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H 1 SECRET H H \ I X^ Sharing the Order Between HARM and ALARM Would Be the Most Expensive H |F ^ ^ O F An

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H 1 SECRET H H \ I X^ Sharing the Order Between HARM and ALARM Would Be the Most Expensive H |F ^ ^ O F An I I SECRET | H THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT C(83) 28 COPY NO 79 ^^^ V 1983 CABINET A J3EFENCE SUPPRESSION WEAPON FOR THE ROYAL AIR FORCE I ^Jl^^^ Note by the Secretary of the Cabinet I The Prime Minisffr Mas instructed me to revise the paper attached to 0(83) 22, on the facts and issues on the choice of a defence suppression weapon for the Royal Air Force, in the ligh t of the revised proposals put forward by Britis h Aerospace and Lucas Aerospace referred to i n a minoE^Lthe Secretary of State for Defence (MO.26/7 d ated 15 July) . The revised note i s circulated herewith for consideration by the Cabinet. & I Sign^V%WBERT ARMSTRONG Cabinet Office 21 July 1983 V5 \ \ I I 1 SECRET ~~| H & I SECRE T H IH A DEFENCE SUPPRESSION WEAPON FOR THE ROYAL AIR FORCE ^jj^ Note by Officials ^ f l Sl^fL Force have a requirement for a missile capable of suppressing • 'he radlrs and eleotronio components of missile defences. Without "issile the new Tornado aircraft, which from 1985 will he equipped with the airfield attack wesson JP233. wiU be unable to penetrate the an- defences MM «c h the Wars ULt is expected to deploy without suffering very .ugh MM, attrition rates. ^ ^ 2- The requirement U^50 missiles, possibly increasing to over 1.000 i f • funds are available. »• The United States el^Jk to deploy aircraft equipped with modern • «efenee suppression weapons. Other NATO countries have expressed interest Mmt ta such weapons, but none has yet taken a decision. Options tfV , . J- The choice is between two missiles - HAffi is a missile already develo p MU •» the United States which win be produc ia^ th e United States Forces by ^xas instruments (Tl) . Proposals have bee Vjj k under which an element of WMt "hal development and a substantial part of vr^Mm to meet a Brit* , order «u,d be carried out in the United Kinplom ^^ is h firms under the WM* leadership- of Lucas Aerospace, though the high teeter homing-head would ^ suPplie d entirely from the United States. The cost of 750 missiles would be MM "54 raimon (al l figure s in 1982/83 prices); of this 53 pnr cent wonld be on a «*ed Price basis, and the final price paid fbr the remaining « « cent wovdd _ he the same as the United States Forces would pay. Th< «* fo r 1.000 H "t^siles would he £309 million. These estimates assume an exchange ra e o U " $1.59. Under the original offer which assumed a firm order being place >» 1 April 1983, sufficient missiles for an initial operational capaW^pould — ^ I SECRET | IH Y^ r e been delivered by September 1986 - the I n Service Date (ISD) - with the 1^750 order being completed by January 1991. T I have advised that these l& no w have to be slipped i n step with the delay in signing the contract, "hi * would mean an ISD of January 1987. I t would be possible to purchase HAllHSLl y from the Umted States at a slighdy lower cost, estimated at «35 mgl^for 750 missiles or £292 million for 1.000 missiles, though wtth a ««ed price element of only 10 per eent; but since the cost saving would be "Mi l and there would be no involvement of British industry, this option is not considered furthe ^ ^ eretwd o 5­ Tl/toas haveVkuy °« ^ " *** l the necessary Un ic e s Navy approval, but wouid also require the endorsement of the Ifck ratio n as a whoie. The first is an invitation to United Kingdom firms ^to pet e fo r the production of microwave sub­ assemblie s wort h about 20 fi\t by value of the homing-head; the second is to set up a United Kingdol ^ l homing-head repair depot at TPs Umted B Ki"gdom subsidary at Bedford. «• ALARM is a missile which would ^ developed by British Aerospace H %na^c7i n conjunction with Marcon ^ and Defence Systems (part of GEO, Thorn-HVlI and other firms. Some early development work has been *°ne at both the firms' and Govemment ^| e and British Aerospace have very recently offered a fixed price developm ^j^ d production contract at a ^ta l cost of £291 million for 750 missiles and Jj ^ illio n for 1,000 missiles Compared with their earlier offer of £388 millio TO^ 50 missiles and £426 **io n for 1,000 missiles). The contract would pro p e r enough missiles to thieve an initial operational capability to be delivered by August 1987 and for liverie s to be complete by September 1989. Failure to deliver the firs t 100 ^ssiles on time would render British Aerospace liable to liquidated damages of ^ to £0.4 million (a similar premium would be payable b ^VU toistr y at M defence for early delivery). ^B^^ . ^certainties 7 - The choice of missile is complicated by a number of uncertainties ^Q|se a «ect delivery and operational capability, final cost and export pptential ^ ^ M I | SECRET ] L_ H 1 SECRET H H \ I X^ Sharing the order between HARM and ALARM would be the most expensive H |f ^ ^ o f an. and we have not considered i t further in this paper. H Pgllyery and npprational Capability ^ V \erican s ^e^rate d that HARM works, but the missile will \ not necessarily be capable of dealing with improvements i n Warsaw pac H defences i n the 1990s without itself being improved. ALARM is as yet developed, but the concept is more advanced than HARM: i t incorporates the latest techno* * particularly i n software, and would therefore be more readily capable of being enhanced to deal with improvements i n Warsaw Pact ^fences in the 1990s (although there must also be some uncertainty as to how ^e threat develops ljffca t will be needed to meet it) . We should be able to ^velop- i t to meet oS* & requirements and should not be dependent on improvements which the Americans might decide to introduce in HARM. H 10. But there must be a aue j^mar k over the ability of British Aerospace • « * its sub-contractors to develop; ALARM to an acceptable standard i n the *°ur years which they have allowed. Past experience of weapon developments, hoth m th e Unit e d Kingdom and the I (to d States, suggest that a six-year development programme would be UV realistic . The contractor s development plan is based on optimistic assumptions and allows virtually no t^ e for the solution of any serious probl t^ ^ arise. There is a risk o ^ e slippage in deliveries. This has to l^ he d against the financial ^eentive on the firms to deliver on time andf A d to supply the RAF with operationally fully acceptable weapon. I f neve TOt e delays occurred and the RAF had to face a conflict without an adequa ^ apon , i t would take betwee n 6 and 12 months, assuming full United States co-operation, to adapt H the RAF Tornado to operate HARM. On final cost the ALARM programme on the face of i t has ^fi^ er degree H o f certainty than HARM, since 97 per cent of the work would be on a tixed P^ice basis subject only to increases due to inflation. As is usuaT ^ rsuc h arrangements, i t is the contractor who would be liable for all ui8 ^J| u i c <*t caused by delays or failures on his part to meet the agreed programme t^s could cost him up to £3 milion for every month overrun. *V*^ H ^^^^ | SECRET | 1££^B \ ) SECRET H IH Va^ospBce could be expected to exploit every opportunity to overturn the feed contract, but the Ministry of Defence would be obliged to meet additional Sflfo . and only if, delays arose from Government failure to provide trials or jfi L facilities. The Ministry of Defence regard British Aerospace's new offer ^^ eptabl e from a contractual point of view. I t involves the company absorbing development and production costs at a saving to the Ministry of Defence of £97 million i n return for a higher unit price to the Department for any missiles bought beyond the original 750. The effect is that the cost is reduced by compa*pn with the previous offer i f less than 1.620 missues are bought and increased i f the total purchased is higher than 1.620 (though the ^fe r does nottaS^commitment by the Ministry of Defence to buy more M 12. The final price of HA *L io t within our control, since we should have to • ^ the same price for th^W g -head , which would be manufactured in the United States, as would be pa^ the United States Forces themselves. The c ost could therefore increase i f improvements were introduced to meet the requirements of the Ufited States Forces, or be reduced i f the United States Apartment of Defense secure savings * * the price. The cost differential between HARM and ALARM is also subjWWtuations in the real, exchange rate o f th e pDun d against the dollar. Fo fflg pe r cent change in the rate the c°st differential on 750 missiles would chang^l bout £10 million. H 1 3. Export prospects are also unclear. If^Bfr ite d Kingdom purchased • HARM. Lucas would have an excellent opportunit^bVq>ort the components **ch they would be making i n Britain to the Unite< #l e s for incorporation 11 1 missiles which would be assembled there for delivery to United States F orce s and to export customers for HARM.
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