforms citizens’ rights vis-à-vis security forces, but which would focus on issues such as the that ensuring the rights of the members of establishment of a clearer legal framework, these security institutions, especially at their the strengthening of transparency and lower levels, can also be an important accountability or institutional reforms, have concern, as shown in particular by the plight so far been very modest. Even though it is of of the Tunisian police under the Ben Ali course still early days, and the jury on the regime. Ennahda government’s willingness to reform A further conclusion of the preceding analysis the country’s security sector is still out, the is that in both the internal security apparatus (growing) suspicion that Ennahada, now that and the judiciary there are formidable it is in power, is more concerned with using obstacles to reforms. As both institutions the security apparatus for its own purposes, as were key instruments of Ben Ali’s opposed to genuine reforms, is not entirely authoritarian regime, and given that many of without foundation. the higher-level officials within these Nevertheless, even though security sector institutions owe their positions largely to their reforms carried out in Tunisia so far have loyalty to the former president, there is an been limited, they are still rather unique in the inherent resistance to reforms. Moreover, the Arab world, and the prospects of achieving fact that Ennahda is in charge of the reform effective SSR are arguably better in Tunisia process, i.e. a movement which used to be one than in any other country of the region. of the main targets of the country’s internal Again, it is too early to make a final

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judgment, but Tunisia is not only the sole country of the region towards Arab country which can be said to have democratization, but there is now a vibrant achieved a successful transition from debate among numerous stakeholders, both authoritarianism to democracy, but it has also within and outside the security sector, on SSR undertaken at least some initial steps towards issues, and at least an acknowledgement achieving real reforms of the country’s among all major political forces that security forces. However modest so far, there reforming the country’s security apparatus is has to date been no other Arab country which key to the consolidation of Tunisia’s has even embarked on such a reform path. emerging democratic regime. Even in the other countries which, in the wake of the Tunisian uprising, have overthrown their authoritarian leaders, the prospects of achieving SSR are much bleaker. Egypt, for example, has effectively been under military rule since the overthrow of Mubarak, and even though the country, too, has held its first free elections of a Constituent Assembly and, more recently of a President, the Egyptian military seems intent on retaining far-reaching powers under the country’s future political system. The establishment of civilian democratic control over the armed forces thus seems like a very distant prospect in Egypt. Libya, for its part, remains in a state of considerable chaos more than one year after the overthrow of Qaddafi. While also Libya has held its first free elections in half a century, the new authorities are still not in full control of the country, with regular clashes between rival militias, jockeying for power in the post-Qaddafi period. Tunisia, by contrast, has not only moved further than any other