Soldiers and Societies in Revolt Military Doctrine in the Arab Spring Nicholas J. Lotito Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 2018 © 2018 Nicholas J. Lotito All rights reserved ABSTRACT Soldiers and Societies in Revolt: Military Doctrine in the Arab Spring Nicholas J. Lotito This dissertation explores civil-military relations in democratizing contexts, specifically how the historical relationship between the military and the broader public shapes re- sponses to political crises such as riots and revolutions. I develop a novel theory, rooted in civil-military relations literature from political science and sociology, for how an army’s historical interactions with the population and with foreign sponsors create doctrine by shaping organizational culture and practices toward the population. Doctrine, in turn, influences the military’s response to a popular uprising. The foundations of military doctrine are historical and include the military’s institutional origins, role in national inde- pendence, and relationship to the ruling party. Subsequently, doctrinal innovation occurs as a result of interacting with the domestic population and foreign military sponsors. The dissertation features qualitative case studies of Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria during the Arab Spring and a quantitative data analysis of major uprisings worldwide since 1950. Both qualitative and quantitative evidence demonstrate that the nature of military doctrine explains soldiers’ behavior during popular uprisings better than alternative arguments based on capacity, patronage, and ethnicity. Contents List of Figures iii List of Tables iv 1 The Puzzle of Military Responses to Uprisings 1 1.1 The Arab Spring ................................. 3 1.2 The Military’s Critical Role in Revolution ................... 6 1.3 Existing Explanations .............................. 10 1.4 A New Theory: Military Doctrine ....................... 19 1.5 Research Design and Case Selection ...................... 22 1.6 Plan of the Dissertation ............................. 26 2 Military Doctrine in Popular Uprisings 29 2.1 Explaining Military Behavior .......................... 30 2.2 The Origins of Doctrine ............................. 35 2.3 Doctrinal Innovation .............................. 38 2.4 Adoption of Doctrine .............................. 47 2.5 Typology of Doctrinal Responses ....................... 51 3 Tunisia: A Doctrine of Restraint 56 3.1 Foundations of Doctrine ............................ 60 3.2 Past Interventions ................................ 74 3.3 Foreign Influence ................................ 80 3.4 Doctrinal Adoption ............................... 86 3.5 Responding with Restraint ........................... 92 4 Egypt: A Doctrine of Control 97 4.1 Foundations of Doctrine ............................ 99 4.2 Past Interventions ................................ 113 4.3 Foreign Influence ................................ 117 4.4 Doctrinal Adoption ............................... 125 4.5 Responding with Control ............................ 128 5 Syria: A Doctrine of War 135 5.1 Foundations of Doctrine ............................ 137 5.2 Past Interventions ................................ 148 i 5.3 Foreign Influence ................................ 154 5.4 Doctrinal Adoption ............................... 161 5.5 Responding with War .............................. 163 6 Generalizability 170 6.1 Across the Arab Spring ............................. 171 6.2 Cross-National Data ............................... 181 7 Conclusion 199 7.1 Military Doctrine for Domestic Intervention ................. 200 7.2 Implications ................................... 202 7.3 Extensions .................................... 205 Bibliography 210 Appendix 230 ii List of Figures 2.1 Diagram of Causal Process ........................... 30 3.1 IMET Trainees .................................. 84 6.1 Electoral Democracy after the Arab Spring .................. 180 6.2 Quantitative Results ............................... 193 6.3 Violent Military Responses ........................... 196 iii List of Tables 1.1 Arab Spring Uprisings .............................. 6 2.1 Typology of Domestic Security Doctrines ................... 51 3.1 Tunisian Military Ranks ............................. 60 3.2 Interviews with Tunisian Officials ....................... 61 4.1 Egyptian Military Ranks ............................ 104 4.2 Egyptian Leaders’ Military Backgrounds ................... 119 6.1 Military Repression and Campaign Outcomes ................ 179 6.2 Summary Statistics ............................... 190 6.3 Main Model Results ............................... 191 6.4 Results with Additional Controls ........................ 194 6.5 Coup Attempts during Popular Uprisings ................... 197 iv Anowledgments Thank you to my doctoral advisers, Jack Snyder and Page Fortna, whose commitment to interesting questions and methodological pluralism taught me to think like a scholar. I am indebted to Al Stepan, whose work inspired my research on civil-military relations, and who offered his advice and support early in this project. And I am grateful to Barak Mendelsohn for pushing me to become a political scientist. “Nick,” he advised, “do not be a lawyer. Lawyers are boring.” I hope this dissertation is not too boring. My field research would not have been possible without Intissar Samarrat, who opened countless doors with tenacity and kindness, and the many Tunisians who vol- unteered their time to help me understand their country. The quantitative chapter was possible thanks to Erica Chenoweth and Christopher Shay for allowing me to analyze not- yet-released data from the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) project. The entire dissertation is stronger for the thoughtful comments and critiques of many colleagues at Columbia and in the Middle East politics community. Thank you to the loved ones who supported me throughout this long and difficult process. My family always encouraged my academic pursuits, even when they wondered what I was actually up to and why it was taking so long. In particular, I remember my late grandparents, John and Mary Leinbach, who were tireless advocates for higher education throughout their lives. Their support made my academic career possible. Finally, to my brilliant Liz. The best part of my Ph.D. was meeting you during fieldwork. You have been my best editor, my best counselor, and my best friend. v To ERN vi Chapter 1 e Puzzle of Military Responses to Uprisings In Tunis, then Cairo, and across the Arab world, armored personnel carriers rolled into the central gathering places whose names would fill newspaper headlines in the first months of 2011: the Kasbah, Tahrir Square, Pearl Roundabout. Swarms of black-clad riot police, plainclothes toughs, and armed soldiers staked out positions of authority to face down the exuberant crowds calling for radical change. As the unprecedented popular mobilization gained strength across North Africa and the Middle East, rulers and their security forces were defiant but fearful. During the uprisings, authoritarian regimes looked to their militaries to restore order when anti-regime protests overwhelmed the normal repressive capacity of the state police. Subsequently, divergent military responses were instrumental in creating varied political outcomes across the region: Tunisia’s army remained neutral, enabling a nonviolent political transition, while Egypt’s forced out the president and eventually seized power itself, and Syria’s launched military operations against demon- strators, starting a conflict that devolved into a devastating and still ongoing civil war. The uprisings proved that even if protesters shared similar symbols, slogans, and aspirations, the military’s dissimilar responses could lead to either social transformation or human tragedy. Until now, soldiers’ decisions in these critical moments have remained a black box to outside observers. When and why do militaries intervene to repress mass uprisings, and under what conditions is revolution possible without violence? 1 In this dissertation, I investigate the causal underpinnings of military intervention in revolutions through the divergence in the uprisings across the Arab world in 2010–2011. Existing theories for both the outcomes of the Arab Spring generally and the military role in particular offer explanations based on characteristics of the military, such as profes- sionalism, patronage or ethnicity. Instead, I argue that the primary variable in military behavior during revolutions is doctrine: the set of rules and understandings through which military planners conceptualize and prepare for future engagements.1 Doctrine is shaped by the military’s relationships with the general population and with the foreign armies that provide armaments, training and military education. An army’s doctrine for domestic intervention provides the guidelines by which soldiers perceive uprisings as either threats or opportunities and governs the nature their response. This dissertation develops a novel theory rooted in civil-military relations litera- ture from the disciplines of political science and sociology. The theory holds that doc- trine first emerges during the formative years of a military’s development under colonial rule. In the former territories of the Ottoman Empire, the creation of modern armies was heavily influenced by the interests of European