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Gigantic Dreadnaughts, That Can Fight W/R£L£SS Like Floating Forts and Dive Like QUAKTKR Ducks When Necessary, to Take the HAT CM Place of Power¬ ^C,0*>R

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Gigantic Dreadnaughts, That Can Fight W/R£L£SS Like Floating Forts and Dive Like QUAKTKR Ducks When Necessary, to Take the HAT CM Place of Power¬ ^C,0*>R Submarinp STERrf HATCH*- Gigantic Dreadnaughts, That Can Fight W/R£L£SS Like Floating Forts and Dive Like QUAKTKR Ducks When Necessary, to Take the HAT CM Place of Power¬ ^c,0*>r- ful but - FOLD!HQ rtAST. Vulnerable KVDDERS PQOP£LLOR y Ships of orr/CEies'jt !/ To-day rroTQR -Roow rrtoship ha ton. The Size of the Proposed Submarine Battleship ifi Compari¬ FORWARD son to the Present Day Submarine Boat. P£fi>lSCOPF~ HE increasing number of sue- combustion type of on/rim* is beinpj cossfuily destructive attacks so developed that it can be conven¬ by Herman submarines upon iently employed for both purposes. British an important convenience, as com¬ warships lias brought, to a pared with the present mechanical SKID QC practical head the long-discusscd arrangements for submarine boats. i§PDys-/A rro rox theoretical question wh^th»»r it was The latter are now equipped with y CHAROl/VO the destiny of th^ underwater boat powerful oil engines of the STORAGE BATTERIES. Di<-.=pl kind for cruising, and 'o supercede the floating ship. also with elcct ric engines SEARCHLIGHT' England, Germany and France are for employment under water. understood to he .so certain that tho The fleotric onginps are con¬ nected s a )tfoh x>ro£d//,'c the day of the ri read naught and su- directly with *.ha gums. perdreadnaunht is passed that they aro experimenting with plans of tho psp/scopr poosr- only thing that can remedy the faults of the submarine and maintain tho 12 JNOHPZPZDING GUM. virtues <jf tho battleship.and that is a submarine battleship. The United States is actually building a rj. jhch lezoedimgc super-submarine which to all intents guns. ^ m and purposes is really a submarine torpedo boat. It will be 20"» feet long.100 feet longer than the lone- est submarine existing. 5T08ACE SATTEPIFS War, both on land and sea, has ® of the become A.Seetlonnl view licnvjr protecting armor of largerlv a matter of conceal- SW/rOHBOARDS. proposed nulimnrlnr, with the mcnt. Tho the porthole open ntid fi- submarine boat is almost tciitlcd Viir hkc. kui* 100 per cent perfect in this respect. II.Sfi'tluual view allowing the gun drnwn hull iinrh Into the INCH P£C£D/UO GUNS. nod porthole cloned ulth 8 with wntcr-ti^ht trover worked TOPPEDO DEOK. niilomntlviill)' the receding of the xun.' TORPrDO TUBES. FOUR TO EACH SIDE or sow ~~~. OUTSIDE HULL r /jY&fpz HULL WATEP3ALLAST COMPA P TITENTS. MA/KS FOR VJATE.R, A /#, OSL,AHO Z-Z.FCT&/C W/^CS. How the Gun 19 x suatiARJHE Quick-Firing rrjTtE Mounted on the Eseck of DIS CHARGE Z>OOK. Submarines Now Used SUB S7A Q/rverriHES by a Foreign Nation. i&f* Diagrammatic ^conp.vjrssrd air Plan Showing the tank. Shane and Essen. equipment of wireless, stretched be¬ tween folding masts, searchlights, tial Parts of the Possible New Sub¬ etc. OIL FUEL TANKS. signals, The small boats could marine Battleship which May he jettisoned by means of an auto¬ Take the Place of the matic release when the ship is to shafts of the oil en¬ War Ves¬ be gines. so that, when sels of To-day. submerged. Extra large peri¬ high cruising speed scopes could bo installed and used as nt the surface is de¬ lookouts, and principally this huge sired the electric battleship would have the advantage The latter of beneath the water Its faults nro motors and Diesel described method will be disappearing its slowness under motors ran ho used for when it is being overtaken water as compared to the used together. stowing a three-inch quick- by ships speed of When the problem of the internal- firing gun on the deck of the of the enemy. !he surface ships; Its limited range huge The of combustion engine has been so far sea-going supersubmarine which, re¬ large drawing on this page activity due to Its limited fuel worked allows what such a rapacity; its in out as to render it available cently provided for by Congress, is submarine bat¬ instability anything for both purposes on now in process of tleship would look like. The most but moderately calm sea and its in¬ submarines, it construction for can be utilized in-like fashion for the the I'nited States Navy. The same notable feature of .his new boat is ability to effectively operate a1 night. i3 true absence of On submersible battleship. Such engines of the masts for this remark¬ funnels, military masts,, the other hand, given favorable will be in effect automobile able craft, which are at the cranes and many other deck fittings conditions, one engines hinged torpedo from !he sub¬ of huge size and great power foot and collapsible. which indentures the present day bat¬ marine can destroy the mightiest of It remains to For some time the tleship. In the picture, sections of tloating determine.or, one past submarine the ships. should rather say, to has been steadily a greater deck have been removed to show The of -war surmise.what assuming the type vessel which the structural modifications a battleship resemblance to the destroyer and principal interna! workings of the nations are seeking is therefore a would ii even future monster submarine submersible require in order to render it with the battleship; a dread- conveniently submersible, apart from t h r e atens various parts lettered to give the naught heavily armored and formid¬ the arrangements for rising out of to usurp reader an idea of the many different ably gunned, of speed equal to the the sea or benenth the the func- details contained in the new subma¬ fastest war vessel of the sinking t present, with waves, by taking in water or pump¬ i o n s of rine battleship. Along with having rapacity to cover as many miles of ing it out again. the latter. tho same armament of the present sea as a dreadnaught; able to fight on Some naval day battleship, it will, ihe Contrivances for making the deck mentioned, surface if necessary, just as tho openings.including hatches and tur¬ exports go have the full underwater equipment. dreadnaught does, yet capable also of rets.water-tight are not matters of far as A boat of this typo may be used sinking at. will beneath the water. to express .with telling effect on coast cities any difficulty. Riddance will be had the and thus gaining concealment while con¬ of smoke-pipes by the use of inter¬ opinion destroy naval stations, likewise fleets tinuing to fight with torpedos, just nal-combustion engines. T'n» masts that before interior View of the hirst Class German of small warcraft. It may also be as a submarine does. In other words suporting wireless apparatus will be long it will Submarine, used to explode submarine mines by a war vessel which render the the Motors ant! shall be able to hinged at the foot, perhaps, so as to Showing Dynamos and Shafting the concussion caused by the explo¬ operate on tho surface or under the fall the dost royer Diagram How New sion of a of along superstructure. But, obaolotc. Showing Battleship, Partly Submerged, for the Twin Screws. volley torpedos dis¬ waves as circumstances may render it will bo can be Will a charged in the neighborhood of "¦ said, what done Offer Only Small Target to an Enemy. the it advisable. with the guns? O r 1 g inally mines. It is hard to designed for successors will bo compelled 10 seek of that class with from GOO to 1,000 anticipate Just A battleship constructed tn prin¬ This is a y»or what this huge agent of death would feature of the problem use in the harbors and In their ots on her so that safety for themselves in hiding, as cent more in ciples of the kind would, of course, more than bo deck, they can be do the under water. efficiency torpedo equip¬ do in actual combat, but wo may simple might supposed. near neighborhood, it lias grown pointed in any direction, whereas or¬ submarines, ment. 1: couli! have h compartment well demand important modifications, as They can br> made so as to be drawn The submarine would lor consider, judging from perform¬ compared with tho surface enormously in size.the German sub- dinary torpedo tubes are flxpd, and battleship submarine mines, with a hatch ances of our present fighting back into the hull, much in the same rnarino of the "U" class Is over the boat has to be have all the features of both types for placing them in (ho day submarines, craft of to-day; but would not as turned to aim path of a that the next step in naval construc¬ they way the present type of dlsappear- two hundred feet has be¬ them.> In mentioned. Asa submarine it would As a he so many, or so difficult of accom¬ long.and effect these pivoted tubes pursuing enemy. surface bat¬ tion will be the submarine pearing guns now used by our coast come a sea-going craft, being de¬ nro guns, which have all the advantages of tiio boats tleship it would still have the battle¬ plishment, as might at first glance The same discharge torpedos regular ship. artillery. machinery which signed to accompany squadrons of Instead of shells. are be supposed. The diagrammatic draws back the guns can bo used Hatchways pro¬ illustration of such a battleships. vided at each end of the craft, submersible by means of cogwheels and pinlone To keep up with the it battleship printed oti this page shows to close battleship through which, for reloading, the automatically the portholes must have speed.
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