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The Cases of Podemos, SYRIZA and the Five Stars Movement

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LUISS Guido Carli University Ph.D. Program in Politics: History, Theory, Science XXXI edition The challenge to traditional party families in Southern Europe: the cases of Podemos, SYRIZA and the Five Stars Movement Candidate: Supervisor: Davide Vittori Professor Leonardo Morlino Table of Contents Chapter 1 – Challenging the tradition(s)? An introduction ................................................................ 12 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 12 1.1 An introductory clarification: traditional or mainstream? Against whom do challengers compete? ............................................................................................................................................ 13 1.2 The research questions ................................................................................................................. 14 1.3 The case for Small-N comparison ........................................................................................... 16 1.4 Research Motivation and the Case Selection: introducing the political actors ....................... 17 1.5 The structure of the paper ....................................................................................................... 21 Chapter 2 – The transformative essence of the political parties ........................................................ 22 2.1 Defining a party: between the minimal and the operational definitions ...................................... 22 2.2 The operational definition: what we must know about parties beyond their ultimate role ..... 26 2.3 The genesis and the evolution of political parties in Western Europe ......................................... 28 2.5 A Typologization of political parties: between traditional and challenger families ..................... 34 Chapter 3 - Traditional parties and the rising electoral challenger .................................................... 38 3.1 The traditional party families ....................................................................................................... 38 3.2 The non -traditional families: challenger parties? ......................................................................... 40 3.3 Are challenger parties anti-systemic? .......................................................................................... 42 3.4 Are challenger parties inherently populist? .................................................................................. 44 3.5 Beyond the definitions. The challenger families: a review .......................................................... 47 Chapter 4 - How does challenger parties compete, organize and articulate their ideologies? A framework for the analysis of new challenger parties. ...................................................................... 55 4.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 55 4.2 The dependent variable: the political success of challenger parties ............................................ 57 4.3 The independent variables: the political opportunity structure, the pattern of competition, the organization and the ideology ............................................................................................................ 59 4.3.1 The political opportunity structure ............................................................................................ 59 4.3.2 The pattern of competition ........................................................................................................ 62 4.3.3 Party organization: a multi-faceted variable ............................................................................. 66 4.3.3.1 Methodology: the organization of the party ........................................................................... 73 4.3.4 The ideological articulation....................................................................................................... 74 4.3.4.1 Methodology: evaluating the ideology of the party ............................................................... 77 4.4 Suggested Hypothesis .................................................................................................................. 80 5.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 82 2 5.2 The economic crisis in Southern Europe: a financial turmoil in a low-growth region? .............. 82 5.2.1 The Euro-Crisis and its consequences for Greece, Spain and Italy .......................................... 82 5.2.2 The Greek abysm: a never-ending crisis ................................................................................... 85 5.2.3 The Spanish bubble: from a sustained growth to the financial bailout ..................................... 86 5.2.4 Crisis in a highly-indebted country: the Italian case ................................................................. 87 5.3 The political crisis during the financial turmoil: it is not just about anti-establishment .............. 88 5.3.1 The economic situation ............................................................................................................. 90 5.3.2 The single currency ................................................................................................................... 92 5.3.3 The image of the European Union ............................................................................................ 93 5.3.4 Satisfaction with Democracy .................................................................................................... 94 5.3.5 The trust on political parties ...................................................................................................... 95 5.4 Defining and apprising a political success ................................................................................... 96 5.4.1 Beyond relevance: the electoral ascendancy of Podemos, SYRIZA and FSM ......................... 97 5.4.2 The critical elections, the de-alignment and the realignment of the three political systems .. 104 5.4.3 The challenger parties’ institutionalization ............................................................................. 106 Chapter 6 – Podemos ....................................................................................................................... 109 6.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 109 6.2 The political Opportunity Structure ........................................................................................... 109 A) The electoral law ....................................................................................................................... 109 B) Social Movement ...................................................................................................................... 111 C) Bipartitism and convergence .................................................................................................... 112 D) The presence of anti-establishment parties ............................................................................... 114 6.3 The Pattern of Competition ........................................................................................................ 116 A-B) Emphasis on policies and electoral campaign ........................................................................ 116 C) The role of the alliances .............................................................................................................. 118 D-E) Elite, membership and participatory techniques. .................................................................... 120 6.3.1 Summary ................................................................................................................................. 121 6.3 The party organization ............................................................................................................... 121 6.4.1 Genesis .................................................................................................................................... 121 6.4.2 Party on the Ground (PoG) ..................................................................................................... 123 6.4.3 Party in Public Office (PPO) ................................................................................................... 127 6.4.4 Party in Central Office (PCO) and Party Leadership .............................................................. 129 6.4.5 Factionalism ............................................................................................................................ 130 6.4.6 Candidate/Leadership Selection .............................................................................................. 132 3 6.4.7 Party Finance........................................................................................................................... 136 6.5 The ideology of Podemos .......................................................................................................... 137 6.5.1 Economic dimension: left-right .............................................................................................. 137 6.5.2 Non-economic dimensions: immigration, multiculturalism, European Union and anti-elitism .........................................................................................................................................................
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