Confronting the Janus Face: the Armed Forces And
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
CONFRONTING THE JANUS FACE: THE ARMED FORCES AND AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL POLITICS by Nathaniel D.F. Allen A dissertation submitted to the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Washington, DC June, 2018 © Nathaniel D.F. Allen 2018 All rights reserved Abstract In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, scholars have given renewed attention to the role of the armed forces as an essential but ambivalent actor in the birth, life, and death of democracy. Despite this emergent literature, there is no consensus concerning the institutional dimensions, causal mechanisms, and regional differences that motivate why soldiers choose to support political reformers, side with dictators, or upend existing democratic regimes. This dissertation proposes a theory on the relationship between authoritarian civil-military relations, democratic transitions, and the duration of emerging democratic regimes in Africa. It argues that the continent has been characterized by three predominant forms of authoritarian civil-military relations, each with distinct democratization patterns: military regimes, ethnic civil-military relations, and representative civil-military relations. Military regimes occur when a country is ruled by a junta of military officers. Cleavages between praetorian and professional factions of the armed forces make democratic transitions likely, but democratic settlements brittle. Authoritarian regimes with ethnic civil-military relations are ruled by a civilian who attempts to recruit co- ethnics into key positions in the army or other parallel military institutions. Patron-client relations between the authoritarian leaders and military institutions dominated by co- ethnics impede democratic transition, but the absence of a politically dominant military results in more stable democracy than in military regimes. Authoritarian regimes with representative civil-military relations refrain from manipulating either the political or ii ethnic loyalties of the armed forces. Marginalized from politics and free from ethnic allegiances, such regimes are most likely to transition to stable democratic rule. These theoretical claims are evaluated through cross-country regression analysis and case studies in Nigeria, Sudan and Tunisia. The cross-country analysis tests whether authoritarian military institutions affect the likelihood of democratic transition, as well as the duration of emerging democratic regimes. The case studies, which are supported by key informant interviews with military officials and politicians in Tunisia and Nigeria, trace the causal mechanisms that facilitate military action for or against democratization. Primary Reader: Peter Lewis (advisor) Secondary readers: Eliot Cohen, Bruce Parrott, Princeton Lyman, Naunihal Singh iii Acknowledgements The act of conducting scholarly research is at once a supremely solitary and supremely engaging endeavor. Solitary, in the sense that the most of the time one spends as a researcher is on one’s own. Absorbing vast literatures, combing through archives, assembling and analyzing data, and working one’s way through chapter drafts are activities demanding little human interaction. Engaging, in the sense that I have found that never is the scholar truly alone. Only by constantly wrestling with the theories, methods, arguments and insights of others is new knowledge created. Moreover, the success or failure of a research project depends on accommodating participants, wise colleagues, and supportive loved ones. The shortcomings of this dissertation are my responsibility, but to others I owe a great debt of gratitude. A number of colleagues and organizations were tremendously supportive of this project with their time and resources. My field research in Nigeria would not have been possible without the support of Colonel Julius Osifo, who graciously offered me accommodations in Nigeria and was crucial in setting me up with interviews with his military colleagues. Thanks is due also to Jackie Farris of the Shehu Musa Yar’Adua Foundation, whose boundless energy and generosity with her time were essential in securing some of this dissertation’s most insightful interviews. In Tunisia, this project would not have succeeded without the support of Sharan Grewal, Major Colonel Mohamed Mezhoughi of the Association of Retired Military Officers and Major Colonel Mohamed Ahmed of INSAF (Justice for Former Soldiers). I would also like to thank Elor Nkweurem, Matthew Page, Darren Kew, Chido Onumah, O’Seun Odwale, Mohamed iv Haruna, John Dara, Max Siollun, and Oussama Ayara for speaking with me and connecting me with their friends and colleagues. This project has the beneficiary of the largess of several organizations and the dedicated people working for them. First, I’d like to thank the U.S. Institute of Peace, and in particular Elizabeth Cole and Tom Scherer, for deciding this project was worthy of financial support, offering me a platform in which to present findings, and offering insightful commentary. I’d also like to thank American University’s Bridging the Gap project, including Naz Barma and Rachel Whitlark, for a summer grant that helped support this dissertation’s fieldwork in Nigeria. Finally, I’d like to acknowledge the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies Ph.D. program, and in particular Jon Youngs, for providing financial support for field research in Tunisia and to present my research at various conferences. A number of colleagues have offered feedback that greatly improved the quality of this dissertation. Dissertation committee members Peter Lewis, Bruce Parrott and Eliot Cohen offered excellent advice when I presented my prospectus that sparked theoretical and empirical improvements in this project’s research design. Ambassador Princeton Lyman, who has been enormously generous with his time and on point with his commentary, has been both a source inspiration and advice. A 2016 panel at the International Studies Association, including Kimberly Marten, Lawrence Rubin, John- Michael Arnold, Madison Schramm and Torrey Taussig provided helpful remarks on the academic paper version of this project. Additional thanks are owed to Bruce Parrott, Risa Brooks, Sharan Grewal, Travis Sharp, Brad Potter, Hilary Matfess and John Speed v Meyers, who offered wonderfully insightful comments on various chapters and drafts. I’d also like to thank my advisor, Peter Lewis, for his guidance, thoughtfulness, and unwavering support of my attempts to shape a research agenda and craft a career that is both academically meaningful and policy relevant. Finally, I’d like to thank my parents, Leslie Feder and Michael Allen, for their support and for reading several of this project’s more painful early drafts. The biggest debt of gratitude of all, however, goes to my amazing wife, Sarah, whose love, patience, feedback and meticulous eye for detail helped make the writing of this dissertation a rather pleasant experience. Her unwavering encouragement kept the sleepless nights to a minimum and made the pages fly by. vi Table of Contents Abstract ............................................................................................................................... i Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................... iv Table of Contents ............................................................................................................ vii List of Tables .................................................................................................................... xi List of Figures .................................................................................................................. xii Chapter 1: The Janus-Faced Soldier and the African State ......................................... 1 1.1: The Argument: Authoritarian Civil-Military Relations and Pathways to and From Democracy .................................................................................................................... 6 1.1.1: Military Regimes and Democratic Instability .............................................. 8 1.1.2: Ethnic Armies and Democratic Obstruction ............................................... 14 1.1.3: Representative Armies and Democratic Stability ........................................ 20 1.1.4: Predicted Transition Paths .......................................................................... 23 1.2: The Evidence: Military Rule, Ethnic Armies, Representative Armies and Democratization in Africa ........................................................................................... 24 1.3: Key Concepts: Democracy, Democratization, The Armed Forces ...................... 30 1.3.1: Defining Democracy ..................................................................................... 30 1.3.2: Measuring Democratization ......................................................................... 32 1.3.3: The Armed Forces ........................................................................................ 33 1.4: Contributions and Qualifications ......................................................................... 34 1.5: The Chapters to Come ......................................................................................... 39 Chapter 2: Civil-Military Relations, Authoritarianism and Democracy in Africa: Debating the Mechanisms .......................................................................................