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Royal Air Force Historical Society Journal 52 ROYAL AIR FORCE HISTORICAL SOCIETY JOURNAL 52 2 The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the contributors concerned and are not necessarily those held by the Royal Air Force Historical Society. First published in the UK in 2012 by the Royal Air Force Historical Society All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission from the Publisher in writing. ISSN 1361 4231 Printed by Windrush Group Windrush House Avenue Two Station Lane Witney OX28 4XW 3 ROYAL AIR FORCE HISTORICAL SOCIETY President Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Michael Beetham GCB CBE DFC AFC Vice8President Air 2arshal Sir Frederick Sowrey KC3 C3E AFC Committee Chairman Air 7ice82arshal N 3 3aldwin C3 C3E 7ice8Chairman -roup Captain 9 D Heron O3E Secretary -roup Captain K 9 Dearman FRAeS 2embership Secretary Dr 9ack Dunham PhD CPsychol A2RAeS Treasurer 9 3oyes TD CA 2embers Air Commodore - R Pitchfork 23E 3A FRAes ,in Commander C Cummin s :9 S Cox Esq 3A 2A :A72 P Dye O3E 3Sc(En ) CEn AC-I 2RAeS :-roup Captain P 9 2 Squires O3E 2A 3En RAF :,in Commander S Hayler 2A 3Sc(En ) RAF Editor & Publications ,in Commander C - 9efford 23E 3A 2ana er :Ex Officio 4 CONTENTS AIR PO,ER IN THE 2003 IRAQ ,AR by Air Chf 2shl Sir 6 3rian 3urrid e SU22ARY OF THE 2INUTES OF THE T,ENTY8FIFTH 33 ANNUA. -ENERA. 2EETIN- HE.D IN THE ROYA. AIR FORCE C.U3 ON 1A 9UNE 2011 ‘PINKBS ,ARB C APP.YIN- THE PRINCIP.ES OF AIR 36 CONTRO. TO ,ADIRISTAN, E 2ARCH TO 1 2AY 1E2A by .t8Col A 2 Roe TRAFFORD .EI-H82A..ORY C CO22ANDER OF 64 CONTRO7ERSY by -p Capt Andrew Thompson A PO.ISH EPIC by Dr 9 T Cliffe 77 THE IN7ENTION OF THE 9ET EN-INE by Alec Collins 12 THE .A,, AND .ORE, OF RAF F.YIN- 3AD-ES by 103 , Cdr 9eff 9efford FEED3ACK and ERRATA 132 3OOK RE7IE,S 134 A SELECTED ABBREVIATIONS ACI Army Council Instruction AEAF Allied Expeditionary Air Force AF7- (The abortive) An lo8French 7ariable -eometry proGect AI Airborne Interception (radar) A2O Air 2inistry Order A2,O Air 2inistry ,eekly Order AOP Air Observation Post 3EF 3ritish Expeditionary Force CAOC Combined Air Operations Centre CAS Chief of the Air Staff CFE Central Fi hter Establishment DCI Defence Council Instruction DPS Director of Personal Services EFTS Elementary Flyin Trainin School E.INT Electronic Intelli ence IAEA International Atomic Ener y A ency ISTAR Intelli ence, Surveillance, Tar et Acquisition and Reconnaissance 9SF 9oint Strike Fi hter (aka the F83A) 2ED 2issile En a ement Done 2RCA 2ulti8Role Combat Aircraft (eventually Tornado) NCA Non8Commissioned Aircrew N-O Non8-overnmental Or anisation QFI Qualified Flyin Instructor SA2 Surface To Air 2issile SDSR Strate ic Defence and Security Review TNA The National Archives ,2D ,eapons of 2ass Destruction 6 Our Guest Speaker at the RAF Club, following the Society’s AGM on 15 June 2011, was the Commander of the UK National Contingent during Operation TELIC Air Chief Marshal Sir Brian Burridge whose topic was: AIR POWER IN THE 2003 IRAQ WAR INTRODUCTION The 2003 Iraq war will rank hi hly amon historians as one of 3ritainBs most unpopular interventions. The seeds lay in the then Prime 2inister Tony 3lairBs Chica o speech advancin the doctrine of preventative diplomacy. Talkin of Kosovo, he said: IThis is a Gust war, based not on territorial ambitions but on values. JKL ,e have learned twice this century that appeasement does not work. JKL ,e need to focus in a serious and sustained way on the principles of the doctrine of international community JKL. (Not the international community but international community). Now our actions are uided by a more subtle blend of mutual self8interest and moral purpose in defendin the values we cherish. In the end, values and interests mer e.B So, the notions of Imoral purposeB and Imutual self8interestB after the Al8Qaeda EM11 attacks in mainland US drove 3ritish security policy towards interventions in Af hanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. In both cases, the UK was a Gunior but si nificant partner in a US8led coalition. The Chilcot Inquiry which is now due to be published in the summer of 2012 will doubtless expose imperfections in the plannin and conduct of the Iraq campai n, focusin particularly on failures in intelli ence and in the machinery of -overnment. A ainst this backdrop, it is conceivable that some of the important aspects of the role of air power would become lost in the fo of political recrimination. This paper therefore seeks to record aspects of the combat phase of the 2003 Iraq war where the si nificance of the employment of air power may not have been immediately obvious at the time. This is an important aspect of historical analysis in that the 2003 Iraq war is the 7 most recent example of a hi h8intensity, Goint manoeuvre campai n. In illustratin this analysis, the paper considers the strate ic complexity of the theatre in order to provide a context for air powerBs contribution at both the operational and tactical level of war. STRATEGIC COMPLEXITY Throu hout the Iran8Iraq war, the 1EE0 invasion of Kuwait and in the run8up to the 2003 Iraq war, much effort was expended on assessin the de ree to which Saddam Hussein represented a rational enemy. Such analysis was made more complex by the fact that IraqBs interface with the international community was controlled by a very small, ti ht8knit roup whose consensus was uaranteed throu h fear. Nevertheless, the plannin for the 2003 war required an understandin of three facets of IraqBs security policy. First, how solid was re ime supportN Secondly, in what circumstances would the re ime resort to the use of weapons of mass destruction (,2D)N Thirdly, to what extent would post8conflict recovery be achievable in an acceptable timescaleN From a re ional perspective, we also needed to assess the de ree to which Iran and Syria would remain non8belli erent and the extent to which Turkey, as a pivotally important ally, would co8 operate. In terms of the fra ility of SaddamBs re ime, intelli ence lar ely but not exclusively based on the views of Iraqi Omi rOs pointed to a situation of near internal collapse with a population ready to come to ether in the event that the re ime was unseated. Other forms of military intelli ence indicated that IraqBs military capability had deteriorated throu h a lack of trainin and maintenance and, iven the rates of desertion, that moral was low. ,hile the military assessment was broadly correct, the removal of the re ime actually inspired violent fra mentation rather than peaceful cohesion. ,hile it is ar uable that the views of many Iraqi Omi rOs were fuelled more by self8interest and wishful thinkin than hard information, it is nevertheless surprisin that, iven our history in that theatre, we knew so little in ranular detail about the way in which the re ime actually worked and the nature of Iraqi society. ,hile we had few human intelli ence sources inside Iraq, we had been flyin over the country for thirteen years maintainin Operations NORTHERN and SOUTHERN ,ATCH. As such, we had squandered the opportunity 1 to build a proper strate ic picture. ,ith hindsi ht, throu hout that period, we tended to address each issue in isolation as it arose whether it was an Iraqi attempt to en a e a coalition aircraft or the expulsion of the UN arms inspectors. Taken to ether, our assumption in 2003 that the re ime would crumble and be replaced by a beni n environment was wron . A related assumption was that post8conflict overnment of Iraq would be feasible. To this end, in the second half of 2002, the US State Department led a comprehensive ran e of work coverin all aspects of the reconstruction and overnance of the new Iraq. This drew on the knowled e and experience of a wide ran e of experts, includin former citiPens of Iraq. The work was comprehensive, pra matic and feasible but assumed that a beni n vacuum would exist. However, towards the end of December 2003, tensions in the US National Security Council reached breakin 8point and, at the insistence of Don Rumsfeld, the Secretary of Defense, responsibility for plannin was transferred from State to the Penta on. On the basis of Inot invented hereB, the previous post8war plannin work was discarded alon with the human expertise that created it. Thereafter, post8war plannin was afforded a low priority and was dele ated to the former -eneral 9ay -arnerBs Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance which lacked both the level of resources and the depth of expertise to confront the problem. In the event, it is ar uable that the post8war sectarian chaos would have rendered either approach impotent. Nevertheless, this second assumption on post8war reconstruction was wron . As for the presence and potential use of ,2D, for the UK, this was the casus belli and we were in no doubt of their existence at least in terms of a tactical capability. Neither were we in any doubt over Iraqi intent iven the 1E11 use of chemical weapons in HalabGa in the Kurdish Autonomous Done and their extensive use in the Iran8Iraq war. -iven this mindset, our assessment of SaddamBs potential courses of action (see below) was heavily skewed and the underlyin assumption, too, was wron .
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