An Attempt to Destroy German U-Boats in Their Pens Was Fraught with Peril and Frustration
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
Hard By Barrett Tillman Targets AP photo/Terry Ashe An attempt to destroy German U-boats in their pens was fraught with peril and frustration. 80 AIR FORCE Magazine / February 2015 A B-17 (top photo) opens its bomb bay door as it nears the target, the U- boat pens in Tourlon, France (bottom photo). etween October 1942 It was not an easy task. From the was underway at Hamburg and Heli- and October 1943 the start of the European war in September goland. Ever methodical, the Germans US Army Air Forces’ 1939 through the end of 1942, Allied conserved material by designing four Eighth Air Force fl ew forces sank 159 U-boats—merely four types of structures: covers over locks to more than 2,000 sorties a month. Meanwhile, the “gray wolves” protect boats being raised or lowered; against German submarine bases at preyed on Atlantic convoys, typically bunkers for U-boat assembly yards; Lorient, Saint-Nazaire, and Brest, in destroying 36 ships of 180,000 tons per postconstruction or “fi tting out” bunkers France, and against Bremen, Emden, month throughout 1941. The monthly where equipment was installed; and most BKiel, and Wilhelmshaven in Germany. fi gure soared to half-a-million tons for notably pens for deploying submarines The missions accomplished little 1942, when U-boats sank 12 ships for and those under repair. against the massive U-boat shelters, but each sub lost. Most operating pens were on the the effort cost the Eighth 135 bombers Allied navies, led by Britain, made French coast at Bordeaux, Brest, La (including 16 written off), for an unsus- dramatic progress technically, opera- Pallice, Lorient, and Saint-Nazaire. tainable 5.9 percent loss rate. Shock- tionally, and with ASW intelligence Together they consumed 5.7 million ingly, almost 1,200 airmen were killed especially. cubic yards of concrete. Construc- or captured in the 119 missing aircraft. tion was mostly accomplished in 1942 Seven decades later, perspective and A RARE KILL though some facilities remained unfi n- context help explain these frustrating The decisive year was 1943, when ished when the Allies occupied northern and tragic events. escort aircraft carriers closed the deadly France in 1944. As with most segments of the US Atlantic gap that existed in the middle Submarine pens were massive struc- military at the time of Pearl Harbor of the ocean beyond the reach of land- tures largely impervious to conventional in December 1941, the AAF’s anti- based aircraft. bombing. The Saint-Nazaire pen, for submarine warfare (ASW) effort was In the second quarter of 1943 the instance, had walls 11 feet thick with forced to play catch-up. Informally German U-boat command wrote off 73 a 16-foot roof. German engineers cal- organized and poorly equipped, the submarines for only 120 Allied ships culated that the roof could withstand Army ASW mission badly needed long- sunk, and German losses exceeded bombs of 7,000 pounds—more than an range aircraft, notably the Consolidated production. As a result, the path to the American aircraft could typically carry. B-24 Liberator, but had to rely on less Normandy landings of June 1944 led The Todt Organization, a German capable types. across the rolling gray expanse of the construction fi rm, built 14 pens at Unlike the Royal Air Force’s Coastal North Atlantic’s shipping lanes. Saint-Nazaire and 20 at Lorient, mainly Command, the AAF had no ASW fl y- However, sub kills were rare, mainly completed in 1943. Some were immense: ing boats so land-based aircraft were because U-boats were extremely hard Saint-Nazaire’s base measured 945 required. However, the Army was fo- to fi nd. Knowing the locations of their feet by 455, reaching 58 feet high. The cused on strategic bombardment, and lairs, the RAF attacked pens in France nearby Keroman facility at Lorient began with B-24s also going to the British, in early 1942 but soon lost interest building in February 1941, and despite the ASW campaign had to make do for owing to a clear lack of results. All the 200 workers killed in British bombings, months into the war. while, construction of U-boat shelters the fi rst of three pens accepted U-boats Furthermore, Germany’s submarine proceeded apace. that August. operating bases were beyond the new Submarine pens represented one of U-boat bases in Norway were an obvi- Eighth Air Force’s reach for nearly a the most intensive building programs ous benefi t to Kriegsmarine operations in year. The only option at the time was in the Third Reich. Before the Battle the Arctic Ocean, but the intended pens to kill U-boats at sea. of Britain ended in 1940, construction came to naught. Facilities at Bergen and AIR FORCE Magazine / February 2015 81 P h o t o s by a a Trondheim, begun in 1941, were left That month, German Adm. Karl Doe- effort. U-boat support infrastructure largely incomplete owing to weather and nitz’s 105 U-boats in the North Atlantic was frequently damaged—sometimes a shortage of heavy equipment. and Arctic sank nearly 90 merchant seriously—but the Germans became Airpower wisdom holds that any target vessels of some 585,000 tons—and that masters of repair and improvisation. worth bombing is worth defending. Lori- was only part of the story. Since January ent fit this description, surrounded by 1942, U-boats had sent 779 merchant- A EAR O G CAM AI N 20 naval batteries. Five lesser batteries men to the bottom, not counting other AAF’s yearlong antisubmarine cam- were deployed farther afield. Allied sea losses to aircraft and mines. paign began on Oct. 21, 1942, with an USAAF only established a dedicated For the eventual Allied invasion of Nazi- inauspicious debut at Lorient. Of the antisubmarine command in October occupied France to occur, the sea-lanes four bomb groups committed, only the 1942. Brig. Gen. C. W. Russell, AAF had to be more secure. 97th Bomb Group penetrated heavy coordinator for antisubmarine activity, The new priority was not entirely weather. Consequently, the defenders favored attacks on U-boat production welcomed among airpower strategists. concentrated on Brig. Gen. Joseph facilities and operating bases rather than They recognized the ASW campaign as H. Atkinson’s 21 B-17s, which had emulating RAF Coastal Command’s defensive in nature rather than depriving descended through a convenient hole policy of hunting submarines at sea. the Third Reich of its production base. in the clouds. Luftwaffe radar control- His opinion seemed to have merit—the Nonetheless, the order stuck. lers vectored 36 Focke-Wulf 190s onto RAF had long since abandoned daylight In October, Lt. Gen. Dwight D. the Americans. Three of the rearmost bombing operations as too costly, while Eisenhower responded to Maj. Gen. bombers were hacked down and six accepting nocturnal bombing’s inevi- Carl A. “Tooey” Spaatz’s concerns by shot up. table reduction in accuracy. declaring the U-boat campaign “one of The others pressed ahead, unloading But America’s faith in daylight pre- the basic requirements to the winning their bombs across five sub pens, but cision bombing seemed valid against of the war.” Eisenhower linked bomb- not even their one-ton ordnance made targets such as U-boat shelters versus ing submarine bases to the success of an appreciable dent. the RAF’s aimpoints of city centers. The Operation Torch, the invasion of French Frustrated by poor results, on Nov. power brokers accepted the approach Morocco in November 1942. 9, VIII Bomber Command directed a offered by Russell and others. At the core, Eisenhower was correct: perilously low-level mission against There were practical advantages as Defeat of the U-boats was essential Saint-Nazaire. An RAF deception drew well. The Bay of Biscay, where the bases to D-Day’s eventual success. But his off many German fighters, but the were located, was within easy reach optimism about the efficacy of bomb- antiaircraft gunners were presented a of AAF bases in Britain—London to ing massive submarine pens—shared rare gift: a dozen B-24s at about 18,000 Saint-Nazaire was 300 miles, Brest even by other commanders—proved badly feet with 31 B-17s between 7,500 and less. The entire approach could be made misplaced. 10,000 feet. over water, largely avoiding Luftwaffe Some senior airmen saw the potential Plowing through heavy, accurate interceptors. That was a major concern, miscalculation. As early as the end of flak, the lower formation lost three as the Biscay ports lay well beyond the October 1942, Spaatz told Lt. Gen. B-17s while 22 took damage. Despite escort range of RAF Spitfires and would Henry H. “Hap” Arnold, “Whether or the expected greater accuracy, bomb remain beyond that of P-47s when they not these operations will prove too costly plots were disappointing: Only about went operational in mid-1943. for the results obtained remains to be eight struck within 200 yards of either In October 1942, the Eighth received seen. The concrete submarine pens are aimpoint. Nearby rail tracks were hit a new list of priority targets. Topping the hard, maybe impossible nuts to crack.” but easily repaired. menu—above German industry—were He leavened the tart message with the The Eighth’s Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker submarine bases, in an effort to support hope that damage to adjacent facilities drew the obvious lesson—subsequent the Battle of the Atlantic. might handicap the German submarine attacks on sub bases were flown from 8 2 AIR FORCE Magazine / February 2015 17,500 to 22,000 feet, encountering chest-pack parachute.