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Home , Bunker buster, Emden, Kriegsmarine, RAF Coastal Command, Submarine, Type I submarine

Hard

By Barrett Tillman Targets AP photo/Terry Ashe An attempt to destroy German U- in their pens was fraught with peril and frustration.

80 Magazine / February 2015 A B-17 (top photo) opens its bay door as it nears the target, the U- pens in Tourlon, (bottom photo).

etween October 1942 It was not an easy task. From the was underway at and Heli- and the start of the European war in September goland. Ever methodical, the Germans US Army Air Forces’ 1939 through the end of 1942, Allied conserved material by designing four Eighth Air Force fl ew forces sank 159 U-boats—merely four types of structures: covers over locks to more than 2,000 sorties a month. Meanwhile, the “gray wolves” protect boats being raised or lowered; against German bases at preyed on Atlantic convoys, typically for U-boat assembly yards; , Saint-Nazaire, and Brest, in destroying 36 of 180,000 tons per postconstruction or “fi tting out” bunkers France, and against Bremen, Emden, month throughout 1941. The monthly where equipment was installed; and most BKiel, and in . fi gure soared to half-a-million tons for notably pens for deploying The missions accomplished little 1942, when U-boats sank 12 ships for and those under repair. against the massive U-boat shelters, but each sub lost. Most operating pens were on the the effort cost the Eighth 135 Allied , led by Britain, made French coast at Bordeaux, Brest, La (including 16 written off), for an unsus- dramatic progress technically, opera- Pallice, Lorient, and Saint-Nazaire. tainable 5.9 percent loss rate. Shock- tionally, and with ASW intelligence Together they consumed 5.7 million ingly, almost 1,200 airmen were killed especially. cubic yards of concrete. Construc- or captured in the 119 missing aircraft. tion was mostly accomplished in 1942 Seven decades later, perspective and A RARE KILL though some facilities remained unfi n- context help explain these frustrating The decisive year was 1943, when ished when the Allies occupied northern and tragic events. escort aircraft carriers closed the deadly France in 1944. As with most segments of the US Atlantic gap that existed in the middle Submarine pens were massive struc- at the time of Pearl Harbor of the beyond the reach of land- tures largely impervious to conventional in December 1941, the AAF’s anti- based aircraft. bombing. The Saint-Nazaire pen, for (ASW) effort was In the second quarter of 1943 the instance, had walls 11 feet thick with forced to play catch-up. Informally German U-boat command wrote off 73 a 16-foot roof. German engineers cal- organized and poorly equipped, the submarines for only 120 Allied ships culated that the roof could withstand Army ASW mission badly needed long- sunk, and German losses exceeded of 7,000 pounds—more than an range aircraft, notably the Consolidated production. As a result, the path to the American aircraft could typically carry. B-24 Liberator, but had to rely on less of June 1944 led The Todt Organization, a German capable types. across the rolling gray expanse of the construction fi rm, built 14 pens at Unlike the ’s Coastal North Atlantic’s shipping lanes. Saint-Nazaire and 20 at Lorient, mainly Command, the AAF had no ASW fl y- However, sub kills were rare, mainly completed in 1943. Some were immense: ing boats so land-based aircraft were because U-boats were extremely hard Saint-Nazaire’s base measured 945 required. However, the Army was fo- to fi nd. Knowing the locations of their feet by 455, reaching 58 feet high. The cused on strategic bombardment, and lairs, the RAF attacked pens in France nearby Keroman facility at Lorient began with B-24s also going to the British, in early 1942 but soon lost interest building in February 1941, and despite the ASW campaign had to make do for owing to a clear lack of results. All the 200 workers killed in British bombings, months into the war. while, construction of U-boat shelters the fi rst of three pens accepted U-boats Furthermore, Germany’s submarine proceeded apace. that August. operating bases were beyond the new Submarine pens represented one of U-boat bases in were an obvi- Eighth Air Force’s reach for nearly a the most intensive building programs ous benefi t to operations in year. The only option at the time was in the Third Reich. Before the the Ocean, but the intended pens to kill U-boats at sea. of Britain ended in 1940, construction came to naught. Facilities at Bergen and AIR FORCE Magazine / February 2015 81 by a a

Trondheim, begun in 1941, were left That month, German Adm. Karl Doe- effort. U-boat support infrastructure largely incomplete owing to weather and nitz’s 105 U-boats in the North Atlantic was frequently damaged—sometimes a shortage of heavy equipment. and Arctic sank nearly 90 merchant seriously—but the Germans became Airpower wisdom holds that any target vessels of some 585,000 tons—and that masters of repair and improvisation. worth bombing is worth defending. Lori- was only part of the story. Since January ent fit this description, surrounded by 1942, U-boats had sent 779 merchant- A EAR O CAM AI 20 naval batteries. Five lesser batteries men to the bottom, not counting other AAF’s yearlong antisubmarine cam- were deployed farther afield. Allied sea losses to aircraft and mines. paign began on Oct. 21, 1942, with an USAAF only established a dedicated For the eventual Allied invasion of Nazi- inauspicious debut at Lorient. Of the antisubmarine command in October occupied France to occur, the sea-lanes four bomb groups committed, only the 1942. . Gen. C. W. Russell, AAF had to be more secure. 97th Bomb Group penetrated heavy coordinator for antisubmarine activity, The new priority was not entirely weather. Consequently, the defenders favored attacks on U-boat production welcomed among airpower strategists. concentrated on Brig. Gen. Joseph facilities and operating bases rather than They recognized the ASW campaign as H. Atkinson’s 21 B-17s, which had emulating RAF Coastal Command’s defensive in nature rather than depriving descended through a convenient hole policy of hunting submarines at sea. the Third Reich of its production base. in the clouds. control- His opinion seemed to have merit—the Nonetheless, the order stuck. lers vectored 36 Focke-Wulf 190s onto RAF had long since abandoned daylight In October, Lt. Gen. Dwight D. the Americans. Three of the rearmost bombing operations as too costly, while Eisenhower responded to Maj. Gen. bombers were hacked down and six accepting nocturnal bombing’s inevi- Carl A. “Tooey” Spaatz’s concerns by shot up. table reduction in accuracy. declaring the U-boat campaign “one of The others pressed ahead, unloading But America’s faith in daylight pre- the basic requirements to the winning their bombs across five sub pens, but cision bombing seemed valid against of the war.” Eisenhower linked bomb- not even their one-ton ordnance made targets such as U-boat shelters versus ing submarine bases to the success of an appreciable dent. the RAF’s aimpoints of city centers. The Operation Torch, the invasion of French Frustrated by poor results, on Nov. power brokers accepted the approach Morocco in November 1942. 9, VIII Command directed a offered by Russell and others. At the core, Eisenhower was correct: perilously low-level mission against There were practical advantages as Defeat of the U-boats was essential Saint-Nazaire. An RAF deception drew well. The Bay of Biscay, where the bases to D-Day’s eventual success. But his off many German fighters, but the were located, was within easy reach optimism about the efficacy of bomb- antiaircraft gunners were presented a of AAF bases in Britain—London to ing massive submarine pens—shared rare gift: a dozen B-24s at about 18,000 Saint-Nazaire was 300 miles, Brest even by other —proved badly feet with 31 B-17s between 7,500 and less. The entire approach could be made misplaced. 10,000 feet. over water, largely avoiding Luftwaffe Some senior airmen saw the potential Plowing through heavy, accurate interceptors. That was a major concern, miscalculation. As early as the end of flak, the lower formation lost three as the Biscay ports lay well beyond the October 1942, Spaatz told Lt. Gen. B-17s while 22 took damage. Despite escort range of RAF Spitfires and would Henry H. “Hap” Arnold, “Whether or the expected greater accuracy, bomb remain beyond that of P-47s when they not these operations will prove too costly plots were disappointing: Only about went operational in mid-1943. for the results obtained remains to be eight struck within 200 yards of either In October 1942, the Eighth received seen. The concrete submarine pens are aimpoint. Nearby rail tracks were hit a new list of priority targets. Topping the hard, maybe impossible nuts to crack.” but easily repaired. menu—above German industry—were He leavened the tart message with the The Eighth’s Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker submarine bases, in an effort to support hope that damage to adjacent facilities drew the obvious lesson—subsequent the . might handicap the German submarine attacks on sub bases were flown from AIR FORCE Magazine / February 2015 17,500 to 22,000 feet, encountering chest-pack parachute. From 20,000 feet, The hardened U-boat pens at Saint- less accurate flak. he smashed into the roof of the train Nazaire (above and above left). The town was both a rail center and a port, Lacking fighter escort, AAF stuck station and sustained serious injuries, making it an obvious and valuable to its doctrinal guns: “The bomber will including a nearly severed arm, but he target for the Allies, who bombed it always get through.” Generally speaking, miraculously survived. almost continuously. that was true, but it ignored the awful Magee was taken to a hospital where reality: Surviving bombers inflicted little he received excellent treatment. “I owe worthwhile damage for the growing cost. the German military doctor who treated “Hell’s Angels” bomb group. The lead Eighth headquarters pressed on. In me a debt of gratitude,” he said. The bombardier was 1st Lt. Jack W. Mathis, January, Eaker happily reported that doctor told him, “We are enemies, but a 21-year-old Texan in 1st Lt. Harold L. bombers could knock down six fighters I am first a doctor and I will do my best Stouse’s The Dutchess. Flying his 14th for every bomber loss. In truth, by that to save your arm,” Magee recalled, ac- mission, Mathis was well-regarded—the time German fighters were downing cording to a 1996 303rd Bomb Group would “drop on his lead.” bombers better than at parity—a clear newsletter. During the run to the target the for- German victory. Magee never knew the doctor’s name mation met heavy flak that pummeled By the end of 1942, photo interpreters but the German had saved his arm. In the low bombers flying at 24,000 feet. reported visible damage at Lorient and 1995, the city of Saint-Nazaire honored Less than a minute from bombs-away, Saint-Nazaire, more from repetition than Magee and the crew of Snap! Crackle! a shell detonated near the right side of accuracy. The five missions between Pop! with a memorial plaque. The Dutchess’ nose. Metal shards blasted Nov. 9 and 23, 1942, involved 158 through the plexiglass, hurling Mathis bombers releasing 385 tons on the sub RA E OF A RI IO to the rear of the compartment. base or the port area. While submarine- Vegesack, Germany, became a fre- Bleeding profusely, Mathis ignored affiliated support and facilities quent sub-pen target. Lying on the Weser his nearly severed right arm, crawled were damaged enough to affect opera- River, 30 miles inland, the pen was the back to his sight, and dropped his bombs. tions, the pens withstood the battering. Eighth’s first target in Germany. Then he collapsed and died. Meanwhile, from late November to On Jan. 27, 1943, Col. Frank A. The 303rd did lose an airplane that day early January, Saint-Nazaire endured Armstrong Jr. shoved up the power to but Stouse got The Dutchess back to RAF no attacks, permitting industrious work his 306th Bomb Group B-17F, leading Molesworth, UK. Mathis became the crews to repair the damage. RAF intel- 63 other B-17s outbound. He was among Eighth’s first Medal of Honor recipient. ligence concluded that the port was fully the most experienced commanders in the As the Eighth still lacked long-range operational the first week in December. AAF, having led the first heavy bomber fighters, on June 11, 1943, Wilhelms- The operations continued. On Jan. mission over France in August 1942. haven provided another hard lesson in 3, 1943, Col. Curtis E. LeMay’s 305th Looping northward to avoid overfly- self-defense. Of 252 B-17s launched BG flew Eighth Air Force’s sixth Saint- ing hostile territory, Armstrong pen- for the mission, 168 dropped on the sub Nazaire raid. His innovative staggered etrated Reich airspace from the coast but base and 30 on the port of . formation within the group pointed the found the primary target smothered by Eight B-17s were shot down and more way toward the Eighth’s evolution in cloud. Thus, Vegesack was temporarily than 60 damaged. tactics as the war progressed. spared and the task force opted for the The B-17 gunners claimed an astro- That same day the 303rd BG lost secondary target, Wilhelmshaven’s port nomically high figure of 85 German four B-17s over Saint-Nazaire. One was area. Damage was moderate, and the fighters destroyed, but in reality the Snap! Crackle! Pop!, which took flak, B-17 bombers sustained only one loss Luftwaffe only lost four. Instead of a killing seven airmen. The ball turret gun- to the surprisingly mild defensive effort. 10-to-one loss ratio, the B-17s were on ner, SSgt. Alan E. Magee, was pitched On March 18, the bombers returned the short end of two-to-one odds—and out of the stricken Fortress without his to Vegesack, again including the 303rd carried much larger crews to boot. AIR FORCE Magazine / February 2015 u e ar by e e

Clockwise from left: The harbor at Mar- damage upon largely useless facilities. seilles before it was bombed by AAF B-17s. Nazi Gen. Wilhelm Fahrmbacher Between July 1942 and August 1943, (center) leads Field Marshall Erwin AAF aircraft are believed to have sunk Rommel (left) on a tour of the U-boat seven U-boats at sea and shared three bunkers at Saint-Nazaire. Probable more. However, Army bombers sank or U-boat pens at Hamburg are marked destroyed as many as 46 in port, includ- number one. ing many at Toulon. Eighth Air Force bombers struck sub mote control, aiming via a television pens at least 27 times from October 1942 camera in the nose. to October 1943. The Aphrodite “designated hitter” The official AAF history concluded, was the 388th BG at RAF Knettishall, “Undoubtedly the AAF raids caused UK. It dedicated a squadron to the temporary dislocations during the early project. US patrol bombers also months, … especially at Saint-Nazaire. participated, and in August 1944 the Clearly, also, they harassed the enemy by seventh Aphrodite mission, targeting a destroying auxiliary construction plants fortress on the French coast, ended with and neighboring railway facilities.” an in-flight explosion. It killed Navy Lt. A postwar interrogation provided a Joseph P. Kennedy Jr. and his engineer, reasoned assessment of the bombing’s Lt. Wilford J. Willy. effectiveness. Doenitz, the Among the 19 Aphrodite missions, of the U-boat fleet, said the sub pens five targeted the ’s were “impervious to anything but the pens in September and October 1944. heaviest type of bomb,” although the Of seven aircraft launched, two were bases included the subs’ maintenance downed by flak and three crashed or and repair shops. He concluded that An inevitable consequence of World missed the target. bombing adjacent installations did not War II bombing was collateral dam- Another specialized used to significantly detract from returning boats age—what some analysts called “spill- hit pens was the 4,500-pound concrete to the Atlantic supply routes. age.” Because Saint-Nazaire was a rail piercing “Disney bomb,” a rocket-as- Some planners resented the campaign center as well as a port, it received near sisted “ buster” conceived by the against U-boat bases, insisting that it continuous bombing, resulting in nearly British . With an extremely bled off weight of tonnage that should 500 known civilian deaths and destruc- high impact velocity, the Disney was have been more usefully expended on tion of perhaps 85 percent of the city. expected to penetrate 16 feet of concrete German industry. There is some merit Nearly all the residents were evacuated before exploding. to the argument, as the Eighth’s first by the spring of 1943. Though potentially effective, the penetration of Reich airspace in January Disneys arrived far too late to defeat 1943 overlapped the remaining subma- A E AR EFFOR the U-boats, only reaching combat units rine missions by 10 months. One of the war’s most technically attacking the Bremen pens in March The legacy and frustration of the ambitious programs was Project Aph- 1945, with the Battle of the Atlantic over. 13-month campaign is still evident rodite, an early attempt at precision In March and April 1945 RAF Lan- today. On the Biscay coast most of the —which also targeted U-boat caster bombers, employing 11-ton Grand massive shelters remain intact, with pens. “War-weary” bombers were Slam bombs, struck U-boat pens at Val- bunkers at Lorient and Brest serving stripped of unnecessary weight and entin and Hamburg, inflicting substantial the . J crammed with as much as 15 tons of high explosives. A pilot and ordnance Barrett Tillman is an award-winning historian who has written 50 books, includ- man took off in the bomber, armed it ing his recent F r e F ee e ar r e r e er ar in flight, and bailed out. A guidance a e His previous article for r F re a a e, “The Mustangs of Iwo,” ap- aircraft then flew the bomber by re- peared in April 2013. AIR FORCE Magazine / February 2015