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Acquisition and Use of MANPADS Against Commercial Aviation C O R P O R A T I O N SEAN M. ZEIGLER, ALEXANDER C. HOU, JEFFREY MARTINI, DANIEL M. NORTON, BRIAN PHILLIPS, MICHAEL SCHWILLE, AARON STRONG, NATHAN VEST Acquisition and Use of MANPADS Against Commercial Aviation Risks, Proliferation, Mitigation, and Cost of an Attack For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR4304 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-1-9774-0418-3 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2019 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Cover: U.S. Air Force photo. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface In March 1975, an Air Vietnam passenger airliner was brought down after being shot with a man-portable air defense system (MANPADS). The resulting crash killed 26 crew members and passengers. Since then, upwards of 60 civilian aircraft have been hit by MANPADS, resulting in the deaths of over 1,000 civilians. Terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, and Hezbollah, are thought to possess MANPADS, presenting an ongoing concern for commercial aviation. Although a MANPADS attack on a civilian aircraft has not been attempted since 2007, the threat of MANPADS attacks remains, as does the need to develop a better understanding of the security risks posed by these systems. The loss of life from a MANPADS incident could be severe and have grave international repercussions. The research summarized in this report aims to provide analysis of the key issues of this interna- tional security challenge. In addition to providing a general overview of MANPADS and their application, this report focuses on four areas: 1. trends in the use of MANPADS against civilian aviation 2. the current and evolving threat environment caused by the proliferation of MANPADS 3. the potential economic effects of an overseas attack on a commercial or government civilian aircraft 4. potential mitigation efforts to address the issue. In examining these four issues, the authors aim to offer a useful resource for policymakers tasked with navigating this complex threat space. This research was sponsored by the U.S. Department of State and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Security Research Division (NSRD). NSRD conducts research and analysis for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the defense agencies, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Intelligence Community, allied foreign governments, and foundations. For more information on the RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center, see www.rand.org/nsrd/ndri/centers/isdp or contact the director (contact information is pro- vided on the webpage). iii Contents Preface ........................................................................................................... iii Figures ...........................................................................................................vii Tables ............................................................................................................ ix Summary ........................................................................................................ xi Acknowledgments .............................................................................................xv Abbreviations ................................................................................................. xvii CHAPTER ONE Introduction ..................................................................................................... 1 Organization of This Report .................................................................................... 2 CHAPTER TWO Characterizing MANPADS ................................................................................... 3 MANPADS Components ....................................................................................... 4 MANPADS Generations ........................................................................................ 5 CHAPTER THREE Historical Use of MANPADS ................................................................................ 7 Overview .......................................................................................................... 7 Geography of Attacks ............................................................................................ 8 Conflict Type and Intensity ..................................................................................... 9 Attacks Over Time ..............................................................................................11 MANPADS Type, Targets Engaged, and Effects ...........................................................12 CHAPTER FOUR NSAG Risk Index ..............................................................................................15 Approach ........................................................................................................15 Outcome of the NSAG Risk Index ...........................................................................18 Limitations ......................................................................................................25 CHAPTER FIVE MANPADS Stockpiles and State Fragility ............................................................... 27 Stockpile Leakage in Fragile States .......................................................................... 27 State-to-State Transfers of MANPADS .....................................................................29 Emerging Issues ................................................................................................ 30 v vi Acquisition and Use of MANPADS Against Commercial Aviation CHAPTER SIX Economic Consequences of MANPADS Attacks ........................................................33 Literature Review .............................................................................................. 34 Econometric Approach .........................................................................................39 Data Sources .....................................................................................................39 Results ............................................................................................................41 Discussion ........................................................................................................45 CHAPTER SEVEN MANPADS Mitigation Options ...........................................................................49 Disrupt or Degrade NSAG Operations ...................................................................... 50 Preventing MANPADS Acquisition ..........................................................................51 Preventing MANPADS Employment ........................................................................57 Reducing the Likelihood of a Successful Attack ............................................................59 Limiting the Damage from a Successful Attack .............................................................63 Consequence Management ....................................................................................65 Summary ........................................................................................................ 66 Multilayered Options ...........................................................................................67 CHAPTER EIGHT Conclusions ....................................................................................................69 APPENDIXES A. RAND Database of MANPADS Attacks ..............................................................71 B. Country Stockpiles ........................................................................................81 C. Sensitivity Analyses of Economic Findings ......................................................... 87 References ..................................................................................................... 103 Figures 2.1. MANPADS Components ......................................................................... 4 3.1. Geography of MANPADS Attacks (1973–2007) ............................................... 8 3.2. Global MANPADS Attacks ......................................................................10 3.3. MANPADS Attacks and Conflict Prevalence ..................................................11 3.4. Number of MANPADS Attacks by Decade....................................................12 3.5. MANPADS
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