Language, Identity and Power: Hybrid Orders of Discourse and Minority Education Policy Enactments in Tibetan School Communities in Sichuan, China

Language, identity and power: hybrid orders of discourse and minority education policy enactments in Tibetan school communities in Sichuan, China

Yang Bai

A thesis in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

School of Education Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences

December 2013

Acknowledgements

There are a number of people to acknowledge who helped and supported this study. First I wish to extend my wholehearted gratitude to my supervisors, Dr. Matthew Clarke, who works in education policy and politics, and Dr. Michael Michell, who works in educational policy, language and literacy education, and multicultural education. They offered me excellent supervision with their professional guidance, feedback, inspiration, and careful assistance throughout my research process. Particularly, their intellectual enlightenment and encouragement inspired me to overcome many obstacles I encountered during difficult times. Without either of these people, I do not know where my work would have ended up. I also wish to thank the members of my thesis review panel who have attended my presentations and given me constructive feedback: Professor Colin W. Evers, Dr. Kerry Barnett, Dr. Phiona Stanley, Dr. Kalervo N. Gulson, and Professor Chris Davison. I am also grateful to Bronwen Phillips for her editorial assistance and thorough help with my writing. I would like to thank Mary Potter Forbes, Ian Forbes and Alexander Forbes for all their support and encouragement during my stay in Sydney. Various teachers over the years have influenced me and my approach to the study in ways that are not always apparent but are nevertheless significant. In particular my M.A. supervisor, Professor Badeng Nima, provided me with useful background information, insights and publications that helped to make the picture of Tibetan education more complete. Thanks are due to Professor Lu Desheng, Professor Li Songlin, and Buqiong of Sichuan Normal University, classmates, colleagues, and friends who shared with me some of the insights from their work. I am also grateful to the people I interviewed and the people I received assistance from throughout my fieldwork in Danba and Ruoergai. Appreciation is due to the Education Bureau of Danba County and the Education Bureau of Ruoergai County, for allowing me to interact with many government officials, scholars, and students. This has helped shape my views, especially with respect to the discord between official rhetoric and social realities. I am in particular indebted to Qimi, Namu, Zaxi Pencuo, Ajia, and Hongke who hosted and looked after me carefully and selflessly during my fieldwork.

Deep thanks inevitably go to my parents for their understanding, support and encouragement. Of course I am truly thankful for my ever understanding husband, Gou Xiyong, and my son, Gou Junlin. Without their patience and love I could not have completed my study. To all of you and many others, my sincere thanks!

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Abstract

China’s engagement with the outside world over the last 60 years has intersected with its internal ethnic relations in a host of complex ways. In the context of China’s changing policies on ethnic relations, this study critically examines key discourses shaping China’s minority/bilingual education policy, and how these policies are enacted in three Tibetan schools. A qualitative research methodology involving an ethnographic case study approach was employed, rooted in a social constructionist epistemology. Three theoretical lenses provided the conceptual framework: policy genealogy, discourse theory, and policy enactment. Documentary, interview, and observational data was collected from a Tibetan farming town school, a Tibetan semi-agro-pastoral school, and a Tibetan pastoral school. Findings show that firstly, a political-moral unity discourse reflecting a discursive dichotomy between ‘backward’ minorities and the ‘advanced’ Han majority and a cultural diversity discourse reflecting neoliberal ideology have been central themes in China’s minority/bilingual education history. These conflicting discourses were further found to be inscribed into the everyday practices of Tibetan school life. A third finding identified varied dynamics of discursive power relations and Tibetan identity across the three schools. In the first school, a moral-neoliberal order fostering monolingual education was identified, in which Tibetan students developed instrumental linguistic dispositions, characterized by Han-only values and marginal Tibetan identities. In the second school, a moral-cultural order fostering monolingual and bicultural education was identified, in which Tibetan students developed instrumental linguistic dispositions, characterized by cultural distance and alienated Tibetan identities. In the third school, however, a cultural-neoliberal order was identified promoting bilingual and multicultural education, in which Tibetan students developed open linguistic dispositions, characterized by multicultural values and core Tibetan identities. The study reveals the hybrid nature of neoliberal globalisation processes in China’s minority education policies and describes the role such hybrid discourses play in shaping public representations and policy enactments in Tibetan schools. This study makes a contribution to developing the theory of policy enactment by extending its

iv reach to the analysis of issues of language, identity, and power affecting bilingual learning of Tibetan communities with relevance to other bilingual and/or multiethnic contexts.

Table of Contents Page

Title Page i Acknowledgements ii Abstract iv Table of Content vi List of Tables xi List of Figures xii

Chapter1. Introduction 1

1.1 Context of this study 1 1.2 Theoretical tools 4 1.3 Research questions 7 1.4 Methods 8 1.5 Findings 10 1.6 Significance 11 1.7 Outline of the thesis chapters 12

Chapter 2. Literature Review 14

2.1 Introduction 14 2.2 Nation-building and language and education policy in China 14 2.2.1 China’s nation building 15 2.2.2 Research literature: language and education policy in China 18 2.2.3 Case studies: language and education policy implementation for Tibetans 25 2.2.4 Implications within the context of the logic of equivalence 30 2.3 Bilingual education policy for minorities in China 31 2.3.1 China’s ethnic diversity 31 2.3.2 Research literature: bilingual education policy for minorities 34 2.3.3 Case studies: bilingual education policy implementation for Tibetans 42 2.3.4 Implications within the context of the logic of difference 44

2.4 Neoliberalism and its impact 45 2.5 Summary 47

Chapter 3. Qualitative Inquiry 50

3.1 Introduction 50 3.2 Epistemology 50 3.2.1 Four tenets of social constructionism 51 3.2.2 Implications of social constructionist tenets for this study 53 3.2.3 Analytical framework 55 3.3 Theories 59 3.3.1 Foucault’s genealogical work and governmentality 60 3.3.2 Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse Theory 64 3.3.3 Ball et al.’s work on policy enactments in schools 71 3.4 Approaches 73 3.4.1 Case selection 74 3.4.2 Comparison case study 76 3.5 Strategies 77 3.5.1 Data and data collection 79 3.5.2 Data analysis 83 3.6 Summary 85

Chapter 4. The Context of Education Policy for Minorities in China 87

4.1 Introduction 87 4.2 The Initial Pluralistic Stage (1949-1957) 88 4.2.1 The Central Government’s Principle of Different Treatment 88 4.2.2 Steady and Gradual Democratic Reform in Sichuan Province 95 4.2.3 The Implementation of the Spoken and Written Languages of Nationalities (1952) in Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures 97 4.3 Chinese Monopolistic Stage (1958-1977) 102 4.3.1 The Central Government’s Policy towards Assimilation 102 4.3.2 Suppression and Reform in Sichuan Province 106

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4.3.3 Anti-Rightist and Destroying ‘Four Olds’ in Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures 107 4.4 The Modernisation Stage towards Harmony and Stability (1978-2012) 111 4.4.1 The Central Government’s Unity between Diversity 111 4.4.2 Western Development Program in Sichuan Province 125 4.4.3 Universal Compulsory Education in Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures 129 4.5 Summary 135

Chapter 5. Case 1 Zhanggu – A Monolingual School in a Farming Town 137

5.1 Introduction 137 5.2 Zhanggu Town 138 5.2.1 Key signifiers in discourses of education policy in the town 138 The discourse of moral education 138 The discourse of education with local characteristics 143 5.2.2 Hybridity in the discourses and discursive strategies in the town 146 Actors: ambivalent attitudes towards development 147 Agendas: tying cultural diversity and political loyalty to the needs of the local community and the CCP 146 Actions: Han model curriculum implementation 150 Artefacts: environmental and cultural artefacts 152 5.3 Zhanggu Primary School 156 5.3.1 Key signifiers in discourses of education policy in the school 156 The discourse of standardisation 156 The discourse of curriculum with local characteristics 159 5.3.2 Hybridity in the discourses and discursive strategies in the school 164 Actors: ambivalent attitudes towards development 164 Agendas: tying standardisation and characteristics to the needs of the School 165 Actions: Han model curriculum implementation 167 Artefacts: environmental and cultural artefacts 169 5.4 Summary 175

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Chapter 6. Case 2 Badi – A monolingual and bicultural School in a Semi-agro- pastoral Area 180

6.1 Introduction 180 6.2 Badi Town 180 6.2.1 Key signifiers in discourses of education policy in the town 180 The discourse of the development of morality 180 The discourse of local community involvement 182 6.2.2 Hybridity in discourses and discursive strategies in the town 184 Actors: ambivalent attitudes towards development 184 Agendas: tying cultural diversity and political loyalty to the needs of the local community and the CCP 187 Actions: Han model curriculum implementation 189 Artefacts: environmental artefacts 190 6.3 Badi Primary School 194 6.3.1 Key signifiers in discourses of education policy in the school 195 The discourse of national standardisation 195 The discourse of practical education with local characteristics 197 6.3.2 Hybridity in discourses and discursive strategies in the school 193 Actors: ambivalent attitudes towards development 193 Agendas: tying national standardisation and local characteristics to the needs of the School and local community 200 Actions: Han model curriculum implementation 202 Artefacts: environmental artefacts 204 6.4 Summary 206

Chapter 7. Case 3 Tangke – A bilingual and multicultural school in a pastoral area 213 7.1 Introduction 213 7.2 Tangke Town 213 7.2.1 Key signifiers in discourses of education policy in the town 213 The discourse of moral education 213 The discourse of promoting Tibetan characteristics 215

7.2.2 Hybridity in discourses and discursive strategies in the town 218 Actors: mixed-positive attitude towards development 218 Agendas: tying local characteristics and standardization to the needs of the local community and the CCP 221 Actions: Tibetan nomadic context-relevant curricula 226 Artefacts: environmental artefacts and cultural signs 228 7.3 Tangke Primary School 231 7.3.1 Key signifiers in discourses of education policy in the school 231 The discourse of patriotic education 231 The discourse of particular cultural interests 233 7.3.2 Hybridity in discourses and discursive strategies in the school 234 Actors: positive attitudes towards development with multiple support 235 Agendas: the hybrid agendas of ‘four teaching and learning bases’ 237 Actions: developing multiple educational practices from multiple supports 239 Artefacts: environmental artefacts and cultural signs 243 7.4 Summary 247

Chapter 8. Discussion, implications and conclusion 253

8.1 Introduction 253 8.2 Discussion 253 8.2.1 Features of China’s minority education policy context 253 8.2.2 Characteristics of policy enactment in Tibetan school communities 257 8.2.3 The role of minority education policy context in policy enactment in Tibetan school communities 263 8.3 Implications 271 8.3.1 Implications for future policy 271 8.3.2 Implications for future policy enactment 274 8.4 Conclusion 281

References 284 Appendices 310

List of Tables

Table 3.1: The implications of social constructionist premises for this study 51 Table 3.2: Laclau and Mouffe’s political logics applied in this study 67 Table 3.3: Orders of discourse 76 Table 3.4: Summary of data colletion 81 Table 4.1: Basic features of education policies for minorities at the initial pluralistic stage (1949-1957) 101 Table 4.2: Basic features of education policies for minorities at the Chinese monopolistic stage (1958-1977) 106 Table 4.3: Basic features of education policies for minorities at the modernisation stage towards harmony and stability (1978-2012) 133 Table 5.1: Overview – ‘Four As’ analysis on the hybridity in discourses and discursive strategies in Zhanggu Primary School community 179 Table 6.1: Overview – ‘Four As’ analysis on the hybridity in discourses and discursive strategies in Badi Primary School community 212 Table 7.1: Overview – ‘Four As’ analysis on the hybridity in discourses and discursive strategies in Erlu Primary School community 251 Table 8.1: Characteristics of hybridity in discourses and discursive strategies in Tibetan school communities 262

Lister of Figures

Figure 2.1: Ethnic minorities in China 33 Figure 2.2: Bilingual education models for minority students in China 37 Figure 2.3: China’s minority communities into three types 38 Figure 3.1: Analytical framework 56 Figure 3.2: Relationship betyween three theoretical ideas utilised in this study 60 Figure 3.3: Locations of the three case schools 75 Figure 3.4: Data collection and analysis in addressing research questions 78 Figure 3.5: The “four As” analytical framework 82 Figure 4.1: Areas of the Khamin Sichuan, China 98 Figure 4.2: Ethnic cultural and linguistic diversity within the logic of difference at the initial pluralistic stage (1949-1957) 102 Figure 4.3: Han majority and the minority nationalities within the logic of equivalence in the Chinese monopolistic stage (1958-1977) 110 Figure 4.4: Discourse Theory concepts used in analysing distinct discourses of education policy in China’s context 134 Figure 5.1: The situation of the hybrid policy agendas in Zhanggu Town 150 Figure 5.2: Display of rely on the CCP in front of the Tibetan Buddhist stupa 152 Figure 5.3: “Alma Mater - Hometown - the state - the world” on a group of wall displays 170 Figure 5.4: “Hello, teachers!” and “Civilised and polite language on campus” on the wall displays 170 Figure 5.5: Wall displays representing Tibetan cultural signs and state symbols in Zhanggu Primary School 171 Figure 5.6: Discourse Theory concepts used in analysing distinct discourses of education policy in Zhanggu Town School community 178 Figure 6.1: The situation of the hybrid policy agendas in Badi Town 188 Figure 6.2: The sign “卍” on local house wall 191 Figure 6.3: “恭喜发财” on the door 191 Figure 6.4: The national flag on the top of the roof of the local temple 192 Figure 6.5: The national flag on the top of the roof of the local houses 193

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Figure 6.6: “Accumulate” (right), “Chinese heart”, and “Environmental protection” (left) on the wall display 205 Figure 6.7: Wall displays representing Tibetan cultural signs and state symbols in Badi Primary School 206 Figure 6.8: Discourse Theory concepts used in analysing distinct discourses of education policy in Badi Town School community 211 Figure 7.1: The situation of the hybrid policy agendas in Tangke Town 226 Figure 7.2: A document ‘protect religion and religious freedom’ written in both Tibetan and Chinese, and two photos of the young Dalai Lama 230 Figure 7.3: Wall painting promoting a harmonious campus in Tangke Primary School (1) 244 Figure 7.4: Wall painting promoting a harmonious campus in Tangke Primary School (2) 244 Figure 7.5: ‘Take the path of innovation and build a model school of the grasslands’ on the wall display 246 Figure 7.6: Wall displays representing ‘an active hybrid third spaces’ in Tangke Primary School 247 Figure 7.7: Discourse Theory concepts used in analysing distinct discourses of education policy in Tangke Town School community 250 Figure 8.1: Features of minority education policy discourses in China’s Context 254 Figure 8.2: Hybrid orders of discourse 264 Figure 8.3: Moral-neoliberal order 265 Figure 8.4: Moral-cultural order 267 Figure 8.5: Cultural-neoliberal order 269

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Chapter 1 Introduction

Since the formation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 the management of inter- ethnic relations through language education policy and practice has been a major political concern. This study identifies two conflicting discourses that are shaping public representations of minority/bilingual education policy and are deployed in policy enactments at three Tibetan school communities in China. This first chapter lays out the background of the study and clarifies its structure. It begins with an introduction of context of this study, focusing on the concern relating to China’s growing power on ethnic relations, China’s minority/bilingual education as research site, and discourse theory as analytical tool. Then, it introduces a theoretical framework, including how research methods were designed. This chapter also briefly mentions the findings and significance of the study though these are not discussed in detail until the final chapter where, on the basis of the analyses presented in the intervening chapters, their full import can be recognized. The introduction concludes by describing the outline of the thesis chapters.

1.1 Context of this study

China’s engagement with the outside world intersected with its internal ethnic relational development in a host of complex ways over the course of the 60-plus years since the formation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In the context of concern about China’s ethnic relations, this study critically examines the relationship between China’s minority/bilingual education policy discourses and policy enactments in three Tibetan school communities, viewed from a discourse analysis perspective. The rise of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to power in 1949 brought a new wave of ‘Orientalism’ to the West’s images of contemporary China (Mackerras, 1989). Yet the years 1958-1962 were ecomonically the worst period the minorities suffered. With the ending of the ten years of Cultural Revolution in 1976, many restrictions on the entry, movement, and activities of Western foreigners were gradually removed (Mackerras, 1989). Since the year 1979 as a transformation from the Mao era to Deng’s economic reform, there has been a gradual decline in ‘Orientalism’ as more people have been forced to confront Chinese values and aims (Mackerras, 1989). Now the world’s

1 fastest-growing power contributing to the world economic growth, significant economic changes have occurred in China since the introduction of the Four Modernisations policy in 1980. Deng Xiaoping advocated and led the reform and the ‘opening up’ policy, which was continued by Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, and is now being propelled by Xi Jinping and the current leadership of the CCP. The emergence of the Chinese economy as a key element in the global economic insitutions has meant the extraordinary economic integration of China into the world economic community (Saich, 2011). Examples are China’s membership of the World Trade Organisation since 2001 and its sponsorship of the Olympic Games in 2008. These trends, reflecting the rapid rise of the Chinese economy, have important implications for society as a whole, including ethnic relations. Significantly, for minorities, the trend towards globalisation has accompanied a rise in ethnic identity feelings in China (Mackerras, 2011a). Over the 60 years of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the major motivation of PRC policy towards minorities has been to integrate minority groups’ life patterns, cultures, institutions and social structures with both Han and Communist Party (Dreyer, 1976), so as to avoid separatism (Mackerras, 2011a). While the changes in the economy and society have been far-reaching, political change has lagged far behind (Saich, 2011). For minorities, the policies regarding the development of minority regions according to the rule of law represent a combination of economic development and separatist suppression. This was an attempt to solidify national unity and stability within certain minority areas. Such integration, on the one hand justifies the process of civilizing “backward” minorities to raise their economic levels; on the other hand, it constructs and reifies images of their ‘ethnic’ ‘backwardness’ (Shih, 2002; Yi, 2011). Therefore, national integration has meant a constant tussle between Han universalism and any kind of ethnic nationalism with the potential to lead to demands for independence (Mackerras, 2011a). Facing ethnic tensions and the possible disintegration of the country, the Chinese government has adopted various measures to manage and improve relationships with minorities (Lin, 1997). However, China’s policy and practice runs into problems in regions inhabited by minorities, who are linguistically and culturally different from the majority Han (Johnson, 2000; Postiglione, 2008). The case of minority language and

2 education policy and practice in China merits particular attention, with over 21.35 million language minority students being educated in PRC’s schools. China faces the dilemma of designing an education system that, on the one hand, promotes national unity and economic development and, on the other, is sensitive to the unique needs and cultural background of various minority groups (Johnson, 2000; Postiglione, 2008). The PRC’s leaders have regarded the “backwardness” of China’s minorities as the fundamental point of departure for the development of a strategy of ‘modernisation’ that has combined policies of economic development and education policies in order to socialize minorities into the national identity (Kayongo-Male & Benton Lee, 2004; Postiglione, 1999). Indeed, education is one of the four areas targeted for modernisation policy – of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national defense. The party-state is increasingly placing its hope in state-run system of public education to play a key role in developing the ‘backward’ minority areas, mostly located in the west of the country, and integrating them with the rest of China (Yi, 2008). China’s focus on education reflects an emerging trend in global neoliberalism, putting education at the top of the political and economic agenda. For example, in Western contexts, neoliberalism has seen an increased emphasis on the role of education as a vehicle of social mobility in the wake of the welfare state, for example, Tony Blair’s ‘Education, Education, Education’, George Bush’s ‘No Child Left Behind’ and Rudd’s ‘Education Revolution’ (Clarke, 2012a). Of particular significance for this thesis is the fact that, while officially China has embraced a multilingual approach, involving bilingual education for minorities, and has also adopted various measures to promote local control over minority education since the launch of modernisation (Gladney, 1993), it is also possible to identify a number of ways in which these trends serve as an ideological veil, behind which we can see the brute realities of ethnic domination and marginalization. These developments reflect the contradictory nature of economic globalisation and neoliberalism (Peck, 2010). The phenomenon of neoliberalism is important, because some scholars argue that China is undergoing a neoliberalising process and learning from Western neoliberal policies as part of its full integration into the global economy (Carolyn, 2011; Kipnis, 2007). However, the notion of the neoliberalisation of China is contested (Jefferys & Sigley, 2009; Kipnis, 2007; Sigley, 2006), while the neoliberalization process itself is full of controversies and inconsistencies, including conflicts between neoliberal

3 practices and social resistance, and tensions between central and local states (He & Wu, 2009). Scholars of Chinese neoliberalism use the concepts of “transition” and “development” to deal with its internal contradictions (Wang, 2003, p. 4). These controversies notwithstanding, the concept of neoliberalism is significant to this study and is detailed further in the literature review chapter. In the context of this study, these contradictions involve the ideological management of cultural and linguistic difference through the commodification and marketing of ethnicity, operating alongside and within the repressive state apparatus of an extremely conservative political formation representing the interests of the one-party state (Althusser, 1971). The conjunction of ideological and repressive state apparat means that the PRC’s intervention in minority education policy discourses and policy practices has become a contentious issue in the PRC’s relations of the rest of the world. Yet, the challenges of minority/bilingual education within the economic, political, historical, and socio-cultural background of contemporary China, involving issues of language, identity and power within minority/bilingual education policy and policy enactment processes, can be read as symptomatic of the modern state’s management of identity and difference. Seen from this perspective, the current study has wider significance beyond the confines of the Chinese national context.

1.2 Theoretical tools

Over the past two decades, research in Chinese ethnic relations within the context of globalisation has become an increasingly prominent area in the field of ethnic minority education (Johnson & Chhetri, 2002; Feng, 2009; Mackerras, 2003, 2011; Postiglione, 2009). Many political, economic, and socio-cultural factors explain the difficulties faced by minority communities. However, this study focuses on two factors: China’s minority/bilingual education policy discourse, and discursive shifts in policy enactment process in Tibetan school community. Following Foucault, discourse is seen in this study as constituting set of social practices and needs to be considered as productive rather than merely repressive (Foucault, 1980). As such, discourse at one and the same time reflects and produces social change. Policy is seen as a framework for the enactment of political and economic discourses. These discourses become invested with the status of ‘truth’ in the

4 day-to-day interactions of policy actors within the existence of school communities. Policy enables a set of discursive articulatory practices (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985) which are realised and struggled over in local settings (Ball, 1994). In this study, policy enables sets of agenda texts, actions, and artefacts, particularly in relation to local practice. Policy is therefore used to study how power relations are enacted in discourse, through examining what similarities and differences in policy enactment. In defining discourse and policy in this way, I am drawing on Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse Theory, and also on Ball, Maguire, and Braun’s work on policy enactments, both of which have shared roots in Foucault’s ideas of genealogy and governmentality. Foucault defines “governmentality” as “the conduct of conduct” which ranges from “governing the self” to “governing others” (Foucault, 1982, p. 790; Gordon, 1991, p. 2). Governmentality represents an apparatus of administrative power that has political economy as its major form of knowledge (Gordon, 1991). Along with the notion of genealogy, i.e. the tracing of the history of the present, governmentality was used to conceptualize how policy documents and tests serve as a technique for governing. Thus, the complex formations of power and knowledge can be revealed through genealogical analyses of governmental policy practices. A genealogical approach seeks to identify older disciplinary forms of power constituting the history of our present and to identify the specific forms of knowledge that both inform and are produced by certain practices. The concept of ‘governmentality’ has been deployed as an ally to ‘genealogy’ to demonstrate how power relations influence policy processes in particular historical contexts (Ketlhoilwe, 2010). In this study, education policy’s trajectory over the last 60 years of economic and social change demonstrates how China has used economic, political moral, and socio- cultural discourses to legitimise its control over minorities. Foucault treats discourses as “a set of social practices” which systematically “form the objects of which they speak”, that is, “a group of rules” in practice (Foucault, 1972, pp. 46-49). Foucault also argues that the subject is a target of a series of techniques and procedures, directed not only at controlling human actions, but also at constituting human subjectivity. In Foucault’s (1991) terms, China’s minority/bilingual education policies can be regarded as “tactics” for the party-government over the course of the CCP rule since 1949 in order to manage both territory and population.

Foucault’s genealogical approach brings his theory of discourse close to that of Laclau and Mouffe, who also emphasize the role of power in the production of identities (Torfing, 1999). When discursive change-making is espoused or promoted by the powers that be, and is aimed at reinforcing the status quo, it can more properly be called ‘hegemonic intervention’ by Laclau and Mouffe or what Foucault called ‘governmentality’. Governmentality studies focus analysis on how dominant discourses came into being, and how they operate to sustain relations of power, so as to differentiate between power and domination. New forms of social governance assume cultural and political difference (see Dean, 1999). This extended notion of political power is exemplified by hegemony. Hegemony identifies how dominance is constituted and thus begins to articulate possible points of intervention through the construction of potentially transformative counter-hegemonies (McKinnon, 2008). However, the constitutive role of discourse in China’s minority/bilingual education policy as part of the changing social order of reform has not been given sufficient attention. In this study, such discursive processes are captured with Laclau and Mouffe’s concepts, ‘the logic of equivalence’ and ‘the logic of difference’, together with other key concepts such as empty signifiers, nodal points and floating signifiers. The term empty signifier acts as a holder of many diverse meanings and nuances that is inherently contested and contestable (Gunder & Hillier, 2009). Where a signifier can indicate different significations in different contexts, Laclau (1996, 2005) terms this a floating signifier. These terms articulate different elements which become the privileged nodal points that bind these particular points into a discursive formation (Laclau, 1996, p. 44). Nodal points organise discourses and around which identity is organised. In addition, the investigation of how China’s minority/bilingual education policy discourses and ethnic minority identity respectively are organised discursively can be achieved with Laclau and Mouffe’s pair of concepts: the logic of equivalence, which organizes social reality in terms of opposing antagonistic chain, e.g. ‘Minority = backward versus Han = advanced’ and; the logic of difference, which resists the formation of such antagonistic chains and instead organizes social reality in terms of pure, naturalised, non-politicised ethnic, cultural and linguistic difference and diversity. These political logics provide a dynamic perspective on China’s language education policy discourses and practices. These related theoretical constructs complement and enrich Ball et al.’s concept of ‘policy enactment’, in order to better understand and explore specific discourses in the

6 practices of everyday life in Tibetan school community. Ball et al. (2012) take policy making in schools as a complex set of processes of interpretation and translation, through which policy actors are involved in making meaning of and constructing responses to multiple policy demands. In the process of policy enactment, actors will use tactics that include discursive sets of teaching and learning activities and the production of cultural artefacts (Ball et al., 2012). Foucault writes that discursive formations are conjunctions of discourses, knowledge and practice and carry meanings that may be common to a whole period (Foucault, 1986, p. 118). In these terms, this study emphasises the discursive formation of educational subjects and practices through the processes of educational policy enactment. Following the above discussions, I argue that the policy discourses shaping public representations and practices of China’s minority/bilingual education policy are embodied in the discursive shifts comprising policy enactment processes. Such discursive processes can be captured by employing three complementary theoretical ideas, suggested by Foucault, Laclau and Mouffe, and Ball, et al. These theoretical ideas form the basis for understanding the interactions between policy discourses and policy enactments, and ground my practice of examining the genesis of China’s minority/bilingual education policy development and discursive shifts in policy enactment in Tibetan schools of China.

1.3 Research questions

With theoretical insights drawn from the studies on policy genealogy and governmentality, Discourse Theory, and policy enactments, I focus on the following research questions:  What are the key discourses of China’s minority/bilingual education policy at three levels of governance over the course of the CCP rule since 1949?  How are minority/bilingual policies enacted (or not enacted) in different Tibetan school communities?  How can similarities and differences between these schools in the enactment of policies be explained?

These research questions guide procedure of this qualitative inquiry. In addressing the research questions, a qualitative research methodology involving an ethnographic case study comparison method and a particular focus on discourses shaping China’s minority/bilingual education policy was designed for this study. Such a design seemed manageable and analytically effective. The following section explains the methods of this study.

1.4 Methods

This study unfolds by addressing these questions through discussing the three levels of official documents, providing methodological details of how I conducted this analysis in the theory and background history sections, and identifying interviewing officials, scholars and students for the case studies. Conceptualising, designing and conducting this research, has involved a reiterative shuttling between epistemological positions, theoretical frameworks, methodological approaches and strategies for collecting, analysing, and interpreting data (Kamberelis & Dimitriadis, 2005). This qualitative research is conducted against the backdrop of a social constructionist epistemology. This, in turn, informed the data collection and analysis, which involved generating contextualized, situated and in-depth understandings through documents reviews, interviews, and observations. Archival data were drawn from official policy documents issued by the central, provincial and local prefecture governments; and from a review of relevant secondary sources. Most of the official policy documents from the national level were downloaded from the major government websites such as http://www.gov.cn of the Central People’s Government of China. A few from the provincial and prefecture level were accessed from websites of the Sichuan government and the Tibetan Autonomous Precture governments. These documents were used to examine the context of China’s education policies for ethnic minorities in which policy enactments in three Tibetan school communities are constructed. Local documents and publications in Chinese on language, culture and minority/bilingual education policy in Sichuan Tibetan school communities were gathered in the field. In addition, some teacher participants provided photocopies of teachers’ research projects and students’ compositions. These documents were examined for evidence of local discourses on China’s minority/bilingual education

8 policy and case studies of the policy enactment in three Tibetan schools. Discourses of China’s minority/bilingual education policy and policy enactment at school communities in China are underresearched (Kayongo-Male & Benton Lee, 2004), with little known about the situation in Tibetan Autonomous County of Sichuan available. Under these circumstances, three Tibetan schools in Sichuan Province were selected as policy enactment sites, within which students’, teachers’ and parents’ perspectives were garnered through interviews. I discussed the field research with the local officials, scholars, teachers and students for the case studies, enabling me to capture something of the voice of the participants. A wide range of contextual data was collected from each school community, including cultural signs and environmental artefacts. Social constructionist epistemology has also an important consequence for requiring reflexivity in the research relationship. I recognise that as a Han Chinese person my interpretations of the discourse with participants may be biased. My limited comprehension of the Tibetan language amplifies this problem. To overcome this potential bias, participants were encouraged to express views differing from the Han/party-state discourse. Ethnograhpic literature recognises that participants might not say to an outsider what they believe would not be understood, or will say what they believe an outsider wants to hear (Bishop, 2005). Bailey (2007) and Stanley (2012) report on the phenonenon of data as ‘performed’ by participants. Adopting their ‘transnational’ approach, I attempted to maintain an active awareness of differences in identity, cultural belief and frames of reference. It might help to conceive of the Tibetan research participants (in the presence of a Han researcher) as a transnational research context. I thus attempt to combine an ‘etic’ with an ‘emic’ approach to understanding the various discourses circulating within and constructing my objects of study. More specfically, through the research process I developed a rapport and a level of trust with Tibetan people involved in my study. They then highlighted aspects of bilingual education they thought important and the social constructions believed necessary to operate the bilingual education system in Tibetan schools. Participants were empowered to engage in a genuine authentic dialogue. Overall, China’s minority/bilingual education policy is more a process than an entity, involving a mixed mode of governing that incorporates colonial and neoliberal strategies. By exploring the relationships between policy contexts, actual policy enactment processes, and policy outcomes, and by seeking to explain the complex

9 relation between the policy’s formulation and its practice, I hope to reveal the contradictions inhering in both colonial and neoliberal discourses. These tensions and contradictions are my study’s focus.

1.5 Findings

There are three major findings. Firstly, I posit the uneasy co-existence of two antagonistic discourses structuring China’s minority/bilingual education history, namely a political-moral unity discourse, reflecting the dichotomy between ‘backward’ minorities versus ‘advanced’ Han majority, and a cultural diversity discourse, reflecting neoliberal ideologies of the commodification of language and culture. In employing these antagonistic discourses, China’s governments have produced a hybridized but ultimately incoherent discourse with the overall effect of confusion of both language and educational aims. Secondly, I argue that these conflicting discourses are inscribed into everyday practices of Tibetan school community life and reflected in the shifts in policy enactment processes. For example, Tibetan culture was represented at a superficial level, equated with beautiful dancing, colourful dress and mysterious legends, thus intensifying the marginalization of Tibetan language and culture in the wider Chinese society. Similar marginalization was observable across all three Tibetan school communities. Third, I argue that despite these similarities, the dynamics of power relationships and Tibetan identity varied across the three school communities. A moral-neoliberal order fostering monolingual education was identified in the first school. Here, Tibetan students developed instrumental linguistic dispositions, characterized by Han-only values and marginal Tibetan identities. A second moral-cultural order fostering monolingual and bicultural education was identified in the second school. Here, Tibetan students developed instrumental linguistic dispositions, characterized by cultural distance and alienated Tibetan identities. However, a third cultural-neoliberal order fostering bilingual and multicultural education was found in the third school, in which Tibetan students developed open linguistic dispositions, characterized by multicultural values and core Tibetan identities.

1.6 Significance

This study reveals the hybrid nature of neoliberal globalisation processes in China’s minority education policies and describes the picture of such hybrid discourse shaping public representations of minority/bilingual policy and deployed in policy enactments in Tibetan schools. It also looks at the evolution of policy discourses in relation to minority/bilingual education over time since the inception of the PRC. Viewing the present through the lens of the past enables us to understand contemporary differences and contradictions in greater depth and detail. This study focuses on characteristics of the hybrid discourse of bilingual education policy and the way the policy is being deployed in Tibetan schools. In the first two schools, the overall effect of discursive hybridity has resulted in the uncertainties and ambiguities surrounding policy enactment. The third school corresponds more closely to the pluralistic attitude towards difference, antagonism, and contestatory thought, reflecting a cultural-moral neoliberalism that contributes to both growth and stability. Thus, I argue that the third experience yields important lessons for other Tibetan areas and for policymakers in Beijing. This study also aims to make a contribution to developing a discourse theory of policy enactment for analysing the issues of language, identity, and power affecting bilingual learning of Tibetan communities with relevance for other bilingual and/or multiethnic contexts. This is the first time that discourse theory has been applied to China’s ethnic minorities. Importantly, as an exploratory case study located within a social constructivist rather than an objectivist/positivist epistemological paradigm, this case study does not set out to test hypotheses with the aim of producing generalizable findings but, instead, seeks to co-construct knowledge through dialogue with participants, and articulate highly contextualized, situated, but in-depth understandings that may have resonance in other bilingual and/or multiethnic contexts (Kamberelis & Dimitriadis, 2005; Kvale, 2002).

1.7 Outline of the thesis chapters

Chapter 2 reviews the research literature on minority education in China. It includes two sections: China’s nation-building and language and education policy; and China’s ethnic diversity and bilingual education for minorities. Each section also discusses what is known and what is still in need of research concerning China’s education policy and policy enactment for minorities; and it illustrates how these views are implemented in the context of the logics of equivalence and difference within Discourse Theory (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, 2001), that frames and informs this study.

Chapter 3 describes the four dimensions or ‘analytic strata’ (Kamberelis & Dimitriadis, 2005) informing this qualitative inquiry of Tibetan students: (a) epistemology, (b) theories, (c) approaches, and (d) strategies. After describing the epistemology of this study, I examine how the main concepts of the three complementary theories could be deployed to understand China’s minority/bilingual education policy discourses and policy enactment research. Then, I explain the approach adopted in this research, focusing on comparison case studies of three Tibetan school communities in Sichuan Province. Finally, I explain the strategies for collecting and analysing data.

Chapter 4 offers an analysis of the education policy trajectory over the last 60 years of economic and social change in China, including the impact of neo-liberalism and marketization on education policy for minorities. I consider the context of China’s education policies for ethnic minorities at three levels of governance, namely, the central government, Sichuan Province, and the Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture governments in Sichuan.

Chapters 5-7 present the contextural case studies. Chapter 5 presents the first case of the study: Zhanggu Primary School, a farming town school in Danba County of Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in Sichuan Province. This case will be used as a basis for comparison of the remaining cases, which will be presented in Chapters 6 and 7. Chapters 6 and 7 are intended as a theoretical replication of Chapter 5 in a semi-agro- pastoral school of Danba County and a pastoral school of Ruoergai County for the base findings of Case 1.

Chapter 8 initiates discussion based on the findings in the previous chapters and presents the implications of the research. It delineates the themes that emerge from the findings of the exploratory case studies in order to address the research questions. After integrating the most important themes emerging from the analysis, it discusses the implications of these findings for the field of minority/bilingual education and makes recommendations for future research.

Chapter 2 Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

The purpose of this study is to explore how the state creates the minority education policy context for Tibetan schools; how Tibetan schools, as the agents of the state, present schooling contexts for Tibetan students’ daily life; and how Tibetan schools, teachers and students engage with minority education policy. As introduced in Chapter 1, China faces the dilemma of designing an education that, on the one hand, promotes national unity and economic development and, on the other, is sensitive to the unique needs and cultural background of various minority groups. With these background themes in mind, this chapter reviews the basic situation, research literature, case studies, and debates about minority education in China. It includes two sections: The first focuses on China’s nation-building and language and education policy; and the second examines China’s ethnic diversity and bilingual education for minorities. Each section also discusses what is known and what is still in need of further research regarding China’s education policy and policy enactment for minorities; and it draws out the key themes from the literature review and illustrates how these themes are interpreted in terms of Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) discourse theory that frames and informs this study.

2.2 Nation-building and language and education policy in China

This section reviews research literature on China’s nation-building, language and education policy for minorities, and case studies of language and education policy implementation for Tibetans. It draws out the the key themes, including (1) the discursive dichotomy of minorities versus Han in the process of nation-building, (2) the role of Chinese culturalism and unity in language and education policy for minorities, and (3) the collision between ‘tradition versus modern’ in policy implementation for Tibetans. These themes are more what I would expect to find in this thesis.

2.2.1 China’s nation building

Much of literature indicates that the naturalization of the constructed discursive dichotomy between the 55 minority nationalities (Min) versus the Han majority nationality (Han) serves China’s nation building interests (Cherng, Hannum & Lu, 2012; Dwyer, 2005; Fei, 1981; Gladney, 2004; Yi, 2008) and solves the problem of maintaining minority groups’ cultural identity in modern China (Yi, 2008; Zhao & Postiglione, 2010). As Connor (1994) notes, “the multination state faces a dual threat, consisting of demands for self-determination from below and governmental programs of assimilation from above” (p. 22). China’s nation-building can be seen as a response to this dual challenge regarding the boundary between the Han and the non-Han groups. From the Chinese government’s nation-building perspective, the Han majority and the 55 officially defined ethnic minorities together form the greater Chinese nationality known as ‘zhonghua minzu’ (Fei, 1988; Johnson & Chhetri, 2002; Yi, 2008; Yu, 2007). The term ‘zhonghua’ serves as a boundary between Han people who are located around the middle and lower reaches of the Yellow River and the non-Han groups along the marginal areas (Chen, 1989; Yi, 2008). Eventually, ‘zhonghua’ developed into a concept with reference to the culture represented by the Han, highlighting the meaning of ‘hua’ as splendid, colourful, and beautiful (Chen, 1989; Yi, 2008). Correspondingly, phrases naming non-Han people were always associated with negative connotations whatever their original meaning (Dikötter, 1992; Yi, 2008). The term ‘minzu’, as a criteria for classifying people was borrowed from the Japanese and according to Liang Qi-chao, was conceptualized in 1903 to pursue a political rationale for nation-state building (Dikötter, 1992). ‘Zhonghua minzu’ was initially developed by Sun Yat-sen, who, in his inaugural speech as provisional president of the Republic of China in 1912, stressed the importance of integrating the five ethnic groups (Han, Manchu, Mongol, Muslim, and Tibetan) into the Chinese nation (Sun, 1986). From 1953, after the foundation of the PRC, the Chinese government launched an ethnic identification program throughout the country. Rather than being based on physical and anthropological race criteria common in the West, Chinese ethnic minority identification relied on Joseph Stalin’s four national criteria: a common territory, a common economy and a common psychological make-up (Fei, 1989; Kayongo-Male &

Benton Lee, 2004; Yu, 2007). Consequently, 56 ‘zhonghua minzu’ were officially recognized and all these, except the Han, were called ethnic minorities. Yu (2007), and Zhao and Postiglione (2010) indicate that the concept of ‘zhonghua minzu’ acts as a framework to unite the ethnic groups of the Chinese nation and maintain the country’s stability under the leadership of the CCP. This is done by creating ethnically based state governments. Officially, the term ‘zhonghua minzu’ stresses Marxist principles of ethnicity which is opposed to biological notions of ethnicity, in order to promote Chinese national cohesiveness, the Han civilization, and Chinese cultural pride in the party-state agenda of modernisation (Zhao & Postiglione, 2010). Moreover, the Han establishes itself as a ‘benefactor’ and ‘teacher’ of the ‘backward’ minority peoples, who should eventually ‘evolve’ and ‘assimilate’, with appropriate support and leadership provided by the CCP (Zhao & Postiglione, 2010). The concept of ‘zhonghua minzu’ has appeared frequently in the media and in statements and speeches from political figures (Yu, 2007). Yu (2007) and Zhao and Postiglione (2010) both point out that zhonghua minzu has a ‘pluralistic unitary structure’ which was set out by Chinese sociologist Fei Xiaotong in 1988. Fei Xiaotong presented a keynote speech titled ‘The Pluralistic Unity of the Chinese Nation’ at the Chinese University of Hong Kong in December, 1988. According to his theory of pluralist unity, the Han work as “the centripetal force around which a unified entity has been built”, and in which the Min participate (Yu, 2007, p. 236). For Fei (1988, p. 2), the Han group became the “core” of the Chinese nation, on the one hand, because of its “advanced” culture and technology at that time as well as its large population, which grew rapidly by both natural increase and assimilating other groups. On the other hand, the ethnic minority groups gradually merged into sub-union. The archeological findings ‘proved’ that a combined, merged common “cultural base”, which was shaped over thousands years, is “the foundation of political unity” (Fei, 1989, p. 3). This belief is reflected in the description of a “harmonious society” with Chinese ethnicity as a “plurality within the organic unity of the Chinese nation” (Postiglione, 2008, p. 15). In general, however, this is considered by many scholars as “a straight-line assimilation theory” (Postiglione, 2008, p. 15). That is to say, the Han is the dominant core of a pluralistic unity (Yu, 2007; Zhao & Postiglione, 2010). Up to now, Fei’s theory of ‘pluralist unity’ is considered by many Chinese scholars as the most important theory for interpreting the framework of the historical process of

16 the Chinese nationality: the distinct identities of the various nationalities are secondary to their identities as zhonghua (Yu, 2007). This influential approach has served as the guiding ideology to analyse the relationships between the ethnic groups (Yu, 2007). As Ma (1999) noted, even though Fei’s theory lacks empirical grounding, his contributions to the ideological consolidation of the formation of ‘zhonghua minzu’ are indisputable. Zhao and Postiglione (2010) further argue that the discourse of modernisation facilitates the cultural assimilation of ethnic groups into Chinese nationality for the sake of nation-building. This is echoed by other critics’ work. Gladney (1994), for example, indicated that the Han Chinese are often represented as being closer to ‘modern’ ends than minorities in terms of an ‘imagined’, normal and ‘unmarked’ category, in accordance with the Marxist historical trajectory from a lower to higher level. Gladney (2004) further noted that the invisibility of the majority Han is “at the expense of the visibility of the displayed minority” (p. 47). Han culture became “the cultural model legitimising national integration and assimilation of the minorities”, and a threat to the cultural identity of ethnic minorities (Dawa Norbu, 2001, p. 96). Taken together, these discursive dichotomies between Han in terms of a ‘core’ versus Min in terms of a ‘periphery’ demonstrate “the fluidity of the boundary between Han and non-Han” (Yi, 2008, p. 21). Notably, Zhu and Blachford (2005) indicate that China’s nation-building policy toward the disadvantaged ethnic minorities is “in contrast to the idea of individual rights in liberal democracies and multicultural countries” (p. 256). Although this kind of nation-building has increasingly deployed popular ideas of “universal human rights”, “China shows discomfort about foreign criticism”, when confronting outside interference regarding minorities (Zhu & Blachford, 2005, p. 256). They further point out that “an ethnic minority problem often becomes a big agony for a multinational state, regardless of whether or not it is liberal and democratic”; examples include indigenous people in Australia, people of the first nations in Canada, Corsicans in France, Basques, Catalonians and Galicians in Spain, Kurds in Iraq and Turkey, Chechens in Russia, and Tibetans in China (Zhu & Blachford, 2005, p. 256). In reviewing the background of China’s nation-building, this section thus highlights how the supposed ‘superiority’ of Chinese culture guides the political ideology of nation-building in China. In dichotomising the population into core versus periphery, the party-state tries to integrate the cultural-political mainstream and minorities into the

17 agenda of modernisation (Postiglione, 2009; Zhao & Postiglione, 2010; Yi, 2008). In this process of nation building, China uses its language and education policy as a fundamental tool (Bass, 2008).

2.2.2 Research literature: language and education policy in China

Since the mid-1980s there has been an increasing amount of research in English and Chinese on minority education in China (Bass, 2008; Fei, 1981; Gladney, 2004; Mackerras, 1998, 2011; Nima, 2001; Postiglione, 2009; Teng & Ma, 2005; Yi, 2008). The focus has been on multiple factors, including national unity, economic development, cultural diversity and socio-political concerns. As noted above, the discourse of modernisation was firmly anchored in dichotomies between Han and Min. However, as Stites (1999) points out, China’s dichotomous position creates a dilemma in relation to language and minority education: On the one hand, without mother tongue instruction, China cannot possibly enroll and keep monolingual linguistic minority children in school, but on the other hand, without providing minority children instruction in Mandarin [Chinese] the Chinese government cannot socialize these children into the political, cultural and economic mainstream of Chinese society. (p. 124)

The dichotomies between Han in terms of a ‘core’ and Min in terms of a ‘periphery’ result in a language and education policy discourse promoting Chinese cultural imperialism (Yi, 2008). The concept of ‘wen’, or culture, in China is a typical example. Historically it was linked to literacy in Chinese. As Postiglione (1999) notes, “the Chinese term wen, translated as ‘literature, writing, inscription’, is a central part of the idea of culture. To be ‘cultured’ is to possess wen or ‘literateness’ and to be transformed by such knowledge of wen” (p. 60). For example, officials believe that the use of Mandarin typifies the Chinese nation as a whole and serves the role of presenting a unified face to the world (Postiglione, 1999). There is also the lingering belief in many public officials that “to learn Chinese mean(s) one (becomes) Chinese” (Postiglione, 1999, p. 61). This was shared by Johnson and Chhetri (2002) who further argued that the process of transforming Min culture has always been related to obtain the goal of national unity. Therefore, to many Han Chinese the only way to civilize or acculturate

18 the minority nationalities is to have them become literate in Mandarin, particularly in relation to the constant theme of ‘national unity’. Chinese researchers believe that to help minorities catch up with the Han, the government must support them in terms of preferential treatment through economic and educational policies promoting unity in diversity (Li et al., 1995; Ma, 2011; Yuan et al., 2003). Much of the Chinese-language research on ethnic minority education discusses, and is grounded in, the Marxist ideology of ethnic minority education (Cherng, Hannum & Lu, 2012). It focuses on the ways that language and education policy for minorities can and should emphasize national unity and patriotism (Cherng, Hannum & Lu, 2012). The main goal of minority education was to foster allegiance towards China and ensure stability in border areas, highlighting Fei Xiaotong’s approach of ‘pluralist unity’ (Zhao & Postiglione, 2010; Yu, 2007). As noted previously, research in Chinese considered the approach of ‘pluralist unity’ as the most important theory for analysing the party- state’s education for minorities. Most of the Chinese official literature supports this ideology, and policies and programs regarding language and education are based on this framework. According to the Chinese policy literature, the CCP set priorities for the protection of minorities’ rights of language use (Li et al., 1995; Ma, 2011; Zhu, 2012). These authors highlight that the Constitution of the PRC in 1982 stipulated that all nationalities are equal and minority rights are protected; however, “the state promotes the nationwide use of Putonghua [Mandarin Chinese] (common speech based on Beijing pronunciation)” (Article 19 of the 1982 Constitution). The same is true in the case of the PRC Regional Autonomy Law for Minority Nationalities enacted in 1984, which guaranteed the language rights of minority students, and at the same time required minority students to learn Mandarin. In his article ‘A few thoughts on current problems in the field of ethnicity’, Zhu Weiqun (2012), the vice minister of the United Front Work Department of the CCP central committee, stressed that, “in terms both of ethnic development and progress, and strengthening the unity of the greater Chinese race, it will be necessary to pay close attention to promoting the spread of a common national language and writing system.” (p. 2). Therefore, the unification and national unity are important themes in schooling for minorities. In terms of education policy, the party-state strives to establish ‘unity in diversity’ policies to help the educational development of minority groups (Li et al., 1995). Ethnic

19 minority education, featured in a series of preferential policies from official perspective, is perceived as a particular measure taken to upgrade minorities’ educational standards in China (Wang & Zhou, 2003). For the party-state, China’s educational success in minority regions will depend on those regions’ engagement in the universal education system. By providing a standardized and unified education, the party-state aims to promote a high degree of cultural and political integration which is based on the more ‘advanced’ Chinese culture (Li et al., 1995). As such, Zhu (2012), for example, noted “a contradiction between self and enemy” in relation to the problem arises from “Western hostile forces” using “ethnic and religious issues to infiltrate and subvert us” (p. 1). Thus, Zhu (2012) calls for more stress on education must be focused on “ethnic commonality and identity in the cause of constructing socialism with Chinese characteristics” (p. 1). Therefore, much of the Chinese policy literature shows that unity is emphasized and anything that damages national unity is prohibited. Both traditional and socialist ideologies placed heavy emphasis on unity education for minorities (Li et al., 1995; Ma, 2011). The trajectory from communism to socialism, and then to ‘so called’ socialism with Chinese characteristics, is characterised by a consistent belief in the new economic and patriotic values. In ‘On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People’, Mao Zedong (1957) articulated the central aim of Chinese education: it should enable everyone to develop morally, intellectually and physically and become a worker with both a socialist consciousness and culture. Since the 1980s, the scope of moral education has been broadened from its original emphasis on the indoctrination of socialist values to encompass ‘legal education’, ‘psychological health’, and ‘knowledge of life’ (State Education Committee, 1986; 1995b). Integration aims to ensure the merging of peripheral ethnic areas into the core Han Chinese nation; this was made clear in the Outline of the Implementation of Patriotic Education, enacted on 8 August 1994. It also claims to maintain the country’s stability and helps to eliminate aspirations for separatism (Li et al., 1995; Ma, 2011). School moral education forms part of such work to cultivate socialist builders and successors. However, some literature in English problematizes this approach (Bass, 2008; Johnson & Chhetri, 2002; Roundtable, 2003; Wang & Phillion, 2009; Zhao & Postiglione, 2010). They argue that through notions of ‘unity in diversity’ Han Chinese identity serves as a replacement for minority identities within China’s modernisation (Zhao & Postiglione, 2010). The ideology behind the emphasis on national identity as a

20 priority in language education by policymakers and educators in China is evidently nationalism/patriotism (Feng, 2009). This argument echoes the views of a number of scholars who are critical of this perspective that focuses on the ways that education can and should emphasize national unity and patriotism (Bass, 2008; Johnson & Chhetri, 2002; Postiglione, 1999; Roundtable, 2003; Wang & Phillion, 2009; Zhou, 2004). These authors argue that the main goal of minority education was to foster allegiance towards China and ensure stability in border areas; whereas, Han Chinese were to be educated to provide technical personnel for social, economic and cultural development. They also argue that there will be growing inequality between core and periphery that will endanger the long-term stability of China as a multicultural nation. Thus, I problematize this term of preferential policy. As Johnson and Chhetri (2002, p. 142) indicated that minority education is a part of “China’s overall defence strategy” focusing on the pacification of minorities. Bass (2008) also noted that China uses its education system relating to preferential policy as a fundamental tool of nation-building promoting national unity and patriotism. Furthermore, some researchers point out that moral education regarding national unity and patriotism is still regarded by the Party and the state as the main or controlling source of the individual’s morality, politics, beliefs and values, along with conflicts between the party-state’s political propaganda and the pursuit of a more free and pluralistic society at local levels (Cherng, Hannum & Lu, 2012; Lin, 1997; Postiglione, 2008; Zhou, 2001). Specifically, in terms of the preferential policy regarding minority rights of language use, Wang and Phillion (2009, pp. 5-6) support Zhou’s (2004) conclusion that minority groups’ language rights stipulated by law empower the state rather than the minority individuals; in effect, state rights are weightier than individual minority rights. Badeng Nima (2001) and Clothey (2001) both indicate that the massive use of Mandarin in technological, economic, and educational development, and in official bureaucracies, government agencies, media, and daily communication enhances its utility. As Lin Jing (1997) points out, Mandarin is overwhelmingly used by the power holders while minority languages “are limited in use and of low social status” (p. 196). As a consequence, Chinese emerges and functions as the main instrument for communication between and across different minority communities (Postiglione, 1999; Roundtable, 2003; Wang & Phillion, 2009; Zhou, 2004). As a result, minorities suffer discrimination (Lin, 1997; Ma, 2006). Notably, Mandarin is required in job market under the economic

21 development policy, social and professional communication of minority students after graduation, Importantly, researchers have found that speaking Mandarin guarantees not only better employment opportunities but also “the option of entry into the identity of being Chinese” (Nelson, 2005, p. 26). Zhu and Blachford (2005, p. 243) argue that “ethnic minorities’ rights and interests are often compromised because they have to be subordinated to the dominant political entity”, particularly in relation to their identity construction. As Eriksen (2002, p. 90) notes, “standardized mass education can therefore be an extremely powerful machine for the creation of abstract identifications”. In terms of education for minorities, the Chinese Communist project has been presented fundamentally as a moral project to remould the cultures of a unifying socialist community, based on Han culture (Bass, 2005). Despite political upheavals and social changes in the last six decades, such ‘moral education’ has continued to be important in the maintenance of the group collectivist ethic evident in China (Bass, 2005; Cherng, Hannum & Lu, 2012). Warren et al. (2011) indicate that moral education in the school and community was a core element of Communist propaganda promoting the Chinese Communist ideology, while moral education for minorities in China has always been closely linked with political nature of policies promoted by the party-state (Lin, 1997; Postiglione, 2008; Zhou, 2001). Lin (1997), and Johnson and Chhetri (2002) both point out that political instability caused by ethnic tension in minority provinces has resulted in the CCP’s political policies that focus on re-establishing national unity and a national identity. These policies have resulted in many exclusionary practices that prevent minority students from fully participating in and gaining benefits from the educational system. Bhattacharya (2007) argues that education has clearly striven to integrate China as a unified nation into which minorities were assimilated. Reports exist of Han Chinese teachers telling minority students that their native language was “useless for job opportunities and traditions would harm their education” (Bhattacharya, 2007, p. 253). As such, Cherng, Hannum and Lu (2012) noted that assimilative education often “ignores other values” and may lead to “the disappearance of distinct cultures” (p. 19). Within the state’s policies and practices of modernisation, Postiglione, Jiao and Gyatso (2006) argue that the meeting of traditional and modern cultural values and practices has the potential to lead to “confusion, conflict and estrangement” (p. 332).

With respect to religion, the political scientist Colin Mackerras claims that “the schools’ emphasis is on Chinese language and culture; and they certainly do not encourage the practice of traditional religions so important to many of the minorities” (Mackerras, 2003, p. 133). On the other hand, “globalisation has even assisted the revival of religions in China”, for example, the global interest in Tibetan Buddhism (Mackerras, 2011a, p. 304). In his more recent publication, China’s ethnic minorities: Global-local interactions over sixty years (2011a), Mackerras argues that the discursive dichotomy in terms of minority nationalities versus the majority nationality mirrors China’s local-global interactions. Because of China’s strong economic development, Mandarin has become essential in national and global contexts. Many do not even speak the language of their own nationality and become all but assimilated. Linguistic assimilation was thus defined as the fundamental condition for belonging to the nation as well as a way of establishing national unity. As Yi (2011) indicates, “the priority of the party-state is usually to justify and legitimize its regime by focusing upon and fostering political loyalty in the masses, centering on economic development, at the expense of second-rate MCs [minority cultures]” (p. 407). Yi described this as “the process through which minority cultures and subjects are interpreted and defined by the cultural mainstream as inferior and less valuable for the modernisation of China, and are in consequent need of transformation, particularly through education”. He puts it as follows: In dichotomizing advanced cultures vis-à-vis backward ones, this process has ethnicized minorities’ differences. However, within the process itself are internal contradictions that render any attempts at actual education self-contradictory and ultimately unproductive (p. 395)

Yi Lin’s work is very important for this study, particularly in relation to the discursive dichotomy of ‘backward’ minorities versus the ‘advanced’ majority. As Yi (2011) concludes that “the discourse of culture often serves as a tool to draw symbolic boundaries for the cultural-political mainstream to retain its privileges and power – correspondingly for minorities to avoid further marginalisation in the larger society” (p. 407). This view is based on Heberer’s (1990) research on the “borderline integration” of the minority policy in China.

However, certain factors contributing to integration and barriers to integration have not been specifically discussed. This has resulted in gaps in the research that produce problems with our understanding of China’s minority policy context and policy practices for national unity and minority integration in the future. In particular, the impact of neoliberalism on China’s minority/bilingual education policy and policy enactment has been largely ignored by both Chinese and Western scholars. Research on market reforms and neoliberalism in China has paid little attention to China’s ethnic minorities and their socio-political concerns. As regards to the above aspects, it is clear from Yi’s (2011) study that China’s integration agenda is limited by notions of cultural backwardness. Postiglione (2009, p. 502) adds support for this argument regarding the dichotomy of minorities versus the majority, linking it with similar patterns in international and global contexts: The notion of cultural backwardness continues to adhere to popular discourse about ethnic minorities, and it is often cited in China as the principal reason for educational under achievement (Harrell, 2001). This notion is not unique to China and was also used by Western nations to stress their cultural superiority, most notably by the British for over a century to the Irish, who they insisted were in need of being civilized, even though Ireland became richer per capita than any other nation in Europe.

Furthermore, Postiglione (2009) argues that the notion of the ‘backwardness’ of minorities within the context of Chinese education is part of a civilizing mission. He highlights case studies in specific minority communities, such as Harrell and Erzi’s (1999) study of the Yi minority who feel that acculturation cannot and should not lead to assimilation, and Hansen (1999) who stresses the negative effects of popular perception about cultural backwardness on the Dai minority. These case studies reinforce Postiglione’s (2002) claim that “the link between policy and practice is an area that receives constant attention in educational research on ethnic minority education in all parts of the world” (p. 87). In other words, it is necessary to analyse education policy in relation to its practice. For the purpose of this study, I will focus on case studies in language and education policy implementation for Tibetans in the following section.

2.2.3 Case studies: language and education policy implementation for Tibetans

Case studies of Tibetans reveal that the implementation of the state language and education policy is limited by notions of cultural backwardness, despite the state’s policy attempts to accord importance to the special cultural characteristics of Tibetan regions and to improve educational access for Tibetans (Bass, 2008; Postiglione, 1999; 2009). The theme of Tibetan cultural backwardness remains salient, reflected in the promotion of Han culturalism in language and education policy implementation. In addressing the perilous decline of the Tibetan language and culture, researchers generally approach this issue with a focus on its political or its educational dimensions (Hillman, 2010; Johnson & Chhetri, 2002; Mackerras, 1994, 2011a; Nima, 2001; Tournadre & Dorje, 2003; Wang & Phillion, 2009).

2.2.3.1 Political dimensions of language and education policy

From the political perspective of policy makers, national unity and stability are considered top national priorities for which any right can be sacrificed, including the right to Tibetan language education in school (Bass, 2008; He, 2005; Mackerras, 1994; Nima, 2001; Wang & Phillion, 2009). He (2005) provided a typical example regarding Tibetan language education implementation. In 1987 the Tibet Autonomous Regional People’s Congress developed a plan for the exclusive use of Tibetan language in school textbooks and classroom teaching as well as cultivating respect for Tibetan culture. This plan, however, “has been abandoned as part of the post-1989 crackdown on ‘separatism’ and almost all subjects are now taught in Chinese” (He, 2005, p. 72). Thus, Wang and Phillion (2009) argue that “any individual rights or policies that are regarded as threats to national unity must be abandoned” (p. 5). Bass (2008) stated that the Chinese Government addressed the threat of Tibetan nationalism by promoting a narrow Marxist model in the political discourse of the wider Tibetan society and in schools. In this Marxist discourse, Tibetan culture was described as a manifestation of the ruling class; and the statements by the Dalai Lama about the status of Tibetan culture were described as being a threat to national unity (Bass, 2008). Bass (2008, p. 40) cited the Tibetan Autonomous Region Party Secretary, Chen Kuiyuan, in a pivotal speech on art and culture in July 1997: the intention of the Dalai

25 clique is to make a so-called unified Tibetan culture in opposition to Han culture (Chen, 1997). By depicting Tibetan culture as representative of “class interests”, a dichotomy between Tibetan nationalism and national unity was constructed in the CCP’s development path (Bass, 2008, p. 40). Bass (2008) further argues that “the interpretation of Tibetan nationalism as a plot by ‘external hostile forces’ to split the Motherland led to the reassertion of the primary ideological role of ‘minority education’ to ensure stability” (p. 40). For example, in a speech to the Fifth Regional Meeting on Education in the TAR, Party Secretary Chen Kuiyuan told delegates: The success of our education does not lie in the number of diplomas issued […] It lies, in the final analysis, in whether our graduating students are opposed to or turn their hearts to the Dalai clique and in whether they are loyal to or do not care about our great motherland and the great socialist cause. (Chen, 1994)

This political discourse regarding Tibetan education implementation was echoed in much research on issues related to minority education for Tibetans. Badeng Nima (2001) states, “for a long time, both Chinese and Tibetan officials have believed that advocating Tibetan language education in school would arouse feelings of local nationalism and would increase the chances of conflict” (p. 98). As a result, “some Tibetans are actually working against those who advocate Tibetan-language education, punishing the lower officials who do so” (Nima, 2001, p. 98) for fear of conflict arising between Tibetan officials and Han officials. For example, Nima found that Mandarin permeates Tibet: from government documents to telegrams, from electrical appliances’ instructions to technical concepts used in work environments, and from businesses to schools. The widespread use of Mandarin in Tibet has had devastating effects on Tibetan language learning, maintenance, and use; in effect there has been a loss of high Tibetan culture, including Tibetan Buddhism, through what Nima terms a “collision between ‘traditional knowledge’ and ‘modern knowledge’” (p. 98). Thus, Tibetans need to learn Chinese to “live in modern society” (p. 100), and to “function well in modern society” (p. 101). In other words, learning Chinese is required for Tibetans to keep pace with the development of modern society. More critically, the goal of the communist government was to assimilate the Tibetans into the Han Chinese culture, by spreading the CCP’s ideology and power base

(Bass, 2008; Sangay, 1998). Bass (2008) points out that schools are intended to provide a space outside the community, where Tibetan children are taught “a new moral code, inspired by sense of modernity, patriotism and socialism” (p. 40). As Hansen (1999) argues, the Central Government guidelines for patriotic education stipulate making ‘love of the local area’ fundamental to the ‘love of the party-state’. This use of patriotism as “a legitimizing ideology” was to have significant implications for education in Tibetan areas, emphasising “pride in China’s economic achievements and its great traditions” (Bass, 2008, p. 40). This resonates with Yi Lin’s argument that “the priority of the party-state is usually to justify and legitimize its regime by focusing upon and fostering political loyalty in the masses” (p. 407), as noted above. In Foucault’s terms, Han Chinese nationalism functions as a ‘regime of truth’ (Mackerras, 1989. P. 263). The failure of this assimilative education is also discussed in relation to curricular implementation in Tibetan schools (Postiglione, 1998). As Bass (2008) points out: The primary Tibetan language curriculum, in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), is used both as a means of engendering the cultural transformation that is part of China’s nation-building project and fostering the political allegiance deemed to be necessary to mould China’s different groups into a single nation. (p. 39)

Specifically, Bass (2008) states that Tibetan children are taught to reason with predetermined formulae that aim to inculcate a belief in “the new economic and patriotic values” (p. 47). This is done through a course called ‘Ideology and morality’ which is an integral part of all the courses in Chinese schools (CCP Central Committee, 1994), and by repeating important texts, such as those about “Communist heroes, or those that outline the relationship between Tibet and China”. Notably, Tibetan stories are classified as “optional reading” (Bass, 2008, p. 47). In other words, Han Chinese ancient traditions were celebrated and encouraged, while “Tibet’s pre-1950s culture was once again described in the curriculum as backward and oppressive” (Bass, 2008, p. 40). Moreover, a renewed emphasis on ethnic unity and amalgamation led to “the reinterpretation of a separate Tibetan culture with its distinctive historic and religious traditions as unpatriotic” (Bass, 2008, p. 40).

The disengaging of Tibetan culture from Tibetan Buddhism has been achieved in the new curriculum by removing Buddhism from the textbooks (Bass, 2008). For example, a number of religious images in the 1993 edition Tibetan textbook, such as a thangka (Buddhist painting), a dorje (a drum used in Buddhist ceremonies) a chorten (a reliquary), and a ba (a mask used in Buddhist ritual dances) have been removed from the 2001 edition (TAR People’s Publisher 1993, 2001a). The preface to one of the new editions makes reference to having “got rid of useless old words” (TAR People’s Publisher, 2001b, as cited in Bass, 2008, p. 43). Tibet’s Buddhist heritage was interpreted as a non-religious cultural heritage (Bass, 2008). That is to say, Tibetan children are taught to understand the heritage of Tibetan culture in the context of “a common Chinese cultural heritage not as separate heritage and, more particularly, not as a religious heritage” (Bass, 2008, p. 43). In doing so, a spirit of unity with other nationalities in China and the identification of Tibet as an “unalienable part of China” are reified in the new curriculum (Bass, 2008, p. 42). Case studies reveal that the transition from religious education to mass secular education has been slow and difficult in policy implementation in Tibet, and has led to resistance (Johnson & Chhetri, 2002; Nima, 1997, 2000; Mackerras, 1994; Postiglione, 1999; Wang & Phillion, 2009). Postiglione (1999) noted that the Chinese standardized curriculum, which was not related to Tibetan lives, causes an increase in dropout rates. For example, historically the majority Han culture has always been secular. Religion and education were not (and still are not) related (Johnson & Chhetri, 2002). Many Tibetans continue to claim that there is a need to include Tibetan religious culture and traditional knowledge in the curriculum so that Tibetan children will be motivated to learn (Johnson, 2000; Postiglione, 1999). Nima’s research (2000) also noted how mainstream education centring on Mandarin leads to a loss of self-esteem and interest in education, particularly in the case of Tibetans, and is reflected in low school attendance rates and dropout rates. As Postiglione (1999) explains: if members of a minority hold the view that they can use education to achieve success, they devise ways to surmount the obstacles posed by cultural divergence. If they hold, on the other hand, the view that the education system will merely strip them of their own culture and identity without giving them equal opportunity in the wider society, they will respond with resistance. (p. 214)

Wang and Phillion (2009) pointed out that dropout rates and high illiteracy rates can be seen as a form of resistance, particularly in relation to a divide between the national curriculum and ethnic minority community knowledge and values. It is through the uniform curriculum and under-representation and misrepresentation of Tibetan culture and language in elementary school textbooks that the hegemonic control over Tibetans and the imposition of Han-dominated ideology is established (Wang & Phillion, 2009, p. 9). This is supported by Mackerras (1994) and Gladney (1999) who argued that Han dominance resulted in little representation of Tibetan language, culture, religion, and knowledge relating to their daily life. Postiglione (1999) calls for more research on this issue, a call to which this thesis, in part, can be seen as a response. Hillman’s (2010) case study on China’s Diqing Tibetans as a model for development with Tibetan characteristics is another attempt to address this issue. Hillman (2010) argues that Diqing’s success in achieving both growth and stability in recent years has been made possible largely by “adopting a relatively liberal approach to cultural and religious expression” (p. 276). As Mackerras (2011b) noted, Hillman’s reesarch is based on extensive fieldwork in the Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in Yunnan Province, particularly in relation to monasticism. Hillman’s case study complements my thesis, particularly given our shared focus on fieldwork into policy enactment practices within the local state’s open policy context.

2.2.3.2 Educational dimensions of language and education policy

From an educational perspective, Sangay (1998) stated that Mandarin pervades all Tibetan areas and all aspects of public life. This has resulted in a deterioration of Tibetan language skills and lack of knowledge about their historical and cultural backgrounds (Postiglione, Jiao, & Manlaji, 2007). Tibetan students who have graduated from all-Chinese language elementary schools more easily find and adapt to education in secondary schools, which are Chinese-dominant in both teaching and curricula (Stites, 1999). Nima (2001) further noted that some Tibetans believe that learning Chinese is the only way to improve their life by “getting government jobs after graduation” (p. 95). This situation promoting Mandarin as the main medium of instruction in education leads Clothey (2001) to conclude that “Mandarin proficiency is still a prerequisite for a more esteemed education” (p. 21).

Another focus of Chinese minority education research is Tibetan boarding schools/classes in which groups of Tibetan students live and study in Han society (Wang & Zhou, 2003; Zhu, 2007). In regard to these schools, diverse results have been yielded in previous studies (Clothey, 2001; Wang & Zhou, 2003; Zhu, 2007). For example, Clothey (2001) concluded that boarding schools could help students to obtain promising education outcomes, whereas, Wang and Zhou (2003) reached the conclusion that boarding schools marginalized indigenous languages and cultures. However, both studies overlooked the voices and perceptions of the Tibetan students themselves. In contrast, Zhu focuses on Tibetan students’ school life experiences and perspectives. Zhu’s (2007) case study, like Wang and Zhou (2003), concluded that the state and the boarding school utilised students’ ethnic identities to serve the state’s political and economic aims of strengthening and developing Tibet within the PRC.

2.2.4 Implications within the context of the logic of equivalence

Building on the above discussion of China’s nation-building, including research literature on language and education policy for minorities, and case studies of language and education policy implementation for Tibetans, this section uncovers how the discursive dichotomy between the ‘core’ of Han versus the ‘periphery’ of Min guides the political ideology of nation-building in China and pervades language and education policy implementation. Specifically, this section consider China’s nation-building and language and education policy in the context of the logic of equivalence in terms of ‘Minority = backward versus Han = advanced’ within Discourse Theory (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, 2001, see Chapter 1 above). The logic of equivalence works by establishing a discursive unity among disparate elements by positing the existence of a common threat, against which these elements define themselves (Clohesy, 2005). The process of China’s modernisation shows that the nation has become the predominant way of imagining the cultural identity and political community of modern societies (Torfing, 1999). As Mark and Mark (2007) indicate, the most common expression of cultural identity in modernity is understood as “national culture” (p. 174), which “emerged with and helped to shape modernity by gradually displacing (but of course not entirely) the pre-modern discourses of identity mentioned earlier: tribal, ethnic, religious and regional” (p. 175). The discourses of nation building and cultural

30 identity continue to “play an important role in providing the myths and social imaginaries that organize and guide social and political action” (Torfing, 1999, p. 191). It is through the discourse of modernisation relating to nation building, cultural identity, and the market system that an expansive hegemony is established. Furthermore, I argue that China’s modernisation, as a neoliberalizing process, inevitably involves many contradictions and inconsistencies that are explored below.

2.3 Bilingual Education Policy for minorities in China

This section reviews research literature on bilingual education policy for minorities in general, and case studies of bilingual education policy implementation in Tibetan areas in particular. It draws out critical perspectives, including (1) China’s ethnic diversity characterised by significant cultural, regional and developmental differences; (2) bilingual education relating to the themes in terms of national unity, economic development, the powerful influence of Mandarin and Han culture, and various minority cultures, languages and ethnic identities; and (3) the extensive gap between bilingual education policy and policy implementation in Tibetan school communities.

2.3.1 China’s ethnic diversity

In recent years, it has become increasingly apparent that China is not an ethnically homogeneous country but a culturally diversified and multinational state (Bass, 2008; Gladney 1998; Postiglione, 1992, 2009; Wang & Phillion, 2009; Yi, 2011), although the process of China’s modernisation shows that the assumed superiority embodied in Chinese culturalism underpins the political ideology of nation-building in China, as discussed above. According to Fei Xiaotong’s (1988) influential theory of plurality and unity, plurality refers to the idea that “the Chinese people are composed of numerous elements”, taking into account the 56 ethnic minority groups of various sizes, origins, histories, religions, languages and customs (Fei, 1988, p. 48). China’s minorities are characterised by great cultural, regional and developmental differences (Postiglione, 1992). Thus, the unified set of national minority policies espoused by the government is intended to “take account of the unique situation of each national minority” (Postiglione, 1992, p. 307).

Officially, recognized ethnic minority groups, accounting for 8.41% of China’s population (National Bureau of Statistics China, 2004), have different places of origin (Fei, 1989). Research notes that minorities occupy a critical place in the Chinese scheme of things in at least two ways (Johnson & Chhetri, 2002; Lin, 1997; Mackerras, 1994; Postiglione, 1992). First, ethnic minority groups occupy more than 60% of China’s total land (Postiglione, 1992) and these areas weigh heavily on China’s economic development (Johnson & Chhetri, 2002; Mackerras, 1994). This is because minority regions are rich in natural resources; they represent 39.3 per cent of China’s forest areas and 89.6 per cent of China’s pastureland and abundant mineral resources (Mackerras, 1994; Postiglione, 1992). The current agendas of China towards economic modernisation obviously depend on the tapping of those resources (Johnson & Chhetri, 2002). Second, these areas feature prominently in China’s overall defence strategy (Johnson & Chhetri, 2002; Mackerras, 1994). Over 90 per cent of China’s international border region is occupied by minorities (Lin, 1997; Postiglione, 1992; Zhou, 2001). As Lin (1997) points out, minority peoples in China mainly reside in areas along China’s strategic and sometimes troubled international borders and often maintain close relationships with those of their group living on the other side of the border. Thus, the strategic geographic positions of China’s ethnic minorities give them an importance beyond their already significant numbers. The multiple places of origin indicate that the pattern of multiethnic structure of the Chinese nation is related to the diversity of historical, cultural, and developmental characteristics. As Mackerras (1994) states, in China, the 55 officially recognized ethnic minorities differ dramatically, with unique linguistic, ethnic and religious features (see Figure 2.1). One of the major distinctive features is the diversity of their languages. Except for Hui and Manchu, who, like the Han, speak Mandarin,, all other 53 minorities have their own languages, which amounts to a total of more than 80 mother tongues (Blachford & Zhou, 2004; Johnson & Chhetri, 2002; Stites, 1999). Minority languages are distinct from each other and Mandarin.

Figure 2.1: Ethnic Minorities in China Source from: http://www.maps-of-china.net/chinamaps/chethnic.gif

Another major distinctive feature is the realm of religion. As Yi (2011) noted, minorities’ commitment to religious beliefs is “in sharp contrast with the largely, though arguably, secular Han culture” (p. 396). In terms of scale, Islam and Buddhism are the most prevalent faiths, comprising the 10 Muslim communities in north-west Xinjiang and the Gansu-Qinghai-Ningxia regions, and the Tibetan Buddhists and some other communities in western China respectively (Mackerras, 1999; Yi, 2011). Importantly, these areas are beginning to become ‘globalised’, particularly in relation to the mutual influences of “Tibetan Buddhism and the ‘new spirituality’ so popular in the West” (Mackerras, 2003, p. 133). Thus, Mackerras (2003) concludes that impact of globalisation is in its early stages in the religion of the China’s ethnic minorities. The impact of globalisation is also in its early stages in China’s ethnic minority education (Mackerras, 2003). Presently, over 21.35 million language minority students are being educated in PRC schools (MOE, 2009). China has the largest language minority student body in the world. These minority students are from more than 80 diverse mother tongues and strategic territories (Blachford & Zhou, 2004; Stites, 1999).

As implied in the Law on Ethnic Minority Education, the primary goal of Chinese minority education is to produce and develop both ethnic and expert learners so that they are adaptable to changing and diverse environments: regionally, nationally, and globally (Postiglione, 1999). However, “the number and diversity of languages used by the non-Han peoples of China is a formidable barrier to the popularization of education in China’s rural and remote frontier regions” (Postiglione, 1999, p. 95). This circumstance led China to provide minority students with bilingual education to promote national unity and solidarity, economic development, a harmonious society, as well as various minority cultures, languages and ethnic identities (Feng, 2009; Johnson & Chhetri, 2002; Tsung & Clarke, 2010). In the next section, I focus on the research literature about China’s bilingual education policy for minorities.

2.3.2 Bilingual education policy for minorities

Minority language rights and equal opportunities in China’s bilingual education programs have long been social issues and comprise a field of academic inquiry of remarkable growth. Much research shows that the Chinese government’s decision to allow bilingual education is not completely altruistic; a number of aims are involved in bilingual educational models, linking minorities’ language heritage, cultural values and beliefs, ethnic identity, economic development, and national unity (see, for example, Blachford & Zhou, 2004; Bass, 2008; Dai & Cheng, 2007; Dai & Dong, 1999; Feng, 2007; Johnson & Chhetri, 2002; Lin, 1997; Nima, 2009; Postiglione, 2009; Teng & Ma, 2005). In the last few decades, the rise of minority language and cultural rights and equal opportunities has brought such issues to the forefront of bilingual education policy for minorities throughout the world. In multilingual Europe, the debate around linguistic diversity and multilingualism has made some governments allow the inclusion of regional indigenous languages in the education system, along with a remarkable growth of interest in cultural tolerance (Baker, 2006; Vez, 2009). In the United States, bilingual education, including the use of native tongues of indigenous populations and the status of Spanish as a ‘threat’ to English, has been a topic of hot debate among politicians, educators, media commentators, and large numbers of citizens concerned wth language diversity (Crawford, 2000; Cummins, 2000; Carlos, 2003; Fishman, 1989; Paulston,

1988). In New Zealand, there remain ongoing and equally significant challenges to bilingual education which are invariably framed within the wider language, social and political context (May, 2002a, 2002b; May & Hill, 2005). Canada is a positive example of a composite multilingual setting, with programs to address minority concerns of bilingual education programs, highlighting that First Nations and Canadians have a collective public responsibility to ensure a high quality system with an emphasis on identity, language and culture (Mcdonald, 2011; “National Panel on First Nations’ Education”, 2012). Western bilingual scholars, such as Cummins (1986) and Lambert (1980), have tackled policy and practice concerns involving minority language (L1) maintenance, majority language (L2) acquisition, the relationship between L1 maintenance and L2 acquisition, noting “how that relationship can be fostered, constrained, or severed as a result of macro and micro-level policies and practices” (Taylor & Sakamoto, 2009, p. 335). Cummins (1986) has chronicled that the common thread that many researchers have highlighted in bilingual education policy debates and implementation issues is that of language and power. Cummins (1986) and Lambert (1980) have also suggested best practices and fought for best policies for minority language speakers in bilingual education programs and mainstream classrooms, particularly in relation to the two types of bilingualism: additive and subtractive (Baker, 2001). Additive bilingualism is “a situation where a second language is learnt by an individual or a group without detracting from the maintenance and development of the first language” (Baker & Jones, 1998, p. 698); for additive bilingualism to occur, the language learner must have a positive attitude towards his or her native language and culture as well as the target language and culture. On the contrary, subtractive bilingualism is “a situation in which a second language is learnt at the expense of the first language, and gradually replaces the first language” (Baker & Jones, 1998, p. 706); that is, learning L2, which is a majority language may undermine L1, which is a minority language, resulting in a subtractive situation (Baker, 2001). For China’s bilingual education policies for minorities, L1 refers to minority languages and L2 refers to Chinese, the majority language. Like other multilingual nations, China’s bilingual education policy and implementation have been a hot topic of debate among politicians and educators. Since the 1990s there have been two contrary trends in bilingual education policy and implementation for minorities around themes

35 such as national unity, economic development, the powerful influence of Mandarin and Han culture, and various minority cultures, languages and ethnic identities (see, for example, Blachford & Zhou, 2004; Cobbey, 2007; Dai & Cheng, 2007; Feng, 2007, 2008; Johnson, 2000; Lin, 1997; Ma, 2007; Ross, 2000; Stites, 1999; Wang & Zhou, 2003; Zhou, 2001).

Bilingual education promoting ‘Min-Han Jiantong’

On the one hand, the Chinese government appears to have done quite significant work to increase aspects of ethnic identity in the education of minority groups, by claiming minority language heritage through the bilingual education promoting ‘Min-Han Jiantong’ (Feng, 2007; Ma, 2007; Wang & Zhou, 2003; Zhou, 2001). The Chinese government policies promoting ‘pluralist unity’ often attempt to pacify the 8.48% of ethnic minority groups living on the border by providing them with relevant social and cultural services (Blachford, 1997; Cobbey, 2007). The government required each district to set a specific policy regarding the issue of bilingual education according to the situation in the district (Ma, 2007). China’s bilingual education policies acknowledge that language carries important cultural knowledge and that native languages help minority cultures inherit and preserve their cultural values and beliefs (Lin, 1997). Ma (2007) further pointed out that policies promoting Fei Xiaotong’s ‘pluralist unity’ have influenced the development of bilingual education in China. To some extent, these policies illustrate that the ‘pluralist unity’ approach in bilingual education is to “take the local language environment as the basis, while also taking into account the social and economic development needs, pedagogical benefits and the wishes of the masses” (Zhou, 1989, p. 31, as cited in Ma, 2007, p. 15). As noted above, the ideal aim of bilingual education is ‘Min-Han Jiantong’, mastery of both Min, minority language (L1), and Han, Mandarin (L2), to achieve bilingualism through bicultural identities (Feng, 2007, 2008, 2009). Officially, minorities are required to be proficient in their native language as well as Chinese in order to strengthen their competence in the two languages and cultures (Blachford & Zhou, 2004; Feng, 2007; Johnson & Chhetri, 2002). Ethnic minority language is interpreted by some local community authorities as the heart of Min-Han Jiantong. This comes before the national language in minority education for the preservation and promotion of minority

36 language and culture, although the nationwide use of Mandarin is also promoted (Dai & Cheng, 2007; Feng, 2008, 2009). Bilingual education models for language minority students in China vary according to the role of the mother tongue in schooling (Feng, 2009; Ma, 2007; Nima, 2000, 2001). The approach to bilingual education mainly has two models, 1) a minority-language dominant model, and 2) a Chinese-dominant model in minority prefectures, counties and towns (Feng, 2009; Ma, 2007; Nima, 2000, 2001). The models are detailed in Figure 2.2 below.

Bilingual Approaches to bilingual education education models Model 1 For those areas where the Mandarin language environment is minority-language not good, students are to learn in the minority language first; dominant model Han is introduced when students have become proficient in their own language. The aim is eventually to have the students become fluent in both languages. Model 2 For those areas where the Mandarin language environment is Chinese-dominant relatively good, teaching is undertaken in two languages. model Teachers teach the texts in Mandarin and use the minority language to give explanations. Mandarin is the main language to be used, and the minority language is used only to facilitate the learning of Mandarin.

Figure 2.2: Bilingual education models for minority students in China

In reviewing the literature on China’s bilingual education models for minority students, I found some scholars’ research very useful and interesting, because they located the bilingual education policies and the implementations of bilingual education models in a certain region and specific historical contexts. These researchers focus on the relations between the changes in bilingual education and educational levels in different types of minority communities, linking local language, local culture, and ethnic identity across time and place (Dai & Dong, 1999; Kolås, 2003; Postiglione, 2008; Zhang, 2004; Zhou, 2001). They categorised China’s minority communities into

37 three types (see Figure 2.3), in accordance with their history of utilising writing systems for native languages and their access to bilingual education (Dai & Dong, 1999; Zhou, 2000).

Minority Contexts community types Type 1 The main minority groups are comprised of more than one million people (Korean, Kazak, Mongolian, Tibetan, and Uygur). They have functional writing systems and regular bilingual education. Geographically, these communities are located along China’s western, northern, and north eastern border areas; and historically, these groups had enjoyed a degree of self-governance prior to the Communist revolution. Type 2 Those between one million and 100000 people (Dai, Jingpo, Lisu, Lahu, Miao, Naxi, Va, and Yi) have greater or lesser degrees of writing systems and occasional bilingual education. Type 3 The remaining 42 language groups with less than 100000 people who have had limited or no bilingual education during the past 60 years.

Figure 2.3: China’s minority communities into three types

On the basis of the above classifications, bilingual education development has been divided into three stages (Zhou, 2000). The first stage is the start-up pluralistic stage (1949-1957). Efforts were made to fully encourage bilingualism and bilingual education, highlighting the implementation of Model 1 (minority-language dominant model) (Dai & Dong, 1997). In the second stage, the Chinese-monopolistic stage (1958-1977), bilingual education was politically discouraged and Chinese as L1 promoted with minority language as a supplement (Dai & Dong, 1999; Zhou, 2001). In this stage, bilingual education was almost completely abandoned in type 2 and type 3 communities, and was reduced to the minimum in type 1 communities (Lin, 1997). This resulted in minority literacy declining (Nelson, 2005). During the third stage of second pluralistic

38 stage (1978-present), bilingual education has developed by restoring the bilingual education model and developing it beyond its previous levels (Dai & Cheng, 2007; Zhou, 2001). It is clear from Zhou’s (2001) study that bilingual education promoting ‘Min-Han Jiantong’ is essential for all three types of communities, although the imperative to implement bilingual education is lacking in lesser populated areas. Therefore, Zhou’s work adds meaning to my understanding of China’s bilingual education policy and policy enactment across three different types of Tibetan school communities.

Language and power in China’s bilingual education for minorities

Reflecting the common thread in all the bilingual education policy debates and implementation issues Cummins (1986) has chronicled, the problems with bilingual education in China that many researchers have highlighted have also been that of language and power (Johnson, 2000; Lin, 1997; Mackerras, 2003; Sangay, 1998; Wang & Phillion, 2009; Zhou, 2000). Generally, there are two main problems relating to the issues of the relationship between bilingual education policies, pedagogical practices and bilingual educational effectiveness: (1) challenges from the powerful influence of official Mandarin and Han culture, and (2) the lack of attention paid to bilingual education in local environments (Blachford & Zhou, 2004; Cobbey, 2007; Dai & Cheng, 2007; Feng, 2008; Johnson, 2000; Kolås, 2003; Ma, 2007; Nima, 2001; Wang & Phillion, 2009; Zhou, 2001). In terms of challenges from the powerful influence of official Mandarin and Han culture, Stites (1999) argued that the big obstacle to bilingual education for China’s ethnic minorities may be the fact that literacy in minority languages lies outside the mainstream culture. The state language, Mandarin, is always taught in some form. This is justified by claims that the Han Chinese language is ‘international’ and therefore should be the main language of education and the medium of instruction (Postiglione, 1999). Therefore, the bilingual education policy has clearly striven to integrate China as a unified nation where all the ethnic minority people of China are fully assimilated, reflecting the powerful influence of Han culturalism. Postiglione (1999) indicated that the CCP controls all the institutions, the instillation of dominant Han ideologies, the reproduction of the dominant Han culture, and the maintenance of national unity

(Postiglione, 1999). As Johnson and Chhetri (2002) noted, “regional and local officials (who are mostly Han Chinese) make most of the decisions on language usage and language of instruction in the schools, although minorities have a right to use their own language” (p. 147). That is to say, minority language rights are subordinate to the CCP’s national policy of stability and unity. This fact creates a wide variety in the goals and methods of bilingual education in China and makes it difficult to evaluate the overall effectiveness of bilingual education programs in minority areas. Against this background, Feng (2009) argued that the current interpretation of Min- Han Jiantong is fundamentally “an assimilation intending to blend minority groups into the mainstream society” (p.291). The ultimate aim of bilingualism in the modern Chinese context is a form of subtractive bilingualism as defined by Cummins (1986) and Lambert (1980), for the reason that the acquisition of Mandarin replaces and displaces minority language and culture (Mackerras, 2003; Yi, 2011). In other words, Min-Han Jiantong bilingualism seeks the assimilation of minorities into mainstream culture. In terms of the lack of attention in bilingual education to local environments, there is little evidence of authentic bilingual education for Min-Han Jiantong at the bilingual schools in minority communities, despite the political rhetoric. Yang (2007) noted that the bilingual educational policies undergo a significant transformation by the time they reach regional and local levels. Tsung and Cruickshank (2009), and Wang and Phillion (2009) both stated that most ‘so-called’ bilingual education involved no specific provisions for students with minority backgrounds whose cultures were absent from their daily life practices. Therefore, Zhou (2001) argued that the lack of attention in bilingual education to local environments is, to some extent, an explanation for the failure of bilingual models. The question of resistance to bilingual education is addressed in the research of Harrell (2001) and Johnson and Chhetri (2002) through their extensive fieldwork in China’s minority areas. Harrell (2001) stated: if members of a minority hold the view that they can use education to achieve success, they devise ways to surmount the obstacles posed by cultural divergences. If they hold, on the other hand, that the education system will merely strip them of their own culture or identity without giving them equal opportunity in the wider society, they will respond with resistance. (p. 214)

Sangay noted that some resistance to bilingual education comes from minority parents who believe the minority language may “not help their children’s future” (Sangay, 1998, p. 294, as cited in Johnson & Chhetri, 2002, p. 147). Minority parents are concerned about their children’s ability to pass the qualifying examinations to move on to higher education. Johnson and Chhetri (2002) assert that resistance to bilingual education comes from school administrators and teachers who fear that “the study of a native language will slow the learning of Chinese” and highlight that “the same curricula as the Chinese language textbooks are needed for the national examinations” (p. 147). More recently, some researchers have come to focus on the relationship between minority students’ identity roles and their bilingual learning experiences within the local communities (Harrell, 2001b; Johnson & Chhetri, 2002; Lu, 2004; Nima & Long, 2010; Postiglione, Jiao, & Gyatso, 2005). Johnson and Chhetri (2002) suggest that: a fully implemented bilingual education program using a student’s native language (to varying degrees), designed and implemented at the local level, is a way to encourage minority participation in public schools, increase academic performance of minority students and create a truly multicultural society. (p. 150)

Sue and Sue (2003) also note that a fully implemented bilingual education program using a student’s native language is vital, especially when seeking to understand the experiences of minority students and ethnic identity confusion. This is echoed by Lin (1997) who maintains that “to teach in the language of minority students is essential for the development of their intellectual ability, particularly for those living in remote areas who have little contact with the Han culture and who speak only their own native language” (p. 195). Many of these scholars favour what they call a multicultural approach, which places equal emphasis on all cultural groups (Sebastian, Emily & Lu, 2012; Wang & Phillion, 2009). They promote the same measures that are advocated by multicultural scholars in Western countries concerned with minority students’ loss of heritage languages, cultures, and knowledge (Banks, 2007; Cummins, 1989; Gay, 2000), such as minority language teacher training, bilingual education, and the learning of minority knowledge. Specifically, Wang and Phillion (2009, p. 10) suggest that Banks’ (2006) theory

41 regarding the five dimensions of multicultural education could be used as a guideline for Chinese policy makers, school administrators, and teachers to address language and culture issues regarding minority students, highlighting a language- and culture-friendly environment. With respect to classroom practice, Wang and Phillion (2009, p. 10) suggest that Ladson-Billings (1994) and Gay’s (2000) culturally responsive teaching, which takes minority students’ learning styles into consideration, will also help Chinese teachers take minority students’ language, culture, and knowledge into curricula and classroom teaching so that minority students will feel that their language, culture, and knowledge are respected. Importantly, Wang and Phillion (2009, pp. 6-7) point out that multicultural education may help minority students “examine inequity and the factors that prevent them from the enactment of their language and cultural rights”, although “multiculturalism in China has its own distinct characteristic: tolerance of minority cultures and languages on the condition that they do no damage to the national stability and national unity (He, 2005).” Thus, a framework for the implementation of multicultural education and an equal approach to minority students in China is expected to help improve bilingual education services. In evaluating Tibetan studies, Mackerras (2011b) noted that they fail to represent “the multiculturalism that the country regards as among its hallmarks” (p. 281), particularly in relation to case studies that reveal a large gap existing between China’s bilingual policy and its practice in specific communities. As Kayongo-Male and Benton Lee (2004) indicate, bilingual education policies have “far-reaching implications for ethnic minority students” (p. 283). This is the focus of the following section.

2.3.3 Case studies: bilingual education policy implementation for Tibetans

Badeng Nima’s case studies of Tibetan communities in Ganzi and Aba Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures showed that the potential contradictions and disharmony of Tibetan children’s home and school literacy interactions are the core problems and challenges to bilingual education (Long & Nima, 2010; Nima, 2000, 2009; Nima & Lu, 2007). The contradictions and conflicts arose between school and home interactions, when the modern bilingual school education cannot meet the Tibetan children’ needs, particularly in relation to their ethnic identity confusion, located as it is between two

42 cultures (Bai & Nima, 2012). Nima (2000, 2009) argued that not enough attention is given to maintaining the Tibetan language (L1) alongside Mandarin (L2). Indeed, L1 replaces L2. In other words, bilingual education policy practices in Tibetan areas promote subtractive bilingualism. While considering the powerful dominance of Mandarin, it is worthwhile to reiterate the value of the Tibetan language, particular in relation to Tibetan identity. Both Nima (2001), and Tournadre and Dorje (2003) noted that the Tibetan language acts as a caregiver that provides the most convenient way to gain the greatest amount of knowledge, and facilitates meaningful community integration and effective societal functioning. Thus, Nima (2001) notes a particular need for Tibetans to develop and strengthen their language “because of their cultural identity in China” (p. 94). This need is increasingly urgent, as Bhattacharya (2007) concludes that “there will be a gradual decimation of the Tibetan identity and its submergence within the larger Han identity” (p. 259). Therefore, Tournadre directly points out that “without the Tibetan language, it is clear that Tibet would not be Tibet any more” (Roundtable, 2003, p. 3). In practice, the implementation of bilingual education is varied across the three main types of Tibetan communities, namely, pastoral areas (Tibetan: drokpa), semi- agro-pastoral areas (Tibetan: sama-drok), and agricultural areas (Tibetan: shingpa) (Nima, 2000; Zhang, 2004). For example, the 9-year compulsory education in Aba Tibetan Prefecture is focused on choosing between herding and schooling for Tibetan pastoral children (Nima & Lu, 2007). Their investigation shows that when parents in agricultural and pastoral areas of Tibet evaluate current school education, they hold more different opinions than similar ones. This is caused by many factors including their family economic level, way of living, production methods and educational background. The discrepancy in their values of education, in turn, affects school education in agricultural and pastoral areas of Tibet in many aspects. (p. 4)

It is also worth mentioning that there is minimal literature on bilingualism for Tibetan nomads, focusing mainly on the state’s grassland policy, and the economic rationality of traditional pastoral strategies (Goldstein, 2003; Miller & Daniel, 2000). Postiglione’s work points out challenges and suggests possible solutions to the serious education problems Tibet faces (Mackerras, 2011b). Postiglione (1999)

43 indicated that Tibetan education is “particularly illustrative of the dilemma of ethnic education in China” (p. 14). As Postiglione told Mackerras during their interview in March 2010: My critical points of view are often focused on this one question of how can we make the educational experience more relevant for the development of the people, not only their livelihood, their standard of living, but also the vitality of their culture of their social groups, of their society . . . . In the end it’s all about the ability to learn, the ability to adapt knowledge to the lives that people live and the value of education and how families participate in the education of their children. These are the issues which to me are important.

Indeed, the problems of bilingual education for Tibetans within the historical and socio-cultural context of China is an essential topic for educators, particularly in relation to the issues of identity, community, power, and traditional culture heritage. It is also a pressing political issue, something Laclau & Mouffe’s discourse theory enable us to highlight.

2.3.4 Implications within the context of the logic of difference

The research literature on bilingual education policy for minorities in general, and case studies of bilingual education policy implementation in Tibetan areas in particular, suggest that a fully implemented bicultural education program using a student’s native language, designed and implemented at the local level, is one way to encourage minority participation in public schools, increase the academic performance of minority students, and create a truly multicultural society. From the perspective of improving the cultural development of Tibetan children, promoting Tibetan language and culture, and ensuring nationality equality, bicultural education in Tibetan regions should be enhanced and strengthened. Importantly, many scholars hold a multicultural approach that is linked to ‘multiculturalism with Chinese characteristics’, tying minority cultures and languages, economic growth, and the national stability and national unity. Here, I return to the critical economic significance of minorities, which suggests that the PRC cannot afford to allow an explicit Us versus Them (i.e. logic of equivalence) discursive formation to emerge, as it would threaten to challenge their hegemony.

Hence, policy makers unconsciously deploy the logic of difference, downplaying oppositional antagonism and promoting pure (i.e. non-politicised) differences. This allowed me to draw upon issues of the anti-apartheid opposition in other discourse research, such as Howarth’s (2000) work on this as well as the discussion in Phillips and Jorgensen (2002), showing the strategy of the apartheid government with their ‘separate development’ agenda which sought to prevent the formation of an anti-white alliance among ‘blacks’, ‘coloureds’, and ‘indians’. Looking through the lens of Discourse Theory, I argue that the discourses of China’s bilingual education policy for minorities consider China’s background of ethnic diversity, that is, in the context of the logic of difference in terms of ‘cultural and linguistic diversity’. Relevant categories of ethnic are not only minorities and Han, but also, for instance, the social space. The logic of difference may shed light on injustices cross-cutting the minorities/Han distinction, it may simultaneously weaken the common ground for ‘minorities’ mobilisation. The logic of difference seeks to break down frontiers separating these “chains of equivalence” by “incorporating disarticulated elements into the expanding formation” (Howarth, 2000, p. 107). Thus, the neoliberalizing process regarding bilingual education policy and policy enactment can be understood in the context of the logic of difference.

2.4 Neoliberalism and its impact Education has been powerfully affected by the rise of the neoliberal political, economic and cultural agenda (Connell, 2013). David Harvey’s (2005, p. 2) definition of neoliberalism offers a pithy and condensed characterization of this phenomenon: “Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade.” As Clarke (2012a, p. 175) puts it, “neoliberalism – despite occasional lapses, such as the classic Keynesian stimulus adopted internationally in response to the 2008 global financial crisis – has embraced ‘the market’ as the master signifier governing and uniting all aspects of social, political, and economic life”. The notion of a ‘socialist market economy’ for the envisaged political-economic model, consequently adopts several resolutions to accelerate economic opening (Schmalz & Ebenau, 2012, p. 493). Thus, ‘neoliberalism

45 with Chinese characteristics’ (Harvey, 2005, p. 120) celebrated a breakthrough. China became an active participant in the global economic system (Nonini, 2008; Wang, 2003). For the purpose of this study, neoliberalism is used as an explanatory framework examining key discourses and practices that have influenced Chinese bilingual/minority education policy and policy enactment. In this section I discuss the concept of neoliberalism, consider it into the context of China and critically consider the term and its use. Neoliberalism here can be seen as a hegemonic discourse to the extent that it has represented certain aspects of the political debate and set a new agenda (Torfing, 1999). The discourses and practices of neoliberalism have been at work in every institutional sector since the mid-1980s (Connell, 2013; Davies & Bansel, 2007). Education has been a central arena for neoliberalization (Dean, 2012; Turunen & Rafferty, 2013). Some educational researchers discuss the nature, power and effects of a neoliberal political, economic and cultural agenda in contexts such as Finland, Australia and New Zealand, noting its impact on subjectivities and practices (Clarke, 2012b; Connell, 2013; Davies & Bansel, 2007; Turunen & Rafferty, 2013). Clarke (2012b) argues that the recent neoliberal education policy represents “depoliticisation” which is reflected in “the hegemony of a managerial discourse and the decontestation of terms like ‘quality’ and ‘effectiveness’” (p. 297). Connell (2013) describes the Australian case as the “neoliberal cascade in education” (p. 101), emphasizing how policy changes are all moving in the same direction – “increasing the grip of market logic on schools” (Connell, 2013, p. 102). The advent of neoliberalism extends from West to East participating in the global economy, and its impacts are more widely geographically dispersed through the globalization of education policy (Rizvi & Lingard, 2010). Wang (2003) indicated that the hegemonic status of Chinese neoliberalism was formed as the state overcame a crisis of legitimacy through economic reform. However, the notion of the neoliberalisation of China is contested (Jefferys & Sigley, 2009; Kipnis, 2007; Sigley, 2006). A number of scholars argue that the government in China is more authoritarian than neoliberal (Jefferys & Sigley, 2009; Sigley, 2006). Kipnis (2007) explains China’s discourse of human quality in terms of neoliberalism and suggest ways in which this discourse “might be contextualized more fruitfully than as a form of neoliberalism” (p. 383). Some reforms in China produce a hybrid socialist- neoliberal form of political rationality that is a combination of market autonomy and

46 techno-scientific, administrative regulation (Jefferys & Sigley, 2009). The current notion of ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ epitomises this feature of China’s governmentalities (Sigley, 2006). The neoliberalization process itself is full of controversies and inconsistencies, including conflicts between neoliberal practices and social resistance, and tensions between central and local states (He & Wu, 2009). Scholars of Chinese neoliberalism use the concepts of “transition” and “development” to deal with its internal contradictions (Wang, 2003, p. 4). The idea of “transition” captures the notion of a necessary link between the actual state of inequality and the final ideal of more widely distributed wealth, justifying the hegemonic status of neoliberalism imposed by state intervention (Wang, 2003, p. 4). Market socialism in this sense, involves a “developmentalist” discourse and practices in an uneasy synthesis with neoliberalism, held together by the authoritarian rule of the CCP (Lin, 2006, p. 60). This study uses neoliberalism as an explanatory framework for exploring China’s bilingual/minority education policy and policy enactment. I discuss the power and effects of neoliberal rationales in China’s bilingual/minority educational settings. Neoliberal discourse forms an important strategic form for examining the coalition of forces in the local, national and international domains. I focus on the impact of neoliberalism and the contradictions of neoliberalism and economic globalisation in Chinese minority contexts. I characterize the changes bringing about the current social orders of discourse through which neoliberal subjects and their education have been constituted. By introducing discourse analysis of three Tibetan school community cases, I examine the inﬂuence of neo-liberal ideology on bilingual/minority curricula and school programs. In this way, this study explores the complex ways in which power relations are exercised in China’s bilingual/minority education policy discourses and policy enactments. This helps to understand the governmentality underpins China’s bilingual/minority education policies, as well as the ways that these policy discourses affect the policy actors.

2.5 Summary

The literature on China’s education for minorities shows that the concepts of Chinese culturalism and unified education, bilingualism and bilingual education, and multiculturalism and multicultural education have had a long association with ethnic

47 minorities in general and with Tibetans in particular. This has promoted a number of reflections and conclusions. In reviewing scholars’ writing in the field of China’s nation-building and language and education policy, Yi (2008) and Postiglione (2009) point out that the Chinese nation-building project over the last six decades has essentially been presented as one of remoulding the cultures of China’s 55 designated minorities into a more ‘advanced’ Han culture, during the past six decades. In the process of nation-building, cultural unity became the essential legitimizing factor for Chinese political ideology. This process reveals the discourse construction regarding China’s language and education policy in the context of the logic of equivalence in terms of ‘Minority = backward vs. Han = advanced’. By reviewing the current problems related to bilingual schools in local communities, there are lessons about the cultural mismatch between home and school that educators may consider when working within their own contexts. China is vast in size, with great regional differences. However, the current literature shows the lack of culturally responsive teaching in bilingual school reforms serving minority student populations. Thus, much of the research calls for a bilingual educational policy that supports and includes minority languages within local community-based cultural activities; in doing so, discrimination may cease to exist within the school system (Ghosh & Abdi, 2004), attendance rates may increase, and the goal of universal education may be reached (Johnson, 2000). The debate over bicultural education is part of a larger political debate over two competing visions of the future — diverse societies made up of many cultures, or one global culture (Johnson & Chhetri, 2002). Yet, the extent to which schools in China create an atmosphere that has positive institutional norms for diverse cultural groups is limited by notions of cultural backwardness of ‘the other’. In summarising this chapter, I highlight that the research on language and education policy for minorities in China discursively shifts. Some researchers come closest to focussing research on whether or not minorities are integrating, using a hybrid discourse (Heberer, 1990; Mackerras, 2003, 2011; Yi, 2008, 2011). The hybrid discourse about China’s language and education policy (especially since the 2000s) expresses a shift that can be understood through the writings of Said (1979) and the thinking of Bhabha (1994). In other words, the emphasis of research on China’s language and education policy has moved from binarism to hybridity. Where previously the dichotomous

48 relations between ‘minority’ and ‘Han’ and other binary contradictions were highlighted (backward/advanced), now the emphasis is on those sites and hybrid experiences that are able to simultaneously sustain socio-political concerns, cultural differences, and economic development. Moreover, the hybrid discourse in China expresses a shift through the impact of local-global interactions. As Postiglione (2009, p. 505) indicates, the Chinese state’s approach to ethnic minority education, although highly centralized, has a great deal of “flexibility at the local level”. Feng (2009) suggests that how to strike a balance between the local and the global, between the past and the present, and between ethnicity, nationalism, and internationalism is indeed a central issue for all, including bilingual education policymakers and educators. The impact of neoliberalism on China’s minority/bilingual education policy and policy enactment has been largely ignored by both Chinese and Western scholars, although integration as a trend is acknowledged, reflected in the hybrid discourse (e.g. Heberer, Mackerras, and Yi). This adds meaning to the study of the integration of Tibetans in Sichuan Province with the impact of neo-liberalism and marketization on education policy. Through this focussed study, research reveals the interactions between China’s minority/bilingual education policy context and policy enactment processes in Tibetan school communities and adds detail and specificity to the situation in Tibetan areas of Sichuan that is lacking in current literature. I have reviewed the literature on minority/bilingual education policy context and policy enactment in China, using it as a reference point for developing my qualitative inquiry. The views above call for further context-based research on how Tibetan school communities deal with minority/bilingual education policy in the light of power struggles over the Min-Han linguistic and cultural conflict within the two main trends of globalisation and regionalization, particularly when education policy and policy practice are embedded with identity development and discourse norms. To answer this call, this study draws on multiple theoretical frameworks to explore the relationship between China’s minority/bilingual education policy context and policy enactment processes within and across different types of Tibetan communities. In doing so, a theoretical framework of China’s minority education policy context of policy enactment at school community was developed, which is the focus of the following chapter.

Chapter 3 Qualitative Inquiry

3.1 Introduction

As established in the previous chapter, discourses of China’s minority/bilingual education policy and policy enactment at school communities in China are underresearched, with little known about the situation in Tibetan Autonomous County of Sichuan available. Under these circumstances, this study draws on a number of theories to identify and explore discourses that are shaping representations of China’s minority/bilingual education policy and policy enactment within and across three types of Tibetan school communities. This chapter describes a set of tools and concepts drawing on elements of three complementary theories: Foucault’s genealogical work and governmentality, Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse Theory, and Ball et al.’s work on policy enactments in schools. This set of tools and concepts, ‘quilted’ by the notion of discourse, is not just “a method for data analysis, but a theoretical and methodological whole – a complete package” (Philips & Jørgensen, 2002, p. 4). The package contains four dimensions or analytic strata: (a) epistemologies, (b) theories, (c) approaches, and (d) strategies (Kamberelis & Dimitriadis, 2005). This chapter describes the four dimensions informing this qualitative inquiry. After describing the epistemology of this study, I examine how the main concepts of the three complementary theories could be deployed to understand China’s minority/bilingual education policy discourses and policy enactment. Then, I provide a picture of the design of my approaches to this research, focusing on a comparison case study of three Tibetan school communities in Sichuan Province. Finally, I explicate strategies for collecting and analysing data.

3.2 Epistemology

The three theories used in my study share a social constructionist epistemology. In this section I first describe the four key assumptions of that epistemology, by drawing on the accounts of social constructionism given by Burr (1995) and Gergen (1985). Then I focus specifically on the implications of these premises for my study of China’s

50 minority education policy discourse and policy enactment, and how use them in my study (see Table 3.1).

Table 3.1: The implications of social constructionist premises/tenets for this study

Four key premises of social Implications of social constructionism premises constructionist epistemology for this study A critical approach to taken-for- Challenge the binarism ‘Minority = backward granted knowledge versus Han = advanced’ Historical and cultural specificity Elucidate links between minority education policy practice in Tibetan school communities and Han socio-cultural context, as well as the impact of neoliberalism Link between knowledge and Explain that minority education policies are social processes generated, constructed, and maintained through everyday life experience relating to wider social process Link between knowledge and Explore how minority/bilingual education policy social action correspond with patterns of policy action with ‘doing’ policy

3.2.1 Four premises/tenets of social constructionism

Burr (1995, pp. 2-5) outlines four key premises/tenets underpinning the broad label “social constructionism”, building on Gergen (1985). Drawing both on Burr (1995) and Gergen (1985), I introduce the four key tenets of social constructionism as follows. First, social constructionists hold a critical stance toward taken-for-granted knowledge. According to social constructionists, our knowledge and representations of the world are “products of our ways of categorising the world”, or, in discursive analytical terms, “products of discourse” (Burr, 1995, p. 3; Gergen, 1985, pp. 266-267). Social constructionists hold the belief that reality is socially constructed (Burr, 1995). That is, reality is produced both via social negotiation and discourses (Gergen, 1985). This point challenges the conventional understanding of reality as “objective, fixed and,

51 with the right instruments, knowable” and the processes by which such understandings come to be seen as ‘natural’ and ‘true’ (Cohen et al., 2004, pp. 409-410). Social constructionists reject the positivist tradition of knowledge that is basically “nonreflexive in nature” involving “taken-for-granted assumptions about the social world, which are seen as reinforcing the interests of dominant social groups” (Lit & Shek, 2002, p. 108). Reflexivity in human beings is emphasized according to social constructionists. Although social constructions are relative, they are not arbitrary; instead, they emerge through social processes that are already shaped by influences such as power relations and material resources (Burr, 1995). Thus, the understanding that knowledge is both relative and emerges from practice gives constructionism a powerful critical impetus (Burr, 1995). Social constructionists’ second point maintains that our understanding of the world is historically and culturally specific (Burr, 1995). It is already a realist argument that history provides extensive evidence that cultures change over time. This is because the means we use to understand the world, such as categories and concepts, are all historically and culturally relative (Lit & Shek, 2002). Burr (1995) further argued that our worldviews are not only “specific to particular cultures and periods of history”, they are seen as “products of that culture and history”, and are dependent upon “the particular social and economic arrangements prevailing in that culture at that time” (p. 4). That is, the way we understand the world must not be seen as static, but as historically and culturally situated; it is a product of a process of change and development between groups of people across time and space (Cohen et al., 2004; Lit & Shek, 2002). That knowledge is created and sustained by social processes is the third tenet of social constructionism. The link between knowledge and social processes refers to how our ways of understanding the world we experience, as well as the people we believe ourselves to be, are created and maintained by social processes (Burr, 1995). It is in social processes and through social interaction that people create and recreate versions of reality, “construct common truths, and compete about what is true and false” (Burr, 1995, p. 4; Gergen, 1985, p. 268). In this sense, the construction of knowledge is a negotiated process “in which certain interpretations are privileged, whilst others are eclipsed” (Cohen et al., 2004, p. 410).

The link between knowledge and social processes leads to social constructionists’ fourth point concerning the link between knowledge and social action and how knowledge and social action are paired (Burr, 1995). Knowledge is inextricably linked to and emerges as a product of activity and purpose. Given the dominance of certain understandings and the subordination of others, the link between knowledge and social action means that “social action will work in the interests of more powerful groups and against those in weaker positions” (Cohen et al., 2004, p. 410). For example, the actors within a nationalist movement might describe their actions as “a struggle for independence founded on the right of the people to self-determination”, while external spectators describe the same actions as “an instance of separatism or imperialism” (Jelica, 1997, p. 149). Thus, some forms of social action become natural, others unthinkable (Burr, 1995, p. 5; Gergen, 1985, pp. 268-269). Within a particular worldview, “different social understandings of the world lead to different social actions”, and therefore “the social construction of knowledge and truth has social consequences” (Burr, 1995, p. 5; Gergen, 1985, pp. 268-269).

3.2.2 Implications of social constructionist tenets for this study

The four tenets of social constructionism have important implications for my study of China’s minority education policy discourse and policy practice in Tibetan school communities, in terms of both what I study and how I study it. Social constructionist measures of education for minorities were hardly ever considered by Chinese ethnologists until the 1980s, and even then very infrequently (Kayongo-Male & Benton Lee, 2004, p. 289). By deploying social constructionism I can get beyond the positivist approach so prevalent in most Chinese researchers’ theorisations of minority education. First, social constructionism invites me to challenge conventional (bureaucratic) definitions of China’s education policy for minorities, the assumptions about what constitutes viable minority policy process and notions of acceptable policy practice. Given the notion of constructed/contested versions of reality discussed, I remain critical and challenge the taken-for-granted ways of perceiving the binarism in terms of ‘Minority = backward versus Han = advanced’, reviewed in Chapter 2. On the face of it, many studies seem to neatly illustrate this dichotomy, which leads to the implication that the backwardness of minorities is their “habitus”, that is, “a system of durable and

53 transposable dispositions” (Yi, 2011, p. 406). However, when examined from a social constructionist perspective, questions arise about the viability of this binarism. This study uses a social constructionist perspective to cast doubt on this arbitrary dichotomizing of advanced and backward cultures. Second, this study highlights the importance of the historical and cultural contexts in framing policy actors’ thinking and action, elucidating links between minority policy practice in Tibetan school communities and their socio-cultural contexts, as well as the impact of neo-liberalism and marketization on China’s education policy for minorities. Such links are often obscured by more positivistic approaches. I also highlight the role of the life context in policy actors’ understanding of education, that is, I stress how their background knowledge and experiences are historically and culturally relative. As Alexander notes that “Life in schools and classrooms is an aspect of our wider society, not separate from it: a culture does not stop at the school gates” (Alexander, 2000, p.29). Before entering the classroom, Tibetan students have broad and rich experiences and have formed background knowledge through their daily past and school life. Thus, this study emphasises the influences of historical and cultural forces on minority education policy discourse and policy practice; and the focus on such roots reminds policymakers of the impact of history and culture on education policy for minorities. Third, this study maintains that minority education policy is generated, constructed, and maintained through everyday life experiences relating to the wider social processes. It is through the process of socializing of Tibetan students that the effects of schooling on the identity, attitudes and aspirations of Tibetan students become significant for the nation. I also take into account the politics embedded in social processes. For instance, the 2008 Sichuan earthquake and the way it was represented by the media, the Olympic torch protests in Paris, and the Olympics themselves, all affected the Tibetan communities of Sichuan that I was researching. Importantly, it is not just the minority education policy discourses at the macro (governmental), mezzo (academic) and micro (individual) levels, but also the complexity of the power relations between minorities and Han that are principally constituted through the social reproduction and transformation of structures of minority education policy and discursive policy practices. In this sense, focusing on power relations as a significant factor is another contribution of social constructionism in analysing minority education policy discourses and policy practices in social processes.

The fourth assumption of this study is that the views of minority/bilingual education policy correspond with patterns of policy action, with ‘doing’ policy. That is, if policy actors’ understanding regarding education policy changes, the policy actions related to it may change. The way policy actors think and the means they use, such as bilingual education models, in understanding education and development imply that language, both as the dominant carrier of bilingual education policy and as the medium which provides much of the raw material for policy actions, is central. In this sense, realities of bilingual education policy discourse and policy practice are reflected in policy action on language use. Hence, language use in action becomes the vehicle in the construction of views on bilingual education policy. I argue that views on bilingual education policy and policy action on language use should not be viewed as two separate phenomena and that language use in action provides the basis for actors’ views on minority/bilingual education.

3.2.3 Analytical framework

A social constructionist epistemology has also an important consequence for how I approach my research. It highlighted the reflexivity involved at every stage between and within a cycle research process: in the construction of the theoritcal framework, in the design of the approach, and in the selection of strategies of data collection and analysis (Grenfell & James, 1998). Importantly, these analytic strata are bidirectional with each element exercising a reciprocal influence on the others (see Figure 3.1).

Social constructionist epistemology

Theories Foucault’s genealogy and governmentality Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse Theory Ball et al.’s policy enactments

Reflexivity Approaches Ethnographic case study Positionality

Strategies Data collection: documents, interviews, and observations; Data analysis: policy discourse analysis and policy enactment

analysis

Figure 3.1: Analytical framework

I argue that social constructionist epistemology directly influences my selection of theories, the design of my ethnographic case study research approach and my choice of research strategies. First, my epistemology influences and aligns with my theories. The three theories are all rooted in social constructionism. I use the main concepts of three theories, Foucault’s genealogical work and his notion of governmentality, Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse Theory, and Ball et al.’s work on policy enactments in schools, to bring the contradictions and struggles over the meaning of minority education policy and policy practice to the surface. Second, my theories influence and align wih my approach. The three theories provide justification for the research approach and the strategies employed. Third, my approach influences and aligns with my strategies. Constructionist epistemology and ethnographic approaches guide me to use specific

56 strategies which produce data and policy discourse analysis and policy enactment analysis. I highlight the historical and cultural context of China’s minority/bilingual education policy discourses and the discursive shifts in policy enactment processes through which the data is collected and subsequently, interpreted. That I use to elucidate the socially and culturally embedded nature of minority/bilingual education policy and policy enactment in Tibetan school communities, and facilitates understanding of the relationship between the school community and wider Han socio-cultural context, particularly in relation to the impact of neo-liberalism. Consequently, my epistemology, theory, approach and strategies all exhibit what Kamerberlis and Dimitriadis (2005) refer to as ‘pincipled alignment’. I return to Burr’s (1995) first point about social constructionism taking a critical stance toward taken-for-granted knowledge. This point requires reflexivity in the research relationship, as noted in Chapter 1. I believe reflexivity is an active and critical process of reflection that may “open the future to alternative forms of understanding” while attending to the way knowledge is intertwined with power (Lit & Shek, 2002, p. 112). I recognise that as a person from the Han Chinese background, my interpretations of the discourse with participants may be biased. My limited comprehension of the Tibetan language amplifies this problem. I therefore note my position as member of powerful majority, and I must address the positionality issues of identity, power, politics and privilege in my research process. To overcome this potential bias, participants were encouraged to express views differing from the Han/party-state discourse. Ethnograhpic literature recognises that participants might not say to an outsider what they believe would not be understood, or will say what they believe an outsider wants to hear (Bishop, 2005). Bailey (2007) and Stanley (2012) reported some of the data as ‘performed’ by their participants in communities of Japan and China. Adopting their ‘transnational’ approach, this study conceived of the Tibetan research participants in the presence of a Han researcher as a transnational research context. Although in the Han/PRC discourse Tibetans are a ‘national minority’ of China and an integral part of the ‘Chinese family’, this is not always the way the relationship is framed in Tibetan discourse. As a result of my extended fieldwork and the trust I was able to build with my participants, I was able to at least partially take an ‘emic’ approach offering an insider’s viewpoint (Miles & Huberman, 1994) and drawing upon various discourses which are in use in the situation.

Yet at all times I attempted to maintain an active awareness of differences in identity, cultural belief and frames of reference. On the other hand, as an outsider, I did not share with taken-for-granted aspects of the context, and thus had the opportunity to question what would stand out. I attempted to pose unasked questions that need answering and bring to the significant aspects of the site to the fore that hitherto had been unexamined. As Blum (2006, p. 79) claimed: The study of China has been enriched by the contributions of “native” anthropologists, but the “native” is not necessarily native to the site studied; the term may not be entirely helpful in the end. At the same time, complete outsiders can still contribute effective and vivid understandings of China. Ultimately, I argue that the anthropologist’s identity may not be an overwhelmingly relevant criterion of a work’s value, since there are many aspects to identity in every case.

Furthermore, as noted above, through the research process I developed a rapport and a level of trust with Tibetan people involved in my study. My previous experience in three projects on the education, culture, and economic development of Tibetan and other minority peoples in China, and my willingness to try simple phrases in Tibetan seemed to earn much good will in the field. Participants then highlighted aspects of bilingual education they thought important and the strategies and perspectives they believed necessary to operate the bilingual education system in Tibetan schools. Participants were encouraged to engage in a genuine authentic dialogue. Since the snowy winter of 2006 (before my PhD study 2010), I have carefully constructed a trust-based rapport with the locals including later participants in these Tibetan communities. I am grateful for the chance to be involved as a research assistant and later a research fellow in Dr. Badeng Nima’s three projects on education, culture, and economic development of Tibetan and other minority peoples in China. As a researcher for these projects, I have been to Lhasa and then Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Region, and Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Region six times, in February 2006, December 2006, January and July, 2007, June 2008, and January 2009. Over these years, I have been involved in socio-cultural research with Tibetan children and adolescents. These studies brought out the need to understand the differences between those students and Han Chinese students from a developmental perspective.

Meanwhile, I learnt a lot from Dr Nima’s unique way of dealing with the local people in order to encourage mutual understanding in a cultural constructionist perspective and show what is common, and what is different between Tibetan and Han Chinese, culture. In the beginning, the participants were cautious of my appearance, and did not want me to intervene, but, they were curious about my research. This lasted a long period of time. But when they found that I respected their culture and traditions they accepted me into the local community. They would like to tell me many things, volunteering information, even if I did not ask any questions. When different or even contradictory views emerged in our communication, I remained introspective and studid these issues further rather than arguing with them. In front of them, I am always a learner. I was the student of the local children, teachers, parents, principals, and the villagers. This cyclical process characterised my fieldwork from observation, to study, to question. It is through the lived experience and the interactions that took place in the natural setting that I was able to understand and explore the way China’s minority/bilingual education policy is being deployed in the Tibetan schools. In doing so, I developed a new, clearer and more particularist interpretive lens for generating ethnographic data. For ethnography offers a way of bringing into play the concerns and diverse voices of marginalized or oppressed social groups, as well as a way of accessing the voices of authority and influence (Gewirtz & Ozga, 1990). The above implications regarding the content and process of my study will be further detailed in the following three sections: theories, approaches and strategies.

3.3 Theories

In this study, Foucault’s discourse analysis serves to frame the key theoretical ideas of power/knowledge and genealogy (see Figure 3.2)., This section examines the nature and implications of these theories in more detail, highlighting how they can be operationalized in conjunction with each other in analysing the interactions between China’s education policy context and policy enactment.

Figure 3.2: Relationship betyween the three theoretical ideas utilised in this study

3.3.1 Foucault’s genealogical work and governmentality

In his genealogical work, Foucault developed his theory of power/knowledge. As Sheridan (1980, p. 221) puts it: “Foucauldian genealogy is an unmasking of power for the use of those who suffer it”. Genealogists immerse themselves in the myriad of power struggles that shape historical forms of discourse and are always bound up with knowledge (Foucault, 1986). Foucault defines “governmentality” as an apparatus of administrative power “that has the population as its target, political economy as its essential technical instrument” (Foucault, 2004, pp. 108-109). The consequences of power expressed within, and created by, human practices. In forms of governmentality, power becomes manifested at a micro-level, through certain discourses becoming internalised (Foucault, 1986). In this study, Foucault’s genealogical theory and his concept of governmentality assist in revealing the operations of power from global to local levels within education policy discourses. Foucault’s power/knowledge relationship is relevant in this study, because cultural- political powers dominate in the field of China’s minority/bilingual education. Foucault’s coupling of power and knowledge has the consequence that power is closely connected to discourse (Philips & Jørgensen, 2002). According to Foucault, discourses are central to “producing the subjects we are, and the objects we can know something about (including ourselves as subjects)” (Philips & Jorgensen, 2002, p. 14). Discourse functions “within a framework of understanding, communication and interaction which 60 is in turn part of broader sociocultural structures and processes” (van Dijk, 1997, p. 21). Discourse, “is not simply that which translates struggles or systems of domination, but it is the thing for which and by which there is struggle, discourse is the power which is to be seized” (Foucault, 1984, p. 10). Meanwhile, power should be understood not merely as a repressive force but as “a productive network” which runs through the whole social world (Foucault, 1980, p. 119). In common with knowledge,, power is spread across different social practices, thus co-constituting discourse as power/knowledge (Foucault, 1980). Foucault argues consistently that power struggles are struggles over interpretations of social reality. Thus, power is responsible both for “creating our social world” and for “the particular ways in which the world is formed and can be talked about, ruling out alternative ways of being and talking” (Philips & Jørgensen, 2002, p. 14). Foucault’s concept of power/knowledge also has consequences for his conception of truth (Philips & Jørgensen, 2002). Foucault adheres to the general social constructionist premise that knowledge is not just a reflection of reality. Foucault makes a link between truth and power, arguing that “‘truth’ is embedded in, and produced by, systems of power” (Philips & Jørgensen, 2002, p. 14). Foucault claims that “truth effects” are created within discourses that shape representation of the reality (Philips & Jørgensen, 2002, p. 14). In this sense, the focus should be on “how effects of truth are created in discourses” (Philips & Jørgensen, 2002, p. 14). Power also provides the conditions of possibility for the social and the production of identities (Philips & Jorgensen, 2002). Knowledge or truth is thus, in effect, a fuction of power. For example, forms of social inclusion should be primarily regarded as “a struggle against overt and covert processes of exclusion and marginalization” (Liasidou, 2010, p. 6) involving an interplay of power and knowledge (Foucault, 1979). The aim of discourse analysis, then, is to describe how discursive struggles construct this reality in terms of inclusion or exclusion so that it appears natural and neutral. As such, Foucault’s (1972) concept of governmentality provides an analysis of this process of struggle by introducing political economy into government (Gordon, 1991). In Foucault’s words, “governing people is not a way to force people to do what the governor wants; it is always a versatile equilibrium, with complementarity and conflicts between techniques which assure coercion and processes through which the self is constructed or modified by himself [sic]” (Foucault, 1993, pp. 203-204). From this perspective, China’s minority/bilingual

61 education serves as a bulwark for a wider set of policies governing ethnic relations. As Mackerras (1989) indicates: Information would be carefully selected and propagated to justify that policy or set of policies. The relationship between knowledge and reality dwindles in significance beside that between knowledge and power. (p. 3)

Therefore, in Foucault’s genealogy and his notion of governmentality, power is thus both a productive and a constraining force. This idea also characterises Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse Theory (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002), emphasizing as it does “the role of power in the production of unstructured discursive identities” (Laclau, 1993a, p. 436, as cited in Torfing, 1999, p. 91).

3.3.2 Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse Theory

Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse Theory, like Foucault, views discourse as central to the constitution of the social world and focuses on power which is spread across different social practices. Although a key difference is that Laclau and Mouffe reject the notion of the non-discursive, in the sense of a realm beyond discourse which we can directly know, whereas Foucault gives more significance to the non-discursive. There is a long history of the idea of hegemony before Laclau and Mouffe adopted it, for example, from Gramsci to the Russian Marxists and all the way back to the Ancient Greeks. Both Foucault’s notion of power and Laclau and Mouffe’s concept of hegemony highlight the notion that power struggles shape historical forms of discourse (Torfing, 1999). This section examines in more detail how the major concepts of Discourse Theory can be used in a critical analysis of the constitution of discourses and discursive hegemonization. Laclau and Mouffe have constructed their discourse theory by combining and modifying two major theoretical traditions, Marxism and structuralism, into a single poststructuralist theory in which “the whole social field is understood as a web of processes in which meaning is created” (Philips & Jorgensen, 2002, p. 25). The first concept that must be considered in the work of Laclau and Mouffe is that of discourse itself. For Laclau and Mouffe (1985), “any discourse is constituted as an attempt to dominate the field of discursivity, to arrest the flow of differences, to construct a centre”

(p. 112). That is, a discourse is an attempt to fix a web of meanings within a particular domain and in relation to the social context. It is an attempt to reduce possibilities and hence to create a unified system of meaning. All other possible meanings excluded by a particular discourse constitute the field of discursivity. Here, the crucial aspect of Discourse Theory is the idea that since social identity, whether economic or political, is constituted in and by discourse, their meanings can never be permanently fixed. Since no discourse can fix a web of meanings completely or permanently, the field of discursivity makes possible the articulation of a multiplicity of competing discourses (Torfing, 1999). In other words, discourses representing particular ways of talking about and understanding the social world are engaged in a constant struggle with one other to achieve a naturalized state of dominance or hegemony. By bringing the idea of hegemony alongside the implication of Foucault’s power/knowledge formations, Laclau and Mouffe demonstrate that hegemony should be understood as “a fundamental discursive condition of the socio-political” (Youdell, 2011, p. 26). Thus, discourse analysis attempts to map out the processes by which the meaning of signs can become relatively fixed (and unfixed), and Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse Theory introduces analytical concepts through which these processes can be analysed and described.

Key signifiers and the constitution of discourses

Laclau and Mouffe’s concept of articulation offers a framework in which key discursive theoretical terms can be employed to enrich a discourse analysis. Articulation is “any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice”, while a discourse is “the structured totality resulting from this articulatory practice” (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p. 105). Here, the concept of element becomes relevant. Elements are the signs whose meanings have not yet been fixed (Philips & Jørgensen, 2002). That is, element allows a certain fixation of the play of signification so that the signifier chain can acquire some meaning. Laclau and Mouffe argue that it is ‘elements’ which are articulated into discourses, and thus become ‘moments’ within discourse (1985, p. 105). Elements from different discourses can change the individual discourses and thereby, also, the social and cultural world. This may result in new hybrid discourses (Philips & Jørgensen, 2002, p. 17). The key

63 discursive theoretical concepts, such as nodal points, chains of equivalence, myth, social imaginary, and floating signifiers, can be collectively labelled key signifiers in the social organisation of discourse (Philips & Jørgensen, 2002). Nodal points organise the discourse around a central privileged signifier, that is, ‘points de caption’ as Lacan (1977) termed them. Referring to Lacan, Laclau and Mouffe call “the temporary fixation of meanings” and “the construction of a discursive centre”, nodal points (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p. 112). Thus, discourses attempt to fix webs of meaning through the constitution of nodal points. They are the privileged discursive points, or signifiers, that partially fix meaning within signifying chains by binding together a particular system of meanings into a ‘chain of signification’, assigning meanings to other signifiers within that discourse. Importantly, nodal points are partial fixations, never conclusively arresting the flow of differences. Summing up their argument, Laclau and Mouffe (1985) state: The practice of articulation, therefore, consists in the construction of nodal points which partially fix meaning; and the partial character of this fixation proceeds from the openness of the social, a result, in its turn, of the constant overflowing of every discourse by the infinitude of the field of discursivity. (p. 113)

According to Laclau and Mouffe, nodal points are empty signifiers that are given meaning through chains of equivalence that link together signifiers and establish identity relationally. The concept of chains of equivalence refers to the investment of key signifiers with meaning; for example, ‘liberal democracy’ becomes liberal democracy through its combination with other carriers of meaning such as ‘free elections’ and ‘freedom of speech’ (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 50). Chains of equivalence play a crucial role in the formation of group identity, which is related to the important concepts of myth and social imaginary introduced in Discourse Theory. All of these concepts refer to key signifiers in the social organisation of meaning (Philips & Jørgensen, 2002). By examining how the key signifiers are combined with other signs in the empirical material, this study explores how discourses of China’s minority/bilingual education policy and policy enactment processes at Tibetan school communities are organised discursively. For example, ‘cultural identity’ becomes cultural identity through its combination with other carriers of meaning such as ‘minority language’ and ‘religion’. By investigating the chains of meaning that

64 discourses bring together in this way, I can gradually identify discourses of China’s minority/bilingual education policy that are deployed in policy enactment processes at Tibetan schools. According to Laclau (1990), the formation of a myth is an attempt to overcome the dislocation by suturing the dislocated space into a new structure. Dislocation refers to the general condition that all identity is constructed by excluding a constitutive outside, which in turn always threatens to subvert any identity’s fixity (Laclau, 1998, p. 39). When a myth succeeds in neutralising social dislocations and constitutes the hegemony of one particular vision of social order, it reaches a sound social imaginary, defined by Laclau (1990, p. 63) as “a horizon” or “absolute limit which structures a field of intelligibility”. Laclau (1996) further argues that myths operate at the level of the interests of a particular group, while social imaginaries occur when a group is able to move beyond its interests on to a universal terrain. I will return to this in the discussion of equivalence/difference in hegemonic interventions. According to Laclau and Mouffe (1985, p. 112), every discourse is constituted as an attempt to dominate the field of discursivity by expanding signifying chains which partially fix the meaning of the “floating signifier”. Elements which are particularly open to different ascriptions of meaning are known as floating signifiers; and “different discourses struggle to fill [them] with different meanings” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 51). Nodal points themselves can be thought of as floating signifiers, but, as Phillips and Jørgensen (2002, p. 28) explain, the term nodal point refers to “a point of crystallisation within a specific discourse”, whereas the term floating signifier belongs to “the ongoing struggle between different discourses to fix the meaning of important signs”. In the example they provide, the word ‘body’ is a nodal point in the discourse of clinical medicine and a floating signifier in the struggle between the discourse of clinical medicine and the discourse of alternative treatment. Using these concepts of discourse, hegemony and social antagonism, it is possible to investigate the relationship between the discursive structure of China’s minority/bilingual education policy and ethnic relations conflicts. Thus, how each discourse constitutes minority identities and ethnic relations is of concern. Likewise, the concept of hegemony can be seen as another name for politics, emphasising “the construction of identity”, and conceiving “values and beliefs as an integral part of such an identity” (Torfing, 1999, p. 82). Within this perspective, minority identity is

“constructed, maintained or transformed in and through political struggles” (Torfing, 1999, p. 82). For example, the fact that the PRC is defined as a single unitary nation- state made up of the 55 minorities and the Han has led Mullaney (2010) to refer to the 55+1=1 formula. Finally, the fundamental state of society is often purported to be characterized by conflict, which constrains the identity of hegemonic discourses (Torfing, 1999). The difference between myth and social imaginary may be seen in terms of Laclau’s reformulation of the Gramscian concept of hegemony (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). This aspect is captured by the notion of social antagonism and by introducing the hybridization of identity (Mouffe, 1994) in China’s context. This is the focus of the following section.

Discursive hegemonization and hybrid discourse

Laclau and Mouffe discuss the highly influential concept of hegemony, which was borrowed and developed from the writings of Gramsci. Following Gramsci (1971), hegemony is social consensus achieved through articulatory practice (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). That practice strives to bring diverse antagonistic forces together to form a contingent collective purpose, reflected in the operation of the logics of equivalence and/or difference (Laclau, 2000). In Discourse Theory terms, hegemony is “the expansion of a discourse, or set of discourses, into a dominant horizon of social orientation and action by means of articulating unfixed elements into partially fixed moments in a context crisscrossed by antagonistic forces” (Torfing, 1999, p. 101). That is, hegemonic interventions strive to override conflicts. As Foucault (1972) states, when two or more antagonistic discourses compete for hegemony within a specific terrain, conflicting demands are made upon social identities, relationships and systems of knowledge and belief. Antagonisms may be resolved, albeit temporarily, through hegemonic interventions (Gramsci, 1971; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985), by concerted efforts to re-articulate discourses and achieve the dominance of one particular perspective, thus reconstituting unambiguity (Laclau, 1993). As such, Laclau (2000, p. 304) has determined hegemonic operations in terms of the logics of equivalence/difference. The logic of equivalence and its corollary, which is the assumption by a particularity of a function of universal representation (Laclau, 2000); and the logic of difference, which “separates the links of the equivalential chains”. That

66 is, the logic of equivalence organizes meaning into two opposing chains of equivalence while the logic of difference strives to resist the formation of such chains. There are examples of linking the logic of equivalence to the French Revolution with its people vs the ancien regime and the logic of difference to the Apartheid regime with its notion of separate development. Therefore, using these concepts, it is possible to explore the functioning of discourses relating to hegemonic interventions and operations (Philips & Jørgensen, 2002) (see Table 3.2).

Table 3.2: Laclau and Mouffe’s political logics applied in this study

Political logics Definition Application to this Study The logic of Dissolving particular differences by Language and education equivalence means of linking signifers within a policies promoting ‘Han signifying ‘chain of equivalence’ that universalism/culturalism’ depends for its meaning on the exsistence of an opposite or ‘antagonstic’ chain of equivalence, leading to the polarisation of society between two or more discursively unified camps The logic of Breaking down the construction of Bilingual education difference society into two opposing chains of policies promoting ‘ethnic meaning by accentuating and cultural and linguistic multiplying pure (i.e. non-politicised, diversity’ non-antagonistic) differences Simultaneous Signifiers are linked together in Education policies operation of intertextual chains to produce more or promoting ‘unity in logics of less stable discourses, thus, forming a diversity’ difference and hybrid but ambivalent arena equivalence

The framework of logics utilized in this study incorporates the key ideas outlined in Table 3.2 as part of a set of conceptual tools for “analyzing and critiquing political and

67 policy agendas” (Clarke, 2012a, p. 178), such as the China government’s minority/bilingual education. Specifically, in the presence of antagonistic forces, the movement from myth to social imaginary sees the operation of the logic of equivalence, leading to the polarisation of society between two or more discursively unified camps, within each of which an array of differences is translated into an overarching equivalence (Clarke, 2012a; Laclau & Mouffe, 2001). Social imaginaries are constituted through the logic of equivalence, which serves to dissolve the boundaries between social groups or different interests by “relating them to a common project and by establishing a frontier to define the forces to be opposed, the enemy” (Mouffe, 1993, p. 50). By means of expanding a signifying chain of equivalence and by “condensing meaning around two antagonistic poles” (Howarth, 2000, p. 107), this logic collapses the differential character of social identity (Torfing, 1999). Consequently, where the logic of equivalence predominates, social division will tend toward a dichotimisation of political space, a division of the social into two opposing camps, such as communism versus capitalism, the West versus the East. This is important for understanding China’s language and education policies promoting ‘Han universalism/culturalism’, which can be understood in the context of the logic of equivalence in terms of ‘minority = backward versus Han = advanced’. However, even a stable social imaginary is not immutable. In the shift from imaginary back to myth, the logic of difference works to dispel the illusion of unity amongst different interests. The logic of difference breaks down that unity, by emphasizing and multiplying the “pure (in the sense of nonpoliticized; not linked to dichotomies like advantaged/disadvantaged)” differences (Clarke, 2012a, p. 182), and “making it more difficult to dichotomise social space into two collective groups” (Rawolle & Lingard, 2008, p. 738). Its objects are to weaken antagonism by articulating differences together to make them appear as complementary rather than confrontational or contradictory, thus, threatening this hegemonic construction of society into two opposing camps. China’s bilingual education policies promoting ‘ethnic cultural and linguistic diversity’ can be understood in the context of the logic of difference. It is notable that the logic of difference also creates “a more complex articulation of elements (Rawolle & Lingard, 2008, p. 738). For example, the application of the universal representing a complex articulation as part of legitimate right to exercise

68 symbolic violence, that is “a violent reduction of difference to sameness” (Torfing, 1999, p. 194). In short, equivalences and differences are constantly being subverted and the borders between equivalence and difference constantly shift in the configuring of the social (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). Torfing (1999) describes the interaction of equivalence and difference as follows: discursive identities are inscribed both in signifying chains that stress their differential value, and in signifying chains that emphasize their equivalence. The relative character of each particular identity transforms it into the meeting point of difference and equivalence. (p. 97)

In this study, China’s hegemonic practices can be understood within the context of the simultaneous operation of the logics of difference and equivalence, through which a hybrid orders of discourse is created and the meaning of minority/bilingual education is fixed (see the case studies in chapters 5-7). The simultaneous operation of logics of difference and equivalence thus forms a hybrid but ambivalent arena. This is because the tension between the differential and equivalential aspects of discursive identities is “unresolvable, but political struggles may succeed in emphasising one of the two aspects” (Torfing, 1999, p. 97). In the first two cases (see chapters 5 & 6), emphasis on the equivalential aspect by the expansion of chains of equivalence will tend to “simplify the social and political space by delimiting the play of difference”; whereas, the collapse of difference into equivalence will tend to “involve a loss of meaning since meaning is intrinsically linked to the differential character of identity” (Torfing, 1999, p. 97). Therefore, the hegemonic practices within the context of simultaneous operation of logics of difference and equivalence can be understood through hybridity. In recent years hybridity has become a popular theoretical lens for understanding communication between and among peoples of different ethnic and/or linguistic backgrounds (Dean & Leibsohn, 2003; Kraidy, 1999, 2002, 2005; Rear, 2011). Hybridity is not a process with an end, but rather the constant renegotiation of the way we construct the self in relation to the culture of others we meet. According to Bhabha (1994, p. 296) “the margin of hybridity, where cultural differences contingently and conflictually touch, becomes the moment of panic which reveals the borderline experience”. Werbner (1997) explains how hybridity as a cultural theory was born

69 during the shift from the modernist to the postmodernist perspective. Dean and Leibsohn (2003) build on Werbner’s definition of hybridity as a cultural theory, particularly as it relates to a framework for understanding Latin American culture: The descriptive term ‘hybrid’ therefore performs a double move: it homogenizes things European and sets them in opposition to similarly homogenized non- European conventions. In short, hybridity is not so much the natural by-product of an ‘us’ meeting a ‘them’, but rather the recognition or creation of an ‘us’ and a ‘them’. (p. 6)

Here, the ‘double move’ can be understood within the context of the simultaneous operation of the logic of difference, in terms of non-European, and the logic of equivalence, in terms of ‘us’ versus ‘them’; that is, the hybrid practice attempts to recognize or create an ‘us’ and a ‘them’. Kraidy (2005) examines the issue of cultural integration through the lens of hybridity in a process he deems a transcultural function. Taking up Bhabha’s (1994) notion of ‘the third space’, Moinian (2009, p. 34) considered identities as shifting hybrids for “understanding the dynamics of identity negotiation in minority communities”. Shoshana (2011, p. 158) further argued that the third space is an “ambivalent arena” that incorporates “identity effects” (Bhabha, 1994, p. 91) that do not have a positivistic or binary nature. Kamberelis and Wehunt (2012, p. 507) highlight that hybrid discourse practices involve the interplay of shifting power relations between and among people; and these discursive and social activities coalesce to produce synergistic activity systems. The main function of ambiguity is to promote so-called unity in diversity. Drawing on these works, I argue that the simultaneous operation of the logic of difference and the logic of equivalence can be used to analyse hybrid discourse practices in which the language of hybridity enters the study of minority/bilingual education policy discourses and policy enactment in state-minority group relationships in China. Laclau and Mouffe’s concepts of articulation and equivalence/difference aim to highlight how social relations inevitably affect the identities of their subjects, constituting new purposes of the particular political agents (Shoshana, 2011). As such, Foucault also argues that the subject is a target of a series of techniques and procedures directed not only at controlling, but also at conducting, human actions (Shoshana, 2011). Both theories have in common the aim of carrying out “critical research”, in order to

70 investigate and analyse “power relations in society and to formulate normative perspectives from which a critique of such relations can be made with an eye on the possibilities for social change” (Philips & Jørgensen, 2002, p. 2). These related premises enable me to use Ball et al.’s concept of “policy enactment” (Ball et al., 2012, p. 2) in order to expose discursive shifts in the process of putting policies into practice and illustrate relations of power in the everyday life of the three Tibetan school communities chosen from my research.

3.3.3 Ball et al.’s work on policy enactments in schools

The use of the concept of policy enactment is based on the related premises that “policies do not normally tell you what to do, they create circumstances in which the range of options available in deciding what to do are narrowed or changed, or particular goals or outcomes are set” (Ball, 1994, p. 19). Policy and policy practice are permeated by “relations of power” (Ball et al., 2012, p. 9). Importantly, drawing on Ball et al.’s writing about how schools enact policy, I have linked their work to Foucault’s and Laclau and Mouffe’s theories, in which discursive shifts in policy processes construct and reflect key policy discourses that are currently engaged in a struggle for hegemony. Borrowing from Foucault, Ball et al.’s (2012) aim is “to reveal a well-determined set of discursive formations that have a number of describable relations between them” (Foucault, 1972, p. 158). In their book, Ball et al. (2012) explore the ways in which different types of policy become “interpreted and translated and reconstructed and remade” in a complex and hybrid process of enactment, where local resources, material and human, and diffuse sets of discourses and values are deployed (p. 6). Policy is very much “a certain economy of discourses of truth” (Foucault, 1980, p. 93) which becomes invested in the day-to-day existence of school communities, the bodies of policy actors and in forms of social relationship (Ball et al., 2012). Thus, Ball et al. want to “make policy into a process, as diversely and repeatedly contested and/or subject to different ‘interpretations’” (Ball et al., 2012, p. 2). This is a process of how schools enact, rather than implement: Enactments are collective and collaborative in the interaction and inter- connection between diverse actors, texts, talk, technology and objects (artefacts)

which constitute ongoing responses to policy, sometimes durable, sometimes fragile, within networks and chains. (Ball et al., 2012, p. 3)

Here, policies are explored as “discursive strategies”, for example, sets of texts, events, artefacts and practices that speak to wider social processes of schooling (Ball et al., 2012, p. 16). This work also draws on Foucault, who writes that discourses are “the set of conditions in accordance with which a practice is exercised, in accordance with which that practice gives rise to partially or totally new statements, and in accordance with which it can be modified” (Foucault, 1986, pp. 208-209). That is, “groups of statements” (Foucault, 1986, p. 125) constitute the discursive formations. However, discursive formations are characterised by “gaps, voids, absence, limits and divisions” (Foucault, 1986, p. 119). Thus, policies are permeated by relations of power, and “to ignore issues of power is to ensure our own powerlessness” (Taylor et al., 1997, p. 20). This becomes evident in Foucault when he speaks of antagonism in power relations, reflecting that issues of power are also ‘a field of possibilities’ (Foucault, 1983, p. 93). The genealogical approach “interrupts the taken-for-granted and isolates the contingent power relations which make it possible for particular assertions to operate as absolute truth” (Ball, 1994, p. 3). It enables an “insurrection of subjugated knowledges” (Foucault, 1980, p. 81) by identifying and counterpointing antagonistic discourses – the dominant and the marginalized/oppressed (Ball, 1994). A similar assumption can also be found in Laclau and Mouffe, who insist that hegemony consists in the play of the universal and the particular, and this play results in the “undecidable relation between the two logics of equivalence and difference can temporarily fixed in a determinate hierarchy (Torfing, 1999, p. 126). That is, when the discourses combined are incommensurate, ‘strategic ambiguity’ may be employed to mask the differences (Leitch & Davenport, 2007, p. 44). Ball et al.’s work offers an original and very grounded analysis of how English schools and teachers do policy. It is thus of interest to my study of China’s minority/bilingual education policy and policy enactment processes at Tibetan school communities. Ball (1994, p. 108) contends, “we should not always expect to find policy coherence and should not be surprised to see struggle within the State over the definition and purpose of policy solutions.” Similarly, Marshall and Patterson (2002, p. 351), while discussing current special education reforms in the United States toward a

72 more inclusive discourse, point to the fact that “Policies, programs, reforms, political pressures and legal mandates push in different directions and thus confuse and confound educators.” Strategic ambiguity ‘serves as an enabling function within discourse by allowing divergent objectives to coexist and ideologically diverse groups to, if not work together, then at least work in parallel’ (Leitch & Davenport, 2007, p. 44). As such, Rizvi and Lingard (2010, p. 12) refer to the ways in which the state “uses its authority” to justify and legitimate the public policy process – but add that in so doing, the state ‘plays a major part in producing “self governing individuals”’ or what Foucault calls ‘governmentality’ (Ball et al., 2012, p. 9). In summary, the three theoretical lenses employed in this study enable me to explore the interactions between policy discourse and policy enactment. These theories also lead me to question power relations in minority education policy making and practice; notably, why certain kinds of minority education policies and practices are seen as legitimate and valued, while others are cast aside as deviant, or are simply ignored. Thus, these theoretical ideas are utilized to inform approaches to this study.

3.4 Approaches

Theories and approaches often develop historically in “mutually constitutive ways” (Kamberelis & Dimitriadis, 2005, p. 22). The approaches of this qualitative inquiry are fully guided by the three theories and the theories are presented in the approaches, which are all based on social constructionism. Foundationally, social constructionist epistemology directly influences the design of approaches: I chose an ethnographic approach because I am interested in mapping the systems of education policy and policy practice that constitute social formations of Tibetan school communities. Like genealogy, ethnography is often about the play of power-knowledge relations in local and specific settings (Ball, 1994). I draw on the methods, data and analytical procedures of ethnography, in order to generate critical perspectives on the impact and effects of China’s minority/bilingual policy in policy agenda, curriculum, and artefacts in three bilingual education settings. As Ball (1994) indicated: “ethnography provides access to ‘situated’ discourses and ‘specific tactics’ and ‘precise and tenuous’ power relations operating in local settings” (p. 2). Thus, I see a methodological affinity between

73 ethnography (as sets of cultural texts) and historical texts in Foucault’s genealogical method (Ball, 1994). By using the term ‘approach’ I want to foreground the ‘practice’ of engaging in policy enactment research (Kamberelis & Dimitriadis, 2005, pp. 17-18). As described previously, this study tries to examine how minority/bilingual education policies are enacted in three Tibetan school communities. According to Yin (2009), case studies are favourable when ‘how’ questions are being asked. In sensibly addressing this research question, I decided to ‘get inside’ Tibetan school communities and ‘get close’ to the discursive policy enactment processes. In adopting an ‘emic’ approach, case studies enabled me to engage in close analysis of the situated policy ‘enactments’. A wide array of local interpretive resourses is used in the case study. My intention was to work in schools in order to explore, theoretically and empirically, my contention that policy responses are localised (Ball et al., 2012), especially in relation to minority/bilingual education policy. Therefore, I needed to establish a basis of comparison between schools by balancing similarities with differences (Ball et al., 2012). Details about the case selection and comparison case study can be found in the following section.

3.4.1 Case selection

The underlying principle behind my selection was to find schools in a variety of locations and under different local authorities. I selected the cases on two main reasons. The first concerns representativeness. Three main types of Tibetan communities were chosen for my study, namely, an agricultural area, a semi-agro-pastoral area, and a pastoral area. Secondly, the three schools occupy different positions in the current policy environment. Accordingly, the selected case schools were Zhanggu Primary School, a farming town school, Badi Primary School, a semi-agro-pastoral district school, and Tangke Primary School, in a Tibetan pastoral district. The first two schools are located in Danba County of Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, and the latter is in Ruoergai County of Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture (see Figure 3.3).

Case 3: Tangke Primary School

Case 2: Badi Primary School

Case 1: Zhanggu Primary School

Figure 3.3: Locations of the three case schools Source from: http://www.taiwandna.com/ChineseTibetTAR-TAP-TAC.png

The second relates to the particular nature of Sichuan Province in southwest China – cultural change. As a political, economic and cultural transition zone between Tibetan and Han, Sichuan Province has a significant population of Tibetans as a main ethnic minority group, and the other significant minorities of Yi, Qiang and Naxi, reside in the western areas (Harrell, 2001a; Nima, 2000). All the three schools are situated in Sichuan Province. As a basin surrounded by the Himalayas to the west, it borders Qinghai province to the northwest, Gansu province to the north, Guizhou province to the southeast, Yunnan province to the south, and the Tibetan Autonomous Region to the west. Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture and Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture in western Sichuan have vast territories and abundant resources, diverse Tibetan dialects and cultures, as well as a unique character that is shaped by thousands of years of Tibet Buddhism. Here, these features of the fieldwork site enabled me to consider the education policy enactment processes of Tibetan school communities from diverse cultural and socioeconomic backgrounds. Thus, the three case school communities represent the merging of the local Tibetan culture, Han culture and diverse socioeconomic background. On the one hand, Tibetan areas in Sichuan Province are officially considered as the gateway for introducing ‘advanced’ technology, scientific culture, and management experience from inland Han

areas to Tibetan areas. This foreshadows the operation of the logic of equivalence in terms of ‘majority Han versus minority Tibetan’. On the other hand, bilingual education policy was introduced earlier here than the other Tibetan cultural areas (Harrell, 2001b; Nima, 2001), foreshadowing the operation of the logic of difference in terms of ethnic cultural and linguistic diversity. Together with diverse cultural and socioeconomic background, these socio-cultural contexts are of great importance when comparing education policy enactment processes within and across the three case school communities.

3.4.2 Case study comparison

This comparison case study is based on the consideration of the importance of socio- cultural contexts, particularly in relation to the impact of neo-liberalism and marketization on education policy enactment processes. This study compares how various Tibetan school communities deal with education policies in light of power struggles over the discourse of Tibetan identity and the discourse of political morality, along with the impact of neoliberalism. This is done by using what I call the ‘orders of discourse’, a model of hybridity including themes of political morality, cultural identities and neoliberalism (see Table 3.3).

Table 3.3: Orders of discourse

Orders of discourse Key elements Political morality • Han universalism • Political loyalty to the party-state • The logic of equivalence in terms of • ‘Tibetan = backward versus Han = advanced’ Cultural identity • Languages • Traditional cultures • Religion • The logic of difference in terms of ‘cultural and linguistic diversity’ Neoliberalism • Marketization, modernisation, and privatisation • Market logic

Three ‘orders of discourse’ are briefly outlined in Table 3.3, prior to a more detailed discussion of each in case study. Based on literature review, ‘orders of discourse’ refers to the interactions between the discourse of political morality and the discourse of Tibetan cultural identity and the impact of neoliberalism. The discourse of political morality focusing upon and fostering political loyalty to the CCP can be understood in the context the logic of equivalence in terms of ‘Tibetan = backward versus Han = advanced’; the discourse of Tibetan cultural identity promoting Tibetan language and religion can be understood in the context of the logic of difference in terms of ‘cultural and linguistic diversity’; and neoliberal discourse can be understood in the context of market logic in terms of marketization, privatisation, and modernisation. My view is that the comparative case study in relation to socio-political and economic concerns, and particularly the bilingual and bicultural settings of local school communities, captures subtle ethnic identity and power relations. These relationships are reflected in the different ‘orders’ of discourses of political morality, cultural identities and neoliberalism relating to different schools. Thus, the comparison case study is focused in particular on the effect of ‘orders of discourse’ across the three Tibetan communities. These ‘orders of discourse’ foreshadow to ‘hybrid orders of discourse’ which will be developed in concluding chapter. In summary, this ethnographic comparison case study explores the interactions between China’s minority/bilingual education policy context and policy enactment processes. I highlight this exploratory case study as a dialogical process through which I try to co-construct knowledge with participants.

3.5 Strategies

Constructivist epistemology justifies the research strategies of this study, informing data collection and data analysis. They also guide the formulation of research questions and explicate the various decisions and considerations that inform the process of analysis. As introduced in Chapter 1, this study has two main objectives, one theoretical (to develop a theory of interaction between policy context and policy enactment) and one empirical (a critical exploration of the enactment of China’s minority/bilingual education policies). It focused on the following research questions:

 Questions 1: What are the key discourses of China’s minority/bilingual education policy at three levels of governance over the course of the CCP rule since 1949?  Questions 2: How are minority/bilingual policies enacted (or not enacted) in different Tibetan school communities?  Questions 3: How can similarities and differences between these schools in the enactment of policies be explained?

These research questions guide the procedural steps of the research aims guiding this study. To this end, two strategies are considered to address the research questions (see Figure 3.4): (1) using archival data for a close analysis on China’s minority/bilingual education policy context, in addressing research question 1; and (2) using archival data, observational data, and interview data for in-depth exploration on policy enactment processes across the three types of Tibetan school communities, in addressing research questions 2 and 3. These research strategies are the specific practices and procedures used to collect and analyse data and to report my findings. All points are detailed in this section.

Figure 3.4: Data collection and analysis in addressing research questions

3.5.1 Data and data collection

In addressing the first research question, I intensively gathered archival data. It includes documents collection from official policy documents issued by the central, provincial and local prefecture governments, including major government websites such as http://www.gov.cn of the Central People’s Government of China. Relevant secondary sources were also reviewed, such as the websites of major Chinese news agencies, for example the Xinhua News Agency at http://news.xinhuanet.com and People’s Daily at http://paper.people.com.cn/. I also studied English and Chinese language literature relating to China’s minority/bilingual educational policies. In addressing the second and third research questions, I conducted intensive fieldwork in the three Tibetan school communities over a ten-month period (February 2011 to December 2011), collecting archival, observational, and interview data. As Taylor and Bogdan (1998) explain, researchers need to convince ‘gatekeepers’ that his or her identity is non-threatening and not harmful to their organization in any way. Before going to Danba and Ruoergai for my fieldwork, Dr. Badeng Nima was one of my essential gatekeepers owing to his significant linkage with the three case school communities. Dr. Badeng Nima was born in Danba County and made a significant contribution in local education. He was also the respected principal of Tangke Primary School in Ruoergai County. Dr. Nima introduced me to the ‘gatekeepers’ principals of the three schools and the related Tibetan community stakeholders. In my first contact with the principals of the three local schools, I presented my written permission for the research, and they were interested in my study of their schools. On several occasions, they told me they were trying to conduct research that would help their schools improve their educational quality. They welcomed me as a critical friend and a volunteer English teacher in Grade six. Thus all three primary school principals were invited, as, to take part in my study. In addition, the principle of Zhanggu Primary School asked me for an official introductory letter from my working unit (Chengdu University) so that he could properly report my case to the Education Bureau of Danba County. This school is located at Zhanggu Town, the Danba County Government seat. The principle explained this was only a kind of formality so that they could put my case on record for the school management and the future examination of higher governmental departments.

Once approval was granted by the principals, the students and teachers were provided with a consent form and a parental consent form through the schools, according to ethical considerations under the Arts, Humanities & Law Human Research Ethics Advisory. Based on our discussions, I noted that the Tibetan language course is offered from the fifth Grade of schools in Danba County. Therefore, in this study, I chose to focus on the fifth grade students in these schools. Students are ideally expected to be fluent in both languages, Tibetan and Mandarin; and students are likely to be able to talk about their own stories, experiences, and feelings. Their teachers expressed interest and welcomed me into their classrooms. I used the above contexts (selection criteria) to narrow and select a purposeful sample, and ensured the selected participants were able to answer questions related to the study. I conducted a series of interviews and discussions with principals, administrators, teachers, students and parents. They are significant policy actors and enacting the specific policies that I identified for this study. The interviews focused on the schools’ current constitutions, such as teaching methods, curriculum materials, and language use in whole-school and in classrooms.The interviews explored the ways in which policies were selected, interpreted and translated (Ball et al., 2012) and how they moved from the leadership into classroom activites and school community life. My starting position was that across the sets of policies, the local actors would play their part in the interpretation and enactment of policy in school communities. The interviews in this case study highlight the voice of the participants, following Goldstein (2003) who indicated that Chinese minority education should be studied by and through hearing insiders’ voices; by listening to those who are experiencing Chinese minority education. I see my participants as actively “shaping the course of the interviews rather than passively responding to the interviewer’s pre-set questions” (King, 2004, P. 11). I discussed the design of my interview questions with some of my Tibetan teachers and friends before the interviews. Their feedback and suggestions inspired me to focus my questions and their content according to the three types of Tibetan communities studied: farming, semi-agro-pastoral, and pastoral areas. Creswell and Miller (2000) stressed the need to “engage in collaborative research practices that are respectful of the individuals we study” (p. 129). By showing respect for their socio- cultural backgrounds, the ways in which questions were asked during the interviews enabled me to establish close relationships with my participants and a ‘tell me more’

80 style. This reflexivity also gave me further opportunities to speak with participants when I collected archival and contextualising data and engaged in broad observations. I collected archival data in relation to minority/bilingual policies issued by the local schools and governments respectively: Annals on Work Plans, Summary Reports and Regulations, pamphlets about school working process were delivered by local administrators, as well as textbooks for the courses of history, Chinese and ideology and politics from grade five to grade six, and teachers’ research projects and students’ compositions. A wide range of contextualising data was also collected from each school community: demographic information about student intake, background, buildings and material resources of wall displays and posters. According to Laclau and Mouffe, non- linguistic practices and objects are also part of discourses (Philips & Jørgensen, 2002). Thus, these school documents, curricula materials, environmental artefacts and cultural signs, belong to the discourses of education policy and are good examples of the re- appropriation and transformation of cultural symbols. I also observed the classes and attended the staff and parents meetings of each school. I focused on the overall Tibetan language use and the cultural environment of the school community, the Tibetan language profile of the teachers and other staff, the interactivities between teachers and students in classrooms and in non-learning activities. I also participated in some social activities to comprehend the social contexts of the three school communities, for example, weddings and family celebrations. Sharing their everyday life and watching and listening to what people naturally do and say, allowed me close contact with the study subjects. Overall, I collected and elicited an enormous volume of data (see Table 3.4). A tape recorder was used to record the natural interaction process and I kept comprehensive interview and observational field notes. Recognizing that memos were helpful and important in the initial analysis of the data (Creswell, 2002), I wrote memos in the margins of the field notes. A data audit for each school was placed as a set of appendices (pp. 304-309) which breaks down interviews/interviewees, documentary sources, observations, etc; research instruments (e.g. interview topic guides) from some of the transcripts.

Table 3.4: Data colletion – overview

Data Type Archival data Interviews Observations

Data process Data collected Official policy documents The schools’ Classes Relevant secondary sources current Staff and English and Chinese language constitutions, parents literature such as teaching meetings methods, Social activities Schools’ Annals on Work curriculum Plans, Summary Reports and materials, and Regulations, pamphlets about language use in school working process whole-school and Textbooks for the courses of in classrooms history, Chinese and ideology and politics Teachers’ research projects Students’ compositions Contextualising data: cultural signs and environmental artefacts Data source The central, provincial and School School local prefecture governments, community sites community sites including major government websites and major Chinese news agencies.

School community sites Data access ‘gatekeepers’: Principals Principals Tibetan scholar: Dr. Nima Administrators Administrators Principals Teachers Teachers Administrators The fifth grade Students Teachers students Parents Students Parents Parents Research Q1, Q2 & Q3 Q2 & Q3 Q2 & Q3 questions addressed

3.5.2 Data analysis

To link the multiple sources of data, the three major theories detailed earlier provided a set of conceptual tools with which policy discourses and policy enactment processes could be analysed and described. Foucault played a central role in this discourse analysis through both theoretical work, as discussed previously, and empirical research, particularly in relation to neoliberal societies. Neoliberalism offers a useful and influential lens and enables me to interpret how global and national political-economic transformation affects the production and reproduction of a minority space, reflecting the ‘orders of discourse’, as noted previously. Foucault’s governmentality studies provide an analysis of the introduction of political economy into government. In the field of education, as yet, minimal work has focused specifically on governmentality. In this study, Foucault’s genealogical method and his concept of governmentality were deployed to re-articulate and re-theorize a new understanding of social minority/bilingual education policy development in China, along with the impact of the impact of neo-liberalism and marketization. As detailed previously, the major concepts of Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985, 2001) discourse theory were used for the analysis of the dynamics of China’s minority/bilingual education policy trajectory at three levels of governance and over the last 60 years of economic and social change in China, including the impact of neoliberalism and marketization on education policy for minorities. All of this can help build up an applicable macro-framework of China’s minority/bilingual education policy context, which further leads to the identification of the micro-framework of policy enactments in Tibetan school communities. To explore policy enactments in school communities, I organized the data by site: school and community, and then organized the data in each site by type: interviews, observations, documents, photograph and other visual materials. I focused on what I call the ‘four As’ analytic framework of policy actors’ activity and experiences: 1) attitudes towards minority/bilingual education, 2) agendas for education development, 3) actions for implementing curricula, and 4) artefact production. These are detailed in this section. The ‘four As’ at the microscopic level are valuable to tease out important elements which shape educational policy enactment processes in the school communities. They also suggest a framework for analysing the fieldwork data, highlighting the day-to-day

83 interactions of policy actors. To analyse the complexity of education policy enactment processes, this study brings together contextual, historic and cultural dynamics into a relation with policy actors, agendas, actions and artefacts (four As). Importantly, the four As are bidirectional and inter-influenced (see Figure 3.5).

Specifically, I present the hybridity in policy discourses and discursive strategies in school communities, using the following aspects in relation to data and data analysis: 1) policy documents and interview data about policy actors’ attitudes towards minority/bilingual education, along with their different interests and perspectives, emphasising the power of actors to resist or transform education policy discourses; 2) policy documents and interview data about policy agendas for education development; 3) curriculum materials, observational data, and interview data about policy actions of engaging with curricula, which make up, reflect and carry within them key policy discourses that are currently in circulation in my case study schools; 4) environmental and cultural signs and interview data about the discursive production of artefacts. The production of artefacts encounters a contested terrain absorbs different voices and justifies the dominant ideology.

These aspects of ‘four As’ are highlighted as contextual factors which are crucial to education policy enactment and its implications for Tibetan students. The ‘four As’ analytical framework is operationalized in a critical analysis of how policy actors make

84 interpretations from positions of their identities, and how governmentality takes place around the manipulation of the integrated agenda through sets of actions and the production of discursive artefacts (Foucault, 1979, 1991). With the help of the ‘4as’ analytical framework, based on data of documents, interviews and observations, this study illustrates how China’s minority/bilingual education policies are enacted in Tibetan school communities.

3.6 Summary

I conclude this chapter with some thoughts about negotiating the relative commensurability between and among four dimensions: epistemologies, theories, approaches, and strategies, within the complex, indeterminate landscape of qualitative inquiry and actually conducting research (Kamberelis & Dimitriadis, 2005). Epistemology foundationally and directly influences theories, approaches, and strategies. In return, approaches, and strategies are constrained by and make visible theoretical and epistemic choices. These dimensions or analytic strata are intimately and intricately connected, and provide the framework for the plan and implementation of this qualitative research on China’s minority/bilingual education policy discourses and policy enactments in Tibetan school communities. This chapter examined the contribution of social constructionism as one alternative way of understanding China’s bilingual/minority education policy discourses and policy enactments. The four tenets of social constructionism allow me to illustrate the ways in which the methodological issue informs or constrains what I see and how I explain what I see, highlighting the reflexivity involved at every stage of the research process (Grenfell & James, 1998). According to social constructionist tenets, the theories of Foucault’s genealogical work and governmentality, Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory, and Ball, et al.’s work on policy enactments are valuable in providing insights into the seemingly most advanced Han educational forms, and the ‘backwardness’ of minorities. Underpinned by this, I cast doubt on the viability of this ‘Minority = backward versus Han = advanced’ distinction. To this end, this chapter has discussed the import of Laclau and Moffe’s theory of discourse analysis in opening up investigations of relations within and between the discursive practice of policy enactments in school community context and in the contexts of tensions between the

85 logic of equivalence and the logic of difference. The full use of an exploratory comparison case study approach using qualitative data, particularly the voices of stakeholders, has been made in this study of policy enactment processes. The ‘four As’ analytical framework offers my thinking about policy enactment. By exposing the processes by which such hegemonic practices are achieved within texts and discursive actions and artefacts, policy enactment research may contribute to the dissolution of those hegemonic practices. Many of my chapters will link the macro (governmental), mezzo (academic) and micro (individual) levels of minority educational discourses with discursive socio- cultural policy enactments and with the complexity of the power relations between the minorities and the Han. The applicability of the theories to the study of China’s minority/bilingual education policy context and the case study of policy enactment within and across three types of Tibetan school communities will be explored in the following Chapters.

Chapter 4. The Context of Education Policy for Minorities in China

4.1 Introduction

China’s ethnic minority/bilingual education policy as my research site tends to be seen in social, political, and historical terms, but attention needs to be given also to economic matters. In this chapter, I offer an analysis of the context of China’s education policies for ethnic minorities at three levels of governance, namely, the central government, Sichuan Province, and the Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture governments in Sichuan. I also consider the education policy trajectory over the last 60 years of economic and social change in China, including the impact of neo-liberalism and marketization on education policy for minorities. There are three main purposes of this analysis. The first purpose is to identify key discourses in minority education policy and research. The second purpose is to identify and explore tensions between the perspectives both in policy and in research on minority education. The third purpose is to provide the ground for the upcoming three chapters, which explore how the different Tibet schools enact (or do not enact) policies in the context of these tensions. Thus, the purposes above are related to the three research questions. The body of this chapter consists of three sections covering three historical periods1 across three policy sites. In section 1, I investigate the contexts of minority education policy documents at the initial pluralistic stage (1949-1957); in part 2, I investigate the Chinese monopolistic stage (1958-1977); and in part 3, I investigate the modernisation stage and its move towards harmony and stability (1978-2012). In each section, I discuss the developments and dynamics of minority education policy change, in terms of Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985, 2001) discourse theory, such as nodal points, the logics of equivalence and difference, chains of signification, hegemony, and floating signifiers, as detailed in Chapter 3. This chapter concludes with a summary of the main themes in the analysis for addressing the research questions.

1 Lin (1997) and Zhou (2000) identify that China’s political policies for minorities have dictated its minority- language policy, which is divided into three stages: the first pluralistic stage (1949–1957), the Chinese monopolistic stage (1958–1977), and the second pluralistic stage (1978–present). 87

4.2 The Initial Pluralistic Stage (1949-1957)

The first stage of the development of China’s language and education policy in relation to minority areas was characterised by a pluralistic approach, described by the CCP in terms of the principle of ‘different treatment’ (“The History of the Communist Party of China”, 2011; Zhang & Liu, 2011). The principle of different treatment had a privileged status, in different levels of local governments, for enhancing nation-building, particularly in relation to the plan of the construction of regime, economy, culture and education in minority areas (Xinhua, 2004). We can gain these insights into how the policies promoting different treatment principles were sustained and developed in this early stage, by examining the logic of difference.

4.2.1 The Central Government’s Principle of Different Treatment

After the founding of new China, Mao Zedong’s Written Report at the Third Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the CCP (1950) put forward the principle of different treatment, that is, the social reform of minority areas must be treated differently on the basis of the specific situations and characteristics of ethnic minority nationalities and regions (Mao Zedong’s manuscripts, 1987). Different treatment henceforth provided the general underlying principle for the development and implementation of policy in relation to minorities (Chen & Qi, 2003; Howland, 2011; Xinhua, 2002; Zhang & Liu, 2011). The basic policy of the PRC towards its minority nationalities in Article 3 of the first Constitution (1954)2, states: The People’s Republic of China is a unitary multinational state. All the nationalities are equal. Discrimination against or oppression of any nationality, and acts which undermine the unity of the nationalities, are prohibited.

All the nationalities have the freedom to use and develop their own spoken and written languages, and to preserve or reform their own customs and ways.

2 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1961, p. 9, as cited in Mackerras, 1994, p. 145). 88

Regional autonomy applies in areas where a minority nationality lives in a compact community. All the national autonomous areas are inseparable parts of the People’s Republic of China3.

There are two very clear principles here which have remained in force throughout the modern period of China (Mackerras, 1994). These are that the nationalities should all be treated equally to have rights of autonomy (Regional autonomy applies in areas where a minority nationality lives in a compact community) and language usage (All the nationalities have the freedom to use and develop their own spoken and written languages). These two principles are consistent with international human rights law, which specifies the minorities’ right to their own culture, language, and religion. In other words, the agenda promoting different treatment saw the operation of the logic of difference, through which ethnic, cultural and linguistic diversity was asserted and defended in the first Constitution (1954). However, rights of autonomy and language usage are only acceptable within the context of prohibiting any secession from the state or right to independence (acts which undermine the unity of the nationalities, are prohibited). This was summed up as ‘unity and equality’ by the CCP (Mackerras, 1994, p. 145). In terms of the political-relational spectrum, the combination of unitary multinational state, the unity of the nationalities and inseparable parts of the People’s Republic of China, places the situation of the minority areas closer to ‘integration’ than to either ‘pluralism’ at the one end or ‘assimilation’ at the other (Mackerras, 1994, p. 145). Even the slightest hint of secession or independence, of breaking up the unity of the PRC, must be prevented at all costs. But regardless of its intention, the basic policy is, at least in theory, a step in the direction of fostering equality among peoples (All the nationalities are equal), particularly in relation to the two principles of rights of autonomy and language usage, with policies promoting ethnic cultural and linguistic diversity following as a result. In what follows, I explore the origin and process of these two principles.

3 In the following discussion, terminology from this extract and others will be in italics, to distinguish them from other sources. 89

Right of autonomy

The establishment of autonomous areas was an early priority of the CCP government, highlighting national forms of autonomous organisations, languages and cadres (Dreyer, 1976, p. 105). The political message of rights of autonomy was reiterated in Mao’s Speeches on Democratic Reforms in Minority Regions. Mao Zedong’s On New Democracy explicitly declared that only through democracy could a government survive being overthrown, and democracy could also bring about the Chinese national goal of ‘great rejuvenation’ (Mao, 1969). The reforms, such as the Land Reform Law (1950), involved such actions as overthrowing the serf system in Tibet, which had persisted even through the 1950s, due to the autonomy required by the May 1951 Sino-Tibetan Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet (Mackerras, 1994). In a speech in the Enlarged Meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee (1951), Mao asserted the need for the CCP cadres to work tirelessly in minority areas and to implement democratic reform according to the local conditions of historical development, cultural characteristics, ethnic relations and ethnic distribution (Chen & Qi, 2003; Zhang & Liu, 2011). On August 8, 1952, Mao issued China’s first administrative regulations on the new regional ethnic autonomy system, the Implementation Outline of the People’s Republic of China on Regional National Autonomy (1952) (abbreviated as Regional National Autonomy). Regional National Autonomy (1952) was promoted as the basic policy for democratic reform in minority areas by the central government (Yan, 2004). Throughout this period, Mao emphasised the importance of fully understanding the characteristics of the different ethnic minorities and minority areas as a necessary condition for implementing Regional National Autonomy (1952) (Chen & Qi, 2003). Thus, identity is the nodal point of this discourse of rights of autonomy. For example, a ‘full estimation of the characteristics and circumstances of each minority group’ was emphasised as critical for implementing Regional National Autonomy (1952) by the Third Expanded Meeting of Central Ethnic Affairs Commission (1953) (People’s Daily, 1953). The identification of nationalities on the basis of Stalin’s definition of the four basic criteria: common language, common territory, common economic life, and common culture, was thus a key task of the central government (Mackerras, 1994). From 1953, this task was conducted by teams of identification groups, such as Fei

Xiaotong 4 . They soon found that the minorities in China were extremely diverse (Gladney, 1994; Mackerras, 1994; Mullaney, 2010). By 1954, the central government had identified 38 ethnic groups in all, after careful investigation and study (Xinhua, 2002). By 1955 over 400 groups registered as nationalities (Mackerras, 1994). At the time of the founding of the PRC, the CCP consciously spoke of the ‘Chinese peoples’ in the plural: the majority nationality consisted of the Han Chinese – itself a twentieth- century construction – and all other peoples were ‘minority nationalities’, to differentiate themselves from their nationalist rivals, who used the singular (Gladney, 1991, pp. 83-93). In July 1956, Premier Zhou Enlai gave a speech on the CCP’s Indication on the Democratic Reform in Ganzi and Liangshan Yi District of Sichuan, highlighting the priority of minority identities: We must conduct democratic reform according to the wishes of the masses, and by getting the agreement of the upper classes of ethnic minorities through peaceful negotiation. In the process of negotiation, it is necessary to convince people with reason, rather than impose ideas on minority people. Han cadres must have patience and be good at waiting. We must pay special attention to the prevention of seeking quick results without minorities’ agreement. (Zhou Enlai, 1956, p. 1)

Here, minority identity is a privileged sign around which the other signs are ordered; the other signs acquire their meaning from their relationship to identity. Minority identity is discursively constituted through chains of equivalence where signs are sorted and linked together in chains in terms of democratic reform=the wishes of the masses=getting the agreement of the upper classes of ethnic minorities=peaceful negotiation=convince people with reason=patience, in opposition to other chains in terms of impose ideas on minority people=seeking quick results without minorities’ agreement. Thus, identity is defined on the basis of conducting democratic reform. Subsequently, at the Central Committee Conference of 1956, Mao emphasised the cause of Regional National Autonomy (1952) resolutely avoiding ‘great nationality chauvinism’, that is, ‘Han chauvinism’5,i.e. the tendency of the Han to look down upon,

4 Fei Xiaotong was a pioneering Chinese researcher and professor of sociology and anthropology; he was also noted for his studies in the study of China’s ethnic groups as well as a social activist (Wikipedia, 2013b). 5 Some scholars prefer to translate da han zu zhu yi and di fang min zu zhu yi as respectively “Han nationalism” and 91 to discriminate against, or otherwise ill-treat the smaller or weaker nationalities (Mackerras, 2003, p. 146). At the opposite end of this ‘evil’ is that of ‘local nationalism’, meaning the tendency of minority nationalities to secede from the PRC (Mackerras, 2003, p. 146). During the first few years, the PRC authorities’ attitude to its minorities has emphasised great Han chauvinism as the more serious evil than local nationalism (Mackerras, 2003). For example, during land reform in minority areas, the policy of Democratic Reform by Peaceful Negotiation involved working together with the old ruling classes to instantiate the new order; this was sharply different from the treatment of Han landlords, who were treated as the enemy and had to be punished (Mackerras, 1994; Zhang & Liu, 2011). The ideal behind this policy of ‘reform by peaceful negotiation’ was to work together with the old ruling classes, trying to persuade them to accept and even encourage the new order, rather than setting them up as the enemy who had to be punished. The CCP initially tried to avoid open class struggle among the minorities as far as it could. Mao further expressed this concern over relations between the Han majority and the minority nationalities in his speech, On the Ten Major Relationships (1956), which emphasised respecting the minority nationalities and according them equal treatment (Howland, 2011). All of this reflects the PRC authorities’ attitude towards promoting ‘a mood of tolerance’ (Mackerras, 2003, p. 21). At the early stage of the founding of modern China, the central government established “a fair degree of national stability” by preventing the tendencies of great- Han chauvinism by balancing “great nationality chauvinism” and “local nationalism” (Mackerras, 1994, p. 150). Implicit within the central government’s attitude of opposing Han chauvinism, was the purpose of gaining the support of minority groups in order to conduct democratic reform by implementing regional autonomy in the interests of common development, prosperity and progress (Chen & Qi, 2003; Yan, 2004; Zhang & Liu, 2011). Thus, the period from 1950 to 1958 saw the establishment of three autonomous regions, 29 autonomous prefectures, and 54 autonomous counties (Minzucidian, 1984, as cited in Mackerras, 1994). In other words, the logic of difference can be seen preventing the formation of dichotomies in terms of great-Hanism and local nationalism, by highlighting the priority of the right of autonomy.

“local nationalism”, which updates the terms for post-1989 audiences concerned with nationalism. But in the communist movement from the 1930s to 1960s, “chauvinism” was the official English translation (Howland, 2011, p. 173). 92

Right of language usage

Regional National Autonomy (1952) guaranteed the right of language usage. The political message of the right of language use was first specified under Article 53 of the Common Programmes of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Congress (1949), highlighting the right of using and developing the spoken and written languages of all ethnic groups (Li, 2010). Importantly, the right of language use in Article 3 of the first Constitution (1954) was accorded extreme importance and respect, as noted previously. In 1956, the policies of minority languages were identified as priorities by the Party in the CCP Central Committee Conference on the Ethnic Minority Languages. Thus, the period from 1951 to 1956 saw the discourse of promoting the right of language usage around the nodal point of minority identities, particularly reflected in the State Council’s establishing a language work committee. The purpose of this language work committee is to promote (a) the written minority languages in Type 1 minority communities6, linking their cultures and traditions to local materials; and (b) the creation and reform of writing systems in Type 2 communities7; and (c) identifying the linguistic and cultural needs and desires of local minority communities in Type 3 communities8 (Dai & Dong, 1997; Ma, 2007; Zhou, 2000). Under these general policies stressing rights of autonomy and language usage, education for minorities has been described by Ma (2007) and Yixi (2005) as ‘pluralistic’. It is focused on the different treatment principle for the development of minority written languages and their use in education. In 1953, the Ministry of Education (abbreviated as MoE) issued the Views on the Teaching Language Application issues of the Brother Nationalities (1953), claiming that ethnic native languages shall be used as teaching languages in minority schools. For those who have only oral language, Mandarin can be used as teaching language before creating the written minority languages (Li, 2010). In the following year, four documents were

6 Type 1 minority communities: The main minority groups with more than one million people (Korean, Kazak, Mongolian, Tibetan, and Uygur) with functional writing systems of historically broad usage; geographically, these communities are located along China’s western, northern, and north eastern border areas; historically, these “nationalistic groups had enjoyed a degree of self-governance prior to the Communist revolution” (Hoddie, 1998, p. 125). 7 Type 2 minority communities: Those between one million and100000 people, Dai, Jingpo, Lisu, Lahu, Miao, Naxi, Va, and Yi, with greater or lesser degrees writing systems of historically limited usage (Zhou, 2000). 8 Type 3 minority communities: The remaining 42 language groups with less than 100000 people, without functional writing systems (Zhou, 2000). 93 adopted by the central government, namely, the Decision on the Establishment of the Institutions of Minority Education Administration, the Instructions on Strengthening the Work of Minority Education, the Pilot Program of Training Ethnic Minority Teachers, and the Interim Measures of Treating Minority Students (He & Liu, 1995). These documents recommended different approaches to school forms, school settings, school systems, curricula, teaching styles, language instruction and the treatment of students. Supporting policies were issued by provincial, prefecture and county level of governments to stress rights of language usage (Yixi, 2005). Underpinning this, the MoE emphasised teaching courses in ethnic languages in specific minority schools (He & Liu, 1995; Yixi, 2005). Thus, efforts were made to ensure that the minority language was the first language and Chinese the second (Zhou, 2000). The logic of difference takes on a particular significance in the central government’s principle of promoting the right of language use. With the priority of minority identities, the different treatment principle acquires its meaning by being represented discursively in terms of steady progress, different approaches, the consultation process, and the peaceful transition to democratic reform; and this is done on the basis of the CCP cadres’ in-depth investigations of minority areas. The purpose of the investigation in minority areas is to understand and master the economic and socio-cultural conditions of various ethnic minority groups (Chen & Qi, 2003; Yan, 2004; Zhang & Liu, 2011). In particular, Mao’s discourse forbade the mechanical importation of experiences, slogans, and policies from Han areas into minority areas (Chen & Qi, 2003; Zhang & Liu, 2011). The different treatment principle, promoting ethnic cultural and linguistic diversity, reflected the central government’s simultaneous understanding and determination of minorities’ differences. In other words, the differential logic became predominant. However, the different treatment principle was not entirely benign; it involved the multiplication of difference as a strategy to prevent the establishment of a unified oppositional movement – the classic strategy of “divide and rule” (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, pp. 144-145). Some critics have argued that this policy of a mosaic of autonomous zones in order to prevent any collective action against the PRC mobilised two basic principles of what was already PRC policy: autonomy, but no secession as detailed previously. Other critics have debated whether or not the PRC’s work in identifying nationalities was an act of colonialism in continuity with Qing imperial

94 practices (Howland, 2011; Mackerras, 2003), particularly in relation to politicized moral education. For example, the 42nd article of the state’s Constitution states: ‘Loving the country, loving the people, loving work, loving science, and loving public property (otherwise called the Five Lovings) are advocated as the principles of social morality for the citizens of the People’s Republic of China.’ This has become the core of moral education in schools. The communist ideology was seen as the guiding principle of student life because only the CCP has total control over educational activities in China (Li, 1990). In order to change the minorities’ old and backward ideas and make it easy for the Party to manage a new and large country, moral education was, in fact, carried out in the name of ‘ideological-political education’ (Li, 1990, p. 162). Thus, moral education could be said to have been politicized from the very outset. But regardless of its intention, the different treatment principle helped minority groups in different areas to successfully realize the transition from different social stages to the early stage of socialism (Mackerras, 1994; Zhang & Liu, 2011). In being represented in this way, as a cluster of signifiers around the nodal point of identity, the rights of autonomy and language usage can be recognized as an early priority of the central government.

4.2.2 Steady and Gradual Democratic Reform in Sichuan Province

During the initial pluralistic stage, steady and gradual democratic reform was carried out by the Sichuan government in line with the actual conditions of ethnic minority areas (Chen & Li, 2009; Huang, 2009). In 1950, Deng Xiaoping told the Welcome Meeting of the Southwest District 9 Delegation that democratic reform should be conducted gradually by local minorities themselves and this was echoed in Liu Bocheng’s requirement in Tasks of Southwest District (1950). Both highlighted appropriate and steady approaches towards democratic reform in ethnic minority areas according to local situations (Yang, 2007). In Sichuan, one autonomous county and two autonomous prefectures were established, namely, Muli Tibetan Autonomous County in 1953, the Ganzi Tibetan

9 It included the municipality of the provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan and Guizhou, and the Tibet Autonomous Region at the early stage of the founding of China (Yang, 2007). 95

Autonomous Prefecture 10 in 1955, and the Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture11 in 1956 (Dai & Dong, 1998). The logic of difference can be seen in calls for training minority cadres for the ethnic minorities to govern themselves, under the central government’s Tentative Plan for the Training of Minority Cadres (1951) (Huang, 2009). Cadres were taught to respect local customs and etiquette in specific minority communities (Mackerras, 1994). Meanwhile, a relatively tolerant attitude towards steady and gradual democratic reform in minority autonomous areas was also evident in Sichuan (Zheng & Liu, 2008). According to the central government’s policy of promoting the wishes of the masses and resisting the temptation to seek quick results, the large-scale drastic democratic revolutionary movement was not carried out in the ethnic autonomous regions of Sichuan at the early stage of socialist construction. The democratic reform in minority areas was promoted as ‘steadier in policy, looser in ways and longer in time’ than that of other regions in China (Huang, 2009). This steady and gradual democratic reform provided the basic guarantee for the rights of minority languages in Sichuan (“Spoken and Written Languages”, 2009). In the 1950s, the Sichuan government organized specialist investigation teams for aiding minority languages. The teams helped the minorities to formalize or reform their spoken and written languages in order to promote the use of ethnic native languages (Nima, 2004). For example, in December 1956, the Program of Yi Alphabetic Writing Language was identified and conducted by the Steering Committee of Minority Languages of Sichuan Province. Like other programs that fostered minority languages, it was a creative application of the central government’s different treatment principle in Sichuan’s democratic reform (“Spoken and Written Languages”, 2009). In recognition of different cultural and linguistic situations in specific minority areas, the Sichuan government increasingly placed its hope in minority languages usage to play a key role in the steady and gradual development of minority education, notably,

10 Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture — is an autonomous prefecture in Sichuan Province of south western China. It is sometimes appears as “Kardze” and Garzin in non-government sources. The prefecture’s area is 151,078 square kilometres (58,332 sq mi). The population is approximately 880,000, with Tibetans accounting for 77.8% of the total population. The capital city of Ganzi is Kangding (Dardo). It is the first largest area inhabited by Tibetans in Sichuan province (Wikipedia, 2013c). 11 Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture — is an autonomous prefecture in the Northwest part of Sichuan Province and Southeast margin of the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau. It connects Northwest and Southwest China, covering an area of 84200 square kilometres with a population of 898846, with Tibetans accounting for 56.6% of the total population. It is the second largest area inhabited by Tibetans in Sichuan province and the main area of the Qiangs. (Wikipedia, 2013a) 96

Tibetan-Chinese bilingual education in the Tibetan autonomous areas of Sichuan (Genwang, 2008).

4.2.3 The Implementation of the Spoken and Written Languages of Nationalities (1952) in Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures

Steady and gradual democratic reform contributed to the development of the Tibetan autonomous areas of Sichuan, particularly in relation to the Implementation of the Spoken and Written Languages of Nationalities (1952) policy for the nationalisation of regional autonomous governments (Duan, 2011; Zhang, 1953). Here, nationalisation invokes the principal of autonomy in the form of autonomous institutions, languages and cadres, as discussed above. Two autonomous prefectures (Ganzi and Aba) and one autonomous county (Muli) were established in Sichuan, each occupying sensitive borders (see Figure 4.1). Specifically, they border Qinghai province to the northwest, Gansu province to the north, Guizhou province to the southeast, Yunnan province to the south, and the Tibetan Autonomous Region to the west. Tibetans as a main ethnic minority group, and other significant minorities of Yi, Qiang and Naxi reside in the western areas forming a traditional transition zone of diverse languages and cultures (Harrell, 2001a; Nima, 2000). Thus it is a Tibetan and Chinese political, economic and cultural transition zone (Bo, 2010; Dai & Dong, 1998). A buffer between Tibet and the Chinese interior, Xikang (Kham12) Tibetan Autonomy (now Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture) was formed in 1950 (Bo, 2010). It was the first local autonomous government to be established subsequent to the founding of the PRC. As Deng Xiaoping pointed out, regional national autonomy should be firstly set up in Kham, and the solutions in Kham could directly affect all Tibetan areas (Duan, 2011). Across this extremely political sensitive region, prominent religious leaders and local headmen were consulted by the provincial CCP Committee in matters relating to the establishment of autonomous governments, such as names, boundaries, personnel, and even the location of government seats (Guo, 2008).

12 In 1950, Kham was split along the Yangtze River into Xikang to the east and a separate Chamdo Territory to the west. Chamdo was merged into Tibet Autonomous Region in 1965. The rest of Kham was merged into Sichuan province in 1955 (Bo, 2010; Duan, 2011; Zhang, 1953). 97

Xikang (Kham)

Sichuan Province

Figure 4.1: Areas of the Khamin Sichuan, China Source from: http://www.tibet.net/en/image/tibet-map.jpg

Under the banner of Regional National Autonomy, the Implementation of Spoken and Written Languages of Nationalities (1952) was adopted at the Third People’s Congress of All Ethnic Groups, in Xikang, for the nationalization of the regional autonomous government (Duan, 2011; Zhang, 1953). The nationalization of the Xikang government meant that the major work of the autonomous region was governed by the minority cadres in their own language, with internal affairs managed through the appropriate use of their own ethnic nationality forms (People’s Daily, 1953; Zhang, 1953). Under Regional National Autonomy (1952), Xikang’s development was praised as an ideal model in the Summary on the Experience of Implementing Regional National Autonomy at the Third Expand Meeting of the Central Ethnic Affairs Commission (1953) (Duan, 2011; People’s Daily, 1953; Zhang, 1953). In what can be seen in retrospect as a foreshadowing of neoliberal ideals that came to prominence in the 1980s, Xikang’s autonomous development was regarded as a best-case example of the notion of self- entrepreneurial agents (here, autonomous minority regions) being empowered by policies that offer incentives and rewards for good practice. Two of Xikang’s experiences are particularly important in this regard. First, the development of Xikang depended on the implementation of the different treatment principle in promoting the Tibetan language in the Xikang government (Duan,

2011; Zhang, 1953). The Tibetan language was utilised as the main language in government documents; and Tibetan-Chinese bilingualism was actively encouraged for both Tibetan and Han Chinese cadres (People’s Daily, 1953; Zhang, 1953). For example, the Xikang government established a translation department in 1951 and the Tibetan editorial office in 1953 (Dai & Dong, 1997). From February 1953, both Tibetan and Chinese were used in all official documents (People’s Daily, 1953; Zhang, 1953). The Ganzi Daily was founded in 1954. It is a Tibetan-based ethnic minority daily newspaper (Dai & Dong, 1997). Second, the development of Xikang was achieved through the appropriate use of Tibetan traditions (People’s Daily, 1953; Zhang, 1953). The activities of the Mountain Strolling Fair and the Temple Fair in 1953 were typical and successful examples. Their purpose was to promote the exchange of Tibetan-Han materials and supplies through cooperation between the Xikang government and the masses (Zhang, 1953). Moreover, the appropriate use of Tibetan traditions contributed to favourable Han-Tibetan relations. Ahwang Jiacuo, the Vice Chairman of the Xikang government, praised Han cadres as ‘the stars in the sky’ for their genuine desire to help Tibetans (Zhang, 1953). Thus, Xikang’s experiences yielded important lessons for other Tibetan areas and for the central governmental policymakers, highlighting Tibetan identity in relation to the usage of Tibetan language and culture. Around the nodal point of Tibetan identity, bilingual education appeared in Sichuan Tibetan areas earlier than in other Tibetan cultural areas (Nima, 2000). For example, in 1950 the first Tibetan Primary School was established in Xikang (Duojie, 2011). In 1952, textbooks in Tibetan were published by the Organization of Human Resources for Compiling the Tibetan Textbooks of Xikang (Zhang, 1953). By 1953, 250 primary schools for Tibetans were established in the Tibetan autonomous areas of Sichuan with more than 12,000 students enroled; this number has grown six fold since then (Xinhua, 2002). In the mid-1950s, the newly established education department in Ganzi issued the Guidelines on Bilingual Education, with emphasis on the use of Tibetan as the primary language of schools for Tibetans (Kolås, 2003). In 1956 the Cultural and Educational Development of Aba published the Plan and Preliminary Views on Minority Education (1956-1957) for promoting Tibetan-Chinese bilingual teaching and learning (Gao, 2009). Thus, the Tibetan people’s enthusiasm for sending their children to school was greatly enhanced by the government’s intensive propaganda work on

99 bilingual education with distinctive Tibetan characteristics (Genwang, 2008; Nima, 2002). In other words, the bilingual educational system with distinctive Tibetan characteristics, highlighting the right of Tibetan language use, can be seen as an instance of the operation of the logic of difference. Table 4.1 summarises the basic features of policies in the three levels of governances at this initial pluralistic stage. The notion of pluralism can be seen in the titles of the education documents as detailed in this section, notably, the Regional National Autonomy (1952), the Implementation of Spoken and Written Languages of Nationalities (1952), the Decision on the Protection of All Scattered Minority Composition of Ethnic Equality Rights (1952), and the Views on the Teaching Language Application issues of Brother Nationalities (1953). The principle of different treatment, particularly in relation to the rights of autonomy and language usage, and the notion of steady and gradual democratic reform, was promoted in the policy formulation and implementation by the central government and local governments, in order that minorities might provide a solid political and social foundation for the establishment of a new united China (Xinhua, 2002),. All of this contributed to the establishment and consolidation of the socialist system in Sichuan minority areas (Huang, 2009). But the promotion of ethnic, cultural and linguistic diversity in the name of democratic reform anded in the late 1950s, which can been seen in retrospect as the most favourable period for Min (minorities)-Han relations (Gengwang, 2008; Mackerras, 1994; Xinhua, 2002; Zhang & Liu, 2011), as we shall see below.

100

Table 4.1: Basic features of education policies for minorities at the initial pluralistic stage (1949-1957)

General Policies Regional National Autonomy (1952) Implementation of Spoken and Written Languages of Nationalities (1952) Decision on the Protection of All Scattered Minority Composition of Ethnic Equality Rights (1952) Views on the Teaching Language Application issues of the Brother Nationalities (1953) Constitution (1954) Policy Principle Different treatment principle Education Policies Pluralistic Key Issue Ethnic identities relating to cultural and linguistic diversity in terms of the rights of autonomy and language usage Minority-Han Favourable Han-minority relations Relations Political logics Emphasizing the logic of difference

Viewed in terms of Laclau and Mouffe’s concepts of political logics, the logic of difference captures China’s different treatment principle and its promotion of ethnic, cultural and linguistic diversity for all nationalities (see Figure 4.2). Policies at this stage attempted to prevent the development of a sharp, antagonistic polarity, and endeavoured to regulate and ameliorate the division between Min and Han by avoiding both Han chauvinism and local nationalism. That is, the logic of difference can be seen to resist the hegemonic construction of society into two opposing chains of meaning, in terms of Han chauvinism and local nationalism, by emphasizing and multiplying ethnic identities relating to ethnic, cultural and linguistic diversity that are not linked to dichotomies like advantaged/disadvantaged. These associations are significant, since they clash with the second major discourse of education policy in China, which I label ‘Han universalism/culturalism’.

101

Figure 4.2: Ethnic cultural and linguistic diversity within the logic of difference at the initial pluralistic stage (1949-1957)

4.3 Chinese Monopolistic Stage (1958-1977)

After a generally promising beginning, the new government’s different treatment principle was dramatically changed by the Great Leap Forward of 1958. This moved China’s overall policy away from autonomy and towards ‘assimilation’. Indeed, the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) was the most assimilative program in the history of China (Mackerras, 1994). Mao’s pronouncements guided this change. His concern was that all the peoples of China, including minority groups, “were well assimilated into one nation” (Kayongo-Male & Benton Lee, 2004, p. 282). In this section, the dynamics of the change from policies promoting championing ethnic cultural and linguistic diversity to policies promoting assimilation are analyzed in terms of the replacement of the logic of difference by the antagonistically-structured logic of equivalence.

4.3.1 The Central Government’s Policy towards Assimilation

The state shifted its emphasis towards the assimilation of ethnic minority groups by imposing drastic reforms onto minorities (Lai, 2009). The Great Leap Forward (1958-

102

1961) under the leadership of Mao Zedong adopted various state-led interventionist, policies. The explicit purpose of these policies was to achieve the major developmental goals of “transcending the United Kingdom and catching up with the United States” (Ngok, 2009, pp. 52-53), by accelerating the development of heavy industry under Soviet-issued loans. Many policies for minorities invoked this discourse of ‘catch up’, which assumed that minorities would continue to be backward if they isolated themselves from advanced groups and developed regions (Yi, 2011). The Second Five- Year Plan (1958-1962) especially focused on rapidly increasing China’s industrial output by mobilizing the country’s vast rural peasantry (Dwight, 1975). This policy shift led to a series of radical political campaigns, including the devastating Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) (Kolås, 2003), including political intervention in education.. The right of regional autonomy survived in theory, but it was undermined by Mao’s political radicalism and policies of forced and rapid integration (Lai, 2009; Ma, 2006). In order to fast-track economic development, drastic reforms were imposed on minorities. These drastic reforms, which were part of the Great Leap Forward, included political movements and administrative measures. For example, communes were set up in Uygur, Korean, Mongol, and Miao territories in 1958, the same year as those in Han areas (Mackerras, 1994). Moreover, in the Anti-rightist Campaign of 1957-1958, people who made moderate demands for ethnic autonomy were branded as ‘rightist’ and condemned (Dang & Zhang, 2003). Ethnic minority-led administrations of autonomous regions were undermined by the growing dominance of the CCP Committee and the CCP Secretary from 1958 to 1965, and subsequently by the radical Red Guards from 1966 to 1976 (Lai, 2009). Although, the Constitution (1975) adopted by the Fourth National People’s Congress retained the concept of the PRC as a unitary multi-national state, and the areas where regional national autonomy was exercised were all inalienable parts of China, no concrete measures were mentioned to ensure its realisation, thus paving the way for practices epitomizing the extreme leftist ideals (Mackerras, 1994). In terms of the right of language use, there was contempt for the languages and writing systems of minority peoples, evident in the policy of imposing the Han language and the suppression of minority languages and cultures, although China’s constitution and various regulations protecting minority language rights still existed in theory (Dai & Dong, 1999; Bruhn, 2008; Nelson, 2005; Teng & Ma, 2005; Zhou, 2001). At the end of 1957, however, the pluralistic approach was abandoned as minority-language policy

103 was replaced by the promotion of Mandarin Chinese, when the Plan for the Phonetic Spelling of Chinese (in the Latin alphabet, known as Pinyin) was published. In 1958, the MoE issued a notice requiring the phonetic spelling of Chinese as a teaching language in minority schools. Thus, Han universalism underlay this discourse of accelerating ethnic and language assimilation, particularly in relation to the importance of politics in education for minorities. It was the daily work of school moral education to strengthen patriotism in China. But its ideological nature failed to motivate people to generate a more realistic and local community life (Li, 2011). This “not only affected relations between the Han majority and minority nationalities but also constituted a potential threat to political unity as the revolution proceeded” (Howland, 2011, p. 187). During this period of retrogression, political intervention in education gained an abnormal ascendancy (Li, 1990). For example, in schools the subjects of Politics and Chinese Language were combined as one course with Chairman Mao’s works as the basic text (Li, 1990). The preferred way to demonstrate an orthodox, proletariat viewpoint was vigilant hatred of the capitalist class, loyalty to the CCP and Mao Zedong, and in all situations acceptance of the dogma: ‘I will do whatever the Party tells me to do’ (Li, 1990, p. 162). The most outstanding revolutionary for fostering loyalty to the CCP and Mao Zedong was Lei Feng, a selfless soldier who always did good deeds for others regardless of thanks or reward. After his death, Mao Zedong’s words (1963), ‘Learn from Comrade Lei Feng’ became the most popular slogan for over 60 years in China. Politicized moral education and policies promoting assimilation resulted in serious tensions and even violence, notably, the resistance and rebellion in Tibetan areas (Mackerras, 1994). For example, the Khampas, who were Tibetans inhabiting the western part of Sichuan and eastern part of Tibet, which the Tibetans knew as Kham (Tibetan areas in Sichuan), had been resisting Han-led land reform for some time (Mackerras, 1994). The Khampas formed guerrilla groups, which took control over considerable territory and, in the autumn of 1958, they attacked the Chinese near a market town south of the Brahmaputra River, killing several thousand of them (Harrer, 1985, as cited in Mackerras, 1994). But this was put down by CCP without great difficulty (Dreyer, 1976). In response to the growing tensions between Han and Min, policies focusing on various forms of struggles, especially class struggle, were promoted as ‘the key link’ for

104 fostering better relations (Howland, 2011; Mackerras, 1994; Ngok, 2009; Zhang, 2010) in order to achieve the CCP’s long-term goal of multinational unity through revolutionary struggle. This was reflected in Mao’s theory that “nationality differences among peoples should blend into a united human universality” (Mao, [1940] 2005, p. 337, as cited in Howland, 2011, p. 183). In Mao’s 1957 Speech on the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People, he noted that ethnic groupings represented a contradiction among the people. Patriotism in the form of Han universalism was thought to be the most effective weapon against the potential loss of Chinese identity,and against all kinds of foreign invasions – political, military, economic and cultural (Li, 2011). Thus, under the central government’s discourse of Han universalism, bilingual education was rejected in order to force Han-dominant education onto minority groups. In September 1958, the CCP advocated the use of nationally-adopted textbooks in schools in all minority communities (Nelson, 2005). Policies for language minority students were targeted against minorities’ traditions and cultural identity (Kayongo- Male & Benton Lee, 2004). The new direction was influenced by policies borrowed from the Soviet model reflected in Stalin and Lenin’s argument that “assimilation of all groups will eliminate ethnic differences and contention” (Ma, 2007, p. 14). Bilingual education was almost completely abandoned in Type 2 and Type 3 communities and was reduced to the minimum in Type 1 communities, while minority- language courses were eliminated or significantly reduced. Chinese became the only or the main language of instruction (Lin, 1997; Zhou, 2000). Consequently, literacy rates declined in various minority communities (Johnson & Chhetri, 2002; Nelson, 2005). The monopolistic approach in most minority school communities was initiated in the early 1960s, but was pushed to its extreme during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). Thus, bilingual education in China reached its lowest point of the last 60 years (Zhou, 2000). Here, the logic of equivalence can be seen in the connections asserted between, for example, signifiers such as the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, assimilation, and education. We can express this chain of equivalence formally as: the Great Leap Forward (anti-rightist campaign) = the Cultural Revolution (revolutionary struggle) = loyalty to the CCP and Chairman Mao = Mandarin = Patriotism = moral education = Chairman Mao’s works = ethnic and language assimilation = Han-dominant

105 education = a unitary multi-national state = Han-dominant unity = Han universalism. We might call this chain ‘assimilation’. It is opposed by an antagonistic chain of equivalence comprising an opposing set of values: ethnic autonomy (rightist) = minority subjects = a potential threat to political unity. In the creation and assertion of such equivalences, the tensions and violence in minority areas are glossed over for the purpose of Han-dominant unity. That is, “the important issue is to construct a united front against a posited opposing chain” (Clarke, 2012a, p. 182). During the Cultural Revolution, a major concern within education for minorities was the achievement of Han universalism in the service of the CCP’s politics. In other words, the logic of equivalence achieved ascendance, positioning local nationalism as a serious crime (Mackerras, 2003). As a result, anti-intellectual policies brought chaos to education with consequent tensions between Chinese universalism and Tibetan identities.

4.3.2 Simultaneous Suppression and Reform in Sichuan Province

The ‘simultaneous policy of suppression and reform’ was implemented by the Sichuan government to safeguard unity (Huang, 2009), particularly in relation to the rebellions, such as those in the Sichuan Kham areas in 1956, as noted above. A combined approach of political campaigning and military strikes was taken to put down the rebellion (Huang, 2009). In March 1957, Mao approved the Sichuan Provincial Report on Proceeding with Democratic Reform in Ganzi after its rebellion. This reflected the central government’s determination to carry out democratic reform in Sichuan ethnic minority areas (Nima, 2004). ‘Democratic’ here meant reliance on self-criticism in meetings where peers and cadres evaluated each other’s work and character. In Sichuan Province, such meetings were usually dominated by a certain authoritative political atmosphere (Li, 1990) and become a tool of political control. For example, between 1958 and 1959, during the Great Leap Forward, the Sichuan government disarmed the feudal military and established a democratic regime for elementary co-operatives, while drastic reform measures were taken in Tibetan Buddhist monasteries (Huang, 2009; Nima, 2004). During the 10-year chaos of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), the policy of regional autonomy in Sichuan minority areas was destroyed in the name of ‘democratic reform’ for the abolition of the ruling

106 system that was independent of the state system (Huang, 2009). The CCP’s idea that the various nationalities should follow their own culture and language was blamed for the current problems. As a consequence, Han cadres demonstrated a high-handed manner towards ‘backward’ minorities (Mackerras, 1994, p. 153) and minority issues, notably, religions, were condemned as backward by the Sichuan government. Thus, there was an assertion of the need for an emphasis on Chinese language teaching in some so-called bilingual schools of Sichuan (Gao, 2009; Nima, 2004). The Tibetan language was removed from the curriculum, and Chinese became the official teaching language in all schools. Simultaneously, schools focused on spreading communist ideology and consolidating the CCP’s power base (Sangay, 1998; Nima, 2000). Although students went to school, they spent much time reciting Chairman Mao’s words, shouting slogans, and vowing to guard Chairman Mao with their lives (Li, 1990), which led to serious impediments in the development of ethnic economies and cultures. As a consequence, schools re-produced a discourse of Han universalism, forming a chain of equivalence in terms of: communist ideology = moral education = the CCP’s power = Mandarin = Chairman Mao’s words = guard Chairman Mao with their lives = Han universalism versus Tibetan = backward = Tibetan language and culture.

4.3.3 Anti-Rightist and Destroying ‘Four Olds’ in Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures

In the context of promoting Han universalism, the Anti-Rightist Campaign led to the destruction and repression suffered by Tibetans, while the Campaign of Destroying ‘Four Olds’ resulted in the downturn of bilingual teaching and learning development (Gao, 2009; Nima, 2004). The ‘destroying the four olds’ meant to abolish four old things in terms of old ideology, old culture, old customs and old habits (Lu, 2004). Under this, Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture governments were heavily influenced by the CCP’s call for a more Han-dominated commonality and less ethnic difference (Mackerras, 1994; Nima, 2004). Under the Great Leap Forward, the Anti-Rightist Campaign started with a universal debate on the Criticism of Rightist Conservative Ideas in Ganzi and Aba in June 1958 (Nima, 2004). In this debate, adherence to minority regional and ethnic national characteristics was criticized and denounced as rightist conservative ideology. The so-

107 called rightist conservative ideology was set against the CCP’s assertion as part of a call for more inter-ethnic commonality and less ethnic difference (Nima, 2004), thus forming a chain of equivalence in terms of ethnic national characteristics = Tibetan culture and language = religious superstition = ethnic difference = backward versus inter-ethnic commonality = Han universalism. During the Cultural Revolution, the campaign of ‘Destroying the Four Olds’ and ‘Cultivating the Four News’ resulted in the magnification of ‘class struggle’ with Tibetans (Nima, 2004). The ‘cultivating the four news’ meant fostering four new socialist things, namely, new ideology, new culture, new customs, new habits (Lu, 2004). Mao’s regime successfully suppressed almost all non-state organizational forms and various cultures (Hsu, 2006). The culture, diet and customs of Tibetans were deemed backward and prohibited (Lai, 2009; Mackerras, 1994). In practice, the Cultural Revolution brought savage attempts by Han leaders to secure a unitary multi-national state. Such policies ignored how anachronistic ideas of class struggle and political mobilization were to the minorities (Mackerras, 1994; Ngok, 2009). Thus, a large number of Tibetan books and documents were regarded as the ‘four olds’ and were burned while the living Buddha was denounced by the social education work team in Rang Tang of Aba with the slogan of ‘down with religion’ (Nima, 2004). In their place, quotations from Mao’s works and ideas were regarded as law and his Little Red Book as the sacred scripture (Lu, 2004). Here, the equivalential aspect was emphasised by the expansion of two chains of equivalence, in terms of Tibetan issues = the ‘four olds’ versus Han = the ‘four news’. This was used as the basis of the CCP’s call for Han universalism. During the Cultural Revolution, the policies of autonomy and the special protection of ethnic differences and cultures were effectively negated. In other words, political struggles succeeded in asserting a logic of equivalence, whereby Tibetan culture and language were associated with religious superstition (Nima, 2004). In terms of bilingual education, the characteristic of Tibetan-Chinese bilingual teaching and learning was regarded as one of the four olds. Hence, bilingual education was discontinued for about 20 years in Sichuan Tibetan areas (Gao, 2009; Nima, 2004). The Tibetan language was not permitted to be used as a medium for instruction in the schools and even, in some cases, was banned from being spoken in public (Gouleta, 2012). In 1967, the Ganzi government issued the Notice on Stopping Using Tibetan

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Textbooks, and Tibetan courses were terminated (Gao, 2009). At the Tenth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee (1968), a series of political activities were carried out in Ganzi and Aba. Class struggle and class education were their key foci (Nima, 2004), in the name of which, schools in Ganzi and Aba were closed (Gao, 2009). An entire generation of Tibetans consequently failed to learn to read and write Tibetan. The result was when bilingual education was reintroduced in Sichuan Tibetan autonomous prefectures in the late 1970s, it was difficult finding teachers who were able to teach Tibetan (Dai & Dong, 1997; Kolås, 2003; Nima, 2000). As a consequence many minorities were illiterate in both Chinese and Tibetan (Kolås, 2003). Table 4.2 summarises the basic features of policy at the three levels of governances in the Chinese monopolistic stage (1958-1977). Assimilation was promoted in the policy implementation by the three levels of government for ‘unified national unity’ (Howland, 2011). As we have seen, under the Constitution (1975), both the rights of autonomy and language usage for ethnic minorities were seriously damaged by extreme leftist views (Nima, 2004). The Great Leap Forward (anti-rightist campaign), the Cultural Revolution (revolutionary struggle, the campaign of destroying the four olds) and Chinese-only education, involving assimilation in the name of Han-dominant unity, thus led to destruction and repression being inflicted on minority nationalities, especially Tibetans, along with large setbacks in bilingual education and deteriorating relations between Min-Han relations which lasted for over 60 years (Bruhn, 2008; Howland, 2011).

Table 4.2: Basic features of policies for minorities at the Chinese monopolistic stage (1958-1977)

General Policies Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1957-1958; Campaign of Destroying ‘Four Olds’ (1967); Constitution (1975); Policy Principle Policy towards assimilation Policy on bilingual education Chinese-only education Key Issue Han universalism relating to Han-dominant unity Minority-Han Relations Deterioration of Minority-Han relations Political logics Emphasizing the logic of equivalence

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Reflecting the operation of the logic of equivalence, ‘ethnic cultural and linguistic diversity’ was destroyed by the assertion of two antagonistic chains in terms of Min = backward versus Han = advanced. Policies promoting Han universalism followed as a result during the Chinese monopolistic stage. That is, assimilative policies promoting Han-dominated unity overturned the different treatment principle that had promoted ethnic and linguistic diversity in the previous period (see Figure 4.3). Within the context of promoting Han universalism, differences were perceived as inconvertible and therefore subject to exclusion. In other words, the chain of equivalence overshadowed any intra-ethnic differences and injustices that cut across the Min/Han distinction, enabling the dominantHan to secure their position through various ‘revolutionary struggles’. Thus, the equivalential logic became predominant, leading to the polarisation of Chinese society between two discursive camps, and ultimately, the assumption of Han universal representation. This laid the ground for socio-political tensions between Min and Han as the revolution proceeded in the Chinese monopolistic stage (Gladney, 2004; Harrell, 2001b; Howland, 2011).

Figure 4.3: Han majority and the minority nationalities within the logic of equivalence in the Chinese monopolistic stage (1958-1977)

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4.4 The Modernisation Stage towards Harmony and Stability (1978-2012)

In this part, I examine education policy documents produced by the three levels of government from 1978 to 2012. This was a period in which the party-state found itself caught between two conflicting demands: one the one hand, calls for autonomy for ethnic minorities, representing the discourse of ethnic identities; and on the other hand, demands representing the discourse of Han universalism, insisting that China’s borders remain unchanged,. These conflicting pressures placed a strain not only on policy choices but also on the ways in which these policies were articulated discursively. I trace how these discourses were constituted through the use of certain key signifiers during two phases: the phase of governmental imposed economic growth (1978-2003) and the phase of people-centred harmonious development (2003 onwards) 13.

4.4.1 The Central Government’s Unity between Diversity

In the phase of governmental imposed economic growth (1978-2003), some policy adjustments were made by the central government to strengthen both the survival of the language and culture of ethnic groups and modern standard Chinese representing ‘the political-economic centre’ (Mackerras, 2003, p. 129). In the phase of people-centred harmonious development (2003 onwards), a hybrid approach to the CCP’s ethnic initiatives called ‘pluralistic unity’ was formulated by the central government in relation to the interactions between ethnic identities and Han universalism, with the impact of economic issues. Viewing these phases in terms of the political logics of equivalence and difference, allows us to see how the hybridised discourse shapes representations of minority education policy, particularly in relation to “neoliberalism with Chinese characteristics”, which was defined by the “compatibility between authoritarianism and the capitalist market” (Harvey, 2005, p. 120).

13 Ngok (2009) identified two paradigm phases of development policy in China since 1978: the paradigm of unilateral economic growth (GDPism) policy (1978-2003); and the paradigm of people-centred harmonious development (2003 onwards). 111

The phase of governmental imposed economic growth (1978-2003)

Against a background of the growing global dominance of market-driven, neoliberal economic ‘shock therapy’ (Klein, 2007), Deng Xiaoping instituted radical reform policies in the name of modernisation of industry, agriculture, science and technology. The idea that “the construction of socialism is centred on development of the economy” was regarded as “a standard of truth and genuinely motivated people towards economic development” (Li et al., 2004, p. 414), thus negating the Cultural Revolution (Mackerras, 1998; Ngok, 2009). The rejection of the leftist policies of the Cultural Revolution brought renewed recognition of the diverse needs of China’s minorities from the end of the 1970s, thus increasing the legitimacy of the regional state (Bass, 2008; Ngok, 2009). Thus, after Deng Xiaoping took the helm in 1978, the central government restored the moderate ethnic polices it had pursued in the initial pluralistic stage (1949-1957) (Zhou, 2000), and adopted reform measures including various preferential policies for minorities (Lai, 2009; Ngok, 2009) and highlighting market-oriented policy orientations that were in accordance with the poor economic situation of the people. The growth of the Chinese economy contributed to a revival of ethnic-identity based language and education policies. For example, in 1979 the rights of autonomy and language usage were reinstituted by the CCP and the State Council (Lai, 2009), while in 1980, the Department of Ethnic Minority Education was established under the MoE. It encouraged the protection of ethnic language use and provided a foundation for the legislation of the use and enrichment of minority languages (Zhang & Ma, 2012). The 1982 Constitution restored and expanded privileges for regional ethnic autonomy that were stipulated in the 1954 Constitution, particularly in relation to the freedom of language usage: regional autonomy is practised in areas where people of minority nationalities live in compact communities; in these areas organs of self-government are established for the exercise of the right of autonomy. The people of all nationalities have the freedom to use and develop their own spoken and written languages, and to preserve or reform their own ways and customs. (Article 4)

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Meanwhile, Article 19 highlighted the privileged position of Mandarin in society: The state promotes the nationwide use of Mandarin (common speech based on Beijing pronunciation).

There statements are symptomatic of attempts to bind the two discourses together, hegemonically appropriating a discourse of ethnic identities (regional autonomy, self- government, the right of autonomy, the freedom to use and develop their own spoken and written languages, and preserve or reform their own ways and customs) within a discourse of Han-baed national development and Han universalism (The state promotes the nationwide use of Mandarin and common speech based on Beijing pronunciation). The attempt to meld two demands of the freedom of language usage and the nationwide use of Mandarin was rationalised by the central government in the guise of safeguarding equality among ethnic groups and enhancing their unity. The 1982 Constitution thus contains provisions on the need to combat the chauvinism of large-ethnic groups, mainly Han chauvinism, and local ethnic chauvinism (Xinhua, 2002). This reflects an attempted compromise solution to the two conflicting demands, tying ethnic identities and Han-dominated unity to the needs of ethnic groups and the party-state. There are similar attempts to meld the two demands together in the Law of Regional National Autonomy. The Law was promulgated by the central government in 1984. It combines systematic provisions on the political, economic and cultural rights and duties of ethnic minority autonomous areas. On the one hand, the Law of Regional National Autonomy concerns the power to train and employ cadres belonging to ethnic minorities, the power to develop education and ethnic culture, the power to develop and employ local spoken and written languages, and the power to develop technological, scientific and cultural undertakings (Xinhua, 2002). For example, six articles focus on the rights of minority language use, along with the preferential policies (Zhou, 2004; Zhang & Ma, 2012) reflecting the logic of difference in terms of linguistic and cultural diversity. On the other hand, Article 37 reflects the operation of the logic of equivalence: Autonomous agencies in ethnic autonomous areas should independently develop education for the nationalities, eliminate illiteracy, set up various kinds of schools, and spread nine-years of compulsory education.

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Autonomous agencies in ethnic autonomous areas may set up public primary schools and secondary schools, mainly boarding schools and schools providing subsidies, in pastoral areas and economically underdeveloped, sparsely populated mountain areas inhabited by ethnic minorities to assure students complete their compulsory education.

Local governments should finance the schools and scholarships. For areas of economic hardship, the next higher level of government should subsidize the costs.

Beginning in the lower or senior grades of primary school, the Han language and literature courses should be taught to popularize the common language used throughout the country and the use of Han Chinese characters.

Every local government should provide financial support for the production of teaching materials in the minority scripts and for publication and translation work.

Here, we can see the operation of the logic of equivalence in the connections asserted between, for example, disparate elements such as independent development, compulsory education, quality education, financial support and accountability. We can express this chain of equivalence formally as: eliminate illiteracy = compulsory education = boarding schools = Han language and literature courses = the use of Han Chinese characters. We might call this chain ‘Han universalism’, noting how it relies on an antagonistic chain of equivalence comprising an opposing set of values regarding ‘ethnic identities’ (that is, illiteracy = ethnic autonomous areas = economically underdeveloped areas = pastoral areas = backward). This Article, of course, reflects the impact of neoliberalism and marketization on minority education policy. For example, it is assumed that local governments should finance the schools and scholarships and every local government should provide financial support for the production of teaching materials in the minority scripts and for publication and translation work. This Article justified the policy of devolving

114 responsibility for resourcing education to the largely rural-based minorities, thus fostering a nascent neoliberal governmentality (Yi, 2011). With the shift to a market economy involving the decentralisation of power and the diversification of autonomy, official stipulations of the freedom to use and develop minority languages were further revised, while preferential policies increasingly promoted ethnic cultural and linguistic diversity for regional development and government autonomy in the 1980s (Dai & Cheng, 2007; Dai & Dong, 1997; Zhou, 2001). This was achieved by the successful efforts of increasing minority representation at the top level of the National People’s Congress and at the lowest level of villages (Mackerras, 1994). All of this marked the start of the first major reform in China’s basic education since the 1950s highlighting culture, ethnicity, humanism, and diversity (Liu, 2004; Wu, 2012). Similar to the transition of western cities in late capitalism, such a shift in China was driven by fiscal decentralization. Decentralization is a central element of the neoliberalizing process, since it results in the rescaling of the state and the promotion of ‘responsibilization’ (Shamir, 2008) by shifting decision-making downward to local state authorities. The policies on regional autonomy do appear to have made a difference in the minority areas in terms of bilingual education. Bilingual education began to flourish in ethnic minority communities in three models (see 4.2.1 the central government’s principle of different treatment): (a) the Type 1 community, which is mainly focused on the minority language as L1 and a teaching language, with Chinese as L2 and a subject; (b) the Type 2 community, which focused on the minority language in lower grades, and the Chinese language in the upper levels; and (c) the Type 3 community, which focused on Chinese Mandarin as a teaching language, with the ethnic minority language considered a supportive media (Zhou, 2001). I next review key signifiers that appear in the 1986 Compulsory Education Law of the People’s Republic of China. This policy uses a seemingly symptomatic phrase in speaking of all children when relating to ethnic identities, implying that ethnic identities are only acceptable within the context of the Chinese national education system: Article 5. All children who have reached the age of six shall enrol in school and receive compulsory education, regardless of gender, ethnicity, region, religion and socioeconomic status.

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Article 6. Schools shall promote the use of Mandarin, which is in common use throughout the nation, meanwhile, schools in which the majority of students are of minority nationalities may use the spoken and written languages of those nationalities in instruction.

Here, difference in terms of gender, ethnicity, region, religion and socioeconomic status and the spoken and written languages of those nationalities is subordinated to a vision of common purpose of building a socialist society, and by asserting the term ‘all’. As Popkewitz (2009, p. 534) observes in relation to education policy making, “the phrase ‘all’ implies this hope of unity and harmony. . . the ‘all’ [and the ‘every’] erases differences as the proper application of procedures and planning produces sameness as there is only one ‘all children’.” Moreover, Article 6 promotes the use of Mandarin, placing Han universalism on a firm legal basis. This is the assumption by the party-state, reflecting the function of universal representation (Laclau, 2000). Not surprisingly, success in implementing education policies for minorities during the 1980s was mixed (Mackerras, 2003). This is reflected in the simultaneous operation of the logic of difference in terms of ethnic cultural and linguistic diversity, and the logic of equivalence in terms of ‘Minority = backward versus Han = advanced’; and the corollary in terms of promoting Han universalism at the expense of so-called ‘second- rate’ minority cultures. In the late 1980s, China underwent a major crisis as group protests and incidents arose as a result of economic, ethnic and religious conflicts (Ngok, 2009). For example, mass demonstrations led by students took place in Beijing from April to June 1989, “calling for a greater degree of freedom and democracy” (Mackerras, 1998, p. 140). These were violently suppressed and denounced as a “counter-revolutionary rebellion” by Deng Xiaoping (Mackerras, 1998, p. 140). But for the minorities, a crisis of even greater significance was the emergence and suppression of the independence movement in Tibet from 1987 to 1989 (Mackerras, 2003). Chinese nationalism is in tension with any rise in minority identities. Thus, stability-oriented discourses circulating in the name of so-called moral education have played a key role in legitimating the rule of the CCP after the crackdown in 1989. In the aftermath of the 1989 crisis and the subsequent crackdown, the CCP leaders tried again to revive interest in Marxist-Leninist ideology and patriotism, collectivism

116 and socialism among students. Patriotism, specifically, has distinctive features and functions. Patriotism provided an opportunity for the CCP to justify its own position in society, by equating the nation with the party-state and stressing the party’s patriotic achievements. CCP-defined socialism plays a role as gate-keeper of values. It ensures that ‘self’ identity will not exceed the context of Chinese citizenship. Collectivism is treated by the CCP as theoretical support for patriotism, socialism, nationalism and even statism. It is also used as a weapon to fight against individualism and liberalism (Li, 2011). That is, individuals’ self-image is tied to the party-state, together with the value and emotional significance they attach to membership of the national community. These points mutually support each other, thus forming a chain of equivalence in terms of ‘patriotism = the party’s patriotic achievements = CCP-defined socialism = collectivism = nationalism = statism’ against the opposing chain consisting of individualism and liberalism. These associations play a significant role in the stability discourse around moral education. Li (1990) comments that moral education is a means of political indoctrination: moral education in China is basically the expressed thoughts of political leaders, which intrude into other branches of education. As such, it is a means of political indoctrination. Unchanging in purpose, it varies in degree and content as political leaders or policies change. (p. 159)

The so-called principle of ‘three dimensions of inseparability’ produced by the central government in 1990 was typically used as a means of political indoctrination in moral education for minorities. It officially means that the Han are inseparable from the ethnic minorities; the ethnic minorities are inseparable from the Han; and the ethnic minorities are inseparable from each other. Under this the stability-oriented discourse, the most pragmatic method for encouraging socialism with Chinese characteristics is the promotion of economic reforms. Thus, since the early 1990s, the state has focused on ‘advanced’ Han coastal development. This led to growing fiscal deficits and a declining national economic standing of minority areas. Deng’s permission to allow some regions and some people to become prosperous first resulted in imbalanced development (Lai, 2009; Mackerras, 1998; Ngok, 2009). Such economic reforms have seen the rapidly developing eastern region ‘embrace economic liberalisation’ and frown upon interference from the party-

117 state; at the same time, the western region that has fallen behind in developing a market economy and ‘has remained distinctively keen on getting the central government involved’ (Guo, 2008, p. 318). Due to the emphasis on the eastern Han seaboard, economic growth in the minority areas fell behind the national rate over the 15 years from 1981 to 1995, (Ngok, 2009). Thus, growing discontent arose from minority regions because of the imbalanced development, exemplified in the unrest in Tibet and Xinjiang in the 1990s (Lai, 2009). This echoes a colonial discourse that constructs the colonized people as a part of an equivalential chain (here, Minority = the western region = backward = fallen behind versus Han = the eastern region = advanced = economic growth), designating a certain identity. These identities will, at the moment of anti- colonial rebellion, inevitably overturn the hierarchy of dominant nationalist values (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p. 129). The first few years of the new century witnessed further policy changes in China (Ngok, 2009). In response to protests and outbursts of violence in minority areas, as noted above, a growing emphasis was placed by the government on autonomy for economic development. This was regarded by the central government as a solution to the growing inequality between the majority Han Chinese and ethnic minorities and a means to stabilize China’s borderlands (Lai, 2009; Mcnally, 2004). One of the major moves was the Western Development Program (2000), reflecting both ‘the impact of globalisation’ and also ‘the manifestations of local identities’ (Mackerras, 2003, p. 133). In 2000, this policy was issued against the background of the East Asian economic crisis of the late 1990s and the PRC’s planned entry into the WTO (Ngok, 2009). The central government mobilized and organized the developed Han areas to support ‘backward’ areas. The purpose was to assist these regions and develop their economies in ethnic minority regions (Xinhuanet, 2002). However, ethnic diversity was tolerated only as long as it was subordinated to all the policies and measures adopted by the central government for promoting economic development and national unity. Premier Zhu Rongji made it plain in his Government Work Report (2000), that common prosperity would strengthen national unity, safeguard social stability, and consolidate border defence (Goodman, 2004; McNally, 2004). In terms of education, the central government is committed to strengthening moral education in order to help students foster a positive attitude toward life and discipline as they face the 21st century. On 1 February 2000, Jiang Zemin (President of

118 the PRC between 1993 and 2003) made an important speech to the Party Central Committee’s Ideological and Political Work Conference concerning the need to further strengthen moral education in Chinese schools, and to ensure that all students receive an all-round moral, intellectual, physical and aesthetic education. According to Li Lanqing, a Vice-Premier from 1993 to 2003 and a key figure in the development of national education policy in China, moral education should be integrated into various school subjects, and ties should be strengthened between in-school moral education and students’ life experience and social practice (Lee & Ho, 2005). All of this has justified and legitimized the way in which the cultural-political mainstream continues to carry out its mission of civilizing minorities, through ongoing integrative agendas that focus on and foster political loyalty to the CCP and centre on economic development. In other words, a hybrid discourse has combined market socialism with pre-existing Maoist nationalist and socialist discourses and practices in an uneasy synthesis held together by the authoritarian rule of the CCP through its efforts at modernisation (Nonini, 2008). The following example from the 2002 National Minority Education Working Meeting is typically hybridised, combining the discourse of ‘catch up’ together with the discourse of ethnic identities: The cause of minority education is still not suited to the needs of economic construction and social development in ethnic minority areas, in particular, it is not suited to the needs for implementing the Western Development Program. For the purpose of achieving the Two Basics/Fundamentals Project, we should vigorously promote bilingual education and distant learning…… National Unity Education shall be vigorously promoted as the important content of patriotic education and moral education and for quality improvement.

Here, the excerpt produced by Minister Chen of the MoE reinforced the Han mainstream’s view of minorities – a people or labour force of low quality (poor literally) – is fundamentally rooted in a Han conceptual framework in terms of the mission of civilizing minorities. This is assumed to be achieved through hybrid policy agendas, such as, the Western Development Program, the Two Basics/Fundamentals Project, bilingual education, distant learning, National Unity Education, patriotic education and moral education for quality improvement.

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In academic discourse, the tensions/contradictions among these policies frame the “boundaries of the arena within which Chinese bilingual educational policies are formulated and interpreted” (Stites, 1992, p. 4), reflected in the conflicting discourses of universalising Mandarin and promoting minority languages use within single texts. Some scholars argued the policies given to improve minority language education are more focused on political and ideological education of minority students, in terms of Mandarin as the common language used nationwide, legitimated by the purported “bad effects of language diversity” (Zhang & Ma, 2012, p. 714). Yi (2011) states: In dichotomizing advanced cultures vis-à-vis backward ones, this process has ethnicized minorities’ differences. However, within the process itself are internal contradictions that render any attempts at actual education self-contradictory and ultimately unproductive. (p. 395)

Based on Laclau and Mouffe’s (2001) political logics, I argue that the central government provided a myth, i.e. “a principal reading of a given situation” (Laclau & Mouffe, 1990, p. 61). It is assumed that minority areas are backward (the logic of equivalence in terms of ‘Min = backward = undeveloped = illiterate versus Han = advanced = developed = literate’) and, in sum, need the advanced Han’s help relating to language use and job opportunities (Ma, 2007). Thus, the central government’s rule over the minorities, such as National Unity Education, entails the construction of a ‘common self’ that contingently brings together the diverse/particular (the logic of difference in term of various ethnic minority languages and cultures), and the universal in terms of universalising compulsory education, without definitively fixing or dissolving the position of either term (Žižek, 2007). Therefore, what has emerged is not a new discourse that reconciles the conflict, but a mixture that serves more to highlight it by encouraging political loyalty to the CCP and economic development. Nevertheless, the worsening conditions resulting from uneven economic growth were recognized fully by the central government until the outbreak of the SARS crisis in 2003 (Ngok, 2009). People-oriented policy orientations and mixed policy instruments were chosen to build a sound social environment and ensure the ideal harmony of all ethnic groups (Ngok, 2009).

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The phase of people-centred harmonious development (2003-2012)

The SARS crisis in 2003 forced the Chinese policy makers to think about how to strike a balance between economic growth and social development (Ngok, 2009). Policies shifted increasingly in response to the social inequality resulting from imbalances in single-minded pursuit of economic growth. The new policy goal was to build up a harmonious society in order to reduce social conflict (Ngok, 2009). A ground-breaking document, the Decision on Further Strengthening Rural Education was issued by the State Council and the MoE in 2003. Rural education is advocated as the most important part of education work to achieve educational equality and social justice, as well as being an essential requirement of socialist education (Article 2). To this end, accelerating the crucial task of the Two Basics/Fundamentals Project was emphasised: Strive to complete the crucial task of the Two Basics/Fundamentals Project in the western regions in five years. Currently, in the western region there are 372 counties that have not achieved the goal of Two Basics/Fundamentals Project. These counties are mainly located in the remote, border and poverty-stricken areas inhabited by minority nationalities. …… The accomplishment of this task is extremely important for promoting poverty alleviation, national unity, stability in border areas and the state’s long-term stability (Article 4).

Meanwhile, government investment is focused at the county-level administrative system. Article 15 states: Act on the county level-focused administrative system for universal nine-year compulsory education in rural areas, highlighting the responsibility of county level government administrations under the leadership of the State Council.

Here, the Decision on Further Strengthening Rural Education (2003) reveals the hegemonic status of this claim, in order to achieve the CCP-defined poverty alleviation, national unity, stability in border areas and the state’s long-term stability. In other words, this is the hegemonic process of building social orders from dispersed elements (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, 1997; Inston, 2009). The signifiers in the quotes above represent the overlaying of the logic of difference in terms of locality (the county level-

121 focused administrative system relating to minority languages and cultures) and the logic of equivalence in terms of minority = remote = border = poverty = does not achieve the Two Basics/Fundamentals Project = illiteracy versus Han = advanced = developed = achieve Two Basics/Fundamentals Project = literacy. However, the political guarantee that all children will receive compulsory education hides the political and historical processes that have produced the difference between ‘advanced/developed’ and ‘backward/underdeveloped’ areas. And the phrase compulsory education in rural areas is measured and indexed in terms of economic development. Thus, the simultaneous operation of the logics of difference and equivalence describes how signifiers are linked together in intertextual chains to produce more or less stable discourses, thus, forming a hybrid but ambivalent arena that incorporates identity effects (Bhabha, 1994). The main function of ambiguity is to promote so-called pluralistic unity. Hu Jintao’s speeches at the central government meeting on ethnic work (2005) made reference to this unity: Throughout the long course of history, the various ethnic groups in our country have maintained close ties, relied on one another, and stood as one. This has shaped the Chinese nation as a pluralistic unity in which all ethnic groups have promoted national development and social progress as a whole.

Here, the discourse of pluralistic unity invokes Fei Xiaotong’s (1989) framework of ‘pluralist-unity’ to describe the basic pattern of ethnic relations in Chinese history. There are two levels in the structure of this discourse: one is at the national level of the Chinese nation, emphasizing political unity, that is, Han-dominated unity, relating to the assumption by a particularity of a function of Han universal representation; another is at the local level of ethnic minorities, emphasizing cultural diversity (in language, religion, customs, and so forth). When considering the language usage and education for minorities, this “pluralist-unity” framework provides a very comprehensive model for the central government. For example, in 2010, the State Council issued an important document: the National Outline for Medium and Long-term Education Reform and Development Plan (2010- 2020). It states: Speeding up educational development for ethnic minority groups is of far- reaching importance for promoting socioeconomic development among the

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people and in the areas inhabited by them, and for enhancing unity between people of different ethnic backgrounds.

Here, ‘unity between diversity’ was officially advocated as the main principle of education policy for minorities, particularly in relation to Hu Jingtao’s policy framework for ‘Building a Harmonious Society’ (Gray, Coates, & Bird, 2008). It articulates a process of mediation through which differences (ethnic minority groups) come to express shared unified objectives and political strategies (enhancing unity between people of different ethnic backgrounds). On the one hand, by taking into consideration the different realities in ethnic minority regions, the central government adopted a series of major polices for the development of ethnic minority areas (“Ethnic Initiatives”, 2012). For example, the State Council has formulated several measures regarding the implementation of the Law of Regional National Autonomy, comprising the first set of supporting administrative regulations for this legislation (“Ethnic Initiatives”, 2012), along with the state promotion of community-based organisations in minority areas (Saich, 2011), representing alternatives in relation to the discourse of promoting ethnic identities. However, on the other hand, the CCP clearly required that cadres and members of the public from all ethnic groups should be more able to identify with the motherland, the Chinese nation, Chinese culture, and socialism with Chinese characteristics (“Ethnic Initiatives”, 2012), highlighting Han universalism. For example, the MoE and the State Ethnic Affairs Commission promulgated the National Unity Education in Schools in 2008, promoting ethnic unity as an inevitable demand for strengthening socialist ethnic relations and avoiding alienation and social instability in the country (Whitepaper, 2009). In terms of curricula, uniformity is an ideology. In the 2010 National Action Plan for Advancing Education Development, distance learning was utilised by the central government as a development strategy to deliver a unified curriculum to students for improving basic education, particularly in relation to the remote and border minority areas. Ding Xingfu (2003), one of the leading scholars in distance education, has convincingly argued that: Distance education is the only means by which high quality education resources can be conveyed from the eastern part of China to the western part. It is also the

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only means by which qualified teachers can be cultivated and retained in the western areas. (p. 13)

Within this discourse of Han universalism, minorities are essentially in need of modern enlightenment, not only in the field of knowledge or skills transmission, but also, more fundamentally, in the field of the cultural transmission of advanced moral standards (Yi, 2011). For example, the central government-approved teaching materials in unity education focus on safeguarding the unification of the motherland and opposing separatism, although it includes topics, such as the state’s guarantee of ethnic minorities’ freedom of religious belief, and their rights to preserve and reform their customs and use and develop ethnic minority languages (Whitepaper, 2009). The ongoing self-improvement ethos of quality (qualified teachers can be cultivated and retained in the western areas) overlaps with identity formation as a process of becoming, and is a metonym for the continual modernizing and “coming into being” of the nation (Murphy, 2004, p. 20). These interventions and strategies reinforce two opposing chains of equivalence in terms of Minority = remote and border minority areas = backward versus Han = eastern areas = advanced. Overall, uniformity is an ideology in these interventions and strategies (Ball et al., 2012). In this regards, Yi (2011, p. 397) makes an important point: In spite of periodically encouraging bilingual education, the CCP still holds firmly to the belief that the backwardness of ethnic minorities can be overcome by stressing the importance of the Chinese language as the means to gain access to Han culture (Teng & Wang, 2001). Government policy concerning bilingual education is the epitome of the civilizing missions of the Party-state, and is also the result of concern about a possible political threat to ethnic unity and state stability.

This reinforces my argument regarding the hegemonic ideology of pluralistic unity. As we have seen, in employing the two antagonistic discourses, the government agenda of modernisation strives to integrate the hard-to-compromise ideas of political loyalty, economic development and cultural diversity into a coherent whole (Yi, 2011). Thus, I argue that the process of minority education policies promoting hegemonic ideology of ‘pluralist unity’ has ethnicised and depoliticised minorities’ differences, by viewing

124 them in the logic of difference, and essentialised the Han in the logic of equivalence, with economic developmental issues coming in between.

4.4.2 Western Development Program in Sichuan Province

During the phase of economic growth (1978-2003), the overall goal of building an economically strong western province resulted in tensions, particularly in relation to the uneven economic growth policy. This was defined as the imbalanced development between economic growth and social inequality by the Sichuan government. During the phase of people-centered development (2003-2012), the goal was redefined by the Sichuan government as creating an economically and culturally strong western province to balance economic growth and social development from a social equity perspective.

The phase of economic growth (1978-2003)

The overall targets for building an economically strong western province were presented at Sichuan’s 10th Five-Year Plan (2001-2005). Sichuan’s policies shifted toward economic modernisation from suppression and reform in the monopolistic stage (1958–1977). This policy shift shaped various preferential policies on minorities in Sichuan, emphasising both ethnic identities and Han universalism. On the one hand, a guiding document on bilingual education models was issued by the Sichuan government in 1985, highlighting linguistic and cultural diversity. An office of minority educational affairs was created in Sichuan during the 1980s, for the purpose of overseeing the development and implementation of bilingual education in minority schools (Lin, 1997). In other words, the logic of difference is reflected in Sichuan’s ethnic policies promoting minority language usage in bilingual education policy and practice. This contributed to bilingual education development in accordance with the diverse needs of the minorities of Sichuan in 1980s. On the other hand, however, the low status of minority groups resulted in many Sichuan government officials seeing minority language learning, culture and subjects as unnecessary for the development of economic construction. In the eyes of these officials, the focus was to build an economically strong western province, reflecting the universal equivalent: “the money form of value” (Elson, 1979, p. 166, as cited in Yan, 2003, p.

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494). It was made clear that the most important language for building an economically strong Sichuan province and for the students’ own individual development was Mandarin (Ma, 2007). Therefore, stress was placed on the importance of having the minority students master standard Chinese. Thus, two chains of equivalence were constructed by the Sichuan government in terms of minority = backward = undeveloped = minority language = unnecessary versus Han = advanced = developed = Mandarin = economic development. Mastering Mandarin has become vitally important for the Sichuan government plan of governing minorities in order to become a competitive player in the field of China’s economic growth. The fruits of the uneven economic growth policy in Sichuan resulted in tensions around the large developmental gaps that existed between eastern and western regions. The increasing socio-economic inequality became concerns in both Beijing and Sichuan in relation to both the possible impact of “the PRC’s entry to the WTO and the potential for increased ethno-political conflict in non-Han areas of the country” (Goodman, 2004, p. 331). For this reason, Sichuan provincial leaders have embraced the opportunities provided by the campaign within the Western Development Program (2000), putting major efforts into fundamental reforms and economic construction in the ethnic minority areas of west Sichuan, in order to narrow the gap in development between the minority groups and the majority (Goodman, 2004; Mcnally, 2004; Consultancy study, 2007). This mirrors the regional inequalities in China’s economic development as a whole (McNally, 2004). As an ideal, the Western Development Program was good news for social mobility. However, the complex effects of the program weakened the common ground for minorities’ mobilization and increased inequality, through restrictions and limitations in the job market. The issue of the development of western region was obviously politicized, particularly in relation to the CCP’s mission of civilizing minorities for economic growth. Against this background, the Sichuan government issued an important document: The 10-year Education Action Plan for the Ethnic Regions of Sichuan Province (2000- 2010). It promotes the principle of ‘classified guidance’ for developing bilingual education in minority areas, by taking into account various local conditions and situations, levels of economic and social development, and existing foundations of education. Meanwhile, universalizing compulsory education was elaborated by the

126 government as one of the major measures to help ethnic minorities escape from poverty. Thus, the 10-year Education Action Plan for the Ethnic Regions of Sichuan Province was involved in the tension/contradiction of simultaneous operation of the logic of difference, in terms of the principle of ‘classified guidance’ and ‘various local conditions’, and the logic of equivalence, in terms of ‘ethnic minority areas = the west = minority = poverty = backward versus the east = Han = developed = advanced’.

The phase of people-centred harmonious development (2003-2012)

In 2003, the Sichuan government redefined its overall goal as ensuring an ‘economically and culturally strong western province’ in its 11th Five-Year Plan, particularly in relation to the wide disparities that existed between the Han eastern region and the western region with its substantial ethnic minorities. The added notion of ‘culturally’ into the overall goal reflects the purpose of rural-urban harmony by changing the model of economic growth (Consultancy study, 2007, p. 19), towards balanced economic growth with social development from a social equity perspective. All of this was aligned with the central government’s guiding principles of pluralist unity relating to Hu Jingtao’s policy framework for ‘Building a Harmonious Society’, as discussed previously. The Western Development Program in some ways resembles a large-scale marketing drive for Sichuan. As a result, provincial officials in Sichuan pay great attention to foreign and domestic Chinese investors (McNally, 2004). For example, the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake caused an outpouring of public activism and public donations, while the official media coverage created a dominant interpretation of a ‘heroic and unified’ war against the common natural disaster. In the aftermath of the earthquake, some reflective discussions about the overall disaster relief performance arose inside the Ministry of Civil Affairs. The effectiveness of collaborating with nongovernmental forces was recognized to be important in creating self-help mechanisms in emergency situations (Dunford & Li, 2011). Despite these improvements, developmental gaps between east Han areas and west regions inhabited primarily by minorities are likely to continue to increase (McNally, 2004). Thus, efforts are targeted at increasing market penetration in minority areas in order to consolidate the control of

127 both the central state and the Sichuan provincial government over peripheral areas (McNally, 2004). In 2010, the Sichuan government issued the second-round 10-year Education Action Plan for the Ethnic Regions of Sichuan Province (2011-2020). According to this document, the general aims are to: popularize bilingual education, establish an equal, compulsory, education system, improve education quality, improve the level of school management, and purify the education environment.

Here, the signifiers within the discursive compromise have too much intertextual baggage attached for this plan to be achieved. The presence of the two conflicting discourses of ethnic identities and Han universalism reflects how the government’s attempt to produce a hybrid discourse, coherent enough to build and maintain hegemony, is laden with difficulty. Within such a hybrid plan (bilingual education, equality compulsory education system, education quality, school management, and education environment), the project of bilingual education was also presented as a mixture as follows: The project of bilingual education is to vigorously promote bilingual teaching and learning, to fully offer a Chinese language course, and to generally promote the national common language. Simultaneously, minorities’ right to use their own ethnic language in education is respected and protected. The state textbook is promoted as the main teaching and learning material, at the same time, local and school-based teaching materials can act as supplements (Sichuan Action Plan (2011-2020)).

The use of the transitional phrases simultaneously and at the same time suggests that the government policymakers are aware of the latent tension between the two discourses. It is as if bilingual education has two separate goals: promoting Mandarin, representing the discourse of Han universalism, and the right to minority language, representing the discourse of ethnic identity. Moreover, the former aim relating to Han universalism was strengthened in the project of national unity education: The project of national unity education is to promote the CCP’s ethnic theories, ethnic policies and national laws and regulations into teaching materials,

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classrooms, and students’ and teachers’ minds; to guide teachers and students to establish a correct outlook on life, the world, their nationality and their religion; to set up firmly the ideology of safeguarding national unity and opposing ethnic separatism; to consolidate the stability of the state; and to enhance the sense of pride and cohesion of the Chinese Nation (Sichuan Action Plan (2011-2020)).

Here, the simultaneous promotion of bilingual education and national unity education under the same policy, represents a linking of the logic of difference in terms of minority languages and cultures, and the logic of equivalence in terms of minority = backward = illiteracy vs. Han = advanced = Mandarin = literacy, with political concerns in terms of ‘promoting the CCP’s ethnic theories, ethnic policies and national laws and regulations into teaching materials, classrooms, and students’ and teachers’ minds’ into a collectively defined hegemonic project. Thus, the overall effect of this hybridity is a confusion of both language and educational aims.

4.4.3 Universal Compulsory Education in Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures

During the phase of economic growth (1978-2003), the governments of the Tibetan autonomous prefectures of Sichuan highlighted the persistence of economic modernisation, their purpose being to shake off ‘backwardness’. During the phase of people-centred harmonious development (2003-2012), governmental policies asserted that the standardization of bilingual education was based on the consolidation and improvement of universalizing compulsory education.

The phase of economic growth (1978-2003)

Linking Tibetan status to economic benefits has always been a key component of Tibetan autonomous governments’ nationalities work. In the 1980s, preferential treatment was promoted in the form of financial subsidies to local autonomous governments and personal benefits in education for a reinstatement or correction of their ethnic status (Guo, 2004). The linkage has directly spurred the development of Tibetan consciousness. The awakening of Tibetan consciousness continued to fuel a revival of Tibetan language and education in the 1990s as economic reforms deepened.

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Against this background, bilingual education in the Tibetan autonomous prefectures of Sichuan experienced three stages during the phase of economic growth (1978-2003). The first stage was the promotion of Tibetan medium teaching in bilingual education between 1986 and 1993. Thus, the rapid development of bilingual teaching and learning led to the training of a group of qualified bilingual personnel (Ma, 2007). The second stage was the backlash in the 1990s, when policy reverted to teaching Mandarin to Tibetan children in the first grade of primary school and promoting compulsory education (Bass, 2008). In other words, political concerns linked compulsory education to the discourse of economic construction. The third stage occurred in the late 1990s, when bilingual education system was popularized as a policy ideal in Tibetan communities. For example, Article XIII from the Regulations on the Usage of Tibetan Language in Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (1998) points out that all levels of state institutions in Ganzi should attach importance to the conduct of Tibetan language teaching. In the primary schools of Tibetan-inhabited areas, Tibetan plus Chinese models14 were to be implemented, based on the language environment and the actual situation of local people. During this time, bilingual education programs were implemented in pastoral areas for three years; in semi-agro-pastoral areas for six years; and in major agricultural areas for nine years (Nima, 2000; Zhang, 2004). Here, the logic of difference can be seen in calls for adapting to local circumstances as a strategy for local economic development. Meanwhile, around the construction of economic modernisation, the Ganzi and Aba governments promoted bilingual education as the fundamental measure of national and regional prosperity and progress. It was bilingual education that could shake off ‘backwardness’. This reveals the operation of the logic of equivalence in terms of ‘Tibetan = backward versus Han = advanced’. Thus, the development of bilingual education is mixed, particularly in relation to the major crisis in the Tibetan areas in the late 1980s and early 1990s, as discussed previously. Since the mid-1990s, some policy adjustments have been made by the autonomous governments to strengthen the notions that Tibetan areas shall remain unchanged, and that autonomy for Tibetans should become more meaningful (Mackerras, 2003). Consequently, some Tibetans do in fact see advantages in remaining

14 Due to the variety in the geographical distribution, historically, there were four types of bilingual models across the two prefectures of Ganzi and Aba. Type 1 Tibetan plus Chinese model; Type 2 Tibetan and Chinese model; Type 3 Chinese plus Tibetan model; and Type 4 Chinese model (Jiayangzhaxi, 1999). 130 part of a comparatively successful state, where their lives have indeed greatly improved, although tension exists between the two demands (Mackerras, 2003).

The phase of people-centred harmonious development (2003-2012)

Since 2003, the Tibetan autonomous prefectures were shaped by mixed development in terms of economic reform (Guo, 2008). Economic development and political integration reinforced each other, facilitating transformation (Guo, 2008; Yi, 2011). Like political integration, economic development is the mission for the autonomous governments to shake off ‘backwardness’. Economic development is today the key concern of the autonomous governments. This fundamental agenda mirrors the constant themes of governance in Chinese history: Han-dominated unity and cultural diversity with economic drive to develop Tibetan areas. Unification and unity rank highly on the Tibetan autonomous prefecture government’s agendas. For example, ‘backward’ Tibetan autonomous prefectures of Sichuan were assigned to Zhejiang (Lai, 2009), highlighting the state’s ‘Two Basics/Fundamentals Project’, that is, the state’s compulsory education policy for the twin goals of universalizing nine-year compulsory education and eradicating illiteracy among young and middle-aged adults in the western rural and minority regions (Wu, 2012). In 2010, the Work Program for Meeting the State’s Supervision and Inspection on the Two Basics/Fundamentals Project was promoted by the Aba and Ganzi governments. Accountability was highlighted in order to pass the State Inspection. This was done by promoting the county-level focused administrative system, strengthening unified propaganda, and creating an atmosphere of propagandizing national unity education. Against this background, the standardization of bilingual education has been promoted by the Tibetan autonomous prefecture governments. The consolidation and improvement of universalising compulsory education have been highlighted as the basis of bilingual education. Thus, unity was promoted by Tibetan autonomous prefectures as a tool to draw symbolic boundaries for the cultural-political mainstream to retain its privileges and power (Yi, 2011). In terms of academia, the arguments are focused on the dilemma between bilingual education promoting both Tibetan and Mandarin. For example, some Tibetan scholars argue that bilingual education does not adequately meet the needs of the Tibetan people,

131 the local society and culture (Nima, 2009). Not enough attention is given to maintaining the Tibetan language (L1) while adding Chinese Mandarin (L2). Instead, L1 is just replaced with L2, focusing on helping Tibetan students become part of Han-dominated culture (Nima, 2009). Assimilation is the ultimate goal (Nima, 2009). In other words, this situation reflects subtractive bilingualism, in which L2 may undermine L1, resulting in a subtractive bilingual education as discussed in Chapter 2. Based on fieldwork in Ganzi and Aba, Ma (2007) argued that mistaken ideas exist in some local governments. For example, some local officials devalued the role of Tibetan language usage in economic development and some were just concerned about Tibetan cultures only, but ignored Tibetan language. A lack of funding and constitutive safeguards was also reflected in their work (Ma, 2007). Furthermore, some scholars argued that the fundamental tension for the Tibetan autonomous prefecture governments is that between the efficiency and effectiveness of bilingual education (Yi, 2011). Efficiency in terms of bilingual education utilised in schools and effectiveness in terms of pedagogical approach to job opportunity are different measures for bilingual education. This tension was brought about by employing bilingual education for Tibetan students, and the decreasing opportunities for using Tibetan language in the wider Chinese society. For example, many minorities lack fluency in Mandarin, which prevents them from equal access to work (Xinhua, 2004; Goodman, 2006). As Ma (2006) points out: “the common language used in school education will make the graduates easy to communicate with others in their future career” (p. 5). Viewed in political logics, I argue that the Tibetan prefecture governments’ bilingual education policies are linked to the tensions between the logic of difference, in terms of promoting ethnic language usage, and the logic of equivalence, in terms of Tibetan = backward = no future career vs. Mandarin = modernisation = Han-dominated culture = economic development = access to work. Yet, when these aspects appear to be in conflict, the priority of the party-state is usually to justify and legitimize its regime by focusing on and fostering political loyalty to the CCP, centring on economic development, at the cost of Tibetan culture, and thus, forming a political hegemony (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985), which reveals the central government’s political control of the autonomous regions. Han-dominated unity is the overriding priority. Indeed, there has been a ‘regime of truth’ concerning China’s ethnic bilingual education, grounded in

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“the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true” (Mackerras, 1989, p. 263) about education for minorities. Table 4.3 summarises the basic features of policies for minorities at the modernisation stage towards harmony and stability (1978-2012). The single-minded pursuit of economic growth became the central task of government officials at all levels; one consequence was the worsening of social inequality, rural-urban conflict, and increased social control (Ngok, 2009; Zhang, 2010). With the globalisation of the economy, we have seen the widespread use of Mandarin in the nation-state together with the loss and endangering of many minority languages (Zhang & Ma, 2012), although this was partially masked by the pluralist-unity discourse promoted in policy texts (Ma, 2007). Thus, China’s policy of ‘unity between diversity’ for minorities uncovers the hegemonic ideology in the phase of modernisation, in which Chinese nationalism is in tension with any rise in minority identities. This involves state- sponsored attempts to integrate the uncompromising ideas of political loyalty, national economic development, and cultural diversity into a hybridised, but ultimately incoherent, whole (Ma, 2006; Yi, 2011).

Table 4.3: Basic features of policies for minorities at the modernisation stage towards harmony and stability (1978-2012)

General Policies The central government: Constitution (1982) Law of Regional National Autonomy (1984) The Compulsory Education Law of the PRC (1986) Western Development Program (2000) Two Basics/Fundamentals Project (2000) The National Action Plan for Advancing Education Development (2010) Sichuan Province: Sichuan Action Plan (2000-2010) Sichuan Action Plan (2011-2020) Tibetan autonomous prefectures: The Work Program for Meeting the State’s Supervision and Inspection on the Two Basics/Fundamentals Project (2010)

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Policy Principle Unity between diversity, with economic issues coming in between Policy on bilingual Pluralist-unity pattern education Key Issue ‘Han-dominated unity’ and ‘ethnic cultural and linguistic diversity’ Minority-Han Chinese nationalism is in tension with any rise in minority identities. Relations Political logics The simultaneous operation the logics of difference and equivalence

Viewed through Laclau & Mouffe’s (2001) political logics (see Figure 4.4), the CCP has responded to educational inequalities in the era of Mao, by allowing minorities a limited degree of autonomy in linking ethnic heritage, cultural values, beliefs, and identity to bilingual education. This reflects the operation of the logic of difference, representing the cultural identity discourse; however, the expansion of the logic of difference is prevented by the presence of an alternative logic of equivalence, which collapses the differential character of social identity by means of expanding antagonistic signifying chains of equivalence (Torfing, 1999). As we have seen, this logic operates in terms of ‘western rural areas = minority = backward = illiterate versus eastern regions = Han = advanced = literate’, representing moral discourse. Thus, policies on bilingual education are implicated in the “undecidable relation” (Torfing, 1999, p. 126) between the two logics. They form a hybrid but ambivalent arena that incorporates the meanings of the middle terms still actively contested.

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Cultural identity Moral conservative discourse discourse

Bilingual/minority Ethnic minority Chinese nationalist education identities values Regional Economic Floating Curriculum Political loyalty to autonomy development Signifiers the CCP

Locality Identity Patriotism

The logic of difference The logic of equivalence cultural and linguistic Minority=backward versus Field of contested diversity Han= advanced signification

Figure 4.4: Discourse Theory concepts used in analysing distinct discourses of education policy in China’s context

4.5 Summary

This chapter investigated the work of policy contextualization within a minority education policy trajectory at three levels of governance, in three stages over the last 60 years in China. It did this by examining the operation of the logics of difference and/or equivalence that the discourses of minority/bilingual education bring together. Some general conclusions can be drawn for addressing my research questions. I identified two key discourses: 1) ‘ethnic cultural and linguistic diversity’ and 2) ‘Han-dominated unity’ which run across all these documents on minority education examined for this study. The party-state’s fundamental agenda on minority education has by and large remained the same over the last six decades and across the three levels of governance. The constant themes of governance in Chinese history have been unity (political) and diversity (cultural) with economic issues coming in between. The correlation between modernisation, integration, and ‘unity between diversity’ generally has been one of enormous change in China’s education for minority population. The

135 process of integration, driven by modernisation, was born in the 1950s. In the 1980s it took firmer root, but also became more complex because of a rise in feelings of national identity among the minorities. Currently, the hegemonic ideology of ‘pluralist unity’ has shaped hybrid education policy for minorities. Thus, China’s minority education policy contextualization is complex, involving tensions/contradictions between the logic of difference, in terms of ethnic cultural and linguistic diversity, and the logic of equivalence, in terms of minority = backward = undeveloped versus Han = advanced = developed. The Chinese state’s adoption of market re-orientation (neoliberalization) processes combining disparate elements from the transnational, national, and local, and are interwoven with non-neoliberal discourses in terms of promoting Han universalism and cultural diversity, that combine market advancement with state control. That is, neoliberalism with Chinese characteristics is a response to the multiple challenges and crises that have beset the desire for rapid development. This chapter provides the ground for the upcoming three chapters, exploring how the different Tibetan schools ‘do’ minority education policies. The above analysis of China’s neoliberal education policy reveals a top down process, within which the central government initiates neoliberal reforms and the provincial and autonomous governments follow up. However, this does not mean that neoliberal education policy unfolds in an automatic way at the local level or that local policy actors are merely passive implementers of central dictats. In the following three chapters, I will explore the active process of enactment of education policies across three types of Tibetan school communities in the Tibetan autonomous prefectures of Sichuan.

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Chapter 5. Case 1 Zhanggu – A Model Regular School in a Farming Town

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the first case study: Zhanggu Primary School, a farming town primary school in Danba County of Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture of Sichuan Province. This case will be used as a basis for comparison of the remaining cases, which will be presented in Chapters 6 and 7. The main purpose of this chapter is to examine the ways in which bilingual/minority education policies are taken up in the Case 1 school community. As discussed in Chapter 4, I identified cultural diversity and unity, that is, Han-dominated unity, as the key discourses of China’s minority education policy. I also identified that tensions between cultural diversity and Han-dominated unity are involved in the “undecidable relation” (Torfing, 1999, p. 126) between the logic of difference, in terms of ethnic cultural and linguistic diversity, and the logic of equivalence, in terms of ‘Minority = backward versus Han = advanced’. Within the context of these tensions, this chapter explores how bilingual education policies are enacted (or not) in the Case 1 school community. This chapter begins with a description of Zhanggu Town where Zhanggu Primary School is situated, followed by a description of the school itself. The analysis for each section is divided into two parts. First, I identify distinct discourses of education policy and curriculum apparent in the texts. These are moral discourses focusing upon and fostering political loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), characterised by Chinese nationalist values, and discourses of identity emphasizing ethnicity, locality and cultural diversity which emerged as a result of the integrated economic environment. I trace how the discourses are constituted through the use of certain key signifiers. Second, I present a more detailed analysis of how these antagonistic discourses are combined and inscribed into the practices of the school’s community life, using my ‘four As’ analytical framework (actors, agendas, actions and artefacts), as discussed in Chapter 3. To recapitulate, this framework is used to identify key policy actors, agendas, actions and artefacts embedded in the discursive shifts in policy enactment processes. It provides a critical analysis of how hegemony can be achieved through the fixation of

137 the meaning of contested signifiers, and how governmentality takes place around the manipulation of the contested signifiers, through the production of discursive environmental artefacts. The chapter concludes with a summary of the findings of the case as a whole, focusing in particular on the effect of hybridity in discourses and discursive strategies in bilingual education policy enactment processes.

5.2 Zhanggu Town

This section presents a picture of Zhanggu Town where Zhanggu Primary School is situated, in Danba County of Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture of Sichuan Province. First, I introduce two distinct discourses on education policies and curricula which relate to the subjects of cultural diversity and national unity that have been espoused over the past two decades by key policy actors in Zhanggu Town: a discourse of moral education and a discourse of identities. Second, I present a more detailed analysis of how these antagonistic discourses are combined and inscribed into the practices of local community life. I do this by identifying the key policy actors, agendas, actions and artefacts embedded in discursive shifts in policy enactment processes.

5.2.1 Key signifiers in discourses of education policy and curriculum

The discourse of moral education

Gao (2009), the former director of the Education Bureau Office of Danba County government, in his study of the county education history, quotes from an important report on education issued by the county government in 1989: We must strengthen moral education. Moral education in school must focus on conducting the education of patriotism, collectivism and socialism, so as to cultivate students’ ability to distinguish right from wrong, to resist spiritual pollution, and to foster socialist builders and successors that are well developed morally, intellectually, physically and aesthetically (Gao, 2009, p. 56). 15

15 In the following discussion, terminology from this extract and others will be in italics, to distinguish them from other sources. 138

Coming from the most powerful administrative authority in the county, this report reflects the political and economic climate of the time. In the aftermath of the 1989 crisis and crackdown, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders tried again to revive interest in Marxist-Leninist ideology and patriotism among the students, as discussed in Chapter 4. China underwent a major crisis in the late 1980s. An event of immense significance for the entire country was the violent suppression of the student movement early in June 1989; but for the minorities the emergence and suppression of the independence movement in Tibet from 1987 to 1989 sparked the central government’s enormous concerns (Mackerras, 2003). Facing the crisis, the state called upon educational institutions to improve the quality of moral education, assume responsibility for preserving the CCP’s leadership, support the CCP-defined socialist political values, and emphasize patriotism, national integrity and a sense of pride in being Chinese among students and teachers through schooling (Ministry of Education, 1998). In Zhanggu town – the seat of Danba County government – the leaders focused on the reintroduction of moral education, emphasising the value and importance of Chinese nationalism (patriotism, collectivism and socialism). As detailed in Chapter 4, patriotism specifically has distinctive features and functions. Patriotism provided an opportunity for the CCP to justify its own position in society, by equating the nation with the party-state and stressing the party’s patriotic achievements. CCP-defined socialism plays a role as gate-keeper of values – the political and legal framework, and ‘self’ identity will not exceed the state’s framework. Collectivism is justified by the CCP on the basis of patriotism, socialism, nationalism and even statism. It is also used as a weapon to fight against individualism and liberalism (Li, 2011). That is, within the CCP ideology, individuals’ self-image is tied to the party-state, together with the value and emotional significance they attach to membership in the national community. The points mutually support each other, thus forming a chain of equivalence in terms of ‘patriotism = the party’s patriotic achievements = CCP-defined socialism = collectivism = nationalism = statism’ against the opposing chain consisting of individualism and liberalism. Hence, the county government leaders mandated moral education (strengthen moral education), centring on a commitment to train constructors and successors for the socialist course and transmit worldviews of patriotism, collectivism, and socialism to students (school must focus on conducting the education of patriotism, collectivism and socialism).

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As noted in Chapter 4, the term moral education refers to what we might call ideological education or political education. Consequently, moral qualities are described as ideopolitical-moral qualities (On strengthening moral education in primary and secondary schools, Article 1, 1990). The priority of moral education in schools was simultaneously stressed by the central government, who claimed that moral education plays a decisive role in ensuring the correct political orientation and overall development of students. For the local political leaders, moral quality was understood to be achieved by focusing upon and fostering political loyalty (socialist builders and successors) to Chinese nationalist values. Thus they made Chinese nationalism a priority (focus on conducting the education of patriotism, collectivism and socialism), assigning it a high value. Indeed, it can be argued that Han universalism/culturalism is the nodal point that binds this discourse of moral education together, with other signs acquiring particular meanings through their association with it. For example, in the winter holiday of 1989, the county government arranged the political study of the Party’s education policy in schools: Through the political study of the Party’s education policy, we understand the nature of the student unrest, and thereby cultivate teachers’ and students’ ability to distinguish right from wrong, and resist spiritual pollution, and improve their consciousness of the Party’s political ideology. … In this year, the ritual of flying the national flag is scheduled for all schools in the county, along with principals’ speeches for the national flag flying ritual (Gao, 2009, p. 28-58).

Here, the signifiers such as student unrest, consciousness and the ritual of flying the national flag acquired particular meanings through their association with the nodal point of Han universalism. The local government made it quite clear that any demands for a student movement and independence were equivalent to unrest, wrong attitudes and behaviour, and spiritual pollution. Consciousness is of a certain and specific kind related to the Marxist-Leninist orientated CCP political ideology, emphasising Han universalism (the ritual of flying the national flag). In other words, the notion of morality as the ability to distinguish right and wrong was proposed. In order to promote such consciousness, political study was stepped up in the town, focusing upon and

140 fostering political loyalty and the ability to distinguish right from wrong, and resist spiritual pollution. The local government policy concerning moral education embodies the ‘civilizing’ mission of the party-state; it is also the result of cultural-political wars between Tibetan religious communities and the Marxist-Leninist CCP. The modern education of Tibetans has always been viewed by the local government as different from ordinary education in Han-dominated regions. In articulating this difference, the particularities of education for Tibetans are deemed by the county government to reflect special difficulties and problems, such as “school dropouts” and “ineffective academic outcomes” (Gao, 2009, p. 30). These difficulties and problems are allegedly connected to the ‘backwardness’ of Tibetans in isolated physical and cultural environments. This ‘backwardness’ is in turn largely traced to the historical socioeconomic and cultural patterns of Tibetans, who lived in primitive or feudal societies before the CCP introduced them to advanced socialism. Gao (2009) notes that “Tibetans lived in rural areas and thus were unfamiliar with modern education. Some Tibetan parents employed people to go to school instead of their own children by paying these people money” (p. 58). Tibetans’ lack of enthusiasm and motivation for education (apparent in “school dropouts”) is thought to be a result of their culture and religious traditions. By locating the ‘backwardness’ of Tibetan people in their historical socioeconomic and cultural patterns, it becomes primordialized (Yi, 2011). Against this background, the local government increasingly places its hope in moral education playing a key role in transmitting advanced Chinese nationalist values to Tibetans, improving their academic, cultural and moral qualities, and integrating the religious community into the ‘developed’ regions. Much of this agenda invokes the higher governmental discourse of ‘catch up’; it is assumed that Tibetans will continue to be backward if they enclose and isolate themselves from more advanced groups and developed regions. For local political leaders, Tibetan students are essentially in need of modern enlightenment, not only in the field of knowledge or skills transmission, but also, more fundamentally, in the field of the cultural transmission of advanced moral standards (Yi, 2011). This sentiment echoes the hierarchical classification of the different races that is organised around the dichotomy of civilisation and backwardness in colonial discourse. Postcolonial theory recognises that “colonial discourse typically rationalises itself

141 through rigid oppositions such as maturity/immaturity, civilisation/barbarism, developed/developing, progressive/primitive” (Gandhi, 1998, p. 32). The indigenous peoples are classified ‘according to their relative complexity of social organization’ (Spurr, 1993, p. 68) and to the coloniser’s interests and needs (Bhabha, 1992). The main aim of these discourses is to confirm the colonisers’ superiority over their colonial subjects, by opening up dichotomies characterising the Others as backward and uncivilised, while ascribing to oneself attributes such as modern and civilised – that is, “the logic of the colonial ‘civilising mission’” (Gandhi, 1998, p. 32). In the treatment of many Africans and other colonial peoples by their colonial masters, however, the example set by the Europeans illustrates a lack of civilised behaviour and, consequently, undermines the fundamental assumptions of their moral and cultural superiority. The “exploitation of colonized territories, thus becomes a moral imperative as well as a political and economic one’ (Spurr, 1993, p. 29). Similar patterns are found in China’s relations with its ethnic minorities. In Zhanggu Town, the set of policies promoting moral education and emphasising Chinese nationalism has remained essentially unchanged into the twenty-first century. The Implementation plan on the construction of primary and middle school students’ morality, issued by the county government in 2004 is typical: We must strengthen the education of national unity and anti-secessionism, to enhance students’ Chinese national identity, their sense of responsibility, their love for the socialist motherland, their dedication to the construction of socialist modernisation, their self-conscious maintenance of national solidarity and unity, and their opposition to national separatism.

The various terms in the extract line up as elements in a chain of equivalence in terms of – national unity = anti-secessionism = Chinese national identity = the sense of responsibility = love for the socialist motherland = dedication to the construction of socialist modernisation = self-conscious maintenance of national solidarity and unity = opposition to national separatism = opposing any demands for independence = Han universalism – a chain that excludes an opposing chain built around separate ethnic (including Tibetan) identities. National unity evokes a vision of making Tibetan students more compliant and more anxious to serve the socialist motherland, rather than being concerned about regional interests. That is, the moral education discourse is based

142 upon the value of Han-dominated unity; it could also be seen in a broader sense as a sacrifice of personal interest. However, for Tibetans, Han-dominated unity comes at the cost of the strict exclusion of religion from the public domain and the second-rate status of Tibetan language and culture. In terms of curriculum, the national unified curriculum has been utilised in county schools since 1999, and moral education has been promoted as a particularly important subject (Gao, 2009). The local government promotes the introduction of patriotic education into the curriculum, contending that students should be taught: values related to patriotism, such as ‘two histories and one condition’. Both China’s modern and contemporary history and China’s national conditions should be the foundation of education, which will focus on cultivating students’ patriotic enthusiasm. (Gao, 2009, p. 57)

Here, the local government’s agenda also reflects the construction of a chain in terms of moral education = Chinese nationalist values = China’s modern history = contemporary history = China’s national conditions = the foundation of education = Han universalism. Thus, I argue that moral discourse in Zhanggu Town focuses upon and fosters political loyalty to the CCP, characterised by Chinese nationalist values.

The discourse of education with local characteristics

The dominant discourse of moral education reveals a pejorative view of Tibetan language and culture, which is seen as needing reform through Chinese nationalist education. However, some school-based teacher-researchers suggest that the national unified curriculum has led to ineffective academic outcomes and/or poor school performance because it lacks responsiveness to locality and ethnic identities. For these academics taking Tibetan children’s life experiences and other factors, which affect their patterns of cognitive development, into consideration would significantly improve education quality. More importantly, they object to labelling Tibetans as ‘backward’ people. In what follows, I examine some school-based teacher-researchers’ views of the education policy and curriculum for Tibetans in their research articles. In 2007, some primary and middle school teachers were appointed as part-time research staff members

143 by the County Education Bureau. This Bureau is considered to be the most influential educational administrative authority in the county town. The role of these teacher- researchers was to improve education quality by conducting teaching and research activities around curriculum reform (The County Education Bureau, 2007). Xu, Ping, and Feng were part-time research staff members in the town and they shared the similar standpoint that responsiveness to individuality, locality and ethnicity should be the basis for curriculum reform. Here are Xu’s views on these issues: The national unified teaching materials weakened Tibetan students’ grasping knowledge. Our students have been born and raised in mountain villages. Their life experiences are quite different from that of city children. The school curriculum should be closely related to locality and children’s daily life, providing grounds for their individuation and development (Xu, 2008, p. 62).

Xu’s idea of linking curriculum to individuation and development is shared by Ping: The national unified teaching materials weakened the development and usage of regional curriculum resources. Tibetan culture should be included within the curriculum, for facilitating their learning and fostering our students’ particular cultural interests, individuation and development (Ping, 2009, p. 82).

Feng also agrees with the inclusive idea: Curricula reform provides us with a broad space for the development and usage of curriculum resources with local characteristics. We must try to make our curriculum lively and interesting for the development of Tibetan students’ individual needs and particular cultural interests (Feng, 2010, p. 69).

Identity is the nodal point that binds this discourse of education with local characteristics together, with other signs acquiring particular meanings through their association with that identity. Signifiers such as life experiences and particular cultural interests acquire their meanings by highlighting responsiveness to locality and ethnicity, and by being related to identity in particular ways. Responsiveness to locality and ethnicity is presented as a positive way to place identity at the centre of education for Tibetan students. These school-based teacher-researchers call for responsiveness to

144 local and ethnic identities in the curriculum, in contrast with the discourse of moral education, arguing that a curriculum grounded in Tibetan community knowledge and values and designed to accord with Tibet’s historical and cultural patterns, as well as its present physical and socioeconomic conditions, will contribute to educational quality improvement and local community development. This call is bolstered by the higher level governmental discourse of the decentralisation of curriculum decision-making for minorities, as discussed in Chapter 4, highlighting culture, ethnicity, humanism, and diversity. There are rich and colourful resources in the Tibetan area, such as abundant Tibetan cultures, traditions, art, architecture, religion and beliefs, as well as individual life experiences; and they are all valuable curriculum resources. As we know, there is nothing advanced or backward about children’s different life experiences. The consideration of cultural diversity should largely exert the educational values of local cultural resources. We should give prominence to ethnic characteristics and local advantage for the service to local agricultural and tourism development. (Feng, 2010, p. 71)

By placing identity in this context, its meaning is extended beyond the narrower connotation of particular cultural interests. Cultural diversity, ethnic characteristics and local advantage emerge as equivalences in the identity discourse. Responsiveness to local and ethnic identities will bring educational values to the local community, and contribute to economic development (agricultural and tourism development). In other words, various ethnic minority cultures should be considered in the curriculum, to make it interrelated with and overlap with local socioeconomic needs. Importantly, the local researchers object to labelling Tibetans as a backward people – there is nothing advanced or backward about children’s different life experiences. The researchers argue that taking Tibetan children’s life experiences and other factors, which may have affected their patterns of cognitive development into consideration should significantly facilitate their learning (Feng, 2010; Ping, 2009). If this were done, they argue, the view that Tibetan children are intellectually inferior would largely be corrected in both majority and minority communities (Nima, 1995). Despite awareness of the importance of being responsive to identity, locality and ethnicity, the curricula reform remained largely superficial. For example, little

145 discussion has seriously focused on religion in education. As previously noted local political leaders hold Tibetans’ attachment to religion responsible for their disengagement from education. The school-based teacher-researchers were silent regarding religion in education. In the end, the cultural-political mainstream discourse has largely reduced the social system relating to ethno-religious communities to the curriculum, which has primarily shaped education policies and practices (Yi, 2011). Moreover, the discourse of education with local characteristics has been co-opted in recent times by a neoliberal governmentality in order to devolve economic responsibilities to the largely rural-based Tibetans, so that they can prosper at little cost to the state (Yan, 2003). It has been colonised by a neoliberal philosophy emphasising individuality, creativity and diversity in both the education system and the local society. Thus, in the neoliberal reform discourse, Tibetans are encouraged to raise their cultural quality themselves as responsibility for socioeconomic wellbeing is displaced from the education system to the individual. By contrast, the school-based teacher-researchers place responsibility for wellbeing squarely on the regional curriculum reform agenda. In their view, a curriculum grounded in identity, locality and ethnicity will bring educational quality improvement and economic development to the local community. These associations are significant, since they clash with the major discourse of moral education in the farming town.

5.2.2 Hybridity in the discourses and discursive strategies

In this section, I explore and identify the key policy actors, agendas, actions and artefacts embedded in the discursive shifts in policy enactment processes from 2008 to 2012. This was a period in which the county government found itself caught between two conflicting demands: appeals for Chinese nationalist values from the local political leaders and calls for responsiveness to local and ethnic identities by some school-based teacher-researchers. The tension between Han universalism and Tibetan identities placed a strain, not only on policy choices but also on the ways in which these policies were articulated and enacted discursively. I present a detailed analysis of how these antagonistic discourses were combined and inscribed into the practices of the county town, using the ‘four As’ analytical framework – actors, agendas, actions and artefacts.

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Actors: ambivalent attitudes towards development

As discussed in Chapter 3, policy actors are involved in making meaning of, and constructing responses to, minority education policy and their attitudes towards education development may combine different aspects of policy work through the processes of interpretation and translation (cf Ball et al., 2012). In Zhanggu Town, the county government leaders represent the key policy actors who expressed ambivalent attitudes towards development relating to Han universalism and Tibetan identities. The following excerpt from the Annual Summary Report issued by the county government in 2008 contains signifiers that are typically rich in this hybridity and tension. It attempts to combine the responsiveness to identity, locality and ethnicity which emerged as a result of the integrated economic environment into the context of cultural- political concern as a whole: After the earthquake of May 12, 2008, the county government determined to allocate 200,000 yuan ($33,000) each year as an incentive fund for county-based teaching quality improvement. The county government started 2008 Education Research Project in Sichuan Minority Areas in the county. In the same year, the project ‘Chinese listening and speaking ability training for primary students in Jiarong Tibetan village schools’ won affirmation and approval from the experts of Sichuan Provence. The county government carried out patriotic education activities around the theme of ‘Opposing Secession and Ensuring Stability’ and thanksgiving for the Party. The purpose was to ensure ‘both hands grasp and balance two sides’ – that is, to ensure the stability and harmony, and at the same time, the steady education quality improvement in schools. (Annual Summary Report, 2008, p. 2)

The use of the transitional phrases at the same time and in the same year suggests that the county government leaders are aware of the latent tension between the two discourses. It is as if education has two separate but equal goals, namely, education quality improvement emphasising responsiveness to local and ethnic identities (county- based teaching quality improvement and Education Research Project in Sichuan Minority Areas), and school stability stressing Han universalism (Chinese listening and speaking ability training and Opposing Secession and Ensuring Stability). This was

147 captured by the official slogan both hands grasp and balance two sides. The county government leaders attempted a discursive compromise, balancing the viewpoints of two sides. Unfortunately, the signifiers within the discursive compromise have too much intertextual baggage attached for this balance to be achieved. Here, it is hard to establish convincing relationships of education quality improvement and school stability among the numerous signifiers – locality, ethnicity, Chinese listening and speaking abilities, and socio-political concerns that are espoused by the local government as affecting education for Tibetans. Thanksgiving, for example, means thanksgiving for the CCP’s support in the 2008 post-earthquake reconstruction. However, the 2008 post-earthquake reconstruction planning process itself underwent a transformation as it became subsumed under a broad set of national policies and governmental practices that predated the earthquake. We cannot say for certain what harmony means in this context. But, the phrase in speaking of stability and harmony implies that harmony is only achievable within the context of the stability of the CCP leadership. Thus, this discursive compromise reflects the key policy actors’ ambivalence attitudes towards Tibetan identities and their underlying support for the words and deeds of the CCP.

Agendas: tying cultural diversity and political loyalty to the needs of the local community and the CCP

Agenda, as noted in Chapter 3, represents not only the abstractions of minority education policy ideas, but also the language of policy practice in relation to power, politics and social regulation (cf Ball et al., 2012). In Zhanggu Town, the discourses of Han universalism and Tibetan identities offer starkly different visions of what the county society and culture should be like. The typical solution was an attempt to meld the two discourses together, tying cultural diversity and political loyalty to the needs of the local community and the CCP. However, within this hybrid ideology, cultural diversity is desirable only in the context of fostering political loyalty. The key signifiers that appeared in the following excerpt from the Aid program from inland partner assistance regions (2008-2012) are typically rich in their hybridity of policy agendas. Specifically, in the opening sentence of the summary of the key points, the county government leaders describe the work of implementing the policy (part of China’s

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Western Development policy as discussed in Chapter 4), by combining the ideas come in and go out, representing an attempt to blend two signifiers from quite disparate discourses: We must implement the Aid program from inland partner assistance regions in accordance with the idea of ‘come in’ – the inland intellectuals come in the county to impart their advanced inland experiences, knowledge, skills and ideology in accordance with the local demands, and the work idea of ‘go out’ – we go out to learn the new thinking and methods of developed areas so that we can improve ourselves and achieve the local socioeconomic development. We must rely on the support from our economically developed partners and cooperate with them. This program shall provide vigour for our “great-leap- forward” development and long-term stability.

Here, the hybridized policy agenda suggests that the hegemonic aim is to appropriate signifiers, often linking dissimilar or semantically antagonistic items. The use of the terms come in and go out reflects the incorporation into the Han majority nation for the mainstream’s agenda of great-leap-forward development and long-term stability. This is done by melding several signifiers that have specific meanings acquired through their association with that discourse, the signifiers, such as, advanced inland experiences, knowledge, skills and ideology; local demands; new thinking and methods of developed areas; and local socioeconomic development. From the perspective of Laclau and Mouffe’s political theory, the situation of the hybridized policy agenda can be presented in the Figure 5.1. The logic of difference may help us understand the work being achieved through the hybridisation agenda. By positing ‘pure’, non-hierarchical differences, this logic weakens the common ground for Tibetan mobilisation (apparent in sending inland Party officials to the county under the work idea of come in) in resistance to Han domination. In other words, the strategy is utilised to prevent the establishment of a unified oppositional movement – the classic strategy of “divide and rule” (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, pp. 144-145), as noted in Chapter 4. Meanwhile, we can express the chain of equivalence formally as: advanced = inland experiences, knowledge, skills and ideology = developed areas = Han culture = Han universalism. We might call this chain integration, and therefore, the opposition of integration becomes an antagonistic chain of equivalence comprising an opposing set of

149 values: Tibetan = poverty = backward. We might call this oppositional chain ‘difficult to integrate’. In contrast to the dispersion of differences through the logic of difference, the deployment of the logic of equivalence provides the Tibetans with a common platform from which to resist domination and claim equal rights (apparent in the serving the local socioeconomic development under the work idea of go out). Thus, the establishment of hegemony (great-leap-forward development and long-term stability) reflects the superficial operation of the logic of difference in terms of ‘cultural and linguistic diversity’ underpinned (and undermined) by the realities of power conforming to the logic of equivalence in terms of ‘Tibetan = backward versus Han = advanced’.

The logic of equivalence The establishment of The logic of difference hegemony  advanced = inland combining the ideas of  the local demands experiences, knowledge, skills come in and go out  the local and ideology = developed areas = socioeconomic Han culture = Han universalism great-leap-forward development versus Tibetan = poverty = development  serving the local backward socioeconomic  sending inland Party officials long-term stability development to the town

Figure 5.1: The situation of the hybrid policy agendas in Zhanggu Town

Actions: Curriculum implementation

The simultaneous operation of the logic of difference and the logic of equivalence can also be seen in the articulation of the policy agenda with policy actions; the abstracts or ideals of education policy texts are translated into actions, things to do in real situations, notably, curriculum implementation (cf Ball et al., 2012). Curriculum development is a floating signifier used by some school-based teacher-researchers and translated as the responsiveness to local and ethnic identities. However, it was appropriated into the discourse of moral education where it was defined by local political leaders in an alternative way which was closer to moral improvement. As noted above, this was

150 achieved by focusing upon and fostering political loyalty with Chinese-nationalist values. In deploying the two antagonistic logics, the local government attempts to incorporate the viewpoints of the two groups within the curriculum. The example of conducting a distance, web-based instructional synchronous curricula in ethnic areas is typical. The policy action promoting the inland Han curricula invokes the developmental discourse of ‘catch up’; it is assumed that Tibetans will not continue to be backward if they adopt national education resources – the local government requires the local schools to adopt the ‘advanced’ Four-in-One synchronous curricula model (Danba County Government, 2011a). The synchronous curricula model, including classroom teaching and learning, preparing class, testing and assignment, is copied from the inland Han curriculum. However, the logic of difference in terms of the purpose of “education with local characteristics” (Danba County Government, 2011a) confuses this policy action promoting the alignment of Tibetan education with the Han model. Thus, the implementation of the synchronous curriculum is linked to an ambivalence, reflected in the undecidable relation between the logic of difference in terms of ‘ethnic cultural and linguistic diversity’ and the logic of equivalence in terms of ‘Tibetan = backward versus Han = advanced’. A similar confusion is evident in the first local/regional textbook, namely, Beauty Valley. This textbook was produced by the County Education Bureau in 2011. It includes five parts: long history, natural environment, rich resources, ‘splendid’ culture, and ‘tantalizing’ specialties, with both pictures and text in Chinese characters. The county government indicated the aim of this textbook as follows: the book is to help students understand the history and customs of the county, to inspire their emotion for love of hometown and country, and to foster their ambitions of further developing their hometown (Danba County Government, 2011b).

Here, the local textbook directly represents various Tibetan cultures, ultimately, for the purpose of unification. Tibetan cultures are represented at a superficial level in the textbook, which demonstrates a lack of a substantive knowledge. The explicit policy goal of the textbook is stated in terms of inspiring students’ emotion for love of hometown and the PRC. That is, the local textbook is utilised by the local government as a tool for the purpose of unification. In this way, the hybridized implementation of

151 curriculum relating to Tibetan cultures serves as a method of drawing symbolic boundaries around which the cultural political mainstream can retain its privileges and power (Yi, 2011). Thus, Tibetan cultures do not have proportionate space in the curricula, based on the assumption that the backwardness of the Tibetan language and culture is responsible for their poor school performance and academic outcomes. The limited coverage of Tibetan language and culture is primarily aimed at inculcating Chinese nationalist values and locating Tibetan language and culture as being in a “historically retarded or static stage”, so as to make manifest the necessity of their “transformation” (Yi, 2011, p. 397).

Artefacts: environmental and cultural artefacts

The local political leaders attempted to achieve the aims of policy through the production of visual materials that carry within them sets of beliefs and meanings relating to identity. These artefacts “speak to social processes and policy enactments – ways of being and becoming – that is, forms of governmentality” (Ball et al., 2012, pp. 121-122). The process of enacting the policy Aid program from inland partner assistance regions saw the production of environmental and cultural artefacts, such as sets of visual materials, illustrating and promoting desirable conduct associated with the policy – for example, the work of come in and go out. Through the production of sets of environmental and cultural artefacts and the manipulation of contested signifiers associated with them, processes of governmentality – the regulation of everyday conduct – occurs. In terms of the work of go out, in 2011, the county government delegation visited one of the inland partner assistance regions, Nanchong City, with the intention of borrowing ideas and practices on the national standardisation construction of primary education. The county government produced a pennant with the large Chinese characters: “Friendly Cooperation” and presented it to the Nanchong City government, expressing gratitude for sending talent to provide guidance in the construction of standardisation education in the county schools (Danba County Government, 2011c). Here, the statement “Friendly Cooperation” on the pennant can be seen as the enactment of subordination. It embodies a set of beliefs and meanings; that is, ways of being, and becoming, standardized according to Han standards. Thus, the power of Han-dominated

152 standardisation is produced through this governmental process in which a particular discursive formation becomes internalised and take-for-granted (Foucault, 1991). In terms of the work of come in, the poster of the ‘Model folk house family’ was produced by the local government, stressing the importance of Han people coming in the county to “help local development, notably tourism development” (Danba County Government, 2011d). One model family consisting of three beautiful Tibetan sisters was the first to engage in the tourism industry’s focus on folk house reception. The three sisters liked to introduce their experiences of folk house reception to guests, including me. For example, Zhuoma, the eldest sister, stated the reason why their folk house reception attracted inland travellers’ attention: We owe the success of our folk tourism to the popularisation of Mandarin, and the good policies of reform and opening up. We appreciate our far-sighted parents who encouraged Mandarin communication. (Zhuoma, Interview, Tibetan in Zhanggu Town, May, 2011)

Here, the production of the ‘Model folk house family’, promoting Mandarin, tends to confuse Tibetans by representing their culture in a hybrid version. The local government produced the models emphasizing that both inland travellers’ support and Mandarin will bring about the success of the local tourist industry, to the community’s benefit. This is particularly so in relation to the Party policies, such as the policies of ‘reform and opening up’ and ‘the post-earthquake reconstruction’ (Danba County Government, 2011d). In terms of the post-earthquake reconstruction planning, what initially was supposed to result in the creative production of environmental and cultural artefacts in governance and project management, with greater participation by local Tibetan residents, ended up having to satisfy the interests of an increasing number of external stakeholders. For example, the local government inscribed the discourse of ‘thanksgiving’ into discursive activities and artefacts, and thereby fostered political loyalty to Chinese nationalist values. It especially targeted the religious community. They produced a large display with large Chinese characters: “when we drink water we should not forget those who dug the well; we rely on the Chinese Communist Party’s support for the post- earthquake reconstruction”. This display is centrally located in front of the Tibetan

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Buddhist stupa, the Mani stone inscribed with the six syllabled mantra, and the Muerdo Holy Mountain (see Figure 5.2).

Mani stone inscribed with the six syllabled mantra. “When we drink water we should not forget those who dug the well; we rely on the Chinese Communist Party’s support for the post- earthquake reconstruction.”

Figure 5.2: Display of rely on the CCP in front of the Tibetan Buddhist stupa

Tibetan cultural symbols are used as the background for the display, showing thanksgiving for the CCP in the post-earthquake reconstruction. This establishes that thanksgiving is about creating a particular version of the town and a particular version of the Tibetans – a version that combines a beneficent Chinese nationalist identity and beneficiary Tibetan identity. In other words, the interweaving of discourses here are involved in the hybrid relation between the logic of difference (apparent in the Tibetan cultural symbols – Tibetan Buddhist stupa, the Mani stone inscribed with the six syllabled mantra, and the Muerdo Holy Mountain) and the logic of equivalence in terms of ‘Tibetan = backward versus thanksgiving the CCP = Han = advanced = political loyalty to Chinese nationalist values = rely on the CCP = Han universalism’. In essence, the local government was telling Tibetans that they would get preferential policies and treatment if they opted to stay within China and follow the ways of being and becoming that align with political loyalty and Chinese nationalist values, with economic and other benefits and an improving standard of living as incentives. That is, dominant discourses are produced and reproduced through the policy enactment processes, in accordance with which, “practice gives rise to partially

154 or totally new statements” (Foucault, 1986, p. 208). This practice further justifies and legitimizes the way in which the cultural-political mainstream continues to carry out its mission of civilizing Tibetans through its ongoing integrative production of artefacts, reflecting ‘the art of government’ (Foucault, 1979, 1991) with the simultaneous operation of the logic of difference, in terms of ‘cultural and linguistic diversity’, and the logic of equivalence, in terms of ‘Tibetan = backward versus Han = advanced’. The overall effect of this hybridity has resulted in the ambivalence and ambiguity of policy agendas, actions and artefacts of education, and of the Tibetan people as dual subjects of cultural diversity and national unity. The local political leaders strive to integrate the ultimately incompatible ideas of political loyalty, cultural diversity and economic development into a hybridized whole. That is, even though the Constitution guarantees Tibetans the freedom of language use and religion, the societal culture that the regional Party leadership offers to Tibetans tends to exert control over a wide range of aspects of their lives, including education, language and religion. This has resulted in ambivalence or ambiguity, not only in government policies, but also among the Han majority and Tibetans positioned within the discursive shifts in policy enactment processes. Ongoing changes in the county government’s bilingual education policy over the past two decades reflect the long course of the discursive power shifts in policy enactment processes. In spite of periodically encouraging bilingual education, the county government still holds that the backwardness of Tibetans can be overcome by stressing the importance of the Chinese language as the means to gain access to Han culture, especially the advanced moral standards associated with Han-dominated unity. Within such a morally conservative vision, there is no room for cultural diversity. This assimilationist trend has created an overarching Chinese national identity, thereby diluting the individual identities of its minorities (Dwyer, 2005, p. 30). In summary, while there has been some attempt to meld the two conflicting discourses together by linking cultural differences with political loyalty to Chinese nationalist values, the process has not been entirely successful or coherent. What has emerged is not a new discourse that reconciles the conflict, but a mixture that serves to highlight it. Thus, governmentality, takes place around the manipulation of the integrated agenda, through the production of sets of actions and cultural artefacts, which focus upon and foster political loyalty in the masses and centre on economic

155 development. For Tibetans this comes at the cost of the strict exclusion of religion from the public domain and second-rate status for Tibetan language and culture.

5.3 Zhanggu Primary School

This section presents a picture of Zhanggu Primary School, the county town primary school. As with the distinct discourses of moral education and education with local characteristics apparent in the town, the key policy actors in the school considered that education for Tibetans should have two distinct objectives: the promotion of national standardisation and local characteristics. In this section, first, I introduce two distinct discourses on education policies and curriculum relating to the subjects of cultural diversity and national unity that are currently in circulation in this school: a discourse of standardisation and a discourse of curriculum with local characteristics. Second, I present a more detailed analysis of how these antagonistic discourses are combined and inscribed into the everyday practices of school life.

5.3.1 Key signifiers in discourses of education policy and curriculum in the school

The discourse of standardisation by the school leaders

The principal Zhang, in his introduction of the pamphlet on Zhanggu Primary School, wrote about the school’s aim of cultivating people with morality: The overall development of teachers and students has been given great importance in the development of the last 100 years in the school. Under the school aim of cultivating people with morality, we uphold the mission of cultivating modern socialist citizens and reliable successors who have lofty ideals, integrity, knowledge and a strong sense of discipline. We strengthen the moral construction of teachers and students, stressing the standardisation of education.

The use of the slogans in the extracts above reflects how much the principal is invested in the Chinese nationalist discourse – he is a believer. The principal expresses his attitudes towards the moral construction of teachers and students, stressing the

156 standardisation of education, in which the fostering of political loyalty (the mission of cultivating modern socialist citizens and reliable successors) is a top priority. The principal Zhang is in his early 40s and of Tibetan nationality. Study experiences in the Chinese Communist Party School heavily influenced the principal. He completed his higher education in Sichuan Education College (the Party School of the CCP Sichuan Provincial Committee) in Chengdu, majoring in Ideological and Political Education. In 2011, he received China Education Administrator Training, spending one month taking a concentrated refresher course for principals at the Party School of the CCP Sichuan Provincial Committee (Zhang, Interview, Tibetan principal in Zhanggu Primary School, March, 2011). Through the nature of minority principals’ training, they “become more adapted to the Chinese state system, rather than to their own ethnic culture” (Mackerras, 2003, p. 133). The extracts from the principal are loaded with signifiers from local political leaders’ discourse on moral education developing political loyalty. Here, the principal represents the CCP ideal of a school leader who expresses a strong attitude towards instilling moral education among students and teachers (the moral construction of teachers and students) through the standardisation of education. Han universalism is the nodal point that binds this discourse of standardisation together, with other signs acquiring particular meanings through their association with it. The following example from the accountability report, the School performance appraisal program (2009) produced by the deputy principal Wang, is typical: Standardize education in accordance with the laws (a score of 10 [out of 100]). Love the socialist motherland, and support the Chinese Communist Party’s leadership. Any words and deeds against the party-state principles and policies are forbidden. Consciously safeguard China’s unity, social stability and national unity.

Foster modern socialist citizens and reliable successors who have lofty ideals, integrity, knowledge and a strong sense of discipline (a score of 10 [out of 100]).

Standardize teaching instrument in classroom (a score of 10 [out of 100]). The local dialect was forbidden in class.

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Here, the standardisation and accountability measures of education is elaborated by the deputy principal Wang in accordance with the central government document the Morality for teachers of primary and middle schools (2009), emphasising Chinese nationalistic values (Love the socialist motherland, and support the Chinese Communist Party’s leadership). The deputy principal Wang, born and raised in Zhanggu Town, is in her 40s and has Han nationality. She is the CCP representative in this school. In 2011, Wang received awards for “Excellent Communist Party Member” and “Model Worker” by the Sichuan government (Wang, Interview, Han Deputy Principal in Zhanggu Primary School, March, 2011). For this school leader, improving moral quality was also understood to be achieved through encouraging political loyalty (consciously safeguard China’s unity, social stability and national unity). Much attention was focused on cultivating students’ good moral character and behavioural norms in tune with Chinese nationalist values (modern socialist citizens and reliable successors who have lofty ideals, integrity, knowledge and a strong sense of discipline); whereas the local dialect (including Jiarong Tibetan) is strictly excluded in the standardized teaching language (the local dialect was forbidden in class). Thus, Han universalism is associated with other signifiers, the standardisation and accountability measures of education. Thus, the School performance appraisal program is typically presented by the deputy principal as matters of managerialism and performativity. In other words, this accountability report combines neoliberal policy form and the role of the party-state in mediating this form by focusing on Han universalism. The school leaders’ views concerning the standardisation of education around Han universalism are the epitome of the civilizing missions of the party-state. They are also the result of cultural-political wars between the religious community and the Marxist- Leninist orientated CCP. The particularities of education for Tibetans are deemed by the school leaders to be embodied in special difficulties and problems, notably the Tibetan students’ ‘low quality’ (from my interviews of the school leaders). Quality improvement is supposedly the key for alleviating the cultural poverty of Tibetans. Thus, the school leaders place their hope in moral education playing a key role in transmitting advanced Chinese nationalist values to Tibetans, improving their perceived low quality, and integrating the school with the developed regions. Much of this arbitrariness invokes the higher governmental discourse of ‘catch up’ as previously discussed, asserting the logic of equivalence in terms of ‘Tibetan = backward versus Han = advanced’. Concern about

158 the backwardness of Tibetan modes of thinking is typically reflected in the mainstream discourse of quality, literally essential character (see Chapter 4). For these key actors who emphasise educational standardisation around Han universalism, it is fashionable to label Tibetans as a people of low quality. Therefore, the school leaders assert that Tibetan students are essentially in need of enlightenment for improvement, not only in the field of knowledge or skills transmission, but also, more fundamentally, in the field of the cultural transmission of advanced moral standards. This reflects their narrow and anxious identification with Han Chinese nationalistic values. A similar view regarding Tibetans was expressed with greater details by the model teachers and students discussed below.

The discourse of standardisation by the models

Nazema, a Tibetan teacher, was recommended by the principal (see Chapter 3). In 2011, she received the award of “Excellent Teacher” by the county government. Nazema integrates her study experiences in Han school into Zhanggu Primary School. She expressed her agreement with the ideals of living and studying in Mandarin environment and addressed the difficulties and problems caused by Tibetan students’ low quality (see the following example from Nazema’s Teaching summary on the standardisation of language for Tibetans): The familial and environmental background of Tibetan students resulted in them being more likely to suffer from self-esteem or passivity in modes of thinking. Some Tibetan students do not dare to speak Mandarin, fearing that they would say something wrong and be ridiculed. These problems caused teaching difficulties. Thus, I insist that living and studying in Mandarin environment would significantly improve their low quality, emphasising the importance of the standardized teaching language. A good linguistic and cultural atmosphere would nurture students in cultural and moral quality improvement.

This framing of Han universalism (Mandarin environment and the standardized teaching language) as a civilising mission excludes the Tibetan language and culture from public institutions. Mandarin is presented positively as a way to affirm Chinese nationalistic values, at the expense of placing Tibetan identities at the centre of students’

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“cultural and moral quality improvement”. The difficulties and problems (self-esteem or passivity in modes of thinking and Tibetan students do not dare to speak Mandarin) are alleged to be principally connected to the backwardness of Tibetans in isolated physical and cultural environments. The implication is that the Tibetan students’ poor cultural and linguistic development and weak school performance is caused by their physical and cultural environments. With such a view of Tibetan language and culture, it is no surprise that the cultural-political mainstream in the school is far from enthusiastic to learn about them. Such a discourse, emphasising and eulogizing Chinese nationalist values, also influenced my student interviewees. Yu was born in Zhanggu Town and is of Tibetan nationality. She grew up in a family that worked for the county government agencies. She speaks the Chengdu dialect16 with her parents and cannot speak Tibetan. Yu was elected by her classmates as the monitor and is among the top students in Nazema’s Class 3 Grade 5. In 2011, she was recognised by receiving the “outstanding student” award of the school. Here, Yu represents a policy model, holding her understanding of the important place of the Chinese language and cultural atmosphere in the highest regard: I become more and more confident in study, because my assignments can often get the result of ‘good’ from my teachers. I am always one of the top students in exam result rankings. I want to study in middle school in Chengdu. I also have friends in Chengdu and other cities. As the old saying goes, ‘speaking Mandarin helps make a world of friends’ (Yu, Interview, Tibetan student in Zhanggu Primary School, June, 2011)

Yu presents herself as benefitting from Han universalism (friends in Chengdu and other cities and speaking Mandarin). She is a member of a Tibetan community which she wants to leave (I want to study in middle school in Chengdu). It is this goal that she has worked hard for (I am always one of the top students in exam result ranking). When asked if it were possible to be confident and happy and only know Tibetan, Yu responded, “I guess it would be hard. There aren’t that many classmates who speak Tibetan, you know; my friends in Chengdu cannot speak Tibetan”. Yu agreed that it is mainstream rather than local schooling that functions as an institution for cultivating useful people of a higher academic standard with a good future (speaking Mandarin

16 Chengdu dialect is the most representative dialect of South western Mandarin (Li, 2009, as cited in Wikipedia, 2012a). 160 helps make a world of friends) – that is, a good command of Chinese would gain her mainstream cultural citizenship, as a result of which she would be “more and more confident”. Moreover, Yu was treated as the most capable person in her class by common consent. The comment that “almost the whole school knows her” was made frequently by her classmates. Here, Tibetan-background students saw “speaking Mandarin” as a vehicle for gaining peer group status. Those values, emphasising Han universalism, were then reproduced within the peer group culture, where students gained status by speaking Mandarin in order to be known. In other words, these students’ identities are constructed around the superior value of Han universalism in relation to their Tibetan identities. All of this suggests that the discourse of national standardisation heavily influenced Tibetan students in this school, reinforcing Chinese nationalist values. In this discourse of Han universalism, Tibetan students are positioned as essentially in need of being enlightened through the transmission of advanced cultural and moral standards. Within such a vision of standardisation, there is no room for cultural diversity.

The discourse of curriculum with local characteristics

The discourse of standardisation reveals a pejorative view of Tibetan language and culture, particularly in relation to Chinese nationalist values education. However, some teachers interviewed support the inclusion of local knowledge and culture within the curricula. For these critics, Tibetan students’ poor academic outcomes are largely a result of their lack of relevant education in relation to the local socioeconomic situation and cultural values. For these teachers, including local cultural resources into the curriculum offered a means to develop Tibetan students’ individuality, creativity and economy. More importantly, they refuse to label Tibetans as a backward people. These critics provide a different way of talking and thinking about education for Tibetan students. Dengzhu, a Tibetan teacher, and Zaxi, a Tibetan student, are policy critics who expressed their support for the development of curriculum with local characteristics, and emphasised Tibetan identity.

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If the curriculum is removed from children’s life experiences, students can only learn by rote and mechanical training, rather than meaningful learning. Many Tibetan students are forced to reconsider the significance and relevance of the local cultural values and beliefs which they have grown up with. They are shamed of and have disregard for their traditional customs. We need to creatively develop curriculum. I think this curriculum development does not always follow the inland teaching concepts and models. We need to include the local resources into curriculum. Life experiences and cultural and natural recourses are our advantage. They are valuable for our students to develop particular cultural interests, creativity and economy with local characteristics. (Dengzhu, Interview, Tibetan teacher in Zhanggu Primary School, May, 2011)

Zaxi explained the view of including the local resources into curriculum as follows: I wish the school offered courses about Tibetan culture, history and historical figures, and arts. You know, most of us hope to have classes like physical exercise activities and after-school readings for particular cultural interests. Sometimes, exams make me feel that I am working like a study machine and I am a bird in birdcage losing my freedom. (Zaxi, Interview, Tibetan Student in Zhanggu Primary School, May, 2011)

As we saw above in section 5.2.1, it is the nodal point of identity that binds this discourse of curriculum with local characteristics together, with other signs acquiring particular meanings through their association with it. Signs such as the local cultural values and beliefs, life experiences, cultural and natural recourses, and Tibetan culture, history and historical figures, and arts acquire their meanings as the responsiveness to locality and ethnicity, and by being related to individualism in particular ways. Responsiveness to locality and ethnicity is presented positively as a way to place identity at the centre of the curriculum for Tibetan students. Notably, Dengzhu raised students’ psychological issues of being ashamed of and having a disregard for their traditional customs. Zaxi wishes the school offered courses on local culture and history, and had a strong feeling of working like a study machine and losing freedom in the exam-based education. Both of them expressed concerns about the ‘standardisation’ of

162 education, and about the effect of the disconnection between Tibetan identity, knowledge, culture and language and the national unified curriculum as implemented in Zhanggu Primary School. Thus, these Tibetan teachers and students represent the key actors who call for individual expertise and an emphasis on Tibetan identity. More importantly, they object to the labelling of Tibetans ‘backward’: there is nothing advanced or backward about children’s different life experiences, actually, the inclusion of local cultural and natural recourses within the curriculum is our advantage for developing Tibetan children’s particular cultural interests, practical skills and creativity and economy with local characteristics. (Dengzhu, Interview, Tibetan teacher in Zhanggu Primary School, May, 2011).

Here, the Tibetan teacher provides a different way of talking and thinking about education policy and curriculum relating to Han universalism and Tibetan identity (there is nothing advanced or backward about children’s different life experiences). As Ball et al. note, albeit in an entirely different context, “these critics are carriers of a collective history and are sometimes irritants to policy around standardisation, making official interpretations or narrative more difficult to sustain or just slightly less credible” (Ball et al., 2012, p. 63). Both these Tibetan teachers and students keep their counter- discourses alive in sites like staff group meetings, class interactions, and student debates, promoting a curriculum with local characteristics. But viewed more critically, the advocacy of local Tibetan cultures’ place in the curriculum contained many ambiguities. For example, Tibetan cultures are represented at a superficial level, equating them with beautiful dancing, colourful dress and mysterious legends – a means of linking student activities and creativity with local tourism (Dengzhu, Interview, Tibetan teacher in Zhanggu Primary School, April, 2011). This linkage is liable to confuse students in the way it presents ideas and information, particularly in relation to the integration of incompatible ideas of political loyalty, cultural diversity and economic development. Such attempts at promoting hybridity are the focus of the following discussion.

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5.3.2 Hybridity in discourses and discursive strategies in the school

By tracing key signifiers through a chain of texts, I identified two distinct discourses on education policies that are currently in circulation in Zhanggu Primary School: a discourse of standardisation and a discourse of a curriculum with local characteristics. The school found itself caught between these two conflicting demands: appeals for standardisation of education, characterised by Chinese nationalist values articulated by the school leaders, and calls for curriculum with local characteristics emphasising Tibetan identities articulated by some Tibetan teachers and students. The tension between Han universalism and Tibetan identity places a strain not just on policy choices but also on the ways in which these policies were articulated and enacted discursively in the everyday practices of school life. This section presents a more detailed analysis of how these antagonistic discourses are combined and inscribed into the practices of the school, by identifying key policy actors, agendas, actions and artefacts embedded in the discursive shifts in the policy enactment processes.

Actors: ambivalent attitudes towards development

The School Leading Group represents the key policy actor who attempts to meld the two discourses together. The Group leaders include the Tibetan principal Zhang, the Han deputy principal Wang, and the Han deputy principal, Liu, who was selected and appointed to support/aid this Tibetan school under the Aid Program from Inland Partner Assistance Regions. They attempt to integrate standardisation stressing Han universalism and local characteristics emphasising Tibetan identities, only to the extent of the needs of the school and the local community. The needs are based on the priority of the party-state – the cultural-political mainstream’s interests and needs. Within this hybrid ideology, cultural diversity is desirable only in the context of encouraging political loyalty to Chinese nationalist values. The following excerpt from the Annual Summary Report produced by the Leading Group in 2010 contains signifiers that are typically rich in hybridity and tension. In the past year, we moved into the new campus under the support of the post- earthquake reconstruction. All teachers and students worked hard to pragmatize and innovate. We all uphold Deng Xiaoping’s Theory and Jiang Zemin’s theory

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of the ‘Three Represents’. We take the provincial, prefecture and county leaders’ research at our school as an opportunity. We establish an educational concept of making all children with their head held high – establishing a foundation for students’ lifelong happiness. We propose a general development goal of establishing a model school with ‘national standardisation + local characteristics’. We implement new strategies for quality education – optimizing the environment in class, enriching extracurricular activities, highlighting arts education, and guaranteeing overall development.

Here, the use of the plus sign “+” suggests that the Leading Group is aware of the latent tension between the two discourses, reflecting their ambivalent attitudes towards development, as if education has two equal but separate goals: national standardisation “+”, local characteristics. In other words, the Leading Group was attempting a discursive compromise, balancing the viewpoints of two sides for establishing a foundation for students’ lifelong happiness and overall development. On the one hand, the Leading Group places an educational concept, a general development goal and new strategies for quality education in the context of the 2008 post-earthquake reconstruction and the priority of the party-state (Deng Xiaoping’s Theory and Jiang Zemin’s theory of the ‘Three Represents’, and provincial, prefecture and county leaders’ research). On the other hand, the principal notes that “extracurricular activities highlighting arts education provide a ground for our students’ particular cultural interests publicity” (The principal, Interview in Zhanggu Primary School, May, 2011). Thus, the Leading Group attempts to bring together diverse viewpoints into a single vision, involving numerous signifiers: national standardisation, local characteristics, extracurricular activities, and art education that are espoused by the Leading Group as affecting education for Tibetans. There were similar attempts to bind the two discourses together. These consisted of hegemonically appropriating the discourse of Tibetan identity, which emerged as a result of the integrated economic environment, into one that promoted political loyalty characterised by Chinese nationalist values. The slogans endorsing Mandarin produced by the Leading Group are typical. For example, there are slogans written in large Chinese characters: “Popularizing Mandarin and the construction of a well-off society”; “Fluency in speaking Mandarin and the construction of a harmonious society”; and

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“Speaking Mandarin and making a world of friends”. The conjunction and is found frequently and highlights the hybridity of slogans linking the economic environment to Han universalism and the world. It attempts to bring Han universalism and Tibetan identities together into a single vision in terms of a harmonious society. These slogans were produced around themes combining economic development and the idea of Chinese nationalist values, as well as China’ local-global interactions. The hybridised discourse, in other words, is the outcome of the process of moving from antagonism and conflict to a carefully constructed consensus.

Agendas: tying standardisation and characteristics to the needs of the school

In employing these antagonistic discourses within single texts, the school Leading Group produces a hybridized but ultimately incoherent discourse. This discourse reflects the ambivalence and ambiguity of the integrated agenda of modernisation. The following excerpt from the School Plan produced in 2011 places signifiers of developing Tibetans in a context of service to the country as a whole: We must achieve satisfactory education in the eyes of the Party and the people through our unremitting efforts. We require that the staff should recognise the importance and necessity of education from the perspective of improving ethnic quality, promoting the overall social development, and ultimately, the national modernisation.

The agenda of achieving satisfactory education strives to integrate the incompatible ideas of political loyalty (satisfactory education in the eyes of the Party), cultural diversity (satisfactory education in the eyes of the people and improving ethnic quality) and overall development (promoting the overall social development) into a coherent whole. Within education modernisation, what remains is the undecidable relation between the logic of difference in terms of ethnic cultural and linguistic diversity, and the logic of equivalence in terms of ‘Tibetan = backward versus Han = advanced’. Furthermore, in order to convincingly assert and maintain dominance the school Leading Group needs to hegemonize the empty signifier of the Party and the people by giving them a particular content (satisfactory education in the eyes of the Party and the people). Against this background, Han universalism can be defined as a myth that

166 provides the empty signifiers of the Party and the people with a “particular, substantial embodiment” (Torfing, 1999, p. 193). As such, Chinese nationalist myth aims to guide this agenda of modernisation in the name of a particular ethnos (satisfactory education in the eyes of the Party and the people). I argue this integrated agenda has intensified the marginalisation of the Tibetan language and culture in the wider Chinese society. In employing the antagonistic discourses of national standardisation and local characteristics, the Leading Group produces a hybridized discourse that attempts to uphold the prevailing school community order by linking the identity of Tibetan students with political loyalty characterised by Chinese nationalistic values. The discourse has justified and legitimized the way in which the cultural-political mainstream continues to carry out its mission of civilizing Tibetans through its ongoing integrative agenda. It also has been co-opted by a neoliberal governmentality in order to devolve responsibilities to the largely rural-based Tibetans, by merely seeking school-based solutions to school-based problems, and ignoring the decreasing opportunities of Tibetans in the wider Chinese world. In other words, neoliberalism pushes Tibetan cultures to the peripheries of the market economy to a significant extent, exacerbating the effects of the civilizing mission excludes them from public institutions (Yi, 2011). Both agendas reinforced the underlying view of Tibetans’ presumed backwardness.

Actions: curriculum implementation

Governmentality takes place around the manipulation of the integrated agenda through sets of actions relating to curriculum implementation. This is reflected in teaching and learning activities that attempt to balance different viewpoints. But as we have seen in the context of other aspects of educational and cultural life, the discursive production of teaching and learning activities relating to the curriculum represents and reproduces a hybridized but ultimately incoherent discourse. The Han deputy principal, Liu, treats the inland curricula and teaching and learning experiences essentially as resources for Tibetan teachers to optimize the environment in class for highlighting standardisation with the work ideas of combining come in and go out. In 2011, Liu offered the ‘opportunities’ for go out actions for the Leading Group to visit the primary schools of Nanchong City, focusing on the Han schools’ curricula,

167 campus culture, school management, and education philosophy. He also invited inland primary teachers to come in and present open classes in Zhanggu Primary School, demonstrating Han teaching methods. That is, his focus was on encouraging the students and teachers at Zhanggu Primary School to adopt Han teaching and learning methods, rather than those relevant to and foundational of the local Tibetan community. The schooling and curricula for Tibetans are still failing to address issues of cultural relevance. Specifically, the textbooks for moral education can be viewed as “normalizing regulations” (Torfing, 1999, p. 163), which contribute to the self-correction of the soul and the installation of virtue through morally infused practices of memorization in relation to discursively constructed truths. For example, the Primary Schools Pupils’ Behavioural Standards presents various aspects of modern life that primary school pupils are supposed to emulate, including love for the collective, good manners, awareness of hygiene, respect for the nation and the constitution, respect for the teacher, truthfulness, good speech and discipline, and a healthy interest in science and technology. Memorization, highlighting the behavioural standards, is the main method in teaching morality to Tibetan students. In other words, the disciplinary technologies of teaching morality aim to extend Chinese nationalist control to Tibetan students’ souls through the performative practice of these normalizing regulations (cf Ball, 2003). The power of Han values is manifested through these teaching and learning activities in which the lessons become internalised – that is, these educational practices represent a form of governmentality. This has resulted in ambivalence or ambiguity, not only in government policies that guarantee Tibetans freedom of language use and religion, but also among Tibetans themselves towards Tibetan language and culture. During my observations, some teachers and students who spoke Jiarong Tibetan dialects in class were registered and reported to the school. In response to being registered, most students switched to Mandarin when speaking to teachers and peers in class and between classes. In other words, “the act of exclusion is an act of power” (Torfing, 1999, p. 161). Thus, Tibetan students were trained to reproduce those Han-only values within and through the standardisation of the classroom culture.

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Artefacts: environmental and cultural artefacts

This section describes discursive shifts in the education policy’s use of artefacts. The production of environmental and cultural artefacts contains signifiers and cultural- political symbols that are typically rich in hybridity and tension. As discussed in Chapter 3, while working in the case study schools, I collected examples of “hard” policy texts and took photographs of other visual artefacts that the school produces and deploys to call attention to what has to be done (Ball et al., 2012, p. 123). The school’s artefacts speak to wider social processes of schooling, such as the production of the “good” student, the construction of the “good” teacher and the purpose of schooling. In what follows, I examine how governmentality takes place through the discursive production of specific sets of school artefacts: wall displays and signs. The production of wall displays is important for the school’s social status, particularly in relation to party-state policies. The school’s physical appearance has been described as attractive with inspirational wall displays under the support of the Post-earthquake Reconstruction Project and the 10-year Education Action Plan for the Ethnic Regions of Sichuan Province (Sichuan News, 2012). There are two groups of wall displays on the wall of the school entrance. On the left side of the school entrance wall, four wall displays are entitled in large Chinese characters: “Love your Alma Mater” (the left), “Love your hometown”, “Build the motherland” and “Have the entire world in your view” (the right) (see Figure 5.3). On the right side of the school entrance wall, are two wall displays. One shows the image of four young pioneers saluting their teachers and the other was titled “Civilised and polite language on campus” in Chinese characters (see Figure 5.4). Four students are wearing red scarves, two are wearing Tibetan clothes and two are wearing school uniforms. There is a title written at the top of the display in large Chinese characters: “Hello, teachers! (lao shi nin17 hao)”. Such representations of Tibetan student images strengthen the distinctiveness and assume the majority Han as the norm. The establishment of a version of the world - the state – the hometown - the school and a version of Tibetan students combines Chinese nationalist values and Tibetan identity.

17 The honorific ‘nin’ in Beijing dialect. 169

Figure 5.3: “Alma Mater - Hometown - the state - the world” on a group of wall displays

Figure 5.4: “Hello, teachers!” and “Civilised and polite language on campus” on the wall displays

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These wall displays representing Tibetan cultures and state symbols (see Figure 5.5) provide the context for the school to construct the relationship between Tibetans’ own perceptions of their ethnic identity and representations of that identity. For example, Tibetan cultures are directly represented by “Love your Alma Mater” and “Love your hometown” (see Figure 5.3) and the image of students wearing Tibetan clothes (see Figure 5.4); and state symbols are directly represented by “Build the motherland” (see Figure 5.3), and “young pioneers saluting their teachers” and “Civilised and polite language on campus” (see Figure 5.4). From these wall displays, we can see that the relationship between Tibetan cultures and state symbols are interwoven with each other (see Figure 5.5). In other words, the production of these artefacts reflects that the hegemonic aim is to link dissimilar items, such as Tibetan cultural symbols and Chinese nationalistic symbols.

Figure 5.5: Wall displays representing Tibetan cultural signs and state symbols in Zhanggu Primary School

To a large extent, the production of the wall displays suggests a policy directionality focusing upon and fostering political loyalty. For example, the deputy principal Wang expounded the meaning of “Civilised and polite language on campus” on the wall displays through a formal document:

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We promote the good behavioural habits of our students. Saying hello to teachers is the basic daily behavioural norms. We wish these norms to play a role in students’ self-management and self-education. We want our students be good students at school, good children at home, and good citizens in society. (Moral Education Plan, 2011)

Here, deputy principal Wang provides a vision of good students, good children and good citizens, emphasising Chinese nationalist values, such as, saying “nin hao” (hello) to teachers in Mandarin. This links Tibetan students with Han universalism. Wang does not mention the relevance of the existing foundation of Tibetan students’ and teachers’ prior sociocultural knowledge and moral education. On the other hand, the purpose of producing the wall displays is to ensure the students would govern themselves (self-management and self-education) – in other words they represent a form of governmentality (Ball et al., 2012; Foucault, 1991). However, self-management and self-education destabilise the establishment of a vision of good students emphasising Han universalism, insofar as a coherent political ideology with which to bind together obedient and self-disciplined citizens. Thus, the production of the wall displays is an important part of constructing and recontextualizing the context/field of the school, particularly in relation to the interwoven discursive relationships between Tibetan cultures and state unified symbols. Furthermore, the discursive production of these wall displays represents the ethnicisation of Tibetans (Yi, 2011) and the essentializion of the Han (Gladney, 1994). It is highlighted how the majority Han have represented China’s minorities as exotic as a means of marking out their own identity and promoting their own nationalism (Mackerras, 2003). Tibetan cultural symbols (such as students wearing Tibetan clothes on the wall display) are largely regarded as a kind of decoration. As such, the Han deputy principal Wang notes that we appreciate Tibetan culture, such as colourful dress and beautiful dancing and singing (Wang, Interview, Han Deputy Principal in Zhanggu Primary School, March, 2011). Here, the Han deputy principal expressed the attitude that Tibetan language and culture cannot bring any “tangible benefit” (Yi, 2011, p. 402). Performances of Tibetan song and dance at campus events are the best way of showing respect for Tibetan culture according to interviews with the Han deputy principal, since entertainment bears little relation to state security (Zhao & Postiglione, 2010). In

172 everyday life, Tibetan cultures are simply residualised and ‘tokenized’ in a way in which the cultural-political mainstream members can “appreciate” them. Thus, I argue that the tension between Tibetan identity and Han universalism places a strain not just on policy choices but also on the ways in which these policies were articulated and enacted discursively in the everyday practices of the school life and in China’s local-global interactions. As noted already, the production of wall displays falls under the party-state policies of the Post-earthquake Reconstruction Project. The 2008 post-earthquake reconstruction planning process itself underwent a transformation as it became subsumed under a broad set of national policies and governmental practices that predated the earthquake. Also the year 2008 can be linked to the 2008 Tibetan People’s Uprising Movement that affected China’s international relations because it occurred just before the Beijing Olympics (Mackerras, 2011a). It seems evident that Han universalism is in tension with any rise in ethnic minority identities (Mackerras, 2003). A similar hybrid tension is evident in the production of signs in the video recording of Tibetan students’ classical Han poetry recitation. The extracurricular activities of Tibetan students’ classical poetry recitations were promoted by the Han deputy principal Wang for highlighting arts education for students’ individualisation development (Wang, Interview, the Han deputy principal in Zhanggu Primary School, March, 2011); however, it merely provides superficial knowledge about Tibetan cultures, such as Tibetan costume and local scenery. In the Spring Semester 2011, the deputy principal Wang organised relevant staff to record Tibetan students’ Mandarin recitations on three selected topics, namely: ‘I am proud, because I am Chinese’, ‘I have a strong motherland’, and ‘Lei Feng18 Spirit Will Shine Forever’. On the recording day, three Tibetan female students, the reciters, were dressed in typical Tibetan costume. Normally they do not wear Tibetan clothes to school. Danba Valley and Muerdo Holy Mountain were used as the background for the DVDs. Facing the video camera, they read aloud in Mandarin, with expression, in what we might read as a form of cultural ventriloquisation. The background music of the DVDs is a piece of western saxophone music which can be seen as embodying the artificiality and vacuousness of the whole exercise, as well as its disconnection with the students’ lives. The terms patriotism,

18 Lei Feng was a soldier of the People’s Liberation Army in the People’s Republic of China. After his death, Lei was characterised as a selfless and modest person who was devoted to the Communist Party, Chairman Mao Zedong, and the people of China. 173 collectivism, socialism, ethnic unity and harmonious society are frequently repeated in the Tibetan students’ recitations. Here, the production of the DVDs illustrates that the hegemonic aim is to link dissimilar items such as Tibetan cultural signs and symbols, Tibetan students’ particular cultural interests, and Han universalism. Tibetan cultural signs and symbols (such as the typical Tibetan costume, Danba Valley and Muerdo Holy Mountain) are again regarded as a kind of ‘decoration’; Tibetan culture is not depicted as the content of the readings; rather, Tibetan students are seen learning and reciting the products of an-other culture. Moreover, the DVDs were produced and used to attend the National Recitation Competition on ‘Excellent Cultural Continuity, Reading Classics’19. Thus, the Tibetan students’ Mandarin recitations on the theme of patriotism and unity establishes a version of the school and a version of the Tibetans – a version which combines Han universalism and Tibetan identity. But I would argue that these extracurricular activities have too much cultural- political baggage attached for this agenda to succeed. This is reflected in the hybridized production of cultural signs in the DVDs. While there has been some attempt to meld the two conflicting discourses together by linking Tibetan students’ particular cultural interests with political loyalty, the process is not strongly developed. What has emerged is not a new discourse that reconciles the conflict, but a mixture that serves more to highlight it. The overall effect of the hybridity in these discourses and discursive strategies is a confusion of both educational and socio-political aims. This has resulted in both the ambivalence and ambiguity of the policy agendas, actions and artefacts of the education policy and the curriculum implementation relating to the subjects of cultural diversity and national unity. The cultural-political mainstream strives to integrate the incompatible ideas of political loyalty, particular cultural interests and economic development into a hybridized but ultimately incoherent whole. In this school community, language policies focus on Chinese-only instruction. The local school community saw these changes as an economic necessity, designed to stem Tibetan unemployment through ensuring all teachers and pupils would have a high levels of competence in Chinese.

19 In 2010, the Sichuan Language Work Committee issued a summary report, Set Law Concepts Firmly and Promote a New Level of Language Work. The activity of ‘Excellent Cultural Continuity, Reading Classics’ further promoted students learning Chinese culture and traditions in order to improve their cultural quality. 174

Thus, governmentality takes place around the manipulation of the integrated agenda, and through the production of sets of actions and environmental and cultural artefacts, which focus upon and foster political loyalty in the masses and centre on economic development at the expense of so-called ‘second-rate’ Tibetan cultures. In this sense, the school worked with the help of the party-state to document discursive shifts in education policy enactment processes, where Tibetan identity is simplified and denigrated while Han universalism/culturalism within the school is valorized yet also essentialized. Consequently, the difference between these two conflicting discourses is highlighted rather than resolved.

5.4 Summary

Through the investigation into the discourses and discursive strategies in educational terms of Zhanggu Town and Zhanggu Primary School, some general findings can be drawn. First, there are two distinct discourses apparent in the texts of the town and the school: a discourse of moral education focusing upon and fostering political loyalty to Chinese nationalist values and a discourse of education with local characteristics emphasizing the responsiveness to local and ethnic identities linked to integrated economic environment. Each discourse is marked by signifiers which are structured around nodal points such as Han universalism/culturalism, identity and cultural diversity. Such a situation is diagrammatically presented in Figure 5.5, with the meanings of the middle terms the most actively contested. In the discourse of moral education, the civilizing mission has been to exclude Tibetan language and culture from public institutions, asserting the logic of equivalence in terms of ‘Tibetan = backward versus Han = advanced’. Ongoing changes in the local policy of bilingual education over the past two decades reflect the long course of this discourse’s development. In spite of periodically encouraging bilingual education, the local cultural-political mainstream still holds that the ‘backwardness’ of Tibetans can be overcome by stressing the importance of the Chinese language as the means to gain access to Han culture, and by advocating the advanced moral standards associated with Chinese nationalism, notably, Han-dominated unity. Thus, moral education plays an important role in upholding the CCP-defined socialist nature of the school community.

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In the discourse of education with local characteristics, respecting local and ethnic identities helped some critics push through regional curriculum reform. Identity, locality and ethnicity were seen to bring educational quality improvement and economic development to the local community. However, this neoliberalization agenda can be seen as placing Tibetan cultures on the peripheries of the market economy to a significant extent, highlighting the logic of difference in terms of ‘cultural and linguistic diversity’ but ignoring the decreasing opportunities of using Tibetan language and culture in the wider Chinese world. Thus the discourse of Tibetan identity has been further co-opted by a neoliberal governmentality in order to devolve responsibilities to the largely rural-based Tibetans and furthering the work of the moral discourse in terms of their subordination. Second, these conflicting discourses are combined by the key policy actors into the integrated agenda of modernisation. The county government and the school leaders represent the key policy actors who expressed ambivalent attitudes towards development relating to bilingual education, economic development, curriculum implementation and the sense of identity. The agenda strives to integrate the incompatible ideas of political loyalty, economic development and cultural diversity into a coherent whole (Yi, 2011). In employing these antagonistic discourses within single texts, the cultural-political mainstream of the town and the school produces a hybridized but ultimately incoherent discourse. This discourse embodies the ambivalence and ambiguity of the integrated agenda. Thus, governmentality takes place around the manipulation of the contested signifiers through some discursive actions and artefacts. Through my ‘four As’ framework, these relations are clarified have been elaborated at various levels of analysis (see Table 5.1). The hybridity in discourses and discursive strategies in this school community reveals a shifting discursive repertoire. On one level, ambivalent attitudes towards the development of school curriculum with local cultural content enable the dominance of negative perspectives about the need of teaching Tibetan languages, in particular, Jiarong Tibetan, in this school. Similarly, some policy actors developed instrumental linguistic dispositions, characterized by Han-only values, whilst others developed resistant linguistic dispositions, characterized by marginal Han identities and an emphasis on Tibetan identities. Overall, as we noted in relation to – the agendas, actions and artefacts of education – as – modernisation, Tibetan identity is simplified and

176 diversity within the school community is overlooked. The power shifts in discursive policy enactment processes each contributed, albeit in different ways, to the ethnicisation of Tibetans (Yi, 2011) and the essentializion of the Han (Gladney, 1994). Whether focusing upon and fostering political loyalty, or promoting economic development, the cost in each case was the positioning of Tibetan cultures as inherently inferior. That is to say, in simultaneously employing the logic of difference, in terms of ‘cultural and linguistic diversity’ and the logic of equivalence, in terms of ‘Tibetan = backward versus Han = advanced’, the cultural-political mainstream emphasised the latter as fixation/dislocation of the former. In other words, neoliberal political intervention in the form of modernisation was mediated by the party-state, thus, forming a hybrid neo-liberal discourse with Chinese characteristics, responsive to the priorities of the party-state, whereas Tibetan language, culture and religion have been marginalised. In doing so, the conflicting discourses are combined and inscribed into the everyday practices of school community life, showing the discursive shifts in policy enactment processes. Therefore, both empowerment and domination are central technologies in the exercise of Han power.

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Hybrid discourse Moral conservative discourse Cultural identity discourse

Tibetan identity Bilingual/minority Chinese nationalist values education Ethnicity Economic Political loyalty to the CCP Floating Signifiers Curriculum Locality development Han universalism/culturalism

Cultural diversity Han-dominated unity Identity

The logic of difference The logic of equivalence

Field of contested signification advanced=Han universalism=patriotism, • there is nothing advanced or backward collectivism and communism=ability to about children’s different life experiences distinguish right from wrong= • particular cultural interests Actors’ attitudes towards minority education resist spiritual pollution= • Cultural diversity, ethnic characteristics Agendas of development socialist builders and successors= and local advantage Actions of implementing curriculum foundation of education= • local cultural values and beliefs Artefacts: identity and power moral standards=standardisation of education=Mandarin environment versus Tibetan=poverty=backward

Figure 5.6: Discourse Theory concepts used in analysing distinct discourses of education policy in Zhanggu Town School community

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Table 5.1: Overview – ‘Four As’ analysis on the hybridity in discourses and discursive strategies in Zhanggu School community

Policy Actors Agendas Actions Artefacts enactment Attitudes towards minority The meaning of development Curriculum implementation Sense of identity processes education (policy documents, articles and (curriculum materials and (environmental/cultural Significances (policy documents and interview) interview data) interview) artefacts and interview) Zhanggu Key government leaders and ▪“Aid program from inland ▪ “Four-in-One synchronous ▪Wall display “Rely on the ▪Some policy actors developed Town people models discourses: partner assistance regions” curricula model” in alignment CCP” instrumental linguistic ▪ “Chinese listening and speaking ▪“advanced inland experiences, with Han curricula ▪Pennant “Friendly dispositions, characterized by ability training” knowledge, skills and ideology; ▪The first local/regional Cooperation” Han-only values, whilst others ▪ “Opposing Secession and ▪“methods of developed areas” textbook, Beauty Valley, ▪Poster of the “Model folk developed resistant linguistic Ensuring Stability” ▪local economic development highlighting love of house family” dispositions, characterized by ▪ “Thanksgiving for the CCP’s ▪“ideas of come in and go out” hometown and country marginal Han identities and an support in post-earthquake ▪“Great-leap-forward emphasis on Tibetan identities. reconstruction” development, long-term stability” ▪When shifting to policy Zhanggu Leading Group and good teachers ▪School aims: national ▪Focusing on the Han schools’ ▪Wall displays “Alma agendas, actions and artefacts, Primary and students discourses: standardisation + local curricula, campus culture, Mater - Hometown - the Tibetan identity is simplified School ▪ “establishing a foundation for characteristics school management, and state - the world” and diversity is overlooked. students’ lifelong happiness ▪The integrated agenda of education philosophy ▪Signs in DVDs: Tibetan ▪A neoliberal governmentality ▪overall development” modernisation ▪Primary Schools Pupils’ costume, Danba Valley with Chinese characteristics: ▪ “the CCP’s support of the post- ▪The integrated agenda of Behavioural Standards and Muerdo Holy focusing upon political loyalty, earthquake reconstruction” satisfactory education in the eyes ▪the inland curricula as Mountain centring on economic ▪slogans: “Fluency in speaking of the Party and the people resources The content: Mandarin development, at the cost of Mandarin and the construction of ▪improving ethnic quality ▪speaking in dialects was recitations on the theme of marginalising Tibetan cultures. a harmonious society” ▪the overall social development reported to the school patriotism and unity ▪In simultaneously employing Analysis ▪The cultural-political ▪Civilizing mission of fostering ▪The power of Han values ▪The ethnicisation of the logic of difference, ‘cultural mainstream’s ambivalent political loyalty to the CCP becomes manifested through Tibetans and the and linguistic diversity’ and the attitudes towards the need of ▪Neoliberal way of seeking the curriculum essentializion of the Han logic of equivalence, teaching Tibetan language in regional/school-based solutions to implementation becoming ‘Tibetan=backward versus school regional/school-based problems internalised Han=advanced’, cultural- political mainstream emphasised the latter as fixation/dislocation of the former.

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Chapter 6. Case 2 Badi - Chinese + Tibetan Model School in a Semi-agro-pastoral Area

6.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the second case of the study: Badi Primary School, a semi-agro- pastoral town primary school. Both this school and the first school are located in Danba County of Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture. This chapter will begin with an introduction to the town in which the Case 2 school is situated, followed by an introduction to the school itself. The chapter concludes with a summary of the case as a whole, focusing in particular on the effect of discursive hybridity on the bilingual/minority education policy enactment processes.

6.2 Badi Town

This section presents a picture of the site of Badi Primary School, a town in the semi- agricultural-pastoral area of Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture. As we will see, there are two distinct discourses on education policies and curriculum relating to the subjects of cultural diversity and national unity that have been espoused over the past two decades by key policy actors in this town: a discourse of the development of political morality and a discourse of local community involvement. These will be first discussed. Then, I present a more detailed analysis of how these antagonistic discourses are combined and inscribed into the practices of local community life by identifying the key policy actors, agendas, actions and artefacts and how these relate to the discursive shifts in power relations of policy enactment.

6.2.1 Key signifiers in discourses of education policy and curriculum in the town

The discourse of the development of morality

Since 1990, the Party committee leaders of the town have stressed that the development of teachers’ and students’ morality should be in accordance with the town government document: the Educational Target Assessment. This echoes the discourse of moral

180 education of case 1 in the same county, as detailed in Chapter 5. The county government leaders mandated moral education, centring on a commitment to Han universalism in the aftermath of the 1989 crisis and crackdown. In this town, the set of policies promoting moral development has remained essentially unchanged into the twenty-first century, emphasising Chinese nationalist values. In 2007, an important report on the composition of teachers’ morality was produced by the Party committee of the town: We must adhere to lifelong learning for strengthening the development of teachers’ morality. Teachers must uphold Deng Xiaoping’s Theory and Jiang Zemin’s theory of the ‘Three Represents’. Political learning makes our teachers learn the series of documents and education regulations, notably, the Professional Moral Standards for Teachers and the Opinions on Further Strengthening and Improving Moral Education in Schools.20

Han universalism is the privileged sign around which the discourse of the formation of political morality is organised. The use of the slogans (Deng Xiaoping’s Theory and Jiang Zemin theory of the ‘Three Represents’) demonstrates that the Party committee consists of believers who were instilling Chinese nationalist values among teachers. The Party committee required teachers to learn the central government policies (the Professional Moral Standards for Teachers and the Opinions on Further Strengthening and Improving Moral Education in Schools), in which China is presented as a monolithic entity, with Chinese nationalistic values and the CCP leadership uncontested. In 2008, the Party committee promoted a project on the Importance of Chinese Listening and Speaking Ability in the Jiarong Tibetan Area, relating to the development of morality: In order to improve Jiarong Tibetan children’s ability to listen to and speak in Chinese, teachers should promote Mandarin in the community and among parents. The community and parents should understand that Mandarin is the essential tool for mastering knowledge and the foundation of communication. Importantly, learning Mandarin is a manifestation of patriotism!

20 Following the conventions of Chapter 5, in the following discussion, terminology from this extract and others will be in italics, to distinguish them from other sources. 181

The Party committee is encouraging Han universalism, embodied in the ability to listen to and speak in Chinese, which is equated at the end of the quote with ‘a manifestation of partriotism’. Mandarin is represented as the essential tool for mastering knowledge and the foundation of communication – that is, Han universalism is something that can be inculcated through education and put to use in a range on contexts, including the Tibetan community. Furthermore, the Party committee insists that Tibetan students are essentially in need of enlightenment, which should be conducted in Chinese, especially the cultural transmission of advanced moral standards (learning Mandarin is a manifestation of patriotism). In other words, the discourse of moral development reflects the collapse of the logic of difference, in terms of ‘ethnic cultural and linguistic diversity’, into equivalence, in terms of ‘Tibetan = backward versus Han = advanced = Mandarin = skill = patriotism’.

The discourse of local community involvement

The discourse of the development of political morality reveals a Han-only perspective, emphasising enlightenment as a tool to transform the Tibetan population, including their language and culture. However, some school-based teacher-researchers in this town suggest that the usage of local language and culture should be involved within curricula: Teachers should creatively combine the local language and culture within curricula implementation. Teachers will find valuable curricula resources in the surrounding environment and from their everyday life. Educational resources in the local community will make up for the shortcomings of the national unified curricula. (Qi, Interview, Tibetan school-based teacher-researcher in Badi Town, July, 2011)

Here, the discourse of local community involvement is organised around the nodal point ‘identity’. Identity is filled with meaning by being equated with local community- based signifiers (the local language and culture), and contrasted with others (the national unified curricula). This discourse ascribes a valuable identity to the local community in relation to Tibetan language and culture. They should be actively engaged in the problems regarding the shortcomings of the national unified curricula, and they should recognise their role as an integrated part of curricula implementation.

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For example, local researchers suggest that schools should invite villagers to teach children their village folk songs and traditional dances, such as those attached to the tradition: Jiarong Guozhuang. Jiarong Guozhuang itself is a kind of spiritual practice. This makes local people use Jiarong Tibetan language and traditions in practical ways. (Pencuo, Interview, Tibetan school-based teacher-researcher in Badi Town, August, 2011)

Here, the role of religion is promoted for strengthening faith to save Tibetan language, culture and traditions (Jiarong Guozhuang itself is a kind of spiritual practice). Recognizing the language shift to Mandarin and the risk of local language loss, local researchers highlighted the linkage between local cultural maintenance and practical ways. In other words, they reject the “in-museum” (Gladney, 1994) characteristic of Tibetan language and culture. However, in the discourse of the development of morality, these things relating to the Tibetan religion are assumed to be backward and hence Tibetan people are in need of enlightenment. Thus, contradictions and conflicts are evident between the local religious community and national schools. As such, Badeng Nima proposes a community-school co-operational model: A culture-based centre was established to serve as a tool for the local community, focusing on the vitality of the local language, culture and traditions. The Jiarong Tibetan linguistic and cultural heritage is attainable through this cultural centre and relate to its culturally relevant educational activities. In doing so, a unique Tibetan curriculum will protect the unique Jiarong language and culture. (Nima, Interview, Tibetan researcher in Badi Town, July, 2011)

Badeng Nima, who hails from this town, holds the first doctoral degree in education ever earned by a Tibetan in China. Naturally, his principal concern is how to improve education for and with his people relating to the local linguistic and cultural heritage. When asked his idea of involving local educational resources through establishing a community-based culture centre, Nima replied that Tibetan children’s psychological development is, particularly, deeply rooted in spatial knowledge, which connects their memories and social identity. However, it is hard for Tibetan children to feel this power and identity in current school life (Nima, Interview, Tibetan researcher in Badi Town, July, 2011). Some school-based teacher-researchers also indicate that not enough

183 attention is given to maintaining the Tibetan language alongside the addition Mandarin. Rather, the Tibetan language is being replaced with Mandarin. In terms of bilingual education for Tibetans, this does not adequately meet the needs of the people and their society and culture. Thus, the construction of cultural centre is particularly useful when the two fields in terms of the state school and local community are difficult to reconcile.

6.2.2 Hybridity in discourses and discursive strategies in the town

In this section, I explore and identify the key policy actors, agendas, actions and artefacts embedded in the discursive shifts in the current policy enactment processes. This was a period in which the town government found itself caught between two conflicting demands: appeals for Han universalism from the Party committee and calls for local community involvement by some school-based teacher-researchers.

Actors: ambivalent attitudes towards development

The town’s mayor represents the key policy actor who expressed ambivalent attitudes towards development relating to Han universalism and Tibetan identity. The following excerpt from the Annual Summary Report produced by the mayor in 2011 contains signifiers that exist simultaneously in different discourses: We must promote the integration of the Party’s lectures with the reality of the town and the local life. We must give full play to the CCP’s exemplary role, and continue to add lustre to the CCP. Around the spirit of ‘passion, innovation, and the great-leap-forward’, we must unite and lead our villagers to take an active part in the rural imperative to eliminate poverty and become well-off.

At the level of rhetoric, the power of mutual responsibility has been ensured by the word integration (in bold in the extract above), which means both the party government and the local Tibetan community must promote the integration of the Party’s lectures with the reality of the town and the local life. The association between Han universalism and Tibetan identities is not secured by a single equivocal word alone; it is also a result of the discursive construction of a common goal of economic development and material commitments and changes (eliminate poverty and become well-off). That is, as soon as

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Tibetan people realise that they are not only ‘Tibetans’ but also ‘Party members’, ‘poor’, and ‘Chinese’, their loyalties, will be divided (such as the spirit of passion, innovation, and the great-leap-forward). In other words, hybridisation refers to the attempt to make Tibetan people realize that their identity is multiple (the CCP’s exemplary role) in the sense of “constituting an overdetermined ensemble of identifications” (Torfing, 1999, p. 255). In the same year, the mayor organised the Party’s lectures in local temples. The town government officials delivered the Party’s religious policies to monks and nuns: Buddhist monks and nuns must uphold the CCP leadership and resist all kinds of illegal activities. Monks and nuns should be actively engaged in establishing a harmonious relationship between politics and religion, with one heart and one mind in ideology, one heart and one direction in orientation, and one heart and one behaviour in action. (Ganzi News, 2011)

The use of the transitional phrase, ‘one heart and one mind, one heart and one direction and one heart and one behaviour’ suggests that the town government is aware of the latent tension between the two discourses relating to Han universalism and Tibetan identity. This was to be ameliorated by establishing a harmonious relationship between politics and religion. In other words, the town’s government attempts to balance the viewpoints of two sides in order to uphold the leadership of the CCP and Tibetan religious freedom in accordance with the actual condition of the town. The presence of the two conflicting discourses makes the meaning of several signifiers used in the extract unclear. The meaning of the words ideology, orientation, and action are contested. That is, in one discourse, ideology, for example, is presented as equivalent to Marxist-Leninist ideology and patriotism, while in the other discourse it means a unique mix of Buddhism and beliefs that are an important component of Tibetan tradition and culture (Sogyal, 2002). The co-articulation of the secular discourse of the CCP leadership and the religious discourse of Tibetan identity serves to demonstrate that the link between the two discourses is established neither in terms of common sense, nor in terms of the parasitic use of one discourse by the other, but rather as a hybrid discourse, linking dissimilar or semantically antagonistic items (Torfing, 1999). In terms of education, it seems that the struggle between Tibetan religious education and school education exists in this town. Local people follow the Bon religion, the

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Nyingma Sect of Tibetan Buddhism. For them, a good education, involving a deep knowledge of spiritual principles, would enable them to achieve well-being. However, when asked whether the local people would send their children to study in temple, the head of Qierong Temple responded that local children have to go to school, and there is no choice for them because of national compulsory education. Moreover, compared with the compulsory education, which is free and promises subsidized accommodation, parents need to pay the living costs if their children study in the monastery. Therefore, although the impact of religion exists in this town it has little influence on school education, particularly in relation to economic development. The following interview with the town’s mayor reflects his economic benefits- oriented views, in which education serves as the tool for eliminating poverty: Unlike the previous officials, the current town’s government members are educated. We have a clearer understanding of national policies and regulations, the higher-level governments’ requirements, and changes in the outside world. This makes our work easy. In this town, education is essential for changing the current economic situation of poverty and backwardness. No matter how much money the government offers, it will run out. If we raise our quality ourselves, we can get more done with the government’s money and solve the problem of poverty.

Here, the mayor attempts to meld the views of Tibetans (who are concerned about the practical development of their local community) with those of conservative political leaders (who are worried about values). In other words, the mayor fixes the meanings of these signs in his own way, that is, economic development is the main purpose of education (education is essential for changing the economic situation of poverty and backwardness). These signs are articulated through the equivalence of, money as the universal form of value, as noted in Chapter 4. Hegemony, then, can provisionally be understood as the dominance of discourse that links the harnessing of education for Tibetans to a vision dominated by the priority of economic development. To this end, the mayor, in true neoliberal fashion, encouraged the town’s children to improve their educational capital themselves. This is a neoliberal governmentality that seeks community-based solutions to community-based problems, instead of relying on the central government (No matter how much money the government offers, it will run out).

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However, the economic-benefits oriented view leads some local villagers to question these policies in terms of their immediate profit, long-term benefits and tangible gain. For example, some local villagers hold that farmers and migrant workers do not need literacy, and religion-centred Tibetan culture cannot bring any tangible benefit to the community. Monastery education cannot immediately change the depressed economic situation. Concern about earnings is separate from concern for education. Due to the key actors’ ambivalent attitudes towards economic-benefits orientation, Tibetan cultures are simplified along with market-driven neoliberal thinking.

Agendas: tying cultural diversity and political loyalty to the needs of the local community and the CCP

Within the hybrid ideology of tying the development of education for Tibetans to meeting the needs of economic development and modernisation, cultural diversity is desirable only in the context of implementing the Party’s policies. The key signifiers that appeared in the following excerpt from the Town Annual Plan (2011-2012) are typically open-ended and ambiguous, reflecting the hybridity of policy agendas: There is a need to increase education investment and allocate local resources rationally for building ‘large and strong’ schools. We must ensure that the town government invests in education. At the same time, we must continue to implement the national layout adjustment of schools. We must make efforts to improve primary schools’ situation with modern teaching and learning facilities, and accelerate the process of the technologisation and modernisation of education.

In the opening sentence of the summary of key points, the town’s government describes the anticipated outcomes of a hybrid agenda (increase education investment and allocate local resources rationally) as a particular type of ‘large and strong’ school. The expression large and strong, itself, is incongruous as we will see below. It attempts to draw together two signifiers from quite disparate discourses. The stated goal is to improve school quality while deploying local resources more effectively. The agenda to increase education investment and allocate education resources rationally evokes the national and provincial policy of helping minority areas accelerate their economic and

187 cultural development in accordance with the peculiarities and needs of the different minority nationalities, as detailed in Chapter 4. In China’s context, the urban-rural dual structure spread into education philosophy and policy. With the insistence of the educational ideology that primary schools and educational resources should be concentrated in cities and towns, boarding schools are founded by merging the surrounding village primary schools. The town government is shifting the pattern of rural schooling by replacing village schools with town central boarding schools (implement the national layout adjustment of schools), to meet the needs of economic development and modernisation (accelerate the process of technologisation and modernisation of education). Thus, the hybridised agenda can be read as the process of integration riding on the back of modernisation (Mackerras, 1994). Figure 6.1 presents the situation of this hybridized policy agenda analysed in terms of the political logics of equivalence and difference. Here, hegemonisation works through particular signifiers (‘large and strong’ school, and the technologisation and modernisation of education) that simultaneously employ the logic of difference, in terms of ‘cultural and linguistic diversity’, and the logic of equivalence, in terms of ‘Tibetan = backward versus Han = advanced’. That is, the town government uses ambiguity purposefully to accomplish goals in the policy agendas, notably, the technologisation and modernisation of education.

The logic of equivalence The establishment of The logic of difference hegemony  advanced = government  the local investment = developed areas resources = Han culture = Han universalism versus Tibetan ‘large and strong’ school = poverty = backward  the national layout the technologisation and adjustment of schools modernisation of  modern teaching and education learning facilities

Figure 6.1: The situation of the hybrid policy agendas in Badi Town

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Actions: Han model curriculum implementation

The agenda of building large and strong schools evokes the national and provincial policy of promoting quality and equity in education. However, large and strong schools fail to protect and enable students’ human rights in terms of linguistic and cultural freedom. This hybridised agenda leads to new inequities, reflected in the town government’s implementation of curricula. The limited coverage of the Tibetan language and culture in the curriculum is primarily aimed at inculcating Chinese nationalist values. The bilingual textbooks regarding patriotism are utilised for promoting the CCP’s policies. Moreover, the town government has strengthened its assessment of teachers’ political morality, for which the implementation of the national unified curriculum is an important criterion. In terms of Tibetan teaching at school, one local teacher indicated that “schools offered Tibetan classes with the help of a living Buddha in 2000. However, the Tibetan classes did not continue, since the Education Bureau does not require schools to provide them.” (You, Interview, Tibetan teacher in Badi Town, July, 2011). That is, the local government does not believe it a serious problem that there is limited space for Tibetan culture in curricula implementation. Here, curricula implementation emphasising the Han-only model heavily influenced the local villagers’ views on schooling and home/community-school interactions. Parents treat school as “a base for training in Mandarin”; for working in inland China as migrant workers and for the sake of the economic future of the family (Maixiang, Interview, Tibetan villager in Badi Town, July, 2011). Parents in the local community are living relatively traditional lifestyles with their own community structure, religion, language use, customs, and production activities. Thus, when I conducted fieldwork in the town, I found village schools had been incorporated in the town’s central primary school, and the rural village schools were empty. The older people, pre-school children, and single men were left-behind in the local villages. This shrinkage of local villages lead me to question whether and how Tibetan identity is fostered and promoted by a supposedly inclusive curriculum. This is discussed in more detail in the next section, particularly in relation to the environmental and cultural artefacts of the town.

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Artefacts: environmental and cultural artefacts

The town government took seriously the policy requirements involved in the notion of the integration, riding on the back of modernisation. In discursive terms, the town government produced sets of environmental and cultural artefacts that were widely circulated. These artefacts are cultural productions that carry within them “sets of beliefs and meanings that speak to social processes and policy enactment” (Ball et al., 2012, pp. 121-122). On one level, through the discursive environmental and cultural artefacts, identities are inscribed both in signifying chains that stress their differential value in terms of ‘ethnic cultural and linguistic diversity’, and in signifying chains that emphasize their equivalence in terms of ‘Tibetan = backward versus Han = advanced’. For instance, the Tibetans’ use of signs on their buildings reflects both traditional and modern attitudes and awareness in the context of dramatic social and cultural changes, through which Tibetan culture has absorbed the cultures of other nationalities. On the one hand, the signs on the town’s street walls have traditional religious significance, reflecting the culture of Jiarong Tibet. The sign “卍” is very symbolic (see Figure 6.2), according to Tibetan Buddhism. As one of the Sakyamuni’s thirty-two images, it signifies the sun and flames. It is regarded as a symbol of Jiarong Tibetan religion culture, with the function of enhancing ethnic consciousness and Tibetan traditional culture heritage. Success, prosperity and luck can also found in the sign, highlighting the relationship between human beings and the natural environment. For most Tibetans in this town, their entire way of life is closely integrated with the physical environment. On the other hand, there have been modern signs painted on the town’s building walls, for example, the “Rich” (恭喜发财)， “Five-pointed Star” (☆), “Double Happiness” (囍) and among others which represent the symbols of fashion and modernisation (see Figure 6.3). The hybridised discourse is written onto the idealised representations in these visualisations, reflecting the simultaneous operation of the logic of difference in terms of Tibetan cultural and religious symbols and the logic of equivalence in terms of ‘Tibetan = backward versus Han = advanced = rich = economic development = modernisation’.

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Figure 6.2: The sign “卍” on local house wall

Figure 6.3: “恭喜发财” on the door

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On another level, while the tension between the differential and equivalential aspects of discursive identities is unresolvable, political struggles may succeed in emphasising one of the two aspects. For example, the town government hangs the national flag on the top of the roof of the local temples, the culture-based centre and local houses (see Figure 6.4 and Figure 6.5), highlighting the identity and function of the town. The flag is the national symbol, signifying the unity of all nationalities under the leadership of the CCP. The repetition and insistence of using national flag repeatedly alert Tibetans to what must be emphasised in enacting policy.

Figure 6.4: The national flag on the top of the roof of the local temple

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Figure 6.5: The national flag on the top of the roof of the local houses

Moreover, the establishment of the community-based cultural centre itself reflects a neoliberal governmentality; that is, Tibetans are encouraged to raise their cultural standards themselves, so to prosper at little cost to the government. In 2011, the Jiarong Tibetan culture-based centre was working under the help of the Ford Foundation (Nima, Interview, Tibetan researcher in Badi Town, July, 2011). Unlike Case 1, the local officials in this town agreed to foreign assistance. From my observations, local villagers and students prefer to learn traditional Jiarong Tibetan drama at the cultural centre, although local officials added content praising the CCP and socialism, as part of the drama program. Thus, the neo-liberal discourse around issue of quality improvement is typically presented by the local officials as hybrid matter of tying Tibetan identity and Han universalism. As discussed in Chapter 4, the phantasmatic production of quality represents a valuation of human subjectivity specific to China’s neoliberal reforms (Yan, 2003). Here, the themes of Tibetan culture identity and the priority of the party-state have been combined and inscribed into the environmental artefacts with neo-liberalism coming in between.

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These are artefacts of “governmentality, order and control” (Ball et al., 2012, p. 129). Tibetan culture is largely politicized in the way in which it is treated in the public sphere, in line with state policies. In the context of the priority of the party-state and Han-dominated unity, the ongoing production of artefacts has justified and legitimized the way in which the cultural-political mainstream continues its mission of helping minority areas accelerate their economic and cultural development, thereby fostering political loyalty to the CCP. This is especially aimed at the town’s religious community. In summary, the overall effect of this hybridity has resulted in the ambivalence and ambiguity of policy agendas, actions and artefacts relating to the subjects of cultural diversity and national unity. Badi Town Government leaders strive to integrate the ultimately incompatible ideas of political loyalty, Tibetan identity and economic development into a hybridized whole. The examples of the environmental and cultural artefacts are part of a shift in this town from text to visual material. Thus, the hybridity in discourses and discursive strategies in the town has resulted in ambivalence or ambiguity within the discursive policy enactment processes, which promoted political loyalty to the CCP while also being centred on locally-led economic development.

6.3 Badi Primary School

This section presents a picture of Badi Primary School. As with the distinct discourses of moral development and local community involvement apparent in the town, key policy actors in this school considered that education for Tibetans should incorporate two distinct discourses: the discourse of national standardisation and the discourse of local characteristics. A more detailed analysis of how these antagonistic discourses play out within the everyday practices of the school life follows, showing discursive shifts in policy enactment processes.

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6.3.1 Key signifiers in discourses of education policy in the school

The discourse of national standardisation

The School Manager, or Deputy Principal (zhuren in Mandarin), in his introduction of the pamphlet on Badi Primary School, wrote about the school aim of cultivating talent with national standardisation: We must uphold Deng Xiaoping’s Theory and Jiang Zemin’s theory of the ‘Three Represents’ for the purpose of cultivating talent with national standardisation. To this end, we must strengthen students’ moral education, notably, the education of the ‘five loves’. We must develop students’ patriotism and guide them to establish a correct outlook on life and the world.

Here, the discourse of national standardisation is formed by the partial fixation of meaning around Han universalism. The School Manager is in his early 40s and is of the Han nationality. The School Manager was the second most senior member of the school’s administration after the principal. For this school leader, cultivating talent with national standardisation was understood to be equivalent to fostering and promoting political loyalty to the CCP (apparent in the terms Deng Xiaoping’s Theory and Jiang Zemin’s theory of the ‘Three Represents’). It is assumed that students can and should establish a correct outlook on life and the world through Han universalism education. The education of the ‘five loves’, for example, refers to the love of the motherland, people, labour, science and socialism. Such moral-political apothegms have long been assumed to prepare Tibetan students with correct moral-political outlooks. Thus, the purpose of cultivating talent with national standardisation is equivalent to the promotion by the school, and the appropriation by students, of Chinese nationalist values. A similar view regarding the national standardisation of Tibetan students was expressed in more detail by some teachers, as shown below, highlighting the revitalisation of China. We must cultivate students who love the motherland, love the people, and serve the people. We must make students understand the crimes of imperialist

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aggression against our country and the West’s capitalist exploitation. (Cao, Teaching Plan of 2011, in the semi-agro-pastoral town school of Danba County)

The discourse of national standardisation shows a vision of moral conservatism relating to foreign power (make students understand the crimes of imperialist aggression against our country and the West’s capitalist exploitation), and emphasizes how moral education cultivates talent with national standardisation (love the motherland, love the people, and serve the people). Cao, a Han teacher, was recommended by the School Manager, as noted in Chapter 3. In her teaching plan of 2011, Cao expressed a positive attitude towards the ideal of integrating moral education into her Chinese class and such views had a significant influence on some students’ attitudes, particularly in relation to identity issues and Sino-Western power relations. I will return to this in the discussion of the hybridity in discourses and discursive strategies in this school. It is worth mentioning that the School Manager and some teachers have intentionally avoided the local Tibetan culture in their cultivation of talent. For example, the School Manager promoted Cao’s study of ‘Measures of Improving the Quality of Chinese Language Teaching in Tibetan Schools, where it is highlighted that Mandarin communication should be used anytime, anywhere. In terms of approaches promoting Mandarin only, Cao emphasized two methods: First of all, it is necessary to popularize Mandarin in our students’ daily life. We should ask our students to speak Mandarin inside and outside the classroom. Second, teachers should popularize Mandarin in the households and local community. It is helpful for parents and villagers to understand the importance of Chinese in their children’s study life, daily life, and future life. Thus, our students’ Chinese communication ability will be improved in the ‘Mandarin only’ environment (the project on ‘Measures of Improving the Quality of Chinese Language Teaching in Tibetan Schools’).

Within such a vision of promoting Mandarin only, there is no room for cultural diversity. When asked their views on the Tibetan language and culture, some teachers demonstrate a problem-orientated attitude towards Tibetan language and culture. Cao explained this view as follows:

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In short, our teaching effectiveness can be described as ‘5+2=0’. We fear their [the students] staying at home [with their parents] for 2 days [on weekends], because they will forget what they learnt during the 5-day boarding school. How can we introduce Tibetan culture in the class? Additionally, the students grew up in the village, and they have a better understanding of the local culture than us, thus we do not need to teach them local knowledge. (Cao, Interview, Han teacher in Badi Primary School, August, 2011) In the eyes of these teachers, there is a strong nullification of the local community- based Tibetan culture, literally embodied in the description of ‘our teaching effectiveness’ as ‘5+2=0’, in which the five days spent studying at school are negated by the two days spent at home with a consequent zero in terms of learning effect. During their study at school, Tibetan students can recite the texts fluently, including the moral-political slogans with little meaningful content. Such recitation-oriented teaching is, of course, common to primary schools in many countries, including the U.S.A (Price, 1992; Tharp & Gallimore, 1988). Within this discourse of ‘forgetting Chinese’, however, some Tibetan students are indeed ‘quiet’ in Chinese class. Thus, making links between quiet behaviour and poor performance in Tibetan students of diverse backgrounds is not all that uncommon for teachers in China. This is because “his or her silence is interpreted as rural, backward” (Bartlett & Holland, 2002, p. 15). It is assumed that the backwardness of rural community-based Tibetan culture is significantly responsible for Tibetan students’ ineffective academic outcomes or poor school performance. This assumption consolidates Han superiority. In other words, arbitrariness is a striking feature of the discourse of national standardisation.

The discourse of practical education with local characteristics

The discourse of national standardisation embodies a pejorative view of Tibetan language and culture, particularly in relation to Chinese nationalist education. However, the majority of the Tibetan teachers interviewed support an education grounded in local culture as the basis for addressing the problems relating to the unsatisfactory outcomes of the current Mandarin language teaching for Tibetan students.

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When asked for their comments regarding the issue of education for Tibetans, some Tibetan teachers noted that Jiarong Tibetan cultural resources should be utilised in classroom practices: Jiarong Tibetan culture and knowledge, such as folk songs and dance, folk handicrafts, oral literature, and architecture, are dying and disappearing. Teachers should involve these valuable curriculum resources within their classroom practices. The unique Jiarong Tibetan culture is not only good for ethnic multi-cultural development in the long term, but also good for the development of the greater Chinese nationality. (Xiajia, Interview, Tibetan teacher in Badi Primary School, July, 2011)

Identity is a privileged sign around which other signs are ordered within this discourse of culturally relevant pedagogy. Xiajia, a Tibetan teacher, strongly argues that culturally relevant teaching should be linked to Jiarong Tibetan culture and knowledge (teachers should involve these valuable curriculum resources within their classroom practices). Furthermore, Xiajia provides an in-depth reflection on the relationship between the traditional Tibetan cultural heritage and its potential contribution to the development of the greater Chinese nationality; that is, a perspective of cultural sharing for co-prosperity and mutual development. For this co-prosperity, Tibetan teachers hope that local officials will learn about the traditional Tibetan culture and knowledge: Teaching was always led by officials. They [officials] always remind us, in a tactful way, that we’d better not arbitrarily add to the contents of teaching. There is not much room to use the valuable local educational resources within classroom practices. We hope the government officials will get some training in the traditional Tibetan culture and knowledge in order to develop practical education with local characteristics.

Here, a balanced bilingualism that sees Tibetan language heritage and Mandarin as ‘resources’ is promoted by Tibetan teachers. Due to the limited space for developing local educational resources within their classroom practices, local teachers propose that local government officials take responsibility for promoting practical education with local characteristics. These associations are significant, since they clash with the major

198 discourse of national standardisation in this school. Compared with the School Manager’s and some Han teachers’ deficit orientation towards Tibetan language and culture, most Tibetan teachers see Tibetan language and culture as ‘valuable resources’.

6.3.2 Hybridity in discourses and discursive strategies in the school

By tracing key signifiers through a chain of texts, I identified two distinct discourses on education policies that are currently in circulation in Badi Primary School: a discourse of national standardisation and a discourse of practical education with local characteristics. This section examines how these antagonistic discourses are combined and inscribed into the discursive practices of school life.

Actors: ambivalent attitude towards development

The school’s administrative leaders include a Han principal, Dai, and the Han School Manager. Dai is in his 40s. In 2011, the principal received China Education Administrator Training at the Party School of the CCP Sichuan Provincial Committee (Dai, Han principal, Interview in Badi Primary School, July, 2011). The nature of principals’ training which emphasised the Chinese state system heavily influenced him, and this is reflected in his ambivalent attitude towards education development for Tibetans. The school’s administrative leaders attempt to integrate ‘national standardisation’, stressing Han universalism, and ‘local characteristics’, emphasising Tibetan identity, in an attempt to meet the needs of the school and the local community. The following excerpt from the Annual summary report produced by the school’s administrative leaders in 2010, combines the different discourses in hybrid forms: We must adhere to the educational philosophy of ‘establishing a life-long foundation for development’, the goal of ‘creating a county-level model primary school’, the motto of ‘unity, civilisation, good thinking, and good study’, and school-based training. In doing so, we will lead teachers and students towards becoming intellectuals in accordance with national standardisation; meanwhile, we stress individual characteristics. Thus, we will establish a school model of ‘national standardisation + individual characteristics’.

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Here, the use of the plus sign “+” suggests that the school’s administrative leaders are aware of the latent tension between the two discourses relating to national standardisation and individual characteristics. This was interpreted as the general development goal of establishing a school of national standardisation + individual characteristics. To this end, the leaders attempt a discursive compromise, balancing the viewpoints of both sides in the creation of a Han model school (county-level model primary school) and stressing their responsiveness to ethnicity and locality (school- based training). Within this hybrid ideology, cultural diversity (individual characteristics) is desirable only in the context of developing political loyalty with Chinese nationalist values (lead teachers and students towards becoming intellectuals in accordance with national standardisation). However, the signs, such as unity, civilisation, good thinking, and good study can only be read as empty signifiers, and employed to signify the absence in the school of fully achieved identities. These signifiers are determined in and through political struggles for hegemony (Torfing, 1999). Thus, the meaning of intellectuals is both limited and made ambiguous by its association with the school model of ‘national standardisation + individual characteristics’. It could be taken to mean either the fostering of national qualified loyalty or the creation of individuals with local characteristics, or both. However, in either case, its inclusion within a hybridised discourse suggests that intellectuals are only attainable through a school system. The empty signifiers unity, civilisation, good thinking, and good study add to the confusion. In the following sections I will discuss the use of agendas, actions and artefacts in fostering intellectuals and how, through that use, the school’s administrative leaders are trying to move from conflict to consensus.

Agendas: tying national standardisation and local characteristics to the needs of the school and local community

The school’s administrative leaders attempt to unify signifiers that derive from disparate discourses in their construction of hegemonizing signifiers as noted above. These signifiers often have too much intertextual baggage attached to them for the project of fostering intellectuals to succeed.

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I next review the key signifiers that appeared in the school’s agenda about the use of distance educational resources for improving student quality, which combines elements from different perspectives: Using distance educational resources, we organize our students to watch programs on the sciences, patriotism, and the environment. The science programs enable our students to understand the development of science and the power of science, and inspire our students’ creativity. Patriotic education enables our students to understand that personal fate is linked to that of the motherland’s future, that is, individuals’ good prospects are based on the construction of the motherland. Environmental education enables our students to understand the importance of local environmental protection.

The school’s administration leaders try to improve educational outcomes in the sciences, patriotism, and the environment through the integration of classroom teaching with the help of distance education resources, as well as catering to the students’ environmental reality. With the development of the Internet and sattelite technology, resources for conducting distance education are now established in several rural schools, as noted in Chapter 4. Distance education resources refer to educational resources from the national central education training satellite broadcasts or Sichuan Internet resources for universal basic education. In this agenda, there are attempts to bind the two discourses together, hegemonically appropriating a discourse of individuality and locality (students’ creativity, personal fate and local environmental protection) to encourage social development and moral conservativism (the motherland’s future and the construction of the motherland). The extract above equates individuals with citizens,, implying that individuality is only acceptable within the context of a person’s duties as a Chinese national. Moreover, the content of universal education within Han universalism is fixed in and through political struggles for hegemony, in which particular demands (Han values) are universalised and others (Tibetan culture) are marginalised. For example, according to the requirements of the central government, the school organized students to watch 100 patriotic films through the distance education resources. The operations and content of these patriotic films are tightly controlled by the CCP. Controlling and determining

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what appears in the films allow the CCP to disseminate propaganda supportive of government policies.

Actions: Han model curriculum implementation

Within the school’s agendas around the use of distance educational resources for improving student quality, notably their cultural and moral quality, the school’s actions serve the cultural-political mainstream. From my observations and interviews, the curriculum is fully implemented in accordance with the national unified curriculum, focusing on and fostering national loyalty. As discussed earlier, the Han teacher, Cao, expressed a negative attitude towards the West’s capitalist exploitation, emphasizing the idea of moral education to cultivate talent with national standardisation and promote the revitalisation of China. This has heavily influenced local students’ views on the West: We are flowers of the motherland. We must study hard and learn more about our history. When we grow up, we can also put the Western imperialists in their place. We can make the Western imperialists know how it feels to be attacked. (Zeshe, Interview, Tibetan student in Badi Primary School, June, 2011)

Here, the association between Tibetan identities and Han universalism is a result of the discursive construction of a common enemy (the West). Zeshe, born in this town, is 图 2-9 学生耗时分配概图 of the Tibetan nationality. Zeshe understands the importance of study for gaining knowledge. He views imperialist aggression as a national humiliation. For Zeshe, the way of revitalising China is related to aggression (make the Western imperialists know how it feels to be attacked). The discursive operation that sanctions this construction involves a displacement (Torfing, 1999), in relation to how the aggression is conceived (we can also put the West imperialists in their place). This displacement binds the school political leaders and the Tibetans in opposition to a common enemy. The national loyalty to the party-state is the outcome of curricula implementation. In terms of Tibetan teaching, the Tibetan language class was taught by Cairang, who was originally a member of the local community. At the time of this study, he lived in a local temple. In interviews he voiced a strong commitment to improving education for students like himself and felt that Tibetan language literacy would improve the local

202 students’ chances for employment after graduation. Interestingly, Cairang, was of the same ethnic group as his students but did not use the local dialect during instruction. From my observations, during Tibetan language arts, the students’ Tibetan dialect – Jiarong Tibetan – was devalued during instruction. Cairang regularly corrected the lexical, phonological, and syntactic features of students’ speech as they contributed to lessons that stressed analysing the language rather than using it for communication. Often, his corrections were accompanied by evaluative explanations that gave the students’ Jiarong Tibetan an inferior status. He held very elitist views regarding the superiority of the standard variety of Tibetan and believed it was necessary for success. Although his efforts were well meaning, they actually contributed to the abandonment of the native language during class and a shift to Mandarin. The lack of recognition of correct and appropriate community language for some smaller minority groups adds an extra burden to students in bilingual schools and dampens the vitality of native language use in the local community (Harrell, 2001b; Kolås, 2003). In fact, Badi Primary School is located in a semi-agro-pastoral community, and Tibetan-centred curricula should be conducted in accordance with the minority policy. However, the academic context of this school is overshadowed by the cultural-political mainstream. Due to the lack of bilingual teachers and a bridge between non-standard Tibetan languages and Chinese mandarin, the Tibetan-medium model has been replaced by the Mandarin-medium model in current practice. Moreover, the school has little contact with parents and the local community, although parents meetings are held each semester. As previous discussed, Han teachers here are trying to create a Han cultural atmosphere on campus. Notably, they did not even stay in the school’s town during the weekend, but went to the city, as far away as possible away from the local community. Due to the teachers’ unwillingness to accept the local culture, Tibetan children’s rights relating to language and culture are overlooked in curricula implementation. Thus, we can see how the hegemony in Badi Primary School, involving the privileged position of Han universalism and nationalistic values, is continually reproduced through the actions of particular actors in the school.

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Artefacts: environmental and cultural artefacts

The production of environmental and cultural artefacts visualises policy, highlighting the contradictions that reflect and shape identity and power relations in this town school. However, these visual artefacts and those discussed in Chapter 5, are “only meaningful, only ‘work’ alongside written texts, practices, organization and talk” (Ball et al., 2012, p. 132). The campus of Badi Primary School is similar to that of Han schools. This is quite different from what I had imagined. I had been visualising the primary school in a magical valley, surrounded by green grass and trees, with golden corn-fields and a river. It was only the few students wearing Tibetan robe that made me feel that this was a Tibetan school. The school buildings are very different from the Tibetan housing style. Compared with the household buildings’ thick walls and small windows, the school building had thinner walls and larger windows. It is cold inside the classroom in the winter, so much so that some Tibetan teachers ask the students to take classes outside the classroom, when it is a sunny day. The principal, Dai, explained that the government unified the planning and design of the school campus (Dai, Han principal, Interview in Badi Primary School, July, 2011). In many ways, this town school seems to be captured by a vision of education that is intimately tied to schooling for improving student quality around themes such as science, patriotism, and the environment, as noted previously. For example, in a Grade 5 classroom, there is a wall display where large Chinese characters proclaim: “Accumulate [knowledge]” (right), “Chinese heart”, and “Environmental protection” (left) (see Figure 6.6).

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Figure 6.6: “Accumulate” (right), “Chinese heart”, and “Environmental protection” (left) on the wall display

The mixed messages for improving quality are reinforced by the visual messages produced by the school, which combines Han universalism and Tibetan identity (see Figure 6.7). The state symbol “Accumulate” provides Tibetan students with moral slogans to inspire them. “Chinese heart” appears frequently in the texts on the wall display, promoting Chinese nationalist values. It forms a nodal point of the moral conservative discourse in this town school. “Environmental protection” reflects the school’s awareness of environmental protection, representing Tibetan environment and cultural signs. As such, this school should be praised for providing an education that affirms students’ identity, grounding them with a sense of their relationship to the local environment. As previously discussed, the entire way of life for most Tibetans is closely integrated with the physical environment, and thus a culturally sustainable education for Tibetans must also incorporate environmental education. However, it is noteworthy that the three themes around promoting quality are all written in Han Chinese characters on the wall display, thus suggesting that Mandarin is in the only way of guaranteeing quality education as well as the integration of accumulated knowledge relevant to local environmental challenges.

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Figure 6.7: Wall displays representing Tibetan cultural signs and state symbols in Badi Primary School

Thus, the activity around the education on science, patriotism, and the environment is directed towards the aim of improving student quality with the help of physical tools, including these environmental artefacts and cultural signs. These physical tools play a crucial role in identity formation. As one Han teacher noted: The school building’s style is different from the housing outside. The campus environment is very Han Chinese. In such a Chinese cultural environment, Tibetan students can learn more about Chinese culture, its habits, and ways of thinking. (Gan, Han teacher, Interview in Badi Primary School, July, 2011).

Here, the Han teacher, Gan, and several other Han teachers explained that a Han- centric cultural campus makes Tibetan students aware of the importance of Han education for gaining high cultural quality and social status, exemplified by “the ideal end-result for Tibetan students is becoming a government official”(interviews with several Han teachers). This in turn shapes a “virtuous circle” (Yi, 2011, p. 405). It was argued that cultivation of Tibetan students in a Han-centric cultural campus could eventually enable the Tibetan community to transform the quality of its population (Yi, 2011).

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In fact, such a cultural environment is very different from the community’s culture. Within such a Han-centric cultural environment, there is no room for teachers to include the local culture within their teaching practice alongside the unified assessment standards provided by the county government. Thus, the school focused on exam-based subjects, such as Chinese and Maths. From the interviews with local parents, the students with good exam scores are always envied by their peers and other parents. Besides being favoured by their teachers, the students with good exam scores are encouraged by the school through award certificates: the ‘good student three ways (good in study, attitude and health)’ and the ‘excellent student cadre’. Here, the neoliberal ideal of self-improvement is evident in these award certificates, which individualizes responsibility for excellence and ignores the role of local resources, such as local environment, culture and religion, all of which may play a significant role in Tibetan students’ performances. The production of these artefacts has heavily influenced the local parents and students. In Tibetan student, Namu’s, extract notes, I found her favourite excerpt: In my memory, my childhood was enveloped in the green grass, green trees, and green hills around. I was a growing green tree. After I entered primary school, red became the main theme: red flags, red scarves, and red certificate for ‘good student three ways’. . . The color in front of us had changed.

Here, the hybridized discourse of ‘two colours, two cultures’ demonstrates how contradictions reflect and shape identity and power relations in that context (Freeman, 2008; Gee, 2000). Colours can produce affective meanings and are loaded with social, political and cultural signification (Carmen & Rick, 2008). Here, the local environment colour (green) and the Chinese flag colour (red) are apparent. Studying and living in the context of a bilingual and a bicultural community, Tibetan students struggle with their identities. Some students could feel inferior because they are unable to be Han Chinese. Issues of acculturative social stress, as a consequence of assimilation into Han culture and disconnection from the local language, culture and knowledge, all of which heavily influence the students psychosocially, remain unexplored in relation to the current bilingual model. In other words, the national school culture inscribes itself through the discursive production of artefacts and signs of “intolerance and fantasmatic representations that invoke the need to purify the social body, to preserve its identity, to

207 protect it from all forms of mixing” (Balibar, 1991, pp. 17-18). By emphasising Han universalism/culturalism (red flags, red scarves, and red certificate for ‘three good student’), Tibetan ethnic identity is folded into a Han Chinese context.

6.4 Summary

Case Two presents the discourses and discursive strategies in educational terms, of a town school community in a semi-agro-pastoral area of Danba County. Some general findings from Case 2 can be drawn as follows. First, Case 2, like Case 1, involved two distinct discourses. They are a moral conservative discourse, promoting political loyalty to the CCP, and a discourse of ethnic characteristics, emphasizing local community involvement and linked to the integrated economic environment. The former sees a strong nullification of the local community- based Tibetan culture. The latter discourse sees Tibetan language heritage and Mandarin as ‘resources’. This discourse was drawn upon by some local critics to promote the ideal of establishing a co-operational community-school model. Each discourse is marked by signifiers which are structured around nodal points such as Han universalism/culturalism, identity and cultural diversity. Figure 6.8 presents such a situation, with the meanings of the middle terms the most actively contested. Secondly, as in Case 1, the cultural-political mainstream in Case 2 combined these antagonistic discourses into an integrated agenda of modernisation. In employing these antagonistic discourses for the school aims: national standardisation + local characteristics, the cultural-political mainstream produces a hybridized but ultimately incoherent discourse fostering intellectuals around the education of science, patriotism, and the local environment. In order to move from conflict to consensus, the ambivalence and ambiguity of the integrated actions of curricula implementation serve the cultural-political mainstream, reflecting the marginalisation of Tibetan language and culture. Thus, governmentality takes place around the manipulation of these contested signifiers, through the discursive production of environmental artefacts and cultural signs. I highlight these significances through the ‘four As’ framework analysis (see Table 6.1). The hybridity in discourses and discursive strategies in this town school community reveals significant power shifts within policy enactment processes. On a surface level,

208 the bilingual model is transferred from a Tibetan + Chinese model to Chinese + Tibetan model in this town school, where Tibetan knowledge, culture and language are virtually non-evident in school, and where the model of education enacted is virtually undifferentiated from an urban school in any Han area in China. Like Case 1, this model treats language as a neutral communication tool, separate from culture, while simultaneously revealing a deficit orientation towards Tibetan language and culture. As such, Badeng Nima and some local Tibetan teachers criticize the transitional bilingual education for shifting prematurely to an all-Mandarin medium instruction, leading to low literacy in both the Tibetan language and Mandarin. This argument has considerable support in bilingual education research outside China, which has found that maintenance bilingual education typically leads to higher proficiency in both the first and second language than does transitional bilingual education (Baker, 2001; Cummins, 2000, 2001; Ladson-Billings, 1995, 2004). In other words, the collapse of the logic of difference into the antagonistic and hierarchical logic of equivalence will tend to involve a loss of cultural identity and meaning. However, there are some important differences between Case 1 and Case 2. Unlike Case 1, the students in the semi-agro-pastoral school experience a cultural distance, in terms of linguistic and cultural capital, between boarding school and the shrinking local communities. Studying and living in a boarding school, Tibetan students’ practices of understanding and inheriting traditions and knowledge are interrupted. This is also reflected in the change and shrinkage of the population and cultural ecology in Tibetan communities. Students are developing instrumental linguistic dispositions, characterized by cultural distance and dislocated Tibetan identities. To some extent, this reproduction has consolidated and strengthened the urban-rural dual structure of China. Badi Town’s current and historic cultural heritage means that its hybridity in discourses and discursive strategies is changing more rapidly than the school in Case 1. As we have seen, the town is lurching between accelerating the process of technologisation and modernisation of education and accelerating the protection of Tibetan culture and religion. While I was writing this chapter, I found my own feelings lurching between despair at the depressing nature of the deficit orientation towards Tibetan language and culture, and hope inspired by the views that see the heritage of the Tibetan language heritage and Mandarin as ‘resources’. In other words, neoliberalism in this case can be seen as a counter-hegemonic discourse in relation to Han universalism,

209 to the extent that it has managed to redefine the terms of the political debate and set a new agenda, which encourages environmental and cultural conservation. For example, the establishment of local community-based cultural centre and the education on environmental protection are both important consequences of this hybrid neo-liberalist discourse. However, when these aspects appear to be in conflict, the priority of the party-state is usually to justify and legitimize its regime by focusing upon and fostering political loyalty in the masses. It does this by centring on economic development at the expense of so-called ‘second-rate’ Tibetan culture (Yi, 2011). We can see the overall operation of the logics of equivalence and difference in accordance with economic criteria and expectations, reflecting neoliberalism’s signature theme of the operation of markets (Dean, 2009). For example, hegemonisation works on signifiers (building ‘large and strong’ school in minority areas, and the technologisation and modernisation of education) that simultaneously employ the logic of difference, in terms of ‘cultural and linguistic diversity’, and the logic of equivalence, in terms of ‘Tibetan = backward versus Han = advanced’. Within such a context of the displacement of political questions by economic considerations, the process of technologisation and modernisation of education reflects how the neoliberal discourse has worked to align education for Tibetans with “the imperatives of the market and managerial technologies of performativity, thereby naturalising a view of education as a technical, instrumental, rather than inescapably political, enterprise” (Clarke, 2012b, p. 307). As a consequence, their political nature, including the deep implication of these discourses with issues of sociocultural and political power, is effectively backgrounded.

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Hybrid discourse Moral conservative discourse Cultural identity discourse

Cultural diversity Han-dominated unity Identity

The logic of difference The logic of equivalence

• spiritual practice Field of contested signification advanced=Han universalism • linguistic and cultural heritage =patriotism=understand the crimes of imperialist aggression against our • Local valuable curriculum resources within their classroom practices Actors’ attitudes towards minority education country=foundation of communication=moral Agendas of development • the development of the greater Chinese standards=a correct outlook on life and the Actions of implementing curriculum nationality world =Mandarin environment versus Artefacts: identity and power • practical education with local Tibetan=poverty=backward characteristics

Figure 6.8: Discourse Theory concepts used in analysing distinct discourses of education policy in Badi Town School community

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Table 6.1: Overview – ‘Four As’ analysis on the hybridity in discourses and discursive strategies in Badi School community

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Chapter 7. Case 3 Tangke – Tibetan + Chinese Model School in a Pastoral Area

7.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the third case of the study, Tangke Primary School, a pastoral town primary school in Ruoergai County of Aba Tibetan and the Qiang Autonomous Prefecture of Sichuan Province. This school is located in a pastoral district and, since its geopolitical location strongly differs from the other schools, it was likewise expected that the Case 3 findings would differ markedly from the other two cases.

7.2 Tangke Town

This section discusses the local community context of Tangke Primary School, in Tangke Town. First, I introduce two distinct discourses on education policies and curriculum relating to the subjects of cultural diversity and national unity that have been espoused over the past two decades by key policy actors in this town: a moral conservative discourse promoting Han universalism and a discourse of ethnic community promoting Tibetan identity. Second, I present a more detailed analysis of how these antagonistic discourses are combined and inscribed into the practices of local community life, showing the shifts in the enactment of discursive policy practices.

7.2.1 Key signifiers in discourses of education policy in the town

The discourse of moral education

The late 1980s saw a revival of the discourse of moral conservatism, which reflects the political and economic climate of the time; notably, the crisis of independence movements in Tibet from 1987 to 1989, as noted in Chapter 5. The Party committee of the Tangke Town Government called for the reinforcement of moral education in schools, contending that teachers and students should establish:

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the correct outlook of the motherland, its nationalism, and religion. We must enhance the identity of the great motherland, Chinese nationalism, Chinese culture, and socialism with Chinese characteristics.21

Here, the Party committee highlighted the role of Chinese nationalist values in moral education (the correct outlook of the motherland, its nationalism, and religion). For example, a Patriotic Education Campaign (1991) was launched by the local government in order to (re)establish Tibetan political beliefs, loyalty to the communist state, and morality among the populace. Thus, Han universalism in terms of the identity of the great motherland, Chinese nationalism, Chinese culture, and socialism with Chinese characteristics are the central signs in this discourse of moral conservatism. The teaching of moral education in schools has remained essentially unchanged into the twenty-first century. In 2010, the Party committee actively enacted the policy called the Long-term Mechanism for Constructing a Peaceful and Harmonious Campus, issued by the Ruoergai County Government: Due to young people’s mistaken values and their lack of national consciousness, we must further deepen moral education in schools. We must emphasise patriotic education and polite daily behaviour education, and thereby enhance our teachers’ and students’ consciousness of safeguarding the motherland’s reunification, safeguarding national unity, and maintaining stability in Tibetan areas.

This document is linked to the political and economic background of the time. Tibetan relations with the Han appear to have deteriorated seriously during the riots of 2008 and 2009 – “both reflected poor relations and damaged them even more, making the prospects for harmony even more remote” (Mackerras, 2011a, p. 304). The series of self-immolations in the local temple were reported by the Party committee as the problems of the town. Against this background, privileged signs such as patriotic education and polite daily behaviour education have a politically loaded significance. These privileged signs are defined as the methods for addressing the political-moral problem (young people’s incorrect values and their lack of national consciousness), in relation to the other signs

21 Following the conventions of Chapters 5 and 6, in the following discussion, terminology from this extract and others will be in italics, to distinguish them from other sources. 214

(the motherland’s reunification, national unity, and stability in Tibetan areas). For example, in the winter holiday of 2010, the Party committee arranged the political study of the CCP’s education policy in schools, focusing on the theme of national conditions and gratitude to the CCP. In other words, Han universalism/culturalism becomes the nodal point in the political discourse of moral education and generally functions as a way of safeguarding the motherland’s reunification, safeguarding national unity, and maintaining stability in Tibetan areas. In terms of bilingual education for Tibetans, the Party committee insisted that bilingual education would build up the national unity education model, emphasising the notion of giving thanks to the CCP and serving the nation. Within this political-moral discourse, there is a pragmatic acceptance of the need to know Chinese, notably, Mandarin, as it is recognized that without this skill it would be almost impossible to obtain a regular job or to acquire any sort of influence within modern society. Knowledge of Chinese is sometimes necessary just for basic shopping in nearby towns and is certainly needed in all main social contexts. Chinese as a major subject is therefore strongly encouraged by the Party committee. Thus, I argue that the moral conservative discourse constructs the Tibetan people as a part of an equivalential chain in terms of ‘Tibetan = backward = young people’s incorrect values = their lack of national consciousness versus Han = advanced = the motherland’s reunification = national unity = stability in Tibetan areas = gratitude to the CCP = national unity education = serving the nation = knowledge of Chinese = Mandarin = obtain a regular job = needed in all main social contexts’. The label of the backward Tibetan suggests “a stigma of being marginal, non-mainstream and unusual” (Baker, 2011, p. 399). Within a second discourse, however, language- and culture-based identity signifiers are infused with more positive associations and expectations, especially in a religious-centred pastoral community. I label this ‘Tibetan characteristics’, the second major discourse of education policy in Tangke Town.

The discourse of promoting Tibetan characteristics

The discourse of moral education is loaded with signifiers that are presented as a monolithic entity, with Chinese nationalist values uncontested, asserting the core role of Chinese in bilingual education. However, local school-based teacher-researchers

215 suggest that Tibetan children should learn Tibetan as their first language and Chinese as their second, highlighting Tibetan characteristics: There are unique characteristics, insights and methods in our religion, astronomy, medicine, and literature. We have something to be proud of. All of this has a very high value in our real life. We cannot deny Tibet’s historical role and its effects. As young Tibetans, we must pay attention to and explore our language and culture. (Luosang, Interview, Tibetan school-based teacher-researcher in Tangke Town, October, 2011)22

The interview above shows that confidence in Tangke Town is high. Luosang, a Tibetan school-based teacher-researcher’s explanation clearly demonstrates his pride in the local community (We have something to be proud of), with unique characteristics, insights and methods in Tibetan religion, astronomy, medicine, and literature. Luosang’s attitude towards Tibetan culture is sufficiently specific to be able to ascertain how much his interest in Tibetan culture is due to its affirming his identity (All of this has a very high value in our real life), and how much is due to a feeling of obligation to pay attention to and explore Tibetan language and culture. Undoubtedly, these two motivations can coexist in the same individual, reflecting a chain of equivalence in terms of ‘Tibetan = something more to be proud of = high value in our real life = Tibetan identity = Tibetan language and culture’ versus Tibetan language and culture = backwards. The values of Tibetan language and culture are linked to the something to be proud of, notably Tibetan Buddhism: Losing the Tibetan religion and culture is a tragedy not only for Tibetans but also for everyone. In order to maintain our religion, culture and unique characteristics, we must pay attention to our language. I see the Tibetan language as a powerful tool to shape Tibetans’ future and destiny. (Sonam, Interview, Tibetan school- based teacher-researcher, October, 2011)

Here, Tibetan characteristics relating to language, culture and religion are emphasised as the core for constructing a Tibetan identity. Sonam is a confident young Tibetan school-based teacher-researcher. He is proud of his learning experiences in the

22 In the following discussion, interviews in this chapter are conducted in Suocang Town, a pastoral town of Ruoergai County in Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture of Sichuan Province. 216

English Training Program under the Asia/US Exchange Programs, in which teaching and resources are quite different from those at national schools. Under the English Training Program, Tibetan students work on Tibetan cultural and linguistic preservation and small-scale development projects for improving the lives of pastoral Tibetans (Sonam, Interview, Tibetan school-based teacher-researcher, October, 2011). For Sonam, the Tibetan language can be a powerful means of securing a positive Tibetan identity, empowering Tibetans and raising their expectations (the Tibetan language as a powerful tool to shape Tibetans’ future and destiny). Importantly, Sonam has extended the discourse of promoting Tibetan religion and culture beyond the Tibetan community and the Han society and into a vision of all humanity (Losing the Tibetan religion and culture is a tragedy not only for Tibetans but also for everyone), thus forming a chain of equivalence in terms of ‘loosing Tibetan religion and culture = a tragedy for Tibetans = a tragedy for the whole humans = Tibetan unique characteristics = a powerful tool to shape Tibetans’ future and destiny = Tibetan identity = empowering Tibetans = raising their expectations’. This chain is defined in opposition to a chain that denigrates Tibetan language and culture as equivalent to backwardness. In this sense, the global interest in Tibetan Buddhism has helped sustain it in its place of origin (Mackerras, 2011a). Globalisation has even assisted the revival of Tibetan language relating to Tibetan religion in this pastoral town. In terms of bilingual education, local researchers’ positive attitudes towards nomadism appear to be a matter of culture. In practice, Tibetan pastoral parents often perceive the values transmitted by state schooling to be alien to their own values. Sonam adds an additional explanation that connects local people’s scepticism towards bilingual education in the context of the national unified curriculum: The national unified curriculum has limited references to Tibetan culture and environment, and no mention of Tibetan Buddhism. Tibetans do not believe ‘humans can and should conquer Nature’. Because we are from here and we want to stay here, we don’t have a get-rich-and-get-out mentality. (Sonam, Interview, Tibetan school-based teacher-researcher, November, 2011).

To Sonam, local Tibetans cuture is at odds with the central government’s emphasis on economic advancement within the wider realm of China. Most Tibetans are in favour of speaking their own language, but the national unified curriculum is too nationalistic

217 and of little relevance, having limited references to Tibetan culture and environment, and no mention of Tibetan Buddhism. For local researchers, the preservation of Tibetan nomads’ extensive traditional knowledge concerns their natural environment and wild animals. Tibetans do not believe ‘humans can and should conquer Nature’ which the Chinese leaders used to believe. Since Tibetan children belong to the Tangke Town community, they are expected to adopt the linguistic and cultural conventions of that community (we are from here and we want to stay here, we don’t have a get-rich-and- get-out mentality). It is evident that ‘identity’ organises this discourse promoting Tibetan characteristics. Furthermore, it is also clear from the literature that Tibetan parents’ resistance towards public schools is also based on the observation that Tibetan children studying in public schools adopt “code switching” between Tibetan and Chinese, and consequently might not become fluent in Tibetan (Bangsbo, 2008, p. 80). The local Tibetans’ scepticism towards the national unified curriculum reflects the tension between Tibetan identity and Han universalism and between the logic of difference, that values multiple cultures and identities, and the logic of equivalence that elevates Han language and culture at the expense of all others, including those of Tibetans.

7.2.2 Hybridity in discourses and discursive strategies in the town

By tracing how the discourses are constituted through the use of certain key signifiers, I identified two conflicting demands within Tangke Town: appeals for Han universalism from the Party committee and calls for promoting Tibetan identity by local school-based teacher-researchers. In this section I present a more detailed analysis of how these antagonistic discourses are combined and inscribed into the practices of the town’s community life, by exploring and identifying the key policy actors, agendas, actions and artefacts embedded in the current policy enactment processes.

Actors: mixed-positive attitudes towards development

The Tangke Town Government has attempted to bind the two discourses together, hegemonically appropriating a discourse of Tibetan identity for one of social development and moral conservativism. Local governance and local policies seek to

218 combine the physical environment, cultural differences, economic development, local religious authorities and socio-political concerns, balancing these multiple priorities in an attempt to achieve both growth and stability. Thus, the local government’s attitudes towards overall social development reflect an increasing place for bilingualism and biculturalism. The basic policy of the Tangke Town Government towards overall social development in the document: Strengthening the overall social cause for enhancing soft power (2011) states: Give priority to the development of education in Tibetan pastoral areas and encourage inland bilingual education for Tibetans.

Maintain cultural and ecological diversity. Marry unique Tibetan culture and tourism.

Strengthen moral education in accordance with the principle of three dimensions of inseparability. Deepen education and gratitude to the CCP. Promote spiritual civilization in the masses. Inspire cadres, the masses and young people to keep firm faith in a diligent and simple character, self-improvement, gratitude to the CCP, hometown construction, and the development of the great-leap-forward.

The signifiers in the excerpts above pertain to two different discourses. Signifiers, such as, the development of education in Tibetan pastoral areas, cultural and ecological diversity, and unique Tibetan culture, are derived from the discourse of Tibetan identity, whereas, strengthen moral education, gratitude to the CCP, and spiritual civilization are derived from the discourse of Han universalism. As the key policy actors in Tangke, the town’s government leaders would have been aware of the intertextual roots of these signifiers, and their use can, therefore, be seen as a deliberate attempt at discursive compromise, through the balancing of distinct viewpoints. The discourse of promoting Tibetan characteristics offers a vision of developing education in accordance with cultural and ecological diversity, whereas the discourse of social-moral development highlighted political loyalty to the party-state (gratitude to the CCP). The typical solution was an attempt to meld the two conflicting discourses together, by linking

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Tibetan identity to political loyalty and to the needs of the local community and the CCP. The local government leaders attempted to integrate nationalism and religious guidance by advocating a principle of three dimensions of inseparability. The notion of three dimensions of inseparability was produced by the central government in 1990, as detailed in Chapter 4. It means that the Han are inseparable from the ethnic minorities; the ethnic minorities are inseparable from the Han; and the ethnic minorities are inseparable from each other. This kind of interdependence invokes the Chinese discourse on ethnic relations ‘diversity in unity’ (Fei, 1989, p. 1). The local government calls for establishing a new socialist ethnic relation based on equality, unity and mutual assistance, reflecting the incorporation of Tibetans into the Han majority nation for the mainstream’s agenda of the development of the great-leap-forward. Viewed more critically, this hybrid discourse makes certain signifiers used in the extract unclear. For example, self-improvement could be taken to mean either the development of education with local characteristics or political-moral quality development, or both – yet in either case, this discourse’s aim of overall social development suggests that improvement is only attainable through the national education system. Even the phrase inland bilingual education for Tibetans adds to the confusion. This resonates with the local government’s ambivalent attitudes towards education development in Case 1 and Case 2, regarding Chinese nationalistic values and Tibetan identity. Unlike Cases 1 and 2, however, the local religious authorities of Case 3 were involved in social development. For example, the local tourism development plan (marry unique Tibetan culture and tourism) is to maintain cultural and ecological diversity. This tourism is called the ‘ecological and cultural tourism of the grasslands’ (Ruoergai Government, 2011a), which involves contact with Tibetan language, culture and religion. The direct involvement of religious authorities in tourism development has helped to ensure that “representations of Tibetan culture are not perverted by commercial incentives and the fantasies of visitors” (Hillman, 2010, p. 275). Participation in local social development by the local religious leaders has also had clear benefits for religious activities, such as local government assistance for monastery renovations. Moreover, unlike in the Tibetan Autonomous Region and other parts of Tibetan China, government officials in Tangke are allowed to visit monasteries and

220 other religious sites, although relations between the local party-state and the monastery have not always been harmonious as the series of self-immolation in local temples, noted previously, attest to. All of this reflects the local government’s attitudes towards social development relating to culturally diverse strategies, notably, the formal and informal relationships between the government and local religious leaders. In terms of education, culturally diverse strategies push local education policy agendas promoting bilingualism and biculturalism.

Agendas: tying local characteristics and standardization to the needs of the local community and the CCP

The aims of the overall development in education were set out in the Annual Report (2011), representing a unique blend of social, political, cultural, economic, educational, geographic and historical circumstances: We must standardise bilingual education and promote qualified, balanced, and scientific development in education, in order to establish a modern education system with ethnic characteristics in accordance with local needs for economic and social development. We must establish a model of education in minority areas, and thereby achieve a new leap forward in education.

From the excerpt above, it seems that Tangke town community is not controlled by one dominant discourse. The hybridization of standardisation (standardise bilingual education), modernisation (modern education), and locality (ethnic characteristics and local needs) includes multifarious connections to education for Tibetans and Tibetan identity, as well as the practices of power regarding Chinese nationalistic values. This hybrid discourse of the Chinese nationalist values and the responsiveness to Tibetan identity establishes and reinforces the cultural-political mainstream’s control that is responsive to locality and ethnic identities (modern education system with ethnic characteristics in accordance with local needs for economic and social development). However, this does not mean that all discourses are equal. For example, the sentence from this report (see below) uses a very symptomatic phrase in speaking of qualified, balanced, and scientific development in education,

221 implying that individual ‘quality improvement’ is only acceptable within the context of a person’s duties as political loyalty to the CCP: We must implement qualified, balanced, and scientific development in education in accordance with the Party’s educational policies, focusing on and fostering students who have good morality, creativity and practical problem solving skills.

The and construction linking is frequently found in this type of discourse where the hegemonic aim is to appropriate signifiers, often linking different discourses of morality (good morality) and locality (practical problem solving skills). Here, the meaning of creativity is both limited and ambiguous by its association within this hybrid discourse. It might mean the encouragement of creative minds or the creation of schools for exercising creativity or both. However, its inclusion within the policy agenda that is in accordance with the Party’s educational policies suggests that creativity is only attainable through a national school system. It is obvious that the party-state is a priority in policy agendas. It is noteworthy, however, that there is a shift in the local government policy agendas regarding education for Tibetans. Local government policies have sought to deliver more inclusive growth: We must establish a long-term system of non-government-run schools. We must adhere to the predominance of government-run schools and the supplementary nature of non-government-run schools. We can form an educational group with cross-regional and cross-categorical schools. Through restructuring assets and staff, we must transform weak schools and improve their educational quality and effectiveness.

Here, local policy has encouraged the long-term system of non-government-run schools and cross-regional and cross-categorical schools, reflecting the local government’s relevant and liberal social and cultural policies, particularly in relation to an important dimension of Tangke’s emergence as a ‘leading’ Tibetan area in Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture of Sichuan Province. This document makes an effort to open up the notion of the predominance of government-run schools and the supplementary nature of non-government-run schools, representing the policy agenda’s creative hybridity (improve their educational quality and effectiveness). Thus, the

222 reproduction of social backwardness is addressed and educational advancement is promoted here through open social policies, locally responsive economic policies, and allowance of non government support for minority educational practices, in particular, local religious and NGO resourses. For example, the policy agenda for establishing the Tangke Education Association created a space for the CCP and government officials to develop good relationships with local religious leaders. In 2010 the Tangke Education Association was established under the initiative of Ake, the late Tibetan vice-chairman of the Political Consultative Committee of Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture Government. It was registered as a non-governmental organisation (NGO) in the Ruoergai Government. The first chairman was a living Buddha in the Tangke Tibetan monastery. Ake indicated that the support of the local living Buddha was an essential aspect for education development in Tibetan areas: Tibetans believe in Buddhism, and the Buddha is of paramount importance. The Buddha’s discourse heavily influences local children. If the local Buddhas pay attention to education, they would transmit this idea to the local people and mobilize children to study. We must establish a good relationship between school education and local religion in Tibetan areas in order to promote the growth of the educational cause.23

This agenda of promoting the connections to local people and practices reflects the similar trend of neoliberal governmentality in Cases 1 and 2, highlighting local characteristics and local needs. Unlike Case 1 and 2, however, the responsiveness to locality and Tibetan identity in Tangke emphasised more personal and religious factors (Buddha’s discourse heavily influences local children and good relationship between school education and local religion). Thus, great involvement of local religious leaders is encouraged for the growth of the educational cause. As my interviews progressed I notice that Cidan, a main member of the Tangke Education Association and other interviewees begin to examine the NGO’s positions both within the local community context and within the wider social environment. For example, a key element in the Tangke Education Association’s development strategy

23 Source from the program of culture and education of southwest ethnic group (2006). 223 was to officially rename itself the “Education Association”, by considering outsiders’ suggestions: The idea of replacing Education Foundation, the original name, with Education Association is based on the consideration of policy terms. This is suggested by outsiders who are enthusiastic about nomadic education. (Cidan, Interview, Tibetan member of Tangke Education Association, November, 2011)

Unlike Cases 1 and 2, such cultural diversity strategies in Case 3 drive the local NGO’s education policy agendas promoting bilingualism and biculturalism. For example, the aim of the Tangke Education Association highlights a responsiveness to local needs and ethnic identities, linking the social environment of supporting bilingual education with respecting knowledge and talent: In order to meet the needs of educational development in pastoral areas, the Tangke Education Association promotes the healthy development of nomadic education by encouraging and establishing a social environment which supports bilingual education and respects knowledge and talent. (the Introduction of the Tangke Education Association, p. 1).

During the conduct of this case study, I found an appreciation for international NGOs. Alpha Communities, an international charitable organization, is present in Tangke and is preferred by local parents because they better harmonize with the values, norms, knowledge and skills of the Tibetan pastoral culture and community than the government. For example, grassland restoration and protection issues are a high priority of the local government agendas in the area and Alpha Communities is working together with one village in Tangke to fence and reseed degraded grassland. Here, Tibetan pastoral ecosystems, regenerated through this NGO’s program, represents nomadism as something to be empowered and valued economically. Alpha Communities has now started discussions with local partners about setting up vocational training to develop skills relevant to young people’s local context that might also help them generate income in the emerging tourism market. Evidence from fieldwork suggests that the Alpha Communities’ program implemented in Tibetan nomadic and pastoralist communities is based on the principle of building on local knowledge and

224 practice. I will return to this in the next discussion on the local implementation of curricula. The integration of these signifiers in terms of values, norms, knowledge and skills of the Tibetan pastoral culture and community into wider ensembles – such as the NGOs – that can create creative hybrid policy agendas in Tangke town, thus representing a “third space”. This is an ambivalent arena that incorporates “identity effects” (Bhabha, 1994, pp. 90-91) that do not have a “binary nature” (Shoshana, 2011, p. 158). Figure 7.1 illustrates that the discourse used is characterised according to the hybrid policy agendas in which its meanings are structured through the simultaneous operation of the logic of difference in terms of ‘cultural and ecological diversity, ethnic characteristics, local needs, and practical skills’, and the logic of equivalence in terms of ‘Tibetan = weak schools = backward versus Han = spiritual civilization= gratitude to the CCP = advanced’. Importantly, there is a shift from the middle contested signifiers (standardize bilingual education, modern education system with ethnic characteristics, qualified, balanced, and scientific development in education, and educational quality and efficiency) to a hybrid third space (see Figure 7.1). The meanings of the third space represent a counterhegemonic agenda in terms of non-government-run schools, an educational group with cross-regional and cross-categorical schools, good relationship between school education and local religion, vocational training under the support of local NGOs and International NGOs. A range of concerns, demands, purposes and desires are engaged in creative dialogue. Despite the exposure of the third space to contradictions and ambiguities, it provides a spatial politics of inclusion rather than exclusion that “initiates new signs of identity, and innovative sites of collaboration and contestation” (Bhabha, 1994, p. 1).

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The logic of equivalence The establishment of hegemony The logic of difference Tibetan = weak schools = standardize bilingual education  Cultural and backward modern education system with ethnic ecological diversity versus characteristics  Ethnic Han = spiritual qualified, balanced, and scientific characteristics civilization= gratitude to development in education  Local needs the CCP = advanced educational quality and efficiency  Practical skills

Hybrid third space a counterhegemonic agenda

non-government-run schools an educational group with cross-regional and cross-categorical schools local religious authorities good relationship between school education and local religion local NGOs international NGOs

Figure 7.1: The situation of the hybrid policy agendas in Tangke Town

Actions: Tibetan nomadic context-relevant curricula

The local education department at Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture and at town district level controls the language and curricula in schools. Schools in Tangke are obliged to follow national education policies. As an ethnic minority, Tibetans are permitted to follow bilingual curriculum material published by the Ministry of Education and by the Five Province Tibetan Publishing Group. The Tangke Government decided to orient education policies toward a bilingual education system of co-existence, co-emphasis and co-action, encouraging bilingual curricula reform (Ruoergai Government, 2011b). Under this bilingual education system, the local government tried to improve bilingual teaching and learning materials for education quality improvement. Here, bilingual curricula reform was significantly assisted by the ‘third space’ education actions, described above, in terms of local temples and NGOs. Initially, this proved

226 difficult politically. As in many other Tibetan areas, Tangke was a ‘closed’ area. Due to the central government’s concerns with political and social stability in ethnic minority border regions, NGOs were not permitted to assist education without permits. Tangke successfully applied for these restrictions to be eased by using culturally diversity strategies. For example, the Tangke Monastery Library has made bilingual readings available for not only the local people but also outsiders. This Library is established under the initiative of two living Buddhas. There are more than 100,000 items in the Library’s collection. They range from Tibetan, Chinese and Tibetan-Chinese bilingual works about history, astronomy, philosophy, law, medicine, and natural sciences to the scriptures of and literature on religions. When interviewed by Global Online, the vice director of the Management Committee of the Tangke Monastery Library explained that the function of this Library has extended beyond religion. It concerns multicultural communication between Tibetan and Chinese culture and East-West culture: The function of this temple library has extended beyond religion, although the Library is built in the temple. The intention of the two Buddhas is to establish a ground of knowledge sharing and cultural communication for local Tibetans to gain nourishment from Tibetan and Chinese culture and from East-West culture. (Global Online, 2012).

Thus, to fully realise Tibetan pastoralists’ right to education, local education systems have attempted to be more flexible and base themselves on the preservation of nomads’ extensive traditional knowledge of their natural environment, particularly in relation to vocational training. The government has set aside funds to send young people from rural areas into cities to participate in vocational training of different kinds and also to help them find jobs there. However, Tibetan pastoralists’ strong sense of dignity is linked to pride in their own identity as nomadic pastoralists. Owing to the geographical difficulties in attending school, numerous local communities have established small vocational schools. These schools are often initiated by the local Community Committee, who raises funds in cooperation with the NGOs. Sometimes they are funded by a local Buddhist monk, who is actively engaged in the welfare of his home community, has some influence in local decision-making and provides a bridge between locals and officials.

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For example, irregular short-term training was provided in the Tangke Monastery Library for the local Tibetans and the surrounding farmers and herdsmen in order to empower Tibetans with nourishment from Tibetan and Chinese culture and from East- West culture. More specific training was promoted by the Tangke Education Association, highlighting multiple ways for improving local education quality. Workshops were provided not only on Tibetan culture and knowledge, but also on other nationalities’ social knowledge (common sense), legal consciousness and manual skills. Alpha Communities is also continuing discussions on Vocational Training for poor and low educated young people. Moreover, the organisation visited Tangke Primary School and, apart from meeting their sponsor students, they also talked to them about cooperative developments and the school’s needs. Tangke Primary School asked Alpha Communities to help produce text books for vocational courses they are running as part of an education program for older students. Alpha Communities will work together with the school to see this textbook produced and printed within reasonable time. As a result, it was not uncommon in Tangke Temple Library to see government officials, monks and local NGOs meeting and talking together. Thus, we can see the success of education depends more on a context sympathetic to nomadic cultural than on the adoption of a particular methodology or curriculum.

Artefacts: environmental artefacts and cultural signs

The Tibetan nomadic context is evident in environmental artefacts and cultural signs. These visual materials are the representation of the sociocultural constructions of this town. In what follows, I examine how governmentality takes place through the discursive production of specific sets of artefacts related to education for Tibetans: buildings and signs (in public space) and reading rooms and exhibition rooms (in the Tangke Temple Library). The town’s physical appearance is attractive. Its Tibetan style provides local people with buildings and signs to transmit Tibetan nomadic context-relevant concepts. The local government promotes buildings with Tibetan style wooden lattice windows. The signs in the street and in scenic spots are bilingual, with both Chinese and Tibetan culture appearing. These buildings and signs assume a material aspect and an ideal conceptual aspect promoting bilingualism and biculturalism. As the town’s mayor notes:

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“the town’s Tibetan style municipal facilities make the town more charming.” (Tangke Town, 2011). The hidden meaning of these artefacts echoes the basic policy: marry unique Tibetan culture and tourism under the document: Strengthening the overall social cause for enhancing soft power (2011), as noted previously. These artefacts are not only viewed by the policy actors as an example of Tibetan culture to strengthen their ethnic identity, but also as an impetus for local people to develop Tibetan culture as well as other cultures. In the Tangke Temple Library, reading rooms are endowed with meanings connected with Tibet and the relationship between Han and Tibetan people. There are over 40 computers for readers to access databases in Tibetan and Chinese. It is evident here that the Library develops bilingual and bicultural sources for not only the local people but also outsiders. The reading rooms analysed in this Tibetan temple Library seemed to be the result of ‘culturally hybrid’ practices (Eduardo, 2008, p. 406). The artefacts (books and computers in the reading rooms) present evidence that the Library drew on the two conflicting discourses: Chinese nationalist values and Tibetan characteristics. It is this hybrid strategy that opens up a third space of/for the rearticulation of negotiation and meaning (Bhabha, 1996). The Library exhibition room is an important part of the town’s static ideological context. It not only informs the local people of Tibetan Buddhism and culture, but also transmits and builds the concept among the local people, as the vice director of the Library states, “Everyone can visit the Library. Religious believers can come to worship, and non-religious people can come to appreciate cultural relics and understand Tibetan achievements.” There are precious cultural artefacts displayed in the room, such as Buddha relics. It is noteworthy that these cultural religious relics are accompanied by a document entitled ‘protect religion and religious freedom’ written in both Tibetan and Chinese, and two photographs of the young Dalai Lama (see Figure 7.2). Having a photograph of Dalai Lama would not be possible in a public space.

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Figure 7.2: Adocument ‘protect religion and religious freedom’ written in both Tibetan and Chinese, and two photos of the young Dalai Lama

Here, the Library exhibition suggests that ‘religious freedom’ is indicative of history engaged in process of cultural production relating to language, identity and power. In terms of the hybrid discourse of Tibetan nomadic context-relevant bilingualism and biculturalism, the meaning of ‘religious freedom’ is neither a retreat into Tibetan traditionism nor merely the alteration of surface discourse features of outside Han culturalism. Instead, it is the adoption of new ideas through a local voice, a way of discoursing that interprets outside ideas according to local practice in terms of local community-based knowledge and methods of cultural transmission that comprise the field and mode of local voices. In other words, third spaces are discursive sites or conditions that “ensure that the meaning and symbols of culture have no primordial unity or fixity; that even the same signs can be appropriated, translated, and rehistoricized anew” (Bhabha, 1994, p. 37). The production of artefacts has the authority to pronounce ‘religious freedom’ as to what has to be done, or what is 230 desirable conduct, in Tangke Town. Students of Tangke Primary School have grown up in such a town context.

7.3 Tangke Primary School

This section explores the ways in which bilingual education policies are employed in the Tangke Primary School context that Tibetan students experience. As with the distinct discourses of Han universalism and Tibetan identity apparent in the town, the key policy actors in the school believed education for Tibetans should be developed towards two distinct objectives: patriotism and particular cultural interests. A more detailed analysis of how these antagonistic discourses are also presented within the everyday practices of school life, showing discursive shifts in policy enactment processes, is now presented.

7.3.1 Key signifiers in discourses of education policy in the school

The discourse of patriotic education

The Moral Education Office produced a document for strengthening the priority of morality in Tangke Primary School: We must love our students. We should be strict teachers of moral education. We must promote the priority of morality. The standards of examining our students are focusing on morality, even for those who have good exam results. Otherwise, our students cannot grow up and become our nation’s socialist builders and successors.

The title of the document ‘Teachers’ Love’ evokes a nodal point of moral conservative discourse. The Moral Education Office describes such love as manifest in strict teachers of moral education. It is a love which highlights Han universalism (socialist builders and successors). Love appears frequently in moral education policy texts, as in the following extract:

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We must foster our students’ love of our motherland’s language, as well as their love of our motherland. Through various teaching and learning methods, we must encourage patriotism and sow patriotic seeds in our students’ minds. Especially during the period of Tibetan stability maintenance, we must make our students feel how happy their life is, and that we have a strong country. We must make our students understand the importance of national unity, and we are inseparable from motherland. We must enable students to understand that the love of the motherland is not an empty phrase, and that learning the language of the motherland is a manifestation of patriotism!

Here, the implicit nodal point ‘Han universalism’ of the discourse of patriotic education can be identified. The extract above is loaded with signifiers from moral conservative discourses that can be traced through a chain of equivalence in terms of love of our motherland’s language = love of our motherland = patriotism = sow patriotic seeds in our students’ mind = national unity = inseparable from motherland = learning the language of the motherland = a manifestation of patriotism = Han universalism. The operation of the logic of equivalence is held together by Han universalism, and is what Laclau (2000) called articulatory logic. For example, Zhang, a Chinese teacher, stated that correct pronunciation and enunciation in Mandarin were necessary to ensure academic success, contending that students should: speak Mandarin in and after class, so as to eliminate their sense of fear of speaking Mandarin and to ensure their academic success for future development. I tell my students that ‘the impact of your native language leads to your incorrect pronunciation in Mandarin. But this does not mean that you cannot speak well. As long as you practice repeatedly, I believe you will overcome the problem and speak correctly.’ Meanwhile, I model speaking for my students.

Zhang embodied the idea of Han universalism. For this Chinese teacher, speaking Mandarin correctly meant speaking Mandarin in a way that one’s accent was not evident (the impact of your native language leads to your incorrect pronunciation in Mandarin). Zhang demonstrates Tibetan language and culture as a deficit orientation (you will overcome the problem and speak correctly). Zhang’s ideas about speaking correctly carried Chinese nationalist values. Put another way, shifting the point of

232 enunciation, i.e. to that of the perspective of Han universalism, implies a transformation of the content of the enunciation. Such shifts are the core of all hegemonic operations (Torfing, 1999, p. 177). An analysis of Zhang’s words reflects the strong connections that she made between speaking correctly and Chinese nationalist identity, that is, Han universalism, around which the discourse of patriotic education is organised.

The discourse of particular cultural interests

The Moral Education Office provides a representation of the type of attributes education should inculcate in its students, stressing Han universalism. However, the Teaching Office provides significant discoursal associations that clash strongly with the first major discourse of the education policy in Tangke Primary School. In 2011, the Teaching Office produced a report entitled ‘Adults’ Vision and Students’ World’, highlighting connections between Tibetan students’ particular cultural interests and their future development: We cannot interfere in our students’ world with secular view. We cannot evaluate, standardise and constrain our students with adult norms. Otherwise, our students cannot develop their particular cultural interests naturally and achieve their dreams.

Here, identity is associated with other signifiers, such as students’ world, particular cultural interests and dreams. Students’ particular cultural interests are presented positively as a way to situate a particular Tibetan students’ world rather than secular Han culture or adult norms at the centre of achieving their dreams. It connotes responsiveness to locality and ethnic identities. One Tibetan teacher indicates: “I do not like people saying that our students are stupid and backward. Actually, they are very bright, kind, simple, honest, and brave, which they learned from their parents. These experiences and practices benefit our students in developing their particular cultural interests.” This reflects a similar view of objecting to labelling Tibetans as ‘backward’ people in the discourses promoting Tibetan identity in Cases 1 and 2. Tibetan identity will develop Tibetan students’ particular cultural interests.

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Furthermore, the Teaching Office has extended the discourse of particular cultural interests, arguing that education needs to provide students with a broader set of skills than in the past: In order to foster our students’ self-study abilities with particular cultural characteristics, we must change the ways of rote learning and mechanical training in the past. We must encourage our students’ exploratory skills, creativity and individual critical thinking.

The connotation of skills is contrasted with signifiers such as rote learning and mechanical training, often depicted as a strength of Chinese moral education but here represented as a weakness in contrast to developing students’ exploratory skills, creativity and individual critical thinking. The Teaching Office suggests that the national curricula has an immediate effect on the failure of bilingual education because it does not support and sustain Tibetan identity relating to students’ particular cultural interests, and because it highlights morality and politics. In other words, Tibetan identity is an example of a master signifier, and this discourse of particular cultural interests offers a particular content to fill this signifier. This takes place through the linking of signifiers in chains of equivalence in terms of ‘Tibetan students’ world = particular cultural interests = their dreams = self-study ability = students’ exploratory skills = creativity = individual critical thinking’ against the opposing chain consisting of ‘evaluate, standardise and constrain our students with adult norms, rote learning and mechanical training’ that establish identity relationally (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). These discoursal associations are significant, since they clash strongly with the major discourse of the education policy of Tangke Primary School, which is labelled ‘moral conservatism’.

7.3.2 Hybridity in discourses and discursive strategies in the school

By tracing key signifiers through a chain of texts, I identified two distinct discourses on education policies that are currently in circulation in this school: a discourse of patriotism and a discourse of promoting particular cultural interests. This section looks at how these antagonistic discourses are combined and inscribed into the practices of school life by identifying key policy actors, agendas, actions and artefacts embedded in

234 the unique hybrid discursive policy enactment processes that have helped Tangke Primary School to achieve both growth and stability in recent years.

Actors: positive attitudes towards development with multiple support

Zeren, the Tibetan principal, defines the development of his school as an emphasis on multiple support, which he explains as meaning: Due to the multifarious social support we have received for a long time our school has become a rising star in pastoral areas. Basically, the school’s growth is in relation to the multiple support of the community.

Zeren is in his late 30s. While working as a principal he studied in the program of culture and education of the southwest ethnic group from 2009-2011. Zeren’s words above promote education for Tibetan nomads, and highlight the school’s socio- historical background (the school’s growth is in relation to the multiple support of the community). They reflect both the school and the local government’s efforts to construct an educational group with cross-regional and cross-categorical schools, along with the relevantly liberal social and cultural policies in terms of forming a long-term system of non-government-run schools, as discussed previously. Against this background, the extract from the School Plan produced in 2011 provided a vision of how Tangke Primary School should look in the near future, particularly in relation to the inclusion of the government, religious authorities and NGOs within school development: We must reform our investment system and raise education funds through various channels. We must apply to the county education bureau for funds, and actively absorb nongovernmental funds for improving the schools and offering modern education facilities. We must make an effort to guide the education consumption market, with the help of the Education Association and the local nomads.

This hybrid discourse produced by the school’s administrative leaders was strongly dependent upon the local community context, notably, the neo-liberal political intervention in the form of marketization (make our efforts to guide the education

235 consumption market), privatisation (reform investment system, and nongovernmental funds), and modernisation (modern education facilities). The Tibetan principal, Zeren, is the main leader of the school’s administration. Using the integration of Tangke’s local unique resources, Tangke Primary School was able to secure a number of grants for improving the school’s condition and offering modern education facilities. It is evident that the development of Tangke Primary School is close related to the relationships between the school, the local government, religion authorities and NGOs (apply to the county education bureau for funds and actively absorb nongovernmental funds). Although this hybrid discourse involves hegemonic ideas of “a combination of managerial accountability mechanisms and market-oriented notions of choice” (Clarke, 2012b, p. 307), this integration reflects and serves the school’s administrative leaders’ positive attitudes towards culture inclusiveness (with the help of the Education Association and the local nomads). A number of Tibetan teachers I interviewed shared a similar standpoint: that responsiveness to locality and ethnicity should be the basis of promoting multiple forms of support for education development. The majority of the school staff were born and bred in Tangke, with a strong sense of identity and pride in their culture. Although they experience hardship in their working and lives, these teachers hope to improve their care of their students. For these Tibetan teachers, parents directly influence students’ thinking and behaviour; as is noted in the local saying: Parents are said to be their children’s ‘mirrors’ [examples] while children are the ‘shadows’ [representation] of their parents. That is, family education is an essential educational force, and it cannot be replaced by school education. Together with the inclusion of the government, religious authorities and NGOs, Tangke Primary School has attempted to work locally and integrate local education resources for international and multiple corporations, thus forming a joint educational force for Tibetan students. I will return to this point in the following sections. This discourse of multiple support, I argue, which is so widespread that it has attained the status of a social fact of this school, makes it easy to adopt the discourse of hybridity, which offers a hybrid identity. For example, the Tibetan principal’s positive attitude towards development with multifarious support was embedded in the school where he felt he shared cultural and linguistic experiences with his teachers and students:

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Democracy and dignity heavily influence the processes of teaching and learning. As Sukhomlynsky indicates, ‘the core of education is essentially to enable children to feel dignity’. Teachers must respect their students and trust their students’ potential creativity. This is the key for students to fully recognize their value and establish their confidence. And confidence is the basis of creativity.

The extract above came under the heading, ‘the power of respect’, in a policy speech by the Tibetan principal in 2011. The principal quotes from Sukhomlynsky’s system of education, reflecting his approach to moral education, enabling children to feel dignity, and encouraging students to take responsibility for the living environment which surrounds them. As regards moral education, the principal adds an additional explanation that connects moral education with morality in Tibetan Buddhism: “we offer moral education for our students through the unique Tibetan Buddhist aspects of morality and ethical behavior” (Zeren, Interview, Tibetan principal, November, 2011). Thus, in policy terms, what the principal is actually promoting here is an egalitarian education for Tibetan students (Teachers must respect their students), emphasising the role of trust as the key to educational excellence (Teachers must trust their students’ potential creativity). In this context, ‘identity’ acquires a powerful connection through the phrase recognize their values and establish their confidence. Identity can empower Tibetan students and raise their expectations (confidence is the base of creativity). As such, Tibetan students I interviewed articulate their pride in the local environment, the grasslands, with Tibetan Buddhism. It is evident that these Tibetan students indicate an interest in learning Tibetan literature and language, which they recognize as linked to their identity. They are resistant to the deficit orientation to Tibetan identity and language. Within this hybrid discourse, Tibetan identity relating to democracy and dignity will bring power to the Tibetan community with multiple support.

Agendas: the hybrid agendas of ‘four teaching and learning bases’

The school’s administrative leaders attempted to unify signifiers promoting multiple support in their articulation of the policy agenda of establishing ‘four teaching and learning bases’. The four bases refer to teaching and learning modern animal husbandry,

237 grassland protection, Tibetan traditional crafts, and ecological and cultural tourism. This school policy agenda was announced in the 2010 School Plan: First, we have a teaching and learning base in modern animal husbandry, as our school is located in a pastoral area; and the Education Bureau of Aba [Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture Government] granted us 50,000 yuan ($8000). Secondly, considering that the state calls for ecological protection for our pastoral area, we must take good care of our grasslands. Thus, we will establish an experiment teaching base of grassland protection, under the help of Tangke Education Association. The third base is to teach our students Tibetan traditional crafts, focusing on tangka painting24 and by inviting Tibetan masters in Qinghai Province25. The fourth base is to focus on and foster talents for meeting the needs of the ecological and cultural tourism market and investors in our town. Our students will be able to serve our home town with these skills.

Here, the operation of articulatory logics (Laclau, 2000), namely, the logic of equivalence, i.e. openness to and acceptance of Han universalism, and the logic of difference, which breaks up the links of the equivalential chains, can be seen in this hybrid agenda of establishing ‘four teaching and learning bases’. Specifically, the school policy makers write about boundary work, which includes distinctions between tradition and modernisation and Tibetan identity and Han universalism, thus forming a chain of equivalence in terms of ‘Tibet = animal husbandry = pastoral area = tradition = grasslands = Tibetan traditional crafts = tangka painting = Tibetan identity versus Han = modernisation’, and its relation to the function of Han universal representation (modern animal husbandry, government grant, and the state calls for ecological protection). Simultaneously, the logic of difference takes on a particular significance in the strategic use of the hybrid discourse, reflected in responsiveness to Tibetan locality and identity (our school is located in a pastoral area, Tibetan traditional crafts, inviting Tibetan masters in Qinghai Province, and ecological and cultural tourism). Overall, it does not appear to me that the school’s administrative leaders’ accounts resonate with the disintegration of borders, ambivalence, fluid boundaries, or the simultaneous existence of subversion and conformism, as is commonly portrayed in the

24 Tangka painting is a painting on silk with embroidery, usually depicting a Buddhist deity, scene, or mandala of some sort (Wikipedia, 2012b). 25 Qinghai province borders Gansu on the northeast, the Xinjiang on the northwest, Sichuan on the southeast, and the Tibet Autonomous Region on the southwest (Wikipedia, 2012c). 238 discourse of hybridity. Moreover, since the school’s administrative leaders wrote these words, the school policy arena has been impacted by neo-liberal political intervention in the form of marketization (the needs of ecological and cultural tourism market), privatisation (Tangke Education Association), and modernisation (modern animal husbandry), with non-neoliberal discourse (ecological protection and we must take good care of our grasslands). In other words, the hybrid agenda of ‘four teaching and learning bases’ is to work locally with cross-regional corporations (Tibetan masters in Qinghai Province and investors), reflecting the operation of articulatory logics. This is the focus of the next section on policy actions that encourage multiple support for educational practices.

Actions: developing multiple educational practices from multiple supports

The operation of articulatory logics can also be seen in the policy actions around the hybrid agenda of establishing ‘four teaching and learning bases’. This is a process in which the texts on education policy agendas are translated from text to actions in relation to history and to the school community context, with the available resources (cf Ball et al., 2012). The bilingual model program of ‘Tibetan plus Chinese’ is practised in this Tibetan pastoral community. The school curriculum consisted of Tibetan, Chinese, mathematics, physical education, music, and drawing, combined with practical work experiences around the school compound. A general knowledge of politics and moral training, which stressed love of the motherland, love of the party, and love of the people, was another part of the curriculum. Amdo Tibetan was taught and used as teaching medium. Chinese Mandarin was provided as a main subject and an enabling language. Tangke Primary School has tried to develop school-based curriculum: Our teachers are sure about the ideological, political and educational significances of the national textbooks. Although the basis of the national textbooks reflects certain regional characteristics, we attempted to develop school-based curriculum in accordance with the environment, conditions and available resources of our school. Thus we can integrate traditional culture, rural culture and pastoral culture in teaching, and thereby create a dynamic, open,

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diverse educational environment for our students and form our school’s characteristics. (School Annual Report, 2011)

This report was produced by the school’s administrative leaders, reflecting the simultaneous operation of the logic of equivalence in terms of ‘the basis = the national textbooks = ideological, political and educational significances = Han universalism versus Tibetan = school-based curriculum’, and the logic of difference in terms of the responsiveness to locality and Tibetan identity in the curriculum (integrate traditional culture, rural culture and pastoral culture in teaching). Although the school’s administrative leaders recognised that the national textbook includes some ideas relating to Tibetan culture, they are not happy with the current curriculum. This was reflected in the school’s classroom actions relating to the purpose of creating a dynamic, open, diverse educational environment and school’s characteristics. For example, observations in the Chinese class showed students were well motivated, perhaps due to the teacher giving detailed explanations and using visual support of local materials for visual support. Due to the content of classes often being irrelevant, the texts were too difficult to sustain the Tibetan students’ interest. To address this problem, Yangjin, a Tibetan teacher shared her teaching method: I try to take my students into nature to enable them to develop the habit of watching things around them. Thus, the dialogue between real life and textbooks can be achieved by using blue sky, white clouds, green trees, and flowers in their compositions. This teaching will give my students a happy childhood memory and the memory of their roots. (Yangjin, Interview, Tibetan teacher, November, 2011)

In order to improve her students’ writing skills, Yangjin changed her teaching perspective based on the children’s pastoral environment, highlighting the inclusion of local natural recourses within teaching and learning (the dialogue between real life and textbooks can be achieved by using blue sky, white clouds, green trees, and flowers in their compositions). The students achieved a basic knowledge of biology and zoology through observing the pastoral livestock breeding, calf and lamb births and their growth process, and their capabilities of observing, thinking and discovery increased as a result. Yangjin and her class were promoted as models in Tangke Primary School, which

240 demonstrates that the school has a strong desire to take Tibetan beliefs and cultural values into account (the dialogue between real life and textbooks can be achieved), to develop Tibetan language and culture, and therefore to promote Tibetan identity (the memory of their roots). Currently the school is working towards establishing a number of vocational courses around the hybrid agenda of establishing ‘four teaching and learning bases’, particularly for those students who will not be able to move into junior middle school. Yangjin told me that not all students continue to Junior high school, and these young students need to learn vocational skills relating to their pastoral context and future work. The ‘four teaching and learning bases’ will provide an immediate reward for the students’ efforts and directly help them and their families. A number of Tibetan teachers and parents I interviewed shared a similar standpoint that ‘the ideal students would be practical’. It is argued that Tibetan nomads are open towards schooling, particularly if their children can be instructed in the four teaching and learning bases relating to animal husbandry, grassland protection, Tibetan traditional crafts, and ecological and cultural tourism. The school policy of ‘four teaching and learning bases’, that strives to integrate the ideas of practicality, cultural diversity and overall development into a coherent whole, was also reflected in the regional textbooks developed with support from NGOs, local community and religious leaders. For example, the school compiled five regional textbooks, highlighting content that is close to the actual economic and social conditions in pastoral areas, such as knowledge of modern animal husbandry, grassland protection, Tibetan traditional crafts, and ecological and cultural tourism. This was completed with the help of the international NGO, Alpha Communities, as noted previously. Tangke Primary School has asked Alpha Communities to help produce text books for the vocational courses they are running as part of an education program for older students. In this sense, the action of establishing ‘four teaching and learning bases’ has deeply influenced current vocational education in Tibet by providing practical technology that relates to their actual labour (Nima, 2001). The characteristics of these regional textbooks significantly influenced the local schools, reflecting pastoral Tibetans’ strong sense of pride in and loyalty to their own nomadic identity. For example, several village schools have directly use these regional textbooks in their classrooms. Thus, I argue that the hybrid actions of ‘four teaching and learning bases’ aid nomadic students and local communities, as well as forming a bridge between locals and the outside world.

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The beginning of economic liberalization in China in late 1970s, was a result of gowing awareness of, and openness to, globalisation on the part of China’s leaders; since then, Tibetans have increasingly found it imperative to learn the global language, English. There are two English teachers in this school, and one is supported by the Tangke Education Association. Although some researchers have argued that the unfinished search for a bilingual education model is burdened by the search for a model of trilingual education (Feng, 2005), from my interviews with the administrative leaders and teachers in Tangke Primary School, it is the local Tibetans that have asked the school for English classes. It could be argued that the insertion of English into the discursive frame helps break up the hierarchical, equivalential relationship between (superior) Mandarin and (inferior) Tibetan. In a sense, it gives local people an alterative source of power than the Mandarin in which they will always be judged as lacking. From my observation, Tibetan students are active in English class and they often say hello in English on campus. Tibetan was utilized as the teaching language in English class. This is in line with the principles and psychological characteristics of children's second language acquisition, and this is also the essential factor that enables Tangke Primary School to carry out English education. Thus, economic development, the intrusion of foreign cultures and NGOs all bring an impetus to the teaching of English in this school. When asked his views on the culture shock inside and outside school, the principal indicated: External influences would affect our traditional way of life. We would accept these effects and conflicts. Actually, we need these different concepts. We encourage our young teachers to learn English and attempt a trilingual education. We can both empower what our Tibetan nomads should have and encourage multiple support. (Zeren, Interview, Tibetan principal, November, 2011).

The excerpts above illustrate how Zeren was engaged in a constant dialogue around fostering his students authenticity as Tibetan nomads and their multilingual competency. He was fully aware of the potential consequences of his choices (We encourage our young teachers to learn English and attempt a trilingual education). The Tibetan principal did not articulate the need to accept an “either/or” position, but instead asserted a “both/and” positionality (Collins, 2000). That is, he could embrace his

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Tibetan identity and his affiliation to globalisation (We can both empower what our ethnic nationality should have and encourage multiple support). As a result, he felt confident to forge a hybrid identity within the nomad school context promoting multiple support, showing his attitude of accepting conflicts and different concepts. Such acceptance of difference, antagonism, and contestation could be the starting point of a genuine educational practice for Tibetans. In the following section, the combination of the various elements embodied in the school’s artefacts is discussed.

Artefacts: environmental artefacts and cultural signs

Within the discourse of promoting ‘four teaching and learning bases’ with multiple forms of support, students and teachers are exposed to the visualisation of policy through a combination of different sets of artefacts. That is, the relationship between texts on policy agendas and the social practice of policy action is mediated by the discursive practice of producing artefacts. For it is through discursive practice, whereby people use language to produce and consume texts (Phillips & Jørgensen, 2002), that texts shape and are shaped by social practice in relation to identity and power. In what follows, I examine how governmentality takes place through the discursive production of specific sets of school artefacts: wall displays and signs. There are two paintings on the wall of the school entrance based around the idea of a harmonious campus. The wall paintings feature Tibetan nomad culture and Han culture on campus (see Figure 7.3 and 7.4). In the first painting, two Tibetan students wearing Tibetan nomad robes hold a Chinese lucky knot. They stand in front of the teaching building with the red national flag. In the second painting, the tangka painting ‘four lucky animals’: an elephant, a monkey, a rabbit, and a pheasant, features Chinese characters, which translate as “a harmonious campus”.

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Figure 7.3: Wall painting promoting a harmonious campus in Tangke Primary School (1)

Figure 7.4: Wall painting promoting a harmonious campus in Tangke Primary School (2)

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The production of both wall paintings constitute a blending of the cultural-political mainstream’s signs, in terms of the red national flag, the Chinese lucky knot, the Chinese characters for “a harmonious campus”, and local cultural symbols in terms of Tibetan nomad robes and the tangka painting of ‘four lucky animals’. Han cultural signs and Tibetan religious symbols were used as sources to produce the discourse of harmony in Tangke Primary School’s context. In other words, the artefact produced by Tangke Primary School presents a blend of Han universalism/culturalism with a representation of Tibetan nomads and religious symbols, particularly in relation to the idea of ‘belonging’ to the Tibetan nomadic community. The idea of ‘belonging’ to the Tibetan nomadic community is highly elaborated through symbols. Such representations of belonging are materialized in Figure 7.5. On the wall of the teaching building is a huge wall display entitled ‘Take the path of innovation, and build a model school of the grasslands’ with the town’s image of the first bend of the Yellow River’s26. There are parallels that can be drawn between visual and linguistic meanings. The languages of the wall display are bilingual, with Tibetan culture, in terms of grasslands, and Han culture, in terms of model, all appearing. The background image is used not merely to illustrate the text, but also to convey subliminal meanings and values, which are implicit in the text. Here, the production of the town’s image of the first bend of the Yellow River beautiful scenery in the town is strongly dependent upon the local community context, notably, its culture and environmentally- based tourism development strategies (ecological and cultural tourism of the grasslands), which dovetail with the provincial government’s economic development strategies, as noted previously. The meanings conveyed through this wall display represent the school’s imprint on the policy agendas and actions of establishing the ‘four teaching and learning bases’ with multiple supports in terms of the path of innovation. In other words, these identity negotiations promote “collaborative relations of power” (Cummins, 2009, p. 30). Collaborative approaches will enable and empower Tibetan students, “amplifying their self-expression and identity, allocating power to the powerless” (see Cummins, 2000b, as cited in Baker, 2011, p. 405).

26 The Yellow River is called “the cradle of Chinese civilization”, as its basin—specifically, the Wei River Valley that cuts across the south of the long Ordos Loop—was the birthplace of ancient Chinese civilizations and the most prosperous region in early Chinese history (Wikipedia. (2012d). 245

Figure 7.5: ‘Take the path of innovation and build a model school of the grasslands’ on the wall display

Overall, the implicit meaning of these wall paintings echoes with school policy agendas and actions promoting vocational teaching and learning bases. The purpose is to work locally and integrate the local education resources for international and multiple corporations. These artefacts represent the school’s approach to what it means to enact bilingual education policies at the school and in the town. These artefacts reflect the context in which Tibetan students navigate the literacy practices which provide them with affordances to participate in multiple cultures. Tibetan students may be able to make good use of all these resources to develop their particular cultural interests and achieve their dreams without feeling marginalised by arbitrary social conventions that end up invalidating their language and culture. Thus, the hybrid artefacts were in line 246 with the practices of local school community life and they constituted a blending of mainstream and local, and culturally relevant resources mediated by discursive policy enactment processes, which highlight but seek to overcome the tension between Han universalism and Tibetan identity. My claim is that the Tangke Primary School case discovers creative hybridity through a process of symbolic representation, where the school seeks out signs of hybridity and imbues them with symbolic value. The school articulated a new identity that bridged its own cultural and linguistic resources with those of multiple supports. This is what I label ‘an active hybrid third space’ (see Figure 7.6).

Figure 7.6: Wall displays representing ‘an active hybrid third spaces’ in Tangke Primary School

7.4 Summary

Case 3 of Tangke presents the enactment of discursive educational policy practices that stands in stark contrast to those of Cases 1 and 2. Using Tangke as a case study, this chapter argues that a combination of liberal/open social policies, smart economic policies, and multiple support for educational practices within a unique hybrid discursive policy enactment have helped Tangke to achieve both growth and stability in recent years.

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Figure 7.7 presents the situation diagrammatically, with the meanings of the middle terms the most actively contested in the Tangke Primary School community. Like Cases 1 and 2, by tracing key signifiers through a chain of texts, I identified two distinct discourses on education policies that are currently in circulation in this town school community: a discourse of Han universalism and a discourse promoting Tibetan identity. The discourse of moral education echoes the hierarchical classification of the different races that is organised around the dichotomy of civilisation and backwardness in colonial discourse as detailed in Chapter 5. It constructs the colonized people as a part of an equivalential chain designating a certain ‘Tibetan’ identity. These identities impede the possibility of anti-colonial rebellion (Laclau & Mouffe 1985, p. 129) that might overturn the hierarchical dominance of Han universalism/culturalism (Mackerras, 1994). In Tangke’s context, the Tibetan nomads are challenged to adapt their cultural heritage, so as to capitalize upon the national administration of schooling for their own economic and social development (Postiglione, 2007). Unlike Cases 1 and 2, in deploying the two antagonistic discourses, Tangke presents the enactment of discursive educational policy practices that emphasise more personal and religious growth than ethnic loyalty. The local authorities of Tangke had begun to explore alternative means of developing the local economy with more open approaches to Tibetan Buddhism and NGOs. Tangke has seen a large expansion in its multifarious supports, such as, Tangke Monastery Library and local and international NGOs who provide regional textbooks and vocational training to Tibetans. In pursuing this idea of promoting multifarious support, Tangke Primary School embarked on the four key development projects of modern animal husbandry, grassland protection, Tibetan traditional crafts, and ecological and cultural tourism. Thus, the discursive policy enactment processes alter power positions within the town school community, particularly in relation to the Tibetan nomads’ constructed, shifting and hybrid identity. While Tangke Primary School has benefited from the idea of promoting multiple support, its nomadic community-led development strategy has delivered more inclusive growth. As a result of a combination of liberal social policies, smart economic policies and multiple educational practices that are rooted in the affirmation of Tibetan language, culture and religion, it seems increasingly economically and culturally valuable to be bilingual. I bring these significances out through the ‘four As’ framework analysis (see Table 7.1).

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Tangke school community created hybrid linguistic and cultural spaces based around those practices that retain a distinctive Tibetan identity. Most Tibetans have developed open dispositions, characterized by multicultural values alongside core Tibetan identity. Thus, power operates discursively through these dispositions and practices within an active hybrid discourse of promoting work locally and integrating local education resources for multiple local and international forms of collaboration. It is thus an instance of the creative appropriation of neo-liberal education policy discourses, in which the creative hybridity shifts power relations, thus forming a collaborative educational force for Tibetan students. Within the active hybrid linguistic and cultural spaces, Tibetan students’ sense of cultural belonging and community involvement (culture capital) offers empowerment within the context of a culturally relevant school community.

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Cultural identity discourse Hybrid discourse Moral conservative discourse

Cultural diversity Han-dominated unity Identity

The logic of difference The logic of equivalence

• something of proud Field of contested signification Tibetan=backward=individual young people’s • high value in our real life incorrect values=lack of national consciousness • Tibetan language as a powerful tool to and legal concepts versus Han=advanced= Actors’ attitudes towards minority education make Tibetans’ future and destiny the identity of the great motherland= Agendas of development • Loosing Tibetan religion and culture is a Chinese nationalism identity=Chinese culture= Actions of implementing curriculum tragedy not only for Tibetans but also for the socialism with Chinese characteristics= Artefacts: identity and power the whole humans the motherland’s reunification= • particular cultural interests national unity=stability=gratitude to the • students’ exploring skills, creativity and CCP=Mandarin=obtain a regular job= individual critical thinking Han universalism

Figure 7.7: Discourse Theory concepts used in analysing distinct discourses of education policy in Tangke School community

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Table 7.1: Overview – ‘Four As’ analysis on the hybridity in discourses and discursive strategies in Erlu School community.

Policy Actors Agendas Actions Artefacts enactment ▪Attitudes towards minority ▪The meaning of development ▪Curriculum implementation ▪Sense of identity processes education (policy documents, articles and interview (curriculum materials and (environmental artefacts and Significances ( policy documents and interview) data) interview data) interview data) Tangke Town Town’s government leaders ▪ “modern education system with ethnic ▪supplementary materials for ▪the town’s municipal facilities ▪Students developed The local nomads characteristics” education quality improvement with unique Tibetan culture make open linguistic ▪ “three dimensions of inseparability” ▪ “qualified, balanced, and scientific ▪ bilingual readings provided by the town more modern charming dispositions, ▪ “marry unique Tibetan culture and development in education” Tangke Monastery Library ▪Bilingual books and computers characterized by tourism” ▪ “the long-term system of non- ▪multicultural communication in the reading rooms multicultural values and ▪ “cultural and ecological diversity” government-run school” between “Tibetan and Chinese ▪a document ‘protect religion and core Tibetan identities ▪‘ecological and cultural tourism of ▪ “an educational group with cross- culture and East-West culture” religious freedom’ written in both ▪the enactment of grassland’ regional and cross-categorical schools” ▪local and international NGOs – Tibetan and Chinese, and two discursive educational ▪ “Education is essential for changing ▪ “good relationship between school provides vocational training and photographs of young Dalai policy practices that the current economic situation of education and local religion” regional textbooks Lama in Tangke Monastery emphasised more poverty and backwardness” ▪local and international NGOs’ funds Library exhibition personal and religious Tangke Primary Key school’s administrative leaders, ▪unify signifiers promoting multiple ▪classroom actions relating to the ▪wall paintings: a blending of than ethnic loyalty. School teachers and students discourse: supports in their articulation of the policy purpose of creating “a dynamic, cultural-political mainstream’s ▪a combination of ▪“school’s growth is in relation to the agenda of establishing ‘four teaching and open, diverse educational signs in terms of red national liberal/open social allowance of non government support learning bases’ environment and school’s flag, Chinese lucky knot and policies, locally of the community” ▪ “the needs of ecological and cultural characteristics”. Chinese characters “harmonious responsive economic ▪“connects moral education with tourism market” ▪work with Alpha Communities campus”, and local cultural policies, and allowance morality in Tibetan Buddhism” ▪ “guide the education consumption for the production of regional symbols in terms of Tibetan of non government ▪“guide the education consumption market” textbooks that will teach skills nomad robes and tangka painting. supports for educational market, with the help of the Education ▪ “Tangke Education Association, that are useful for people ▪Signs in ‘Take the path of practices within the Association and the local nomads” Tibetan masters in Qinghai Province and engaged in local pastoral context innovation and build model unique hybrid ▪“apply to the county education bureau investors” and jobs school of grassland’ on wall discursive policy for funds and actively absorb ▪ “modern animal husbandry” ▪“We encourage our young display: the image of the first enactment have helped nongovernmental funds” ▪ “ecological protection and we must teachers learn English and bend of Yellow River and Tangke to achieve both take good care of our grasslands” attempt to trilingual education” grassland’s beautiful scenery growth and stability Analysis ▪positive attitudes towards development ▪The process of integration riding on the ▪the simultaneous operation of ▪the hidden meaning of these ▪ Neo-liberal political with multiple supports back of modernisation the logic of equivalence in terms artefacts echoes with the local intervention in the form ▪Tibetan identity relating to democracy ▪ Linking Tibetan cultural resources with of ‘the basis=the national policy agendas and actions of marketization, and dignity will bring power to Tibetan those of allowance of non government textbooks=ideological, political promoting vocational teaching privatisation, and community under the multiple supports. supports, thus, forming ‘active hybridity and educational and learning bases, in order to modernisation was ▪Neoliberal way of seeking third space’ – a counterhegemonic significances=Han universalism work locally and integrate the mediated by the regional/school-based solutions to agenda; versus Tibetan=school-based local education resources for coalition and regional/school-based problems curriculum’, and the logic of international and multiple convergence of very difference (integrate traditional corporation, thus forming a joint diverse cultural culture, rural culture and pastoral educational power for Tibetan backgrounds and social culture in teaching) students. strata.

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Chapter 8: Discussion, implications and conclusion

8.1 Introduction

China’s international engagement with the outside world over the last 60 years has intersected with its internal ethnic relations in a host of complex ways. In the context of China’s changing policies on ethnic relations, this study explored the minority education policy trajectory and policy enactment, including the impact of neoliberalism and marketization. This study identified and partially deconstructed 1) two conflicting discourses that shaped public representations of minority/bilingual education policy among various stakeholders and, indirectly, identities in modern China, and 2) the enactment of minority/bilingual education policy in Tibetan school communities, from the perspectives of social constructionism. The findings in Chapters Four, Five, Six and Seven have given an in-depth description of the relationship between China’s minority education policy context and the enactment of policy. Within the context of the correlation between modernisation and integration, the similarities of the first two cases promoting Han universalism/culturalism resulted from the underlying dominance of Han universalism over the three periods, to which neoliberalism adds further weight, focusing upon and fostering political loyalty, centring on economic development, at the cost of the so-called ‘second-rate’ Tibetan cultures. The differences in the third case, however, promoting both growth and Tibetan identity resulted from the unique neoliberal hybrid discourse of combining liberal/open social policies, locally responsive economic policies, and support from religious leaders as well as the local and global NGOs, for educational practices. The purpose of this chapter is to initiate discussion based on the findings in the previous chapters and present the implications of the research.

8.2 Discussion

As mentioned above, policy enactment emerges in the midst of policy contexts. The analyses of documents, interviews, and observations have provided a triangulated and in-depth picture of policy enactment in the specific Tibetan school communities within the context of China’s modernisation. The discussion below includes the

252 following sections: characteristics of China’s minority education policy context; features of policy enactment in Tibetan school communities; and the role of policy context in policy enactment.

8.2.1 Features of China’s minority education policy context

During the past 60 years, China’s fundamental agenda on minority education has reflected the same constant themes: cultural and linguistic diversity, political unity, and economic development at the centre (Guo, 2008; Mackerras, 2011a; Shih, 2002; Yi, 2011). Chapter 4 addressed these major themes in China’s minority education policy context through identifying: 1) two key discourses in minority education policy and research: cultural and linguistic diversity, representing the discourse of cultural identity, and Han-dominated unity, representing the discourse of Han universalism; and 2) tensions in the running of the state integrated agenda of modernisation, which are involved in/linked to the ambiguous relation between the logic of difference, in terms of ethnic cultural and linguistic diversity, and the logic of equivalence, in terms of minority = backward = undeveloped versus Han = advanced = developed. This context reveals the minority education policy trajectory over the last 60 years of economic and social change in China, particularly in relation to the more recent impact of neo-liberalism and marketization. Figure 8.1 summarizes some key features of such a situation diagrammatically (first introduced in Chapter 4), with the meanings of the middle terms still actively contested from moment to moment.

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Cultural identity Moral conservative discourse discourse

Bilingual/minority Ethnic minority Chinese nationalist education identities values Regional Economic Floating Curriculum Political loyalty to autonomy development Signifiers the CCP

Locality Patriotism Identity

The logic of equivalence The logic of difference Minority=backward versus cultural and linguistic Field of contested Han= advanced diversity signification

Figure 8.1: Features of minority education policy discourses in China’s context

Political unity versus cultural and linguistic diversity

On a fundamental level, the two themes of political unity and cultural and linguistic diversity are incongruent. Most significantly, the discourse of moral education, representing political unity, is based upon Han universalism; whereas, the discourse of cultural identity, representing cultural and linguistic diversity, is based upon local identity. Furthermore, Han universalism depicts Han-dominated unity and Chinese nationalist values as superior, reflected in the moral discourse, which can be regarded as an effort to establish the hegemony of that nationalistic idea. The moral discourse focuses on patriotism and the political loyalty to the CCP. From this perspective, promoting the priority of party-state, there is no room for cultural diversity. Minority language and culture, especially religion, were seen as ‘problems’ to be resolved. On the contrary, the discourse of cultural identity emphasises minority cultures as ‘valuable resources’, particularly in relation to languages, ideas, actions, objects of everyday existence and the construction of identity. The topic of minority language, being a highly significant marker of ethnic identity and a key arbiter of symbolic

254 power, carries important cultural knowledge to help minority children study bilingually, inherit their cultures, and preserve their cultural values and beliefs (Feng, 2009; Gladney, 2004; Johnson & Chhetri, 2002; Mackerras, 1994; Nima, 2004; Postiglione, 2008; Yi, 2011). These signifiers in terms of political unity and cultural and linguistic diversity appear in the texts repeatedly, and only with knowledge of context can their significance be realised. As we have seen, at the initial pluralistic stage (1949-1957), the logic of difference took on a particular significance in policies promoting ‘ethnic cultural and linguistic diversity’. The new CCP regime asserted its authority over minority areas steadily and gradually under the principle of different treatment; thus, the most favourable period for Min-Han relations was achieved by understanding and determining minorities’ differences. In other words, emphasizing the logic of difference attempts to weaken and displace a sharp antagonistic polarity, and endeavours to relegate that division between Min and Han, in terms of avoiding great nationality chauvinism and local nationalism. The bilingual educational system stressed distinctive minority characteristics, highlighting the right of language use. However, at the Chinese monopolistic stage (1958–1977), ‘ethnic cultural and linguistic diversity’ was subordinated under ‘Han-dominated unity’, by asserting two chains of equivalence in terms of Min = backward versus Han = advanced. This led to the deterioration between Min-Han. Thus in this period, bilingual education in China reached its lowest point of the last 60 years, evident in the policy move of imposing the Han language and the suppression of minority languages and cultures. From these associations, there appears to be an interaction/relationship between the two phenomena of ‘ethnic cultural and linguistic diversity’ and ‘Han dominated unity’, be it political, social, cultural, or economical. In other words, China’s minority/bilingual education is part of a ‘power/knowledge’ relationship. The greater degree of Han dominated unity, the less extensive the degree of ethnic cultural and linguistic diversity is likely to be. Conversely, more ethnic cultural and linguistic diversity implies less thoroughgoing Han-dominated unity. As Mackerras (1994) points out: “the farther policy is from the assimilation, the better relations will be” (p. 165).

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Rethinking hybrid discourse

The problem for policymakers is that the two competing discourses differ in such fundamental ways that any attempt to produce a hybrid discourse coherent enough to build and maintain hegemony is laden with difficulty. During the modernisation stage (1978-2012), the general policy promoting ‘unity in diversity’ has represented the tensions between the logic of difference and the logic of equivalence, with economic development as the central influence, as I detailed in previous chapters. One method by which the production of an effective hybrid discourse that involves the interplay of shifting power relations might be achieved in policy discourses is through the use of strategic ambiguity, in which the meanings of floating signifiers are blurred to allow them to be appropriated into a hybrid discourse. In terms of minority education policy discourse, the main function of ambiguity is to promote so-called unity in diversity. Around the contested signifiers, such as socio- political concerns, cultural differences, and economic development, the party-state promoted the integration of ideas of fostering political loyalty to the CCP, centring on economic development, and ethnicising minority cultures. That is to say, in order to become a hegemonic power, the party-state deploys the empty signifier of ‘the people’ and ‘the nation’ by giving them a particular and substantial content (Torfing, 1999, p. 193), in terms of people-centred harmonious development. These empty signifiers are nodal points in the political discourse of modernity. In short, the ‘I speak’ of the state must be transformed into ‘the nation/the people speaks’ (Ifversen, 1989, p, 38, as cited in Torfing, 1999, p. 193). Such minority education policy discourse equates to assimilation. Against this background, minority education issues are a modern state phenomenon rather than an ethnic phenomenon, particularly in relation to neoliberalism in minority education policy. Continued modernisation, including economic development and Tibetan quality-of-life improvement, is likely to be the fundamental pre-requisite for China to remain “an integrated state”, in which the various nationalities continue to interact and complement each other (Mackerras, 1994, p. 260). In Chapter 4, I problematized the governmental policy concerning bilingual/minority education for enhancing unity between people of different ethnic

256 backgrounds by drawing attention to the work of policy contextualization within a minority education policy trajectory at three levels of governance, namely, the central government, Sichuan Province, and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture governments in Sichuan. According to the national, provincial and the Tibetan autonomous prefecture policies there are at least two clear, if somewhat incompatible, primary objectives: 1) to diminish the large developmental gap between poor and affluent regions and; 2) to maintain the state authority across the three levels of governments. Even though the CCP is still the dominating force and power in co-ordinating policies on minority education and the discourse of unity and the logic of equivalence remain dominant, it seems likely that these two discourses and logics are likely to remain in tension. In summary, key features of minority education policy discourses in China’s context reflect the patterns and events of the history of education policy for minorities and the emergence of a hybrid developmental neoliberalism. These discourses partake of power and knowledge that are fused in the practices that comprise the history of China’s education policy for minorities. Centring on economic development, China is lurching between accelerating Han universalism and accelerating cultural diversity. China’s developmental neoliberalism in minority education policy is a top down process, within which the central government initiates neoliberal education reforms and the provincial and Tibetan autonomous governments follow them up. The strength and weakness of China’s unity have persisted into recent times, as China strives to balance minority education policies affecting its minority groups and its Min-Han relations, as well as its relations with the rest of the world.

8.2.2 Characteristics of policy enactment in Tibetan school communities

Although China’s neoliberal education policy is a top down process, this does not mean that policy actors are passive at the local level. Minorities have become more important in their influence on China as a whole. They have also become “a more significant factor in China’s relations with the rest of the world” (Mackerras, 2011a, p. 305). This section discusses characteristics of policy enactment in the three Tibetan school communities by examining the school communities’ engagement with neoliberalism within the discursive policy enactment processes.

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Similar characteristics: political unity versus cultural and linguistic diversity

Across the three Tibetan school communities, two demands currently conflict: appeals for Han universalism from the local political mainstream, and calls for responsiveness to local and ethnic identities by local school-based teacher-researchers. The neoliberalization of the discourses of Han universalism is characterized by standardisation and accountability measures. The neoliberalization of the discourses of cultural identity is characterized by an increasing sense of responsibility for resourcing education to the rural-based Tibetans and private investment. Standardisation and accountability measures have seen the essentialization and consolidation of the Han, highlighting Han-dominated values for improving Tibetan quality of life. As we have seen, for the local political leaders, Tibetans are essentially in need of modern enlightenment to improve their quality, not only in the field of knowledge or skills transmission, but also, more fundamentally, in the field of the cultural transmission of advanced moral standards. For example, the local political mainstream fashioned the ‘Patriotic Education Plan’ for moral education to promote the spirit of national unity in teaching materials, classrooms, and the students’ minds. It highlighted ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ and the ‘scientific concept of development’ (Sichuan Ethnic Committee, 2011). That is, standardisation and accountability measures relating to moral education have been utilized by the local political leaders to address the main difficulties and problems in improvement for Tibetans. Moreover, the use of quality as the key to understanding the local political mainstreams’ ‘backwardness’ is measured and indexed in terms of economic development. This was articulated through the universal equivalent, i.e. money, as a form of value. Thus, I argue that neoliberalization in the discourse of Han universalism justified and legitimized the civilizing mission of the cultural-political mainstream, tying individuality and political loyalty to the party-state. The devolving of responsibility for resourcing education to the rural-based Tibetans and private investment saw the ethnicisation of Tibetan culture and subjects, emphasising cultural values in Tibetan language and religion for life quality improvement. As we have seen, policy critics in the school communities contribute to education policy work in terms of developing regional curriculum and could inspire a strengthening of the desire among the population to maintain their own differences in

258 political, economic, social, and cultural terms. For these policy critics, ‘quality’ is seen in terms of the logic of difference, highlighting cultural and linguistic diversity. Most rural-based Tibetans and private organisations share a similar standpoint. In my opinion these critics can become significant in the policy process at particular moments; that is, “moments when policies or policy translations threaten the interests of members” (Ball et al., 2012, p. 61). There is clearly value in continuing to respond to individual specialties, creativity, ethnicity and cultural diversity. However, the effect of neoliberalism in the discourses of cultural identity has been to push Tibetan cultures to the peripheries of the market economy to a significant extent, particularly in relation to the ideas of ethnicizing Tibetan culture and subjects. Tibetan culture was represented at a superficial level, equating it with beautiful dancing, colourful dress and mysterious legends. Therefore, the hybrid discourse of ‘political unity versus cultural and linguistic diversity’ has intensified the marginalization of Tibetan language and culture in the wider Chinese society, as reflected in key discourses of minority education policy across the three Tibetan school communities.

Different characteristics: hybridity in discourses and discursive strategies

The hybrid discourse of minority education policy reveals two conflicting demands in terms of Han universalism and Tibetan identity. The two conflicting demands placed a strain, not only on policy choices, but also on the ways in which these policies were articulated and enacted discursively. In each case study in the previous chapters, I present a detailed analysis of how these antagonistic discourses were combined and inscribed into practice, using the ‘four A’ analytical framework – actors, agendas, actions and artefacts. The findings show that education policy enactments vary across the three types of Tibetan school communities. Based on these findings and significance, this section discusses the different characteristics embedded in the hybridity of discourses and discursive strategies. The differences between the three schools derived from the ‘four A’ analysis can be interpreted in terms of geopolitical contexts relating to Tibetan identity and power relationships, neoliberal hybrid discourse, and outcomes (see Table 8.1). Three

259 visions emerge from the study of the ways in which bilingual/minority education policies are taken up in the three Tibetan school communities. (1) Regular Chinese-medium education (monolingual education). As a school situated in the county government seat and on the developed transportation hub, the farming town school, Zhnaggu Primary School, narrowly and anxiously identifies with Han universalism and gives less cultural recognition to Tibetan identity than the other two schools. Here, Tibetan students developed instrumental linguistic dispositions, characterized by Han-only values and marginal Tibetan identities. (2) Monolingual and bicultural education. Situated close to the developed transportation hub, the semi-agro-pastoral school utilises Tibetan culture as a political tool of rural urbanization. Here, Tibetan students developed instrumental linguistic dispositions, characterized by cultural distance and alienated Tibetan identities. (3) Bilingual and multicultural education. This pastoral school is geographically remote from the developed transportation hub and demonstrates a greater and more accurate cultural recognition of Tibetan identity than the other two schools. The pastoral Tibetan students in this school developed open linguistic dispositions, characterized by multicultural values and core Tibetan identities. Thus, the dynamics of Tibetan identity and power relationships vary across the three school communities. The first two visions saw the neoliberal governmental hybrid discourse, centring on economic development and focusing upon and fostering political loyalty, at the cost of ‘second-rate’ Tibetan cultures. The suturing of individual identity and political loyalty is evident in the forms of standardisation and accountability as noted previously. “Excellent learning is the basic of being an official” has been the ideal motto for young students. Holders of this vision for local minority education largely see Tibetan culture and language as problems to be resolved, reflected in strengthening the ethnicization of Tibetan language and culture and the consolidation of Han language and culture as key resources for improving Tibetan quality of life. Tibetan language and cultural use in this context, embodied in the hybrid policy enactment processes, follows the cultural-political mainstream, Han universalism. This was reflected in the agendas, actions and artefacts produced by key policy actors from these two schools, which contained a blend of cultural-political mainstream practices.

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The third vision saw a neoliberal hybrid discourse combining liberal/open social policies, locally responsive economic policies, and multiple forms of aid for educational practices. It develops additive bilinguals who know the heritage of their minority as well as the national curriculum in Mandarin. A vision of balanced bilingualism that sees heritage languages and Mandarin as valuable resources is shared by the large majority of parents and students, most teachers and some administrators, highlighting the way in which it is of increasing economic and cultural value to be bilingual. Pastoral Tibetans in this school celebrate the ideal that “excellent learning is the basic of being practical”, evident in the school’s agendas, actions and artefacts around the ‘four teaching and learning bases’. Such policy enactment can strengthen Tibetan students’ bicultural habitus and give them access to the power field position (Bourdieu, 1977). The liberal/open school policies and practices mean that the school is open to dialogue with the rural-based Tibetans and to support from religious leaders as well as the local and global NGOs. Thus, students were able to construct bilingual and bicultural dispositions and habitus, whereby they positioned themselves in spaces of engaged interaction between the school and their communities. Thus, the discursively hybrid characteristics and strategies of these Tibetan school communities suggest that the interactions between local contexts and education policy enactments lead to different policy outcomes. Policies are enacted in different contexts in terms of geopolitical localities, with varying resources, in relation to policy actors’ dispositions, identities and activities. The first two visions of schooling saw the common practice of putting a neoliberal governmentality with Chinese characteristics, which is responsive to the priorities of the party-state and is a culture- blind model with a top-down set of power relations. However, I attempt to disrupt this neoliberal approach by introducing the ‘reality’ of my third case study school community, highlighting the role of a reworked neoliberalism in achieving both local life growth and stability. Moreover, this approach may have potential for a re- envisioned state role that might enable China to engage as a respected partner on the world stage. Therefore, the relationship between local context and policy enactment and outcome in the case of the third school represents a unique blend of political economic, socio-cultural, and geographic and historical circumstances, as well as China’s local-global interactions.

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Table 8.1: Characteristics of hybridity in discourses and discursive strategies in Tibetan school communities

Schools Zhanggu Badi Tangke Regular Chinese- Monolingual and Bilingual and multicultural medium education bicultural education education (monolingual education) Contexts ▪Situated in the ▪Situated in the semi- ▪Situated in the pastoral farming county agro-pastoral town and town and remote from the government seat and close to the developed developed transportation on the developed transportation hub hub transportation hub ▪Tibetan students ▪Tibetan students developed ▪Tibetan students developed open linguistic dispositions, developed instrumental instrumental linguistic characterized by linguistic dispositions, dispositions, multicultural values and characterized by Han- characterized by core Tibetan identities only values and cultural distance and marginal Tibetan alienated Tibetan identities identities. Enactments The neoliberal governmental hybrid discourse The neoliberal hybrid focusing upon and fostering political loyalty, discourse combining and centring on economic development at the liberal/open social policies, cost of ‘second-rate’ Tibetan cultures. locally responsive economic policies, and multiple forms of aid for educational practices. Outcomes Strengthening the ethnicization of Tibetan Strengthening Tibetan culture and the essentialization of Han morality students’ habitus and give for improving Tibetan life them access to the power field position

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In summary, the neoliberalization of the discursive policy enactment processes in all the three Tibetan school communities is characterized by forms of standardisation and accountability, and increasing responsibility for resourcing education to the rural- based Tibetans and private investment for improving Tibetan quality of life. I argue that these characteristics of hybridity in discourses and discursive strategies can be regarded as determining factors in relation to local school community development. These new factors thus give birth to emerging neoliberal minority education policy enactments. I also identified that forms of state intervention, representing the original neoliberal ideology, play a key role in minority education policy enactments in the three Tibetan school communities. This is the focus of the next section.

8.2.3 The role of minority education policy context in policy enactment

Within discursive policy enactment processes, local state governments have played an active role and have engaged intimately with neoliberalism. In the three Tibetan communities, local governments have different shares of responsibilities and interests in education development. Their development strategies and their interactions with the market and local communities are different. In other words, different local state governments have different degrees of engagement with neoliberalism. Therefore, the relationship between the minority education policy context and policy enactment in Tibetan school communities can be best illustrated in the tensions/contradictions between political unity, cultural identity, and neoliberalism. In what follows, I discuss these contradictions in horizontal and vertical directions, by examining the association between the minority education policy context and policy enactment in relation to the impact of neo-liberalism. This was done through using what I call ‘hybrid orders of discourse’ (see Figure 8.2, first introduced in Chapter 3). Contradictions may arise in both horizontal and vertical directions. Vertical tensions are generated from interactions between political morality and local cultural identity (see ‘first hybrid space’) and between political morality and neoliberalism (see ‘second hybrid space’); while horizontal tensions are created between the emergent neoliberalism and local practices (see ‘third third space’).

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Political morality:

Han universalism; Political loyalty to the party-state; The logic of equivalence in terms of ‘Tibetan = backward versus Han = advanced’

First hybrid space Second hybrid space

Cultural identity: Neoliberalism:

Languages; Economic development; Traditional cultures; Third hybrid space Market logic; Religion; The logic of difference in terms of ‘cultural and linguistic diversity’

Figure 8.2: Hybrid orders of discourse

Moral-neoliberal order

The first model saw tensions between political morality, neoliberalism, and cultural identity in Zhanggu Town (see Figure 8.3). Tensions between Han universalism and neoliberalism are formed in the ‘first hybrid space’, focusing on political loyalty and centring on economic growth, at the cost of the ‘second-rate’ of Tibetan culture and language. The political moral discourse of the local political mainstream in this model treats language as a neutral communication tool (instrumental linguistic disposition); separate from culture, while simultaneously revealing Tibetan language as a problem. The standard of Han culture is established in the ‘second hybrid space’, result in the tension between the local political mainstream (governing) and the local traditional community (being dominated). Contradictions between neoliberalism and cultural identity in the ‘third hybrid space’ are focused on the decreasing opportunities of using Tibetan language and culture in the wider Chinese world, notably, the strict exclusion of religion from the public domain and the ‘second-rate’ status of Tibetan culture.

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I call this model ‘moral-neoliberal order’. In this order, Tibetan students are located in a simple curriculum with emphasis on Mandarin and Han culture, which reinforced and internalized the idea that Tibetan students have poor cultural competencies. For example, teachers and students who spoke Jiarong Tibetan dialects in class were registered and reported to the school, as discussed previously. That is, nonstandard languages and dialects were viewed as “illegitimate” (Anzaldua, 1999, p. 80). Due to the neglect of their own language and culture, Tibetan children are forced to adopt and accept the political mainstream’s recognized language and culture. For the students in this ‘bilingual model transformation school’, their one-way recognition of Mandarin and Han culture and their belief in the inferiority of Tibetan identity block the fruition of their identities as Tibetans. Thus, I see this ‘moral-neoliberal- cultural discursive order’ as assimilation.

Political morality:

Han universalism; Political loyalty to the party-state; The logic of equivalence in terms of ‘Tibetan = backward versus Han = advanced’

First hybrid space Second hybrid space

Focusing upon and fostering One-way recognition of Mandarin political loyalty; and Han culture; Centring on economic development; Inferiority complex in Tibetan At the cost of marginalising Tibetan identity; cultures;

Neoliberalism: Cultural identity:

Centring on economic development; Tibetan identity; Life quality improvement; Third hybrid space Tibetan language; Accountability; Traditional cultures; Centring on economic development; Religion; The logic of difference in Ignoring the decreasing terms of ‘cultural and opportunities of using Tibetan linguistic diversity’ language and culture in the wider Figure 8.3: Moral-neoliberal orderChinese world; – levels of contradictions in the hybridity in discourses and discursive strategies in Zhanggu

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Moral-cultural order

The second model of Badi saw similar tensions between morality, cultural identity, and neoliberalism as in Zhanggu Town (see Figure 8.4). As discussed in Chapter 6, the ongoing transition from the countryside to the central town manifests in their speech. While many families try to acquire a ‘town/city dialect’ and aspire to adhere to the socially constructed lifestyle of the town/city, they still draw heavily on their original ‘rural dialect’ and ‘traditional way of life’ (see first space). As a reflection of this transitional phase in their lifestyles and in the way they speak, students switch from ‘rural dialect’ to ‘town/city dialect’ when they participate in school. The integration and conflict between Han universalism and neoliberalism in Badi is also evident (see second space). The general contradictions show an ambiguous attitude towards the local language and culture. On the one hand, they were against Tibetan language being utilized in school education. On the other hand, they recognised the important role of their native language in communication, and continuation and transference of their native culture within the local community, particularly in relation to environmental and cultural conservation (see third space). Thus, I see this order as constituted by a ‘moral-cultural order’ and reflecting limited pluralism. Like the Zhanggu model, when these aspects appear to be in conflict, the priority of the party-state is usually to justify and legitimize its regime in Badi, by focusing upon and fostering political loyalty in the masses. This caused the continuing changes of Badi Tibetans’ linguistic and cultural environments, with the decline of Jiarong Tibetan language use.

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Political morality:

Han universalism; Political loyalty to the party-state; The logic of equivalence in terms of ‘Tibetan = backward versus Han = advanced’

First hybrid space Second hybrid space

Switch from ‘rural dialect’ to Focusing upon and fostering ‘town/city dialect’ when they political loyalty;

participate at school Centring on economic development; At the cost of marginalising Tibetan cultures;

Cultural identity: Neoliberalism: Tibetan identity; Tibetan language; Centring on economic development;

Traditional cultures; Third hybrid space Quality improvement; Religion; Accountability; The logic of difference Centring on economic development; in terms of ‘cultural and linguistic diversity’ Encouraging environmental and cultural conservation;

Figure 8.4: Moral-cultural order – levels of contradictions in the hybridity in discourses and discursive strategies in Badi

In both Cases 1 and 2, emerging inequality and ambiguity spread throughout the educational and psychological field. On the one hand, the market-oriented approaches of neoliberalism have intensified the marginalisation of the Tibetan language and culture in the wider Chinese society, thus forming inequality in relation to the right of language use. In China, the most useful language, bequeathing a high social status, is Mandarin, similar to the way in the world at large that benefits accrue from English (Mackerras, 1994). In both cases, if the Tibetan students master yet another language, it is likely to be English, not the mastery of their own Tibetan dialects; as Mackerras (1994) notes, “the languages of the minority nationalities are likely to be left out” (p. 270). Tibetan students were typically denied their identities and home language. A

267 language like Jiarong Tibetan in Cases 1 and 2 will remain in use in the rural areas and among those people wishing to accentuate their own nationality, but as “modernisation proceeds it is likely to be used less and less as a living vehicle of communication” (Mackerras, 1994, p. 271). That is to say, minority education policy for efficiency in learning and economic development, rather than effectiveness in learning and cultural diversity for minorities, is still the ultimate goal of minority education development. On the other hand, the market-oriented approaches of neoliberalism complicate minority education development, thus forming ambiguity in relation to identity. Although Tibetan students show the one-way recognition of Han identity, the common cultural characteristics of ethnic origin and religion are strong evidence of their own ethnic identity. Tibetans in both Zhanggu and Badi do not accept the traditionally negative connotations of the terms illiterate and backward being applied to them. However, neither Zhanggu Tibetans nor Badi Tibetans can find an adequate way to realise (in the sense of make real) their status. These participants are articulate about exploring a new life, but they struggle with their own identity. Therefore, the emerging inequality and ambiguity cannot simply be seen as the negation of Tibetan culture, but a short-term shift in the basis of cultural identity, in relation to political and economic transformations resulting from state intervention. In other words, these identity negotiations reinforce “coercive relations of power” (Cummins, 2009, p. 30). The existence of dominant-subordinate expectations and relations has profoundly limited the role of community-based efforts in regard to the production of Tibetan identity and cultural heritage. Therefore, these two schools are largely determined by state intervention, which seeks short-term returns and visible achievements from the implemention of Han universalism.

Cultural-neoliberal order

The third model saw that as the share of responsibilities and interests in minority/bilingual education development increases, the degree of engagement with neoliberalism also increases (see Figure 8.5). In the third model of Tangke, minority education development is determined by the culture that binds the society together and gives it a sense of identity, dignity, security and continuity. This is enacted

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through the unique neoliberal hybrid discourse of combining liberal/open social policies, locally responsive economic policies, and multiple forms of aid for educational practices. Thus, neo-liberal political intervention was mediated by the coalition and convergence of very diverse cultural backgrounds and social strata, highlighting the idea of working locally and integrating local education resources with those from international and multiple corporations. I see this model of ‘cultural- neoliberal order’ as reflecting and expressing an open pluralism.

Cultural identity:

Tibetan identity; Tibetan language; Traditional cultures; Religion; The logic of difference in terms of ‘cultural and linguistic diversity’

First hybrid space Second hybrid space

Personal and religious growth; A combination of liberal social policies, locally responsive Local and international NGOs; Centring on economic economic policies and multiple educational practices that are rooted development; in the celebration of Tibetan Encouraging environmental and language, culture and religion; cultural conservation;

Neoliberalism: Political morality:

Centring on economic Han universalism; development; Third hybrid space Political loyalty to the party-state; Quality improvement; The logic of equivalence in terms of Accountability; Centring on economic ‘Tibetan = backward versus Han = development; advanced’ Involvement of personal and religious factors;

Figure 8.5: Cultural-neoliberal order – levels of contradictions in the hybridity in discourses and discursive strategies in Tangke

From this case study, I imagine the pluralistic hybrid discourses as having great potential to transform current bilingual education policy and practice. These hybrid

269 discourses can reconfigure power relations and open doors so that preservice teachers who embody hybrid identities on the basis of ethnicity and language feel a sense of belongingness in multiple contexts. In this model of ‘cultural-neoliberal order’, where collaborative approaches are found (see the three spaces), Tibetan students are enabled and empowered in their self-expression and identity, reflected in their open- mindedness to the wider society. This is a way of allocating power to powerless (see Cummins, 2000, 2001). In comparison to models 1 and 2, Tangke’s leaders have been remarkably successful in pursuing economic growth and social stability over the past decade. Their success has been made possible not just by sound economic planning based on inclusive development, but also by adopting a relatively liberal approach to cultural and religious expression (Hillman, 2010). In Tangke Primary School, there are positive signs of non-dominating forms of power operating in relation to identity and community. Signs, such as the coalition and convergence of very diverse professional backgrounds and social strata, are exactly what is needed for Tangke’s further development and what is expected by local reformers. That is to say, neo-liberal political intervention in the form of marketization, privatisation, and modernisation is mediated by alternatives, which encourage development that brings with it both change and continuity. Thus, by locating the points made within a broader discussion of politics and the nature of the political, I argue that the Tangke case shines additional light on the workings of minority education as a response to neo-liberal education policy. In summary, the contradictions and relations in the models are interwoven to create the peculiar fabric of neoliberalization in the three Tibetan communities within China’s context and that of the wider world. Neoliberalization in the discursive policy enactment processes in all the three Tibetan school communities is characterized by increasing responsibility for resourcing education to the rural-based Tibetans and private investment, as well as the constant intervention of the party-state. Instead of entirely resting on market logic, the institutional transformations happening in China, for example, decentralization, empowerment and localism, are not intended to diminish the role of the state, but rather to foster market operations through providing necessary governmental services and support. In this sense, the pattern in China reflects wider contradictions in neoliberal views on the state, which is both upheld as

270 a source of power and influence and demonized as a byword for inefficiency by neoliberals (Mirowski, 2013; Peck, 2010; Stedman Jones, 2012). Within the particular Chinese political appointment system, the municipal government has to deliver the policy of the central government and has its own responsibility to balance economic growth and social needs. The neoliberalization process is full of controversies and inconsistencies, which involve conflicts between neoliberal practices and social resistance, and tensions between central and local states. While each of the three cases represents a blend of social, cultural, economic, educational, geographic and historical circumstances, I argue that Tangke’s experience nevertheless yields important lessons for other Tibetan areas and for policymakers in Beijing.

8.3 Implications

The above discussion highlights some special factors concerning the characteristics of China’s minority education policy context, the features of policy enactment in Tibetan school communities and the role of policy context in policy enactment. Thus, the implication of the research can be summarised from the following two perspectives of future minority education policy and policy enactment.

8.3.1 Implications for future policy

This study explored the minority education policy trajectory over the last 60 years of economic and social change in China, including the impact of neo-liberalism and marketization. This was achieved by pursuing change and continuity in terms of the themes of cultural and linguistic diversity, and political unity, which (r)evolved around a center of economic development. History was explored to challenge a number of hegemonic ideas relating to the logic of difference in terms of cultural and linguistic diversity, and the logic of equivalence in terms of ‘Minority = backward versus Han = advanced’. By bringing the past into the present, this section discusses the implications for future minority education policy. As discussed previously, key features of recent minority education policy discourses in China reflect the emergence of a hybrid neoliberalism. Centring on economic development, China is attempting to balance the acceleration of Han

271 universalism and the acceleration of the ethnicisation of minorities. Thus, along the spectrum extending from pluralism (the initial pluralistic stage promoting principle of different treatment) to assimilation (Chinese monopolistic stage), integration (modernisation stage) most appropriately describes the minority education policy in China, a concept which, potentially at least, allows for some freedom of language use. The policy of freedom of language use has been implemented with mixed success, and varies from period to period, reflecting China’s neoliberalization process. The history of the 1980s, and the 1990s were the most favourable periods for Han- minority relations, even though there was a decline at the end of each decade (Mackerras, 1994), and this suggests that linguistic and cultural diversity, economic development, and political integration are reconcilable. The 1950s witnessed the actions of a government that took language use relating to the problems of identification and identity seriously for the first time (Mackerras, 1994). In the 1980s, China’s political climate was initiating a process from the centralization of state power to limited forms of democracy, autonomy, economic neoliberalization, and linguistic and cultural diversification (Friedman, 1995). In 1982, democratic socialism was outlined as the general task of the CCP at the 12th National Congress of the Communist Party of China: [The general task of the CCP is] to unite the people of all ethnic groups to work hard and self-reliantly, to achieve the modernisation of industry, agriculture, science, and technology, and to make China a culturally, ideologically advanced, and highly democratic socialist country.

Here, the CCP attempts to recognize the dynamics of state-society relations (the people of all ethnic groups), and the dynamism of economic development modernisation (achieve the modernisation of industry, agriculture, science, and technology), alongside the continuation of a political integration (make China a culturally, ideologically advanced, and highly democratic socialist country). In the 1990s, the CCP fully considered its minority/bilingual education policy as part of the thrust towards the modernisation that Deng Xiaoping had determined as China’s top priority (Mackerras, 1994). Linguistic and cultural diversity emerged as a result of the integrated economic environment. Thus, among the most important reasons why China has survived as a unified state is its economic success.

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My claim is not that economics has replaced politics in China’s neo-liberalist turn. Rather, as Clarke (2012b) suggests, “there is an insistence within current discourse upon the separation between economics and politics itself, a separation that seeks to withdraw political stakes” (p. 307). The revival of the government’s emphasis on equality and rights of language use among the nationalities, as well as the attempts to implement them, indicates that “the movement towards modernisation is being felt on not only the economic plain, but also the social and political” (Mackerras, 1994, p. 267). From the initial minority policy, there is a general but clear correlation between policy and the state of Min-Han relations, particularly in relation to the policy promoting rights of language use. At the same time, a kind of “ethno-nationalism” was on the rise in China along with modernisation (Mackerras, 2011a, p. 304). As long as there was no question of secession, the government was happy to encourage this heightened sense of national identity (Mackerras, 1994, 2011a). In other words, the feelings of identity which emerged as a result of the integrated economic environment do not necessarily presage the breakup of China. By viewing the present through the lens of the past, this study adds support to Dwyer’s contention that “it could be Han chauvinism that leads to a breakup of China” (Dwyer, 2005, p. 65). For example, the Cultural Revolution from the mid- 1960s to the mid-1970s saw a drastic turnaround in favour of national identity. During this period, the CCP tried to suppress ethno-nationalism in favour of feelings of class loyalty (Mackerras, 1994). However, the reaction against the suppression characteristic of the Cultural Revolution made the development of national consciousness go beyond what the government desired (Mackerras, 1994). A reduction in the extent of the rights of autonomy and language use led to the troubles in Tibet from 1987 to 1989, along with the extension of Han universalism. The attempt to suppress local identity partly explain why ties to ethnic identity remain strong in those areas where secessionist rebellions have occurred in the past (Mackerras, 1994). There is now an opportunity for China’s leadership to shape language and education policy for minorities so that it creates cooperation rather than resistance. If Chinese minorities are to participate in the modern Chinese nation, the PRC should foster their languages, for languages are central to national identity (Dwyer, 2005;

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Mackerras, 1994, 2011b; Postiglione, 2008). Enhancing the Han acceptance of minority language and culture benefits the nation as a whole. Without this acceptance, the continuing dichotomization of ‘advanced’ Hans and ‘backward’ minorities may deepen the rifts between ethnic groups; as Dwyer (2005) points out: “minority nationalities such as the Uyghurs who see no future in participating in China’s society may eventually decide to opt out” (p. 65). Therefore, by jettisoning static binaries relating to the logic of equivalence in terms of ‘Minority = backward versus Han = advanced’, more pluralistic minority education policies can be reintroduced and be enacted.

8.3.2 Implications for future policy enactment

By jettisoning the binary model, pluralistic minority education policy would, in effect, be mandating a change to accept difference, and allow ‘agonistic’ (Mouffe, 2000, 2005, 2013), that is, contested but non-adversarial thought. This suggests practical implications for future minority education policy enactment at the local level in highly diverse school communities, particularly in relation to the three orders of discourse in terms of ‘moral-neoliberal order’, ‘moral-cultural order’, and ‘cultural-neoliberal order’, as discussed previously. Using my ‘four A’ analytical framework (actors, agendas, actions and artefacts), I present the implications of these hybrid activity models for future minority education policy enactment using the following aspects: 1) actors’ attitudes towards minority education, 2) agendas for minority education development, 3) actions for implementing curricula, and 4) artefacts manifesting Tibetan identity and power relations. These aspects are highlighted as contextual factors, which are crucial to education policy enactment and its implications for linguistic minority students.

Actors’ attitudes towards minority education

As discussed previously, the overall effect of hybridity in the discourses and discursive strategies of minority education has resulted in the ambiguity of policy enactment in Tibetan school communities. On the one hand, the ambivalent attitude toward Tibetan language and culture is promoted through a fantasmatic vision of

274 harmony, whereby the contradictions, tensions, and other uncomfortable aspects of social reality are ideally glossed over and obscured (Glynos & Howarth, 2007). The party-government acknowledges that social harmony is a complicated issue arising from unbalanced regional development, the uneven allocation of resources, the unfair distribution of income, and the corruption and deficiencies in the legal system (NPC & CPPCC, 2010) but these issues tend to be seen in technical rather than political terms. Officially, China acknowledges that it must promote unity among all ethnic groups, improve the system of regional ethnic autonomy, promote economic and social development of ethnic minorities and ethnic minority areas, and consolidate and develop socialist ethnic relations of equality, unity, mutual assistance and harmony. For example, the party-government strives to achieve ‘social harmony’, ‘leapfrog development’, and ‘lasting stability’ in Tibetan ethnic areas in Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu and Qinghai provinces. However, on the other hand, the relationship between policy and policy enactment in Tibetan school communities is not very harmonious. In case studies of Zhanggu and Badi of Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, the key actors’ attitude towards minority education permeates schools and serves the political aims of social harmony; but it is Han-dominated harmony. The tension between Han universalism and Tibetan identities places a strain not just on policy choices but also on the ways in which these policies are articulated and enacted discursively. Zhanggu and Badi provide examples of how an ambivalent attitude can mask contradictions in the hybridity of discourses and discursive strategies. Outcomes of minority education policies depend on their intentions; that is, they are more likely to succeed if their intentions are focused and well-defined, rather than implicit and/or ambiguous (Gornitzka, 1999). Thus, I argue that the ambivalent attitude towards the value of Tibetan cultures produces a faultline that runs through education policy and policy enactment, and it is an issue that policy actors in different Tibetan school community must surely get to grips with. The alternative to such fantasizing in order to deal with such differences is to accept difference, antagonism, and contestation as essential constituents of democratic politics (Clarke, 2012b; Mouffe, 2000, 2005, 2013) and as potential starting points of a genuine education enactment for minorities. Such acceptance repudiates “the devaluation of identity (e.g. students’ culture, language, and religion) that students and communities frequently experience in schools and the wider society” (Cummins,

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2009, p. 266). Without this acceptance, minorities are forced to choose between ethnic loyalty and loyalty to the party-state (Dwyer, 2005). Identity, of course, is multilayered, and need not be polarised; it is entirely possible to have a strong ethnic cultural identity and simultaneously be a citizen of China (Dwyer, 2005). For example, in the case of Tangke, Tibetan identity relating to democracy and dignity brings both development and stability to the Tibetan community with support from local religious leaders and local NGOs, as well as outside organisations. Such improvement depends on a positive attitude towards the acceptance of difference, especially in religious and cultural matters (Mackerras, 1994). Indeed, the worldwide growth of religious and cultural influence has had significant implications for the minorities of China, many of whom place great importance in their own religions and cultures. A positive attitude towards the acceptance of difference promotes a depth of understanding of religions and cultures. Responsiveness to locality and ethnic identities will strengthen, enlarge, and enrich the prevailing culture, religion, and tradition, revealing the deeper layers in the nature of education. Such attitude is also compatible with a real awareness of the problems and challenges of modernisation and globalisation. A greater confidence in genuine bilingual education and more – and more diverse – forms of support have the potential to improve China’s stated reforms. All of this should be underpinned by a pluralistic attitude, which would make minority education policy enactment more effective in dealing with the difficulties of our time. The move from an ambivalent attitude to the acceptance of difference, antagonism, and contestation would be an improvement in policy enactment, particularly in relation to the tensions between Han universalism and Tibetan identity. It would also rely on a more secure form of Han identity that wasn’t threatened by difference and antagonism. The tensions may mirror that between globalisation and localisation, as the kind of globalisation that would see one or two cultures consuming all others must be resisted at all costs. Thus, it is urgent for the government and schools of China to introduce an appropriate education in the direction of a positive attitude towards the acceptance of Tibetans’ language and cultural rights in their own areas. It is through promoting linguistic and cultural diversity that Tibetans have a choice of educational agendas.

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Agendas for minority education development

As noted above, there has been tension as a result of policy actors’ ambivalent attitudes. This is reflected in the contradictions in hybrid policy agendas. The political agenda of moral education centred on Han universalism in relation to an antagonistic binary in terms of ‘Tibetan = backward versus Han = advanced’, contrasts markedly with the cultural identity discourse emphasising linguistic and cultural heritage, along with the economic policy agenda geared to individualism and capitalism together with the pursuit of western values and culture by the young. The relatively liberal social and cultural policy agendas in Tangke contribute to an approach that avoids the perpetuation of antagonistic binarism and develops inclusionary, not exclusionary, and multi-faceted, not dualistic, patterns of cultural exchange and maturation. Tangke Primary School’s agenda, promoting “four teaching and learning bases” and international cooperation with NGOs, reflects four dimensions of education development for pastoral Tibetans, in terms of modern animal husbandry, grassland protection, Tibetan traditional crafts, and ecological and cultural tourism. These four dimensions are seen as integratory. This hybrid agenda is underpinned by key policy actors’ positive attitude towards cultural diversity, in order to work locally and integrate the local resources by international cooperation, thus forming a joint educational power for Tibetan students. The inclusion of support from religious leaders as well as the local and global NGOs within the school policy agendas is an important dimension of Tangke’s emergence as a ‘leading’ Tibetan school in Sichuan. Moreover, the relatively liberal policy agendas in Tangke involved changing the school structure, particularly through including the local community, local religion and NGOs, and allowing them shared responsibility in resourcing bilingual education. The liberal policy agendas reveal that the responsibility of education not only lies in formal schooling, it also extends to the local community and larger sociocultural context (Akkari, 1998). As discussed in Chapter 7, Tangke has practiced one of the region’s more open approaches to Tibetan Buddhism. The open/liberal policy has created a third space for the local party-state and the school to develop good relationships with local religious leaders. For example, it is common in Tangke Temple Library to see government officials, school leaders, teachers, students, and monks reading and communicating together. This policy enactment adds support to a

277 former ethnic Tibetan prefecture governor’s notion that “Religion for Tibetans is like a rubber ball – if you hit it, it will only bounce higher” (Hillman, 2010, p. 275). The 7th Daza living Buddha27 in Tangke Temple adds an additional explanation that connects the development of Tibetan Buddhism, language, culture, and tradition and globalisation: In Tibet, a temple is not only a religious centre, but also a school and a cultural learning centre. Since the reform and open period began, the global interest in Tibetan Buddhism has increased. Scholars from more than 20 countries have visited our temple and library to become familiar with Tibetan Buddhism, language, culture, and tradition. Moreover, no matter what nationality we are, belief is of great help to our morality and ethics.

The above quote shows the necessity of strong links between broader policy (the reform and open period) and wider societal factors (the global interest in Tibetan Buddhism) in relation to the freedom of language, culture, and religion for world people (no matter what nationality we are, belief is of great help to our morality and ethics). In this sense, globalisation has assisted the revival of Tibetan culture. Tangke Primary School receives support from religious leaders as well as local and international NGOs. These multiple forms of aid accessing liberal social and cultural policy agendas assisted the development of Tibetan students through their direct interactions with the local community members and those in the larger sociocultural society.

Actions for implementing curricula

There are advantages for children to be taught with their background language and culture. Importantly, the role of bilingual education as “beyond linguistic instrumentalization” (Akkari, 1998, p. 103) should be fully taken into account in curriculum making and implementing curriculum. As Yi (2011) indicates, the curriculum not only serves as an instrument to help create human capital, but also as a tool that guarantee and enhances the cultural wellbeing of minority groups. Under the government’s new curriculum reforms, schooling could come to more accurately reflect

27 The 7th Daza living Buddha is Garang Tuobu Dan Laxi Jiangcuo. 278 the cultural and linguistic diversity that characterizes China’s minorities (Postiglione, 2008). In doing so, genuine curriculum reforms would enable minorities to choose what they want for their children. Tangke’s culturally responsive action could be used as a good example for policy makers, school administrators, and teachers to address linguistic and cultural issues regarding minority education policy enactment. Tangke Primary School’s positive attitude towards the open/liberal policy agendas encouraged the NGOs to take a greater role in actions of curriculum making and implementing curriculum. One aim of the devolution of school/community-based curricula around “four teaching and learning bases” is to develop schools’ individuality. Under such curricula, individual values would not normally be integrated into a common value (Bourdieu, 1977). So it is a real achievement to consider individuality and respond to locality and ethnicity within the school curriculum, which provides Tibetans with more confidence in valuing their own cultures and their intellectual quality. Specifically, the school curricula promoting “four teaching and learning bases” reflect the practice of providing culturally responsive education for Tibetan students, particularly in relation to the following actions: 1) Tibetan language and culture inclusion in school curriculum; 2) teaching approaches adapted to pastoral Tibetan students’ needs; and 3) prejudice reduction through the inclusion of multiple perspectives. All of this echoes Banks’ (2006) theory of multicultural education and Gay’s (2000) culturally responsive teaching, which may provide a framework for the implementation of multicultural education and equal education to minority students in China, as reviewed in chapter 2. The inclusion of Tibetan culture within a curriculum can help strengthen and perpetuate Tibetan identities. It also makes state schools much more attractive to the local community, thereby promoting a harmonious multiculturalism for a more unified nation (Postiglione, 2008). Thus, Tangke’s actions of implementing multicultural curricula could be used as principles for Chinese policy makers, school administrators, and teachers to develop genuine curricula reforms.

Artefacts manifesting Tibetan identity and power relations

The principles in implementing multicultural curricula highlight the inclusion of minority students’ language, culture, and knowledge into curricula and class teaching,

279 with multiple sociocultural support. These principles may also provide minority students with a language- and culture-friendly environment, particularly in relation to the production of environmental artefacts and cultural signs. A positive attitude towards the open/liberal policy agendas and culturally responsive actions will provide a supportive environment for minority students, as it takes the relevance of the existing foundation of minority students’ prior sociocultural knowledge and learning styles into consideration. Thus, this section proposes the highlights of culturally responsive artefacts as the key points of school education reform in relation to identity construction and power relations. From the three cases, it is clear that the production of environmental artefacts and cultural signs played an important role in the norms, values, and beliefs conveyed in the classroom, school, and local community. Thus, the production of environmental artefacts and cultural signs can be regarded as the enactment of a hidden curriculum, which is a side effect of education. For example, the cases of Zhanggu and Badi saw the ethnicisation of Tibetan culture and the essentializion of the Han culture, reflecting social inequality and injustice. In the case of Tangke, the production of culturally responsive artefacts is based on the coordinated efforts of the school and community to create an empowering school and social culture for Tibetan students with rich, culturally relevant background knowledge. In such an environment, Tibetan students can experience success and critically examine social inequality and injustice. The environmental artefacts and cultural signs are closely connected to the key policy actors’ attitudes towards minority/bilingual education, the agendas of education development, and the actions of implementing curricula. As an important part of the education policy enactment process, the environmental artefacts and cultural signs are implicit educational factors for the achievement of educational aims. Environmental artefacts and cultural signs with accurate ethnic characteristics are important for the formation of students’ positive attitude, in providing teachers and students more creative space and power to improve education effectiveness and campus cultural identity. On the contrary, the essentializion of Han universalism and the lack of a culturally relevant environment keeps minority students in the state of cultural disadvantage, greatly affected their academic success, cultural competence, and critical consciousness in a multicultural society.

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In summary, the implications for future minority education policy should be to introduce more pluralistic minority education policies, by jettisoning static binaries relating to the logic of equivalence in terms of ‘Tibetan = backward versus Han = advanced’. Implementing the best elements of China’s pluralistic minority education policy would produce a system that gives Tibetan students a confident identity within the Chinese state and provide them with Tibetan language, knowledge, and skills bases. This would allow them to embrace the future and take an active role in the development of Tibetan regions (Bass, 2008). The implications for future minority education policy enactment suggest that the design of practices should provide more possibilities for Tibetans to gain equitable access to learning culturally valued literacy practices. These implications show the strong link between identity and practice as “mirror images of each other” (Wenger, 1998, p. 149). Tangke’s experience has clearly shown that there are benefits of ‘pluralistic cultural-moral neoliberalism’ for Tibetan students. The hybridization in the discourses and discursive practices could be a democratic development, since there is the recognition of the positive value of adopting new ideas within a local voice and the interpretation of those new ideas according to local practice (Bartlett, 2012). Therefore, policy enactment in the Tangke school community yields important implications for future minority education policy enactment, particularly in relation to the impact of neo-liberalism and globalisation.

8.4 Conclusion

China has manifested a hybrid form of governance that has combined discourses and practices focusing upon and fostering political loyalty to the CCP. This governance represents the logic of equivalence in terms of ‘Minority = backward versus Han = advanced’, and accelerates the ethnicisation of Tibetan identity. It also represents the logic of difference in terms of ethnic cultural and linguistic diversity. Market socialism interacts with and influences both these forms of political logics. With the ascendance of neoliberalization as the state philosophy for development, China has been pursuing “neoliberalism with Chinese characteristics” defined by the “compatibility between authoritarianism and the capitalist market” (Harvey, 2005, p. 120). Strong ambivalence about markets continues to exist in contemporary China, particularly in relation to the state agenda of modernisation. For ethnic minorities,

281 modernisation and social change are clearly related and bring both risks and opportunities. Therefore, it should be noted that the neoliberalization of minority/bilingual education development does not come easily within China’s context, as the result of bitter contests between constant themes: cultural and linguistic diversity, on one side, political unity, on the other, and economic development at the centre. The overall effect of this hybridity is reflected in the ambiguity of the term neoliberalism with Chinese characteristics, embodied in the simultaneous operation of the logics of equivalence and difference and market logic. Indeed, ‘neoliberalism in China’ shows how privatization and liberalization can proceed through state intervention. The ‘pluralist unity’ approach to minority education policies constructs the party-government’s policy interventions and strategies as neutral and providing technical solutions to the challenges of modernity and globalisation (Warren et al., 2011, p. 843). The teleological promise of economic growth to improve the quality of minorities masks this self-fulfilling. It hides the political-historical processes that have produced the difference between ‘advanced/developed’ Han areas and ‘backward/underdeveloped’ minority areas (Yan, 2003). Even the slogan “harmonious society” does not reflect, nor change, the nature of China’s minority education. The central government policies are made for diverse local communities, asserting that policies that have been declared valid in one context must be valid in another. However, this study reveals the development of three differernt orders of discursive policy enactment in one province: one of a moral-neoliberal order fostering monolingual education, one of a moral-cultural order fostering monolingual and bicultural education, and one of a cultural-neoliberal order fostering bilingual and multicultural education. Each of the three models represents a hybridity of social, cultural, economic, educational, geographic and historical circumstances. In the first two models, the overall effect of the hybridity has resulted in the uncertainties and ambiguities characterizing policy enactment. The third model corresponds more closely to the pluralistic attitude towards difference, antagonistic, and contestatory thought, reflecting a pluralistic cultural-moral neoliberalism that contributes to both growth and stability. The three case studies identify a localized, neoliberalizing process in China’s context. That is to say, the neo-liberal governmentality left room for exploring more

282 forms of education for ethnic minorities (Yi, 2008). In particular, the ‘pluralistic cultural-moral neoliberalism’ order of discourse has significant implications for the education of China’s national minorities. The case studies show the importance of community engagement and indicate that an important factor for a successful outcome of establishing and running a local community primary school in Tibetan areas depends, to a large extent, on “recognizing and accepting local values” (Bangsbo, 2008, p. 76). Within this culturally responsive policy enactment process, Tibetan students are likely to engage in alternative work opportunities, most probably in urban areas located away from the pastoral community. There is no inevitable conflict between ethnic identities and state identity or patriotism. There are growing voices calling for effective protection of minorities’ rights to be taken as the core of national unity, although it remains to be seen whether or not the CCP leadership will change its course to accommodate the educational movement and eventually create a new path towards constitutional democracy. That is a societal change “from coercive to collaborative relations of power” (Cummins, 2009, p.270), that suggests a way of going beyond the empty signifier of ‘unity in diversity’ / ‘harmony’ by experiencing a plural culture and plurilingual competences from within. Educational justice is not merely spoken of in moral or political terms; there is a convergence between socio-political concerns and economic imperatives, especially regarding the acceptance of difference, antagonism, and contestation. Enhancing Han acceptance of minority cultures benefits the nation as a whole. Such acceptance could also become a significant factor in China’s relations with the rest of the world.

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APPENDICES Appendix A: Interviews/interviewees

Method What Data From Whom Where & When How Long & Why How Often

Students -Demographic information The three focused 1. Zhanggu Town -30 minutes per To identify the students’ Interview -Bilingual learning at school fifth grade students 02/2011-05/2011 student; perspective of bilingual -Bilingual practices at home in each school, by 2. Badi Town -Twice per semester: education and explore -Home-school literacy interaction experiences the five criteria. 06/2011- 09/2011 the second time is a the ways in which -Relationship between school education of nationality 3. Tangke Town follow up to check education policies were culture and family education of ethnic minority culture 10/2011- 12/2011 information etc. enacted

Teachers -Demographic information Teachers of thethree 1. Zhanggu Town -30 minutes per To identify the teachers’ Interview -Bilingual teaching experiences focused fifth grade 02/2011-05/2011 teacher; perspective of bilingual -Views on bilingual education students at the three 2. Badi Town -Twice per semester: education policy and -The way schools viewed and related to parents, schools, by the three 06/2011- 09/2011 the second time is a explore the ways in families and communities, and how they handled criteria. 3. Tangke Town follow up to check which policies were demands and expectations 10/2011- 12/2011 information etc. selected, interpreted and translated

Parents -Demographic Parents of the three 1. Zhanggu Town -30 minutes per To identify the parents’ Interview information focused fifth grade 02/2011-05/2011 parent; perspective of bilingual -Bilingual and bicultural students at the three 2. Badi Town -Twice per semester: education policy and practices at home types of 06/2011- 09/2011 the second time is a explore the ways in -Views on bilingual education for children communities 3. Tangke Town follow up to check which policies were 10/2011- 12/2011 information etc. enacted in the specific community

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Appendix B: Documentary Sources

1. The Central Government of China

 Regional National Autonomy (1952)  Implementation of Spoken and Written Languages of Nationalities (1952)  Decision on the Protection of All Scattered Minority Composition of Ethnic Equality Rights (1952)  Views on the Teaching Language Application issues of the Brother Nationalities (1953)  Constitution (1954)  Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1957-1958  Campaign of Destroying ‘Four Olds’ (1967)  Constitution (1975)  Law of Regional National Autonomy (1984)  The Compulsory Education Law of the PRC (1986)  The State Education Committee’s Decision on National Teaching Guideline for Moral Education Courses in Primary Schools (1986)  Guideline of Moral Education at Higher Educational Institutions (1995).  Western Development Program (2000)  Two Basics/Fundamentals Project (2000)  CPC Central Committee on the development of the five-year construction plan should pay attention to the instructions of the minority areas (2004).  Consolidating and Developing the Great Unity of All Ethnic Groups (2009).  National People’s Congress Work Report (2010).  The National Action Plan for Advancing Education Development (2010)

2. The Sichuan Government

 The program of culture and education of southwest ethnic group (2006)  10-year Education Action Plan for the Ethnic Regions of Sichuan Province (2000-2010)  10-year Education Action Plan for the Ethnic Regions of Sichuan Province (2011-2020) 311

 The investigation and report on Sichuan Bilingual education (2011)

3. The Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Governments

 The Work Program for Meeting the State’s Supervision and Inspection on the Two Basics/Fundamentals Project (2010) On establishing leadership group for distance education in Danba County (2011)

 On using local teaching material Danba Beauty (2011)  Friendship and cooperation between Danba and Pujiang (2011)  Activities of ‘one heart and one direction in orientation’ in Temple of Danba County (2011)  Planning on establishing new Danba County (2011-2020)  Establishing campus culture in Danba County primary school (2012)

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Appendix C: Observations

Method What Data From Whom Where & When How Long & Why How Often

Observation -The organization of 1.The teacher and 1.In the fifth 1.Four lessons per To get the examples school/household space; the focused grade classroom school; of the discourses of -The staff and parents meetings students; of each school; 2.Two hours per education policy and -Buildings and material resources 2.The parents and 2.At home of each parents; the re-appropriation of wall displays and posters the focused type of 3.Two hours per and transformation -Curriculum, classroom students; community; villager; of cultural symbols organisation, tasks and 3.Villagers in the 3.In the three -Twice per across the three achievements; three specific local semester types of school -Language use and allocation at communities; communities; communities. school and in Tibetan home culture environment respectively; -The way schools viewed and related to parents, families and communities, and how they handled demands and expectations; -Social gatherings;

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Appendix D: Interview Topic Guidelines

Interview Topic Guideline for Tibetan Students

1. What language do you use in your school?

2. What language do you use in the after school?

3. How do you like your school? (How do you like your Mandarin class?)

4. How do you like this school?

5. Describe a good experience in Tibetan/Mandarin language class.

6. Describe a not so good experience in Tibetan/Madarin language class.

7. In which language do you speak at home?

8. Which language does your mother want you to speak, Tibetan or Chinese? Why?

9. What language do you use most frequently to talk with your families and friends when you are at home?

10. What did you do when you were at home?

11. Please tell me something about your family.

12. How many languages can you speak/read/understand?

13. Which language can you speak better, Tibetan or Chinese? What made you so?

14. Who is your best friend?

15. In which language do you speak to your friends? (If you do, why is that?)

16. In which language do you speak at community meeting (e.g. Guozhuang)? (In what cases, do you speak Tibetan or Chinese?)

17. When is the Tibetan Spring Festive this year? How do/did you celebrate it?

18. Please tell me something about the tradition of Tibetan festive.

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Interview Topic Guideline for Teachers

1. What subjects are the students being taught?

2. Does the curriculum work to incorporate minority viewpoints and culture?

3. What problems or difficulties have you encountered when you teach them Tibetan? For example, aspects of time, effort, people, place, resources. What is your solution?

4. Please describe your final comments in general regarding the issue of bilingual education.

Interview Topic Guideline for Parents

1. What is the purpose of sending your children in this bilingual school?

2. What do you think is the most important knowledge for your child to learn?

3. Your final comments in general regarding the issue of bilingual education?

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